1984

Examination of National Park Service decision making | A case study of Grant Village, Yellowstone National Park

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AN EXAMINATION OF
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE DECISION MAKING:
A CASE STUDY OF GRANT VILLAGE,
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK

by
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B.S., South Dakota State University, 1978

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Recreation Management
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1984

Approved by:

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Dean, Graduate School

Date 10/30/84
The policy process of any government agency involves many participants representing diverse interests. The participants involved in the national park policy process have not only caused many changes in park policy through the years, but have also caused an evolution in the philosophical basis upon which that policy is founded. The anthropocentric philosophy, which places primary emphasis on providing recreation, dominated national park management after World War II, but because of public pressure on the National Park Service, seems to have given way to the biocentric philosophy, which places primary emphasis on preserving naturally occurring environmental processes.

This study first reviews the history of the national parks with the objective of tracing the evolution of park policy and the changes in its philosophical basis. The study then examines as a case study a specific visitor facilities development, Grant Village, in Yellowstone National Park which has been under construction through the time of the major shift in National Park Service philosophy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism.

The development has been controversial for several reasons; one of the most important is that it is seen by many people to be an outdated response to increasing visitation because it provides convenience-oriented facilities characteristic of the anthropocentric era of management. The Park Service, on the other hand, insists that completion of the project will accomplish the biocentric goals of replacing other facilities in fragile thermal areas and grizzly bear habitat. Critics of the development, however, argue that the tradeoff is an unfavorable one with questionable ecological benefits.

Biocentrism seems to be the appropriate basis for future park policy because it recognizes the importance of preserving complex ecological processes to the recreational visitor's experience. Examination of Grant Village within the context of this philosophy indicates that the Park Service needs to openly adopt biocentrism as its basis for policy. Once that is done the agency must choose the clientele it will seek to serve. In order for the choice to be effective, the parks need Congress to strengthen the laws under which the Service operates.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed in various ways to this study, and I would like to identify and thank them. First, my parents have contributed considerable moral support and patience, which has not only enabled me to achieve my master's, but has also given me the freedom to choose my own path in life. Second, my major professor, Dr. Stephen McCool, provided expertise, advice, and most importantly, research assistantships which enabled me to pursue my own thesis topic. Third, the other members of my graduate committee, Drs. H.D. Hampton and Richard Shannon, offered excellent ideas and criticisms. Fourth, the faculty and staff of the School of Forestry provided direction and technical assistance which was invaluable.

I also wish to thank all those who graciously consented to the interviews which were so important to this study. I especially thank Jack Anderson, Robert Barbee, Aubrey Haines, and the late Lon Garrison. I am particularly indebted to Dan Wenk and Joan Anzelmo for their interviews and additional assistance.

Last of all, I want to thank Dr. Riley McClelland of the University of Montana and Glacier National Park for taking the time to help me polish up the final product and, more importantly, for being an excellent teacher of national park ideals.
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CHAPTER ONE:
EXPLANATION OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

For any agency of the federal government the formation and implementation of policy is a complex process involving many participants from both within and outside the government. These participants can be constituency groups, public interest groups, forces within the involved agency, other governmental agencies, Congress, the president and his cabinet, the judicial branch, and even state governments. Frequently their effects on policy are not easily discernable in the process; motives and actions are often unclear, unspecified, or consciously concealed. These participants can facilitate, hinder, or even block the formation and implementation of an agency's policy.

Federal land management agencies in particular experience a wide variety of participants in their policy process. These agencies manage millions of acres, primarily in the western states and Alaska. The USDA Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service (NPS) are the major federal land managers. Decisions made by them concerning industrial and agricultural uses of the land (timber, grazing, mining), as well as recreational uses (boating, hunting, hiking, tourism), can have tremendous local and regional economic impacts. For this reason diverse groups work to influence policy decisions in favor of their particular
interests.

These agencies are often mandated by law to manage the lands for a wide variety of uses that are frequently seen as conflicting by user groups. For example, the Forest Service is instructed by the Multiple Use- Sustained Yield Act (16 U.S.C. 528-531) to manage each national forest equally for wildlife, livestock grazing, recreation, timber production, and watershed protection. The BLM manages primarily for grazing, mining, and recreation. Additionally, both agencies, as well as the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service, are mandated by the Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 1131-1136) to manage legally designated wilderness within lands under their respective jurisdictions. This multiple use management presents inherent user conflicts.

Perhaps one federal land management agency more than any other is faced with dealing with a wide assortment of participants in its policy process. The National Park Service is charged with the responsibility of managing national parks, monuments, recreation areas, historic sites, national capital parks, parkways, seashores and lakeshores, scenic riverways, historic landmarks, and one park for the performing arts (Lee, 1974). The diversity of lands under its control requires the NPS to operate under a wide-ranging set of management policies that critics say cloud the original purpose of each type of unit in the system. Also, lands managed by the NPS are the most visible of all federal lands. They are located in almost every state, frequently in or near major cities, and by 1982 recreational visits to these areas had reached 245 million per year (USDI, 1983).
Of the lands managed by the NPS, the national parks arguably have the largest and most vocal group of participants in their decision making process (For the purposes of this study, the term "national parks" will refer to those units in the national park system officially called national parks, as well as national monuments which contain large segments of pristine backcountry). One reason for this intensity and diversity of participants is that the parks are the oldest type of unit in the system, and through the years have become the best known. Parks such as Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Grand Canyon are known worldwide and are often referred to as the "crown jewels" of America; because of their popularity, people from around the world share an interest in their management. Another reason is that the parks have been established individually through the years since 1872, each with its own organic act. Frequently, provisions in some of these acts allow uses in a particular park (such as grazing, hunting, or mining) that are generally contrary to NPS policy. A third reason is that several of the parks were established before the Park Service was created, and therefore policy development in those parks was originally uncoordinated; often practices begun in that era continue to exist in those parks in spite of contradictory NPS policy. A fourth reason is that the NPS, when created, was given an ambiguous mandate by Congress (the National Park Service Act of 1916; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) to provide for use of the parks as well as to preserve them.
All these reasons contribute to very active interactions in the national park policy process, but perhaps the center of all park disputes is the vague mandate of the National Park Service Act. The meaning of the Act is subject to a wide range of interpretations, and Hendee et al. (1978) assert that "[t]he ambiguity inherent in the National Park Service Act has been a source of extensive commentary and still more extensive agony for subsequent park managers". Indeed, the mandate to preserve the parklands while at the same time providing for their use by the public forces NPS managers to strike a balance between the two seemingly diametrically opposed goals, and an argument can be made that practically all problems in national park management revolve around the "preservation versus use" issue, as the mandate has come to be called. Since any use by the public will impair a natural environment to some extent, complete preservation is impossible. Therefore, the question NPS administrators face is one of degrees: How much change in the natural resources of the parks will be tolerated in order to allow the public to make use of the parks? The logical follow-up to that question is: What levels and types of use can be allowed which will provide the visitor the experiences he desires from a national park and yet still afford the preservation of the essential aspects which made the park worthy of establishment?
THE CHOICE OF A MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

The philosophical approach through which to achieve those dual goals has been left to the discretion of the agency. Hendee et al. (1978) propose and define two primary philosophical approaches to wilderness management, both of which can be expanded to apply to national park management. According to them, one is anthropocentrism, the other is biocentrism. The anthropocentric approach takes the "benefit and enjoyment of the people" phrase from the Yellowstone Act (16 U.S.C. 21-22), the "promote and regulate use" phrase of the National Park Service Act, and the "use and enjoyment" phrase of the Wilderness Act literally. Increasing the public's direct use and thus increasing human values and benefits is the primary concern of managers choosing this approach; sociological considerations and cultural definitions take precedence over biological concepts (Hendee and Stankey, 1973). Convenience-oriented styles of recreation are facilitated, and "[b]ecause the production of recreational experiences is a primary goal, actions to increase access, to reduce difficulty and danger, and to facilitate use would be encouraged" (Hendee et al., 1978). Those environmental conditions most pleasing to the majority of users are aided by managerial actions.

On the other hand, Hendee et al. (1978) define the biocentric approach as one which "places primary emphasis on preservation of the natural order", and where "recreational use is secondary to maintenance of the natural order". Managers favoring this approach allow naturally evolving environmental processes (erosion, fire, etc.) to proceed to the
maximum extent possible. Because of the values, including recreational and scientific, placed on the preservation of those processes, certain benefits will then accrue to society (Hendee and Stankey, 1973). Control of visitor behavior in order to protect the naturalness of the area is emphasized rather than control of environmental conditions.

The primary difference between the two approaches is the "extent to which...[human] benefits are viewed as being dependent on the naturalness" of the managed area (Hendee et al., 1978). The anthropocentric approach asserts that naturalness is of little importance to the visitor's experience, and therefore permits manipulation of the environment to meet visitor demands and thus provide benefits; the biocentric approach advocates manipulation of visitor behavior in order to preserve natural conditions which lead to desired benefits. Hence, both approaches seek to provide similar benefits through the use of different management actions.

As Hendee et al. (1978) point out, purely anthropocentric and purely biocentric philosophies are at opposite ends of a continuum of management orientations. Interest groups at both ends of the continuum work to influence policy, and Nash (1982) called the debate between the two opposing philosophical viewpoints "[o]ne of the most sensitive issues in wilderness management". Actual policies for a park or wilderness may be a compromise between the two philosophies and therefore be a combination of them which lies somewhere along the continuum between the two polar extremes. The use of these terms—anthropocentrism and biocentrism—with respect to resource
management was begun only recently. Historically, the choice of a philosophical approach to land management has been unarticulated and can only be inferred by studying statements and policies issued during the time period in question. Thus, determining the exact point at which a particular policy lies on the continuum is an arbitrary decision, and it is therefore more useful to point out relative differences in the philosophical orientation of policies in question.

Aspects of both philosophies abound in national park management. Park managers may utilize biocentric manipulations such as restricting or limiting backcountry use, eliminating exotic species, and allowing natural fluctuations in wildlife populations, while in the same park such anthropocentric policies as fire suppression and encouragement of convenience-oriented camping and lodging may be advocated. Frequently the degree to which either an anthropocentric or biocentric approach is utilized varies from park to park, depending upon each park's particular traditions, history, administration, and political environment. The political environment is particularly important because each park has its own unique set of political forces which exert a substantial amount of pressure on that park's policy process in order to push policies toward the philosophical approach they favor.

A HISTORICAL REVIEW

The first part of this study will examine the history of national park policy within the context of the management philosophy continuum, and will identify relative changes in the philosophical orientation of
policy as it evolved through the years. The participants who were most responsible for the shifts in philosophy will also be identified, and their roles in affecting those shifts will be examined. This review will be done in order to build a basis of understanding for closer examination of a case study of national park policy.

THE CASE STUDY

Following the historical review, the study will examine a particular visitor facilities development in a major national park as a case study of the forces at work in the park level policy process. According to Gilbert (1971), "The case study approach to analysis and learning is widely acclaimed by educators. Reading about an actual event and the chronological happenings that took place gives the student...an insight into the planning, or lack of it, and the results that followed".

The Grant Village project in Yellowstone National Park will be used as the case study. It is a very controversial visitor facilities development that was first conceived in the 1930s, and construction which was begun in the 1950s is not yet completed today. Grant Village is a major development that includes a campground, visitor center, gas station, marina, and 700 units of lodging (planned); plus roads, parking lots, sewer and water systems, employee housing, and other necessary support facilities. Throughout its history problems have arisen, including concessioner financial difficulties, which could have terminated the project had the Park Service been less committed to it.
Moreover, several policy changes have occurred in the past twenty years which reflect changes in NPS philosophy since the time Grant Village was begun. The decision making process as used at Grant Village will be expanded upon to determine what conclusions can be drawn about participants involved in the National Park Service policy process in general, and their effects on the results of that process. The focal point of this study will be a comparison of national park policy as stated at the national level, and policies and management actions at the park level. Apparent discrepancies that occur will be examined to determine if they actually exist, and if they do, why they occurred.

Grant Village will be used because it is controversial; several participants have been involved in the decisions made over the past twenty-five years. It is a major development located in the oldest and probably best known national park, and thus it would be expected to attract a larger number and broader range of interested participants from outside the government than would a smaller development in a lesser known park. In addition, more participants from within the government would be expected to be involved because of the importance of decisions made in the world's first national park. Another reason for using Grant Village is that the original concept of the project arose almost fifty years ago in a different era of park management, and it has slowly been developed over the years with only relatively minor changes. It was planned during a period of relatively extreme anthropocentrism in park policy, but is being constructed during a time when a more biocentric philosophy has been adopted, at least by implication, by the National
Park Service; thus, at several points throughout its history decisions must have been made that dealt with changes in NPS policy as they related to Grant Village.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study is particularly concerned with the participants in the national park policy process and the methods they use to influence the process. Ogden (1971) stated that public policy is made within power clusters made up of the various participants, or actors, and a particular type of policy, such as resource policy (including national parks), has its own power cluster. He described those power clusters:

Public policy in the American political system is made within power clusters which operate with remarkable independence from one another within the common constitutional and political party structure. Each power cluster consists of administrative agencies, executive review staff, legislative committees, interest groups, influential private citizens, and attentive publics who center their public policy concerns and activity primarily in one broad policy area. Most power clusters operate at all levels of government.

In order to examine the actors within the national park power cluster and to determine the effects of individual actors or groups of actors on the national park policy process, a conceptual framework, or model, is needed to facilitate understanding of how the process functions. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) provide a simple framework for the policy process which is well-suited for this analysis. In this model, there are three environments in the policy process: policy formation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. Within these environments are any number of actors who operate within various arenas
to affect policy. Communication linkages occur between different actors in the three environments and serve to tie the system together. (Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. The policy process (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980).

The advantages of this model are that it is cyclical, fluid (actors operating in one environment can also act in others), and open (policies can originate within or outside the system). The "classical" policy implementation model was hierarchical, with policy formulatours directing policy to policy implementers who carry out instructions, creating policy outputs (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). Being cyclical makes the model more powerful because policy formation and implementation are continuing processes. This model also lacks the rigidity of the old model; the linkages between environments can go both ways between any two environments, rather than one way down through the system.

Further explanation of the principal components of this framework is necessary. These explanations are paraphrased from Nakamura and
ENVIRONMENT I: Policy Formulation. This environment consists primarily of formal policy makers—government officials who create policy. These actors operate within the governmental arena and are influenced by special interest groups and other constituency groups from outside arenas who push for policy decisions favorable to their respective causes. Clarity, or lack of it, in the policy messages passed from the policy makers is a major factor in the implementation and evaluation of the policy.

ENVIRONMENT II: Policy Implementation. Within this environment many different actors, operating out of many diverse arenas, work to facilitate, hinder, or block the implementation of policy directives sent from the formal policy makers. Policy makers from Environment I, lobbyists, consumers, the media, among others, as well as formal implementers within the government, are involved. Diversity, fluidity, and complexity in terms of actors, arenas, and linkages are characteristic of this environment; formal implementers must coordinate this environment, often using only ambiguous policy directives. As a result, the policy implementation environment is very political.

ENVIRONMENT III: Policy Evaluation. The evaluation of policy can be done by the policy makers or the policy implementers, but more objective evaluation can best be carried out by professionals who evaluate on technical bases. These technical evaluators are limited because they have no political constituency of their own; they must rely on the power and influence of others. Also, evaluation is not totally objective nor an alternative to political judgments because
it is "ultimately controlled by policy makers and policy implementers".

**Linkages.** The linkages are the communications bridges between policy makers and policy implementers, as well as evaluators; they are also between those actors within government and actors outside government. Linkages between policy makers and implementers are especially important. Breakdowns can occur when messages are garbled by the senders or misinterpreted (intentionally or unintentionally) by receivers, when "overload" occurs (many conflicting messages are received), or when "follow-up and compliance mechanisms" fail to ensure that messages have been accurately received and carried out.

**SUMMARY**

The purpose of this study is to examine park policy first in a historical context in order to trace the evolution of its philosophical orientation, then within the context of a particular case study, in order to draw conclusions about differences that occur between stated policy at the national level and policies and management actions at the park level.

The overall objectives of this study are:

1) to provide an understanding of the historical changes in national park management philosophy and the actors involved in the policy process who were most influential in causing those changes,
2) to identify the major actors involved in the Grant Village project throughout its history in order to discover who influences decisions made at the park level,

3) to draw conclusions about the philosophy behind broadly stated policy at the national level and the effects of various actors on policy at the park level, and to theorize about the implications these conclusions may have for national park management.

The thesis of this study is that within the set of actors, or power cluster, which works to influence park policy a subset of actors at the park level effectively works to influence that particular park's policy, and frequently prevents those policies from following the course of park policy at the national level. Therefore, emphasis will be placed on the actors involved in the process and the methods they employ to affect the decisions resulting from the process, as well as their reasons for involvement in the process. A simple, cyclical model will be used to facilitate understanding of the the policy process. The actors and the arenas within which the actors operate will be identified, as will the policy environments (formation, implementation, and evaluation) the actors work to affect.

In order to achieve an overall understanding of how national park policy is made, the evolution of national park policy will be reviewed, identifying the actors involved, and the relative changes
in management philosophy between anthropocentrism and biocentrism will be placed within a historical context. The study will then focus on a controversial visitor facilities development in Yellowstone National Park and the actors involved in the decision making process who have helped perpetuate the project in spite of various problems and objections. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the sets of actors involved at the national level as well as the park level and their effects on policies resulting from the process.
CHAPTER TWO:
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PARK POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the following historical review is to provide a basis for understanding the development of national park policy, particularly in the areas of concessions and visitor facilities, and to show shifts in policy between biocentric and anthropocentric management philosophies. Emphasis will be placed on the actors involved in the evolution of park policy from the beginning of the national park idea in the early nineteenth century to the present.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL PARK IDEA

The establishment of Yellowstone National Park by Congress in 1872 is often referred to as the beginning of the national park idea, but the origins of the idea actually came from a variety of influential people over several years prior to the passage of the Yellowstone Act. The most important actors in the early years of the national park concept were the writers and artists of the nineteenth century who went against the accepted view of wilderness as a place to be feared and conquered, and instead depicted the American frontier as something beautiful and unique. Their reasons for believing in the preservation of wild country were varied, but were generally based in biocentric philosophy.
George Catlin was an artist who became famous for his paintings of American Indians. In 1832 he foresaw the decline of the Indian and buffalo on the Great Plains and wrote:

And what a splendid contemplation too, when one (who has travelled these realms, and can duly appreciate them) imagines them as they might in future be seen (by some great protecting policy of government) preserved in their pristine beauty and wildness...A nation's Park, containing man and beast, in all the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty!" (Catlin, 1880)

Thus, although Catlin envisioned national parks as huge tracts of wilderness set aside so Indians and wildlife could live as they had before white man came to the continent, he is generally recognized as the first to specifically call for a national park.

Henry David Thoreau was a writer and leader of the Transcendentalist movement, whose members believed that a realm of spiritual truths exist on a higher plain than physical truths, and that wilderness offered the best environment for seeking these spiritual truths (Nash, 1973). They thus advocated the preservation of wilderness because wilderness would in turn help preserve civilized man. In Thoreau's words, "in Wildness is the preservation of the World" (Nash, 1973).

In 1858 Thoreau suggested "national preserves, in which the bear, and the panther, and some even of the hunter race may still exist, and not be civilized off the face of the earth---not for idle sport or food, but for inspiration and our own true recreation" (Udall, 1963). Thoreau's vision was thus much like Catlin's, only he cited recreation
as a purpose for the preserves.

Other writers (William Cullen Bryant, James Fenimore Cooper, and Ralph Waldo Emerson) and artists (John James Audubon, Thomas Cole, and Albert Bierstadt) helped advance the positive image of wilderness through their works during the early and mid-1800's. But it was an age when the prevalent philosophy was one of "manifest destiny", the belief that the possession and settlement of the western frontier by Americans was a Christian duty. Also, the "Myth of Superabundance" (Udall, 1963) was prevalent; Americans believed the Western frontier to be so vast and its resources so abundant that man could never use it all up. Thus, wilderness advocates did not reflect the feelings of the majority of Americans. Instead, they offered a minority opinion, and while they sought wilderness preservation for a variety of reasons and influenced a relatively small number of Americans, they did provide the spark for the national park idea.

One of the most important actors in the gradual changing of America's environmental philosophy was George Perkins Marsh. In 1864 Marsh wrote an influential book about man's treatment of nature in which he recognized the complexity of ecological interactions, and wrote that man's actions can have important, and sometimes devastating, effects on the environment; therefore man should recognize and understand the potential consequences of his actions before he acts. He put wilderness preservation in practical terms; it was useful to protect watersheds and regulate stream flows, as well as to provide recreational opportunities and wildlife habitat (Nash, 1973). Marsh's reasons for
preserving wildlands were anthropocentric, rather than biocentric; his argument thus made wilderness protection more compatible with progress and economic gain (Nash, 1973), and therefore gained wider acceptance for the idea.

In the same year that Marsh's book was published, 1864, Yosemite Valley was ceded by Congress to the state of California. At the time, grants to states were not unusual, but the reasons for this particular one were important. The valley was to be set aside for "public use, resort and recreation", and this use was to be "inalienable for all time" (June 30, 1864, c. 184, secs. 1,2,13 Stat. 325). The primary actors in getting the valley reserved were a small group of Californians concerned about private abuse of the area. They convinced their US senator to sponsor protective legislation (Runte, 1979). In that same year Albert Bierstadt's paintings of the Rocky Mountains and Yosemite Valley had gained him a great deal of fame, and probably helped popularize the idea of protection for the Valley. Most likely, however, the "driving force" of the Yosemite Valley preservation movement was Frederick Law Olmsted (Huth, 1957), who was subsequently appointed the first chairman of the board of commissioners established to manage the new Yosemite Park (Sax, 1980). Olmsted, a premier landscape architect of his day, believed in the preservation of outstanding scenery because, in his words, it had a favorable influence on the "health and vigor of men" (Nash, 1973). He wrote a report which presented philosophic reasons for the establishment of state and national parks; the primary reason being that outstanding scenery provides stimulus for man to
disengage his thoughts from daily tasks, and to engage them instead in contemplation (Sax, 1980). Olmsted believed that activities in parks should center around, and be dependent upon, the scenery the park was established to preserve; those activities not dependent upon the unique scenery, or which interfered with contemplative activities, should not be encouraged (Sax, 1980). Olmsted thus believed in preserving wildlands for primarily biocentric reasons, and many of his ideas are still considered important principles of recreation management today.

It is important to recognize that in spite of Olmsted's biocentrism, Yosemite Valley was not set aside to preserve pristine wilderness in response to the writings of wilderness advocates, but rather to protect outstanding scenery for the purpose of providing public recreation. Many Americans in the nineteenth century felt culturally inferior to Europeans because of the lack of cultural monuments in America (Runte, 1979). Thus, when writers and artists who travelled the West described giant waterfalls and beautiful valleys surrounded by majestic mountains, they often compared them to Europe's man-made monuments. Runte (1979) uses the term "monumentalism" to describe this substitution of natural monuments for man-made monuments as cultural symbols, and suggests that it was the underlying reason for the establishment of Yosemite Park. Runte's monumentalism is fundamentally an anthropocentric concept because it asserts that the naturalness of an area was second in importance to its spectacular scenery. The style of tourism in that time period supports his theory. Fine accommodations and easy access to the points of interest were
considered essential to the tourists of that era because they preferred to view outstanding scenery from the comfort of their luxury hotel. This style of tourism has come to be called the "portal syndrome" (Hendee et al., 1978).

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK

In 1870 an expedition consisting primarily of prominent Montanans and an army escort explored the region known today as Yellowstone National Park. Fantastic stories of the natural features of the area had been circulating since the days of the mountain men. However, after the members of the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition saw the geysers and hot springs for themselves, they decided "that there ought to be no private ownership of any portion of that region, but that the whole of it ought to be set aside as a great National Park" (Langford, 1905). Several of the members went on to lobby for the establishment of Yellowstone National Park and although they did not originate the national park idea, they are often given credit for it because, unlike the Yosemite Grant, Yellowstone was kept under federal control (Runte, 1979). The Yellowstone region was located in a territory rather than in a state, and thus had to be retained by the federal government (Udall, 1963). Eventually, Yosemite Valley was re-ceded to the federal government to become part of Yosemite National Park.

One year after the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition, the Hayden expedition went into the region to survey it and to gain scientific information about it. Included in that group were a landscape artist,
Thomas Moran, and a photographer, William Henry Jackson (Nash, 1973). Upon the expedition's return, a movement to create Yellowstone National Park began. The most prominent actors in this movement were members of the two expeditions. Hayden and Langford actively lobbied for the Park; both wrote articles about the unique features of the region in *Scribner's Monthly* which generated much public interest (Huth, 1957). Also, Moran's paintings of the geysers, waterfalls, and Yellowstone Lake, as well as Jackson's photographs of the area, were effectively used to convince congressmen of its uniqueness (Runte, 1979). Therefore, the movement to establish Yellowstone Park was similar to the wilderness preservation movement and the Yosemite Valley movement because artists and writers were used to influence the public and members of Congress.

However, the most important actor in the creation of Yellowstone Park was undoubtedly Jay Cooke's Northern Pacific Railroad, which may have actually suggested the park bill (Runte, 1979). In 1871 the railroad sponsored lectures given by Langford in the East; Cooke financed Moran on the Hayden expedition, and an agent of the railroad officially asked Hayden to lobby for the park proposal (Runte, 1979). The reason for the railroad's interest in the Park was clear: It saw Yellowstone as a "national vacation mecca" from which they would profit as the only transportation line to the area (Nash, 1973).
Congress passed the Yellowstone Act in 1872, and just as with the Yosemite Grant, the reason for its passage was not wilderness protection, but perhaps monumentalism as Runte (1979) has suggested. The "portal" experience of viewing the area from the safety and comfort of civilization was again to be provided. When Langford saw Yellowstone Lake for the first time in 1870, he clearly did not foresee the area preserved in its pristine state:

It is dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with villas and the ornaments of civilized life...It possesses adaptabilities for the highest display of artificial culture, amid the greatest wonders of Nature that the world affords, and is beautified by the grandeur of the most extensive mountain scenery, and not many years can elapse before the march of civil improvement will reclaim this delightful solitude, and garnish it with all the attractions of cultivated taste and refinement. (Langford, 1905)

While Langford may have refined his prediction for the Lake after his initial excitement, he definitely favored some form of public use, as his diary states: "I do not know of any portion of our country where a national park can be established furnishing to visitors more wonderful attractions than here" (Langford, 1905). Langford's comments reflect the general anthropocentrism that pervaded in his day. Undoubtedly he also reflected the Northern Pacific railroad's attitude as well.

Also, passage of the bill was not due to a strong feeling of support in Congress, but rather to the lack of opposition. Some members had reservations about the bill, but it passed for four primary reasons: First, although the amount of land to be set aside was huge, its size had nothing to do with protecting complete ecosystems or preserving wilderness; it was intended to be that extensive only to protect as yet
undiscovered geysers, hot pools, and other outstanding natural features (Runte, 1979). Second, as in the case of almost every succeeding national park establishment bill, the Yellowstone region was presented by park supporters as economically worthless (Runte, 1979). This argument was necessary to appease actors from mining, ranching, and lumber interests so they would not use their considerable influence in Congress to block the bill. Third, the area was largely inaccessible, and the Myth of Superabundance probably prevented some members of Congress from being concerned about such a remote and economically insignificant area. However, Congress did reserve the right to dissolve the Park should economic interests demand it. Runte (1979) quoted Representative Dawes, who stated at the time of the debate over the bill:

This bill reserves control over [Yellowstone] and preserves the control over it to the United States, so that at any time when it shall appear that it will be better to devote it to any other purpose it will be perfectly within the control of the United States to do it.

Fourth, supporters believed the Park would be self-supporting, which eliminated opposition from members of Congress concerned about the cost of the Park to taxpayers. This belief is further evidence of the anthropocentrism behind the park's establishment, because only by providing the luxury accommodations demanded by the "portal" tourists could the Park be expected to generate adequate income.

In the Yellowstone Act, just as in the Yosemite Grant, Congress did not state its intentions regarding management policies for the Park, or the type of recreational opportunities to be provided for visitors (Sax,
1976). The Act stated that the area was to be "set apart as a public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people", and that the Secretary of the Interior "shall provide for the preservation, from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition", and "provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park". Exactly how the Park was to be used for the "benefit and enjoyment of the people" was not specified, and the bill provided no funding, staff, or penalties for violating protective provisions of the law. However, the bill did include a provision for the Secretary to grant leases for "small parcels of ground, at such places in said park as shall require the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors". Congress thus recognized the anthropocentric support for the Act and considered concessions within the Park appropriate. Lobbying by the Northern Pacific Railroad was probably at least partially responsible for this provision being in the bill; railroad officials recognized the necessity of having comfortable accommodations in the park to draw tourists.

For the first ten years of the Park's existence, however, the area was very remote and largely inaccessible; visitation was confined primarily to wealthy Easterners and settlers from surroundings areas. Langford was appointed the first superintendent, and immediately implemented a policy of denying virtually all applications from private interests desiring to construct and operate toll roads, hotels, and stores in the Park (Bartlett, 1983). Most likely he was waiting for the
Northern Pacific to lay tracks to the area and place their own concessions application (Haines, 1977). Some small concessioners claiming to have been in the area prior to 1872 were allowed to continue operating their crude concessions (Bartlett, 1983). These operations consisted primarily of a log shack "hotel" and small bathhouses at Mammoth Hot Springs (Haines, 1977).

Not until 1877 did the Secretary of the Interior establish rules prohibiting commercial hunting, fishing, and trapping, and not until a year later did Congress provide any management funds for the Park (Ise, 1961). The second Yellowstone superintendent, Philetus Norris, used some of those funds to construct the first crude road system, which was designed to take visitors to the prominent features of the park: Mammoth Hot Springs, the Upper Geyser Basin, the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River, and the outlet of the River at Yellowstone Lake (Haines, 1977). The road system that exits in the Park today essentially follows Norris' original layout, and it is important to recognize that it was designed to provide tourist access to the natural features preserved within the Park, in keeping with the anthropocentric desires of the "portal" tourist.

By 1882 Norris' road system was fairly extensive; the Northern Pacific had extended its tracks to Livingston, Montana, sixty miles north of the Park, and had begun to publicize the Park as a vacation "Wonderland" in order to entice travellers to ride their line (Bartlett, 1983). Norris favored the licensing of guides and the development of concessions and, unlike his predecessor, he opposed the railroad's
efforts to gain monopolistic control of Park concessions. This opposition indirectly led to his removal from the superintendency when a group of Montanans whose town would have benefited from a Northern Pacific line into the Park objected to Norris' policies and gained the support of railroad allies in Congress (Haines, 1977). The railroad was thus once again was an important actor in the formation of national park policy. However, Congress as a whole favored competition in the Park; one senator went so far as to state, "All who desire to operate concessions of any kind in Yellowstone National Park should be permitted to do so" (Everhart, 1972). Nevertheless, the railroad had powerful allies and Norris' replacement was a man much more sympathetic to its interests (Haines, 1977). Also, the Secretary of the Interior anticipated substantial numbers of tourists since the area had become accessible, and realized that they would be expecting resort hotels to accommodate them (Bartlett, 1983). He believed a monopolized concessioner would be best able to build those facilities quickly, and granted the concessions contract to a group of investors with Northern Pacific connections. In 1882 a monopoly entered the Park, and from 1892 until 1967 the primary hotel and transportation concessions were operated by the same company managed by two men and their descendents (Bartlett, 1983). However, Bartlett states that this arrangement came about because of pressure and politics, not planning or past policy. It is clear that from the initial movement to establish Yellowstone National Park through the early stages of policy formation, the railroad interests were the leading actors in the process. They were able to exert substantial pressure because of the expansionist desires of a
public who wanted more access to the West, and because the vague intent of the Yellowstone Act allowed a wide range of interpretations. Furthermore, the anthropocentric orientation of the park movement and early park policy was due to a significant extent to the railroad's influence and its desire to serve the "portal" tourist.

The Park did not have an adequate staff to enforce the protective rules established by the Secretary. Squatters, poachers, and vandals became so numerous, the wildlife so decimated, and the mineral formations around the thermal features so scarred, that in 1886 the Department of the Interior requested the Secretary of War to send a troop of cavalry to take over the administration and protection of the Park (Hampton, 1971). The request came about partly as a result of criticism of Park administration by a member of Congress and the editor of the Chicago Tribune, who were heavily fined by corrupt officials of the Park while on a visit there; at the time Congress had grown discontented with the Park's management and had considered repeal of the Yellowstone Act, turning the Park over to Wyoming territory, or ending civilian administration of the Park (Haines, 1977). Had either of the first two options been chosen the national park movement would most likely have come to an early end. Once again, the primary actors in policy formation (in this case military administration) were prominent people who enjoyed influence in Congress.
The army took over the administration of the Park in 1886, and in spite of there being no "well-defined policy of protection", no "judicial machinery" for the prosecution of violators, and no training for the soldiers in how to protect the Park, it managed Yellowstone and other national parks as they were established and is credited with saving the early national system (Hampton, 1971).

Not until 1894, with the passage of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C.S. 24,26,30,30a), did the Army receive the judicial machinery to prosecute and punish law breakers; prior to passage of the Act soldiers used extralegal means of punishment, such as temporary and unauthorized incarceration (Hampton, 1971). The Act established penalties for killing or injuring wildlife, removing timber, and damaging thermal features; it also set up a legal system for the prosecution of violators under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government.

According to Hampton (1971), several similar bills failed to pass because railroad proponents in Congress always added amendments which granted rights-of-way through the Park to the Northern Pacific. Park proponents would then remove their support from the bill. The Lacey Act passed because George Bird Grinnell, editor of Field and Stream, wrote several editorials about poaching and vandalism in the Park, and also because citizens of Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah signed petitions protesting a railroad right-of-way. Although visitation was still quite low, a little over 5300 in 1895 (Hampton, 1971), the public knew of the Park largely through stories in books and magazines, and through railroad advertisements. Thus, public involvement was becoming a major factor in
the Park policy process. The railroad lobby was still very powerful, and determined to gain as much control of Yellowstone as it could get. Also, in 1890 Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant (now part of Sequoia-Kings Canyon) were set aside, largely through the efforts of the Southern Pacific Railroad; in later years other railroads helped get Glacier (Great Northern Railway), Grand Canyon (Santa Fe Railroad), and other parks established (Runte, 1974). The railroads were obviously a very formidable lobby. One park proponent in the Senate described the railroad lobby as "exactly like a compact military organization working for one object alone. They are persistent, aggressive, sleepless, untiring, and they are determined..." (Hampton, 1971). The national park movement and the railroads thus entered into a "pragmatic alliance"; railroad lobbying helped create parks, their advertisements helped increase visitation and boost public support of the parks but their motives were purely selfish and therefore park proponents were wary of them (Runte, 1974).

POLICY FORMATION DURING MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

During civilian administration, the superintendent of Yellowstone was responsible for most of the policy formation. Congress had no clear idea of what was to be done with the Park they had created, and in the early years after it was established, showed little interest in Park matters because the public had not yet become interested; therefore the superintendent had a free hand in making and implementing policy (within budgetary constraints), until his actions came in conflict with an influential actor in the process, most often the railroad. Norris
designed and constructed roads as he wanted them (Haines, 1977); established policies forbidding the cutting of timber and removal of mineral deposits, prohibiting hunting, trapping, and fishing (except to provide food for visitors or residents), and forbidding the selling of liquor or establishing a permanent residence within the Park (Hampton, 1971). He also worked to prevent the railroad from gaining control of Park concessions (Haines, 1977). It was his railroad policy that led to his removal. His successor was removed at least partly because he stood in the way of a monopoly attempt by a railroad-backed concessioner (Haines, 1977). Thus, policy evaluation in the early period of Yellowstone Park history was indirectly carried out in a large measure by the Northern Pacific Railroad.

When the Army took over administration of Yellowstone and the other parks as they were established, the effect was to:

..remove the administration of the Park from the political arena; and under the direction of energetic and conscientious military officers the rules and regulations governing the Park were revised and enforced, various threats to the very existence of the Park were met and overcome, policy was determined, a precedent was established for a national park system, and punitive legislation was finally obtained from a reluctant Congress. (Hampton, 1971)

Under the Army superintendents several policies were initiated or continued from civilian superintendents: cutting timber, hunting, trapping, discharging firearms, selling liquor, grazing stock, and throwing objects into geysers and hot springs was prohibited; use of campfires was restricted (Hampton, 1971). Also, the practices of fish stocking in barren lakes, predator control, active forest fire
suppression, and the building of backcountry patrol cabins were begun (Hampton, 1971). Therefore, while army administration effectively blunted the railroad's influence, several anthropocentric policies were instituted which were meant to change the parks to suit the desires of the visiting public.

During the 32 years of Army administration a national park "system" was begun, but it was actually a very loose collection of independently managed units. According to Ise (1961), "each park was officially a separate unit, administratively different from the others". In the first decade of the twentieth century a controversy arose which gave evidence of the weakness of the park "system". The city of San Francisco needed a source of water, and decided that Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite Park would be an excellent location for a dam to produce hydroelectric power and to provide a reservoir for drinking water (Nash, 1973). Hetch Hetchy was "an aesthetic and geographical complement to the Yosemite Valley" (Mantell, 1979), and park proponents vigorously objected to the proposal.

The conservation of natural resources had become an accepted concept by the turn of the twentieth century. The issue was no longer "between a good (civilization) and an evil (wilderness) but between two goods" (Nash, 1973). Conservation as described by Marsh in 1864 had grown into a viable movement in American society, largely due to the efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, lifelong conservationist (Udall, 1963); but the Hetch Hetchy controversy served to widen a split within the movement between the utilitarians and the
preservationists. Utilitarians believed in the use of all resources for commercial needs: timber, minerals, livestock. The use they advocated was not the destructive and wasteful use practiced in the previous century, but the "wise use" (Nash, 1973) Marsh had advocated, which could be sustained over several generations with minimal damage to the resource. Their concept of conservation was at the far anthropocentric end of the management philosophy scale, and they believed that damming the Valley was a proper use, and the most beneficial use.

Preservationists on the other hand believed, like Thoreau, that civilized man could benefit from the preservation of outstanding scenery and pristine wilderness. Their philosophy was strongly biocentric, and they felt that the dam would needlessly destroy a wild area equal in scenic beauty to Yosemite Valley.

The two most prominent actors in this controversy were Gifford Pinchot and John Muir. Pinchot, Chief Forester of the USDA Forest Service, was a "highly effective publicizer" for the utilitarian opinion (Nash, 1973). He was a "magnificent bureaucrat" who worked closely with Theodore Roosevelt to form a conservation policy that forced "the American people to turn from flagrant waste of resources to programs of wise stewardship" (Udall, 1963). Pinchot believed that "conservation meant use rather than reservation from use" (Ise, 1961), and thus had no interest in parks or wilderness preservation. He felt that a dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley was a proper use of the resource which would benefit the greatest number of people. Pinchot used his considerable influence to work from within the federal government for the dam's construction.
Muir, on the other hand, was a naturalist and founder of the Sierra Club who believed in the Transcendentalist interpretation of wilderness (Nash, 1973). He felt that "wilderness freedom, like political freedom, was perennially in danger and could be maintained only by eternal vigilance" (Udall, 1963). Like Pinchot, Muir was a friend of Roosevelt and an effective publicizer; but Muir worked from outside the government to convince Roosevelt and the American public that Hetch Hetchy should be preserved. He was known for his fiery oratory, and his arguments against the dam took on religious overtones. He called dam supporters "temple destroyers", and went further in stating: "Dam Hetch Hetchy! As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches; for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man" (Ise, 1961). Muir's speeches, as well as magazine articles and editorials of the day, helped make the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal a national controversy.

In 1913, after a long and bitter political battle, Congress voted to allow the construction of the dam. The controversy had several important implications for the national park preservation movement. First, because of the intense public support the battle had generated for the parks, the movement had been shown to be a "viable political force", but it was also "apparent that the very survival of the national parks depended on the number of people who visited them" (Mantell, 1979). Also, rather than using the argument that parks were economically worthless, preservationists realized that they needed to stress the potential economic advantages of tourism to the parks, which
meant they had to compromise some of their biocentrism. Third, the controversy served to introduce the biocentric approach into national park management, at least as a concept to be considered.

CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

The Hetch Hetchy battle also served to point out the need for unified management of the park "system". By 1915, the "system" consisted of fourteen independently managed units (Sax, 1976), including Yellowstone, Yosemite, Rainier, Crater Lake, and Glacier; each created by separate acts of Congress, and all in the Interior Department. It also included several national monuments, most established from the public domain by presidential proclamation under broad interpretation of the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.); these monuments included Muir Woods, Mount Olympus, and the Grand Canyon. Some of these were under the control of the Department of Agriculture, others were under the War Department (Ise, 1961). Shankland (1951) described the situation:

The concessioners operated under widely variant regulations from park to park. The division of authority among the parks, and even inside a single park, came close to chaos. In Yellowstone all improvements and their appropriations were managed by an officer of the Army Corps of Engineers, who answered to neither the Interior Department nor the park superintendent; the Superintendent was himself an army officer, appointed by the Secretary of War; and "exclusive control" rested with the Secretary of the Interior.

Other serious problems plagued the parks. Buchholtz (1969) described two of the most serious:
Congress formulated each of the national park organic acts with a similarity of vague goals and imprecise wording which, in time, contributed to administrative confusion during their application or enforcement.

Most parks did not receive any appropriations from Congress until several years after their formation, because of the belief that they were to be self-supporting.

Ise (1961) described another, perhaps less evident, problem:

Some locality with an area of very modest scenic values, or perhaps nothing at all, with an eye to Congressional appropriations and profitable tourist traffic, might steam up a campaign to have it made a national park, and if it had an influential delegation in Congress might succeed in it.

In 1915, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, in an effort to solve these problems brought Stephen Mather to Washington, D.C. to be Assistant to the Secretary in charge of the parks. Mather was given the responsibility of gaining Congressional support of the parks in order to get increases in appropriations for the system, additions of appropriate units to the system, and authorization of a bureau to manage the system; he was also directed to organize this bureau once it was created, develop facilities both within and around the parks, and increase public use and support of the parks (Shankland, 1951).

Several influential people had been pushing in Washington for an agency to manage the whole park system for several years before Mather arrived there (Ise, 1961). However, along with the Hetch Hetchy resolution, Mather's arrival in the capital was a major factor in getting a managing agency created. Mather was a "[s]elf-made millionaire, philanthropist, mountain climber" (Udall, 1963); he "was a man of prodigious and explosive energy, a tireless worker, a born
promoter" (Ise, 1961), "a disciple of John Muir" (Sax, 1976), and a member of Muir's Sierra Club. He used his "business acumen and powers of persuasion" (Udall, 1963) to publicize the parks in order to gain the necessary support for the creation of an agency to manage them.

In 1916 the National Park Service Act was passed by Congress. Mather worked closely with Horace Albright, a young lawyer in the Interior Department, to organize the new Service as ordered by the Act (Runte, 1979). Utilitarians in general, and the Forest Service in particular, had opposed the bill; the Forest Service felt it could best manage all federal lands, but preservationists saw the bill as "a clear-cut blueprint of what the national parks stood for and how they should be administered" (Runte, 1979). Control of all existing and future national parks, plus the national monuments in the Department of the Interior was granted to the new agency in the Act; the monuments in the Departments of War and Agriculture remained there until 1933 (Lee, 1974). By 1918 the army was removed completely from the parks (Hampton, 1971), and Park Service rangers took over the soldiers' duties.

Rather than being a "clear-cut blueprint" for the parks, the Act went no further than previous legislation in defining their proper use. Instead it contained a mandate for the Service that has been at the center of virtually every policy dispute since the Act was passed. The Service was directed to "promote and regulate use" of the parks, while at the same time it was also directed to "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations". This "double mandate of preservation and use", as these statements have come to be known, leaves the Service a great deal of discretion as to what uses are to be considered appropriate in the national parks.

STEPHEN MATHER'S NATIONAL PARK POLICY

Mather was appointed the first director of the Service, and he served in that position from 1917 until 1929, although his health broke several times in that period from overwork. He died in 1930, after being stricken in 1928 (Ise, 1961). Albright became Mather's close friend, and served as his assistant and as superintendent of Yellowstone from 1919 to 1929 (Haines, 1977), when he succeeded Mather as Director. He served in that position until 1933 when he retired to enter private business (Ise, 1961).

Together Mather and Albright worked to create a unified policy for the national park system. Mather was undoubtedly the single most important actor in the early formation of National Park Service policy. Like Muir before him, he saw the need to cultivate support for the parks, and devoted his energy and promotional skills toward convincing "the leading eastern newspapers and magazines that the parks should be sacrosanct. He carefully cultivated the members of Congress from the park states, as well as those from other areas with committee assignments important to the service" (Smith, 1966). He made every effort to place the parks in the public consciousness. According to Ise (1961), "[h]e courted senators and representatives and government
dignitaries, writers...and newspaper owners and reporters". One of his most effective ways of cultivating support was to take such influential people on excursions through some of the parks (Ise, 1961). Mather understood the importance of writers, as well as painters of national park scenes (Ise, 1961), in influencing public attitudes of the parks; he thus continued the practice that had been an important part of the growth of public acceptance of the national park idea throughout its history.

Mather also actively cultivated the support of the railroads, who as had historically been true, were very willing to promote the parks. Unable to foresee the coming impact of the automobile, they extensively promoted park tourism (Ise, 1961), fully expecting to be the sole beneficiaries of increased travel to the parks. Therefore, although they did not enjoy the power they previously had, they remained important actors in the park policy process.

Concessions were a major problem when Mather joined the Interior Department in 1915. He felt the concessions system in general needed to be "overhauled" (Ise, 1961). Yellowstone, for example, had the most extensive concessions system of all the parks, but there was much competition and overlapping of services. The primary hotel and transportation systems established in 1892 had expanded to include a chain of five hotels, two lunch stations, and a stagecoach line under the auspices of two companies, both run by the same man; there were also two other stagecoach lines, three permanent-camp systems, and a "grab-bag of traveling camps" (Shankland, 1951). Mather saw this
situation as wasteful and costly to visitors. He believed a regulated monopoly would be more efficient and better able to provide quality service at more reasonable prices. It took until 1924, but through mergers, buy-outs, and coercion Mather succeeded in creating a monopoly out of the concessions, excluding general stores and minor concessions (Ise, 1961). Also, in 1915 he induced two of the stagecoach companies to merge in order to establish a motor-bus service, which brought the automobile to the Park (Shankland, 1951).

Some of Mather's promotional ideas would be considered quite inappropriate in national parks today. He once wrote in reference to Yellowstone:

Golf links, tennis courts, swimming pools, and other equipment for outdoor pastime and exercise should be provided by concessions, and the park should be extensively advertised as a place to spend the summer instead of five or six days of hurried sight-seeing under constant pressure to keep moving ... There is no national park better suited by nature for spending leisurely vacations (Ise, 1961).

However, Merriam (1972) stated that "in spite of the drumfire of visit-your-parks propaganda that emanated from the new bureau, the earliest formal statement of the new National Park Service showed that Lane, Mather, and company had a very clear and less selfishly motivated idea of the nature and mission of a national park." He quoted the first annual report of the Service, in 1916, as stating that the national parks were not supposed to be thought of primarily in terms of recreation. The report stated, "the fostering of recreation purely as such is more properly the function of the city, county, and state parks, and there should be a clear distinction between the character of such
parks and national parks." Mather thus advocated a biocentric approach to national park policy, but he recognized the fact that certain aspects of anthropocentrism were a necessary part of any policy that was to have wide public support. At that time in national park history, when the national parks were still relatively unknown, generating substantial public support was essential; therefore Mather's policies were not as strongly biocentric as many preservationists would have liked.

The most important piece of policy that came out of the Mather era was a letter from Secretary Lane to Mather, written in 1918. In it, the administrative policies of the Park Service were spelled out. The letter provided the basis for Park Service management that remains fundamentally intact today. Ise (1961) quoted the three primary goals from the letter:

First, that the national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations as well as those of our own time; second, that they are set aside for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third, that the national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks.

Significantly, preservation of the parks was the first priority listed. According to Ise (1961), other policies set forth in the letter were: Cattle grazing was allowed in areas not frequented by visitors in all parks but Yellowstone; no leases were to be granted for summer homes; no timber cutting was permitted, except for buildings, and only where it would not affect the forest or landscape; roads were to harmonize with the landscape; private inholdings were to be eliminated; all outdoor sports, including winter sports, were to be encouraged; educational
use, as well as recreational use of the parks, was a desired goal; low-priced camps, as well as high-priced hotels, were to be offered to visitors; concessioners were to be protected against competition, and were to pay a revenue to the government, but not so that it would place a burden on the visitor; the Service was to cooperate with city, county, and state parks; the Service was to use the Railroad Administration, chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and "auto-highway associations" to advertise the parks; only areas of distinctive scenery or unique features were to be considered for inclusion into the system.

The letter was widely believed to have been completely, or at least partly, written by Mather and then signed by Lane. But in 1964 Albright admitted writing the letter while Mather was recuperating from a nervous breakdown (Garrison, 1980). The letter undoubtedly expressed the beliefs of both Mather and Albright, with Lane's approval, and reflected Mather's primarily biocentric beliefs mixed with anthropocentric provisions.

The letter has been called the "magna carta" of the national parks (Mantell, 1979) because in it basic principles were set forth which more clearly stated what the national parks were to be. It reflected a biocentric orientation by stressing unimpaired preservation for the use of future generations, but it also reflected some anthropocentrism by advocating educational use of the parks, a range of facilities to serve all income levels, and extensive advertisement of the parks. The letter also set forth monopolized concessions as a desirable goal. While Mather had always favored monopolies in the parks, the Lane Letter was
the first official statement of them as National Park policy.

The Lane Letter was important for another reason: It came from within the Service. The intent of Congress regarding specific park policy was still unknown or nonexistent, and therefore it was left up to Mather and Albright to create policy. Thus, Congress was willing to leave the formation of park policy up to the Park Service. The discretion left to the Service in 1918 is significant today because it set a precedent for the role of Congress in national park management.

In 1925, another Secretary of the Interior, Hubert Work, restated the national park mandate with even more emphasis on the preservation aspect: "The duty imposed upon the National Park Service in the organic act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other activity" (Merriam, 1972).

When Albright succeeded Mather as director, Park Service policy continued in the same direction Mather had started it, plus its duties expanded to include management of new parks, historical sites, and monuments; it also gained control over many units previously under the Departments of War and Agriculture (Ise, 1961).

THE SERVICE AFTER MATHER AND ALBRIGHT

The outward expansion of the Service's responsibilities continued when Arno Cammerer replaced Albright as director. Cammerer had served under both Mather and Albright, and took over the Service in the midst
of the Great Depression. During his administration, Congress continually cut the parks' funding although visitation rose rapidly, from almost 3.5 million in 1933 to almost 16.8 million in 1940 (Ise, 1961).

At the Service's urging Congress passed the Historic Sites and Building Act of 1935 (16 U.S.C.S. 461 et seq.), which "declared it a national policy to preserve such things for the inspiration and benefit of the people" (Ise, 1961). The system also expanded to include National Recreation Areas, National Parkways, National Seashores, National Military Parks, National Capital Parks, and National Cemeteries.

Also, during Cammerer's tenure as director conservation groups became more organized and vocal about park policy, and he was criticized by "purists" in the conservation movement for overbroadening the Service's responsibilities, de-emphasizing and over-developing the scenic parks and monuments, and making too many concessions to commercial interests in newly established parks (Ise, 1961). This criticism of the Service from within the national park movement marked the beginning of a split between those who wanted only the most scenic and pristine natural areas included in the system, and those who wanted any area of nationally significant historic, cultural, or recreational value, as well as outstanding scenery included in the system. This difference of opinion has grown and polarized in the years since its beginning as the Service's responsibilities have widened and the system has grown.
The controversy during Cammerer's directorship also marked the beginning of active participation in the Park Service policy process by organized conservation groups. Two of the most vocal critics were the Wilderness Society and the National Parks Association (now the National Parks and Conservation Association). Stephen Mather helped found the N.P.A. in 1919 to, in the words of its organizers, "defend the National Parks and Monuments fearlessly against assaults of private interests and aggressive commercialism" (Ise, 1961). The N.P.A. had previously had disagreements with Mather's policy, but the broadening of the system under Cammerer was essentially the beginning of a continuing disagreement over park policy. Ise (1961) described the dispute:

Some of the purists simply wanted one kind of park administration, the Park Service believed in a somewhat different sort of administration; and they were both informed, enlightened, and sincere. To some extent the difference was due to their different respective positions; the purists were free of all responsibilities and could speak and write without fear or inhibitions; the Park Service, on the other hand, had a job to do, the job not only of protecting the parks but of making them accessible---as required, by implication at least, by the act of 1916---and of winning friends and public support for them.

In other words, the "purists" were free to speak their mind without restriction. The Park Service, on the other hand, had political constraints. The diversification of the system, as well as the rise in visitation that accompanied it, broadened the Service's constituency and greatly increased the number of actors involved in the policy process; many of these actors were much less "purist" oriented than others. The purists basically feared that diversifying the system would cloud the origins of the system, and that the addition of areas established primarily to provide recreation would shift NPS policy away from the
biocentrism they advocated.

Cammerer left the director's office in 1940, and was replaced by Newton Drury. Drury was not a career Park Service man, but had previously had contacts with Mather while serving as executive secretary of the Save-the-Redwoods-League (Shankland, 1951). World War II was fought during the first half of Drury's administration and most of his efforts were directed toward preventing commercial interests from exploiting the parks for timber, range, minerals, and water under the guise of aiding the war effort (Ise, 1961). He was quite successful, probably because the War ended before these interests could gain enough support for their proposals. Drury was successful in preventing timber and mineral extraction from Olympic Park, and in preventing dams from being built in Glacier and the Grand Canyon (Ise, 1961).

Gas-rationing during the War was partly responsible for reducing visitation to the parks; as a result most hotels in the parks were closed or their seasons shortened. In Yellowstone, for instance, Lake Hotel and all the lodges remained closed until the War ended (Haines, 1977). Congressional appropriations, as well as ranger and maintenance forces, were largely lost to the war effort. As a result park facilities fell into disrepair.

The War effectively ended the period of growth and expansion of the national park system begun by Mather. During that period the number and types of units in the system increased, policy was formed, and most importantly, public use and support of the parks had increased
dramatically. The national parks had gone from being rather obscure pieces of federal land to being a popular part of American culture.

THE PARKS AFTER WORLD WAR II

In the years following World War II, the parks were inundated with visitors. The automobile had become not only affordable to the average American, but also a reliable means of transportation, and after the combined hardships of the Depression and the War Americans began to travel as never before possible. Tourism became a major national industry; visitation to the parks jumped from 6.9 million in 1943 to 21.7 million in 1946, and to 29.6 million in 1948 (Drury, 1949). Park concessioners had great difficulties providing the necessary services; the hotels had deteriorated due to lack of maintenance, and as Ise (1961) stated;

After five hungry years they had insufficient supplies, labor, buses, and many other things; especially they lacked experienced help and accommodations for their help, and had to pay much higher wages for such inexperienced help as they could get.

Drury was thus faced with circumstances opposite from those Mather faced; the parks had become so popular that funding and staffing could not keep up with the increases in visitation. Drury, like his predecessors in the national park movement, used the media in an effort to point out the problems in the parks. In 1949 he wrote an article in American Forests in which he made a case for increased funding from Congress; however, the necessary appropriations did not come during his administration, and he was unable to solve the problems he faced.
During his tenure Drury suggested two long range solutions to overcrowding which became important years after he first conceived them. In 1945, he considered moving concession facilities and administration buildings out of congested areas of some parks; he also considered earlier opening and later closing dates in some parks to spread visitation out over a longer season, and proposed government construction of concessioner facilities (Ise, 1961). His proposals to manipulate visitors and facilities rather than the environment are evidence of his strong biocentric orientation.

In fact, Drury was arguably the most "purist" oriented and biocentric of the directors to that time, and his opposition to commercial exploitation of the parks cost him the directorship in 1951. He was forced to resign by the Secretary of the Interior because he refused to support the Secretary's approval of construction of a system of dams in Dinosaur National Monument (Ise, 1961). The situation was one of park policy being formed above the agency, at higher levels of the federal government, with the Secretary being the most visible actor. Drury failed to implement the policy as dictated to him and was removed from his position. Congress served to evaluate the policy by overturning the Secretary's approval of the dams, after extensive lobbying by several conservation organizations. Once again Congress did not create policy, but acted as policy evaluators.
Drury's biocentric argument for park preservation was quoted by Ise (1961):

If we are going to succeed in preserving the greatness of the national parks, they must be held inviolate. They represent the last stand of primitive America. If we are going to whittle away at them we should recognize, at the very beginning, that all such whettings are cumulative and that the end result will be mediocrity. Greatness will be gone.

CONRAD WIRTH AND MISSION 66

In 1951 Conrad Wirth ascended to the directorship from within the Service. His background was as a landscape architect; his first association with the NPS came during the Great Depression when, as an administrator with the Civilian Conservation Corps, he oversaw construction projects in the parks (Wirth, 1980). His development background signaled a significant shift in emphasis from Drury's biocentrism toward a more anthropocentric philosophy.

During the early years of Wirth's directorship the parks continued to deteriorate while visitation rapidly rose. In 1940 the national park system included 161 areas encompassing 21.5 million acres, with approximately 17 million visitors and appropriations of almost 33.5 million dollars; by 1955 the system had expanded to include 181 units encompassing almost 24 million acres, with approximately 55.6 million visitors, operating with appropriations of only 32.5 million dollars (Wirth, 1980). In other words, during those 15 years the national park system increased by 20 units, visitation tripled, but appropriations from Congress decreased by a million dollars. One editorial placed the blame for the park "crisis" on Congress for not appropriating sufficient
funds, and on the concessioners for "enjoying monopolies,...taking advantage of the situation" by providing poor service at high prices (Netboy, 1955).

In February of 1955 Wirth devised a ten year plan to upgrade and expand park facilities to meet the increasing visitor pressure. He felt that a long term program, including proposals for developments in almost every unit of the system rather than short term requests for the funding of individual projects, would have a better chance of receiving broad support in Congress because units in practically every state would benefit (Wirth, 1980). He called the program Mission 66 (frequently referred to as M66), and it was intended to culminate in 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the National Park Service. The program was intended to get sufficient funding from Congress to improve and expand facilities in the park system in order to accommodate 80 million visitors per year, the number estimated to be visiting the system by 1966.

Wirth set up a "Mission 66 Committee" consisting of personnel in the Washington office of the Park Service. Members were from the divisions of Design and Construction, Operations, Interpretation, and Cooperative Activities, with several branches under the Operations Division also being represented (Wirth, 1980). This committee was given the responsibility to develop the program. A "Steering Committee" was also established, consisting of the supervisors of the members of the Mission 66 Committee, which had the responsibility to "plan the scope and pattern" of the main committee study (Wirth memo, 1955).
Additionally, the regional offices established their own Mission 66 committees and individual parks created working committees to plan projects at the park level (Wirth, 1980).

During 1955 the Mission 66 Committee conducted pilot studies of several parks, set forth procedures, and directed each park to submit a prospectus of projects needed (Wirth, 1980). The prospectuses consisted primarily of updated park master plans. Individual park master plans had existed in the system for several years; Wirth (1980) states that they were essential to the Mission 66 program.

The problems of the parks had gained such notoriety that President Eisenhower drew attention to them in his 1956 State of the Union address, stating that his administration would submit recommendations to provide more facilities for the public (Wirth, 1980). A bill for the M66 program was submitted to Congress and passed with appropriations of $786,545,000 (Vetter, 1957). The program began in July 1956 amid a great deal of publicity put out by the Park Service. Robert Barbee (pers. comm.) stated that "every [interpretive] program had to include some sort of discussion of Mission 66. It was a great propaganda effort. It was a stroke of genius to get a ten year commitment from Congress. That was unheard of." Once the program had started, the Mission 66 Committee was disbanded and the Steering Committee was enlarged and reorganized as the "Mission 66 Advisory Committee", and assigned to monitor the program (Wirth, 1980).
Mission 66 was conceived, designed, and organized almost entirely within the National Park Service. It came about largely because of public criticism of the deterioration of the units in the park system, but once the program began there was very little public input. Therefore the NPS was the most important actor involved in the policies of the program, and those policies reflected Wirth's strong anthropocentrism. In a manual entitled *Mission 66 For the National Park System* (USDI, 1956), sent out by the NPS Washington office to the field employees as an explanation of the program, the Mission 66 philosophy was enunciated. The Forward to the manual, entitled "The Basic Purpose of the National Park System", reinterprets the National Park Service Act by reducing the Act's double mandate of preservation and use to a single mandate to "promote and regulate use":

This act charges the National Park Service to do one thing---to promote and regulate the use of the parks. This is the one positive injunction placed upon the Service---a clear statement of Service responsibility. The intent of the remaining portion of this Act, which defines the purpose of the National Park System, is clear, but its language leaves room for interpretations which may obscure its true meaning.

The Forward went on to define the national park system in strictly anthropocentric terms:

The National Park System is a national resource---a natural resource, a historical resource, a cultural resource. Like minerals, timber, soil, or water, it is a resource that has meaning and value only when transmuted into products useful to man...the primary justification for a National Park System lies in its capacity to provide enjoyment in its best sense, now and in the future.

The Forward did not go on to define "enjoyment in its best sense", but it did refer to the preservation aspect of park management by declaring: "To change the character of a park area in any important way destroys a
part of its ability to yield...benefits to the human mind and spirit." However, the meaning of "any important way" was not clarified, so what was considered important change cannot be determined.

The National Park Service Act was referred to again in the main part of the manual, in a statement that clearly reflects the anthropocentric ideology of placing preservation within the context of recreation:

"The law insisted that these areas were to be so managed that their natural qualities would remain unimpaired; for only if thus protected would they provide the fullest degree of enjoyment and inspiration for present and future Americans. Without the concept of public use and enjoyment the function of preservation and protection is without meaning. (emphasis added)

The manual went on to state: "It is the task of the National Park Service, therefore, to assure the America people opportunity for maximum beneficial use and enjoyment." The use of the word "maximum" perhaps best reveals the approach of the Wirth administration toward park use. The word had not been used in policy statements prior to Mission 66.

Mission 66 had a significant impact on virtually every unit of the national park system. The program was eventually responsible for the construction of: 1570 miles of reconstructed roads, 1197 miles of new roads, 936 miles of new and reconstructed trails, 330 parking areas, 575 new campgrounds consisting of 17,782 campsites, 742 new picnic areas, 114 visitor centers, 584 new comfort stations, and 50 marinas, boating ramps, and facilities; plus 535 new water systems, 521 new sewer systems, 271 power systems, 221 new administrative buildings, 218 new
utility buildings, as well as hundreds of employee residences, entrance stations, lookout towers, and interpretive exhibits (Wirth, 1980).

CRITICISM OF MISSION 66

The Mission 66 program was initially welcomed by the interested public as a dramatic step in the right direction. However, not too long after the program began doubts were expressed. Without specifically mentioning M66, Krutch (1957) wrote:

Up until now the original purpose of the national parks and monuments has been fairly well preserved, partly as the result of more or less conscious policy, more perhaps because limitations of money and time have slowed down the tendency to prevent it. But now that the integrity of the parks is being increasingly threatened by would-be exploiters as well as by the simple pressure of an increasing population looking for "recreation"—a definite policy of protection from both ought to be formulated. Along with the question of "good roads", especially within the parks themselves, it would have to consider all the other "improvements" and "facilities" proposed and sometimes provided.

He went further by stating that "parks should not be turned into resorts. And the distinction should be not how long the visitor stays, but why and under what inducement". He then went on to reflect upon Park Service philosophy and policy:

Are parks doomed in their turn to become mere resorts? Ultimately perhaps. But how rapidly will depend largely upon the philosophy which the Park Service formulates and the support it can win for it. A wise one could make them last out not only my time and yours but that for generations yet to come.

Some conservation groups also began to question Park Service policy early in the Mission 66 program. Everhart (1972) quoted the National Parks Association as stating in 1958: "Conservationists and the lovers of our national parks in general are becoming increasingly apprehensive.
about the trend toward some national parks becoming recreational resorts."

By 1961 criticism of Mission 66 had become relatively widespread. As had been historically true, popular magazines were instrumental in making the issue public. In February of 1961 Atlantic Monthly published a series of articles under the heading "Our National Parks In Jeopardy". One article in the series (Brooks, 1961) referred to the "much disputed Mission 66", and hinted at some of the interest groups who pushed the Park Service to develop the parks:

Some development is necessary; the danger today is that, under pressure, it may be going hog-wild. I venture to suggest that much of this activity—particularly the building of roads for fast cars and marinas for fast boats—is based on a mistaken premise. It is assumed that the public (as distinguished from the automobile and motorboat industries) demands these things and that the parks cannot be used without them. Is this true?

The article went on to state: "This project, however legitimate its objectives, is sometimes being carried to excess. One can only hope for restraint, in both central planning and local execution."

The architectural style by the Park Service during Mission 66 also came under attack. Prior to the program, the "national park style" had been one of generally simple rustic buildings, built with native materials, which blended into the surrounding landscape (Wilson, 1976). However, another article in the series (Butcher, 1961) stated:

Under Mission 66, too many of the parks are being cluttered with buildings of freak and austere design. No longer are the architects concerned with producing structures of beauty and charm that help to create a proper atmosphere and are inconspicuous and harmonious with their surroundings. Rather, they seem obsessed with designing monuments to their
own inventiveness. Widely criticized, these buildings are unlike any others in the parks and are creating a hodgepodge where, instead, there should be uniformity.

The article went on to call for the Park Service to adopt a policy prohibiting construction of any further facilities in the central parts of the parks, and also advocated the construction of necessary facilities either just within the park entrances or outside the parks.

The Park Service also drew considerable criticism from several conservation groups for the lack of resource protection, in particular wilderness protection, included in M66 policies. As early as 1951, a legally established "national wilderness preservation system" was proposed, and from 1957 to 1964 several versions of wilderness protective legislation were debated in Congress, culminating in the Wilderness Act of 1964 (Nash, 1973). Wirth and the Park Service were said to oppose a wilderness law (Craig, 1957), but Wirth (1980) claimed that the Service did not want to be "included in it because the protection section of the original bill was not as protective for national parks wilderness as our own basic legislation". However, Lemuel Garrison (pers. comm.), who served as the chairman of the Mission 66 Steering and Advisory Committees, stated that the Service felt that a wilderness bill "over-emphasized" the importance of wilderness in parks. Garrison (1983) also stated that he felt wilderness legislation was "redundant as it related to National Parks". Whatever the reason, the passage of wilderness legislation was not incorporated as an objective of M66, and that omission caused many conservation groups to turn against the program (Garrison, pers.
A significant change occurred in the federal government during the Mission 66 program which led indirectly to a change in Park Service philosophy and policy. The program had begun with a Republican administration in the White House that fully supported it, but in 1960 a Democrat, John Kennedy, was elected president. While the Kennedy administration's policies regarding national parks did not publicly differ significantly from the Eisenhower administration's, there arose several disagreements between the Kennedy Interior Department and Wirth's National Park Service. First, Kennedy supported enactment of wilderness legislation (Wirth, 1980). Also, Kennedy favored the establishment of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) (Chubb and Chubb, 1981) as an effort to begin comprehensive national outdoor recreation planning; the NPS, on the other hand, felt that the BOR was unnecessary and intruded upon the Park Service responsibility (Wirth, 1980).

Wirth (1980) cited incidents between the Kennedy Interior Department and the Park Service which suggest friction between the department and the agency, but the only public split in policy between the two came about because of a controversy regarding the management of elk in Yellowstone. Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall established an Interior Department-level advisory board to examine the problem of wildlife management in the national parks. The board's report,
published in 1963 and known as the Leopold Report (Leopold et al., 1963), dealt primarily with resource issues. However, it made recommendations for park management which differed with some of the principles of Mission 66. The report recommended that rather than providing for public use, the "primary goal" for park management should be:

...that the biotic associations within each park be maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man. A national park should represent a vignette of primitive America.

The report then questioned the appropriateness of many of the facilities existing in the parks, including some being built under M66:

...it seems incongruous that there should exist in the national parks mass recreation facilities such as golf courses, ski lifts, motorboat marinas, and other extraneous developments which completely contradict the management goal. We urge the National Park Service to reverse its policy of permitting these noconforming uses, and to liquidate them as expeditiously as possible (painful as this will be to concessionaires). Above all other policies, the maintenance of naturalness should prevail.

Although the Leopold Report was not a rejection of existing NPS policy and did not specifically criticize the Mission 66 program, it did advocate a definite shift in NPS policy toward a more biocentric approach to management. It sought to direct the Park Service away from merely providing recreational opportunities toward scientifically managing the parks as complex ecosystems. It urged the Service to expand its research programs because of their importance as the basis for management decisions.
Because of the broad discretion left to the NPS in its organic act Mission 66 and the Leopold Report could both be construed by their respective proponents as appropriate under the law. Their differences reflected fundamental differences in their philosophical orientations toward management; the Leopold Report emphasized the preservation aspect of the Service's legal mandate, Mission 66 emphasized the promotion of use aspect. The Leopold Report can be regarded at least partly as a reaction to the rejection of Mission 66 philosophy by the interested public. The Park Service was directed by Udall to adopt the Leopold Report as policy (Barbee, pers. comm.), and while it is doubtful that the agency was completely pleased with the directive, visitation to the system in 1963 had exceeded the M66 estimate for 1966 by 20 million people; the Service most certainly recognized that constructing facilities to keep up with visitation was no longer feasible, and probably also felt the need for an adjustment in policy. The Leopold Report became "a kind of manifesto" for the Park Service (Barbee, pers. comm.).

Mission 66 did not culminate in the dramatic fashion Wirth had originally intended. In 1966 visitation to the system exceeded the M66 estimate of 80 million people per year by over 53 million, in spite of several revisions of the M66 program (Wirth, 1980), and according to Garrison (pers. comm.) the Service did not end the program, it merely incorporated its objectives into long-term planning. Haines (1977) states that the program "passed quietly out of the picture" when Udall announced a new program entitled "Road to the Future", which
"deemphasized construction of facilities". Wirth retired in early 1964 amid rumors that he was fired, but both he and Udall denied those rumors (Wirth, 1980). However, whether or not his resignation was due in any part to criticism of Mission 66 or to changes in policy dictated to the Park Service from the Interior Department or Congress is impossible to determine.

Because of the long-term effects of M66, the program has remained a topic of discussion in the years since it ended. Darling and Eichhorn (1969) wrote:

Thinking independently as individuals we have both felt uneasy about the conception of Mission 66. It has seemed to us that this operation over 10 years has been to increase visitation, making it easier to get into the national parks and that the visitors should be more comfortable in various ways once they are there. Mission 66 has done comparatively little for the plants and animals.

Mission 66, instead of being a far-sighted planning operation to conserve these choice areas, seems to have been conceived to allow more complete infiltration and uncritical use.

Hill (1972) called the program "a misguided spasm of political cosmetology...nominally aimed at improving the parks, but also at galvanizing public interest and stimulating appropriations". Udall (1972) was undoubtedly referring to M66 when he wrote:

History has shown, incidentally, that "beneficent projects" of one period---the building of unneeded roads is a prime example---can be the bane of park administrators a few years later.
IMPORTANT ACTORS DURING THE MISSION 66 PROGRAM

Placed in a historical context, the shift in national park management philosophy from the anthropocentric end of the spectrum toward the biocentric side that occurred in the early 1960's was dramatic. Therefore, a closer examination of the actors involved in that shift is necessary.

Although Mission 66 policy was formulated and implemented within the Park Service, the major evaluator of the program was essentially the Interior Department, in the form of the Leopold Committee. Spokesman for the public interest, largely through popular magazines, had provided the impetus for the Mission 66 program by serving as informal evaluators of previous policy, or lack of policy, after World War II. During the course of the program the print media was also the means through which informal public evaluation was expressed. By this time the public had become a very important actor in the policy process because of the tremendous increase in visitation to the parks, and organized conservation groups had also grown in size and strength. Organizations such as the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the National Parks Association were important not only for their objections to M66, but also for their efforts to convince Congress to pass wilderness legislation which placed a legal obligation on the Park Service to protect wilderness in parks.
If a single most important actor in the national park policy process during the period of the early 1960s is to be considered, that actor would be Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. He was responsible not only for establishing the Leopold Committee and for directing that their recommendations be adopted as policy by the NPS, but he also reorganized the national park system in 1964, based on Park Service recommendations, into three management categories—natural, recreational, and historical (Lee, 1974). This reorganization differentiated management policies for the various types of units of the system and established "principles of resource management, resource use, and physical development that should characterize each category" (Lee, 1974). This reorganization pleased conservationists who had felt since the expansion of the system in 1933 that the preservation aspect of the Service mandate had been obscured by the addition of units set aside for recreational or historical purposes.

Udall was probably the most active secretary in the policy formation environment of the park policy process, but more than that he was instrumental in initiating the environmental movement that arose in American society in the late 1960s. His years as secretary (1961 to 1969) have been described by Barbee (pers. comm.) as "a heady time...incipient...sort of a conscious-building era before the environmental movement". Udall wrote a book in which he described the "quiet conservation crisis" of pollution, waste, and "vanishing beauty" facing the United States in the 1960s, and the need to develop a "land ethic for tomorrow" in which the "science of ecology" would be employed
to provide a high standard of living as well as an unspoiled environment (Udall, 1963). Udall as Secretary thus sought to change American attitudes toward the environment, and his efforts to shift the emphasis of national park policy toward a more biocentric approach were a part of his efforts to change the national conservation agenda.

THE CONCESSIONS POLICY ACT

While Congress helped to push the NPS toward more biocentric management by passing the Wilderness Act in 1964, the following year it passed the Concessions Policy Act (16 U.S.C.S. 20 et seq.), which indirectly helped to maintain a strong element of anthropocentrism in park policy.

Concessions policy in the parks had historically been vague, and after World War II it became a substantial problem because of exploding visitation, NPS desires to accommodate all who wished to visit the parks, and expansion of concession facilities. Three government reports issued in 1963, two by Congressional committees and one by the General Accounting Office, "urged that concession contracts made little economic sense and that the government's policies amounted to subsidization of an industry that no longer needed it" (Mantell, 1979). Concessioners objected to the studies and argued that policy changes recommended in the reports would "discourage investment of private capital" which could affect the quality of service and the rates charged to visitors (Mantell, 1979). Congress, sensitive to the desires of private business offering a public service and concerned about the potential for millions
of dissatisfied park visitors, responded by passing the Concessions Policy Act of 1965.

The Act was intended to insure quality service to park visitors by protecting concessioners and insuring them a reasonable opportunity to make a profit. It gave legal support for the longstanding policy of monopolies in the parks, granted preferential rights to satisfactory concessioners in the granting of new contracts, and gave possessory interest to concessioners who constructed facilities within the parks. The Act limited concessions to "those that are necessary and appropriate for public use and enjoyment of the national park area in which they are located and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and conservation of the areas"; however, it did not define what facilities and services are to be considered "necessary and appropriate". Mantell (1979) articulated the objections of critics of the Act:

The Concessions Policy Act of 1965, outdated when written, has provided concessioners with too much protection. It has helped entrench concessioners in the parks and has enabled them to wield an unjustifiable degree of influence over management policy and to obscure the purpose of the parks. In order to stimulate investment and create more services, the Act's design was to assure the concessioners a profit. As a result, those services with a low cost, but high return ratio, such as souvenir stores, snack bars, and liquor stores are particularly favored.

The Park Service has been entangled in a statutory web of promoting and encouraging use of concessions. Park preservation and the concept of the park experience providing a contrast which reinvigorates have been virtually forgotten, giving way initially to the political necessity of creating park use, then acceding to concessioner pressure and, finally, to "user" desires.
In the late 1960s an environmental movement arose in the United States. Essentially begun by writers and scientists who warned of the consequences of the continued deterioration of the earth's environment, it was usually referred to as a revolution because it was an attempt to drastically change society's values. Unlike the conservation movement at the turn of the twentieth century, which was based in part in the fear of running out of resources, this movement was based on "ecological awareness [which] transcended concern for the quality of life to fear for life itself" (Nash, 1982). Man was seen as "part of a larger community of life, dependent for his survival on the survival of the ecosystem and on the health of the total environment" (Nash, 1982). The movement rejected the prevalent belief that advances in science and technology would solve environmental problems as they reached the critical point. Hence, the movement was a revolution because this "Myth of Scientific Supremacy" (Udall, 1963) was replaced with a desire to change the values of American society. Hardin (1968) explained the need for value changes when he argued that some problems had no technical solutions, but could be solved only by fundamental changes in human values. He presented the thesis that the earth was much like a commons shared by the entire human community and even seemingly insignificant actions by one affected the quality of life for everyone in the community.
The revolution, which consisted primarily of young people led by the writers and scientists, forced federal and state governments to assume a more active role in environmental protection. Among the important federal legislation passed were the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts (42 U.S.C.S. 25,1857-18571,1858,1858a and 33 U.S.C. 1151 et seq., respectively), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), and the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321,4331-4335,4341-4347).

The national parks were a focal point for the environmental revolution. They suffered from many of the same environmental problems as the rest of the country---pollution, overcrowding, extinction of wildlife species---and many felt that if those problems had already reached these areas especially preserved, then there was little hope for the rest of the nation. NPS Director Hartzog compared the parks to the miner's canary as an early warning system for the environment (Darling and Eichhorn, 1969).

During this period perhaps more was written and spoken about the national parks than ever before in their history. Restatement of the purpose of the parks and the role they would play in American society in the future, redefinition of appropriate types of uses, and advocacy of limiting use were common themes. Udall (1972) wrote that "[t]he park idea will flourish only if it is constantly restated and made relevant to the values esteemed by future generations". In general, most of what was written during this time was very biocentric; the idea that the Park Service should seek to maximize use was generally considered
obsolete and replaced with various ideas to limit the types of use allowed. Hill (1972) wrote:

The environmental revolution is doing something to save the Park Service from its own follies of political accommodation. The clamor for an improved "quality of life" has included pressures to get the schlock out of the national parks and not let their use eclipse preservation.

Conservation organizations were dominant actors in the efforts for biocentric policies during the environmental revolution. The Conservation Foundation sponsored a study by an ecologist and a geographer that examined park policy. The report of that study (Darling and Eichhorn, 1969), first published in 1967, reiterated the Leopold Report's criticisms of park development and anthropocentric policies. It stated:

If national parks are to continue to be a retreat from urban civilization for increasing numbers of people, much of what was permissible in the less-crowded past will need to be more carefully controlled or eliminated....the only absolute administrative principle in the National Park Service is to make ecological health or repose of an area the first consideration.

The report ended by advocating limits on use and types of use:

In conclusion, we foresee a time of greater realization that in an area of large, mobile, leisured populations, it is a privilege rather than an unheeded right to visit the superb national properties.... Certain forms of decorous behavior should be accepted and not questioned. The National Gallery of Art and the great museums expect and get such behavior within their precincts. The national parks of the United States present the glorious creations of nature and no expediency or misconception of their beauty must endanger the world heritage of which they are so shining a part.
In 1968 Edward Abbey gained recognition as a radical environmentalist-writer. His extremely biocentric view of what the parks should be conflicted sharply with what he perceived them to be. He spoke out against the leisure-seeking park visitor, and attacked what he called "Industrial Tourism", the modern tourism which created and is dependent upon the travel industry (Abbey, 1968):

Industrial Tourism is a big business. It means money. It includes the motel and restaurant owners, the gasoline retailers, the oil corporations, the road-building contractors, the heavy equipment manufacturers, the state and federal engineering agencies and the sovereign, all-powerful automotive industry. These various interests are well organized, command more wealth than most modern nations, and are represented in Congress with a strength far greater than is justified in any constitutional or democratic sense. (Modern politics is expensive---power follows money.) Through Congress the tourism industry can bring enormous pressure to bear upon such a slender reed in the executive branch as the poor old Park Service, a pressure which is also exerted on every other possible level---local, state, regional---and through advertising and the well-established habits of a wasteful nation...

Industrial Tourism is a threat to the national parks. But the chief victims of the system are the motorized tourists. They are being robbed and robbing themselves. So long as they are unwilling to crawl out of their cars they will not discover the treasures of the national parks and will never escape the stress and turmoil of those urban-suburban complexes which they had hoped, presumably, to leave behind for a while.

In 1972 the Conservation Foundation issued a report of a task force organized to coincide with the centennial of the creation of Yellowstone National Park (Conservation Foundation, 1972). The task force advocated preservation as the primary function of the NPS, restricting automobile use, turning concessions over to non-profit, quasi-public corporations, expanding biological and sociological research, and the NPS taking the
lead in environmental education; the biocentrically-oriented report also stressed the importance of wilderness management in national parks and elimination of inappropriate facilities and activities.

Stewart Udall, almost four years after his term as Secretary of the Interior ended, joined in the discussions of the role of the national parks and how they should be used:

The parks were not intended for these kinds of travelers, who come to the rims of canyons and the foothills of mountains to peer at the parks. The parks are preeminently for those who relish the rugged life and who are willing to get off the beaten paths and into the silent cathedrals of the out of doors. National parks must always be quintessentially nature parks, and their preferred customers will be those ready to make the physical effort to get acquainted with their secret places and catch the "barks and tonics" of their wilderness fragrances. (Udall, 1972)

By 1974 the anthropocentrism of the Mission 66 era had been fully supplanted by biocentric park policy, at least in theory if not totally in practice. An assistant director of the Service wrote that "[i]ndisputably preservation comes first in law. Indisputably it comes first in logic---without preservation the rest is utterly pointless" (Utley, 1974). His statement was a complete turnaround from the M66 edict that "[w]ithout the concept of public use and enjoyment the function of preservation and protection is without meaning" (USDI, 1956).

Although the environmental revolution subsided by the mid-1970s environmental awareness did not end, and efforts to push the NPS toward more biocentric management continued. Sax (1980) perhaps wrote the definitive argument for the biocentric philosophy. He offered what he
called the "preservationist point of view"; in his opinion, "[t]he preservationist is not an elitist who wants to exclude others....he is a moralist who wants to convert them". He went on to describe the preservationist position:

The preservationist does not condemn the activities he would like to exclude from the park. He considers them perfectly legitimate and appropriate---if not admirable---and believes that opportunities for conventional tourism are amply provided elsewhere: at resorts and amusement parks, on private lands, and on a very considerable portion of the public domain too. He only urges a recognition that the parks have a distinctive function to perform that is separate from the service of conventional tourism, and that they should be managed explicitly to present that function to the public as their principal goal, separate from whatever conventional tourist services they may also have to provide.

Like Olmsted a hundred years before, Sax based his argument of what constitutes appropriate park use, not on the activities and facilities provided for the park visitor, but on the attitudes the visitor brings to the park and the atmosphere the manager provides for the visitor. He stressed the importance of the experience the visitor derived from his visit; those activities which afforded the visitor an unconstrained experience which involved some form of risk and challenge to the individual were to be encouraged by management. He referred to such activities as "reflective" or "contemplative" recreation, and stated:

Rather than seeking mainly to serve the wide variety of recreational preferences visitors bring with them, park managers would encourage all visitors---whatever their past experiences or skills---to try more challenging and demanding recreation. While the Park Service may believe it is doing this effectively now, the actual pattern of park visitations suggests a quite different conclusion.

Sax said the issue of automobiles in parks was "not an issue of transportation, but of pace"; the automobile tourist was simply not
induced to get out of his vehicle and engage in contemplative recreation. He argued that the purpose of having natural areas preserved was "to expose, rather than to insulate", in order for the visitor to more fully experience the unique character of the area.

Sax argued that the Park Service should seek to "unbundle" their goals. Rather than trying to be all things to all people they should provide an opportunity for a specific type of recreational experience, by encouraging contemplative recreation. He attacked concessions policy:

Under the present practice, with a plethora of concessioners offering a wide variety of services, and with strong economic incentives to stimulate additional clientele, the system works to bundle together as much as possible of what should be separate. Under the approach suggested here, the emphasis would be on the maximum possible separation ... Supportive services---supply stores, unpretentious restaurants associated with hotels, and gas stations in more remote parks---are also perfectly appropriate. What do not belong in such places are facilities that are attractions in themselves, lures that have nothing to do with facilitating an experience of the natural resources around which the area has been established.

He cited souvenir shops, swimming pools, and organized concessioner activities such as horseback rides as inappropriate because they discouraged the visitor from experiencing the park himself.

Sax's argument is uniquely biocentric because it focuses on the visitor's experience rather than the appropriateness of facilities or developments. To him the attitudes behind visitor behavior and management policy were the important considerations; any activity or development could be considered appropriate in the parks as long as it facilitated the experience he felt should be derived from them. Certain
developments simply tended to discourage the visitor from seeking the experiences Sax advocated. His biocentrism was a result of his belief that only by preserving the natural qualities of national park, and allowing the visitor to experience it on an individual basis unencumbered by mass recreation facilities and activities could the visitor be insured of obtaining the desired recreational experience.

McCool (1983) believes, like Sax, that recreational preferences are changing. He based his opinion on the wave theory presented by Toffler (1980). Toffler theorized that cultural development occurs in waves. The First Wave, which lasted thousands of years, dominated early cultural development and was characterized by small agrarian communities with primitive technology and substantial leisure time, used primarily for religious celebrations. The Second Wave was characterized by the Industrial Revolution, with more urban societies, advanced technology, and limited, structured leisure time. The Third Wave, which is now overtaking society today, is characterized by greatly increased technology, flexible work schedules, and a shift of the work place back to the home; all of which help decentralize society. The Third Wave is also characterized by increased, flexible leisure time.

McCool asserted that the Third Wave has important implications for recreation managers such as the Park Service:

...recent trends in recreation activity participation suggest that the Third Wave holds the possibility of major surprises. Less emphasis on entertainment, more focus on involvement, appreciation rather than consumption, self actualization in place of mass amusement. These suggest that the park experience may be more demanding---and more rewarding---for both the visitor and the manager.
Thus McCool, like Sax, believes that recreational preferences in the future will be more physically and mentally demanding, and less convenience-oriented than in the past; Should this be the case, it follows that biocentric management will be most able to provide those types of activities; structured activities designed to entertain the visitor which were favored under the anthropocentric philosophy will be less in demand.

In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president, and his choice for secretary of the Interior, James Watt, became perhaps the most active secretary since Stewart Udall. However, Watt's policies differed significantly from Udall's. He firmly believed in maximum resource development on all available public lands, even on wilderness; his philosophy toward the parks was one of extreme anthropocentrism, and he pushed for their maximum use by the public. His federal land policies were a 180 degree turnaround from the trend in policy that had developed over the previous twenty years.

In 1981 Watt spoke at a conference of national park concessioners. His speech reflected the strong anthropocentrism upon which he based his policy. Frome (1981) quoted parts of the speech. Referring to the concessioners, Watt stated:

You are going to play a tremendously important and growing role in the administration of our national parks, and we are going to reach out to involve you in some areas that you haven't been asked to be involved in before.

As had been done during the Mission 66 period, he placed preservation of the parks within the context of recreation when he stated, "I will err
on the side of public use versus preservation". He essentially made the concessioners the dominant actor in the park policy process by stating, "Don't be hung up on protocol. If a personality is giving you a problem, we're going to get rid of the problem or the personality, whichever is faster".

Conservation groups and those in the public who supported the trends in park policy since the Leopold Report objected vociferously to Watt's statements. Many immediately began to call for his resignation. He eventually did resign, for reasons other than his federal land policies, and it is doubtful that he significantly altered the trend in park policy away from the biocentrism that had begun twenty years earlier. Watt's policies were compared to those of the federal government in the nineteenth century which had advocated conquering the Western frontier. Nash (1982) spoke for many of Watt's critics when he stated that "[t]he Reagan administration's championing of the frontier perspective might be a final flare-up of values approaching obsolescence".

SUMMARY

Although the first suggestions for establishing national parks were generally based in biocentric philosophy, the first national park was reserved primarily for anthropocentric reasons. Policy has historically shifted along a continuum between anthropocentrism and biocentrism, however an element of biocentrism has existed in management policy, even during periods when anthropocentrism dominated. In the early 1960s,
increased understanding of ecological interactions in natural systems and changing public attitudes helped cause a dramatic shift in park policy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism. In the years since that shift arguments for biocentric management of the parks have gained in intensity and strength.

The earliest and perhaps most persistent national park advocates throughout park history have been popular writers and artists who, through their works, have publicized and popularized the parks. However, national parks became a reality largely through the efforts of economic interests. These interests have grown and diversified as visitation to the parks has increased. The growth of the conservation movement in the early twentieth century, and subsequently the environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, established a park constituency concerned primarily with preservation of natural values. These "preservationists" generally have biocentrism as their philosophical basis, while the economic interests generally favor anthropocentrism. Most park management controversies have resulted from the conflicting perceptions these groups have of what national parks should be.
CHAPTER THREE:
A CASE STUDY OF GRANT VILLAGE

INTRODUCTION

The road system that exists today in Yellowstone National Park essentially follows the same course as the first roads in the Park, which were designed by the Park's second superintendent. The roads loop through the interior of the Park in a figure-eight (referred to as the "Grand Loop") with auxiliary roads connecting the loops to the five park entrances. The roads were originally built to transport tourists to the most outstanding features, and Park accommodations were historically built at most of the scenic points-of-interest: Mammoth Hot Springs, Upper Geyser Basin (Old Faithful), West Thumb Geyser Basin, the north shore of Yellowstone Lake (near the outlet of the Yellowstone River), the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River, Tower Falls, and Fountain Paint Pots (facilities there no longer exit). (See Fig. 2)
Fig. 2. Yellowstone National Park roads and overnight facilities.
EARLY PLANNING

By the 1930s NPS personnel recognized that having major visitor facility developments located on or near fragile areas or areas of significant scenery, such as geyser basins and the Canyon rim, was detrimental to the scenic beauty of the area. In 1935 the Park master plan included recommendations for relocating the road and some facilities away from the Old Faithful area, and in 1936 the master plan recommended relocating facilities away from the West Thumb Geyser Basin as well (Wirth, 1980). The development at West Thumb had been built in the 1920s and 1930s at the "wye" formed by the junction of the Lower Loop road and the south entrance road, and included a ranger station, a general store, a photo shop, a cafeteria, tourist cabins, a boat office, a boat dock, and support facilities (Yellowstone Park Master Plan, 1953). By this time concessions in the Park were divided between three family-run concessioners: the photo shops (now operated by Hamilton Stores) were run by Haynes Photo; the general stores were run by Hamilton Stores; the lodging, dining, transportation, horse rides, and boating facilities were run by Yellowstone Park Company (YPCO); and the gas stations were run jointly by Hamilton and YPCO (USDI, 1976). These concessioners had helped direct planning toward having commercial facilities at the "wye", but after World War II the NPS cited increased visitation, travel trends, and encroachment upon the thermal area as reasons for moving these facilities from the site (Yellowstone Park Master Plan, 1953). The area south of the West Thumb development was surveyed, following the shoreline of Thumb Bay in 1946 and 1947 (Haines,
pers. comm.), and in 1947 a decision to relocate the West Thumb facilities was made at a field meeting "at which many of the interested parties including the concessioners were present" (Yellowstone Park Master Plan, 1953). Also according to the 1953 master plan the campground, service station, and garage would have remained at the "wye", but by 1949 the NPS decided it would be desirable to have "the wye free of all commercial development". It was at this time that NPS Director Drury had recommended moving concessions facilities and administration buildings out of congested areas of the national parks, and although the West Thumb move was suggested before Drury was director, his recommendations most certainly gave new impetus to the idea in the years after World War II.

However, the relocation was not carried out in those post-war years. In fact, no on-site work was done between 1947 and 1956 (Haines, pers. comm.), primarily due to the financial shortcomings of both the Park Service and the concessioners. Concession facilities continued to deteriorate after the War, as they had during the War when most facilities were closed, largely due to Yellowstone Park Company's financial problems (Haines, 1977). Concessions in the Park had never been particularly sound financially, and the lack of income during the War had left YPCO especially vulnerable. The Northern Pacific Railroad had been a financial backer of the company since the early days of the Park (Bartlett, 1983), but by the end of World War II had recognized that the automobile would continue to be the primary means of transportation for tourists and decided to end their financial support
As the post-war financial problems increased so too did the numbers of visitors to the Park, along with visitor dissatisfaction. The state of Wyoming recognized the adverse effects visitor dissatisfaction in Yellowstone could have on the state's economy. A study conducted in 1950 estimated that Park traffic generated almost $19 million worth of business in the immediate vicinity (Haines, 1977). In February of 1955, the Wyoming State Legislature passed a proposal for the state to purchase YPCO's operation (Haines, 1977). It was that same month and year that Wirth conceived the idea that was to become Mission 66 (Wirth, 1980), and Haines (pers. comm.) believes that the M66 program was in effect a direct response to the Wyoming effort to gain control of Yellowstone concessions; the NPS was vigorously opposed to the proposal because of the potential for problems of state involvement in federal land management. Aside from the possibility that it provided the spark for the M66, the Wyoming proposal was important because it showed the importance the state placed on having adequate concession facilities within the Park.

The proposal went no further because YPCO received a loan from Eastern banking interests in 1956 to replace the backing of the Northern Pacific Railroad, who had liquidated its interest in the company in 1955 (Haines, pers. comm.). Yellowstone Park Company then had its concession contract renewed by the Park Service in 1956, and part of the contract was a promise to build their part of the Canyon Village project (planned to replace the development located along the Canyon rim) as the
first phase of the Mission 66 program in Yellowstone (King, pers. comm.).

MISSION 66 IN YELLOWSTONE

With the beginning of Mission 66 new emphasis was placed on improving and relocating facilities as called for in Park master plans, as well as on building new developments. The Mission 66 program for Yellowstone (USDI, undated), based on the recommendations of the Park Working Committee (which consisted of the superintendent and other Park administrators), called for doubling the number of lodging accommodations within the Park, more than doubling campground capacity, and increasing other visitor services. Specific developments called for were: Canyon Village (already under construction at the time the program for Yellowstone was written) consisting of a campground and 500 cabins, plus stores, a restaurant, a visitor center, cabin office, and snack shop built in a horseshoe shape around three sides of a parking plaza; a recreational vehicle campground and expanded campground at Fishing Bridge (at the outlet of the Yellowstone River from Yellowstone Lake); Grant Village (originally to be called "Thummbay"), to be located 1.5 miles south of West Thumb along Yellowstone Lake, and intended to replace the West Thumb development; Bridge Bay, located approximately two miles from Lake Hotel along the shore of Yellowstone Lake, consisting of a campground and marina and intended to replace the boat docks in front of Lake Hotel and at Fishing Bridge; Firehole Village, suggested to possibly begin late in the M66 program and intended as a replacement for facilities at Old Faithful. The entire
program was intended to increase guest capacity in the Park from 8,500 to approximately 14,500, with most of the increase coming from construction of new cabins. This figure was not a ceiling on the guest capacity of the Park, but was what was believed to be necessary to meet the demand for overnight accommodations in the coming years.

As evidence of the magnitude of the concessions problems in Yellowstone as viewed by the Park Service, in 1956 Lemuel Garrison, chairman of the Mission 66 Advisory Committee, was sent from the Washington Office of the NPS to be superintendent. He was instructed to get the program for the Park under way, and within a year Canyon Village, which had been in the planning stage for twenty years, was open to the public (Haines, 1977). Canyon Village was one of the first projects begun under the system-wide M66 program and was used as a focal point for the program; it was presented as an example of what M66 would do for the national parks. The groundbreaking ceremony at Canyon was highly publicized, and attended by "Assistant Secretary of the Interior Wesley A. D'Ewart, National Park Service Director Conrad L. Wirth, State officials of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, members of Congress and representatives of conservation and business groups" (USDI press release, 1956).

PROBLEMS WITH CANYON VILLAGE

Yellowstone Park Company estimated that their part of the construction at Canyon Village would cost $2.5 million, but the final cost was much higher, due to it being built on a cost-plus basis, which
caused more serious financial problems for the company (Haines, pers. comm.). Garrison (pers. comm.) however, denied that construction of Canyon caused the company problems; he stated that their problems were due to accounting errors and poor management.

Whatever the cause of the company's financial problems, they were compounded after Canyon Village was opened. Although the old lodge on the Canyon rim had been razed when the Village was built, the old Canyon Hotel remained open to the public and was filled to capacity almost every night during the 1957 and 1958 seasons; the new Village, more expensive to stay in, "went begging" (Haines, 1977). That trend was "so inimical to that precarious financing on which Canyon Village was based that the Yellowstone Park Company decided to abandon the hotel in order that the Canyon Village units might be filled and the investment there made to pay its way" (Haines, 1977). The hotel was then sold for salvage in 1959 and its hulk accidentally burned in 1960 (Haines, 1977). However, eliminating competition from their own hotel did not solve YPCO's financial problems:

...even that massive sacrifice was insufficient. The cost of the Canyon Village development was more than the Yellowstone Park Company could bear; just a hair's-breath short of bankruptcy its affairs were placed under the management of a board representing the mortgage holders. (Haines, 1977)

Hence, the bankers who backed YPCO must have felt, like Garrison, that the company's problems were at least partly due to mismanagement.
FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH YELLOWSTONE PARK COMPANY

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty the concessioner had with Canyon Village, the NPS pushed forward with Grant Village. No on-site work had been done from the time the area was surveyed in 1947 until surveying was restarted in 1957 (Haines, pers. comm.). The Western Office of Design and Construction of the NPS, located in San Francisco, took over the project from park level planners in 1959 (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). In 1961 the government cleared the forest (Haines, corr.) and began construction of their part of the Grant Village facilities. By 1962 roads, utilities, a campground, and a boat launch were complete and opening ceremonies were held (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). The Village was dedicated and named for President Ulysses Grant, who had signed the Yellowstone Act into law.

In 1963 the NPS Division of Concessions Management in Washington, DC, hired the director of the University of Denver Hotel School, Dr. Ralph Wilson, to study Yellowstone Park concessioners (Flynn memo, 1964). Dr. Wilson's report was extremely critical of YPCO. In a letter to Superintendent Garrison, Wilson summarized what the study had concluded about the company (Wilson letter, 1963):

In the past few years there has been a lack of adequate operating management present in the YPCO and as a result no positive plans or continuity of operation has resulted. No positive leadership has been exercised and at the present time the Company is looking to the Park Service for ideas as to necessary services and facilities. It is also quite evident that a conflict of ideas exist between the ownership of the company and the management committee. The demands for dividends and the demands for money for new construction and remodeling are in constant conflict. The management committee has little or no equity ownership but does have operating
interests in the earnings and continued life of the company. Wilson went on to state the company's financial situation was such that rehabilitation of facilities and construction of new facilities could not be accomplished using the company's potential earnings, and that the Park Service had allowed "accommodations 'slums'" to develop in the Park. He stated that "services provided by the YPCO to the visitors of Yellowstone Park left much to be desired in the way of cleanliness of the rooms, adequate service in the dining rooms, coffee shops and cafeterias", and that the quality of food and service deteriorated in the latter half of the summer season due to lack of employees. Wilson felt that room rates could be lowered to be comparable to rates charged in communities surrounding the Park. He also noted that little or no screening was done when the company hired its seasonal employees, and stated that substandard housing for employees contributed to attitude problems.

With regard to Grant Village, Wilson wrote:

That [sic] it is economically feasible for 150 motor hotel units with coffee shop and other services to be built at Grant Village. The construction should be adequate space accommodations but not luxury accommodations...The area will develope [sic] slowly and plans for additional motel units should be made for construction when demand develops.

He made suggestions about solving the company's financial problems:

The financial condition of the YPCO is such that consideration must be given to means other than profit to provide funds necessary for rehabilitation, remodeling, and new construction...

Due to the need for capital funds for remodeling, general upgrading of facilities, and the need for new construction it is not desirable for the YPCO to declare stockholder dividends in the near future. Without possible dividends and
since ownership and management have been separated in the company it would be to the owners benefit to sell the YPCO to a more financially sound operating company.

That same year Garrison informed the company "that the quality of their service was so poor that I felt their contract was in jeopardy. This created a major fracas, and unfortunately the major drive seemed to be to get me fired, instead of improving service" (Garrison, 1983).

During the next two years the Service pressured YPCO to build their part of Grant Village, but the company refused, claiming that they could not secure construction capital (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). In 1964, Dr. Wilson issued a supplemental report to his 1963 study (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). That report dealt with concession financing of the proposed Grant Village, which was planned at the time to consist of "2,700 pillows [number of overnight guests in lodging facilities] in 414 motel units, 240 kitchen apartment units, 246 canvas cabins, and 900 seats in coffee shop and cafeteria feeding units" (Wilson, 1964). The report (Wilson, 1963) found that a twenty year loan to cover 100 per cent of construction cost of the development would make the project feasible for the company, but recommended consideration of having another, more financially sound, company than YPCO building and operating Grant. The report stated that "the investment of some equity capital rather than one hundred [per cent] financing would improve the profit possibilities of the operation". The company still did not act, but in spite of YPCO's recalcitrance, the NPS continued to build their part of the Village. Garrison was transferred to Omaha to head the Midwest Region of the NPS that same year (Haines, 1977), and to what
extent his battle with concessioners over Grant Village contributed to the decision to transfer him is impossible to determine. He had other conflicts with interest groups from the Yellowstone region during his tenure in the Park, and it is possible that there simply was too much friction in the political climate for him to continue to be an effective administrator.

LEMUEL GARRISON AND GRANT VILLAGE

Garrison's role in Yellowstone during Mission 66 was extremely important and thus deserves closer analysis. He described his reasons for strongly supporting the completion of Grant Village (Garrison, 1983):

The creation of Grant Village was one of the "horizon" events from the beginning. I encouraged it because we needed to replace the West Thumb complex. Hamilton's Store was new and adequate. Everything else was dilapidated. The public campground was worn out by our standards---road ruts, dust, crowded, and scant vegetation; however, campers used it and used it. Overnight cabins were forlorn and maintenance was poor. A tiny dock and marina were inadequate. Roads, campers, playing children, all were mixed up with each other around the boat areas. The abrasive gravel land surface of West Thumb lacked dignity, usability, safety, and information services. Yet it was at a major road intersection, and from the shoreline we had a great view up the lake to the Absaroka Mountains and "the Wilderness."

We had so much wilderness. It was a popular topic of planning. But there had been few access points. Grant Village would become the wilderness take-off point. Trails would lead to Heart Lake and Flat Mountain Arm. A short trail from Lewis Lake would provide access to Shoshone Lake and on into the Bechler River country. The interpretive theme of our visitor center would be "The Wilderness and Ways to Enjoy It." Our new marina would be a takeoff point for canoes, and include a major campground, a campfire circle, and a visitor center. This would be a great congregation point.

Garrison (1983) described himself as "both user- and preservation-
oriented". He felt that proper development could reduce human impacts on the resource (Garrison, 1964); he referred to his concept as "development as a tool of preservation" (Garrison, 1973), and was therefore, in his own words, "development oriented" to that extent (Garrison, pers. comm.). He reflected the desire to accommodate increasing visitation and the ambivalence toward wilderness that existed in the NPS during Mission 66 when he stated:

The whole thrust at that point in time was to serve more visitors. Travel was on the upswing. The roads could handle more cars with only minor work, such as turn-outs, vista clearing, and curve straightening. But the pressing need was for visitor services. We were still destroying wilderness. Grant Village was a normal outcome of this growth pattern in 1963. (Garrison, 1983)

Although he was a primary architect for the system's Mission 66 program, and was sent to Yellowstone to carry the program out there, it is important to recognize that he came to realize that the Service could not continue to attempt to provide accommodations for all who wished to visit Yellowstone. Garrison (1973) reflected on the situation as it existed at the time:

In the context of the times, we were still operating under the principle that every visitor that wanted to come to Yellowstone, you'd let him in. If he wanted to camp, you tried to provide a campground for him. We got off of that before very long because it became obvious we had to do something in restriction...camping, for instance. We built the Madison Junction Campground, rebuilt it, enlarged it. We built the West Thumb, or Grant Village Campground, but it was so obvious that to really meet the forward demand, we would end up with a ring of campgrounds around Yellowstone Lake from Grant Village through to Mary Bay, which was about 33 miles, and they'd be full all the time. This was a perversion of the purpose of the park. So we just finally, I say finally, it wasn't too late in coming, adopted the principle we just weren't going to expand our campgrounds at all. Weren't going to add any more camp capacity. So that, I think, was one of
the major decisions,...I look at it as a wise decision.

Garrison faced several controversies during his term as Yellowstone Superintendent. Besides Grant Village, there was an intense public debate over the Service's elk reduction program; the argument reached the Secretary of the Interior's office and led to the Leopold Report. However, perhaps the hottest local issue he had to deal with was the reaction of boating interests to his proposal to close portions of Yellowstone Lake to motorboats. Boating on the Lake had been a tradition that originated in the late nineteenth century, and after World War II had become very popular, especially with people from surrounding communities. Garrison's proposal drew such criticism from local, as well as national boating clubs, that there were a series of Congressional hearings held in the Park and surrounding communities (Garrison, 1973). A compromise zoning system was finally approved, but it is likely that the controversy had a negative effect on Garrison's effectiveness. The controversy is particularly important to understanding Garrison's role in the histories of Mission 66 and Grant Village because although he was responsible for the construction of two marinas that were intended to accommodate those who wished to boat on Yellowstone Lake, he risked his career by proposing a zoning system which was intended to protect the wildlife of the Lake and to keep the numbers of boat users down.
Garrison was replaced by John McLaughlin in 1964.

GENERAL HOST CORPORATION

In 1966 the NPS director wrote Secretary Udall about YPCO's failure to build Grant Village, and Superintendent McLaughlin proposed construction of an initial 500 rooms by 1972, with 400 more to be built later if visitor trends indicated the need (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). In that same year YPCO was sold to Goldfield Corporation, which "through various mergers and acquisitions, evolved into the General Host Corporation" (USDI, 1976), a "mini-conglomerate" (Frome, 1981) which was granted a thirty-year lease to operate all of YPCO's facilities and services with the provision that they build "500 housing units and related facilities at a cost of not less than $5 million by the end of 1971 at Grant Village" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated). Overall the contract "required that a minimum capital expenditure [$10 million], according to a specified schedule of projects [primarily Grant Village] be completed by December 31, 1975", and if the company did not comply, its contract could be terminated (USDI, 1976).

Thus by the late 1960s the government had built at Grant Village a visitor center and ranger station, as well as a marina, a campground, roads, utilities, and parking lots, and had cleared the forest where the lodging was to be located. In all, it had spent $7 million (Anzelmo, per. comm.) and finally had a commitment from the concessioner to complete the development.
However, in 1969 a feasibility study of Grant Village was done by a private firm hired by the new Yellowstone Park Company (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated). The study found that it would be difficult for the company to recoup its investment from room revenues because of the short season (Edlund, pers. comm.) and maintenance costs (King, pers. comm.), and thus concluded that Grant Village was not economically feasible (Edlund, pers. comm.).

Jack Anderson, who replaced McLaughlin as Yellowstone superintendent in 1966 (Anderson, pers. comm.), recommended in 1970 minimal development at Grant Village to make it an "operational entity" (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). Anderson's recommendations included converting the parking lots already in place into a recreational vehicle campground and having it and the campground already in place as the only overnight facilities (Anderson, pers. comm.). Anderson (pers. comm.) thought Grant Village was a mistake, citing bad climate, short season, snow levels, wind, and the presence of grizzly bears as reasons, and suggested to the Director that the NPS "take our red face and walk back to Congress and say, 'We made a real mistake here. We think we should pull out.'" (Anderson, pers. comm.)

The Director did not take Anderson's advice, but instead sought another solution to the concessioner problem. According to Everhart (1972) the Director went to Congress:

Testifying before the House Appropriations committee in April, 1971, the Park Service Director announced that almost one-third of all park concessioners lost money in 1970 and that an equal number, from a financial point of view, could be considered only marginal operations. He informed the
committee that he intended to request appropriations to purchase the holdings of General Host and concluded, "I am confident that that is just a prelude to buying out the possessory interests of a number of other concessions".

However, the Office of Management and Budget turned down his request (Everhart, 1972).

THE YELLOWSTONE MASTER PLAN OF 1973

By the early 1960s the Mission 66 program for Yellowstone was being criticized just as was the nation-wide program. Butcher (1961) expressed a lengthy opinion about M66 in Yellowstone:

Yellowstone is the scene of one of the most expansive and elaborate of Mission 66 projects. A lodge and cabins were torn down on the south rim of the spectacular canyon of the Yellowstone River. Well rid of the unsightly structures, this beauty spot is being restored to nature; but across the canyon and back in the woodland, a whole new village has been built, complete with lodge, dozens of boxlike cabins for visitors, two two-story dormitories for employees, a concessioner's office building, store, visitor center, and a large parking area.

As elsewhere, the Park Service built a case to justify this big development. It is said that Yellowstone is so vast and remote that it cannot be experienced in a single day, and visitors need facilities to enable them to remain in the park either overnight or for a week or more. The park prospectus explains that Yellowstone visitors will reach an estimated two million by 1966 and that overnight accommodations must be expanded from the 8500 capacity of 1955 to 15,000 in 1966; and this calls for increased housing, food, medical supplies, and other services of a "small city." More visitors' facilities require more employees. Together with utilities, this project has cost $70 million. Concerning the removal of the earlier development, a Park Service release quoted Director Conrad L. Wirth as saying, "The old development is an intrusion on the natural scene which the Service is charged by law to preserve." How could the director fail to see that the new village is an even greater intrusion on the natural scene?
Two more villages are scheduled for the park: Grant Village, to be even larger than Canyon Village, at the west side of Yellowstone Lake; and Firehole Village, near Old Faithful.

One thing leads to another: Up to now, the Park Service and the concessioner have supplied the park's electricity with thirty diesel-powered generators. Because of the expansion, commercial power, says the service, has become a necessity; and as this is written, Yellowstone's forests are being cut to make way for power lines, many miles of them—further marring the park's beauty.

Yellowstone was our first national park, established by Act of Congress in 1872. It was made accessible during the stagecoach era. Long distances and slow travel required that hotels and camps be located at the end of each day's journey. Today, smooth roads and fast automobiles do away with the necessity to stay in the park overnight; yet the National Park Service still administers it as though we were living in the old days.

Darling and Eichhorn (1969) were also very critical of Mission 66 developments in Yellowstone:

Canyon Village is another seasonal community which covers large acreage and is difficult to justify in its present position. It could just as well have been outside the park and would have played a larger part in the economy of the state of Wyoming. In addition to a large plaza with supermarket and gift stores and art shop, there are 1,500 duplex cabins where one can distinctly hear his neighbor breathing in sleep, though this is the pleasantest sound to come through the flimsy walls. Our stay there conveyed to us none of what we have heard called the national park experience; or perhaps this is the modern national park experience,... Some would justify the existence of Canyon Village because of its proximity to points of high scenic value in the park. We would take the view that this is a prime reason why Canyon Village should not be there.

The same objections apply to trailer camps and automobile camps. They could be outside the park. The trees have completely disappeared from parts of that national park slum called Fishing Bridge; many trees were felled to make the large new trailer and automobile camp at Grant Village, where the rest of the trees are blowing down through lack of support and shelter by their fellows. The very term "village" indicates the present dangerous trend of thinking in national parks. We were in Grant Village just before its dedication
and were depressed by the sense of dereliction already palpable, for the village was by then occupied.

After the end of the M66 program, the NPS began a new master plan process. The new master plan process was a re-adjustment of Mission 66 (Anderson, pers. comm.), no doubt in response to critics such as those previously quoted. The Director established a study team to develop a regional master plan for Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks. The team consisted of Yellowstone Superintendent John McLaughlin and Grand Teton Superintendent Jack Anderson (who later replaced McLaughlin as Yellowstone Superintendent), as well as a representative of the NPS Denver Field Office, the Midwest Regional Associate Director, representatives of the Izaak Walton League and the Wildlife Management Institute, a consultant from Salt Lake City, and Sigurd Olson, a naturalist and writer, referred to as a NPS collaborator (Hartzog memo, undated).

The study team faced several controversial issues. Among the key issues the team dealt with were: the amount of the Park to be designated as wilderness under the Wilderness Act; the idea of building bypass roads around high concentration areas such as Lake, Old Faithful, and West Thumb; the concept of removing or limiting overnight accommodations within the Park; the installation of a mass transit system in the Park; the elimination of inappropriate facilities or services; and the problem of Grant Village (Anderson, pers. comm.).
Public hearings held in surrounding communities in 1972 brought out various opinions about the proposed master plan. In Livingston, MT, concessioners complained that they had not been consulted in the planning process and that a mass transit system would be too costly, while conservation groups present advocated removal of overnight facilities (Billings Gazette, 1972). The Denver Post (Wynkoop, 1972) proclaimed that Mission 66 was "dead", and that at the hearing in Jackson, WY, the new master plan proposals emphasized preservation. According to the Post the Governor of Wyoming and state and civic business leaders did not like the plan's preservation orientation and its "new direction" for the Park. They felt that the Wyoming tourism industry was at stake, and objected to what they perceived as proposals to restrict automobile use in the Park. Most chambers of commerce in surrounding communities favored the completion of Grant Village (Anderson, pers. comm.), possibly because they felt that having more facilities within the Park would help draw more tourists to the region.

Meanwhile, the Park Service was planning for Yellowstone's centennial that same year, and the Park became the subject of much public debate over what was wrong with the Park and what should be done to preserve it for another century. In Billings, MT, a Montana Congressman called for development of the Park's "fringe areas" and attacked YPCO for allowing the facilities within the Park to deteriorate (Sullivan, 1972). Huser (1972) argued that, as had been historically true, the three states surrounding the Park were pushing for more use, although the Park had reached a point of overuse. Huser favored
restricting automobile use and developing a mass transit system.

In 1973, the final version of the Yellowstone Master Plan (YMP) was completed, and a year later it was approved (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). The new master plan (USDI, 1974) was different from previous plans; instead of being a detailed document that specifically identified future plans and development, it was a "conceptual document" which outlined in broad terms the future direction of the Park's management (Barbee, pers. comm.) It was not intended to tie the NPS down to specific actions, but rather was intended to provide general guidance under which there was much opportunity for change (Barbee, pers. comm.). The new master plan left a substantial amount of discretion to future administrators, and was intended to provide for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which mandated federal agencies to give opportunities for public involvement in planning and to determine environmental consequences of potential management actions.

The new Yellowstone Master Plan reflected the attitudes prevalent at the time. It was written during the environmental revolution and restated the "preservation and use" mandate of the Service "in terms of contemporary connotations" (USDI, 1974):

To perpetuate the natural ecosystems within the park in as near pristine conditions as possible for their inspirational, educational, cultural, and scientific values for this and future generations.

The YMP called for regional planning with the US Forest Service, state agencies, and surrounding communities. It perpetuated the M66 concept
of removing roads and facilities from fragile and impacted areas, but the final plan did not call for the installation of a mass transit system or a one-way traffic system on the lower-loop road as had been proposed. It also "backed off" from calling for the removal of all overnight facilities within the Park, but instead called for a ceiling of 8,300 pillows (total overnight guest capacity in cabins, hotels, and trailer parks, but excluding campgrounds) within the Park (Anderson, pers. comm.) and development of the gateway communities surrounding the Park's to provide accommodations for increasing numbers of park visitors. The Master Plan stated that with guest ceilings established within the Park:

Ultimately freed from having to provide the mass terminal creature-comfort facilities and services within its prime resource zone, Yellowstone National Park can begin to expand its interpretive, educational, and environmental functions.

Anderson had of course favored no further development at Grant Village, but was outvoted by other members of the study team, as well as by the Director (Anderson, pers. comm.). However, rather than perpetuating the Mission 66 plan of constructing Grant as part of the triad of Canyon Village, Firehole Village, and Grant Village to replace facilities removed from the Canyon rim, Old Faithful, and West Thumb, respectively, the new Master Plan advocated completion of Grant as an immediate replacement of West Thumb and a future replacement for overnight facilities at Old Faithful and Fishing Bridge (to be removed when the situation permitted). Therefore, because Grant Village had already been partially constructed at considerable expense to the federal government, rather than abandoning the project as part of obsolete planning the
Master Plan attempted to adapt the project to help achieve the new goals of limiting overnight use and rehabilitating impacted areas. The desire to remove facilities from Fishing Bridge came about because of recognition of the importance of the area around the Lake outlet as grizzly bear habitat.

THE 1976 YELLOWSTONE CONCESSIONS STUDY

When the Master Plan was approved in 1974, the Grant Village project was at essentially the same standstill it had been in 1969. Although the marina, visitor center, and gas station were open to the public, there was still no lodging facilities built and little chance of YPCO building any in the foreseeable future. Then, in 1975 John Townsley replaced Anderson as Superintendent, and was sent to the Park with "pretty specific directions" from the Director to find a solution to concessioner problems (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). By this time the Service was not only upset by General Host's refusal to fulfill its contractual agreement to build Grant Village, but also by the numbers of complaints about poor service from visitors and from surrounding communities whose economies are dependent upon Park visitation (Anzelmo, pers. comm.).

The Service established a study team in 1976 to conduct an extensive review of YPCO (USDI, 1976). The study team's report (USDI, 1976) was harshly critical of almost every aspect of the company's operation; their findings were quite similar to those of Dr. Wilson's study of the old YPCO thirteen years earlier. Among the basic comments
Management in the Yellowstone Park Company is fragmented, lacks sufficient experience in operations, and, therefore, does not respond adequately or consistently to visitor needs. The management cannot respond to visitor needs because the company is not oriented to service to the public, but only to the generation of profit dollars.

Currently, executive bonuses are being paid at an increasing rate, presumably as a reward for the production of increased profits, while the services and facilities being provided in the park are deteriorating. The company reacts only to pressure, and cannot seem to work out long-range solutions to its problems. There is a reasonable profit generated by the company, not because of good service or quality facilities, but because of the thousands of visitors who enter Yellowstone National Park and have no other place to eat or sleep. Without a captive audience, and in a competitive situation outside of the park environment, the company could not survive as it is presently constituted.

The seasonal employees of the Yellowstone Park Company are not treated equitably. They are paid low wages, work long hours, are housed in inadequate quarters, are not properly trained, have poor supervision, are fed unprofessionally prepared food in unpleasant, unclean staffeterias, and do not have supervisory or managerial support in their daily work....

Food service is usually slow, and employees are not aware of, or responsive to, basic needs. Sanitation standards are below the standards of many public health departments and large hospitality companies....

Lodging in the park is characterized by slow service at the front desk and poorly furnished, ill-maintained sleeping quarters....There are no apparent standards for maid service. Generally, the lodging facilities are poorly decorated, poorly furnished and equipped, poorly lighted, poorly cleaned, poorly heated and insulated, and merely tolerated by the typical park visitor....

Most facilities throughout the park show extensive signs of advanced age and improper maintenance....

In short, the Yellowstone Park Company is providing to the visitor unacceptable facilities and services. These problems cannot be solved with the current management structure, attitude, and emphasis. The company, if it continues to exist in Yellowstone, must undergo a complete overhaul, both in management philosophy and structure, and in facilities and
facility presentation.
The study team admitted that "in light of existing developed areas in the park, it is not economically feasible for the concessioner to develop Grant Village", and therefore recommended that the NPS "purchase the possessory interest in all concession-owned buildings at Grant Village", begin building "low-cost shelter units, cottages, public buildings, and related site work", and lease back all, or part, of the facilities to a concessioner. The study team held the positions that:

The Yellowstone Park Company and its owners, the General Host Corporation, have not met their contractual commitments with respect to facility development.

The development of new facilities at Grant Village should be the responsibility of the Government.

The contract, without renewal, expires on September 30, 1977, due to non-compliance by the concessioner.

The National Park Service is willing to extend the contract for an additional twenty years...if the concessioner and the parent corporation will agree to the renovation program and the managerial and operational improvements specified in this report.

The company is in violation of its contract by giving unsatisfactory service.

The development to be built by the government, as proposed by the study team, was to consist of "400 lodging units, a restaurant, concessioner dormitories, utilities roads and related development at a net cost of $14,782,000" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated).

By 1979 the Park Service, citing poor service to the public and failure to develop Grant, finally convinced Congress to appropriate $19.9 million for government purchase of the facilities owned by General Host, and thus eliminated their possessory interest (Anzelmo, pers.
General Host lost their lease at the end of the 1979 summer season, and a subsidiary of Trans World Airlines, TWA Services, was granted a two-year interim contract for the concessions.

THE GRANT VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PLAN

Also in 1979, in accordance with NEPA, the NPS issued the Environmental Assessment and Preferred Alternative for the Grant Village Development Concept Plan (USDI, 1979). The Preferred Alternative cited Grant Village as the solution of "two pressing problems" in Yellowstone, the "removal of development from environmentally sensitive areas", and "management of traffic on the Grand Loop Road". The Preferred Alternative called for:

Locating 700 new lodging units at Grant Village [which] is intended to compensate for overnight accommodations removed from West Thumb and to allow the eventual removal of lodging from Fishing Bridge and Old Faithful,...

The Plan called for multiunit buildings, with a maximum of 100 units per building and interior access to individual rooms. The buildings were not to be higher than three stories, and each room was to have at least a half-bath. Construction was to be carried out in phases. Phase 1A was to consist of construction of 100 to 200 units, and had already been planned prior to the writing of the preferred alternative. The rest of Phase 1 was to be the construction of employee dormitories, roads and parking, and a restaurant. Phase 2 was to consist of upgrading the sewage system. Phase 3 was to be construction of 200 more lodging units, a second restaurant, and support facilities. Phase 4 was the construction of 200 to 300 more lodging units. The Park Service was to
"pay all costs and...make new facilities available to the concessioner at no expense to them". Thus the Service, in order to complete the project, was willing to construct the facilities with federal money. This proposal alleviated the concessioner complaint that construction and maintenance costs made Grant Village unfeasible. It should be noted that the units called for were no longer a variety of cabins ranging from luxury to shelter, but were to be multiunit buildings with each room having some bath facilities.

The Plan stated that "[t]he primary interpretive theme at Grant Village will continue to be the wilderness threshold experience". Grant Village was to be a starting point for those wishing to hike out into the southern backcountry of the Park. However, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, in their biological opinion of the Preferred Alternative, expressed concern for the impact the completion of Grant Village would have on the grizzly bear. Five cutthroat trout spawning streams flow through the developed area, and bears had traditionally frequented the area in spring in search of trout. The Fish and Wildlife Service stated:

It is our biological opinion that the proposed development within Grant Village is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly bear. However, we question the need and justification for such extensive commercial development within occupied grizzly habitat and believe that adverse impacts to the bear will result, although they may be at a level that does not constitute jeopardy to the species. We also believe the project will negate many of the benefits acquired through the phaseout of facilities at Fishing Bridge and view such a "trade-off" as an unfavorable solution to a wildlife conflict that, with development of Grant Village, will likely be duplicated rather than eliminated (USDI, 1979).

Dr. Richard Knight, head of the Interagency Grizzly Study Team which is
responsible for grizzly research in the Yellowstone ecosystem, was
vehemently critical of both the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park
Service. He is quoted as stating (McNamee, 1982):

[T]he habitat encroachment is always considered by the
Fish and Wildlife Service item by item. They're always
saying, no, this won't jeopardize the bear by itself. But
what about the cumulative effect of five or six developments?
They won't address that. Yellowstone Village is a big real
estate development right in the middle of where there used to
be lots of bears. Then you've got Ski Yellowstone, and that
by itself wouldn't wipe out the bears--- just take a few more.
And right here in the park, twenty to twenty-eight million
dollars' worth of development at Grant Village is coming,
sitting on top of five Yellowstone Lake spawning
streams---some of the most heavily used grizzly habitat we've
got.

In August 1980 a meeting was held at Grant Village including the
NPS Director, the Rocky Mountain Regional Director, and Superintendent
Townsley and members of his staff (Wenk, pers. comm.). According to
Wenk, the meeting was deemed necessary because approval for the
completion of the Village was required at only the regional level, but
because of its controversial nature it was decided that the Director
should be fully informed about the project. At the meeting the Director
gave his commitment to the development. The primary interest groups
concerned about Grant Village at this time, besides those worried about
the bear population, were motel owners in surrounding communities who,
after a "disasterous" 1979 season, were now concerned that the Park
Service was creating competition at Grant (Wenk, pers. comm.).
The NPS began construction of the first phase (two 50 unit buildings), but with the election of a new president came new attempts to reduce federal spending. In compliance with that policy, Secretary of the Interior Watt ordered that no more federal money be spent on development in the national parks, and thus the Grant Village project had another setback (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). Superintendent Townsley flew to Washington, DC, in an effort to find a way to complete the development; he had a strong personal commitment to the project, to the extent that its completion became "an obsession" with him, although he was unpopular with many of his field employees because of his commitment (Anzelmo, pers. comm.).

The end result of the Secretary's decision and Townsley's efforts was a plan for the concessioner to finance construction of the remaining facilities at Grant with a percentage of their gross revenues. TWA Services outbid other corporations for the long-term contract (five years with a five year renewal option) by promising to re-invest 22 percent of their gross revenues into a maintenance and improvement fund which would be used for facility rehabilitation and construction at Grant Village (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). TWA advanced seven million dollars toward the construction of Grant, which will be credited to the 22 percent fund (Wenk, pers. comm.). Should TWA's lease not be renewed, they will leave the Park with no possessory interest (Anzelmo, pers. comm.).
TWA is presently constructing four 50 unit buildings and a restaurant that will complete their part of the contractual agreement. For its part, the Park Service is attempting to get appropriations for the rehabilitation of the Grant Village marina. It has been closed since 1980 because wind and rough water so severely damaged the docks that they had to be removed. TWA is pushing for the reopening of the marina, feeling that it is an important factor in keeping occupancy levels up at the new development (King, pers. comm.). The Park Service hopes to reopen the marina in 1985 or 1986 (Wenk, pers. comm.).

There has been considerable adverse comment on the architectural style of the Grant Village lodging facilities. People often refer to them as "condos" and have asked why the NPS did not have rustic buildings or cabins built. Wenk (pers. comm.) states that the decision was a matter of economics; the Park Service had to settle for the least expensive buildings, which then would cost the Park visitor less to stay in.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF WEST THUMB, OLD FAITHFUL, AND FISHING BRIDGE

The development of Grant Village is predicated on the removal of facilities at West Thumb and Fishing Bridge, and the cabins at Old Faithful. In order for the project to comply with the intent of the 1973 Master Plan, that tradeoff must occur. Jack Anderson, who was never a strong advocate of the project, feels that removal of all the intended facilities is necessary to make Grant an acceptable development (Anderson, pers. comm.). Dan Wenk, the current Landscape Architect for
the NPS in Yellowstone, expressed his personal opinion:

Grant Village is the right move only if three things happen: that we can continue to get out of Old Faithful, we continue to get out of West Thumb, and we continue to get out of Fishing Bridge. If those three things don't happen, then it's a giant mistake. (Wenk, pers. comm.)

Therefore, with so much importance being placed on Grant Village as only a part of an overall effort on the part of the Park Service to dramatically change the overnight use of the Park, it is important to examine the current status of the three developments involved in the Grant Village tradeoff.

The facilities at West Thumb are to be removed in the Fall of 1984, but Hamilton Stores wants to keep their store open there until all 700 units are built at Grant Village (Wenk, pers. comm.). The NPS has not made a decision about that store at this time. Further development at Grant will probably not occur until a new concession contract is negotiated after the current one expires in ten years (Wenk, pers. comm.). Thus, if Hamilton is allowed to keep the store at West Thumb until Grant is complete, it will be open for several more years.

After issuing an environmental assessment and holding public hearings to discuss alternatives as part of the NEPA process, the Park Service issued a draft Development Concept Plan for Old Faithful in February 1984. The Plan called for removing several facilities from the Old Faithful area, including all cabins (USDI, 1984). Most of the cabins are scheduled to be removed at the end of the 1984 season (King, pers. comm.); those needed for employee housing will remain until new housing can be provided in the employee housing area (Wenk, pers.
The cabin removal is essentially a one-to-one tradeoff for the opening of lodging facilities at Grant; 326 cabins for 300 new units (Wenk, pers. comm.). Opposition to the cabin removal comes primarily from historic preservation groups who claim that the cabins have historic value, and from members of the public who believe the traditional experience of staying in the Old Faithful cabins is one which should be perpetuated (Wenk, pers. comm.). Concessioners are interested to the extent that they feel a segment of the public will no longer have their interests served, but they do not really consider the Old Faithful cabins an issue (Wenk, pers. comm.).

Presently the Park Service is developing a Lake Area Development Concept Plan. In the summer of 1983 several public meetings (termed "workshops" by the NPS) were held in the Park and in surrounding communities. At those workshops, NPS representatives presented alternatives for future planning for the Lake-Fishing Bridge-Bridge Bay area. The alternatives dealt with several issues: removal of some facilities, building new facilities, relocating some facilities, and building new roads and closing others. However, the most important issue at those workshops seemed to be the future of the recreational vehicle campground at Fishing Bridge. The workshops were very biased (Barbee, pers. comm.), with the recreational vehicle constituency and Hamilton Stores usually heavily represented. As far as the RV group was concerned, the issue is one of having RV camping facilities within Yellowstone Park. Many preferred that the existing RV campground remain at Fishing Bridge, but their main concern was that the facilities be
present somewhere within the Park (Wenk, pers. comm.). They strongly opposed what they felt were NPS efforts to force them to stay in the "condos" at Grant in order to benefit TWA Services. Hamilton Stores is interested in the RV park because their store at Fishing Bridge is dependent on the people who stay there. Even if the NPS were to allow Hamilton to keep the store there, without the RV park profits at the store would suffer considerably. The other concessioner, TWA Services, wrote to members of Congress in the context of speaking for the public interest suggesting that the RV park at Fishing Bridge was a service which, if eliminated, would deprive certain members of the public of the experience they desired in Yellowstone (Wenk, pers. comm.). The RV constituency is represented by regional and national recreational vehicle organizations such as the Good Sam Club. These organizations have worked at the national level to protect their constituents' interests.

At a workshop in Cody, WY, Hamilton Stores was again well-represented. Also, the business community of Cody firmly believes that the facilities at Fishing Bridge are essential to their economy. The highway through Cody continues through Yellowstone's east entrance and leads directly to Fishing Bridge; people in Cody feel that the Fishing Bridge development is a primary reason for tourists to enter the Park from the east entrance, and that removal of the facilities will "destroy the economic viability of their tourist trade" (Wenk, pers. comm.). US Senator Alan Simpson is from Cody (Wenk, pers. comm.) and therefore provides a sympathetic ear in the senate for the people of Cody.
Environmental groups, on the other hand, have been supportive of the NPS proposal at Fishing Bridge. The plight of the grizzly bear population in Yellowstone has become a highly visible issue in the popular media recently, and environmentalists feel that returning the Fishing Bridge area to its natural condition is important to the survival of the bear in the Yellowstone ecosystem.

Because of the "intense" interest on the part of the public, special interest groups, and Congressional delegations, who "brought a lot of pressure" on the Park Service, the Service in conjunction with the Fish and Wildlife Service reviewed the data that led to the Fishing Bridge decision, and presented the findings to the Director, who then made the final decision to remove the facilities (Wenk, pers. comm.). The review was essentially an attempt to provide a sound basis for the Park Service's argument that the Fishing Bridge area is extremely important habitat for the Yellowstone grizzly bear population.

The end result of the debate could have been that both Fishing Bridge and Grant Village would have remained as operating locations. Because of strong opinions on both sides of the issue the final decision was probably based more on political considerations then on biological evidence (Wenk, pers. comm.).

Robert Barbee succeeded the late John Townsley as Yellowstone Superintendent in 1983. As Wenk (pers. comm.) stated, Barbee "arrived for the last scene of the last act of the play" at Grant Village. Barbee (pers. comm.) stated his thoughts on the development: "I'm not
an apologist for Grant Village. I'm accepting that it's there. It offers us the opportunity to do some things that the Service has wanted to accomplish." He was referring to the removal of facilities at Fishing Bridge, Old Faithful, and West Thumb; the decisions made concerning those facilities will ultimately be one which he will have to deal with, and because of their controversial nature, he will undoubtedly draw the wrath of the special interest groups that disagree with that decision.
CHAPTER FOUR:  
CONCLUSIONS

THE MERITS OF GRANT VILLAGE

Upon superficial examination the Grant Village development today seems to be an outdated response to visitation demands in Yellowstone Park, and unfortunately, too many people have based their arguments against the development on such examination. Closer study of the project makes the complexity of the issues surrounding it more apparent and clarifies the purpose the development is supposed to serve.

The project was begun in an era of extreme anthropocentric philosophy in the National Park Service, and has survived throughout years of relatively dramatic change in the Service's philosophy toward biocentrism. The Leopold Report of 1963 served to steer the Service toward a biocentric course, but the marinas at Grant and Bridge Bay, which the Report stated were inconsistent with the purpose of national parks, were already under construction when the Report was published. The Report therefore had little direct impact on the project, but it and subsequent post-Mission 66 studies, reports, and articles (such as the Darling-Eichhorn study sponsored by the Conservation Foundation) did serve to help lead national park policy away from the anthropocentrism that dominated M66. The master plan process instituted by the NPS in the mid-1960s was in a part a response to those efforts; the process was conceived as a re-adjustment of M66 planning to bring it more in line with biocentric goals, and the Yellowstone Master Plan that
resulted from that process reflected many of the changing attitudes toward the national parks that had arisen during the environmental revolution. Instead of trying to accommodate increasing recreational use of the parks, the new Master Plan sought to place a limit on the number of overnight accommodations, and therefore reflected the newly popular belief that national parks, like the Earth's environment, had a limit to the amount of use they could withstand without being destroyed.

The Master Plan changed Grant Village from being one part of a triad of major visitor facilities developments planned during M66 to replace and expand facilities located in fragile or impacted areas to being a replacement for facilities at three impacted areas. Grant was seen as a way to help reduce impacts at three important areas by relocating equivalent facilities without impacting an additional pristine area.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to find anyone in the Park Service in Yellowstone today who is fond of the massive, urban-looking development at Canyon Village, and it is doubtful that many feel more charitable toward the development at Grant. But as Superintendent Barbee suggested, it does offer the Service the opportunity to accomplish some desired goals. Removal of all overnight facilities in Yellowstone was not politically feasible when the new Master Plan was written, and is not feasible today. Given that fact, a compromise tradeoff to get facilities removed from some fragile areas was probably the only way to eliminate impacts caused by overnight use at those areas. Although the merits of the tradeoff can be questioned on several
grounds, particularly the grizzly issue, Grant Village was probably the only resolution to several conflicts (including the bears, visitor impacts on fragile areas, improvement of visitor facilities) that was economically and politically viable. In the long term, should the political climate change so that overnight facilities could be further reduced within the Park, and should the NPS desire to do so, Grant Village could be reduced or eliminated much more easily than could several developments. Thus, Grant Village could serve as an intermediate stage in a long term effort to remove overnight facilities from the Park.

Therefore, while Grant is seen by many to be incorporating an outdated management philosophy that was rejected several years earlier, it can be viewed as an attempt by the NPS to bring Yellowstone Park planning more in line, within political constraints, with the broad biocentric goals of national park policy by using an area already partially developed under the anthropocentric philosophy to accomplish some biocentric objectives. Hence, the Grant Village plan today must be looked at as part of an overall effort to bring the Park's management more in line with the current biocentric management philosophy, and within that context the development does have beneficial aspects for the Yellowstone ecosystem.
THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF GRANT VILLAGE

Grant Village has several negative aspects which help make the project controversial, and also limit its value as a tradeoff for biocentric purposes. One negative aspect which has plagued the project from its inception is its poor location. Haines (pers. comm.) stated that, had the planning remained at the Park level instead of being taken over by the Service's Western Office of Design and Construction, development would not have been at the present location. Haines felt the present location was a bad choice because the area gets little sun, has cold, damp nights, and water circulation in the Thumb area of the Lake is poor, resulting in a danger of water pollution in the Village's water supply, as well as the Lake itself. Anderson (pers. comm.) also cited several reasons that he felt the location was poor:

I felt that Grant Village was a mistake from the standpoint of a developed area. Number one, it is infested with mosquitoes half of the summer. Number two, it is the highest snow load area in the park, literally; it is the first to close, the last to open. You're sitting in a bog down there. It was also...historically a grizzly breeding area....It isn't an area...where you want to take your family and stay a week or two.

Garrison stated that Grant Village was planned as a "wilderness takeoff point" and would be a starting point for canoe trips on Yellowstone Lake, but anyone familiar with the West Thumb of the lake knows that wind makes it too rough for canoes practically every day of the summer. Also, if the primary clientele was to be canoeists, clearly the elaborate marina that exists today would not have been built. Wind and wave damage to the marina's docks caused its closure in 1980, which
is further evidence that the site for the Village was poorly chosen, but both the NPS and TWA consider the marina important to attract visitors to the development. Hence, at a time when the Park Service would seem to have an opportunity to make Yellowstone management more in line with the policies of the Leopold Report, it is continuing to perpetuate Mission 66-type activities by rehabilitating the Grant Village marina.

The bear issue is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Grant Village. The lack of enthusiasm expressed by the Fish and Wildlife Service and Dr. Knight for the Fishing Bridge tradeoff cause one to question how much the bears will actually benefit. Certainly the worst possibility as far as the bear population is concerned would be for both Fishing Bridge and Grant to provide overnight accommodations.

THE BIOCENTRIC ARGUMENT

In studying the Grant Village project it becomes apparent that local and regional interests have assumed a very important role in the Yellowstone Park policy process, and in some instances have forced compromises and tradeoffs which have prevented Park policies from fully complying with the stated goals of park policy at the national level. The regional economic interests are especially powerful. Their power is due to the fact that the economy of a three-state region is extensively dependent on Park visitation. Regional non-economic interests are also powerful, as are Park concessioners, who are no longer small family-run operations, but are now corporate enterprises.
Because these interest groups generally desire increased Park visitation, or at least are against restrictions on what they consider desirable uses, their arguments can be placed in the anthropocentric end of the management spectrum, and they have a fairly viable foundation in law and tradition for their anthropocentric arguments. Yellowstone was established for essentially anthropocentric reasons, and early tourists were largely wealthy Easterners seeking the luxury of the portal experience. The first NPS director freely encouraged anthropocentric uses of the parks, and played a major role in the construction of luxury hotels which catered to the portal tourist. The Mission 66 program was an anthropocentric answer to the post-World War II recreation boom; the facilities built during that program will continue to exist for several years, and by their presence and use will perpetuate the convenience-oriented types of use which reflect anthropocentric ideals. The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 gave legal strength to the concessioners' anthropocentrism by putting responsibility for their opportunity to realize profits on the Park Service. Under the current presidential administration anthropocentric management has received important support from the Interior Department, with the Secretary offering his sympathies to concessioner interests. Thus, the anthropocentric argument is fairly strong.

However, the biocentric argument is much stronger; it has its basis in several laws dealing with the parks, as well as in the philosophy of the preservation movement that grew in this century, reached a peak during the environmental revolution of the 1970s, and has
been an essential factor in the evolution of national park policy. The legal basis began with the Yellowstone Act of 1872 which included the biocentric goal of preserving all "natural curiosities...in their natural condition". The National Park Service Act of 1916 also had the biocentric goal to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife", and the Lane Letter went further by establishing as the first goal of the Service "that the national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form". That statement perhaps best expresses the biocentric basis of the first NPS director's philosophy. The Leopold Report of 1963 became undoubtedly the most concise biocentric statement of policy to this day. It refuted the anthropocentric answer to the post-war crush of park visitors, and made it clear that, as Haines (pers. comm.) stated, the M66 planners' "crystal ball was off" when they tried to plan for future management of the parks.

The biocentric philosophy for national park management has also enjoyed a growing popular support. The first suggestions for establishment of national parks were essentially biocentric, although at the time they did not generate public interest. By the late nineteenth century, however, Olmsted helped popularize biocentric management when he stated that parks should be maintained in as natural condition as possible with only necessary, unobtrusive visitor facilities provided. He believed that facilities and services provided within parks should not be attractions in themselves. In the early twentieth century John Muir generated a great deal of public support for the biocentric park
philosophy, and when the environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s arose, his writings enjoyed a renewed popularity. Several writers of that revolution, such as Edward Abbey, wrote strongly of the need for biocentric management, and their ideas were widely accepted. In the 1980s, Sax has spoken eloquently for the need for park visitors to enjoy the parks unrestrained by conventional services provided by concessioners. He advocated the elimination of "resort"-style convenience-oriented recreation in the parks.

It can be argued that the biocentrism which grew to dominate national park policy in the late 1960s is only a phase which was popular during the environmental revolution but is coming to an end in this era of "new conservatism". Perhaps James Watt did signal the beginning of an era when the American people will favor maximum resource development and reject preservationist biocentric ideals as incompatible with the needs of modern American society. That prospect seems highly unlikely because the biocentric philosophy that exists within the National Park Service policy today arose out of the preservationist ideas first voiced in the United States over 150 years ago, and the preservation movement has grown since then as American society has progressed. The movement grew in the late nineteenth century because the public began to realize that the continent's natural resources are finite, and came of age when science came to more fully understand the ecological interdependence of all living things. For the national parks, the implication is that park visitors, instead of merely enjoying the parks as portal tourists, will become more sensitive to ecological problems created by altering the
park environment. They will be more aware that actions which affect one aspect of a park may have undesirable impacts on other aspects which may be considered essential to the park experience; therefore the biocentric philosophy, which emphasizes the maintenance of naturally occurring environmental processes, is most likely to be desired by more park visitors in the future.

While the Third Wave theory does not deal with biocentrism or anthropocentrism in leisure activities, it does tend to support the idea that biocentric recreation will continue to gain in popularity. The portal tourism prevalent in the past century is emblematic of the structured, convenience- and entertainment- oriented recreation of the Second Wave. The contemplative, educational, and self-actualizing forms of recreation favored by biocentrists are emblematic of the Third Wave. Hence, for those who subscribe to Toffler's theory, the biocentric argument for national parks would seem to be the most farsighted.

IDEALISM VS. REALISM

Many may contend that the Leopold Report was not meant to be given the importance it has been given in this paper. Some would assert that it is only a broad guideline for national park management. Others would argue that it was meant to deal only with resource issues. However, the authors of the Report clearly felt that recreational issues cannot be separated from resource issues. The significant contribution of the Report was that it stressed the concept of integrated park management, and that the goal of providing recreational opportunities should be
subordinate to preserving ecosystems. It is the Report's emphasis on preserving ecosystems that makes it powerful because that makes management consider more than just insuring that visitors can see unspoiled scenery; it must insure that visitor use will not disrupt the natural system.

The goals of the Leopold Report are ideals the Service was directed to seek to achieve, but as both former Superintendent Anderson and present Superintendent Barbee stated, "Sometimes you have to be a realist" (pers. comm.). The national parks are a highly visible, extremely popular institution in American culture which also have significant economic value to several interest groups. Thus, decisions made in the parks, especially a Park as famous as Yellowstone, are invariably very political. As Barbee (pers. comm.) stated:

> [I]n every national park there is a constellation of special interest groups that surround it...there are certain traditional kinds of uses that exist there that one more or less accepts as part of the picture. They don't seem to materially affect the entire park and so one has to ask the questions: How far do you want to go? How pure do you want to get? At what cost do you want to pursue that, politically and so on?

Many of these special interests are not concerned with the philosophical basis for policy formation, be it anthropocentric or biocentric, but are only concerned with how the implementation of various policies will affect them. This fact makes these interests especially difficult for the NPS to deal with because they are unwilling to look at the overall goals of national park management.
Included in this type of special interests are individuals and groups who regularly patronize a particular park and, because of their political connections, are able to either change policy or prevent its implementation, at least to the extent that it would affect them and their activities. Because of the difficulty in identifying them and measuring their influence on the policy process they are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless they do exist, and anyone familiar with Yellowstone can identify some of them; for although their power is informal, they are well-known to Park employees, are treated with deference, and are often allowed special privileges or considerations. For examples of this type of special interest, one could study Bridge Bay Marina, where several wealthy people, primarily from the surrounding region, rent summer-long dock space season after season; many of them live on their boats for the entire season, which tends to give the marina the atmosphere of a private yacht club. Some of these people are friends of state or national politicians, and are very vocal about fishing and boating restrictions on the Lake. The degree to which these people have an effect on Park policy in any important sense is quite difficult to determine, but the fact that they do have an effect is very important to recognize in order to understand the realities of national park management.

Congress, in the Concessions Policy Act, allowed for these political considerations when it failed to define "necessary and appropriate" facilities and services in national parks. Consequently, those terms are usually defined on a case-by-case basis in the political
arena. Because of the political power of the special interests, the Park Service is placed in a position of seeking compromises, which some refer to as "the balance of preservation and use". However, that label implies that preservationists are opposed to any use, which is not the case. Preservation interests only seek to narrow the definition of the purpose of the parks to in order to exclude what they consider inappropriate uses. The balance is actually between those interests favoring a narrow set of biocentric uses and those favoring a wide range of uses, including anthropocentric uses.

COMPROMISES IN BIOCENTRIC MANAGEMENT

In theory the preservationists and the Park Service are on the biocentric side, but in reality, because of its vague legal direction and the power of the anthropocentric interests, the NPS is more of a mediator who tries to accommodate the wishes of both sides by striking compromises between them in its management decisions. The tradeoff of Fishing Bridge for Grant Village is one such compromise.

The contractual agreement between the NPS and TWA Services in Yellowstone can also be viewed as a compromise between biocentric and anthropocentric interests, and it is a compromise with dangerous potential. The Park Service benefits from the agreement by insuring the improvement of many of the Park's deteriorated facilities and the construction of Grant Village which would then allow the achievement of the biocentric goals of removing the facilities at Fishing Bridge, West Thumb, and Old Faithful in order to restore impacted thermal areas and
grizzly bear habitat. TWA benefits by having to re-invest only a specified percentage of their revenues into these projects. However, the agreement is a Catch-22. In order for the NPS to achieve its desired biocentric goals, it must rely on capital provided by TWA. Therefore, in order to guarantee enough capital to accomplish those goals, the Service is in the position of helping TWA maximize profits. TWA, in turn, pushes to expand the services it provides in order to increase revenues. Frequently the Park Service is faced with allowing TWA to provide anthropocentric services in order to accomplish biocentric goals.

TWA's position as a concessioner and economic interest is perfectly clear; they are in business in the Park to generate profits by serving Park visitors. They cannot be expected to share either the Park Service's point of view or its concern for biocentric management. They have expressed their desire to increase tourism and make Yellowstone a "destination resort" (Bozeman Chronicle, 1982), and have instituted such attractions as live bands, gourmet dining, and fast food services. The corporation also has a marketing division in the Park which promotes and advertises the Park as a resort. TWA brochures advertise boat and horse rides, fishing expeditions, and family cookouts in an effort to generate more Park tourism. Perhaps, as Superintendent Barbee (pers. comm.) suggested, such issues are relatively unimportant, and for the Service "to get all bloodied up" politically over them would distract it from more important things it is trying to accomplish. There is a significant danger, however, that in allowing (or being forced to allow)
such anthropocentrism within the Park, the NPS in Yellowstone is actually being pulled further away from the biocentric goals stated at the national level.

One example of TWA's anthropocentric intentions is the recent renovation of Lake Hotel. The Hotel had been deteriorating for decades and was badly in need of repair. In the fall of 1983 TWA began a 1.7 million dollar renovation project (Billings Gazette, 1984) with the stated objective of bringing back the elegant tourist experience of the late nineteenth century. The Billings Gazette (1984) paraphrased the president of TWA Services, Yellowstone:

People may like to "rough it" on occasion, he said, but hot dogs and campfires don't hack it when you feel like getting fancy in a nice dress or suit and enjoying a meal of lobster and pate topped off with cognac and classy conversation.

At the gala opening two weekends ago, musicians played, canapes were served and guests from all over the United States mingled to enjoy raw oysters, filet, crab and strawberries with champagne.

The Lake Hotel lobby today offers a beautiful and tasteful contrast to the drab and shabby lobby of recent years, and by any standards is a great improvement. The decor of the Hotel is not the issue; the issue is the clientele TWA is seeking to attract. They are gearing much of their operation toward visitors who are more interested in being entertained in posh resort facilities surrounded by beautiful scenery than in experiencing preserved ecosystems. With an operation such as this the facilities and services provided become as much an attraction as the Park itself, and are therefore incongruous with biocentric
Possibly the most disturbing evidence of the direction TWA seeks to push Park management is a houseboat that, according to Wenk (pers. comm.), TWA Services purchased with money from the maintenance and improvement fund created by the contractual agreement with the NPS. The boat offers the classic "portal" experience; it has plush furniture and is fully carpeted, has a stereo system with outside speakers, has cooking facilities and a bar, and comes equipped with fishing poles and two guides. It is ostensibly for rent to Park visitors, but the rental price is prohibitive to all but the most wealthy, and therefore it has primarily been used as a pleasure boat for TWA executives and prominent people TWA wishes to entertain; in the summer of 1983 at least one congressman from a bordering state was treated to a complimentary day on Yellowstone Lake. In essence, therefore, the boat is used by the company as a tool with which to lobby for support for TWA initiatives in Yellowstone. Such activity may have been considered appropriate in the nineteenth century, but is inimical to today's biocentric management. Furthermore, it subverts any Park Service effort to move away from providing such convenience-oriented, mass recreation opportunities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

Examination of the evolution of national park policy and the history of Grant Village points out two primary problems that greatly affect the national parks' policy today: One, the vague legal basis upon which policy is made. Two, the failure of the National Park
Service to identify a clientele for whom it will seek to manage. The second problem to a great extent follows from the first problem.

The vague legal basis. From the beginning of the national parks Congress has been unwilling to form a concise legal basis for park management. The reason is largely due to the fact that the parks were not established as an organized system with a common purpose and policy, but were established individually with individual management prescriptions; a central management agency was not formed until after several parks had been established, and it was given only a broad mandate to both preserve the parks and provide for their use by the public. Also, units established for recreational and historical purposes were added to the system, further confusing management goals.

Early on the Park Service made every attempt to generate park use, and these efforts were so successful that most of the major parks became surrounded by communities dependent on park tourism. Because of the strength these regional interests have gained as park visitation grew, they have been very important in keeping tourism a major consideration in park policy. Efforts by preservationist interests to strengthen the preservation mandate of the Service have been frequently thwarted by members of Congress sympathetic to these interests. Language in national park legislation is generally broad enough to allow several interpretations.
If, as this paper has argued, the biocentric philosophy, which stresses the importance of naturalness to the visitor, is the one which best allows the Park Service to preserve the parks for future generations and which will also provide the experience most desired by park visitors is to be fully implemented by the NPS, Congress must give it legal strength by more clearly defining proper park management. The Leopold Report is the most concise statement of how the parks should be managed, and Congress should give the principles expressed in the Report legal strength.

The Choice of a Clientele. It has been recognized that recreational use of any wildland area can reach a point where both the resource and the experience of the recreationist are impaired; this point has been termed the recreational carrying capacity of the area. Thus, it follows that when this carrying capacity is in danger of being exceeded, management must act to prevent impairment of the resource or the recreational experience. One possible action is the establishment of use limits, and the Leopold Report advocated use limits as a proper management action when it stated, "If too many tourists crowd the roadways, then we should ration the tourists rather than expand the roadways". However, establishing carrying capacity and rationing use are complex problems. As Shreyer (1979) stated, "Carrying capacity is a tool to attain an outcome, rather than an inherent characteristic of a recreation resource". Therefore, it "is a social cost imposed upon society in order to attain other ends". Those ends may include preservation of a desired recreational experience. Shreyer stated that
applying recreational use limitations is actually a resource allocation problem in which a certain desired clientele whose experiential goals are most in line with management goals benefit from management actions, while those whose goals are in opposition to management goals suffer.

The National Park Service has historically been unwilling or unable, because of political pressures, to identify its desired clientele. Shreyer (1976) claims that the Park Service suffers from two "hang-ups": One, because the parks were established "for the benefit and enjoyment of the people" (the Yellowstone Act of 1872) maximizing visitors is considered by the Service to be equivalent to maximizing benefits. Two, since the parks are for all people, visitors are treated "as a vast, indistinguishable, amorphous mass" and the parks are managed for everyone. He asserts that these hang-ups lead to what he referred to as "lowest common denominator (LCD) management", which offers the visitor the "most bland and least distinctive line of values", and therefore "no one is really pleased very much, since they never get exactly what they want, but then no one is really offended enough to take action against" the NPS. The appeal for the management agency, states Shreyer, is that it is politically safe; no one is really offended, and therefore "they will not likely try to challenge your philosophies". LCD management maximizes the number of visitors who benefit from a particular recreational resource but does not maximize the benefits derived by individuals, and therefore cheats all visitors of quality in their recreational experience. Furthermore, it reduces diversity in experience because all areas managed under this strategy
offer the same experience.

Because of broad statutory mandates and intense political pressures, the National Park Service often seems to adopt the LCD strategy. Policy statements, such as the Leopold Report, offer direction but do not give the Service the strength it needs to withstand objections to its biocentric management actions that come from special interest groups. The argument is not the appropriateness of anthropocentric activities, but whether they are appropriate within national parks. Structured, convenience-oriented, resort-style activities can easily be provided outside the parks. Such recreation can best be provided by private enterprise, and therefore should be provided outside the parks on private land. In the Yellowstone region these types of activities can be (and are) provided by resorts located outside the Park, such as Big Sky Resort, Chico Hot Springs, and Flagg Ranch. Within the Park, biocentric activities in which the Park visitor is allowed to engage in unstructured, contemplative forms of recreation (as described by Sax) should be encouraged, leaving the visitor free from constraints presented by concessioners and large, resort-style facilities. This type of recreation is most likely to be in line with preservation of park values and resources. The parks should provide an experience unique from that provided by private resorts, other federal lands, and state and county parks. They must be viewed as part of a diverse system of recreational lands, and must be expected to provide quality experiences for a portion of recreationists, rather than trying to meet all recreational demands. The parks simply cannot be all things
to all people, and therefore as Sax advocated, the experience provided within the parks must be "unbundled" from that provided outside the parks. For this to happen, the parks need more legal protection and direction from Congress.
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