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Commerce, race, and diplomacy: Henry Shelton Sanford and the American recognition of the International Association of the Congo

Sarah Elizabeth Wiley

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COMMERCE, RACE, AND DIPLOMACY:
HENRY SHELTON SANFORD AND THE AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CONGO

By
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B.A., University of Alabama, 1985

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This thesis examines the activities of Henry Shelton Sanford, a "Gilded Age" businessman and private diplomat in securing American recognition of the International Association of the Congo. This organization, created by King Leopold II of Belgium to gain a colony in Africa, was a significant stage in the European partition of Africa.

This study traces Sanford's activities largely through his sizable collection of personal correspondence, but also through government documents, contemporary newspaper and magazine articles, and published compilations of letters and documents pertaining to this subject. Secondary sources used include other unpublished and published works centering on Henry Sanford, surveys of American diplomacy centered on the Gilded Age, works pertaining to the Congo Free State and its creation, and accounts of the Berlin Conference.

The American recognition of the AIC was a significant step away from traditional American isolationism. The U.S. set an international precedent by becoming the first nation to recognize the AIC.

Henry Sanford served as King Leopold's personal agent in lobbying the American government and private sectors for recognition of the AIC. Sanford was motivated by a combination of self interest and conviction of the American need to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. This extraordinary individual represents an extreme example of the power of private business interests on American foreign policy in the late nineteenth century. He directed his attention to specific interest groups, in particular advocates of the colonization of American blacks and advocates of American economic expansion. In addition, Sanford cultivated a confusion among both the public and the private sectors over the identity of Leopold's organization. Through a combination of persuasion and deception, Sanford secured American recognition of the AIC, and, as a result, included the United States in the tragic history of the Congo Free State.
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Prologue

Regard an 1884 map of black Africa and observe the few demarcation lines. However, look at a map of the continent in 1914 and the comparison is astounding. Between these years, Africa endured a startling transformation, about which scholarly debate still rages. Historians have termed the three decades preceding World War I as "the scramble for Africa," a period during which the powers of Europe partitioned Africa. By 1914, only Liberia and Ethiopia had escaped inhalation by some European nation.

The first concrete act in this "scramble" was the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885. Significantly contributing to bringing about this conference was King Leopold II of Belgium and his quest for a personal colony. Leopold achieved his goal with the creation of the Independent State of the Congo (the Congo Free State) in 1885.

Although the United States never claimed any territory in the region, it still played a major role in establishing King Leopold's hold over a large part of Central Africa. Almost exclusively due to the activities of one extraordinary individual, Henry Shelton Sanford, the U.S., by recognizing Leopold's organization, the International Association of the Congo (also known by its French acronym, AIC), significantly contributed to Leopold's achievement.
This thesis seeks to explain how the activities of Henry Sanford, an American businessman, general, and former diplomat, helped bring about American recognition of the AIC, and, as a corollary emphasis, to offer a new view of America's recognition of Leopold's organization in American diplomatic history between 1865-1890, a period in American history commonly referred to as the "Gilded Age".

Henry Sanford's role in the event has two larger contexts: diplomacy during the Gilded Age, an American subject, and the events leading to the Berlin West African Conference, a European topic. Before examining Sanford's individual activities, it is necessary for those not intimately knowledgeable about either subject, to briefly illuminate first the European aspect: the coming about of the Berlin West African Conference, and then the American aspect: the place that American recognition of the AIC and subsequent participation in the Berlin Conference traditionally assumes in American diplomatic history.

I.

Through much of the twentieth century historians have examined the question of how and why the "scramble" occurred. (1) In that process certain apparent facts have emerged. Before the 1870's, the European nations involved in West African trade--particularly Great Britain--had little interest in creating colonies in the region. (2) As long as trade
remained free and undeterred by any power, there was little interest in furthering political influence in the region.

However, certain factors stimulated a new, heightened interest in Africa in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. Increased commercial demands in Europe for Africa's rich natural resources, such as rubber, palm oil, and ivory, facilitated the growth of large commercial houses—particularly Dutch and British—at the mouth of the Congo. (3) Furthermore, medical discoveries such as quinine allowed Europeans to live and explore in Africa at much less risk. (4)

These factors stimulated the exploration of Central Africa by such explorers as David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, Lieutenant V.L. Cameron, and Savorgnan de Brazza. As the historian Sybil Crowe emphasizes, "It was these activities which finally brought the Congo into the sphere of international interest." (5) Foremost among these journeys in the Congo region was Henry Morton Stanley's 1874 assignment from the New York Herald. Stanley's letters and telegrams from deep within the "Dark Continent" excited statesmen and the general public alike. (6)

Before Stanley's journey, Europeans had possessed only rudimentary knowledge of Central Africa beyond the mouth of the Congo on the West coast and Lake Tanganika in the east. In his historic journey between 1874 and 1877, Stanley crossed Central Africa along the Congo River and in the process revealed a massive—in many parts navigable—river through which Europeans could now penetrate into Central Africa. This discovery potentially eliminated the need for African middlemen. A new world of trade had been opened. (7) Stanley wrote to the Daily Telegraph in 1877, "I feel convinced that the question of this mighty water-way
will become a political one in time.... I could prove to you the power possessing the Congo, despite the cataracts, would absorb in itself the trade of the whole enormous basin behind. The river is and will be the grand highway of commerce to West-Central Africa."(8)

Such letters fed King Leopold of Belgium's rising enthusiasm for the prospect of a colony in the Congo region.(9) Leopold had spent twenty years studying the potential of colonization as a means to expand Belgium's power and his own personal influence. By 1876 he had realized that the Congo basin was a prime region in which to begin. As a consequence, in September of that year he invited to Belgium selected explorers, scientists, and representatives from interested nations. A result of this Geographical Conference of Brussels was the International African Association, which included an International Commission devoted to the exploration and acquisition of information about Central Africa. The seat of this organization was Brussels, and each participating nation had its own national committee that would participate in the work of the Association. In the ensuing year, most European nations, as well as the United States, created national committees in association with the International Association.(10)

Most historians recognize Leopold's Association as a ploy to gain ascendancy in Central Africa.(11) As will be discussed in much greater detail later, Leopold dominated the Association from its beginning and directed its development. When Stanley returned from the Congo in 1877 Leopold immediately made overtures to enlist him in the name of his committee. When Stanley failed to attract British backing for further exploits, Leopold immediately commissioned Stanley as the agent of the
King's International African Association. Upon Stanley's enlistment, Leopold created the *Comité des Études du Haut Congo*, at first regarded as a branch of the Association. However, the committee's emphasis was blatantly commercial and is now seen by most historians as "merely a cloak for the political aims of the King."(12) Once Stanley embarked on his return to the Congo in 1879 Leopold clandestinely dissolved the Comité and maneuvered himself into position as sole director of Stanley's activities. The new "International Association of the Congo" became Leopold's personal vehicle for territorial acquisitions.(13)

Stanley had a rival in the French explorer Savorgnan de Brazza. De Brazza, in effect sponsored by the French government—although in name an agent of the French national committee of the International African Association—had been in Africa at the same time as Stanley in 1875-1877. He returned to the Congo region in 1879, eleven months after Stanley. Between 1879 and 1883 both de Brazza and Stanley journeyed along the Congo signing treaties with local tribal rulers and establishing conflicting territorial claims in the name of France and Leopold's Association.

The Portuguese had traditional and shadowy claims south of the Congo and along and including the mouth of the Congo dating from fifteenth century explorations. But for various reasons—notably apathy—these claims had gone relatively uncontested until the mid-nineteenth century, when Portugal and England initiated a series of boundary disputes.(14) Britain, to protect her small but important trade at the mouth of the river, began to pressure Portugal away from the Congo. At first Britain carried out this policy with the cooperation of France, which also had
some interest in the area. However, de Brazza's remarkably successful 1879-1880 journey into the Congo increasingly alarmed the British and the Portuguese at what they considered the encroachment of French claims on what had been a "sort of no man's land."(15)

One historian emphasizes this alarm as the immediate motive for the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, signed by the two powers in 1884. England was well aware of France's tendency toward exclusiveness and high tariffs in the territories it controlled; Britain had a strong commercial influence over Portugal and thus felt better able to work under Portuguese rather than French control.(16) The treaty, recognizing the claims of Portuguese influence between the five degree, twelve minute and eight degree south latitude, was considered by the rest of the European powers as a "veiled British protectorate" over the Congo.(17)

Thus, King Leopold's aspirations for colonial power, the recent explorations by Cameron, Stanley, and de Brazza, and, most directly, the Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1883, all played causal roles in the Berlin Conference.

Another factor behind the scramble for Africa was Bismarck's Germany. Victorious in the Franco-Prussian War, Germany emerged as a surprising new force, hungry for power. With Germany's new face, Europe witnessed increased tension in the diplomatic arena. A strain in relations between Germany and Britain, the resulting Franco-German entente, and the stress in European relations due to England's presence in Egypt, also played causal roles in the Berlin Conference.(18)

Although historians speculate over which was the most important factor in the movement toward the partition of Africa, few disagree about
the events in 1884 that facilitated the convergence of the interested nations in November of that year. As already noted, the British and Portuguese, each alarmed by the territorial activities of Stanley and de Brazza, signed the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty in February, 1884. France, already chaffing at England's occupation of Egypt, immediately refused to recognize the treaty. Germany did not declare its refusal until its conflict with England over Angra Pequena (a strip of land along the West African coast) and the subsequent Anglo-German rift, after which it too refused to recognize the treaty. German denial was followed by that of Holland, Leopold of the Belgians and the United States, all of which voiced denunciations.(19)

Many historians cite Germany's refusal to recognize the treaty as the death knell of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. When the deadline, June 26, passed, "Bismarck's hatchet had indeed carried the 'coup de mort' to the treaty."(20) The Franco-German alliance against England formed because both feared what they perceived as England's expansionist tendencies. Sybil Crowe considers the Anglo-German quarrel as unfortunate because, ironically, they were the nations closest in colonial aims and most interested in international free trade. France, conversely, was guilty of territorial aims. The resulting Franco-German entente, according to Crowe, was the direct cause of the Berlin West African Conference.(21)

During the Egyptian Conference of June 28-August 2, 1884, Germany and France solidified their entente, supported Egypt against England, and united the question of Egypt to that of West Africa.(22) Together, France and Germany persuaded Portugal to put the unresolved questions over West Africa--raised by the now defunct Anglo-Portuguese treaty--to an
international conference. (23) From November 15, 1884 to February 26, 1885, the conference met in Berlin.

The Conference had come about in large part due to European—and in particular German—belief in English imperialist aims. But from the beginning of the Conference, Germany and England realized that their goals for Africa were almost identical, particularly as opposed to the motives of France and Portugal. (24) Both England and Germany professed their desire for free trade in the Congo region and free navigation along the Congo and the Niger rivers. The Conference assumed an internationalist, philanthropic tone in its preamble, which stated that the Conference's purpose was "to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation...to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which might in future arise ...and concerned, at the same time as to means of furthering the moral and material well being of the native populations." (25)

But at the same time, the resulting General Act laid the foundation for the future colonial divisions. Germany and England realized the danger of France maintaining a large degree of control around the Congo. The French were notorious for high protective tariffs which would reduce potential profits. As a result Bismarck recognized Leopold's Association just before the opening of the Conference on November 9, and Britain recognized it soon after the Conference began. Thus, partly for fear of French tariffs, the British and Germans decided that Leopold's Association was the lesser of two potential evils. Since France had considerable claims throughout the Congo, the only way to nullify them was to recognize Leopold's holdings. (26)
By the end of the Conference, in separate treaties from the General Act, all the powers recognized Leopold's International Association of the Congo as a sovereign state—from 1885 termed the "Independent State of the Congo" or the "Free State"—where trade and commerce would remain unimpeded, while Leopold would take care of its administration. Leopold cultivated the idea that the Congo Free State would be a region where, under his royal tutelage, the native populations would be "civilized." This appealed to the European philanthropic ideals and also their very real financial interests. They were free of the economic and political challenges of maintaining administration but still had open access to the region. (27)

Within a year, however, the Free State was in the process of becoming merely an area for exploitation and rapid commercial profits for Leopold. By 1908, the abuses of the native populations had become so notorious that Leopold was forced to cede the Congo to autonomous authority under Belgium. (28)

The remainder of the areas already claimed by the powers were established as "protectorates." These protectorates seemed to follow with the philanthropic nature of the Conference, defined as "the recognition of the right of...actual inhabitants to their own country, with no further assumption of territorial rights than is necessary to maintain the paramount authority and to discharge the duties of the protecting power." But, in effect, they merely established the areas under the control of the European powers. The European nations were free to use their protectorates as they chose. (29)
While in the immediate future the powers followed the general philosophy of the protectorate, the groundwork was laid for subsequent colonial usurpation. By 1914, the partition of Africa was completed. Due to a blend of European rivalries, territorial interests, capitalistic pursuits, diplomatic misunderstandings, and the underlying belief in the inferiority of the native African inhabitants, few Europeans questioned their nations' occupation of the African lands.

II.

The Berlin West Africa Conference is generally a European story and it was the Europeans who reaped the territorial benefits. However, deeply involved within this venture that resulted in the creation of the Congo Free State was one extraordinary American, Henry Shelton Sanford. Because of General Sanford's activities, the United States has a place in the history of King Leopold's state.

Some historians regard the period of the "Gilded Age" as a time of "slumber" in terms of American foreign policy, when Americans looked inward and isolated themselves from world matters. Other historians note this period for its series of "outward thrusts" that foreshadowed the
United States' break away from its isolationist policies in the 1890's, and emergence as a world power. (30)

Referred to by David Fletcher as "the awkward years," the first half of the 1880's were studded with a series of "outward thrusts," that represent the undercurrent of expansionism in America during the Gilded Age. Under James Garfield's Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, and then Chester Arthur's Secretary of State, Frederick Frelinghuysen, these years were marked by a series of expansionist moves such as the creation of a Nicaraguan Canal treaty and a system of Caribbean reciprocity treaties. Included with these movements away from isolationism was the American recognition of the International Association of the Congo and the subsequent participation in the Berlin West African Conference. (31)

With the election of Grover Cleveland in 1884, the proponents of isolationism prevailed with a repudiation of these expansionist thrusts. In 1885 the United States became the only participating power in the Berlin Conference not to ratify the General Act. Thus, for these historians, the participation in the Berlin Conference and its repudiation is an example of America's move away from isolationism and, the waning, yet still dominant, anti-expansionist environment of the 1880's. (32)

While this argument is acceptable, historians have failed to regard America's recognition of the AIC in a separate light from the Berlin Conference. This thesis emphasizes that the United States' recognition of the AIC remained a true step away from American isolationism. Traditionally, historians look upon the recognition as a step toward American participation in the Berlin Conference, and emphasize the participation as the most important aspect of America's role in the Congo
episode. The American recognition of the AIC has not been sufficiently studied on its own accord. (33)

This thesis isolates the American recognition of the AIC as the more important event in American diplomatic history, rather than the participation in the Berlin Conference. Looked upon as a separate episode, by recognizing the AIC, the United States made an important decision, that, supported by various important interest groups, represented a step away from American isolationism that was never checked by the anti-expansionists.

The United States participated in the Berlin Conference almost as an afterthought, in response to an invitation accepted by fourteen European nations. The American minister to Germany, John A. Kasson, had to convince Secretary of State Frelinghuysen that no word of the Conference objectives related to political or territorial arrangements. Moreover, Kasson had to assure Frelinghuysen that no government was bound to adhere to the Conference resolutions. Only when convinced that participation would not be out of step with the United States policy of non-interference did Frelinghuysen acquiesce and appoint Kasson as delegate to the conference. (34) Like the other nations, participation required merely the attendance of the minister to Germany. Once appointed, Kasson was confined to discussing economic and humanitarian interests, with strict instruction against participating in any hint of land acquisition.

Unlike the American recognition of the AIC, few Americans were aware of the Conference or of the U.S.'s participation. It was neither a major foreign policy decision, nor did it involve numerous interest groups. It
was a decision made solely by the Secretary of State and required no legislative approval. John Tyler Morgan, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee who played a major role in acquiring the American recognition of the AIC, did not even know of the American participation in the Conference until it was almost over. Morgan wrote Henry Sanford in 1885, "You will be surprised to know that I was wholly ignorant of the Berlin Conference until I was informed of it in the newspapers. No one has yet mentioned the matter to me and I only know of what our Govt. has been doing from a response to the Secretary of State to resolutions of enquiry from the House of Representatives." (35)

Following the close of the Conference, an uproar would erupt in many sectors of the country. While such newspapers as the New York Times had supported the American recognition of the AIC, they castigated the U.S. participation in the Conference. John Kasson would find himself writing articles justifying the American participation at the conference and entreat ing the government to ratify the treaty. However, as already noted, the U.S., under the administration of Grover Cleveland, refused to ratify the General Act and, in addition, condemned the fact that John Kasson had signed the Act at the close of the Conference. (36) In terms of the Berlin Conference, the United States can make little claim on influencing its outcome, or its ultimate results.

In sharp contrast, the United States was the first power to recognize the AIC, and thus took an initiative that greatly helped King Leopold's hope of creating a personal state become a reality. By recognizing Leopold's Association, the U.S. secured for Leopold a legitimacy that the other nations would observe. Its recognition of the AIC increased the
legality of the King's claims in the Congo region and facilitated a "chain reaction" by the other powers that Leopold needed to recognize his future "Free State." In effect, by the time of the Conference, the "Congo Free State" was well on its way to becoming a reality. As one historian has stated, "With American recognition, the Congo Free State was born."(37)

The U.S. recognition of the AIC was the result of the lobbying of various interest groups that called for the United States to take action in securing the neutrality of the Congo region and was supported by such newspapers as the New York Times and the New York Herald. In addition, the legislative branch, along with the executive branch, was deeply involved with the decision to recognize the AIC.

While participation in the Berlin Conference was condemned by the recently elected isolationist president, Grover Cleveland, America's recognition of the AIC was enthusiastically reaffirmed in 1885 with its prompt recognition of Leopold's newly named state, the "Independent State of the Congo."

Thus, while participation in the Berlin Conference is viewed correctly by historians as an example of the burgeoning expansionist tendencies in the 1880's being checked with the election of Grover Cleveland in 1885, America's recognition of the AIC in 1884 and re-recognition of the Congo Free State in 1885 represents a true step away from the isolationist foreign policy of the Gilded Age. In addition, this move from isolationism represents a profound paradox. The very reasons for which the United States so gladly recognized the Congo Free State are the same
reasons for which it became the most cruel and tragic example of European colonialism--its independence from a European power.

The United States happily reaffirmed its recognition of the King's new state in 1885 because Leopold, as the sovereign of the Congo Free State, was independent of a European state and its influences. It was precisely for this very reason that Leopold had free license to so brutally exploit the people and resources of the Congo region. Thus, the great irony in the American step away from isolationism, is that in doing so it created for itself a significant place in the history of the most cruel example of European imperialism.

III.

Historians, such as Walter LaFeber, look to this period as a time when there was a growing relationship between American business and government, particularly in the State Department. While Henry Shelton Sanford's activities as a businessman capable of influencing foreign policy have been examined, particularly by his biographer, Joseph A. Fry, the importance of his individual activities have not been sufficiently emphasized. (38) It was due to Henry Shelton Sanford's efforts as an agent to King Leopold II that the U.S. recognized what would become the Congo Free State. Henry Sanford is an extreme example of the enthusiastic speculator of the Gilded Age, a man with very strong opinions about American foreign policy, and with a personal stake in
gaining the American recognition of the AIC. While unsuccessful in business, he was exceedingly effective in diplomacy as is witnessed in his "Washington Campaign" when he obtained American recognition of the future Congo Free State.

The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate Henry Sanford's role in obtaining recognition of the AIC, emphasizing him as an extraordinary example of both the ardent economic expansionist of the 1880's and the strong relationship between private business interests and the American government in late nineteenth century America in influencing American foreign policy.

In order to explain Sanford's activities, this thesis traces Sanford's development as an economic expansionist and his growing involvement with King Leopold II of Belgium. Through graduating stages, Sanford became involved with Leopold's plans. Sanford acted as an agent in helping Leopold acquire Henry Morton Stanley's aid in obtaining the territory for the King's future state. Once Stanley joined Leopold's organization, Leopold used the two Americans-- Stanley to acquire the land and Sanford to acquire the international acceptance of his new state. (39)

Sanford's most important involvement in the Congo episode came in 1883 when Leopold sent him to the United States to lobby for recognition of the AIC. By 1884, Henry had achieved this goal by appealing to specific prevailing American interests. The two most influential interests were a concern for economic expansion and the colonization of America's black population.

The correspondence between Henry Shelton Sanford and other key individuals who played a role in the eventual recognition of Leopold's
organization repeatedly referred to "overproduction," and "markets," when referring to Africa. The most active men in bringing about the American recognition of the AIC, including Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen and Senator John Tyler Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, expressed deep belief in the need to open African markets to American manufactured goods. John Kasson, the American representative at the Berlin West African Conference, was an expansionist concerned with opening markets and with American prestige as a world power. Sanford harnessed the private sector through powerful allies in the business establishment. Using his friend Charles P. Daly, President of the American Geographical Society and a man with strong ties to the New York Chamber of Commerce, Sanford was able to gain the powerful organization as an ally. Sanford, in convincing the U.S. to recognize Leopold's association, appealed to this specific interest in which he shared.

In addition, Sanford pandered to a lingering and, in the 1880's, strengthening movement for colonization of what some believed to be America's unwanted black population. In this aspect, Sanford's activities fit into the interpretation of George M. Fredrickson, who emphasizes the alarm in the 1880's over the increasing black population in the United States as a step in the rise of racism. The "inability to visualize an egalitarian biracial society"(40) and the resulting popularity of colonization as a solution is represented by both Senator John Tyler Morgan and John Latrobe, president of the American Colonization Society. These two ardent colonizationists greatly helped Sanford obtain American recognition of Leopold's Association. Those who believed in colonization
used Liberia—which John Latrobe had played a large role in developing—as a precedent of a private organization creating a political power in a region of Africa. Latrobe and Morgan believed the Congo basin could become a repository for American blacks. The freed slaves, according to these colonizationists, had a "superior knowledge" from having been enslaved in America. By colonizing in Africa, according to these advocates, the American black population could be a vehicle to export America's shining system of government and at the same time help "civilize" Africa.

Thus, in securing American recognition of the International Association of the Congo, Sanford appealed to both the private and public sectors in exclusive and overlapping ways. To the private sector, he illuminated the Congo region as a repository for American blacks and as a market for surplus manufactured goods. To the American government, he also underscored the Congo region an answer to American overproduction but, in addition, he emphasized that by recognizing the AIC, the U.S. would be helping to "civilize" Africa and stamp out the remnants of the slave trade, thus adding a philanthropic bent to the argument.

His arguments successfully secured for King Leopold the recognition by one power of the future Congo Free State. In the process, Sanford, disgusted by American isolationism, and with great hopes for what Leopold's new state could offer him—whether a post in the new government or a private company to exploit the rich wealth of the Congo region—was willing to deceive his supporters. He cultivated the confusion between the international and philanthropic International
African Association of the Congo with the personally controlled International Association of the Congo and led those advocates of recognition to believe they were supporting an internationally controlled neutral organization rather than a private enterprise. Thus, through a combination of persuasion and deception, Henry Shelton Sanford manipulated the United States Government into asserting itself internationally with the recognition of the AIC. His success represented a personal diplomatic triumph, as a private citizen singly influencing national foreign policy, and a significant step away from American isolationism.
Chapter I

Henry Shelton Sanford:
Private Businessman, Public Diplomat

John Garraty, in The New Commonwealth, properly takes issue with those twentieth century historians who have, when writing of the period between 1877 and 1900, adopted Mark Twain's interpretation of the national character as The Gilded Age. Ironically, however, Garraty's own description of Twain's character Colonel Sellers as "of the gilded cane, grandiose dreams, easygoing optimism, and flexible ethical standards" aptly describes the persona of Henry Shelton Sanford. (1) Moreover, Twain's search for a place where "there is no fever of speculation, no inflamed desire for sudden wealth," would not have ended when he laid eyes on General Sanford. (2) This "all pervading speculativeness" (3) comprised a large part of Sanford's character. Born rich, he strove to make himself richer. Upon losing much of his inheritance, he spent the rest of his life seeking to regain the fortune he had lost.

His involvement in King Leopold's plans for the Congo region was due, at least in part, to this latter acquisitive aspect of his life and can be viewed as one more speculative venture. Rather than investing money, he invested himself, spending huge amounts of time and energy to help found Leopold's state, with the hopes of future benefits.

This study is not a biography. Sanford's biographer, Joseph A. Fry, aptly details Sanford's sporadic successes and ultimate failures. But by examining certain aspects of Sanford's early life, one can witness the
evolution of an American businessman—prone to speculative ventures—into an ardent economic expansionist.

While he was ambassador to Belgium, Sanford became acquainted with King Leopold II of the Belgians. King Leopold, bored with his little kingdom and in search of a colony, initiated its creation by organizing the International African Association, ostensibly for the purpose of studying Central Africa and opening it to "civilizing" forces. In actuality, he was taking the first step toward the creation of his own personal organization. Sanford became increasingly involved in Leopold's activities and in addition, as is witnessed in his reports to John Latrobe, President of both the American national committee of the International Association of the Congo and the American Colonization Society, began laying the foundations for his future arguments in obtaining recognition of the AIC.

Born of a prominent New England family in Woodbury, Connecticut in 1823, Sanford grew up in a wealthy business-motivated atmosphere. His father, a successful nail manufacturer and land speculator, embued in young Sanford a drive, energy, and enthusiasm for business. His father's interest in land speculation seems to have played a role in Sanford's intoxication with investment opportunities in little-developed areas and helped facilitate Sanford's weakness for high risk, big-yield
investments. Both for pleasure and with an eye for business prospects, Sanford travelled extensively, particularly in Michigan and Wisconsin, where his father owned land. Financially secure after his father's death in 1841, Sanford used a portion of his inheritance to invest in western land and railroads. While Henry's family expected him to settle down in Connecticut and direct his energies into the nail business owned jointly with his uncle, Sanford had other ideas.

He had tried working in the family business but the business acumen and temperaments of uncle and nephew soon clashed. The contrast demonstrates a telling feature of Sanford's philosophy of business. While his uncle possessed a rational and prudent business sense, Henry depended more on impulse and instinct, operating less with reason than emotion. Henry tended to risk large, big-money orders that the company could not necessarily fill. He hazarded dealings with customers about whom he knew little. Uncle Shelton, on the other hand, insisted on careful research about each customer and on taking only orders that were well within the limits of the company's manufacturing capabilities. While Henry suggested altering the weight in the larger orders and giving preferred customers cheaper rates, his uncle dismissed these ideas as unscrupulous business practices.

By 1847 Sanford had decided to sell his share of the business to his uncle. After the sale, Sanford's financial holdings were impressive. However, he was not content to live on his principal holdings. He was driven toward investment opportunities.

After his first intoxicating trip to Europe in 1841 Sanford had become enamored of the European aristocratic world. Through his extensive
travel in Europe and Asia Minor in 1842-1843 and again in 1845, Sanford increasingly, in the words of his friend Jules Levita, became "European by intellect, knowledge, artistic and socialistic taste." (9) Sanford learned German, French, Spanish, and Italian and his life became increasingly focused on Europe. After selling his share of the family company, Sanford sailed again for Europe. This time, he was introduced to the career that he would aspire to, lose, and continually attempt to regain, for the rest of his life--diplomacy. By capitalizing on various influential contacts he made, Sanford was offered a position as Secretary of the American Legation in St. Petersburg and then as Acting Secretary of the Frankfurt Legation. As his contacts improved, so did his appointments. By 1849 he had decided on a diplomatic career. Through his favorable performances in Frankfurt and St Petersburg and with the help of such prestigious family contacts as Thurlow Weed, Sanford acquired the post of Secretary of the Paris Legation in 1849. (10) During this time he earned his doctor of laws from the University of Heidelberg.

Sanford, while loudly proclaiming the virtues of republican simplicity, very much enjoyed his luxurious aristocratic lifestyle in Paris. His mother, admonishing Sanford for his flamboyant style, wrote, "You ridicule the idea of aristocracy and at the same time hope to reach the same point if possible." (11) As secretary to the American legation and later as Charge D'Affaires, Sanford lavished money on himself and on Americans visiting Paris. This was to become a regular tactic in bringing people to his side of the issues. He would in the future be accused of buying his comrades with lavish dinners and entertainment.
During this period Sanford increasingly demonstrated certain traits that would determine many of his subsequent actions. There persisted, as seen in his early work in the family business, a developed degree of craftiness plus a driving, aggressive ambition. On the victory of the Democrats and Franklin Pierce, the American minister to France, William C. Rives believed it prudent to resign his post and urged Sanford to do the same. Sanford, however, recognizing the opportunity for higher employment in the absence of Rives, ignored his request and was rewarded the post. Thus, in 1853 Sanford was promoted to the rank of Charge d'Affaires and functioned as the American Minister to Paris for a year after the resignation of Rives. During that year the new Secretary of State William Marcy suggested to Sanford and fellow diplomats that in accordance with republican ideals, the elaborate diplomatic finery traditionally worn by American diplomats when attending formal court functions be jettisoned for the sober black suit worn by most Americans during important occasions. Marcy left the decision up to the discretion of each minister, and Sanford felt reservations at appearing at the very ornate and elaborate court functions of Napoleon III in his simple attire. However, Sanford, displaying his usual obsequiousness when personal gain was in question, recognized the opportunity to gain popularity with the new Secretary. Thus he immediately adopted the sober dress and risked the raised eyebrows of the French Court. While Parisian journals noted that Sanford was "the most conspicuous figure at the court ball last evening," Sanford, according to his biographer, relished the notoriety, especially since he believed his strict compliance with the State department's suggestion would help him in future appointments.
However, on the arrival of the new American minister, John Mason, Sanford was disappointed to learn that a new secretary would be appointed. Simultaneously, Mason informed Sanford that he deemed it improper to discard the formal diplomatic attire. Sanford, personally offended and recognizing the opportunity to leave on his own accord rather than to be dismissed, sent his letter of resignation to the State Department. He correctly believed such a resignation would set him up "well before the country at home." (14) Mason recognized the scheme, stating that Sanford's actions were hypocritical considering the fact that he was about to be dismissed anyway. Sanford was accurate however in recognizing that his resignation would be more beneficial to his future than would a formal dismissal. American newspapers lauded his action. (15)

On returning to the United States Sanford developed certain views on American foreign policy and furthermore displayed those traits that would directly relate to his involvement in the Congo. (16) His uncle, Philo Shelton, (whom his mother had unfavorably compared to Henry, believing that both shared a dangerous lack of caution and prudence in business matters) (17) had become involved in guano—a rich fertilizer—speculation on islands off Venezuela. When other investors were granted permission, by the Venezuelan dictator to extract guano, they encroached on Shelton's claims on the island of Aves. (18) Shelton, convinced that Aves was a "derelict," island, enlisted his nephew Henry to prosecute his huge damage claim and prove his claim of ownership. (19) Sanford ably presented the appropriate evidence to the Secretary of State and simultaneously mounted a public campaign in support of his uncle's claim.
In a revealing exchange between uncle and nephew, Shelton inquired of Henry as to whether "the administration could be screwed up to the point of enforcing such a claim if some of their friends were let in as shareholders." (20) Equally telling are Sanford's frustrated remarks in response to the State Department's careful treatment of the situation. In terms of Venezuela, according to Sanford, the State Department's prudence was a "most rascally virtue" with "timidity worse than stupidity." (21) Clearly, careful study of facts before making important decisions and precise and thoughtful attention to detail were not impressive traits to Sanford. Moreover, with these remarks, Sanford demonstrated a view of underdeveloped areas that would become even more apparent with his actions in the Congo. Sanford regarded undeveloped regions as justifiable targets of exploitation by American business interests. He furthermore believed that annexation of Latin American territory was necessary for American commercial activity if the U.S. wanted to be competitive with Europe. Referring to the Venezuelans as "pigmies," [sic] Sanford advised the new Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, to demand of the Venezuelan government the payment of an indemnity. If Venezuela refused, Sanford advised, than the U.S. should resort to force. (22)

Sanford's efforts resulted in increased pressure by the United States government on Venezuela. (23) Cass sent the note called for by Sanford, demanding that Venezuela pay an indemnity and threatening to break diplomatic relations if Venezuela did not comply within thirty days. (24) Eventually, after ten years of dogged pressure on the U.S. State Department and on successive Venezuelan regimes, Sanford collected $162,487.00. (25) More significantly however, the Venezuelan case
facilitated the creation of a new doctrine of American foreign policy applied to Latin America: "Sovereignty of the United States over Derelict Islands," largely based on Sanford's arguments. Sanford's efforts transformed a personal conflict into an American foreign policy issue. One American businessman, in quest of personal financial gain, had been able to incorporate the U.S. State Department into a minor, private skirmish to such an extent that the *New York Times* noted the possibility of a "speck of war on the horizon, Venezuela-wards." (27)

II.

The Venezuela incident, coupled with the fact that Sanford's actions resulted in a new foreign policy doctrine, demonstrated the increasing power of private business interests in American foreign policy. One historian cites the post-Civil War era as a time of simultaneous economic strength and upheaval. The perceived surplus of manufactured goods led many Americans to focus "on finding overseas markets for the U.S. glut of goods. Business needed an efficient global foreign policy to match industry's efficient global sales network." (28)

Sanford is an extreme example of a growing number of Americans who believed that business needed, as one manufacturer stated at the time, "an intelligent and spirited foreign policy," willing to ensure a sufficient number of overseas markets for America's surplus goods. (29) Convinced of American superiority and destiny as a world power, Sanford devoted
considerable time and energy toward convincing the U.S. government of its right and duty to assert its power over lesser nations. Described as a "legal filibusterer," Sanford in the 1850's and 1860's joined the ranks of those Americans demanding greater attention toward the assertion of American power in behalf of business interests. Like others, Sanford advocated the annexation of Latin American territory to guarantee freedom of commerce.

Sanford would later redirect these attitudes toward the Congo, seeking to exploit the natural wealth of the Congo region as others had done in Latin America. He would attempt to capitalize on the efforts of the English and French explorers in Africa just as others had capitalized on the efforts of the Spanish explorers in Latin America, both having entered into lands rich with resources prime for exploitation. Just as the British earlier in the century had successfully exploited the untouched coffee potential in Costa Rica, Sanford would attempt the same feat with ivory in the Congo during his Sanford Exploring Expedition in the 1880's. While other opportunists had gotten to Latin America first, Sanford determined to be first in Africa.

Another of Sanford's activities in Latin America also provided valuable background for his developing ideas about American foreign involvement. In addition to his struggle with Venezuela, between 1857 and 1860 Sanford worked as a special agent for two railroad companies seeking financial advantages from Latin American nations. In both cases his attempted missions proved unsuccessful, due in large part to the opposition of Latin American governments. As special agent for the Panama Railroad company, he was sent to Bogata, Colombia where he attempted to extend the
company's monopoly from forty-nine to ninety-nine years. The idea was met with vast opposition in Colombia, and in April, 1860, the Colombian Senate forbade a new agreement. Sanford returned to the U.S. empty handed, most likely reflecting on the power of the U.S. government to force an agreement for the private railroad company, had it so chosen, and on the necessity of American annexation of Latin American and other territory to guarantee successful commercial activity in underdeveloped areas.

With Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860, Sanford was finally able to regain a diplomatic post, perhaps the most important of his career. Sanford had repeatedly attempted to attain a post in Latin America in the 1850's. Having developed the reputation as a "Latin American trouble shooter" among much of the commercial community, his appointment was strongly endorsed by influential businessmen and companies, many with huge investments in Latin America. Unfortunately, due to his ties to the Whig party, Democratic administrations had been wary and had declined to offer him a position. Sanford held few partisan political views and most likely would have fit quite comfortably into the Democratic administrations. However, his familial Whig background coupled with strong ties to such famous Whigs as Thurlow Weed decidedly diminished any Democratic administration's proclivity to appoint him to the desired
diplomatic posts. (34) With the demise of the Whig party and the rise of the Republican party, however, his prospects improved. Sanford, with his friends Thurlow Weed and William Seward, became closely allied with the more conservative wing of the Republican Party and, not surprisingly, was among those who endorsed a compromise with the South on the question of slavery. Like many others of his political persuasion, Sanford travelled to Springfield, Illinois in hopes of convincing Lincoln to issue a public statement that would soothe the nerves of those southerners who feared the loss of their rights on Lincoln's inauguration. Although unsuccessful, he did become well acquainted with Lincoln and moved to Washington to lobby for the Panama Railroad Company and for a diplomatic post for himself. (35) With Lincoln's election, Sanford achieved his personal goal and was appointed United States Minister to Belgium. (36)

Sizing up Belgium as "afraid to do anything without the approval of the great powers," (37) Sanford's time was freed to pursue activities around the continent and in England for the war effort. Sanford's biographer, referring to these activities, entitles Sanford's role during the war as "Seward's Minister to Europe." (38) Sanford was given the responsibility of fiscal agent for the Union and in this capacity bought arms, munitions, blankets, cloth, and saltpeter for the North. (39) Some of his activities were controversial, and his critics enjoyed denouncing Sanford as a profiteer. Although such charges were never substantiated, Sanford's diplomatic career would be tainted from this period and severely curtailed. (40) Sanford's most interesting wartime activities centered around the espionage ring he developed for the purpose of finding and foiling the work of Confederate agents in Europe. (41) In 1861 Sanford
employed a band of detectives and directed his secret network with an
eye toward England. Reasoning that the South would focus on England
for vital supplies, Sanford successfully maneuvered a series of operations
that sabotaged Confederate attempts to gain English support. Joseph A.
Fry emphasizes the significance of these surveillance and sabotage
activities to the Union victory and attributes to Sanford the creation of
"the prototype" and the "tone for the entire Northern espionage effort" as
well as deeming him more "responsible... [than] any other United States
official for the form of the surveillance activities."(42) It also
demonstrates his affinity for secrecy and intrigue, a trait that he would
employ during the Congo episode.

As in his experiences with his uncle in the family business,
Sanford's propensity for undertaking unscrupulous means for the desired
end propelled him further than the Union wished to go. Frustrated by the
acquisition of ships and supplies on the part of the Confederacy, Sanford
advocated the jettison of international law and the sabotage of the
purchased ships. He begged Seward to intercept Southern ships and to
seize those carrying contraband, and he emphatically advocated other
actions that could have propelled England into retaliatory action against
the Union. Sanford's statement that we can "discuss the matter with the
English afterwards"(43) confirms his tendency toward drastic and
irrational measures that harmed his careers as both a diplomat and a
businessman.

Simultaneously with his work for the union, Sanford energetically
performed his duties as Minister to Belgium, in the process becoming well
acquainted with the royal family. It is telling that while Sanford
energetically pursued activities for the Union cause, Leopold I viewed
the Northern cause as "rank republicanism" and fervently hoped for the
Republic to remain split so that it would be reduced as a commercial
rival. (44) Neither father nor son, the Duke of Brabant, had any sympathy
for the rule of the many. However, this does not seem to have caused any
moral problems for the ardent republicanism of Henry Sanford.

Sanford had success as Minister to Belgium and became a court favorite.
While minister, he purchased the elegant Chateau Gingelom, located near
Brussels and the King. Sanford and his family would reside there until
just before his death in 1891 when, with mounting debts, he was forced to
relinquish the grand home. From the 1860's onward, Sanford maintained a
close relationship with the King. (45)

IV.

When, in 1865, the Duke of Brabant became Leopold II, few realized the
colonial ambitions of the new monarch. Leopold, as one historian says,
"had too little to do," and felt very limited as a constitutional monarch
in his little kingdom of Belgium. (46) He had long been interested in
Belgium's commercial expansion and the search for new markets abroad, as
demonstrated by his return from a trip to Greece with a marble slab
inscribed with the words, 'Belgium must have colonies.' (47) Leopold had
earlier been interested in Africa as a prospective spot for future Belgian
colonies but by 1860 his attention had been diverted toward the Far
It was not until 1875, after failed attempts to establish colonies in the East, that Leopold’s attention, sparked by reports of success from the European explorers in Africa, was redirected toward the "dark continent." He wrote, "I intend to make discreet inquiries as to whether there is not something to be done in Africa." His inquiries led him to focus on Central Africa, where the explorations of David Livingstone, Verney Lovett Cameron, and Henry Morton Stanley had unveiled an area of great commercial potential. Emerging from the jungle in November 1875, Cameron correctly reported that the Lualaba River, running from Central Africa to the Indian Ocean was the same as the Congo River, running from Central Africa to the Atlantic. Unfortunately for Cameron he had not travelled the entire course of the river and thus couldn’t prove his theory. More important for Leopold were Cameron’s reports sent back to Europe, and read by Leopold in January, 1876, ecstatically describing the fertile land, rich with mineral resources, that the river traversed. Leopold’s proposals for colonies were met with skepticism by the Belgian citizens and thus Leopold, alone, assumed responsibility for colonization in Africa.

Sanford had lost his post as U.S. minister to Belgium, in the meantime, with the election of President Grant in 1868. Although Grant nominated Sanford as ambassador to Spain, his nomination was quashed by detractors in the Senate who questioned Sanford’s controversial actions during the Civil War and his subsequent activities. Sanford was unable to acquire another diplomatic post and had engaged in widespread commercial investments around the U.S., particularly in Florida with its budding citrus industry. As long as Sanford had followed the careful and
prudent business advice of his sober relatives, he had remained a wealthy
man. However, with increasing investments into potential quick profit
schemes, Sanford's financial portfolio suffered seriously. As Fry states,
"His tendency toward speculative undertakings in less developed areas of
the country forecast a pattern that ultimately led to his downfall."(55)
A relative, William Shelton, wrote him prophetically in 1869 that "no man
can manage a plantation in Louisiana, shipbuilding in Maine and other
remotely situated points of business without being ruined. It is a
simple question of time."(56) Sanford had never "served his
apprenticeship" so that "he grasped at flashy, faddish, 'get-rich-quick'
oportunities...and failed to give sufficient personal attention to his
investments."(57) With the depression of 1873, Sanford's holdings
seriously declined so that by the mid-1870's he was in search of deals
that would replenish his financial welfare.(58) Clearly, Sanford regarded
Leopold's prospects for the Congo as just the solution he needed to place
him back on firm financial ground.

When, in 1876, Leopold convened a conference in Brussels of interested
explorers, geographers, and delegates from twelve European countries,
although the United States was not officially represented, allegedly
standing with Leopold was Henry Shelton Sanford,(59) most likely as an
aid to Leopold without an official title.

Preparations by Leopold for the Geographical Conference of Brussels
were impressive. Along with careful review of the feats of the French,
German, and British explorers and an indepth study of each country's
intentions toward Africa, Leopold sent an agent to determine German
public opinion toward the proposed conference. Leopold himself travelled
to England to sound out interest in the Congo and to attract to the
conference delegates who were likely to agree with his point of view.\(^{(50)}\)
In his opening speech on September 12, Leopold stated his desire that the
conference would result in an organization existing for a purely
philanthropic purpose in the Congo. According to his speech, Leopold
wanted to eliminate the slave trade and open the most unknown region of
Africa to "civilizing" influences.\(^{(61)}\) In discussing his aims for the
Conference and Africa, Leopold stated,

> It will also give me great pleasure to meet the distinguished men whose
> work in favour of civilization I have followed with interest for
> years.... Needless to say, in bringing you to Brussels I was in no way
> motivated by selfish designs. No, Gentlemen, if Belgium is small, she
> is happy and contented with her lot.\(^{(62)}\)

Perhaps the Belgian people were content with their nation's size, but
Leopold certainly was not. No historian accepts Leopold's words at face
value. Particularly considering Leopold's actions once he had obtained
complete legal control over the Congo region in 1885, Leopold's professed
aims at this conference are revealed as tragically comical. Described as
"crafty" and, a "master at clever propaganda," by appearing to be
motivated by purely humanitarian impulses, Leopold could accomplish his
commercial aims and at the same time avoid rousing the suspicions of the
other European powers.\(^{(63)}\) As one historian emphasizes, the other
European powers were obvious competitors for land in the Congo region.
Leopold, however, sought to persuade the European community that his
organization had no such designs and merely existed to eliminate the
slave trade, open the region to commerce, and thus introduce civilizing
influences into the most remote area of the "dark continent." (64) As his biographer states, "His tactics were to create an innocuous-seeming international structure for the opening up of Central Africa behind which he could pursue his own ends." While preventing suspicion on the international front—particularly among the British—these tactics could also serve to eliminate a backlash of anti-imperialist sentiment in his own country. (65)

The Conference adopted Leopold's proposal for setting up operational posts on the coast of Zanzibar and at the mouth of the Congo. From these bases, the international organization would open routes into the interior. Along the routes, stations for scientific study and for the housing of medical supplies, would be established along with, as Leopold stated, "'pacifying' bases from which to abolish the slave trade." (66)

The most important result of this meeting was the creation of the International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Central Africa, variously referred to as the International African Association, or "The Association," or by its French acronym, AIA. The Association would be headed by the International Commission, comprised of the presidents of the geographical societies from each participating country and two members of the national committees of the AIA. The supreme head of the Commission was its president, King Leopold II. (67) Directing the Commission was the Executive Committee, composed of three members representing the three language groups, English, Germanic and Latin, plus a Secretary-General. (68) Although the initial representative of the English language group was British, the British—recognizing the conflict participation in such an enterprise might provoke with their own national
interests---eventually withdrew from the Association. Henry Sanford eventually assumed the post. With the close of the Conference, the foundation was now laid for Leopold's personal colony.

V.

Although Sanford was definitely part of the AIA by 1877, there is no direct evidence that Leopold, in the early stages of Sanford's involvement with the Congo project, offered Sanford any kind of employment or other immediate economic benefits for his efforts. However, as has already been discussed, Sanford's financial situation, by the 1870's, had seriously deteriorated. Moreover, at least by 1878, Sanford was looking forward to starting a company in the Congo basin once the region was sufficiently opened by the King. Thus, one can certainly view Sanford's willingness to expend so much time on this project as a form of business speculation. By the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, Sanford would write to his wife that he expected "important things" for his efforts.

In June, 1877, when Sanford attended the first (and last) meeting of the International Committee of the Association he reported to John Latrobe, President of the American national committee of the International African Association, on the meeting's developments. Sanford's report is an excellent window into not only the activities during the meeting but also the mindset of both Americans about the role of the AIA.
In the report, Sanford noted that he had accepted the appointment as "sole" delegate to the convention in Brussels, which began on July 20.\(^{(74)}\) During the meeting, "convoked...by its President, the King of the Belgians, to carry into practice the principles laid down by the Brussels Congress last September," plans were made to begin "in Africa...the great work of civilization and humanity inaugurated by his Majesty."\(^{(75)}\) Delegates from the U.S.\(^{(Sanford)}\), Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland were present. While Portugal and Russia were unable to attend, England made it clear through its absence that it desired independence from foreign associations in order to "act for itself" in terms of African investment and exploration.\(^{(76)}\) Piously, Latrobe referred to England's withdrawal from the International Association as one resulting from her fear of its "philanthropic" goals conflicting with her own interests in new markets. "Nowhere, is this want [for new markets] more felt than in England.... The work of exploration she would willingly keep in her own hands...and take exclusive possession of any newly discovered territory."\(^{(77)}\) This is a remarkable statement in light of Leopold's true aims, where, "with time, the enterprise will become...Belgian in name as in actual fact."\(^{(78)}\)

As a result of England's withdrawal, the new representative of the English speaking peoples to the Executive Committee became Henry Shelton Sanford, due, no doubt, to the fact that he was the only delegate present who spoke English as a first language.\(^{(79)}\) During the meeting, in addition to deciding on exploration into Central Africa from Zanzibar, the delegates discussed how each national committee would raise money for the Association.\(^{(80)}\) Each local committee was to send money to the National
Committee on a monthly basis, from which it would be sent to the
Association, usually after expenses. Funds were to be raised through
various means, usually through membership subscriptions. The delegates
discussed the popularization of exploration into Central Africa by
circulating "pamphlets calculated to interest the masses." (81) With this
system, where the funds raised by the national committees were sent to
the Association, controlled by Leopold, the committees were kept
impoverished, "and the King did what he could to make good the
deficiency," according to one historian. (82) In this position, the King
could control all activities of the AIA. (83)

Sanford continually professed the belief that the selfless aim of the
Association, and all of its members were solely of a philanthropic nature,
"with no interests to promote other than those of civilization and
humanity," and that during this meeting, "the hearty cooperation on their
part which will be given by other nations came with no aims for conquest
or aggrandizement." (84) However, it is interesting to note that the
delegates readily agreed to forego one of the main goals of the
Association, elimination of the slave trade, in favor of exploration. "To
exterminate the slave trade, a better trade must be furnished," agreed John
Latrobe. "Exploration aims at this," and if the Association was successful
in carrying out its plans for exploration, he stated, "the slave trade
will die out for want of a market for slaves." (85) The opening of new
markets for commercial activity had become incorporated into this
"philanthropic undertaking."

Moreover, Sanford envisioned other, "special reasons why we of the
United States should promote actively and earnestly this great work of
the International Association." (86) This "peculiar interest" (87) was the size of the American black population. Sanford, with Latrobe, who was also President of the American Colonization Society and an important developer of Liberia, believed that it was the role of American blacks to civilize Africa.

Near 5,000,000 of our people are of African race—descendants of slaves; contact with the white races and lately emancipation, education, and equality of political rights have made them by far superiors of the parent race and will tend to excite a spirit of enterprise, ambitions and desires for which central Africa opens a wide peculiarly appropriate field. Physically they are better adapted than whites to its climate and to undergo fatigues... (it is a topic) well worthy the attention of our citizens and our philanthropic spirit." (88)

"I cordially agree," replied Latrobe, "to all you say...for more than half a century, now, I have been advocating the idea that Africa is to be civilized...by the emigration on their own cost, of the colored people of the United States to that continent." (89) It was this consideration that led Latrobe to be so interested in the work of the International African Association. (90)

Finally, during the meeting, the delegates to the International Commission violated their own rules and re-elected Leopold as President of the Commission, a post that was intended to be held for a single one-year term. (91) Latrobe, rationalizing this oversight, stated, "This is not a case where the American doctrine of "Rotation in Office" is at all applicable....The King of the Belgians is peculiarly and happily situated. The prestige of his name is important now and will continue to be important." (92)
One last accomplishment of this first and last meeting of the AIA was the adoption of a flag. Leopold and his agents would repeatedly refer to the banner as the "blue flag with the gold star floating over lands under its civilizing direction." Leopold would use the same flag for his personal organization, the International Association of the Congo, thus furthering the confusion between the two "Associations." The irony of the elaborate first and last meeting of the AIA, with its intricate organizational structure and philanthropic and international emphasis is best symbolized by the adoption and future of its flag.

Leopold, with this meeting of the International Commission, had accomplished everything he wanted so far. The members, as seen in the correspondence between Latrobe and Sanford, heartily agreed that this "international" and "philanthropic" enterprise should be based in Belgium and that its patriarch and president should be Leopold. For the future of the AIA, such an elaborate organization needed a devoted leader to call meetings and ensure its perpetuation. Unfortunately, this was not on Leopold's agenda. Instead, because the King "purposely refrained from convoking" the AIA, the committees--particularly the Belgian and the French--abandoned the international emphasis and took on their national characters with their own expeditions.

In the meantime, Leopold had acquired a devoted American ally and agent in Henry Sanford. At this point the King probably had no concept of how important Sanford would be for him in the future. From 1877 on, however, Sanford would place himself at Leopold's beckoning. For the moment, Sanford made himself available to Leopold when he was needed.
Continual reminders of his availability peppered his letters to Leopold. Conveniently accessible in his Gingelom chateau, a few miles from Leopold's palace in Brussels, Sanford, in the meantime, travelled back and forth between Belgium and the United States. He continued to develop his struggling citrus investments in Florida and sought unsuccessfully through the late 1870's and 1880's to attain a seat from Florida in the United States Senate. In the meantime, Sanford continued to invest in unsuccessful business deals, such as a Republican newspaper that he started in Florida in an attempt to develop a political base for himself. The paper ultimately went bankrupt. (95)

Leopold now devoted his energies to commissioning an explorer to survey the Congo basin and assess its economic potential. Stanley, who had already predicted great promise for the region, was the obvious candidate. Leopold's next assignment for Henry Sanford was as recruiter of the explorer's services.
Chapter II

Henry Shelton Sandford and Henry Morton Stanley:

Leopold II secures a diplomat and an explorer

During the years 1877-1879, Henry Sanford became increasingly involved in Leopold's plans for the Congo region. On Henry Morton Stanley's return to Europe after spending three years following the Congo river from Lake Tanganika in eastern Africa to Boma, in western Africa, the world learned of the great commercial potential in the interior of Africa. Stanley's letters, aglow with conviction that the Congo region was the next great point of commercial exploitation, convinced Leopold that Stanley was the explorer that he needed to acquire the land for his future colony in Africa. Leopold's American contact, Henry Shelton Sanford, who had repeatedly offered his services, became very useful in aiding Leopold's acquisition of Stanley's services. In the meantime, Leopold took his second and third major steps toward the creation of his future state with the creation and dissolution of the Comité D'Etudes du Haut Congo and the creation of the International Association of the Congo, an organization totally under Leopold's control.

I.

While Sanford, in 1877, knew little of Africa, in the ensuing year he threw himself into the study of the Congo region and exchanged numerous
letters with other members of the Association.(1) With Baron Greindl, the Secretary General of the Executive Committee, Sanford exchanged eighteen letters in a seven-month period.(2) By January, 1878, Sanford was actively engaged in attracting Stanley to the AIA.(3)

Stanley had emerged at Boma, three days from the Atlantic coast on August 9,1877, having proven Cameron's hypothesis that the rivers Lualaba, running from eastern Africa north and the Congo, running from the interior of Central Africa south, were one and the same. "On the 31st of July, I arrived at a point on the Lower Congo.... I knew then, beyond dispute...that the Lualaba, whose mystery had wooed Livingstone to his death, was no other than the 'lucid, long-winding Zaire.'...or the mighty Congo."(4) Stanley had departed from Zanzibar on November 12, 1874.(5) Three years later to the day, he wrote in the Daily Telegraph, "I could prove to you that the Power possessing the Congo, despite the cataracts, would absorb to itself the trade of the whole of the enormous basin behind. This river is and will be the grand highway of commerce to West Central Africa."(6) Thus, Stanley had returned convinced--by what he saw in the Congo basin--of its huge economic potential.

Stanley was not alone in this view. Immediately on his return to Europe in January, 1878 the explorer was met at the Marseilles railway station by "two Commissioners from his Majesty the King of the Belgians, Leopold II...and before I was two hours older I was made aware that King Leopold intended to undertake to do something substantial for Africa, and that I was expected to assist him."(7) Those two Commissioners were none other than Baron Greindl and Henry Sanford.
Leopold, had written in November 1877 that, "if the English do not forestall our efforts by getting hold of all of Central Africa," he hoped to found posts in the Congo, and then "try to transform these posts into something like Belgian establishments." In other words, Leopold, in 1877, already envisioned his future Congo Free State.

The King hoped that by intercepting Stanley before he reached England he could prevent the possibility of Stanley convincing the English of the Congo's great economic potential. Thus, Leopold dispatched Sanford and Greindl to the Marseilles train station. That evening, after meeting Stanley at the Station, Sanford and Greindl were present at the reception held for Stanley by the Geographical Society of Marseilles, of which both Sanford and Greindl were honorary members. During the reception, Sanford proposed that Stanley join the Association to "continue and develop the great work which he [Stanley] had accomplished." Leopold's agents then invited Stanley to Brussels to meet the King and discuss the explorer's ideas before journeying to London. However, Stanley had lost many people during his last mission. He was "slowly recovering from the effects of famine and fatigue" and thus met the idea "that I should return to the scene of so much disaster and suffering" with reluctance.

Moreover, Stanley had other ideas for the Congo region. Convinced that it should be England that took the initiative in the Congo, Stanley delayed joining Leopold's enterprise and travelled on to London. Before he left, Sanford and Greindl swore Stanley to absolute secrecy about their proposition, a promise that he promptly broke. Before Stanley had even arrived in London, Greindl read in the Etoile Belge about their
invitation to Stanley to visit Brussels before returning to England. (13) One historian suggests that Stanley could not resist the temptation to flatter himself as a man in great demand. (14) Also, perhaps, the explorer hoped that if the British establishment knew of Leopold's interest in the Congo basin they would feel a greater sense of urgency and adopt Stanley's plans.

Stanley "threw himself" into the task of convincing the British political and commercial powers to seize the great opportunity offered in the Congo. (15) He travelled around England speaking in the major commercial centers, particularly Manchester and Liverpool, but as stated in his Autobiography, "The Government and the people of England turned a deaf ear." (16)

Sanford in the meantime travelled to the United States. Stanley was still bound to his employer, J.G. Bennett, of the New York Herald. Leopold coveted Stanley's services but did not want to appear too eager. (17) Thus, Leopold instructed Sanford not to openly seek out Bennett but that if he "bumped into him by chance" Sanford should describe their tentative plans for Stanley. (18)

Greindl and Leopold, hearing nothing from Stanley, grew restless. (19) Stanley must have told Greindl that he would contact him on May 15, after his book was published because Greindl wrote to Sanford on May 27 that "May 15 passed twelve days ago and we have not spoken to or heard of Stanley or his book." (20) Greindl even checked the bookstores for word on Stanley's pending publication. (21) Leopold wrote to the Belgian
ambassador to England inquiring about the delay and noting that if a much longer time passed they would begin a search for another explorer.(22)

By June, 1878, after a period of rest, during which he wrote *Through the Dark Continent*, Stanley had become restless, and, "with restored health, 'liberty' became insipid and joyless, that luxury of lounging which had appeared desirable to an ill-regulated and unhealthy fancy became unbearable."(23) Having received "no help or encouragement from Britain" in his quest to open the Congo region to "legitimate and wholesome commerce,"(24) Stanley, on June 11, 1878, finally presented himself to King Leopold.(25) Sanford realized Stanley's change of heart was due to his lack of success in convincing the British commercial and political establishment to support his plans for the Congo. Referring to Stanley's lobbying activities in England in the preceding months, Sanford wrote Greindl that "his [Stanley's] escapades...in England will not have added to his popularity or excited any argument in his favor for employment on the part of the English."(26) Thus Sanford recognized that Stanley's well known failure in convincing the British had eroded his bargaining position with Leopold. "All will probably depend on the wishes and determination of the King," wrote Sanford.(27)

The year 1878 marked the planning stages for the first expedition to the Congo commissioned by King Leopold. Stanley's first meeting with Leopold marked the first major step toward the expedition. Until
June, there had been no definitive plan for the Congo Basin. During the June meeting, however, Stanley proposed the creation of a company for the purpose of building a railroad to by-pass the cataracts on the lower part of the Congo River. For transport on the upper part of the river, Stanley believed that steamships would be the best choice, with trading stations set up intermittently along the route. The meeting proceeded well and Leopold, according to Greindl, was "disposed" to back such a company. Greindl was also impressed with Stanley's propositions, terming them "practical" and predicting success. (28)

II.

Until September, the International African Association remained the only organization in existence relating to the exploration of the Congo region. The Belgian committee undertook an expedition from Zanzibar, establishing a station on Lake Tanganika. (29) However, the King's plans had now progressed beyond simple exploration. These plans required considerable funds, which still had to be raised. Moreover, Leopold needed a more Belgian-centered group that would function in accordance with his direct purposes. He and Greindl began canvassing for subscribers for a new organization. (30)

In the meantime, Leopold, responding to Sanford's offer of service, asked Sanford to act as an intermediary between Stanley and Leopold. (31) Stanley didn't speak French, and Sanford shared Stanley's
adopted nationality. Thus, Sanford and Stanley embarked upon a period of interviews and correspondence, while the Baron kept Sanford apprised of any new developments in Brussels to relate to Stanley.

During this period, Leopold seems to have been entertaining two possible avenues. His Dutch supporters condoned commissioning a "preliminary" expedition, in which specialists would be sent to assess the economic opportunities along the Congo. His alternative was to embark upon a full-fledged permanent expedition and establish trading stations.

Stanley made it very clear to Sanford that he was only interested in the latter alternative. He told Sanford that if "unacclimated, untried specialists" were sent to the Basin without established stations prepared for them that they would certainly meet with disaster. Stanley wanted to return to the Congo, establish permanent stations, and then receive the specialists. As the specialists moved deeper into the basin, Stanley would precede them and establish more stations. Moreover, Stanley had no intention of embarking on a return expedition to the Congo without some sort of "guarantee for the future." He sought a five-year contract, at a salary of $1,000 per year, and on assurance that the "philanthropic" aspect of the enterprise would continue, "no matter what the result of the commercial and R.R. expedition." If Leopold was merely interested in another exploratory expedition like that from which he had just returned, Stanley was not interested in giving up a proposed lecture contract. Stanley also convinced Sanford, who saw the creation of a "smaller, permanent expedition," as the perfect approach to which the
King's name would be "affixed to it for all time," and "it could be utilized for the reconnaissance and for commerce and the railroad...and be much more than self-sustaining by trade." (35)

In August, 1878, Stanley met Leopold's commissioners in Paris where he further described his plans for the Congo. "It is from this meeting, which took place in August, that I date the formation of the project of the first enterprise of the Congo," Stanley would later write. (36)

In November Leopold summoned Stanley to Brussels where, with Dutch, French and German, and British capitalists, the foundation was laid for the "Comite d'Etudes du Haut Congo, (Committee to Study the Upper Congo) a Belgian-based organization with mainly Belgian-Dutch backing and the King as Honorary President. In addition, Colonel Strauch, General Secretary of the AIA, was now also President of the Comite. (37) On November 25, Leopold met again with his financial backers, and the Comite was officially established. (38) Leopold chose a compromise between the ideas of Stanley and the Dutch capitalists. The proposed expedition—to be led by Stanley—would both explore the region for economic opportunities and create bases between the lower Congo and Stanley Pool. If the studies confirmed the assumed commercial benefits the Comite backers would form two companies, one company to build a connection—most likely a railroad—between the Lower and the Upper Congo, and the other to establish commercial enterprises and navigation on the Upper Congo. (39)

In the meantime, through October and November, Stanley and Sanford exchanged letters discussing the goals and costs of the proposed
enterprise. By January 2, 1879, the details were worked out and, "it was resolved that I [Stanley] should lead an exploring expedition into Western Africa along the Congo." (40) Sanford does not seem to have attended any of these meetings because Stanley wrote to him on February 27, from Alexandria, that "you must know that on January 2, 1879, a council was formed called the "Commission d'Etude du Haut Congo." (41)

Stanley apparently completely failed to recognize Leopold's goal of creating a Belgian organization for the purpose of exploiting the Congo region. He voiced regret that Leopold had been unable to find American subscribers for this "international enterprise" and even recommended to the King that Leopold donate a certain amount of money in Sanford's name "for it is essential that we also get a few Americans...[to] purchase the right by this expression of sympathy to supply Africa's greatest River for Commerce." (42) Little did he know that both Leopold and Sanford had great hopes for divesting the Comite completely of those few subscribers that it already had.

III.

At this point the history of the International African Association and the Comite D'Etudes becomes very murky. While the AIA had explorations already underway on the eastern coast of central Africa, starting from Zanzibar, Stanley's plans for the Comite were for the
west coast, starting from Banana, at the mouth of the Congo River. Stanley seems to have believed at this point that the Comite was a branch of the AIA. In fact it could be said that the Belgian National Committee of the AIA was renamed the Comite d'Etudes du Haut-Congo, as the leadership of both Committees was basically the same and the Belgian National Committee ceased to exist with the creation of the Comite. However, the national committees of the AIA were never informed of this new creation, the Comite. Moreover, by its very name, as Stanley points out in *The Congo*, one can see that there was a completely different area of emphasis under the Comite. The AIA was principally interested in exploration of the east coast while the Comite, as noted, after some struggle, chose to center on the west coast and the upper Congo River. Moreover, the Comite assumed a much more commercial look than the AIA, as it was backed primarily by large scale capitalists and was devoted to the study of commercial possibilities and founding a railway company. However, through 1885 the two titles were continally interspersed as though connected, whenever Sanford or any of Leopold's agents referred to Leopold's organization.

Further complicating the names of the organizations was that, as soon as Stanley left for Africa, under the auspices of the Comite, that organization was dissolved, the subscriptions returned, and a new title unveiled. "The International Association of the Congo," by 1881, was attached to Leopold's phantom organization, but deliberate confusion would be perpetuated by Leopold, Sanford, and the rest of the King's agents. Throughout, the associates referred to the organization as either the "International" or the "Association," allowing outsiders to
decide, according to preference, which society they were dealing with. Leopold, wrote, "care must be taken not to let it be obvious that the Association du Congo and the Association Africaine [AIA] are two different things." (46)

Sanford carefully followed these instructions. In convincing Secretary of State Frelinghuysen of his legitimate role, Sanford would write to him in 1882, "I beg to recall the fact that I am a member of the executive committee of the African International Association." (47) As late as 1884, Sanford would, in a letter to Senator Morgan of Alabama, refer to the Comité d'Études not only as a branch of the African International Association but also as a functioning body, although it had been defunct for five years. (48) As late as 1885 Stanley would still call Leopold's organization, now forming as the Congo Free State, the "Comite." (49) No matter which organization was in discussion, they were in reality singly referring to King Leopold II of the Belgians. As the historian Stanley Thompson states, "the Belgian Committee [of the AIA] was evidently the Comité d'Études du Haut-Congo, that is to say Leopold II." (50)

IV.

How did Leopold dissolve the Comite? When, in May, 1879 the Dutch firm, the Afrikaansche Handelsvereeniging--Dutch African Company--a primary backer of the Comite, collapsed, Sanford eagerly suggested to
Leopold that he take this opportunity to rid the organization of backers altogether. On hearing of the "catastrophe that has befallen the Dutch African Company," Sanford, who was in New York at the time, rushed back to the Continent. "It appears to me that an occasion has been furnished to be relieved of a charge.... I do not, therefore, view the bankruptcy as a misfortune, but the contrary as giving an opportunity to be freed." (51) Thompson goes so far as to suggest that because of this advice to Leopold, Sanford might be credited as the progenitor behind the eventual sole ownership by Leopold of the Congo basin. (52)

During the annual meeting in November, 1879, Leopold made his move. Emphasizing that most of the subscription money had been drained in the initial exploration stages earlier in the year, Leopold was able to sufficiently frighten the Comite backers. Through Leon Lambert (a Belgian banker, who, acting for Leopold, had become co-founder of the Comite), Leopold offered to return the subscribers' original investments and absolve them of financial responsibility if they would, in return, agree to dissolve the Comite. The shareholders happily agreed and the Comite d'Etudes du Haut-Congo no longer existed. (53) Leopold had established the illusion of a philanthropic, international, "Association" supposedly motivated solely by a desire to "civilize" Central Africa. The Comite's dissolution remained a secret and Leopold was now free to pursue his self aggrandizing aims of establishing a personal colony.
Chapter III

Henry Shelton Sanford:
Public Businessman, Private Diplomat

Leopold assumed sole control and financial responsibility over the Congo project. The enterprise now began to shape into the project that Leopold had envisioned all along. It was "not a question of Belgian colonies [but of] creating a new State, as big as possible and of running it."(1) To accomplish this dream, Leopold needed to succeed at two crucial tasks: first, the physical acquisition of land for his future state; and second, the acquisition of world acceptance. It would be two Americans, Henry Stanley and Henry Sanford, who would succeed in attaining both of these goals. In the next six years, Stanley, intrepid, determined, and with moral conviction, would systematically make treaties with the chiefs along the Congo river, thus giving Leopold a hold on which to base his claims. Simultaneously, Sanford, energetic, powerfully connected, and keenly aware of the financial benefits he might reap, would lobby the United States government, through a combination of persuasion and deception, to recognize Leopold's claims in the Congo. Sanford appealed to specific interest groups, particularly advocates of American economic expansion and the colonization of American blacks. In addition, he cultivated the confusion between the international, philanthropic AIA and Leopold's personally controlled AIC, allowing supporters to believe they were advocating the recognition of the neutral, international, AIA. The resulting U.S. recognition helped legitimize Leopold's organization, and set a precedent that other nations would follow.
The first goal, according to Leopold, was to be achieved by establishing the already planned three stations along the Congo River and forming them "into a Free State to which may be added further stations and settlements beyond the immediate limits of the Congo." (2)

Concurrently he began dissociating himself from the purely philanthropic ideals that some of his associates continued voicing. Sanford had written Leopold in June, suggesting that because the Dutch African Company's "main motive" was to exploit the "Association," the company's failure marked a positive development. He believed that "in the eyes of the world," the Dutch company's organization removed from the enterprise "that high and philanthropic character which was its purpose." For Sanford, this was a further reason for Leopold to drop his subscribers altogether. (3) Stanley also continued to worry about actions taken by the "International" as appearing too commercial and less philanthropic. (4) Leopold, dissolute, decided the time had arrived to lessen the emphasis on the philanthropic objectives. (5) While baldly stating that "there is no question of granting the slightest political power to negroes," the King simultaneously appealed to those Europeans who were eager to eliminate the slave trade but gazed toward unfortunate Liberia as the revealing result of native rule. The ideal solution seemed to be black states under the protectorate of European powers. (6)
From his personal fortune, in part amassed through shrewd speculation, Leopold funded the land acquisition he now pushed Stanley to carry out in the Congo basin. But Leopold continued to hide his true motives from the explorer. Quixotic and naive, Stanley continued to believe that he was working for the "international" Comite. As late as December 1881, Leopold wrote to Stanley, "Belgium desires no territory in Africa, but it is indispensable you should purchase for the Comite d'Etudes as much land as you will be able to obtain." (7) As one historian notes, "Having thus lent his own money to himself, Leopold naturally retained a control over the capital of the [future] Free State." (8)

Stanley arrived at the mouth of the Congo on August, 14, 1879. In the next three years he opened a route along the Congo stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to Stanley Pool. Along the way he founded the stations of Vivi, Isangila, Manyanga, and Mswata. (9) However, Leopold was impatient with Stanley's progress, believing his heavily laden method of travel caused him to move too slowly compared with the movements of rival explorers in the region. The King also believed that Stanley was insufficiently driven to claim territory, and continually exhorted Stanley to be more aggressive in land acquisition. (10) In 1880 Leopold was shocked to find that Stanley was moving only 22 miles a month. Realizing De Brazza's greater speed and foreseeing his probable goal of claiming Stanley Pool, Leopold ordered Stanley to cease building roads and stations and make a direct plunge toward the inland sea. Stanley, however, ignored Leopold's orders. (11)
The King wrote to Stanley in December, 1881.

"you should place under the suzerainty of that Comite [they still had not bothered to inform Stanley of the fact that the Comite no longer existed] as soon as possible and without losing a minute, all the chiefs from the mouth of the Congo to Stanley Falls. Brazza in a very short time has placed under his dependence the chiefs around Stanley pool. Should we not do as much for the Comite?"(12)

Stanley did finally reach his destination. By March, 1882, he had created the most important of the stations linking the Upper and Lower Congo on the southern shore of Stanley Pool, and named it Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). While De Brazza's Makako treaty covered the north side of the pool, Stanley's treaties lined the southern side. On partition, Leopold's state and the future French Equatorial Africa would be divided down the middle of part of the river and the pool. On the north shore, a town would be named "Brazzaville." Both towns became the capitals of the new colonies once the European powers achieved full partition.

With the creation of Leopoldville, Stanley's crew began trading with the natives.(13) The King was still displeased, however. He wrote Colonel Strauch in October. "The terms of the native chiefs do not satisfy me. There must at least be added an article to the effect that they delegate to us their sovereign rights over the territories."(14)

Stanley fell ill and returned to Europe in September, 1882. After some persuasion on the part of Leopold, the explorer resumed exploration the Congo in December, 1882, and in the process outflanked de Brazza who had also returned to Europe.(15)
Sometime near the end of 1882 or the beginning of 1883, Leopold renamed his elusive organization the International Association of the Congo, or AIC.\(^{16}\) By the end of 1883, in the name of the AIC, Stanley successfully forestalled the Portuguese and French threat of superceding Leopold's goals in the interior. As Stanley travelled along the Congo, using a combination of bribery and force of arms, he established a string of stations and completed treaties with the surrounding tribal chiefs. Arriving at Stanley Falls and creating Stanleyville, over one thousand miles into the interior, he completed the dominant position over the Upper Congo that Leopold sought.\(^{17}\)

The court in Brussels was ecstatic at Stanley's triumph. Leopold's secretary, Jules Devaux, wrote to Sanford, "Stanley has been successful in founding in a pacific way a new station at the Stanley Falls. You see that we are progressing very fast toward the fulfillment of the 1876 program."\(^{18}\) However, without international recognition, the treaties and stations that Stanley had completed remained in a precarious position. Moreover, as Stanley conquered the interior, the mouth of the river became increasingly vulnerable. When in February, 1884, Britain and Portugal signed the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, it appeared that Leopold's state, even when finally officially recognized, might still be at the mercy of the English and Portuguese. Without free entry and exit into the Congo basin by way of the river's mouth, the future Congo Free State could become a prison. Without international recognition and acceptance of Leopold's apparent goals, the future of his independent state was doomed. If Leopold could attain this international acceptance, Britain and Portugal could be
blocked from "corking" the Free State. Henry Shelton Sanford now became a crucial figure.

II.

Sanford had become very useful to Leopold as Stanley laid claim to the Congo interior. Through unacknowledged methods, as Sanford said, "details...related to me by one who had seen them," he obtained for Leopold information from letters written by De Brazza to his family, thus helping to keep Leopold apprised of much of De Brazza's competitive activities in the region.(19)

From Sanford, in part, Leopold learned of the powerful French interest in attaining free access to the mouth of the Congo river. "For a permanent way and outlet for the world's commerce," Sanford wrote, "the mouth of the Congo will doubtless prove to be the best—that the French will now strive to open the way marked out by their traveller [De Brazza] is probable—it will be very important for the prosperity of their colony, Gabon. It is to be hoped they will not be too prompt about it."(20)

As the French threat grew, Leopold harnessed Sanford's contacts and willingness to employ his stature as former U.S. minister to Belgium. In November 1882, the series of treaties that de Brazza had made with Congo chiefs in 1880 and 1881 in the name of the French were finally ratified by the Quai d'Orsay.(21) This apparent "policy of penetration
in Africa" now posed a particular threat to the Congo mission.(22) Thus, in December, Sanford wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State, Frederick Frelinghuysen, asking that the State Department inquire of the French government "respecting the so called Treaty of De Brazza." Through Frelinghuysen, Sanford, under the pretext of inquiring about French intentions for the new territory, hoped to convince the U.S. government of the threat to its interests posed by France's latest actions. Referring to the ratification of De Brazza's treaties as a French "assumption...based upon the flimsy and specious pretext of a treaty with an ignorant chief, who denies any knowledge of the transaction," Sanford warned Frelinghuysen against ignoring this French behavior. "We could afford to pass over [France's assumptions] without notice, did they affect in no way the interests of this country and its people," he wrote.(23)

At the same time that Sanford performed these services for Leopold, he continued to remind the monarch that he was "at all times entirely at your disposal in any way where I can be of service."(24) Leopold now had a concrete mission for Sanford to accomplish: to gain American recognition for his organization, the future Congo Free State.

III.

As early as 1882, Leopold had Sanford laying the groundwork for gaining United States recognition of the International Association of the Congo. In a letter to Secretary of State Frelinghuysen in late
1882, Sanford revealed not only Leopold's strategy for acquiring recognition of the AIC, but also Sanford's willingness to distort the truth in order to achieve Leopold's goals. Writing, as Sanford stated, "on behalf of no one, only as an American citizen desirous to see his country participate its full share in the important results to follow from what is now going in Africa," Sanford emphasized to Frelinghuysen that the "great commercial powers" were going to have to make a decision over the question of "what is to be done with regard to the Congo." (25) If the U.S. would recognize the flag of their international organization, rather than allow the Congo to fall into the hands of individual nations motivated by "greed, rapacity and the desire to offset cheaply abroad marketing humiliations at home," it would help decide the question. Once the U.S. recognized the international flag of the "International Association," it "could be assured, Great Britain has given too many examples in this way of doing business for herself not to assent to receive such an Embassy if we would." Once the U.S. and Great Britain recognized the flag of the "Association," the assent of these two nations would naturally draw in that of Germany and other powers would doubtless follow." (26)

Unbeknownst to Frelinghuysen, Sanford also revealed another tenet of Leopold's strategy in his letter to the Secretary of State. Secrecy as to the nature of the AIC remained of grave importance. Emphasizing an international flavor of the enterprise—the concept of a Free State open to the commercial use of all powers, but at the same time kept under control by one organization, remained the most palatable and saleable attribute of the Association. (27) Thus, when referring to the
organization in question, Leopold and his agents continued to employ the term African International Association, although that organization had not had a meeting of its international committees since 1877, and the committees themselves had long since competed against each other in the Congo for territory. De Brazza had explored under the auspices of the French Committee of the AIA, while the Belgian committee had become the Comite D'Etudes du Haut-Congo, which also had been defunct since 1879. However, in his letter to Frelinghuysen, Sanford referred to the AIA as though it remained a thriving international organization.

"I am a member of the executive committee of the African International Association founded by the King of the Belgians for the purpose of opening up equatorial Africa to civilizing influences by a series of ports to stretch across from ocean to ocean." (28) Sanford continued to expound on the international nature of this enterprise and described in detail the composition of the organization. "This society has branches in most civilized countries and on this continent of Europe are generally presided over by members of their reigning families (in France by M. De Lesseps and in the United States by M. Latrobe of Baltimore and M. Daly of New York." (29) Never referring to the "AIC", Sanford continued to describe the composition of the basically defunct "AIA". Thus, in continual references to the "Association," while Sanford and Leopold were referring to the AIC, those they were entreating for recognition were hearing the "AIA."

In the same letter to Frelinghuysen, Sanford emphasized Stanley's American citizenship, thus further employing the specific tactics that would become common in his arguments to convince the U.S. to take a
greater interest in African affairs. Although Stanley was never a naturalized American citizen, Leopold and Sanford continually manipulated Stanley's status as an American explorer to bolster their argument that United States had a right and duty to involve itself in the Congo mission. Stanley, in fact, chose to regard himself as an American citizen.

Stanley had been born in England as John Rowlands. Abandoned by his family, he eventually made it to the U.S. where he was taken in and raised as an American. The name he eventually took as his own was that of his surrogate parent, Henry Morton Stanley. After finding Livingstone in Ujiji in 1871, he had returned to England which he apparently, regardless of his American benefactor in the U.S., still regarded as home. However, in England, his accomplishment was greeted with scorn and scepticism. The President of the Royal Geographical Society even wrote that Stanley hadn't discovered Livingstone but that Livingstone had discovered Stanley. From this point on, Stanley began to emphasize American mannerisms and characteristics and increasingly took on the persona of an American. However, although he stated at one point, "I am undoubtedly a citizen of the United States, I claim and possess all rights of an American citizen," he, in fact, for most of his life was a man without a country. In 1885 Stanley would learn that he never had official American citizenship, would resume British citizenship and even become a member of Parliament late in life.

Any question of Stanley's American citizenship was inconsequential to Leopold and Sanford, however. They needed Stanley to be American
and they used this assumption for all it was worth. Sanford wrote to Frelinghuysen, "But the Congo, discovered by an American, [Stanley], now engaged in opening it to civilization and the whole world under the direction and the lavish, unselfish expenditure of the philanthropic King of the Belgians without any restriction—the United States has a lively interest in."(34) Such an argument was very effective. John Kasson, Minister to Austria, was very struck by the fact that an "American" had opened the Congo to the world's view and chastized the U.S. government for not being as energetic and imaginative in its foreign policy as its citizen, Stanley, was in his explorations.(35) During the campaign for American recognition of the Free State, repeated references to Stanley's American citizenship would appear in the letters and reports issued by the Secretary of State and President Arthur seeking to bolster their argument that the United States should recognize the Association. Sanford's emphasis on the United States's obligation to support an American explorer's efforts thus proved very successful.

Sanford's next tactic was to emphasize the great economic opportunities available to American business interests. "It is to that vast river and its tributaries," he wrote, "exceeding our own Mississippi in extent and agricultural resources, teeming with a population estimated by Mr. Stanley at 80,000,000 of [sic] people 'thirsting for trade' it is to that...more than any hitherto unoccupied part of the inhabitable globe that we are to look for relief from the overproduction which now threatens us in some of our manufactures."(36)
Implied in Sanford's words was the philanthropic duty of the U.S. government to recognize the "Association." Particularly with the large black population of the United States, it was the duty of the American government to support an organization devoted to the elimination of the slave trade. King Leopold II, this "liberal and large-minded Prince," had selflessly donated his time and money to completing this necessary civilizing enterprise, according to Sanford. He "is expending about a million annually for this benefit of humanity and of civilization with the unselfish desire that all the civilized world may participate equally in the benefits to be derived." According to Sanford, King Leopold would happily continue with the current situation if it were not for acquisitive infringers waiting to take advantage of his benevolence. "I say that the flag of the Association would suffice, and protect the work for the benefit of all, but public attention having now been directed to the Congo and greed [and] rapacity...are not to permit this peaceful work to go on undisturbed."(37) Thus, it was up to the "great commercial powers," such as the U.S. to save the Congo basin and recognize the sovereignty of the Association in that region, and thus "recognize the importance of civilization and commerce."(38)

Thus, as early as 1882, in attempting to convince the American government of its duty to recognize the Association, Sanford had emphasized three compelling arguments, the fact that its explorer, Stanley, was an "American," the great economic opportunities available to those countries that threw their support to the AIA, and the philanthropic spirit behind the organization in its desire to "introduce civilizing influences" and eliminate the slave trade in Africa.
In convincing the American private sector of the need to recognize the Association, Sanford directed his persuasive arguments to two more powerful interest groups, those who continued to regard African colonization as a solution to what they considered to be the "negro problem" and those who believed that the United States should take a greater interest in international affairs and thus take its rightful place as a world power as a means of eliminating the nation's impending trade surplus. Three figures who represented these ideas and played roles in the United States's recognition of the Association and participation in the Berlin West African Conference are John Latrobe, John Tyler Morgan, and John A. Kasson. Both John Latrobe, President of the American Colonization Society, and Alabama Senator John Tyler Morgan were greatly interested in the colonization potential of the Congo. Sanford had already emphasized this possibility to Latrobe. Morgan was also a strong economic expansionist whose chief interest, along with John Kasson, lay in America's international responsibility to expand economically. Kasson, expressing his opinion in articles for the North American Review, believed that it was time for the U.S. to assert itself as a world power and secure markets for American manufacturers. Sanford would appeal to each of their specific interests and in the process gain strong support for American recognition of the AIA.

Sanford's greatest work in this area lay in the future, with his "Washington Campaign," when he would travel to the U.S. capitol and systematically convince these varied interest groups of the need to secure the neutrality of the Congo region by recognizing the AIC. At
this time, he concentrated on preparations for the campaign. (39)

Evidence points to Colonel Strauch (40,41) as having conceived the idea of sending Sanford to Washington. (42) As early as May, 1883, Strauch seems to have been thinking in this vein when he had Sanford read copies of the Antislavery Review and thus get a feel of the national sentiment at the moment. (43) Sanford certainly believed that something should be done to block an Anglo-Portuguese grasp on the Congo mouth. Devaux wrote him, "As you say, if such a good thing can be done, there is no time to be lost, for I strongly suspect that the French and Portuguese are very much engaged in carrying out some mischief which might smash us at once." (44)

The initial step toward the "Washington Campaign" was a letter drafted to President Arthur by Leopold, which Sanford translated. The letter suggested that Arthur consider sending an American Consul to the Congo area. A follow up letter was drafted by Leopold in June and translated by Sanford offering to pay the consul from the funds of the "International Association." (45) Arthur responded to these letters by expressing deep interest in the work of the AIC and promising to explore the possibility of recognition of the AIC. (46)

Leopold continued to woo Arthur, keeping him apprised on the progress of the Association in Africa. "I am encouraged to further inform you," he wrote, "that the work of the Association in Africa continues to be rapidly and pacifically developed." (47)

Sanford not only translated Leopold's letters but also offered valuable advice to Leopold regarding wording and content. This is seen clearly in the case of the next letter written to President Arthur in
October, 1883. Leopold dictated the letter to Sanford. Sanford, while translating, compiled a set of suggestions for Leopold to consider. The original draft by Leopold and the final copy, sent to Arthur, provide an excellent example of Sanford's editing. Sanford's notes, referring to the conclusion of the letter, advised Leopold that he make the last lines more forceful and suggested that Leopold add to the phrase "the blue standard with the golden star, [the flag of the Association] the words, "which now floats over 17 stations, many territories, steamers engaged in the civilizing work of the Association and over a population of several millions." Almost the exact words appear in the final draft delivered to Arthur.(48)

Colonel Strauch compiled Sanford's extensive dossier of diplomatic documentation to present to the U.S. government and the various interest groups from whom Sanford sought help.(49) In the meantime, the King and Sanford worked to perfect the letter requesting that Arthur consider recognizing the Association as the protector and insurer of neutrality in the claimed region. Leopold dictated the rough draft to Sanford and Sanford translated and revised.

I wish...to renew the proposition I made to you and to add another. I would be pleased by a convention or a declaration of the International Association, representing the states of the Congo, before mentioned, to assure to the United States freedom from customs duties upon all products of your country into our independent territories, and that citizens of the United States shall have full liberty, while conforming themselves to the laws of those territories, to acquire and occupy lands, to trade there, and to enjoy therein all privileges which may hereafter be given to the citizens or subjects of other nations. We would be glad to accept from the United States, in such a form that may be deemed proper, by letter or by treaty, our proposal to your
country. Also the official announcement that the Government of the United States has given to its agents on land and sea instructions to treat as a friendly (and if possible as a neutral one) the blue standard with the golden star which now floats over 17 stations, many territories, 7 steamers engaged in the civilizing work of the Association and over a population of several millions.(50)

Finally, by mid-November, armed with the completed letter to the President and an extensive dossier, Sanford was ready to depart for Washington with high hopes of successfully completing the "Washington Campaign." Included in his papers was an elaborate code devised by Strauch. Sanford was to periodically telegraph Brussels in code with updates on his progress.(51) Arriving in New York on November, 27, 1883, Strauch cabled to Sanford, "We had no Joseph at spot occupied by Louis. Hand the letter...William."(52) Translated, the telegraph seems to say, "We had no sovereign right at the spot occupied by Portugal." "William" was code for Strauch, while "Hand the letter" presumably merely reminded Sanford to travel directly to Washington and personally deliver Leopold's letter to Arthur.

IV.

Sanford needed to direct his attention towards the executive branch, specifically President Arthur and his Secretary of State, Frederick Frelinghuysen, and the legislative branch and private sector, represented for the purposes of this study by Alabama Senator John Tyler Morgan, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
John Latrobe, president of the American Colonization Society, John Kasson, the future delegate to the Berlin Conference, and Charles P. Daly, president of the American Colonization Society and with strong ties to the New York Chamber of Commerce.

In terms of the President, "The Washington Campaign" succeeded almost immediately. Within days of delivering Leopold's letter, Leopold and his agents were rewarded in the President's Message. On December 4, 1883, Arthur, standing before Congress, stated,

The rich and populous valley of the Congo is being opened to commerce by a society called the International African Association, of which the King of the Belgians is the president and a citizen of the United States the chief executive officer. Large tracts of territory have been ceded to the Association by native chiefs, roads have been opened, steam boats placed on the river, and the nuclei of states established at twenty-two stations under one flag which offers freedom of commerce and prohibits the slave trade. The objects of the society are philanthropic. It does not aim at permanent political control, but seeks the neutrality of the valley. The United States cannot be indifferent to this work nor to the interest of their citizens involved in it. It may become advisable for us to cooperate with other commercial powers in promoting the rights of trade and residence in the Congo Valley free from the interference or political control of one nation. (53)

This statement by no means suggested recognizing the Association as a sovereign power over territory in the region. However, Arthur clearly displayed a conviction that Portuguese pretensions of sovereignty in the region, with or without English backing, were unacceptable. The address marked a spirited step in the desired direction. It also incorporates every point of Sanford's strategy aimed toward the government. From freedom of commerce, to the elimination of
the slave trade, to reference to the "African International Association." each of Sanford's campaign tactics were referred to in Arthur's speech.

Devaux wrote to Sanford in glee, "The king wishes me to say that nothing could be better than what the President said in his message, and that H.M. is a thousand times obliged to you for having obtained it." (54) With the President in his corner, Sanford now headed for the State Department, where Frederick Frelinghuysen had been receptive to Sanford's overtures since late 1882. Frelinghuysen had enlisted Sanford's aid in drafting the Congo portion of the president's message and thus already displayed a belief that Portuguese and British claims in the region were unacceptable. (55) Now, Sanford needed to convince Frelinghuysen of the benefits to the U.S. that recognition of a sovereign and viable "neutral" organization in the Congo could provide—a state protecting the freedom of trade in the region for all powers and at the same time "civilizing" and maintaining stability in the region.

Sanford had been approaching the U.S. State Department in relation to neutrality in the Congo since 1881. He wrote to Secretary of State James G. Blaine, concerning "steps [that] should be taken to protect our prospective commerce with that region...by protesting against its military occupation by any power...and...by an understanding with the commercial powers against the exclusive sovereignty...by any nation and the free and unrestricted intercourse of all." (56) Blaine, while expressing himself as an economic expansionist, centered his energies in the Western Hemisphere, where he hoped "to cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a
larger increase in the export trade of the United States" (57) and thus showed little interest in commercial prospects in Africa.

While little had come of his overtures to Blaine, Sanford had stepped up the pressure in 1882 with the new Secretary of State, emphasizing the increasing power struggles centered around the Congo. Frelinghuysen, even more than Blaine, was a firm economic expansionist. While also devoting much of his efforts to South America (he signed an agreement with Nicaragua for an American-Nicaraguan canal, stating, "It opens the markets of Asia and the west coast of South America to the manufacturers of the Atlantic seaboard.") Frelinghuysen was open to the idea of turning American eyes and markets toward the African interior. (58)

As already noted, Sanford had made his first overture to Frelinghuysen in December, 1882, when, concerned about French pretensions, he wrote, "I feel assured that the watchful solicitude of yourself and our own government will not allow to pass unheeded any attempt to secure exclusive privileges in that region by any power, great or petty." (59)

Throughout the spring and summer of 1883, he wrote to Frelinghuysen, updating him on the progress in Parliament of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. "I believe the question of a treaty with Portugal has not been abandoned," he wrote, "Portugal shall give a foothold for British influences," and he suggested that Frelinghuysen inquire of Britain as to her intentions. "There might be a point of departure on [their?] side in sounding out the British Govt. as to some harmonious action in the protection of commerce and the civilizing influences at
work there" he wrote. (60) The urgency in Sanford's letters increased as the Portuguese and English moved toward signing the treaty. "I beg leave to say this action of Portugal in exercising acts of sovereignty at Banana point [the mouth of the Congo] is bringing this important International protection...question rapidly to a head." (61)

His words appealed to Frelinghuysen, who sought to proceed in the desired direction, albeit cautiously. In a response marked "Confidential," Frelinghuysen wrote, "I can say to you that my own judgement is in favor of the recognition of the neutrality of the stations along the Congo, and I shall not fail to call the President's attention to the subject." "However," he added, "my opinion on this subject...if used at all must be used confidentially." (62)

With this response, Sanford wrote to Frelinghuysen, "I am greatly gratified to learn of your intentions.... I doubt not the whole country will applaud this act of far seeing statesmanship and will profit largely by the opening thus assured to our Enterprise and surplus manufacturers." To Devaux, he wrote gleefully of his words to Frelinghuysen, "There! I think that ought to help keep him up to the mark he has been so slow to reach!" (63)

Thus, by Sanford's November arrival in the U.S., he already had Frelinghuysen leaning toward recognition. In a show of support, Frelinghuysen, at Sanford's request, sent a U.S. Naval man-of-war to the mouth of the Congo. (64)

With the executive branch firmly inclined toward recognition, Leopold now instructed Sanford to test the waters of the legislative
branch. "The King is very anxious to hear from you what the
dispositions of the Senate are," wrote Devaux. Thus Sanford now
turned his attention to Congress and the private sector. Armed with
his dossier, Sanford and his wife settled in Washington at the Edward
Everett mansion on G street. Here, he and his wife embarked on what he
considered to be one of the most effective methods of diplomacy:
lobbying through the stomach. At one point, on discussing a diplomatic
maneuver, Sanford stated, "This cannot be done simply by subsidizing
certain organs of the press; it can be accomplished mainly over a table
with good cheer and good liquor upon it and good company around it. I
have the greatest faith in this as the best of weapons." So famed
for his methods was Sanford that he was termed "the gastronomic
diplomat" in a hostile newspaper article entitled "Blue Ribbon
Sanford."

Sanford now employed his "gastronomic" methods with a vengence in
a frenzy of parties and formal suppers during this stay in Washington.
The letters addressed to him from Latrobe, Morgan and Kasson during
this period are heavily peppered with profuse gratitude for his
hospitality and that of his beautiful wife, Gertrude, who Sanford
utilized to entertain and charm his guests. Latrobe, in several
letters, referred to the stimulating conversation at Sanford's dinner
table and thanked him emphatically for a wonderful time. "What a
charming dinner that was at your home and in such a queenly presence
too." That sentiment toward Gertrude was echoed with a passion by
John Kasson who was so mesmerized by Gertrude's beauty that he even
carried her picture. Kasson had been the beneficiary of Sanford's form
of diplomacy for years and in letters to others wrote lengthy descriptions of Sanford's hospitality and Gertrude's beauty. (69)

In this vein, Sanford turned his attention to the multifarious interest groups he wished to influence. The idea of colonization as a solution to America's "peculiar interest," as John Latrobe termed the the size of America's black population, was one of these peripheral interests that Sanford continued to incorporate into this arc of diplomacy.

V.

During the 1850's and 1860's the idea of the American government creating colonies for the resettlement of the freed slaves in Africa had been considered by many a feasible solution to the "black problem." The fear held by American whites concerning the consequences of freeing the slaves was a common social attitude of the period. Envisioning that emancipation would mean an eventual mass resettlement of blacks in the Northeast, many feared the saturation of the work force by blacks and loss of jobs for whites. Others were simply concerned that a mass influx of freed slaves, with their "remarkable fecundity" (70) would mean the eventual elimination of the white race in America. In *The North American Review*, Charles Gardiner, for example, informed the reader of "thorough research" that produced data showing the "American problem [to be] the most difficult that has confronted a civilized
people," and with one exception, "has no parallel in ancient history." According to this "research," while the "predominance of white blood increases cerebral development...the presence of one-quarter, one-eighth, or one-sixteenth produces a brain capacity decidedly inferior to that of the pure negro" which the research had already proven to be decidedly inferior to the caucasian, according to Gardiner. He thus prophesied that "whites would be absorbed by negroes, not negroes by whites, and the brain capacity of the mixed race would be less to that of the pure negro. Fifty years hence," he predicted, "when negroes will surpass whites as three to one, the mongrel race will represent brain capacity decidedly inferior to the negro of pure blood." For Gardiner, unless something was done, the United States was doomed.\(^{(71)}\)

Moderate Republicans, such as Lincoln, and conservative Republicans considered the possibility of returning the freed slaves to their homeland and thus eliminating the problem altogether.\(^{(72)}\) Before the Emancipation Proclamation Lincoln had hoped to gradually free the slaves and simultaneously set up colonies for those blacks willing to emigrate. These hopes were dashed with the Emancipation Proclamation, however: and as the historian, George M. Fredrickson discusses, for various reasons, mainly the realization that such a solution would be impossibly complicated, and the proposition of colonization as a government policy was discounted. Many prominent individuals, however, continued to believe that colonization was a valid solution. Two of these were Senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama and John Latrobe of Maryland, President of the American Colonization Society.
The call for colonization had been on the wane in the late 1860's and 1870's, due in part to the "half unconscious," (73) macabre belief--supported by the racial Darwinian concept of the black race as the inferior one--that the freed blacks would be unable to adjust to the fast paced white world and would soon die out. "Many Northerners...entered the postwar era with a strong suspicion that the blacks would not survive emancipation." (74) Those Americans who regarded the black in Darwinist terms saw as inevitable the eventual extinction of blacks who sought to succeed as equals in the white world. (75) Those who subscribed to this theory believed the census reports would prove their theory. But the 1880 census shook many of these manipulators of natural selection into a frenzy of doubt. "All predictions that the black population would quietly fade were thrown into a cocked hat when the census of 1880 appeared to demonstrate that the rate of increase of Southern Negroes was substantially greater than that of whites." (76) Charles Gardiner wrote in 1884, "The census of 1880 disclosed the fact that...increasing two per cent annually, whites will double in every thirty years, while negroes...will double in every twenty years." (77)

Their dark hopes dashed, these "prophets of extinction" began searching for alternatives. (78) In an article entitled "The African in the United States," Professor E.W. Gilliam called vehemently for the colonization of American blacks. Arguing that because of the "remarkable fecundity of the African," the black population would eventually take over the white population, and that the United States must protect its racial purity by sending the blacks packing. Gilliam
argued that because all free peoples seek to advance themselves, the black population would become increasingly frustrated with inability—because of its inferiority—to catch up. "The fact that fusion [of blacks and whites] is impossible no one in his senses can deny," he wrote, and if the black remained in the U.S. "the advancement of the blacks [would become] a menace to the whites. No two free races remaining distinctly apart can advance side by side without a struggle for supremacy," and eventually the black race, gaining increasing power due to its ever enlarging numbers, "will assert that power destructively, and bursting forthlike an angry, furious cloud, avenge, in tumult and disorder."(79) "These are real and gigantic evils gradually looming up," he wrote," and they merit the immediate and best attention of American statesmen...Colonization, we conceive, is the remedy." He further wrote, "we have an impression that a move was made in Congress last winter by some Senator, looking to the acquisition of territory in Central America as a home for the blacks."(80)

Certainly one such Senator was John Tyler Morgan who, with the persuasion of Henry Shelton Sanford, would, within a year, look toward Central Africa as a future repository for the unwanted black Americans. Morgan, a devoted white supremacist, had been a member of the Alabama secession convention in 1861 and was made brigadier-general in the Confederate army. Elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 1876, Morgan fought for white supremacy by, for example, ardently opposing the Blair education bill for eradicating Southern illiteracy.(81)

Seemingly responding to those who predicted racial extinction, Morgan, writing in 1884, pointed out that the black was developing in
both strength and numbers. "The negro is a physically strong man," he wrote, "in his native land...his stature is good, and his muscular development...is sinewy, tense and powerful. In America, he has gained greater height...ease and smoothness of movement...nothing in the census reports indicates that the negro race in the United States will not increase in numbers." Their "power and importance" would grow in the United States, he predicted, but "in this country, this growth will avail but little for their advantage. Here they have to encounter personal, individual competition with the white man." And their successes would be dimmed by the jealousy of their "caste." Thus, he prophesied, "race-prejudice will forever remain as an incubus on all their individual or aggregated efforts."(82)

The solution, Morgan believed, was colonization. And the best place for colonization, for Morgan, was "a land that has been under the seal of darkness until now:" Central Africa. Here, he wrote, "we seem to discover the natural theater for negro development, and welcome it as a door opened by the hand of Providence to the Africans who have gained the powers incident to Christian civilization while in bondage, and are now prepared to enter upon their inheritance with the assurance of success."(83) "The Free States of the Congo," said Morgan, was the American black's "first real opportunity to prove himself worthy of the liberties and civilization which he has been endowed."(84)

This theme, that the great benefits that the American black had reaped while in the United States could be exported to Africa with him, and thus serve to "civilize" his African relatives, was underscored by John Latrobe. Latrobe, whose presidency of the American
Colonization Society spanned from 1853, when he succeeded Henry Clay, until his death in 1891, was a very active member of the organization. He developed the first map of Liberia and devoted much time to helping found the colony of Maryland at Cape Palmas which later became a county of Liberia. The Maryland Colonization Society—organizers of the Maryland colony—had been created in 1831, in reaction to the Nat Turner rebellion. This society reflected more of the aversion to the freed blacks than did the American Colonization society and actually tried to pass laws to forcibly deport blacks from America. Since Liberia's independence in 1847, the American Colonization Society had increasingly become more of an emigration society, helping blacks to leave the United States. (85)

As a founder of the Maryland Colonization Society and president of both the American Colonization Society and the American branch of the AIA, Latrobe was perhaps the most actively involved of any American in colonizing the American black population in the second half of the nineteenth century.

For Latrobe, the United States had a "peculiar interest" in the opening of Central Africa. That peculiar interest was the size of its American black population. Sanford, understanding Latrobe's beliefs, used this attitude to its full advantage. Writing to Latrobe in 1877, Sanford emphasized that he believed it was the role of American blacks to civilize Africa.

"Near 5,000,000 of our people are of African race—descendants of slaves; contact with the white races and lately emancipation, education, and equality of political rights have made them by far superiors of the parent race and will tend to excite a spirit of enterprise, ambitions and desires for which central Africa opens a wide, peculiarly appropriate field. Physically they are better
adapted than the whites to its climate and to undergo fatigues... (it is a topic) well worthy the attention of our citizens and our philanthropic spirit." (86)

Latrobe responded,

"I cordially [agree] to all you say of the peculiar interest that we, in the United States, have in the exploration of Africa. For more than half a century now, I have been advocating the idea that Africa is to be civilized, not by occasional efforts, here and there, of enthusiastic travellers, or devoted white missionaries, but by the emigration at their own cost, of the colored people of the United States to that continent." (87)

Sanford seems to have believed that a helpful tactic would be to parade blacks eager to emigrate and requested that Latrobe find blacks who would publicly attest to a desire to help settle the Congo. Interestingly, Latrobe greeted this request with little enthusiasm, and responded,

"I have your note of yesterday. In the first place, my extremely intelligent colored porter tells me there are no leading men among them here, and if there were, I am afraid, their advocacy of any proper connection with Africa would tend to diminish if not destroy their popularity. The better sort of the race in Baltimore are too comfortable, too much respected...to take any interest in Africa or anything African...nothing can be done in this quarter." (88)

A tactic that Latrobe and Sanford agreed upon was to emphasize Liberia as an historical precedent for the recognition of the AIA as the sovereign power in the Congo. Like the Association, the American Colonization Society was a private organization that privately colonized Liberia. The Association hoped to use this precedent in order to achieve a similar recognition of the Congo Free State. Latrobe provided historical sketches and documents from the Colonization Society pertaining to the recognition of Liberia by the United States.
Describing the origins of Liberia as "the work of a benevolent association gradually developing into a nation whose flag is recognized everywhere, and with which all the civilized nations of the world have treaties," Latrobe believed that there was "no better precedent to be found anywhere for the establishment of colonies on the Congo under a common head...with a recognized flag just as the American Colonization Society was the representation in the United States of the infant settlement on the S.W. coast of Africa."(89)

Although confused, like most, over the identity of the Association, ("What, in good plain English, do the words, 'Comite d'Etudes du Haut Congo' mean?" he would write to Sanford) he acted as a learned envoy, responding to "unlearned questioners" who desired more information on the Congo project.(90) He committed to write to U.S. Senators who he knew personally "as soon as there is a resolution to be voted upon....I...do not think they will have any trouble voting for it," he predicted.(91) In addition, Latrobe repeatedly offered the quarters of the Colonization Society as an office for Sanford if he needed it while staying in Washington. He saw Sanford as, "the most efficient emissary [sic],"(92) and on the U.S.recognition of the AIA, in April,1884, congratulated Sanford on "your very great success in this whole affair. Mr. Webster once said to me that Results afforded the true standard by which to measure men--you have illustrated the application of this rule."(93)

So inspired was Latrobe by the Congo project, "and the notice taken of my agency in connection with Liberia," he wrote a paper for the Maryland Historical Society on the origins and history of Liberia, in
which he discussed Sanford's work. Referring to the Congo project as the "noblest work that prince or potentate has had a hand in for centuries," Latrobe remained an ardent supporter of Sanford's efforts.

VI.

As discussed by Milton Flesur, with American industrial expansion in the 1880's came a perception of overproduction and a need to search for markets. Coupled with this desire for economic expansion was a concern for American prestige in the world community. Thus, the years preceding the Spanish American war represented an "incubation period" of America's impending empire. "The new departure had its roots in the quiet years of the gilded age." One American who reflected these views was John A. Kasson.

There has surfaced no evidence that John Kasson had any influence on the recognition of the Association. However, when Stanley emerged from his successful exploration along the Congo river in 1877, Kasson responded enthusiastically to Stanley's reports of rich commercial prospects in the region. As Minister to Austria, he wrote home of the great interest the Austrians displayed in the commercial prospects reported by Stanley and complained about the American government's refusal in its foreign policy to live up to the drive and energy of citizens such as Stanley. Moreover, as his biographer states, "Feeling
as he did about expansion, Kasson naturally approved recognition of Leopold's stations.\((97)\) When the King of the Belgians request that Kasson help, as Minister to Germany, to attain German recognition of the future Free State, Kasson heartily complied.\((98)\)

John Kasson, through the post-war era, had gradually evolved into an ardent economic expansionist and a spokesman for the American businessman. Kasson believed American expansion of foreign trade was crucial to American economic well being and became increasingly frustrated by what he observed as the feckless American isolationism. How much longer," he asked,

is our unobservant Congress to shut its eyes to the sagacious extension of the commercial lines and positions of foreign countries? How much longer are we to continue blind to the demands for new markets for our already excessive and rapidly increasing production? How much longer fail to seize opportunities for the wider distribution of our manufactures?\((99)\)

Kasson's ideas for a new American foreign policy agenda included expansion of the Monroe Doctrine and acquisition of overseas territory. As Minister to Austria from 1877 to 1881, Kasson observed the pervasive imperialistic energy in Europe and felt that U.S. was being left behind. \((100)\) When he returned home in 1881, he wrote two articles in the \textit{North American Review} beseeching the American public to "implore Congress and the Executive to release themselves, in part, from interior political struggles, and to remember that it is the duty of statesmanship to anticipate the future."\((101)\)

For Kasson, the refusal of the U.S. to "plant" its money into opening overseas markets would cause the American agricultural and manufacturing surplus to "roll back from the Atlantic coast upon the
interior," and the "wheels of prosperity" would be "clogged by the very richness of the burden which they carry, but cannot deliver."

Refraining from acquiring outlying possessions, for Kasson, was "at this stage of our history, simply imbecile." (102)

Thus, in the case of the Congo, as his biographer states, "He would seize any and every opportunity to further the interest of the Association, whose interest," Kasson believed, "was also the American interest." (103) Although in 1881 his expansionist vision was focussed on South America, when the Congo issue arose, Kasson would fight for, and ardently defend, American participation. By recognizing the AIA and participating in the Berlin Conference, Kasson stated, "we gain everything which we could gain by owning the country [the Congo], except the expense of governing it." (104)

As already discussed, Senator Morgan remained convinced that the solution to the "negro problem" lay in the colonization of Africa by black American emigrees. (105) In addition, Morgan, like Kasson, was an ardent economic expansionist who introduced and supported much of the expansionist legislation proposed in the Senate. (He was the "foremost advocate" of a Central American canal, always discussing it in terms of economic benefits for the U.S. He also advocated annexing Cuba, and bringing in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii as states.) (106) Moreover, he is cited by one historian as having viewed the "Congo's throngs of unclad natives" as seeming "to offer an unlimited market" for southern textiles. (107)
Thus, Sanford appealed to Morgan with two compelling arguments and, by January 1884, had successfully interested the Senator in the Congo region. "I am reading up on Congo and the attitudes of Portugal," he wrote Sanford. (108) Morgan, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, held considerable power over American foreign policy issues. By February, 1884, Sanford had Morgan wielding his power for the recognition of the Association. Morgan wrote to the Secretary of State, asking him to look into the Anglo-Portuguese treaty and inform Morgan on the direction that Frelinghuysen wished Congress to take. "As I wish to aid and not retard any movement that will give us footing there," he wrote Sanford, "I am reluctant to do anything in the absence of information as to the policy of the administration." (109) However, without this concrete evidence, Morgan was still convinced that England's motives for the Anglo-Portuguese treaty were antithetical to American interests. "No one should mistake the policy of England in such matters," he wrote, "It is historical and unchanging. The English will always find the way to their interests whatever it may cost in anything but money. So they will agree quickly with Portugal that through that power, they may increase their traffic with Congo and monopolize its trade." (110) Thus, Morgan displayed an eagerness for the project before he had even received the information he needed in order to commit himself to attaining U.S. recognition of the Association.

Further building on his expansionist lobby, Sanford turned his attention toward the American business community. Sanford directed
this tactic toward the powerful New York Chamber of Commerce, using the influence of his friend Judge Charles P. Daly, president of the American Geographical society and organizer of the original American national committee of the AIA in 1877. Daly firmly believed that the U.S. should recognize the Association. Upon Sanford's arrival, Daly placed himself at the service of Sanford. Before Arthur delivered his message on December 4, Daly, probably at the request of Sanford, wrote the president and informed him of his views. "I said nothing about your visit," he wrote Sanford, "but only about my own views of the necessity of immediate action and what action should be taken—the official recognition of the Association by our government." Thus, seemingly without the instigation of Leopold's agent, influential citizens were now calling on Arthur to recognize the Association. Believing that the President's Message was "all that is necessary to begin the movement," Daly pledged to continue his pressure and "follow it up here," in New York.

He was true to his word. On January 2, the New York Times predicted that as "the Commercial interests involved are so important, that the influence of Commercial bodies in this country may properly be expected and action will probably be soon taken by the Chamber of Commerce in this city." Eight days later, through Daly, Sanford was able to convince the Chamber to issue two resolutions on January 10, 1884. Introduced by A.A. Low, the first resolution condemned Portugal's efforts to gain sovereignty over the mouth of the Congo, while the second resolution called on the United States to recognize the Association's sovereignty in the region. The resolution read:
Resolved that the recognition by the Government of the United States of the flag of the International African Association now extending over twenty-two settlements, in the heart of Africa, will be but an acknowledgement of the fact that that organization, under rights ceded to it by African chiefs of independent territories, is exercising rule and authority over a large part of Africa...and that it be recommended to the President to send an accredited agent of the Government to the Congo, to confer with that Association on the adopting of such measures, as may secure to American citizens free commercial intercourse along the course of that river and through the various settlements or stations established by the Association."

Both resolutions were passed unanimously. The following day, the New York Times reported the resolutions and commented in a lengthy editorial that they "should receive prompt attention of the Federal Government." In glowing terms the editorial predicted the Congo region to be "the source of enormous trade" and expressed the belief that "United States can rightly lend its most active and earnest co-operation" to "the establishment of absolute neutrality in such a region and its opening to the commerce and peaceful enterprise of all nations."(117) At Leopold's expense, the resolutions were printed and delivered to influential people such as congressmen and members of chambers of commerce around the country.(118)

In addition, Sanford transmitted the resolutions to Morgan which were clearly helpful to him in the Senate, where he could refer to them as evidence of a desire among American business interests for the U.S. to play a greater role in securing new markets. "I have Major Low's resolutions [resolutions of the New York Chamber of Commerce] and will be glad to have his speech if he wrote one," wrote Morgan to Sanford.(119) From Latrobe, Sanford gleaned the details of the creation
of Liberia and sent them to Morgan. Morgan used Latrobe's information in his report to the Senate.

VII.

The Alabama Senator, through January and February of 1884, corresponded with Frelinghuysen, gradually learning more and more about the Congo and the Association. By March, Frelinghuysen had accepted all of Sanford's arguments and had become convinced of the viability of the AIA and the need to recognize its claims in Central Africa. Frelinghuysen wrote Morgan on March 13, that "the protection of life and property of our citizens requires that something should be done." Using almost the identical wording of Sanford, Frelinghuysen demonstrated the degree to which Sanford had influenced the Secretary of State. Frelinghuysen wrote Morgan that the Portuguese claims could not be allowed to extend to the Upper Congo where, "discovered by an American and opened to the world and to civilization by the African International Association...to this region, free access both by land and water, should be secured to our citizens and trade." In one sentence, Frelinghuysen's words exemplified Sanford's skill
at persuading others to accept his statements as the truth. Not only had Sanford managed to keep Frelinghuysen convinced that the AIA was the "Association" that the U.S. was being asked to recognize, without any question of the Comite or the AIC coming into the picture, but also Frelinghuysen demonstrated his conviction that Stanley's adopted nationality as an American played an important role in the issue. (121)

Frelinghuysen continued to describe the AIA exactly as Sanford had explained it to him. Rather than describing the current Belgian based AIC (the actual "Association" that Leopold wanted recognized) Frelinghuysen described the AIA, detailing even the Executive Committee, with its three representatives of the "English-speaking, Germanic, and Latin races." (122) No mention was made of the fact that the last meeting of the AIA was in 1877 or that Belgian national committee of AIA had become a separate unit and had been renamed the "Comite D'Etudes Du Haut Congo."

There was, in addition, no mention that this committee and the French national committee of the AIA had been competing for territory for the past five years, or that the Comite had been disbanded in 1878 and the International Association of the Congo subsequently created, an organization completely devoid of the "International" aspect, except in name, and completely under the control of Leopold II. Frelinghuysen demonstrated no hint of such alterations. "The African International Association," he wrote,

has for its sole object, the development of the vast, fertile and populous regions of Central Africa, by a chain of posts or stations under its flag, which shall give hospitality and aid to all comers traders, or missionaries, or others. (123)
The government's attention had been called to the situation in the Congo because, he continued, a neutral association was "in the interests of our citizens seeking trade with that vast and fertile region, and [was] an outlet for the overproduction of our manufactures," and also was "a practical means of striking at the roots of the slave trade." The way to assure "protection to our citizens in their legitimate enterprises," for Frelinghuysen, was the "recognition, as a friendly flag, of the flag of the International Association which floats over these stations as a sign of protection and of civilization around it, and the appointment of an Agent of the Government to reside there." (124) In return for simple recognition of the Association's claims in the region, the Association would allow the importation of American goods into the region, duty free, and would assure the rights of any American to "hold property and to exercise every legitimate pursuit." In short, any American would be treated as a citizen.(125)

For the United States, the offer by Leopold to allow the U.S. to share in all of the economic benefits of controlling an area without the complications of political control should have appeared to be too good to believe. But there is no hint of any such suspicions in any of Frelinghuysen's words. Frelinghuysen, his words further attesting to Sanford's skills, went on to inform Morgan of the precedents that justified a private organization assuming political control in a region, Liberia being the most notable. "Liberia," he wrote, "like the States of the Congo, was founded by private citizens united in a philanthropic association and it derived no authority from the Government." Thus,
Frelinghuysen reasoned that because the territory controlled by the Association had been ceded to it by tribal chiefs in seventy-nine treaties, that the State Department could not "but admit" that the territorial rights of those "native princes...appear to have been duly ceded to the International Association." (126) Such being the case, Frelinghuysen saw no reason "why the United States may not recognize such sovereign powers, and thereby secure protection for the legitimate enterprises of our citizens," and neither did Morgan. With both the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in their corner, it was only a matter of time before Leopold and his agents succeeded in their goal.

VIII.

In all of their instructions and correspondence to Sanford, Leopold and his secretary, Devaux, expressed continual and profuse gratitude and satisfaction. After the President's message Devaux wrote, "The King wishes me to say that nothing could be better than what the President said in his message.... H.M. is a thousand times obliged to you for having obtained it."(127) "What you say and do is perfection and I am commanded to express the King's gratitude." Devaux wrote in one letter.(128) After the resolution by the New York Chamber of Commerce was issued, Devaux wrote to Sanford, "I got your letter of Jan'y 17 and have no end of thanks to convey to you from the King. You are doing
things in such a way that instructions are completely useless says H.M. (129) In another letter he wrote “I have yours from 27 Feb. You have done wonders. The King wants me to say that nothing can be better and also how very thankful he feels for your valuable efforts.” (130)

In the meantime, Leopold, through Devaux, sent updates of Stanley’s and De Brazza’s progress in the Congo, and extensive advice and information for Sanford to employ in his arguments.

The urgency to obtain American recognition increased as England and Portugal moved closer toward signing their treaty. In February, Devaux complained bitterly to Sanford that the Anglo-Portuguese treaty “is the death of all commerce in Central Africa.” Although, as the treaty now stood, England would have access to trade along the Congo River by water, the treaty made no mention of movement by land. Devaux noted that land travel was crucial to transit along the river. Remarking that the “English have been taken in like babies,” Devaux underscored the grave necessity of securing America’s recognition. “Our only hope is that the U.S. will protest energetically.” (131) Finally, on February 24, 1864, the British signed the treaty, hence recognizing Portuguese sovereignty at the mouth of the Congo. Leopold needed the dual influences of American recognition and general international outrage at the pretensions of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, in order to prevent the ruin of his dream. Although the treaty still needed to be ratified by the British Parliament and the European powers, Leopold needed to gain prompt American recognition. (132)

On the same day as the signing of the treaty, Morgan sent Sanford the rough draft of the resolution he was preparing to offer in the Senate the
following day. Requesting advice and criticism, Morgan wrote Sanford, "If I should offer something like this in the Senate tomorrow, it will at least give us a point of inquiry to be specifically addressed to the Secretary of State by the Committee in confidence and will develop an outline of policy."(133) Morgan then sent the draft on to Latrobe for further advice.(134)

The following day, Morgan introduced a joint resolution in the Senate, "Declaring the lawfulness of the occupation of the country drained by the Congo River and its tributaries by the African International Association...and to recognize its flag, and to appropriate money to carry this resolution into effect." It stated that the rights and privileges obtained by the African International Association, "entitle its flag, as the symbol thereof, to the recognition and respect of other countries as the flag of the Free States of the Congo."(135) Interestingly, the following day, because "I have been requested," Morgan introduced a second resolution that merely called for the President to take "such measures as may be necessary to assure protection to our citizens and their trade in the territories called the Free States of the Congo."(136)

Both resolutions were sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations for study. There the resolutions sat little touched until the Committee concluded deliberations over the Mexican Treaty. In the meantime, both Sanford and Latrobe continued to collect data for Morgan to use in the Committee. "Won't you get up the instances in our history of the treaties made by those who came to America as private people, not under charters, and made treaties with the Indians. In such cases, all that has been
done in Congo is fully justified both as to the right of the tribes...and also of the immigrants," Morgan requested. (137)

Finally, the Committee began examining the material and by March 22, had completed its report. Morgan sent the report to Sanford asking that it be kept confidential until he delivered it to the Senate. (138)

Although the attitude toward the resolutions were "excellent," as Morgan said, the Committee asked numerous questions about every aspect of the Association and Morgan found himself devoid of much of the pertinent information. Morgan asked Sanford for such documents as a declaration of the Association or an official statement of the "objects and purposes" of the International Association and furthermore warned Sanford against "anything that can't be fully explained." (139)

Sanford, in turn, apparently demanded of both Daly and Latrobe documentation that Sanford may once have sent to the Geographical Society in the 1870's. In several letters both responded, almost defensively, to Sanford's requests, saying that they had no such documents nor could they remember ever having seen the sought after papers. The question arises whether Sanford knew that he had never sent the documents and was merely, by requesting the documentation from Daly and Latrobe, seeking to cover his tracks. (140)

Certainly Sanford played the dissembler in the letter that Morgan finally received, dated March 24. Sanford shamelessly proceeded to give the history of the AIA without any mention of the AIC and describing the Comite D'Etudes as a branch of the AIA.

This work, which the King of the Belgians has taken under his especial personal and financial protection, has developed to extraordinary proportions, and has had for practical result the opening-up to civilizing influences and to the world's traffic this vast, populous,
and fertile region, and securing certain destruction to the slave trade wherever its flag floats." (141)

As undocumented and flagrantly incorrect as the letter was it was accepted by the Committee as sufficient documentation of the "Association's" background and purposes. On March 26, Morgan presented the Committee's report to the Senate. This exhaustive document was heavily peppered with Sanford's touch. Morgan stated in his report, at one point, that the opening of the Congo by the AIA "opens to civilization the valley of the Congo, with its 900,000 square miles of fertile territory and its 50,000,000 of people, who are soon to become most useful factors in the increase of the productions of the earth and the swelling volume of commerce." (142) John Latrobe, on reading the report, also noted Sanford's presence in Morgan's words, telling Sanford, "I have Senator Morgan's report which I take for granted you had a good deal to do with, with many thanks." (143)

In the report, one can see all of Sanford's efforts come to fruition. Morgan set out point by point every one of Sanford's tactics. He emphasized the Congo river as having been discovered by an American. He asserted Liberia and the colonization of the U.S. as "civil power exerted by commercial associations" as binding precedents. (144) He, moreover, termed the recognition of the Free State as a "duty to our African population" as "we should endeavor to secure them the right to freely return to their fatherland." Thus, Morgan simpered, if black Americans desired, they could have a place to go "as individuals or as associated colonists looking to their reestablishment in their own country." (145) And he continually celebrated the Association's main goal, according to
Morgan, "of the civilization of the negro population of Africa, by opening up their country to free commercial relations with foreign countries."

For the Senator from Alabama, it was the philanthropic duty of the U.S. to help these "civilizing forces" in Africa and recognize the "International African Association."

Most exhaustively, however, Morgan focused on the commercial promise in the Congo and the great market potential for American surplus goods. Unless the United States recognized the Association's claims, future trading in the region by the U.S. would be in jeopardy. The Portuguese pretensions were invalid and dangerous to American freedom of trade in the region and must be blocked. The Congo "could not therefore be placed under the shelter of any single foreign flag," and Morgan emphasized the AIA as not an organization from one nation but "composed of persons from various countries." (146) The recognition of its claims would be the recognition of freedom for all foreign countries to trade in the region.

The language in Morgan's report was profoundly paternalistic and racist. He blithely promised that the people of the Congo region had happily submitted to the "banner" of the Association, recognizing and submitting to it as a "symbol...that promised them good will and security." (147) He furthermore assured the Senate, and no doubt believed, that the Association was not "a new and usurping sovereignty seeking to destroy existing governments," but was "a common agent for the common welfare." He then, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, recommended the recognition as "a proper means of carrying into effect a policy concerning the Free States of the Congo." (148)
Support came from many sectors around the country as Morgan's resolutions were being deliberated in the Senate. Latrobe wrote to the two Maryland Senators, requesting that they vote for the resolution. (149) Certainly Sanford's other supporters, whether members of chambers of commerce around the country, white supremacists, or expansionists, were similarly following suit. Since late December, 1883 and January, 1884 the New York Herald and New York Times had printed editorials supporting the recognition of the Free State. (150) Referring to the President's message in 1883, and noting the president's words that it "may become advisable for us to cooperate," the New York Times editorial stated, "It not only may, but it has already become advisable and imperative that we should move on this matter." The same editorial emphasized Stanley as an American and predicted that the Congo region would one day be "as populous wealthy and powerful as the United States." (151) James Bennett of the New York Herald, who had commissioned Stanley's 1874-1877 journey into the Congo, remained an ardent supporter of the Association's efforts and thus gladly printed supportive articles in the newspaper. Sanford even wrote an accompanying piece at Bennett's request printed with a Herald article in December, 1883. (152)

All of these efforts proved successful; on April 10, 1884, the Senate passed the resolution. "It is the opinion of the Senate that the flag of the African International Association should be recognized as the flag of a friendly Government." (153) Sanford's "Washington Campaign" was victorious.

Although an injunction of secrecy was placed on the resolution, Sanford still telegraphed in code to Brussels. Strauch immediately
responded with the coded message, "Georges enchante vous ecrit. William" Devaux wrote, "Hurrah! old fellow! Well done by jove!"(154)

Once Congress extended its recommendation, Frelinghuysen readily agreed to recognize Leopold's organization.(155) On April 22, 1884 Frelinghuysen and Henry Sanford, as representative of the "International African Association", exchanged declarations. In both declarations, the titles International African Association, and the International Association of the Congo were used interchangeably without question by the United States. This fact, however, was apparently inconsequential. The U.S. government announced its approval of "the humane and benevolent purposes of the International Association of the Congo administering, as it does, the interests of the Free States there established." It then pledged to "order the officers of the United States, both on land and sea, to recognize the flag of the International African Association as the flag of a friendly Government."(156) The AIC was officially recognized and the future "Independent State of the Congo" finally formally accepted by at least one nation as a legitimate entity.
IX.

Leopold still wanted more of Sanford. The Anglo-Portuguese treaty remained a grave threat to the Association. Devaux wrote, "I think that if the U.S. could work the English a little, they might prevent the ratification of the Anglo-Port. treaty. Lots of M.P. are against it." (157)

However, Leopold's vision of a successive reaction once one nation had recognized the Congo Free State soon proved accurate. As one historian states, "By recognizing his private association as a sovereign power the American Government gave real existence to this previously very precariously placed body and thus enormously strengthened Leopold's international position." (158)

Almost immediately, on April 23, France followed the example of the U.S. and recognized the Association. The degree to which American recognition influenced the French is a point of dispute. While one historian assumes American recognition helped stimulate the French action, (159) another believes that, despite Leopold's hopes, America's initiative had little initial effect over European policy. (160)

Certainly the key motivating factor for France was the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, which, although not ratified, posed an increasing threat to French hopes for the region. France, moreover, assumed that Leopold's state would eventually fail. Believing that it was outwitting Leopold and the other European powers, France recognized the AIA on the condition that France would receive first bid should the Free State decide to sell its possessions. (161) The acceptance of such a clause by
Leopold is seen as a "masterstroke" by one historian. (162) This put France in an apparently powerful position in the eyes of other nations. Germany and England hence became wary of French pretensions. Thus, the three powers, rather than regarding Leopold with apprehension, allowed the king to play the nations against each other. As a result, all of the interested powers came to look at the small unassuming state of Belgium as the least of the possible evils in Central Africa. A "Free State," set up merely to ensure the free trade in the region by all nations, appeared a better solution than France, Germany, Portugal or Britain obtaining sole control. (163)

Although Bismarck had many questions about the AIA and AIC, questions that the U.S. should have asked, he was more incensed by the combined British offenses of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty and the Angra Pequena affair. (164) Hence, at the end of April, the German Chancellor began studying the terms of the United States recognition of the AIC. (165) He found much to be suspicious about and in no way accepted Leopold's feigned philanthropic concern over the slave trade. (166) While the U.S. had accepted Leopold's vague descriptions of what exactly his state sought to consist of, Bismark demanded specificity, and Leopold gave it to him. Bismark was shocked when Leopold informed him of his claim on much of Central Africa. (167) At the same time, however, Bismarck was now in the process of "cementing" a Franco-German entente, and with the French in the position to buy the land that it was assumed Leopold would eventually sell, Bismarck saw no reason to deny the King what he wanted and thus recognized Leopold's claims on November 8, 1884. (168)
With three countries having recognized the Association, the Free State of the Congo was now a powerful force. In the meantime, it became increasingly apparent that the powers should meet to discuss West Africa. Bismark took the initiative, and thus control over the plans for the Conference. (169)

X.

The Conference was scheduled to meet in Berlin in November, 1884. The U.S., along with thirteen other countries, was invited. Frelinghuysen was hesitant to appoint a delegate, fearing that participation would appear out of step with the United State’s policy of non-interference. Largely due to Kasson’s assurances that no word in the Conference objectives related to political or territorial arrangements and that no government was bound to adhere to the Conference resolutions, Frelinghuysen acquiesced. Since the foreign ministers to Germany were generally the appointed delegates to the Conference, it required no special effort or added expense to allow a U.S. representative to attend. Moreover, in appointing Kasson, the Secretary of State confined Kasson to discussing economic and humanitarian interests, with strict instructions against participating in any hint of land acquisition. (170)

Earlier, on the way to begin his post as Minister to Germany, Kasson had stopped in Brussels, had an audience with the King, and spent an evening at Gingelom with his old friend Henry Sanford. Upon Kasson’s
appointment as delegate to the Berlin Conference, Sanford sent him congratulations and urged him to oppose Portugal's claims. Allowing the Association power over the Congo's mouth, he added, "would be a matter of pride to us Americans." (171) When Kasson learned in Berlin that he could have an associate delegate to the Conference, the obvious choice, after his visit to Brussels, was Henry Sanford. (172) Leopold seems to have had similar ideas, since no representation of the AIC was allowed at the Conference. (173)

Sanford might have even written to Kasson offering his assistance at the Conference, because, when Kasson wrote him in October asking that Sanford attend, he stated, "I hasten to acknowledge your note of the nineteenth... You might be very useful here during the 'Conference.' " (174)

On the other hand however, the tone in Kasson's request suggests that Sanford had seemed hesitant about the idea. Sanford must have told Kasson that he needed to return to the States to vote because the next day Kasson wrote Sanford "You would do more good [at the Conference] than to go home and vote. Your council would be most useful. Think of it." (175) After convincing Sanford to attend the Conference with him, Kasson telegraphed Frelinghuysen his request for Sanford as associate delegate and October 24 reported to Sanford that he was "authorized to request your association without provision for compensation." (176) Thus, because of Kasson's request, Leopold now had a representative of the AIC at the Conference.

Stanley was also included as the "American citizen... discoverer, traveller, and expert" also without pay, as Frelinghuysen was having difficulty funding his expanding foreign policy initiatives. (177)
There was some controversy over Kasson's invitation to Stanley. Stanley still harbored ideas of Britain establishing a protectorate over the area in question. Thus Leopold had become increasingly frustrated with the explorer. The last thing Leopold needed at the conference was someone, still in his employ, representing Britain's interests. Kasson believed that "we have a perfect right to offer an American citizen...as witness to facts existing in the Congo country," particularly since De Brazza would be in attendance with France.

Kasson prevailed, and Stanley attended as an advisor, although he was given strict instructions to comply with Sanford's instructions. Moreover, Stanley left Berlin and returned to London early in the Conference's proceedings, where he remained, sending Sanford updates on the developing British sentiment toward the Association. Writing Sanford on December 4, he asked Sanford to telegraph, "if my presence is needed in Berlin, because if it is not necessary it is of no use for me to go....I have received great welcome since my return here though the papers are rather severe on you." At the same time Sanford clearly displayed doubt of Stanley's loyalty to Leopold because Stanley wrote him defensively in January 1885 that "I have given you my word that 'I am out of it' unless I am asked to."

With Sanford and Stanley as advisors to Kasson and also as agents to Leopold, clearly not only the United States, but also the AIC, was represented by the American delegation. In addition, Bismarck had become convinced that Germany would maintain greater freedom in a Congo controlled by the AIC under King Leopold than under any other European power and thus became the champion of the Association during the
Conference. As one historian notes, "It did not seem to Bismarck to matter much whether an eccentric European monarch was able or not to indulge in his fancies in tropical Africa. For once the chancellor was wrong." (183)

In the next four months, the foundation for the future of black Africa was settled among the Europeans. Although the Conference was comprised of ten full sessions, between November 15, 1884, and February 26, 1885, the actual work was accomplished by the committees set up between the sessions. (184) The resulting "General Act," signed by all of the delegates and eventually ratified by all of the attending countries except the United States, dealt with the establishment of free trade in the mouth and basin of the Congo region, the freedom of navigation on the Congo and Niger rivers, and the setting up of "protectorates." All of this was accomplished by the end of January, 1885. (185) However, the Conference continued for another month in order to determine who would control the Congo region. (186)

The negotiations over the territorial settlement of the Congo were not part of the conference proceedings per se. France had required, as a requisite for attending the Conference, that this issue be left out of the Conference goals. (187) Thus, the fate of the Congo was actually decided in separate treaties. The key to the attainment of Leopold's goals lay in the recognition by the rest of the powers of the Association as a legitimate political entity in the Congo. Great Britain officially recognized the AIC on Dec, 16, 1884, and thereafter the rest of the powers, with the exception of Turkey, followed suit. Belgium was the last country during the Conference to officially recognize the AIC as a sovereign
Simultaneously, in February, France and Portugal concluded territorial treaties with the AIC. The powers weary of Portugal's "erratic" methods of diplomacy, pressured it to relinquish the right bank of the Congo mouth containing Banana point. Portugal conceded and the new State had its outlet to the sea. These recognition and territorial treaties, though not part of the General Act, were nevertheless drawn together with the Conference protocols. Thus, the Congo Free State, by February 26, 1885 had enough authority to sign the General Act of the Berlin West African Conference with the rest of the powers.

Kasson, forced to constrain his participation to non-territorial issues, had little say in the significant decisions of the Conference. His performance has been described by one historian as "distinguished by more verbosity than brains," her conclusion being that the United States role in the Conference was "of no practical importance." Similarly, another historian terms Kasson "totally incompetent." However, his biographer emphasizes that his restraint was due to American attitudes and his specific instructions.
The key act by the United States had been the recognition of the AIC as a "friendly flag" in the Congo. Germany and England, before recognizing the AIC, carefully studied the American precedent. It was recognition of the AIC that put the United States into the European arena, concerning Africa, and cinched its invitation to the Conference.

Interestingly, when Sanford had first written to Frelinghuysen on the subject in December 1882, he had revealed his strategy—and thus Leopold's—that if the U.S. would recognize the Association, "it could be assured, Great Britain has given too many examples in this way" that it would "receive such an Embassy if we would....The assent of the two would naturally draw in that of Germany and other powers would doubtless follow." Instead, Britain had been the last major power to acknowledge the AIC as legitimate after which the smaller nations had followed.

Although having participated in the emergence of the Congo Free State as a viable political entity, the United States had little to do with the region—with the exception of participating in the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference of 1890—for the rest of the century. Most likely this was largely due to the fierce opposition that confronted those Americans involved in the participation the Berlin Conference before and after its conclusion. The same sectors of American society that had demanded the recognition of the AIC, castigated the participation in the Conference, and repudiated Frelinghuysen, Sanford and Kasson for their involvement.
While the Conference convened, opposition to the American presence grew in both Congress and American newspapers. On January 11, 1884 the New York Times had cheered the New York Chamber of Commerce for its resolutions calling on the U.S. government to help secure neutrality in the Congo by cooperating with the AIA. Exactly one year later, to the day, the same newspaper condemned the American presence at the Conference. Scathingly referring to Sanford and Kasson as "two irresponsible individuals," the editorial stated that "it is certain that, with a continuance of our commercial policy, the opening of Africa to trade would be of less interest to us than to any fifth rate power in Europe." Moreover, such participation "may entail very serious national responsibilities."(198) Even the New York Herald turned against the U.S. participation at the conference.(199) Although the House of Representatives had no official powers in ratifying the General Act, the House Foreign Relations Committee submitted two resolutions disapproving the American participation in the Conference. Congressman Perry Belmont introduced a resolution stating that

"The House of Representatives...hereby explicitly declares its dissent from the act of the President of the United States in accepting the invitation of Germany and France to participate in the International Conference of Berlin."(200)

The president-elect, Grover Cleveland, agreed.(201)

The backlash against American participation in the Berlin Conference became part of the general "repudiation of Arthur and Frelinghuysen" in 1885, in response to the administration's expansionist measures.(202) One historian couples the signing of the General Act with the Nicaragua Canal treaty and the Carribean Reciprocity System as examples of
expansionist impulses that would emerge in full bloom in the 1890's. (203) Kasson's biographer emphasizes the participation in the Conference as "the most serious deviation of our traditional policy since Monroe," a part of "the deeper current of American thinking which would become the main current within fifteen years." (204) Sanford believed that the Act could have won approval had Frelinghuysen pushed it through the Senate before the change in administrations. By March, however, it was too late and the United States became the only participating power never to ratify the General Act of the Berlin West Africa Conference.

XII.

The King, "authorized by the Belgian Legislative Chambers to become the chief of the new State," informed President Cleveland, in August, 1885, that the possessions of the AIC "will hereafter form the Independent State of the Congo." The new "Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo" asked Cleveland to "facilitate my task by giving a favorable reception to the present notification." In other words, the King had renamed the AIC and Leopold wanted the United States to officially recognize his new state. (205)

It is at this point that one finds the most paradoxical aspect in this episode. The United States, while not signing the General Act of the Conference, did not have reservations about recognizing the Free State as it,"does not rest upon the conventional arrangements contemplated by the
conference of Berlin." (206) The U.S. had been reassured that the King, "conforming to article 10 of the general act" of the Conference was in fact sovereign over an independent neutral state without ties to any European nations. (207) It was this neutrality and independence that the U.S. condoned and thus happily recognized the new state. (208) However, it was this very independence, the fact that Leopold needed to answer to no authority but his own in regard to the Congo Free State, that allowed for the widespread atrocities that would later be committed in the new state.

Thus, when on September 11, 1885, Cleveland enthusiastically responded to Leopold's request by informing him of the U.S. recognition the Independent State of the Congo, the United States solidified its role in the creation of the worst example of European colonialism. This was far from what Cleveland expected when he offered his hearty congratulations to the Belgian King as the sovereign of the new State. (209)

The U.S. had refused to sign the General Act of the Conference, but in terms of the American recognition of first, the AIC and subsequently the "Independent State of the Congo," the United States had made a decisive step away from its isolationist stance and decidedly influenced a part of the world many thousands of miles from America's sphere of influence. American activities as related to Africa remain a sign that "the outward thrust from the United States was becoming too powerful to be restrained by a tradition of isolationism that even then was beginning to loose its vitality." (210)
In terms of the celebrated economic potential of the Congo basin, Sanford was the one American, following the Conference, to seriously attempt the exploitation of the Congo's resources. In September, after the recognition of the AIC, the United States had appointed a consul, W.P. Tisdel to travel to the Congo and study its economic possibilities. The tone of the resulting correspondence during Tisdel's travels are fascinating. Tisdel's early letters to Sanford are enthusiastic and positive. By 1885 however, his letters are incessantly negative, filled with the numbers of dead and dying that he witnessed. "I am dumbfounded with the condition of things out here," he wrote. His final report to the State Department detailed little promise for American trade. Other reports were just as dismal. Trade between the United States and the Free State remained "almost nonexistent for the remainder of the century." While in 1865, a whole network of consuls and commercial agents guarded American trade interests along the western coast of Africa, by the early 1890's, one British survey reported not one American ship among the thousand that were cited during a certain period.

In addition, Leopold was eliminating his non-Belgian aids such as Stanley and the atmosphere appeared ominous. Stanley wrote Sanford, "I hear the Comite [as Stanley continued to term the State] is still weeding out the English at fearful expense, literally buying them out, and I have been told that they are only waiting an opportunity to get rid of me also." In another letter he warned Sanford that, after visiting the King, "I found at Brussels...the same enormous voracity to swallow a million square miles with a gullet" and appealed to Sanford to be
wary. (217) Sanford, however, had little interest or time for such pessimism.
Sanford had expended a huge amount of time and energy working for Leopold. In the meantime, his financial investments had returned increasingly dismal results. Where he had once been a wealthy man, he was now heavily indebted to the point that he was forced to sell furniture and paintings from his chateau. (1) However, the Congo basin provided a great deal of hope. In August 1884, Sanford wrote his wife, "If I can get a good hold there it will fix me with regard to the future. There is just the sort of work I would like, with both reputation and money to gain and the satisfaction of doing good. I think I will have it out with H.M...and propose a plan of operations and offer my services." (2) He had expected "important things" from his involvement with Leopold and in March 1885 suggested to the new proprietor of Central Africa that he set up a five-member committee, with Leopold at the helm. Sanford suggested that one of these members "should be a practical man capable of managing...financial and political interest under the direction of the King.... Such a trust I would be willing myself to accept." (3)
However, the King, at this point, was dropping all pretense of an international enterprise from his plans. After assuming complete control of the area in July, 1885, Leopold installed favorite Belgians in the top administrative positions. Thus, Sanford's high hopes of obtaining a government position in the Free State were dashed. (4)

Leopold did, however, in recognition of Sanford's efforts, grant him permission to start a commercial company in the Upper Congo. Sanford had mulled over the idea of starting a company at least since 1878. (5) Stanley warned Sanford that "under these new conditions [the King's new attitude toward non-Belgians] I should seriously advise you to think well before you commit yourself. The King's intention...to grant you facilities means little." (6) However, Sanford, always the speculator, seized the opportunity and began rounding up investors for this last chance to salvage his lost fortune. (7) With the regional abundance of natural resources, particularly ivory, and the native love of considerably cheaper items in trade, Sanford felt assured of making a fortune. (8)

As Stanley had warned, the King's assurances of helping the Sanford Exploring Expedition, guarantees upon which Sanford based much of his optimism, were soon revealed as empty promises. Although Leopold had promised to provide four hundred native porters—a crucial element where there was no railroad or highway yet—they were never delivered. Moreover, although the Congo State did not eliminate most private companies until the 1890's, Sanford's expedition experienced the first stages of this trend. (9)

Sanford, always aware of appearances, had organized the expedition in 1886 ostensibly for the dual purposes of scientific study and commercial
trading. Thus he could appear philanthropic and make money at the same time. He became concerned however that his leader of the expedition, Emory Taunt, would forego the money making goals for the scientific goals. Taunt assured Sanford when he wrote in 1886, "give yourself no uneasiness about the scientific part of the expedition. I came out here soley and entirely to make the money.... You can rest easy that I am just as anxious to get the ivory, to make the money as any stock holder in the company. (10)

However, like most of Sanford's speculative endeavors, the Sanford Exploring Expedition ultimately failed. The Compagnie pour le Commerce at l'Industrie du Congo absorbed Sanford's company in 1888. (11) While Sanford retained a small share in the company, on his death in 1891 he left behind debts and mortgages totalling more than $150,000.00. His wife sold the remaining shares to help pay his creditors. (12) For Henry Shelton Sanford, the Congo affair was over.

Unfortunately, for the people of the Congo basin, the horrors were just beginning. By the 1890's, Leopold had complete control over all commerce. This "international" state, supposedly created to ensure free trade, gradually became nothing more than a personal monopoly. (13) Although the state continued to maintain that trade remained unimpeded, one contemporary remarked that there was one law of commerce in the Free State with two articles: "Article 1: Trade is entirely Free. Article 2: There is nothing to buy or sell." (14)

Why had the United States along with the European nations allowed this personal monopoly to emerge? One historian emphasizes that the powers were well aware that the "international" AIC was none other than
Leopold's organization. "They were so little interested in the Association *per se* that they did not even seek to investigate the nature of the body whose sovereignty they were about to recognize." (15)

But all the powers—the United States, Germany, England and France—little cared whether or not Leopold's motives were honest. They realized, or thought they did, that by recognizing the Congo Free State, they could have all the benefits of controlling a region—particularly freedom of trade—without the burdens of political control. In the words of Voltaire's Professor Pangloss, the situation appeared to be the "best of all possible worlds." Morgan said as much in his report on the Congo. (16)

Thus, the powers overlooked the obvious questions. "Whenever the word 'Association' was used in the treaties of 1884-1885, everyone read Leopold" and didn't care. (17)

When the powers agreed in 1885 that all 'vacant lands' in the designated area would become the property of the Free State, little did they know that on this clause, Leopold would build "a system of state monopoly to the exclusion of private enterprise," upon which "the enormous machine of exploitation by force" would be built. (18)

The state proceeded to seize all of the land that held the most lucrative products, ivory and rubber. From this point, any trader who bought ivory or rubber from the Africans could be accused of receiving stolen goods, "stolen, in effect, from the state." (19)

The atrocities committed in the Congo Free State from the 1880's until 1909 make unbearable reading. (20) British Consul Roger Casement noted that between 1887 and 1903 the village group Tshumbiri diminished
in population from four to five thousand to five hundred. (21) He witnessed the same scale of depopulation in many places. It was the forced labor of the natives that provided the spectacular profits that the Free State initially reaped from its rubber trade. The punishments were brutal for both those who complied and those who did not. (22) Continual floggings, severing of body parts, particularly hands, and murder were commonplace. (23) It was Roger Casement's Congo Report of 1904 that greatly facilitated Belgium's final annexation of the Free State in 1908. (24) One who read the report wrote, "I verily believe I saw those hunted women...the blood...the hippopotamus hide whip...savage soldiery...burning villages...the ghastly tally of severed hands." (25) In response to the report and other outcries, Leopold commissioned a committee to study the Free State and thus justify his position. Instead, they indicted his state and the King was forced to relinquish his hold in 1908. With that act came the birth of the Belgian Congo. When Leopold died a year later Mark Twain suggested a memorial for the king—forty avenues of skeletons leading to a pyramid of 15,000,000 skulls. (26)

Largely due to Henry Shelton Sanford's efforts, the United States has a place in present day Zaire's tragic history. It is ironic that a major move away from traditional isolationism, when the United States set a foreign policy precedent by assuming the initiative and recognizing the future Congo Free State, placed the U.S. in the worst episode in Western imperialism.
Prologue Notes


(3) H.L. Wesseling points out the fascinating paradox that while the Dutch were the chief traders on the Congo at the time of partition, they made no land acquisitions in "The Netherlands and the Partition of Africa," *Journal of African History* (1981): 495-509; Freund, p. 62, 89.

(4) Freund, p. 89


(10) Keith, pp. 31-40; Stanley, *Unpublished Letters*, p. 7


(12) Keith, p. 39.

(13) Crowe, p. 15.

(14) Sanderson, p. 19; Keith, pp. 20-23.
(15) Crowe, p. 12.

(16) Freund, p. 94; Crowe, p. 18; Sanderson, p. 11.

(17) Crowe, p. 15.


(19) Crowe, p. 23.

(20) Crowe, p. 33.

(21) Ibid, p. 49.

(22) Ibid, p. 61.

(23) Chamberlain, p. 55.

(24) Crowe, p. 76.


(28) Stengers, p. 288.


(31) Both David Pletcher, The Awkward Years (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962) and Milton Plesur have chapters centered on the Conference.

(32) Pletcher, pp. 325-346.
This point is also noted by James L. Roarck in his brief article "American Expansionism vs. European Imperialism: Henry S. Sanford and the Congo Episode, 1883-1885." *Mid-America* LX (1978): 21-33.


Henry Shelton Sanford Papers, Morgan to Sanford, February 5, 1885. Box 26, Folder 5, hereafter cited as S.P. Sanford's papers are housed at the Henry Shelton Sanford Memorial Library and Museum in Sanford, Florida. About 5,000 items pertain specifically to Sanford's activities in Africa. Thanks to the great kindness of Alicia Clarke, curator of the Sanford museum, I was able to receive in the mail the many rolls of microfilm necessary for this study.

Younger, p. 337.


Until 1960, Sanford's papers were inaccessible to historians. In the early 1930's, Robert Stanley Thomson had been able to study the papers. After that, they were closed to the public. Luckily, for such historians as Edward Younger and David Pletcher, and William H. Halligan Jr. (in his M.A. thesis, "The Berlin West African Conference from the viewpoint of American Participation") Thomson did publish some of the letters--some that include the full texts--in three articles for the *Le Congo, Revue generale de la Colonie belge*. These letters are published for the purpose of shedding light on the founding of the Congo Free State, and thus center on the European aspect of the mission. However, because I only had access to the portion of the papers dealing specifically with the Congo, some of the letters published in Thompson's articles were not in the collection that I used. Thus, these articles remain very useful to writers today. In addition, Thomson's articles are very helpful in clarifying the events that took place. Since the opening of Sanford's papers to historians, Sanford's activities pertaining to the Congo region have been dealt with at length twice. Lysle Edward Meyer's 1967 unpublished Ph.D dissertation, "Henry Shelton Sanford and the Congo," in which a chapter deals with the recognition of the AIC, and a 1982 biography of Sanford by Joseph A. Fry, *Diplomacy and Business in Nineteenth Century America*. This biography includes a chapter on Sanford's dealings with the Congo region. Fry's study offers great help in areas of Sanford's career that are not addressed in Sanford's papers pertaining to Africa. Although several articles have been published pertaining to Sanford's Congo activities, none have adequately centered on the American recognition of the AIC.

As will be discussed in greater detail, Stanley learned late in life that he was never a naturalized American citizen, reassumed British citizenship, was knighted, and eventually became a Member of Parliament.


Chapter One Notes


(3) Mark Twain, cited by Garraty, p. 1.


(6) Fry, p. 7.

(7) Ibid, pp. 7-9.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid, p. 5.

(10) Ibid, pp. 9-11.


(12) Fry, p. 15.


(14) Fry, p. 16-17.

(15) Ibid; Years later on becoming Minister to Belgium, Sanford appeared in Leopold I's court wearing his sober black suit. Feeling out
of place and not wanting to don the court finery, Sanford, in effect, bought for himself a military post--as major general of the First Minnesota Infantry. This enabled him to wear military finery to the court while retaining his republican honor. He kept the title of "General" to his death. See Fry, p. 67.

(17) Fry, pp. 7-8.

(18) "Scope and Content Note," Henry Shelton Sanford Papers, (General Sanford Memorial Library, Sanford, Florida, 1960), p. 3.

(19) Ibid.
(20) Quoted in Fry, p. 21.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Fry, p. 22; Meyer, p. 20.
(23) Ibid, p. 23.
(24) Ibid.
(26) Sanford Papers, "Scope and Content Note", p.2.
(27) Fry, p. 23.


(30) Ibid; Meyer, pp. 7-8; Fry, pp. 26-27.


(32) Sanford Papers, "Scope and Content Note," p. 4; Fry, p. 30.

(33) Fry, p. 29.

(34) Fry, pp. 27-30.

(35) Ibid, pp. 31-32.

(36) Sanford Papers, "Scope and Content Note," p.4.
(37) Fry, p. 66.

(38) Ibid, p. 35.

(39) Sanford Papers, "Scope and Content Note," p. 2.

(40) Meyer, p. 11.


(42) Fry, pp. 42-51.

(43) Ibid, p. 44.

(44) Ibid, p. 67.

(45) Sanford Papers, hereafter cited as S.P., Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10

(46) Slade, p. 35.

(47) Ibid; Maurice, p. 2.


(49) Slade, p. 36.

(50) Ascherson, p. 89; Stanley, Unpublished Letters, pp. 2-6.

(51) Ascherson, p. 89.

(52) Emerson, p. 74; Maurice, pp. 6-7.

(53) Slade, p. 37.

(54) Fry, p. 85.

(55) Ibid, p. 79.


(57) Fry, p. 81.

(58) Meyer, p. 20


(60) Ascherson, p. 88; Emerson, pp. 99, 75-76.

(61) Stanley, Unpublished Letters, p. 3.
(62) Emerson, p. 77.

(63) Slade, pp. 38-39; Ascherson, pp. 88-93.

(64) Ascherson, pp. 88-90.

(65) Emerson, p. 79.

(66) Ascherson, p. 94; Emerson, pp. 77-78.

(67) Emerson, pp. 78-80; Ascherson, pp. 94-95.


(70) Fry, p. 134.


(72) Fry, p. 156.

(73) Sanford Papers, hereafter cited as S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(74) Ibid.

(75) Ibid.

(76) Ibid.

(77) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.


(79) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.


(81) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.


(83) Ibid.

(84) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(85) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.
(86) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(87) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.

(88) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(89) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.

(90) Ibid.

(91) Ascherson, p. 95; S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877.

(92) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.

(93) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, folder 10.


(95) Fry, p. 128-132.
Chapter 2 Notes

(1) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(2) S.P. Sanford to Greindl, Box 24, Folder 15.


(8) Letter printed in Ascherson, p. 104.

(9) S.P. Sanford to Bennett, no date, Box 29, Folder 2.

(10) Ibid.

(11) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, undated, Box 24, Folder 15.


(13) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, Box 24, Folder 17; Thompson, "Leopold II et le Congo," p. 169.

(14) Thompson, p. 169.


(16) Ibid, p. 334; Understandably, in his 1885 book, The Congo and the Founding of the Free State, dedicated to Leopold II, Stanley makes no mention of his attempts to woo England. He describes this period as merely one of recuperation. However, in his Autobiography, published in 1909, when the atrocities committed in the Free State were well known, the British disinterest in Stanley's plans is treated as a great tragedy. See Stanley, Autobiography, p. 334; The Congo, pp. 21-22.

(17) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, January 31, 1878, Box 24, Folder 17; also in Thomson, "Leopold II et le Congo."

(18) Ibid.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid.


(25) S.P. Sanford to Greindl, June 12, 1878, Box 29, Folder 3.

(26) Ibid.

(27) S.P. Sanford to Greindl, June 12, 1878, Box 29, Folder 3.

(28) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, June 11, 1878, Box 24, Folder 18; also in Thomson, "Leopold II et le Congo."


(30) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, June 17, 1878, box 24, Folder 18; also in Thomson, "Leopold II et le Congo."

(31) S.P. Greindl to Sanford, September 18, 1878, Box 24, Folder 18.

(32) S.P. Sanford to Greindl, undated, Box 29, Folder 2.

(33) Ibid.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Ibid


(38) Greindl to Sanford, December 10, 1878, reprinted in Thomson, p. 178.

(39) Emerson, p. 88.

(40) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, February 27, 1879, Box 27, Folder 3.

(41) Ibid; It is interesting that at this point Stanley noted January 2 as the date for the Comites' beginning, while in The Congo he would write of its foundation as being in November, 1878.
(42) Ibid.

(43) Emerson, p. 89.

(44) Stanley, The Congo p. 50.


(46) Ascherson, p. 117.

(47) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.


(49) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, November 10, 1885, Box 27, Folder 5.


(51) S.P. Sanford to Leopold, June 1, 1879, Box 29, Folder 12.


(53) Ascherson, p. 117.
Chapter 3 Notes

(1) Belgian document cited by Emerson, p. 89.

(2) Note by Leopold, cited by Emerson, p. 89.

(3) S.P. Sanford to Leopold, June 1, 1879, Box 29, Folder 12.

(4) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, October 19, 1878, Box 27, Folder 2.

(5) Emerson, p. 89.

(6) Ascherson, p. 113.

(7) Leopold to Stanley, December 31, 1881, in Emerson, p. 96.

(8) Ascherson, p. 117.


(10) Ibid, p. 115; Stanley, Unpublished Letters, p. 34.

(11) Emerson, p. 93; Stanley, Unpublished Letters, p. 35.

(12) Leopold to Stanley, December, 1881, in Emerson, p. 96.

(13) Emerson, pp. 95-96.


(17) Ascherson, pp. 122-123.

(18) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, March 27, 1884, reprinted in Thompson, "Leopold II et Le Congo, p. 193.

(19) S.P. Sanford to Leopold, no date, Box 29, Folder 12.

(20) S.P. Sanford to Devaux, no date, Box 29, Folder 7.


(22) Ibid.

(23) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.
(24) S.P. Sanford to Leopold, no date, Box 29, Folder 12.

(25) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Stengers, p. 264.

(28) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.

(29) Ibid.


(33) Ibid, p. 126.

(34) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.

(35) Younger, p. 324.

(36) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Ibid.


(40) Strauch replaced Baron Greindl as Secretary General of the AIA in 1878. Greindl to Sanford, November 1878, in Thomson, "Leopold II et Le Congo," p. 178.

(41) Strauch became president of the AIC on its creation in 1882. He is referred to by Jean Stengers as "no more than a man of straw," in terms of power in the organization, Stengers, p. 264.


(43) Strauch to Sanford, May 1, 1883, in Thomson, "Leopold II et Henry S. Sanford," p. 298.


(47) Ibid.


(49) Ibid.

(50) Leopold to Arthur, draft, Ibid.

(51) Thomson prints a complete list of the letters, pp. 304-308.

(52) Ibid, p. 304.


(54) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, December 12, 1883, Box 25, Folder 19.

(55) Fletcher, p. 312.

(56) S.P. Sanford to Blaine, June 27, 1881, in Thomson, p. 297.

(57) Quoted in LaFeber, New Empire, p. 47.


(59) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.

(60) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, April 25, 1883, Box 29, Folder 9.

(61) Ibid, no date.

(62) S.P. Frelinghuysen to Sanford, August 4, 1883, Box 24, Folder 11.

(63) S.P. Sanford to Devaux, Box 29, Folder 7.

(64) S.P. Frelinghuysen to Sanford, Box 24, Folder 11.

(65) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, December 12, 1883, Box 25, Folder 19.

(66) Quoted in Meyer, p. 79.

(67) Meyer, p. 79.

(68) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, March 18, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.


(74) Ibid, p. 236.

(75) Ibid, p. 239.

(76) Fredrickson, p. 239.


(78) Fredrickson, pp. 239-241.


(80) Ibid.


(83) Ibid, p. 84.

(84) Ibid.

(85) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877. Box 25, Folder 8; Dictionary of American Biography, p. 28; Duignan and Gann, U.S. and Africa, pp. 83-90

(86) S.P. Sanford to Latrobe, July 30, 1877, Box 29, Folder 10.

(87) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, September 22, 1877, Box 25, Folder 8.

(88) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, March 4, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(89) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, March 6, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(90) Ibid, April 24, 1884.

(91) Ibid, March 18, 1884.

(92) Ibid, June 2, 1885, Folder 9.

(93) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, April 24, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(94) Ibid, June 2, 1885, Folder 9.
(95) Ibid.

(96) Plesur, pp. 9-10.

(97) Younger, pp. 324-329.

(98) Younger, p. 329.


(100) Younger, pp. 285-289, 364.


(103) Younger, p. 329.


(105) As late as 1890, when a young black, who Morgan knew, moved to Africa, Morgan wrote to Sanford, "I feel that this is a pioneer movement from the south that will be followed by a great drift of our negroes to their native land." S.P. Morgan to Sanford, February 19, 1890, Box 26, Folder 5.


(107) Quote in LaFeber *The American Age,* p. 162.

(108) S.P. Morgan to Sanford, February 7, 1884, Box 26, Folder 5.

(109) Ibid.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Fry, p. 138.

(112) S.P. Daly to Sanford, December 5, 1883, Box 24, Folder 8.

(113) Ibid.


(115) *New York Times,* 11 January 1884, p. 4; Thomson, "Leopold II et Henry Sanford," p. 314; S.P. Daly to Sanford, January 5, 6, 9, 1884, Box 24, Folder 8.


(118) Meyer, p. 86.

(119) S.P. Morgan to Sanford, February 1, 1884, Box 26, Folder 5.

(120) Ibid, March 5, 1884; Latrobe to Sanford, March 25, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(121) S.P. Frelinghuysen to Morgan, March 13, 1884, Box 24, Folder 11.

(122) Ibid.

(123) Ibid.

(124) Note the similarity in Frelinghuysen's words to those of Sanford.

(125) Ibid.

(126) Ibid.

(127) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, December 12, 1883, Box 25, Folder 19.

(128) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, January 29, 1884, Box 25, Folder 19.


(130) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, March 13, 1884, Box 25, Folder 19.


(132) Emerson, p. 104-105

(133) S.P. Morgan to Sanford, February 24, 1884, Box 26, Folder 5.

(134) Ibid.


(137) S.P. Morgan to Sanford, March 5, 1884, Box 26, Folder 5.

(138) S.P. Ibid, March 22, 1884, Box 26, Folder 5.
(139) Ibid.

(140) Daly wrote, "You are wrong in supposing that you left a copy of the Statutes of the International Association with me. I have never seen them and after a thorough search find nothing but the proceedings of 1877 in my papers and none in the Library of the Society." See Daly to Sanford, March 22, 1884, Box 24, Folder 8; Also see letters from Latrobe to Sanford, March 25, 1884, and undated, Box 25, Folder 8.


(143) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, April 1, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(144) U.S. Congress, Senate, Compilation of Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, Vol. 6, p. 222-225.

(145) Ibid, p. 228.

(146) Ibid, pp. 222-225.

(147) Ibid, p. 223.


(149) S.P. Latrobe to Sanford, April 1, 1884, Box 25, Folder 8.

(150) Meyer, p. 83.


(152) Meyer, pp. 82-83.

(153) Thomson, p. 326.

(154) Thomson, Devaux to Sanford, April 12, 1884, "Leopold II et Henry Sanford," p. 327.

(155) Pletcher, p. 314.


(157) S.P. Devaux to Sanford, April 12, 1884, in Thompson, "Leopold II et Henry S. Sanford," pp. 326-327.

(158) Crowe, p. 81.
(159) Ibid, p. 82.
(160) Emerson, p. 104.
(161) Crowe, pp. 81-82.
(162) Crowe, p. 82.
(163) Crowe, p. 82-83.
(164) Emerson, p. 107.
(165) Ibid.
(166) Ibid, p. 108.
(168) Stengers, p. 275; Crowe, pp. 63-71.
(169) Crowe, p. 62.
(170) Younger, pp. 329-330.
(171) Ibid.
(172) Ibid.
(174) S.P. Kasson to Sanford, October 21, 1884, Box 25, Folder 4.
(175) S.P. Kasson to Sanford, October 22, 1884, Box 25, Folder 4.
(176) S.P. Ibid, October 23, October 24, 1884.
(177) S.P. Kasson to Sanford, November 6, 1884, Box 25, Folder 4; Younger, p. 330.
(179) S.P. Kasson to Sanford, November 6, 1884, Box 25, Folder 4.
(180) Emerson, p. 112.
(181) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, December 4, 1884, Box 27, Folder 4.
(182) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, January 14, 1885, Box 27, Folder 5.
(183) Emerson 110; Also see Crowe, p. 96.
(185) Ibid, p. 102.
(186) Ibid.
(187) Ibid.
(188) Ibid, p. 149.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Emerson, p. 117.
(192) Crowe, p. 97.
(193) Ibid.
(194) Younger, p. 335.
(195) Crowe, p. 146.
(196) S.P. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, December 30, 1882, Box 29, Folder 9.
(201) Pletcher, p. 344.
(202) Pletcher, p. 347.
(204) Younger, p. 343.
(205) Leopold to Cleveland, August 1, 1885, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1886, p. 58.
(206) Bayard to Tree, September 11, 1885, Ibid, p. 60.
(207) Betevelde to Bayard, August 1, 1885, Ibid, p. 59.
(208) Bayard to Tree, Ibid.


(212) Frelinghuysen to Tisdal, September 8, 1884, *Foreign Relations, 1885*; S.P. Tisdal to Sanford, Box 28, Folder 9, 1884-1885; Meyer, p. 102.

(213) Tisdal to Sanford, January 31, 1885, Ibid.

(214) S.P. Tisdal to Sanford, April 26, 1885, November 17, 1885, Box 28, Folder 9; Duignan and Gann, p. 138, Meyer, pp. 103-106; Tisdal's devastating reports to the State Department are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1885*, pp. 285-314.


(217) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, November 10, 1885, and March 10 1885, Box 27, Folder 12.
Epilogue Notes

(1) Fry, p. 170; Vachel Lindsay quote is in Hyland, p. 216.

(2) quoted in Fry, p. 156.

(3) Memo to Leopold, in Fry, p. 156.

(4) Ibid.


(6) S.P. Stanley to Sanford, May 6, 1886. Box 27, Folder 6.


(8) One historian illuminates the exploitive possibilities by telling of a Baptist missionary, who, "to test the market," purchased a thirty pound tusk for an empty vegetable can: White, p. 293.

(9) Fry, p. 158.

(10) Quoted in White, p. 297.

(11) White, p. 301.

(12) Fry, pp. 163, 170; White, p. 332.

(13) Stengers, p. 265.

(14) Ibid, p. 266.


(16) Morgan's report is in U.S. Congress Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Vol. 6.

(17) Stengers, p. 264.

(18) Ascherson, pp. 149, 202.

(19) Stengers, p. 265.

(20) Neal Ascherson's provides horrifying descriptions and photographs.


(22) Ibid, p. 145.

(23) Ibid, p. 147.
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