Palestinian Arabs and the Middle East

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THE PALESTINIAN ARABS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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This paper is intended to describe and analyze the methods, rationale and influence of the Palestinian Arab refugees in their attempts to prevent an Arab-Israeli settlement of the Middle East conflict. Palestinian tactics have been both direct and indirect. Since 1947, the Palestinians have had an effect on the policies and actions of the United Nations and the five Middle Eastern governments most directly involved. The Palestinians’ power and influence have grown considerably during the 1960’s and show little prospect of waning.

The Palestinian conflict, originally confined to diplomatic maneuvering between representatives of the Arab States and Israel in the United Nations, has gradually broadened to include the Palestinians as an important third element. Much of the Palestinians’ present role in the Middle Eastern conflict, as will be shown, can be directly attributed to actions, or inaction, on the part of the regional governments, both in their treatment of the refugees and in their failure to reach a settlement. Though the Palestinians are Arabs, their methods and goals differ from those of the Arab Governments. Even with the status being accorded them today, the Palestinians seem to be only complicating and prolonging an already complex problem.
In attempting to describe how the Palestinians have had a negative influence in reaching a solution of the Middle Eastern conflict, it has been necessary to rely, perhaps a little too heavily, on current newspaper and news magazine articles. Where possible, United Nations documents have been used. However, much of the material dealing with current events and refugee organization is not available from U. N. sources. For, unless the military confrontations or governmental crises directly affect U. N. operations in the area, these occurrences are not reported in official U. N. documents. Nor has the United Nations had reason to be concerned with the Palestinians' effects on either internal or regional politics of the States involved unless these politics have led to a major military clash such as in 1967.

There has also been a dearth of scholarly articles on the refugees. Several reasons can be given for this. First, the refugees tend to be quite secretive about their organizations and operations. The refugee population has also been quite mobile and, until recently, rather inarticulate. It has been necessary to rely on observations by United Nations personnel and journalists who have visited the area, and on statements of the refugee leaders as they are published in the news media, in an attempt to determine refugee attitudes and objectives. However, a variety of sources have been studied and, in general, accounts of particular events or of the refugees' feelings and goals do not differ significantly.

This paper is not intended to speculate on a solution to
the conflict. Rather it is designed to show the complexities of the present situation and the present influence of the Palestinians. This influence is felt in the refugees' relationships with Israel and with the Arabs, both domestically and regionally, and has been pronounced enough to deter these governments from achieving a solution. Only cursory mention is made of Arab and Israeli governmental positions relative to a solution, although their attitude toward the refugees is explained. No mention is made of outside governmental stands, and particularly those of the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, the scope of the paper is not such as to allow for outlining a final or complete solution.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Palestine problem, around which today's Middle East conflict is centered, has roots far older than the United Nations intervention in 1947. Religious conflict, one facet of the present problem, can be traced back to Biblical times and the conflicts between the Moslems and the Jews. However, despite religious differences, the present problem can largely be attributed to various policies of the British Government during the early Twentieth Century, and to the United Nations partitioning of Palestine in 1947.

Prior to Israel's becoming a sovereign state in 1948, the territory of Palestine\(^1\) had been under British rule. In 1917, Lord Balfour of the British Government issued a statement granting the Jews the right to a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Jewish population interpreted this statement, known as the Balfour Declaration, to mean that Great Britain acknowledged the Jews' right to a separate state. The Arab population felt the Declaration granted the Jews a right to

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\(^1\)See maps, Appendices A, B, and C. Before 1923, Palestine was the geographical area which is now the states of Jordan and Israel, including all of the areas now occupied by Israel except for the Sinai Peninsula. In 1946, Jordan, or Transjordan, was granted full sovereignty. At the time of the 1947 U. N. Partition Resolution, Palestine was only the area which is presently the State of Israel, including the occupied areas except Sinai.
live in the area, but to live under Arab rule.

With the formation of the United Nations, Palestine was placed under the auspices of Great Britain. Problems had been developing among the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine for many years, largely as a result of increased Jewish immigration to the area and the Jewish desire to set up a Jewish state. The British Government had tried to limit Jewish immigration to the area, hoping to end the Moslem-Jewish conflicts. However, its action came too late, and only increased the Jewish populations determination to obtain its National Home.

Consequently the British Government finally requested the aid of the United Nations in resolving the problems in the area. The "Question of Palestine" was placed on the General Assembly agenda at the Second Session of the United Nations. The Arab Higher Committee, representing the Arab population of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, representing the Jewish population, were invited to send observers to supply such information and to render any assistance as might be required. Both groups accepted the invitation.

Two plans evolved from the Assembly's work. The minority plan called for a unitary Arab-Jewish State set up on a system of cantons, much as the government of Switzerland is today. The majority plan called for the creation of two States—one Arab and one Jewish—from the territory of Palestine, with a provision for economic union between the two States.
The majority plan became General Assembly Resolution 181(II). However, no Arab government favored this plan.

At the time of partition, the Jews were a minority in Palestine. The Arabs, having voiced their desire for a unitary state, refused to accept the General Assembly's decision; the Jews were determined to defend what had been given them by the International Community. Thus, in 1948, war broke out between the newly created Jewish State and its Arab neighbors. As a result of both Arab and Jewish urging, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine fled to the surrounding Arab states. Those who fled felt assured of a speedy return to their homes as soon as the Arab armies defeated Israel. However, Israel was not defeated, and on May 11, 1949, was admitted to full membership in the United Nations. Because Israel was not defeated, the problems which resulted from the creation of the Jewish State have persisted to the present.

From the time of the admission of Israel to the United Nations, the General Assembly and its various committees have been a debating forum for both the Arab and Israeli representatives. Much of this debate has concerned the implementation of the 1948 General Assembly Resolution 194(III), and particularly of paragraph 11. This Resolution outlined a solution to the

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2 At the end of 1946, there were approximately 608,000 Jews in Palestine, making up 32.9% of the population. (See United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records (hereinafter referred to as GAOR), United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Volume I, Supplement No. 11, September 3, 1947, p. 11.

3 See Appendix D.
situation which followed the 1948 War. Paragraph 11 outlined a solution to the refugee situation.

While the Arab and Israeli delegates have been debating, many former Arab Palestinians have been existing in refugee camps, mainly in the Arab nations surrounding Israel. They have been cared for primarily by the United Nations. Their maintenance was temporarily the responsibility of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR). This body became the more permanent United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) when it became evident that there would be no quick solution to the Palestine problem or to the refugee problem.

Through the years, UNRWA has, despite often adverse conditions, provided quite admirably for the basic health, shelter and subsistence needs of the refugees. However, in the line of projects to further the development of the Middle Eastern host countries and to bring about the social and economic integration of the refugees into the area, the Agency has all but failed.

At the Fourth Session of the U. N. in 1949, the General Assembly made provision for the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. This body was to act as a mediator between the Arab States and Israel in resolving differences and facilitating the repatriation or compensation of the refugees.

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4 See Appendix C.
5 General Assembly Resolution 302(IV).
Failure has been the fortune of the Conciliation Commission. The Commission has faced an almost hopeless task. The Israeli officials feel that the Commission is prejudiced toward the Arab States, and the Arab officials feel that the Commission is not only worthless, but also on the side of Israel.

Following almost twenty years of Arab-Israeli deadlock, the governments of both sides did finally agree to the solution outlined in the 1967 Security Council Resolution. However, the Resolution was so vaguely phrased and open to interpretation that each side could read in what it desired. Though there was agreement to the printed word, the opposing interpretations have thus far kept any implementation of the Resolution from being realized.

For the first ten years of their exile, the refugees were heavily dependent on the Arab Governments to do their negotiating and to voice their opinions. For the most part, the Palestinians remained passive, although embittered against Israel, and waited to achieve the implementation of Resolution 194(III).

During the 1960's, initially with the encouragement of several Arab host states, the refugees have become more organized and have gained both political and military recognition in the Middle East. The refugee organizations also have their own political goals. These center around the liberation of Palestine. As will be shown, much of today's tension in the area is a result of refugee attempts to implement their goal of regaining Palestine.

\*See Appendix E.\*
CHAPTER II

THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS

Although today the Palestinian Arabs are the main group blocking a settlement of the Middle East conflict, their influence has not always been so pronounced. From 1947 until approximately 1960, the conflict was centered more around disagreements between the Arab and Israeli governments. Until the 1960's, except for the conflicts in 1948 and 1956, military activities were generally subordinated to diplomatic disagreements. Yet, diplomatic disagreement was not simply two-sided between the Israeli officials and the Arab officials. The Arab Governments themselves were unable to agree on a solution. This governmental disagreement, and consequent prolongation of the Palestine problem, was one major factor in bringing about the rise in influence of the Palestinians themselves. Had the governments involved been able to reach a diplomatic agreement in the earlier stages of the conflict, they very likely could have imposed it on the refugees and brought about peace, rather than having created the present military situation.

Yet, despite the fact that the Middle East conflict is no longer solely between the Governments of the Arab States and Israel, it seems necessary to look at the political positions of the Governments involved both to show how these Governments, more
by inaction than action, encouraged the present situation, and
to show the conflicts between the refugees' means and goals and
those of the Middle Eastern governments.

The creation of the State of Israel caused the exodus of
nearly one million Arabs from the area which had formerly been
Palestine. The presence of these refugees in the Arab States
became a factor of major economic and social disruption. Nearly
one-half of the refugees still live in overpopulated areas
where work opportunities are virtually non-existent. These
refugees have little hope of ever becoming self-supporting, at
least under the present economic structure in the Middle East.¹

Since 1949, the Arab Governments have generally claimed
that the refugee problem is the most pressing problem in the
Palestine conflict and that it must be resolved before discussions
can begin on other outstanding issues such as the permanent
delimitation of boundaries. With the exception of Jordan, the
Arab Governments maintain that Israeli officials must accept the
right of the refugees to return home. However, the Arab
Governments have yet to grant Israel political recognition as
a sovereign state, despite the State's twenty-two year existence.
Thus, Israeli officials have been unwilling to discuss solutions
to the refugee or Palestine problems.

Neither Arab nor Israeli officials want to make the concessions

¹GAOR, 6th Session, Assistance to Palestine Refugees,
Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/1451/
Rev. 1), Supplement Number 19, 1951, p. 13.
necessary to break the political deadlock. Both sides have come to agree that the situation as is cannot continue indefinitely, but neither wants to surrender its possible political advantages and begin a compromise.

Until 1967, the Arab and Israeli governments based their positions largely on interpretations of the 1948 General Assembly Resolution 194(III) which outlined a solution to the refugee question. One facet of this Resolution proposed allowing the refugees a choice between repatriation to their old homes now in Israel or resettlement in the Arab countries or elsewhere.

**Israeli Position**

Israeli authorities have refused to acknowledge en masse repatriation of the refugees as a possible solution. The government claims that repatriation is qualified by practicality and regional peace. Because of the influx of Jewish immigrants, many from the Arab countries, repatriation is impractical. Peace, obviously, does not exist. Israeli officials seriously doubt that, if repatriated, the refugees would be loyal citizens. They strongly question whether any state could be required to do that which is inconsistent with its own survival.\(^2\)

The Israeli delegates to the United Nations point out that if the Arab Governments truly wanted the State of Israel to repatriate the refugees or pay compensation to those not choosing

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to return, they would end their economic boycotts against Israel and would agree to enter into direct negotiations, an Israeli government prerequisite for any solution.\(^3\)

The Israeli delegates have pointed out that in 1949 their government did agree to take back 100,000 refugees. The offer was not even acknowledged by the Arab Governments.\(^4\) Again in 1957, the Israeli Government offered to attempt a large-scale repatriation endeavor, conditional on Israel's administration of the Gaza Strip. This offer, too, was ignored.\(^5\) Now, except for reunification of families and a few special cases, Israel's government rejects any large scale repatriation of the refugees.

Israeli delegates provide several reasons for the rejection of repatriation as a solution. The State of Israel has accepted and integrated hundreds of thousands of Jews from around the world and from the neighboring Arab States.\(^6\) Acceptance of these Jews, combined with the belief that 60% of the refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon have been resettled by "spontaneous absorption" leads officials to believe that the refugee problem is not so great as the Arab Governments claim.\(^7\) Also by 1956, over 50% of the refugee population was under 15 years of age.

\(^3\)GAOR, 18th Session, Special Political Committee, 410th Meeting (November 15, 1963), p. 187.

\(^4\)GAOR, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 11, 1953), p. 142.


\(^6\)GAOR, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 11, 1953), p. 142.

\(^7\)GAOR, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 162nd Meeting (November 30, 1959), p. 164.
Most of these younger refugees have no conscious memory of Palestine and were not even Palestinian citizens.  

The Israeli Government prefers a solution based on resettlement and compensation of the refugees. This solution seems to be more natural in view of the similarities of language, culture and religion between the refugees and the Arab hosts, Israeli officials feel. This alternative has also been a stalemated issue.

The Israeli Government, in 1950, agreed to the principle of compensation for lands and buildings abandoned by the Palestinians. Most of these lands and buildings were occupied and used by the incoming Jews. Since the 1956 War, the Government has linked consideration of the compensation issue to the abandonment by the Governments of the Arab States of their economic boycott against Israel. Though the Arab Governments' claims that Israel's treasury is accruing large sums from this abandoned property, the Israeli Government counters that it has had to invest large amounts to reclaim much of the property.

The former Palestinians also abandoned large sums in bank holdings. The Israeli Government, through the auspices of the Conciliation Commission, did finally release the majority of

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these holdings, including monies deposited in accounts and the contents of safety deposit boxes. However, it considered the release as a concession and expected some corresponding action from the Arab Governments, who considered this release as an obligation and duty on the part of the Israeli Government. However, it considered the release as a concession and expected some corresponding action from the Arab Governments, who considered this release as an obligation and duty on the part of the Israeli Government. Though these accounts were returned directly to their owners, Israeli officials maintain that their release does not set a precedent on the compensation issue. Rather, any compensation must be paid to a reintegration fund so that all of the refugees will benefit rather than just those who owned property in Palestine. Most of the former property owners, Israeli officials feel, do not truly need the monies anyway. Israeli officials also insist that the value of the property appropriated by the Arab States from their former Jewish residents should be determined before arriving at any final figures on which compensation is to be paid. The value of the Jewish property would then be deducted from the value of the Arab property abandoned in Israel.

The Israeli Government also has specific ideas of methods of achieving a settlement. The Government maintains that no substitute exists for a peaceful settlement of disputes by direct negotiations. Until Arab and Israeli representatives can nego-

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tiate directly on an overall peace settlement, possibly with the refugee situation as the first item to be considered, there will never be much hope for Middle Eastern peace. Such negotiations are hampered by the Arab Governments' refusals to grant political recognition to Israel. This idea of negotiations between governments has never been modified by the Israeli officials to include the Palestine Arabs.

**Syrian Position**

Syrian delegates to the General Assembly have consistently maintained that repatriation is the only solution to the refugee problem. In reply to Israeli delegates' contentions that the clock cannot be put back five, ten or twenty years in order to allow a return of the refugees, Syrian delegates have responded that Israel owes its existence to the clock's being put back 2,000 years. The delegates maintain that the decision to return or to accept compensation cannot be arbitrarily decided by the Conciliation Commission, the United Nations or any one government involved. The refugees must, individually, be given completely free choice between repatriation or resettlement with compensation. For each refugee is entitled to a choice under General Assembly Resolution 194(III).

As a general observation, Syrian representatives have

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15 *GAOR, 18th Session, Special Political Committee, 410th Meeting (November 15, 1963), p. 181.*
16 *GAOR, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 30th Meeting (December 2, 1952), p. 175.*
17 *GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 63rd Meeting (November 30, 1950), p. 408.*
maintained that the entire Palestine problem is the responsibility of the United Nations. Since the U.N. perpetrated the problem by partitioning Palestine, it cannot withdraw its program of assistance, although its relief program is only a stopgap. If the United Nations can persuade Israeli officials to permit the refugees to return home, the problem can at least be reduced to negligible proportions, and probably would cease to exist. In the meantime, the Syrian delegates, at least vocally, support the Agency programs as they help to improve refugee living conditions and to save the refugees from complete moral degredation and physical deterioration.

Syrian representatives, like those from other Arab States, in resisting any solution except repatriation, claim to be only safeguarding the right of the refugees as guaranteed by the United Nations. So far as considering any other solution, it would be illusory without taking into account this right of the refugees. Until the Israeli Government agrees to the implementation of previous U.N. resolutions, and particularly to the solution outlined in Resolution 194(III), there can be no basis for negotiations.

Syrian representatives do admit that no one denies the right of a state to decide whether immigration constitutes a threat

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18 GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 34th Meeting (November 6, 1950), p. 205.
20 GAOR, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 27th Meeting (November 6, 1953), p. 129.
to the security of a State. However, even this right would not apply in the case of Israel where the refugees would just be crossing the border to reenter their own country.\textsuperscript{21}

The Syrian representatives have noted in U. N. debates that the increasing economic development of the host countries would provide a greater opportunity for paid work by a large number of the refugees. However, they have also cautioned that these opportunities should not be closely linked with the rehabilitation of the refugees or made dependent on it, or political complications might arise such as those which have prevented the implementation of various large-scale works projects during the years.\textsuperscript{22}

On the subject of compensation, the Syrian delegates feel that Israeli officials have applied so many reservations and conditions as to amount to a refusal to pay. They also feel that the Israeli Government intends to use the compensation issue to force the Arab States to negotiate on Israeli terms.\textsuperscript{23} As stated by one Syrian delegate in 1950, "Israel's government is prepared to discuss compensation, but not to take measures to bring it about."\textsuperscript{24} This feeling has persisted to the present.

\textsuperscript{22}GAOR, 11th Session, Special Political Committee, 29th Meeting (February 20, 1957), p. 134.
\textsuperscript{23}GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 66th Meeting (December 1, 1950), p. 430.
\textsuperscript{24}GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 68th Meeting (December 4, 1950), p. 441.
As for Arab property in Israel, there should be a receiver to collect any rent or revenue from the property. The money collected could be applied toward reducing the U.N. relief budget. Such action would be justified, since at the time of Partition, Israel, or the Jewish population of Palestine, possessed only 6% of the land area in Palestine. The remainder of the property and land still belongs to the refugees, who are now living on international charity.\(^\text{25}\) Compensation, as against income from the property, is the right of an individual owner, however, and cannot be turned over to a reintegration fund.\(^\text{26}\) The Israeli Government's excuse of financial problems and economic boycotts as reasons for not paying compensation are equally invalid. The economy of Israel is based on Arab wealth and property and on donations from the international community.\(^\text{27}\)

The Syrian delegates have felt that the Jews are attempting to use the refugee problem as a bargaining factor in their quest for further territorial expansion. This is borne out by the annexation of the Gaza Strip being a condition of an Israeli repatriation offer, as the acquisition of more territory was the only way Israel could absorb so many extra persons.\(^\text{28}\) Even if the refugees are economically integrated into the host

\(^{25}\)GAOR, 9th Session, Special Political Committee, 30th Meeting (November 22, 1954), p. 137.

\(^{26}\)GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 63rd Meeting (November 30, 1950), p. 408.


countries, as Israeli officials would like, they are still refugees as long as they are unable to return home, according to Arab representatives. 29

Though the Syrian Government is probably the most militant of the four main Arab host governments, the other three states involved are equally adamant on many of the issues. None of the Arab States is willing to take responsibility for the beginnings of the conflict. Before 1967, no host government acknowledged a permanent solution other than repatriation. Nor are any yet willing to begin individual negotiations with the Israeli Government.

**Egyptian Position**

Egyptian delegates feel that little honest attempt has been made to solve the refugee problem, but believe that as long as the refugees are kept from their homes, they are the responsibility of the United Nations. 30 The delegates also claim that Jewish immigration has been a calculated move by Israeli Zionists to rid Israel of its Arabs and to prevent their return. In-migration of Jews has made the implementation of various U. N. resolutions impossible. 31

The refugee problem was a direct consequence of the intervention of the United Nations in the Palestine conflict and the

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29 [GAOR, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 30th Meeting (November 22, 1954), p. 138.](#)

30 [GAOR, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 151st Meeting (November 13, 1959), p. 114.](#)

31 [GAOR, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 31st Meeting (November 23, 1954), p. 139.](#)
U. N., together with Israel, will remain responsible until a just and lasting solution is found, according to the Egyptian representative. The question of relief, one issue of the larger problem, should be considered as a political, rather than a humanitarian, matter. Following this line of reasoning, the Egyptian spokesmen have not hesitated to criticize UNRWA, from its slender budget to its proposed rehabilitation and resettlement projects. An Egyptian delegate in 1952 stated that the economic development of the Middle East was the affair of the states in the area; they should be left to work out their own plans without foreign interference. Some of this "foreign interference" refers to the existence of the State of Israel.

Egyptian officials have also maintained that the presence of the refugees in all of the host countries has imposed a great hardship on these countries. The refugees' presence has brought a considerable drop in wages and in overall standards of living. To support this contention, the Egyptian delegate pointed out that in Palestine the minimum daily wage of an agricultural worker had been $1.00. In Jordan in 1953, the comparable wage was $2.28, and in the Gaza Strip, $1.15. Although much is made of the miserable conditions in which the refugees live, little mention is ever made, at least by the Arab

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33 GAOR, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th Meeting (November 4, 1953), p. 120.
34 In 1953 each refugee received relief from UNRWA amounting to $0.08 per day. Five cents of this amount was spent on food. (See
representatives, of the agency's often repeated contention that the refugees have a standard of living and an education somewhat better than that of most of the inhabitants of the host states.

Egyptian officials have also criticized the Conciliation Commission's efforts to obtain the release of blocked accounts, calling this step an inversion of the logical order in dealing with the refugee problem by placing it before the questions of repatriation and compensation. 35

**Lebanese Position**

Lebanese representatives feel that the problem of the refugees involves an entire people deliberately displaced from their homes and replaced by alien elements from abroad. 36 They maintain that the refugee problem is the core of a dispute involving millions of people and is constituting a definite danger to world peace. 37 The time element which some hoped would bring about a solution seems only to have provided for more

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35 GAOR, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th Meeting (November 4, 1953), p. 119. By 1966 the allowance for foodstuffs was $1.20 per person per month or about $0.04 per day. (See GAOR, 21st Session, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/6313), Supplement Number 13, 1966, p. 8.)


bitterness. The Israeli representatives' implications that the Government has the right to permit the refugees to return to their homes, or not to return, is in no way supported in pertinent U. N. resolutions. Israeli delegates' arguments against repatriation because most of the refugees are too young to remember Palestine is strange logic, Lebanese representatives feel, coming from representatives of a state most of whose inhabitants are recent immigrants from abroad, and who are claiming a land because it belonged to their ancestors over 2,000 years ago. Plus, much of the land occupied by the Israeli military after the 1948 War, (and again after the 1956 and 1967 wars) is a direct violation of the provisions in the original partition Resolution.

Lebanese representatives have stated that the right of repatriation is a vested right of the refugees, and the Arab States have no way to dispose of that right. A rehabilitation program to equip the refugees for resettlement is neither a final nor a permanent solution to the question. Even if the projects were carried out, the only problem which would be solved would be the relief problem. The works projects can never imply any

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39 GAOR, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 152nd Meeting (November 16, 1959), p. 118.
surrender of the refugees' right to repatriation.\textsuperscript{42}

Lebanese delegates, like those of other Arab States, do not insist on face to face negotiations with the Israelis. In fact, they argue that the United Nations should take steps to solve the refugee problem in line with General Assembly resolutions, but \textit{without} direct negotiations.\textsuperscript{43} The Arabs, according to Lebanese representatives, are basing their positions on legal considerations, while the Israelis are recognizing only the \textit{de facto} situation.\textsuperscript{44} The Israeli Government's refusal to allow the refugees to return is based on the Zionist intent to create a Jewish State, hostile to all non-Jewish elements. The creation of a Jewish State is also intended to justify expansionist politics to the world and to make further conquest appear inevitable.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Jordanian Position}

The Jordanian Government, though probably the most willing of the hosts to include the refugees in its national life, still feels much the same as the other host countries. The question of the rights of the refugees should take precedence over the question of regional peace.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{GAOR}, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 38th Meeting (November 30, 1954), p. 178.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{GAOR}, 6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 44th Meeting (January 18, 1952), p. 245.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{GAOR}, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 28th Meeting (November 29, 1952), p. 159.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{GAOR}, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 36th Meeting (November 29, 1954), p. 170.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{GAOR}, 17th Session, Special Political Committee, 360th Meeting (December 3, 1962), p. 179.
\end{itemize}
refugee groups, or fedayeen, the Jordanian representative drew the parallel that if the "fedayeen are disturbing Israel, Israel in turn is disturbing the whole Arab world."47

For the Jordanian Government, the Palestine problem has three main aspects: the refugees, the territorial problem, and the problem of compensation. Because the attempts to settle the refugee problem have been made without reference to the territorial aspects of the problem, no success has been achieved.48

Israel's Government opened its frontiers to immigrants and had settled them on lands and in the homes of the former Arab population. Peace in the area would be threatened until the Israeli Government abandoned that policy, according to Jordanian delegates.49 Israeli officials' motivation in the release of accounts was not especially noble or generous, but was the result of pressure by the United Kingdom and the banks which had branches in the Arab States and were being threatened with having their holdings impounded.50

Rents earned from former Palestinians' lands should be placed in a special fund for the benefit of the refugees, pending a final settlement. If Israeli officials refused to cooperate

50 GAOR, 16th Session, Special Political Committee, 320th Meeting (December 16, 1961), p. 322.
with a custodian of such a fund, the member states, which so
generously respond to Zionist appeals for funds, could deduct the
same amounts from these funds and apply this money directly to
the benefit of the refugees.\footnote{GAOR, 12th Session, Special Political Committee, 69th
Meeting (November 26, 1957), p. 122.}

Five points were listed by the Jordanian representative in
1957 as being essential to any solution. If anything, these five
points have become even more important after the 1967 War:

1. The establishment of a United Nations commission
   for the custodianship of Arab property in Israel.
2. Return of the Arabs to that part of Palestine which
   the U. N. had decided would remain Arab territory.
3. Repatriation of those refugees wishing to return.
4. Payment of compensation to the others.
5. The establishment of international control of
   Zionist immigration into Israel.\footnote{GAOR, 12th Session, Special Political Committee, 69th
Meeting (November 26, 1957), p. 123.}

Summary

Though Arab representatives are agreed that the refugees
should be given a choice between return or compensation, and
that the responsibility for the refugees' welfare until a settle­
ment is reached belongs to Israel and to the United Nations, they
do not agree on all of the other issues involved. Each seems to
be placing its own desires above other considerations. For
example, the Egyptian Government refused to accept Israel's
offer for repatriation at least partly because the offer also
required Israeli administration of the Gaza Strip. Israel now
occupies the Strip. Jordan, having the most accessible border to Israel wants especially to limit Jewish immigration because of her own security needs, real or imagined. Jewish immigration, to all of the Arab Governments, implies Zionist expansion. Jordanian officials feel that they could loose more and more territory. Thus, the Jordanian Government prefers to resolve the territorial issue before the compensation issue or even the total refugee problem.

An observation by Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, made on one of his United Nations survey trips to the Middle East, gives one possible reason for the lack of governmental diplomatic success during the past twenty years. He notes that the Israeli leaders can and do take much the same positions in public as in private; Arab leaders, however, feel compelled to take strong and even extreme stands in public, although they may hold less extreme views privately. Israeli officials, basing their positions on the de facto situation, thus seem more confident of their positions than do their Arab counterparts. The Arab Governments, in refusing to accept the de facto situation and basing their positions on the legality of United Nations resolutions, seem to be arguing from a weaker position. For, though the resolutions are binding, technically, they are in practice little more than recommendations whose success is based on the acceptance of the parties involved. The Arab States representatives, too,

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are arguing not only for their governments, but also for the
displaced Palestinians living in their countries.

Yet, various other factors and pressures seem to have had
more influence on the Arab Governments' positions than on
those of the Israeli Government, at least prior to the 1967
War. Few Arabs favored the creation of the Jewish State; no
Arab State voted in favor of the Partition Resolution. The
Arab States have now suffered three military defeats and several
have lost much of their productive or strategic territory. The
Arab Governments have also had to contend directly with the
restless and bitter Palestinians. Israel had only a handful until
the 1967 War.

The Arab Governments have been vividly aware of the refugee
populations within their borders since 1948. The refugees residing
in the Arab States have had a direct influence on many Arab
statements and beliefs. The Arab Governments have insisted on
repatriation largely because this has been the refugees' desire.
The Arab Governments have also refused to accept resettlement, for
the refugees have been opposed to this solution. However, by 1967,
the Arab host governments did seem more willing to try to
find a settlement. Much of this change in their earlier, more
adamant position was a direct result of the refugees' disruptive
influence on several of the host countries.

By 1967, two decades of disagreement and diplomatic stalemate
had allowed time for the Palestinians to become partially
organized and to gain political status in the Middle East. By
this time they had definite goals. And Palestinian desires were different from those of both the Arab Governments and the Israeli Government. Two decades of inaction and exile were enough to prove to the Palestinians that the Arab Governments were not the allies the Palestinians had hoped. Thus, Palestinian leaders, supported by the refugee masses, began more and more to seek a solution independent of any government.
CHAPTER III

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The relationship between the Palestinian refugees and the United Nations has been one of political turmoil since 1947. The humanitarian aspects have been expected and exploited by both the Arab Governments and by the refugees. As the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was the only means the Palestinians had for political expression until recently, they often used and sabotaged UNRWA programs as an indirect expression of their political positions. Many of their positions, including the militancy of the commando groups today, have been expressed more indirectly for some time. Yet, it is not surprising that the refugees have only recently gained political recognition as a party involved in the Middle East conflict.

In the middle 1940's, the Arab population of Palestine was divided about 70% rural and 30% urban. Most of this urban group—the professionals, educators and businessmen—had fled Palestine shortly before the 1948 war so that they would not be trapped by the events they foresaw. About two-thirds of the urban Palestinians had skills needed in the Arab States and readily found employment. These persons and their dependents, or about 20% of the total displaced, have never been reliant
The refugees who have been cared for by the U. N. are, for the most part, the agrarian population of Palestine—a group tied to its land and suddenly without land or any other visible means of support. Because of the breakdown in Palestinian social structure, brought about by the exodus and resettlement of the Palestinian elite, this agrarian group has been left largely leaderless until the early 1960's.

Shortly after the 1948 conflict, when it became evident that there would be no short-term solution to the refugee problem, the U. N. began taking steps to provide for this segment of the former Palestinian population. Despite its humanitarian endeavors, the U. N. has never been liked by the refugee population and has endured much criticism from the refugees. The definition of who is a refugee has been one contested issue. The refugees, especially those in the camps, feel that the definition should also include the Bedouins, or Palestinian nomads, as well as the persons who lost either their homes or their livelihoods, but not both. Though the modification of this definition has been proposed in the General Assembly, no revision has yet been made.


2The United Nations has defined the term "refugee" to apply to those persons living in Palestine for two years prior to the outbreak of the 1948 conflict and who lost both their homes and their livelihood as a result of the war. (See GAOR, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 19, 1954), p. 135.)
However, just speaking of the refugees contained in the camps and supported by the United Nations does not seem to be entirely representative. The Agency Director stated in 1967 that the number of persons in camps has never exceeded more than 40% of the total refugee population. This figure has varied only slightly during the years as statistics show that in 1950 one-third of the refugees were living in some 60 camps and the remainder were in the towns and villages of the host countries.

Typical of the refugees, both in and out of the camps, is the "refugee mentality" which the Agency's Director noted in 1954. Part of the "refugee mentality" results from the intense individualism of the Palestinians and their minimal sense of solidarity with their fellow Palestinians. Also typical is their passive expectation of continuous benefits. The refugees regard themselves as temporary wards of the international community, which they hold responsible for their plight. They also feel this community has a duty to enable them to return to their homes. In the meantime, however, the refugees feel that the United Nations must provide for their welfare and

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5 Ibid., p. 5.
As early as 1952, the Director of the Agency noted that many of the refugees were ceasing to believe in a return to Israel, or Palestine. However, he stated that this feeling was not preventing them from insisting on a return. For, they felt that to agree to consider any other solution would be a sign of weakness and a relinquishing of a fundamental right.

**Political Position**

Through the years, the refugees have felt that any attempts to bring about their employment or resettlement would automatically mean an end to their claim for compensation or repatriation. Their distaste for UNRWA and its programs has been shown by their lack of participation in most instances.

The refugees themselves feel that today's problem is a political one. Mr. Izzat Tannous of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office and a frequent participant in the United Nations debates on the Palestine problem has stated that the problem is not simply an economic one open to an economic solution. The problem he feels cannot be settled simply by compensating the refugees and integrating them into the lands outside of what was Palestine. Such solutions ignore the yearning and attachment of the Palesti—

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ians for their villages, farms and social environments.

In 1961, the Agency Director stated that the feelings of the refugees and of the local populace in the Arab host states were generally parallel on the Palestine issue. In both segments, he noted, bitterness and resentment were strong. The Director continued that it was difficult to detect much difference between the views of the refugees who had been employed and self-supporting for thirteen years and those who had been languishing in camps, or between these two groups and the non-Arab refugees living in the Arab host states. Nor could he find evidence of a different feeling among the younger and the older refugees. He also pointed out that for thirteen years, the feelings of the refugees had been characterized by frustration, uncertainty, disappointment and hardship. In his opinion, it was hardly a matter of surprise if these refugees were embittered and resentful and if they clamored to return to Palestine. He also expressed no surprise that they would be supported politically by the Arab Governments.9

The refugee representatives who have participated in the annual Palestine debates feel that the Palestine problem is a case of colonialism in its ugliest form. Mr. Emile Ghory, the delegate of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office, in 1961 stated

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that nowhere outside of Palestine had imperialism displaced and expelled an indigenous population from its homeland.\textsuperscript{10} Being part of a developing area, the refugees' attitudes toward colonialism were understandable, and the refugees' insistence that the colonialist situation replacing a prior colonialist situation be ended was hardly surprising. Though this feeling had been latent since 1948, it is being expressed more and more during the 1960's.

Though the refugees have no liking for the U. N., one of the possible solutions proposed by Mr. Ghory in 1961 was to use peaceful means through the U. N. Charter and international law and justice. The refugees, like the Arab Governments, tend to place a great deal of emphasis, though no particular hope, on a legal method of solution. The other possible solution Mr. Ghory mentioned in 1961 was the way of force. He added that the refugees hoped the U. N. would not compel them to use force, but if the organization proved unable to bring about a just settlement, the refugees would be obligated to liberate their country themselves.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, the refugees did forewarn the United Nations and the world community of their current disruptive role and militant tactics.

Mr. Ghory also stated that the Palestine problem was a conflict between the Zionist invaders and the Arabs of Palestine. Thus, he, like Israeli officials, is making a two-sided issue

\textsuperscript{10}GAOR, 16th Session, Special Political Committee, 311th Meeting (December 7, 1961), p. 264.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
of the problem. Yet he, and the refugees, feel that the
controversy is between the Palestinians and the State of Israel.
The Israeli officials prefer to keep the problem on a governmen-
tal level—between the Governments of Israel and the Arab States.
Though the refugees welcome Arab governmental assistance and
concern, Mr. Ghory continued that the Palestinians regard the
problem as essentially a matter which they themselves must
settle. The Palestinians have felt that the Arab States
would never exploit the refugee problem to further their own
ends, however. Still, the refugees are more and more coming
to believe that the Arab Governments have not done enough to
bring about an agreeable solution.

Regarding finances, Mr. Ghory states that there is no need
to resort to charity to finance UNRWA. Rather, a simple act of
justice would suffice. Turn over the lands and property of the
refugees to a custodian who would administer them and see that
the revenues were paid to the legitimate owners. In fact,
the Palestinians would welcome the appointment of such a person
by the United Nations.

In 1960 the Palestinian representative at the Committee
debates declared that the hopes of the refugees had recently
been rejuvenated. They had come to believe that the U. N. had

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\[12\] GAOR, 16th Session, Special Political Committee, 311th
\[13\] Ibid., p. 263.
\[14\] Ibid., 15th Session, Special Political Committee, 202nd
changed substantially since 1947 and would no longer tolerate a situation which prevented the Palestinians from returning to their homes. This change was brought about by the increasing United Nations membership from the third world in Asia and in Africa which could sympathize with the Palestinians in their fight against colonialism. However, the Palestinian representatives have also shown their pessimism by repeating the contention that the U. N. has a moral duty to attend to the refugees' needs by continuing to provide for their subsistence. Thus, though the U. N. created the problem but is unable to solve it, the United Nations still is, according to the refugees, held responsible for perpetuating it by supporting the displaced Palestinian population.

At the 17th Session, the Palestinian spokesmen declared the Palestinians to be a peaceful people who insisted on a just peace. With reference to the Jews occupying Palestine, the representative outlined these feelings:

1. The Jewish authorities had no rights in the occupied areas of Palestine other than those of a temporary belligerent occupant and as administrators under the laws of war. They had no sovereignty.
2. International law upheld the principle that private property was inviolable and that all encroachments on property constituted a war crime.
3. The Jewish authorities had committed and had been accessories in the commission of acts against Arab private property and public assets which constituted

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war crimes as recognized by international law and the United Nations.

4. Jewish authorities had reaped advantages from their unlawful acts and could not deny the rights of the Arabs to possess and enjoy such property and assets.

5. The United Nations was legitimately and morally bound to recognize and act in conformity with justice and international law and bound to take action regarding the Palestine problem in general and Arab private property in particular. The U. N. was bound to protect, preserve and restitute the property and should appoint a custodian to administer it.  

The representative continued that the refugee problem is only a part of the whole Palestine problem. It is the tragedy of a nation temporarily displaced and determined to regain full rights to its homeland. That nation is the principal party in the issue and no other has the right to negotiate a peace in disregard of that fact.

At the 17th Session, Mr. Tannous of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office predicted that the patience and determination of the Arabs would ultimately defeat all of their enemies. The invading crusaders, he pointed out, had tried for over 150 years to occupy Arab territory far beyond the limits of Palestine, but finally the Arabs had driven them out. The Zionist invasion would end the same way, he predicted.

The feelings of the refugees and especially the embittered attitude of the younger generation were shared by the Arabs in

19 Ibid., p. 235.
general, the Palestinian representative claimed in 1960. Time, he said, would never solve this problem. Most of the refugees were well indoctrinated in their desire to return home. This indoctrination resulted mainly from socialization through the schools and through community life, especially in the refugee camps. Most of the teachers were refugees themselves; many had been employed as teachers in Palestine.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the United Nations, in trying to aid the refugees was also keeping alive, if not increasing, the tensions in the area.

\textbf{Education and Employment}

Though the Agency has tried many methods of assisting the refugees, its educational facilities have been given the most attention and funds. This is because education is one of the more important means of preparing the refugees to become self-supporting, wherever they may ultimately live. As of 1957 all refugee children received an elementary education. Secondary education was provided in proportion to that of the host countries and technical education was provided as funds were available. University education was available to a chosen few. However, though the Agency would and did provide the refugees' education, it could not, for various reasons, provide employment to follow. Education has been the end, not the means. It has given the Palestinians the means to advance, but there is

nowhere for them to go at present. Consequently, they have become more and more bitter. Almost all of the youth who became dependent on UNRWA in 1948 have had some special training, but as of 1961, only 3,000 were self-supporting. Over one million refugees were still dependent on the Agency. Half of the latter were over eighteen years of age. Generally the young adults since the 1960's have been more literate than their parents. Thus, they are better equipped to hold a job if the opportunity arises. However, this same group is less skilled in simply making a living. These youth have not had the opportunity to learn a trade or technical skill through apprenticeship. Nor are they conditioned to working for a living.

Following the 1956 War, the education program was the only part of the UNRWA rehabilitation program which continued uninterrupted in many areas. As of 1969, the Director reported that education had overtaken relief as the largest Agency budget item. It accounted for 43% of the expenditures. Thus, with the cooperation of the refugees, the Agency has been able to fashion a solid and acceptable educational program. Its success in finding employment to follow has been very limited.

As a means of providing some income to the refugees so that

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\textsuperscript{22} \textit{ibid.}

they might buy foodstuffs to supplement their rations, the Agency itself has long employed refugees whenever possible. These Palestinian employees have a great loyalty to the task of feeding the refugees and administering to their daily needs. On occasion they have calmed down the more extreme elements of the camps who want to reject even the food provided. However, to the second purpose of UNRWA, the peaceful resettlement of the refugees, these Palestinian employees are negative. Rather, they like their fellow refugees, advocate taking back their land and "pushing the Jews into the sea."24 Despite this adversity to Agency resettlement projects, UNRWA has recruited more and more of its staff from among the camp populations. This has included even its technical staff, and as early as September, 1950, only 135 of a staff of 6,071 were recruited internationally.25

By 1958, it finally became possible for the Agency to assist the refugees in finding jobs in the Arab States, other than those jobs available with the Agency, on a more organized basis. For the first time, the Agency was able to help refugees in Syria to find local employment. Opportunities for employment also became available in the Gaza Strip as a result of improvements begun by the Egyptian authorities and jobs connected with the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). A placement service designed to assist refugees skilled in trades

and professions to find work in neighboring countries was maintained. During 1958 some 1,400 job vacancies were advertised by the Agency. More refugees found permanent employment during this year than ever before. However, by 1969, the Agency noted that employment prospects for the graduates of its vocational schools were declining rather than increasing. By this time, too, the refugees were coming more to feel that placement services were designed as disguised resettlement projects and were becoming increasingly wary of seeking jobs.

**Resettlement**

While Agency educational endeavors have been accepted by the refugees, this education has nurtured refugee independence and awareness and seems to have maximized attitudes among the refugee population which are adverse to any permanent solution involving resettlement. That the refugees have not favored or cooperated with Agency resettlement endeavors is substantiated by comments of the Directors. Mr. John Blandford, the Agency's Director from 1951 to 1953 commented that the Agency's functions to help improve the living conditions of the refugees, to enable them to become self-supporting and to provide hope of social and economic recovery was a difficult task, even when the Agency stated specifically that its assistance did not prejudice the

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refugees' right to repatriation or compensation.\footnote{GAO, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 3rd Meeting (October 23, 1952), p. 9.}

In his report to the Eighth Session, Mr. Leslie J. Carver, the Acting Director of the Agency, stated that results were disappointing with regard to the Agency's plan of creating jobs to help the refugees to become self-supporting. He noted that more time than anticipated had elapsed in deciding on specific self-support projects. He also commented on the virtual unanimity with which the refugees had told him they would accept nothing but a return to their homes as granted them in General Assembly Resolution 194(III).\footnote{GAO, 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 23rd Meeting (November 2, 1953), p. 113.}

At a conference with the representatives of the refugees in Jordan in 1955, the spokesmen refused all resettlement projects and insisted on repatriation in line with previous U. N. resolutions. In Lebanon, in the same year, the refugees resisted efforts to improve their shelter because they suspected that improved shelters were a disguised resettlement project.\footnote{GAO, 10th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 14th Meeting (November 15, 1955), p. 54.} During the years, trees have been uprooted in camps after they were planted by the Agency because the refugees resented any action suggesting that the camp was anything but a transitory stage leading to repatriation.\footnote{Tibawi, op. cit., p. 510.}
Time does not seem to have changed this attitude, yet it does seem to have reduced the refugees' patience in waiting for a solution. Time has also maximized the lack of refugee confidence in the United Nations. Camps erected close to cities have, over the years, become part of the adjoining towns and generally have turned into slums. The camps in the country, though providing few positive opportunities for the refugees, have generally turned into villages. The demand for farm hands on a seasonal basis has helped improve the lot of this group which generally has a more optimistic outlook than the refugees in or near the cities. The more urban camp inhabitants have had the fewest opportunities for employment. This situation has had a negative effect on their standard of living, their feelings and their interest in their surroundings.31

The situation of the refugees living outside of the camps is not necessarily superior from the viewpoint of housing or economics, but their social and cultural position seems better. The refugees and their children are less bitter. But, they do have problems peculiar to their circumstances. One of the primary ones is that their non-refugee neighbors dislike them and often prefer not to maintain any social relationships with refugee families.32

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The Agency has also been willing, although discriminating, in supporting projects requested by the refugees. Several camps have, with Agency support, built their own mosques. In several instances, the Agency has simply provided roofing. A vegetable market was requested as a project for the largest refugee camp in Jordan.\(^{33}\) The refugees, when left to their own ideas and supported in these ideas by the Agency, have done much to make their camps more permanent living places. Yet, they have resisted much the same ideas when suggested by UNRWA.

Despite the fact that one of the obstacles to making the refugees self-supporting is the refugees themselves, the Agency has still found that most of the refugees, as individuals, are willing to work when the opportunity is presented and especially if they can keep the U. N. ration cards on which they have come to rely. Small projects, particularly those not requiring changes in the social structure to guarantee some benefits, have been most successful.\(^{34}\)

Success of small resettlement projects has been most noticeable in Jordan. Two small agricultural projects were started on State lands. Part of the project was to establish a series of border settlements and resettle those who had lost their homes, but not their lands. The projects which will eventually resettle


5,000 refugee families have been well received.\(^{35}\)

As early as 1957 the Director noted that a shift in the overall refugee attitude was becoming noticeable. There were increasing requests for assistance in individual self-support projects and a substantial rise of interest in vocational training of all types. There were even a few requests for more and better housing.\(^{36}\) The refugees to the present, however, have continually rejected the types of self-support projects which have political implications such as the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley irrigation projects.

To date the small scale projects offer little long-term hope as a solution to the Palestine and refugee problems. For, these projects have absorbed less than the natural increase of the refugee population. Yet, because there is no stigma of resettlement attached to smaller scale projects, the refugee leaders can afford to lend their support.\(^{37}\)

The underlying consideration of UNRWA in stressing resettlement projects has been that participation of the refugees in constructive projects would arrest the development of a "professional refugee mentality" and the demoralizing effects of the refugee camp surroundings. Also, if such projects were successful, the cost of relief would be reduced. However, without refugee cooper-

\(^{35}\)Ibid., p. 146.


\(^{37}\)Peretz, op. cit., p. 148.
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resettlement projects are doomed. For, the Arab Governments will not act against the wishes of the refugee population, largely for fear of political and military repercussions by the refugees.

Changes during 1960's

Despite the upheavals and uncertainties of the refugees, the Agency Director reported in 1969 that a great majority of the young people seemed to want to complete their training and acquire skills to help them find employment and thereby aid themselves and their families. The smaller projects became increasingly successful as the Palestinians seemed willing to give up the security of the camps for a definite and tangible alternative within their realm of experience. However, nearly all still prefer refugee status to a gamble on an experiment beyond their comprehension. The smaller projects, too, are largely self-sustaining and require little or no inter-governmental cooperation, which is virtually non-existent.

This interest in smaller projects, though still with the consideration that the projects do not prejudice the refugees' right to repatriation or compensation, does give those who migrate successfully more chance of adjusting to the concept of resettlement. Such migrants may eventually give up their desire

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40Ibid., p. 29.
However, this does not seem to be the case as yet.

Rather there are still many refugees, both in and out of the camps, who are militant and increasingly antagonistic toward the state of Israel. The camps and villages of the refugees are often described as breeding places of unrest in the Middle East. This unrest is seen by teachers in the refugee schools in particular. And, the United Nations, once it provides the education, cannot convince the refugees to participate in large-scale resettlement projects, nor can it provide enough work on smaller scale projects to empty the camps.

The "Palestine conscience" or Palestinian nationalist feeling which has developed during the years has found a focus in the guerilla organizations whose members are recruited from the refugee population. The guerilla organizations, unlike the United Nations, seem to have gained a quick and universal acceptance among the camp populations.

In 1969, Laurence Michelmore, present Commissioner-General of UNRWA, admitted that the commandos had taken over six Agency buildings in several Lebanese camps. He added that finding funds for the Agency's work is becoming increasingly difficult, partly

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43 "Issues Before the 24th General Assembly," International Conciliation, Number 574 (September, 1969), p. 27.
because of the strength and influence of guerillas in the camps and the corresponding international unwillingness to support the commando movement for fear of escalating the conflict. Mr. Michelmore also stated that it is UNRWA's responsibility to provide food, shelter and other necessities, but that policing the camps and maintaining law and order is the responsibility of the refugees and of the Arab Governments. Though some of the camps are used as training centers for the commandos, the United Nations disclaims all responsibility for the actions of the inhabitants.44

Though the refugees have caused problems for UNRWA, they have also gained a political status in the United Nations. Rather than just hearing a Palestinian refugee representative, the General Assembly has been hearing spokesmen of one of the commando organizations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, since 1965. In 1965 the Arab representatives first asked that this group be heard as the official representatives of the Palestinian people. They noted that there was a distinct difference in the political capacity of the individuals heard by the General Assembly since 1952 (representatives of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office) and the delegations representing the Palestinians directly through the Palestine Liberation Organization.45 Since then these representatives have been invited to speak annually.

These spokesmen, like their predecessors, hold the opinion that the right of the refugees to return home is uncontestable. They feel that the Partition Resolution was illegal and undemocratic and maintain that the United Nations is more an enemy of the Palestinians than a friend. Such plans as the Johnson Plan, which provided for economic development of the area and consequent resettlement of the refugees, would only provide for a complete fragmentation of the Palestinian people as a political and ethnic group. The refugee representatives claim that this type of solution to the refugee problem would not lead to a termination of the larger Palestine problem. 46

Summary

Although UNRWA has done a needed job in maintaining the refugee population, it also seems to have perpetuated the Palestine conflict. Through its inability to sell the idea of resettlement, UNRWA has allowed the refugees to remain in the camps, many of which have recently been turned into commando bases. Though educated, the refugees are unable and unwilling to channel their energies into constructive acts and have tended to a more destructive course—to destroy the present State of Israel and to replace it with some type of a new Palestine.

Had the United Nations concentrated as hard on a political solution as on the humanitarian problems, much of the current

dissent might have been avoided. However, looking back on refugee relationships with the United Nations and on refugee positions expressed during General Assembly debates, one can hardly be surprised at the growth of militance among the refugees or at their growing influence in the Middle East.

The refugees have never liked the United Nations which they blame, at least partially, for their displacement. Nor have they been grateful for the subsistence and aid provided by UNRWA. Rather, they have come to expect and demand such service as their right. In return, they have not cooperated, except slightly, with Agency resettlement endeavors. Instead they have used the United Nations, the Agency, and especially the education services to recreate a Palestinian community and Palestinian nationalist feeling. This Palestinian community has now become a disruptive influence to the area.

The regional governments, through their failure to reach a solution, must bear at least part of the responsibility for this Palestinian socialization. By their inaction in finding a settlement, they necessitated the prolongation of the U. N. aid to the refugees. The refugees, once it became apparent that no solution was readily forthcoming, began to shape Agency services to fit their own goals. At the same time, they resisted resettlement projects as these implied they had given up their hopes of return. The concept of return to Palestine has become the main goal of the former Palestinians. How many would actually choose to return, if given a choice, is unknown. However, basing their claims
on legal positions resulting from U. N. resolutions, the refugees have capitalized on an issue which has strong emotional overtones.

In order to pursue their goal of return, the refugees have more and more turned U. N. services from the original intent of providing subsistence and facilitating resettlement. Instead the refugees have formed militant groups from among the camp inhabitants and have turned some refugee camps into guerilla bases. These commando groups have, particularly since the 1967 War, been the leaders in the campaign to return to the area which was Palestine.

The humanitarian services provided by the United Nations as a temporary measure have become semi-permanent. These services to feed, clothe and educate the refugees have given the Palestinians the tools to revive a dormant culture. Although the intent was humanitarian, it has been given political overtones by the Arab Governments, the Israeli Government and the Palestinians. Coupled with governmental political deadlock, the Palestinians have been able to gain a significant voice in the Middle East problem and in Middle Eastern governmental policies.
The so-called "refugee mentality" is one common bond for the former Palestine community. One characteristic feeling of this refugee mentality is the Palestinians' desire to regain their homeland. Since the beginning of the 1960's, at first with the aid and encouragement of the Arab States, and presently more spontaneously, this desire has been focused in organized and often militant refugee organizations. The estimated numbers of these groups varies from 27 to 40. Of this number, however, only four have any appreciable influence on the area: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Al Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Thunderbolt. Estimates of their total guerilla strength range from 3,000 to 15,000.

Palestine Liberation Organization

One of the first commando groups to be formed was the PLO. It was established by the Arab States Summit Conference in 1964 as the official voice of the Palestine people. The Arab States

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gave it financial support and quasi-diplomatic status. Its main governmental patron was and still is the United Arab Republic. Its constituency among the Palestinians was originally the established bourgeoisie and the professionals. At first, the PLO was regarded quite cynically by the middle-class Palestinians, although it is now more generally accepted.

In September, 1964, the Arab League approved the PLO's plan to recruit a Palestine Liberation Army from among the refugees. This army was conceived as an integral part of the Egyptian led Unified Arab Military Command and was to be a vanguard in the Arabs' battle against Israel. The Palestine Liberation Army was voted $15 million by the Arab States. Training facilities were offered by Egypt in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula. Syria and Iraq also offered training areas to the Palestinians.

In March, 1965, the organization announced conscription of all residents in the Gaza Strip born between 1937 and 1944 and scheduled summer training for some 6,000 refugee students.

The PLO at the time of its establishment was more than just a means to placate the refugees and contain anti-Israeli feeling

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4 Ibid., p. 294.

among them. It was also designed to implement the Arab plan to prevent Israeli use of the Jordan waters for irrigation.\(^6\)

Since 1964 the PLO has been officially recognized by the Arab League and most Arab Governments as the spokesman for all of the Palestinians.\(^7\) And since 1964, the president of the PLO has been accorded a place as Chief of State representing the Palestinian entity at meetings of the Arab League.\(^8\) Ahmad Shukairy, considered one of the best mob orators in the Middle East, first headed the organization. The present leader is Yasser Arafat.

Though the Arab States have granted status to the PLO, other, particularly Israel and Al Fatah, have considered it merely a facade. Its freedom of action is somewhat limited by dependence on the Arab Governments for money and supplies.\(^9\)

However, the PLO does have ambitious, if somewhat contradictory goals. Although its title indicates its main goal is to liberate Palestine, Shukairy once stated his organization's policies toward Jordan by saying "before the liberation of Palestine, Jordan will have to be transformed into a military base after being liberated." He also commented that "the first target is Jordan, not Israel."\(^10\)

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Referring to a future Palestinian State, one FLO spokesman said, "we do not intend to drive them (the Israelis) out as they drove us out. We think that there is room in Palestine for six million Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The only condition is that they accept to live as peaceful citizens." Shukairy himself, before 1967, hoped that a result of guerilla war would not necessarily be the direct liberation of Palestine, but that it would provoke Israeli officials into a large-scale counter-attack and, as a result, the Government would incur international condemnation as an aggressor. He also hoped to provoke the Israeli military into attacking Jordan, annexing the West Bank and thus acquiring more rebellious Arabs than the country could contain. The Israeli military did occupy the West Bank in 1967, but Shukairy's hoped for results have not been realized.

The Palestine Liberation Army, before 1967, was reputed to be of the highest quality. In theory, this Army was on offer to any of the States bordering Israel. In practice, the offer lay fallow because of the mistrust between the Arab nations. The Army was decimated in the June, 1967, War. By 1969 it had been partially reorganized and units were stationed in Syria.

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11 Hudson, op. cit., p. 304.
12 Huizinga, op. cit., p. 34.
14 "Make Them Quake!" p. 40.
Throughout its history the PLO has been more closely tied to Middle Eastern governments than any of the other commando groups. Following the 1967 war, the organization has been under constant pressure from President Nasser to merge with the Egyptian controlled paper organization "Heroes for the Liberation of Sinai." 15

Thunderbolt and the Popular Front

Thunderbolt, known as "Saiga" in Arabic, is one of the smaller, but more militant of the commando groups. It was formed in November, 1967, as the consolidation of several Syrian terrorist groups. It is entirely Syrian controlled and equipped, but because of relaxed Syrian policies toward the guerillas, does have a great deal of latitude in its actions. It is widely disliked by many Arabs and Palestinians because of its extreme anti-Nasser orientation and its close ties with the most fanatic elements of the Syrian Baath Party. 16 It is most active on the Syrian–Jordan border and along the Jordan River. 17 Its strength is estimated at 1,500 men. 18

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was the product of a 1967 merger of several smaller Arab based terrorist groups and is headquartered in Beirut. Commanded by a former Syrian army captain, Ahmad Jibril, the PFLP has training camps

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Hudson, op. cit., p. 297.
scattered throughout Lebanon in refugee villages. The diversion of an El Al jet to Algeria in July, 1963, and the attack on an El Al 707 at Athens airport in January, 1969, are its most impressive claims to date. The main methods of the Popular Front have been to organize inside occupied areas and carry out spectacular acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens. The Front’s leadership claims a commitment to inculcating a revolutionary, egalitarian spirit among the Palestinians as well as the indigenous Arab population. In addition to attempts to organize inside occupied territory, it seeks to establish “liberation” beachheads in the more conservative Arab States.

The Popular Front, like the PLO considers the State of Jordan as much of an enemy as it does Israel. It also considers the PLO too much of an offspring of the Arab League to be able to represent the Palestinians. Rather, the PFLP would like to see an organization comprising all of the commando groups in a broad federation with all of the active groups on equal footing. Such an organization, Popular Front leadership feels, would provide for a more successful struggle against Israel. However, the Front is itself split three ways: the non-political fighting group, one moderate political wing and one Marxist wing. Yet, its guerilla force is one of the largest, totalling

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19 "Make Them Quake!" p. 40.
20 Hudson, op. cit., p. 299.
21 Ibid., p. 300.
approximately 2,000 men.

**Al Fatah**

Al Fatah is the largest and oldest of the major resistance organizations; it is also the most active group today. It was founded in 1956 as a secret society, but did not begin active operations against Israel until 1965. Fatah is committed to the liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist political control and its leaders believe the only means is armed violence. To Fatah "liberation" means not only the destruction of the imperialist base of Israel, but also the eradication of Zionist society by striking at its industrial, agricultural and financial institutions. One of its primary means to achieve its goal is to keep alive an emotional attachment of the younger refugees to Palestine as a national "homeland."

Fatah was originally sponsored by the Syrian Government. Syrian officials have made it plain that they hoped to provoke war by encouraging sabotage by the commandos. Though the main Fatah bases have been in Syria, the organization has precipitated tensions in the Arab world by crossing to Jordan and Lebanon to stage its raids on Israel rather than trying to cross the more highly fortified Israeli-Syrian border.

Al Fatah, at least initially, represented the marginal

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23 "Growing Threat to Israel," p. 10.
24 Hudson, op. cit., p. 299.
26 Ibid.
Palestinians—the unemployed young, both educated and uneducated, who were prey to deliberately inculcated hatred and had a desire for both glory and money. After the 1967 War, Fatah's popularity spread to more diverse groups. Saudi Arabian King Feisal's wife gave $4,500 to the organization. Arab youth now peddle Fatah stamps like Christmas seals. From the refugee camps and the universities, which are often staffed with zealous Palestinian professors, come more recruits than Fatah needs. The organization accepts mostly Palestinians, and then only those who can pass rigorous medical and psychiatric tests. Today Fatah has a fighting strength of about 5,000.

Like the other fedayeen groups, Fatah is most secretive about its leadership. It is said to be ruled by a committee of wealthy civilians in Damascus. As Fatah grew and began to feel a need for a visible spokesman, Yasir Arafat became the ambassador extraordinaire to the Arab world, chief fund raiser for the organization and field commander in Jordan.

Following the 1967 War, Fatah became better armed than before, and at the expense of the Arab hosts. After the War, Fatah teams took camels into the Sinai desert to collect the machine guns, rifles, bazookas and grenades left by the retreating

29 Ibid., p. 32.
30 "Growing Threat to Israel," p. 10.
Arab armies before the Israeli salvage squads could gather them.\textsuperscript{32}

Fatah leaders do not fear renewed aggression by Israel against Egypt or any other Arab State; rather they feel that they could profit. Mostly they are concerned that there might be a diplomatic settlement.\textsuperscript{33} Fatah officials do not expect to defeat Israel directly or alone. Rather they plan to wage a prolonged campaign of violence against vital institutions of the Israeli State, being careful to avoid any situation where the Israeli military can profit from its superior organization and technology.\textsuperscript{34} Yet, even the June War helped Fatah. It created a climate in which the Palestine question again became the principle issue in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{35}

Once Palestine is liberated, opinions differ among Fatah members as to the type of state which will follow. One Fatah spokesman declared that only the Jews who were in Palestine before 1948, and their offspring, would be allowed to remain.\textsuperscript{36} Others claim that no one will be driven out who is ready to live under a Palestinian democracy.\textsuperscript{37}

Today the general trend within the commando movement is consolidation under the leadership of Fatah. The formation of

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33}Hudson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 300.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 304.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 299.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 304.
the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, a federation of the commando organizations, in April, 1969, was intended to improve the military cooperation among the guerrillas. However, cooperation has not improved greatly and much infighting and distrust still exists. As one member of the more politically active Popular Front said of Fatah, "Fatah is a blank sheet. Anyone may write on it what he wants." Fatah has virtually taken over the eleven man executive committee of the Command. It has four members and holds the chairmanship. The Committee tries to neutralize the hostility of the dissident groups. The presence on the executive committee of members of the Syrian supported Saiqa group does not help to dispel hostilities. Other commando groups suspect this group of keeping tabs on them for the Syrian Government.\(^38\) The infighting among the commando groups also contradicts the current guerrilla philosophy of "one enemy at a time is enough."\(^39\)

**General Guerilla Support**

As a whole the guerrilla movement is negative in tone. Mainly it promotes the destruction of the State of Israel. Yet, the guerrilla organizations, in recent months, no longer have to recruit members, but are receiving volunteers. Their ranks are no longer solely Palestinians. Members now include foreign

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\(^38\) "Arafat in Command," p. 25.

nationals and even some lower class Jews. Most of this latter group are Eastern Jews who are the subjects of discrimination in Israel by their Western Jewish counterparts. These anti-Zionists sympathize strongly with the commando cause, but for reasons different from those of the Arabs.  

The fedayeen, translated men of sacrifice, are also fighting against the Arab Governments. They owe no allegiance to any government and are responsible only to themselves. They view any settlement other than their own as a betrayal or a disaster. So far they have prevented the Arab Governments from negotiating with the Israeli Government.

Before 1956, most of the border violations were carried out by unofficial, unorganized and relatively non-violent infiltrations of individuals and small groups. Often these raids were a response to a specific wrong such as loss of an Arab raider's land or the death of a family member at the hands of the Israelis. Thus, the commando raid is not a new phenomena. However, commando organization is. Yet, the commandos still do not follow a typical guerilla warfare pattern. Most targets are not the military installations or public utilities. Rather they are airplanes, buses and other means of conveyance, religious shrines and general large urban areas. The targets seem to be chosen to meet two criteria: to kill the maximum number of

people and to provoke maximum anti-Israeli sentiment, both locally and internationally.

The sense of Palestinian political community which has reemerged after two decades draws much of its cohesion from the common refugee experience of loss of land and of homeland. This may be one reason why today the commando movements have been able to develop a base with participation of all classes of Palestinians. This broad base is in contrast to the limited resistance movements, both political and military, which have arisen since 1917.

Despite their differing opinions on the long-range objectives and the means to these goals, the commando groups are agreed in their rejection of the November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution. In this rejection, they are supported by the refugee population in general, which still calls for a settlement on the basis of the 1948 General Assembly Resolution. Whereas the refugees in 1955 were reported to be willing to accept a separate state or to accept Arab-Jewish coexistence in Israel, no Palestinian organization today has adopted these goals. Rather, the Palestinians and the populations of the Arab States seem more bent on driving out the Israelis or at least subordinating the Jewish population to Arab rule.

Though anti-Israeli feeling is still strong among the Palestinians there are some recent signs of demoralization and

general weakness among the terrorist organizations. Money is some impetus to the guerrillas, but it does not seem to be enough to draw the older refugees. Most of the recently captured commandos have been young, new recruits. The veterans and officers seem to have grown wary of the deeper raids into Israel.43

Though the ideal of recovering Palestine is stronger than ever, several reasons can be offered for this demoralization and restraint:

1. the lack of ideological underpinnings on what to do once Palestine is liberated and

2. the disagreement among and within the groups on goals and tactics presently.

That the rival groups and factions also occasionally claim credit for the more spectacular forays indicates competition rather than cooperation.44 Nor do the groups appear able to resolve their differences satisfactorily with even the possibility of an Arab-Israeli diplomatic settlement looming before them.

43 In Jordan, the guerrillas receive 10-15 dinars per month plus their keep. The Arab Legion soldiers get only three dinars. (See Amnon Rubenstein, "'Damn Everybody' Sums Up the Angry Mood of Israel," The New York Times Magazine, February 9, 1969, p. 96.)

44 The bombing of the Mahanak Yehuda marketplace in Jerusalem was claimed by two rival groups. The bombing killed 12 civilians and wounded 53. The fedayeen council finally awarded the honor to Al Fatah as it told the most convincing story of the bombing. Fatah also took credit for blasting the garage of former Israeli Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin. Later, it was learned that he had no garage. (See "The Guerilla Threat in the Middle East," p. 53.)
Summary

Four main guerilla groups have taken on an important position in the Palestinian cause during the 1960's. The goal of regaining the homeland of Palestine is common to all of them. However, the means to achieve this goal as well as the structure of a future Palestinian state differ among the groups. This disagreement among the Palestinians further complicates the disagreement among the Arab Governments and between the Arabs and the Israelis, and definitely has decreased the chances of a diplomatic settlement.

The present Palestinian militance has been developing for some time, although the present organization is new compared to the sporadic, unplanned forays against Israel in previous years. Adequate notice of Palestinian demands has also been given. Many of the current Palestinian demands had earlier been voiced in United Nations debates. The factor which would have been the most difficult to foresee is the commando's attacks, both verbal and military, on the Arab host nations. Political disagreements have existed between the Palestinians and the Arab States, but the refugees sudden and unabating disruption in the host countries is more recent. The Arab Governments, as well as Israel, have now become the Palestinians' enemies.
In general the Palestinians look upon the Jews and the State of Israel as intruders in the Middle East. The militance of the commando groups, however, is more typical of the Palestinians living outside of Israel's borders. The Arabs living in Israel and in the areas occupied by Israel during the 1967 war, though they sympathize with commando goals, display an entirely different relationship with Israel. This relationship is presently one of coexistence, despite the discrimination to which they are subjected. Though the Israeli Arabs resent their second-class citizenship status, they seem more willing to accept the Jewish regime than any other groups of Palestinians. A study of their current role and their potential role in the conflict serve to show even more how complex the situation is and how much influence the Palestinians have in the chain of Middle Eastern events.

Prior to 1967

The Israeli Government realized soon after the 1948 war that the Palestinians would not be returning en masse. It quickly took steps to end Arab property ownership in order to set a firm base for the new country. In 1953 the Israeli parliament, or Knesset, passed the Land Acquisition Law which stated that
any person who had fled his village and was absent when Israeli forces had entered the area automatically lost his land to the Custodian of Absentee Property. Another Law, the Law of Return, also discriminated against the Palestinians. It stated that any Jew coming to Israel could claim immediate citizenship by declaring his intentions to settle; non-Jews had to endure a waiting period. That these Israeli legal procedures were detrimental to the Arabs who had lived in Israel or wished to return, and that they were contrary to provisions of the United Nations Partition Resolution, which stated that the Arabs in Israel should not be subjects of discrimination, has increased Palestinian and Arab Government arguments against recognition of the State of Israel. However, Israeli officials have consistently maintained that such actions are within the limits of a sovereign state and that, as a member of the United Nations, Israel is definitely granted all of the rights and privileges of a sovereign state. This position has not made Israeli relationships with the Palestinian Arabs, either inside or outside her borders, any easier.

The Israeli officials have maintained since 1948 that direct relief by the U. N. was only a temporary measure. The works projects, which have never materialized to any extent, have been considered more important because they had longer-range implications.  

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1 GAOR, 22nd Session, Note by the Syrian delegate to the Secretary-General (A/7173), Agenda Item 94, August 10, 1968.
2 General Assembly Resolution 181(II), November 29, 1947.
They were also better suited to achieving Israeli ends. However, they have never provided a satisfactory solution because of opposition by the Arab States and by the refugees. As the refugees living in Israel do have citizenship, relief and works projects in Israel have, for the most part, been carried on as an internal matter without UNRWA assistance. By 1951, Israel's Government reported that most of the breadwinners, among the 24,000 Arab refugees in Israel, were gainfully employed. This number, however, excluded the white collar workers. The Government felt that those not yet employed could easily be absorbed by various works projects if they so desired.

Through 1952, the Agency was providing for two types of refugees in Israel. It provided for 17,000 Jews who had fled the Arab States, all but 3,000 of whom had been resettled. It was also providing for 31,000 Arabs, 7,000 of whom had been resettled. Thus, Israel was not so quick to welcome Arabs as to welcome Jews, although the Government did take over the maintenance of these refugees by the middle 1950's.

In addition to appropriating the lands of the Palestinians who fled and not granting immediate citizenship to Arabs as to Jews, the Israeli Government also authorized the acquisition of land from Arabs living in Israel if it were needed for the expansion

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5 Ibid., p. 5.
of a kibbutz or of private Jewish farm holdings. Much of this property, as well as the property appropriated from the absent Palestinians, was in the border regions, a fact which made it strategically significant. The Land Acquisition Law did provide that compensation be paid for property acquired from Arab residents of Israel, but made no provisions for those Arabs living outside of Israel. It also stipulated that the land taken from Arab residents be necessary for "vital development, settlement or security" during the period from May 4, 1949, to April 1, 1952. Compensation was to be paid in cash or an alternative piece of land was to be found if the owner had been engaged in agriculture. This Law was opposed at the time by the Arab minority in the Knesset. Yet it was at least a partial effort to appease those who increasingly favored payment to all Palestinians for their lost property. 6

The United Nations estimated that the total abandoned property passed to Israel was 16,324 square kilometers. This was valued at 100 million Israeli pounds. 7 In addition, the Israelis acquired some 20 million Israeli pounds worth of movable property left behind by the refugees. 8

In addition to appropriating Arab property, Israeli officials

8 Ibid., p. 6.
have segregated the Arab population into specific areas of the country for "security" reasons. They have also restricted Arab movements within Israel. Until the 1967 June War, the Israeli Government maintained curfews throughout all of the Arab areas. Such internal policies have done little to win the allegiance of the Arab population to the Israeli authorities. Thus, more and more Arabs have left Israel all the time.

However, some of the more moderate Israelis disputed these means, most of which resulted from policies of former Prime Minister Ben Gurion. The more moderate elements felt, rather, that such militant policies would only cause more alienation, instead of making the Arab residents into loyal citizens. Their opinions have been borne out by current situations. 9 The Israeli militance, as will be shown, seems to have lessened, rather than increased, the willingness of the Palestinians to seek a permanent settlement with Israel.

Violence and harsh military policies have also been characteristic of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. According to a report by the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) Chief of Staff, an Israeli attack in the Gaza Strip on August 22, 1955, began the chain of violence which started the subsequent organized fedayeen attacks on Israel. 10 This military

10 Ibid., p. 440.
retaliation has greatly escalated tensions in Israel and in the refugee camps surrounding Israel. Israeli officials claim that during the period of Egyptian belligerency prior to the 1956 Suez War, there were some 435 cases of armed fedayeen incursions against Israel, nearly 2,000 cases of armed robbery and 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by the Egyptian military and fedayeen groups.\(^{11}\) Israel's military was the first of the Middle Eastern states to develop a deliberate and official policy of retaliation to such commando attacks.\(^{12}\)

The Karf Qasim incident in 1956 is one example of the direct Israeli use of terror against its Arab population. The incident, according to the Arab States, is typical of Israeli policy. According to Israeli officials, it is not. The village of Kaf Qasim lay about one-half mile from the Jordan border, inside of Israel. Many of the 1,500 villagers had gone to work the fields in the morning. When they returned home, they were rounded up and told they had violated a curfew imposed that morning while they had been working. For a crime of which they were ignorant, they were shot. The Israeli Prime Minister withheld the news for some time until he had reported the incident to the Knesset. The Israeli Government announced that it was an accident and that compensation would be allotted to the surviving relatives. The number slain has never been determined exactly, but estimates

\(^{11}\)GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Session, 562nd Plenary Meeting (November 1, 1956), p. 23.

\(^{12}\)Khoury, op. cit., p. 436.
Such incidents, whether mistakes or preplanned, have not helped the Palestinians, or the Arab community, to view Israel as a peace-loving state.

Despite rather harsh Israeli retaliation policies, the Government has not applied continuous military pressures in the occupied areas. Once the Israeli military occupied the Gaza Strip, Jordan and the other Arab States imagined that the indigenous Arabs and the refugees would be thrown out so that Israel would have more space to accommodate Zionist immigrants. However, the U. N. Secretary-General, in a note to the General Assembly in 1956, stated that, except for some groups of local inhabitants taken out for questioning, there was no evidence of mass deportation of the Strip's inhabitants. He also noted that migration between the Strip and Jordan was continuing as in the past, despite proclamations forbidding this movement. Though the Arab States were concerned about Israeli expansion, this expansion seemed to be in line with the wishes of certain of the Palestinian commando groups who wanted to force Israel into large-scale retaliation and the subsequent takeover of more territory, just so that the territory was filled with Arabs. Thus, the Palestinians would, they hoped, have an inside base

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13 GAOR, 11th Session, 630th Plenary Meeting (December 1, 1956), p. 785.
for their operations. However, Israeli economic advantages to the Palestinians in Israel have left this group not so prone to resist as had been hoped. The Israeli military has also been harsh on any Arabs suspected of aiding the commandos. Arabs' houses have been destroyed and persons arrested simply on suspicion of their having participated in guerilla warfare against Israel.

Changes After the 1967 War

After the 1967 War, the situation was drastically altered. Israel had gained uncontested control in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula and had become the largest host country in the Middle East. Instead of being able to criticize the Arab States for their inaction, Israel's Government was in the position of being the occupation power and of having to deal with the refugees whether they remained in occupied territory or moved into Israel proper. The Israeli Government was also faced with the question of what to do with the new territorial acquisitions—annex them to Israel or leave them open for bargaining. This question has yet to be resolved and is one of the worst points of disagreement between the Arab Governments and Israel today. The Israeli Government's relations with the Palestinians, both the Arab citizens and the new refugees of the 1967 conflict, changed drastically following the 1967 War. As yet, much of this relationship is hinging on the eventual disposition of the occupied territories.

Rather than make a decision as to how to solve the problem
of the refugees, the Israeli Government has taken action only when necessary. Little in the way of long-term projects which could provide a final solution have been initiated. However, Israeli officials have remained very aware of the feelings of the Palestinians and have taken minimal steps to calm down this population whenever feelings begin to rage.

The main fear of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel following the 1967 War was that they would be cut off from the remainder of the Arab world. Israeli officials allayed this fear by allowing trade and traffic with Jordan from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israeli officials intended not to treat the Palestinians of the occupied territories as a people apart, a mistake which they felt had been made by the Arab States. Before the 1967 War, UNRWA had cared for approximately 400,000 refugees on the West Bank and 320,000 on the East Bank. By July 2, 1967, approximately 100,000 had fled from the West Bank to the East Bank and to the Gaza Strip, many into existing UNRWA camps in these areas. Though others left after this date, the total numbers who fled by no means reached the numbers of those who had fled in 1948. This would seem to signify that though the Palestinians still carried a violent distaste for the Zionist philosophies embodied in the State of Israel, they were no

16 "Israel and the Occupied Lands," New Statesman, April 15, 1968, p. 442.
17 The Economist, July 8, 1967, p. 103.
longer so adverse to living under Israeli rule that some could not rationalize to themselves why they should stay instead of being uprooted again.

Israeli policy toward those who left occupied territory as well as toward those who remained was that a solution to both problems was subsidiary to the overall dispute between Israel and the Arab states. Unless and until the Arab Governments agreed to direct negotiations and diplomatic recognition of Israel, no concession on issues such as refugee return or evacuation of the occupied areas would be made. 18

By 1966 some 10,000 Arabs had been reunited with their families in Israel. However, only about 6,000 were reunited by direct application. Most of the remainder were infiltrators who applied after returning to Israel illegally and were granted the right to remain. 19

After the 1967 war, the Israeli occupation forces turned their immediate attention to national security in the newly occupied areas. The fact that most of those Arabs remaining were only remnants of families caused the military to consider them a potential fifth column. In the interests of security and army rule, equality was given a backseat in the Israeli Arab community. Security regulations on Arabs in Israel proper, however, were relaxed after the 1967 war. All travel restrictions

19 Rotetz, Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, p. 55.
were lifted. There were no longer any night curfews except in the Gaza Strip. Yet, despite leniency by the Israelis, growing terrorist activities staged from the Arab States have ignited nationalist feelings among the younger Arabs under Israeli rule. Occasionally proterrorist slogans are found on houses. The Arab population becomes nervous whenever a bomb explodes and usually avoids Jewish population centers for several days.  

Since the 1967 War, a few Palestinian leaders, both in Israel and in the Arab States, have dared to suggest that the Palestinian people should make peace independently with Israel to obtain territory for a new Palestinian nation. Most, however, still seem to want revenge for their losses of property and years of exile more than they want peace. How successful any peace settlement would be today is questionable as Israeli officials still refuse to recognize the refugee population as a political entity. And the refugee leaders claim more and more that there can be no peace without their participation.

Military Roles after 1967

The Israeli military has developed a firmer strategy against retaliation since the 1967 War. Shortly after the war, the guerillas tried to establish bases on the West Bank. The Israeli military used helicopter and infantry search and destroy missions to discourage such moves. The camps were moved back across the Jordan River and larger bases were established there. The

Israeli military continued pushing the groups, sending infantry and planes across the River to eradicate the newly established bases. Current reports indicate that the bases have been moved farther from the border and are smaller and much less permanent.\(^{21}\)

Also following the 1967 war, Al Fatah announced that it would transfer its headquarters to Israeli occupied territory. This announcement failed to arouse the support of the millions of Arabs in the occupied areas. The terrorist groups have since found that they cannot trust the local population and orders are given to avoid contacts with Arabs in the occupied zones. However, despite this hesitance to work directly against Israel, the zone Arabs still resent the Israeli presence. Most of the Palestinians do not cooperate with the commandos because they stand to lose more in the way of a modest economic boom, a relative peace and a way of life more bearable than in a refugee camp. They may also remember Arab terror of the 1936—1939 period in which more Arabs were killed than either Jews or British.\(^{22}\)

What is non-cooperation with the commandos has been expressed as passive resistance when directed against the Israeli military government. This passive resistance on the part of the Arab population in the occupied areas has been met with apathy by the Israeli occupiers. Israeli officials have taken the attitude that

\(^{21}\)"Make Them Quake!" p. 40.

\(^{22}\)Rubenstein, op. cit., p. 93.
if the Arab children in these areas did not go to school or if their parents did not work it was their business, so long as they were not militant.\(^{23}\)

Yet terrorist activities have continued from outside of the occupied areas and Israeli officials have met these attacks with force. Commando attacks have brought several distinct responses from the Israeli authorities and the Jewish populace. They have reduced to a minimum any Israeli willingness to lose military control of the West Bank. Thus, at least this portion of the occupied territory is not negotiable under any settlement following the outline of the 1967 Security Council Resolution.\(^{24}\)

Though it is impossible to measure accurately the physical damage inflicted on Israel by the terrorists, it seems so far to have been negligible. Terrorist activities have, however, introduced a daily tension into Israeli life, especially in the border regions. Shelling across the Jordan River is an almost nightly affair. Heavy weapons, including long-range guns and bazooks are often used. Shelling and mine-laying account for the great majority of the incidents. Of a total of 1,288 incidents reported between June 12, 1967, and December 31, 1968, only 157 were acts of terror and sabotage deep inside Israeli territory.\(^{25}\) This would seem to indicate a certain

\(^{23}\) "Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 443.

\(^{24}\) Rubenstein, op. cit., p. 27.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
loyalty among the Arab population in the border regions as well as an effective Israeli defense system.

A decline in the number of infiltrations and an increase in shelling from safety across the border has been a noticeable change in commando tactics since the June War.\(^\text{26}\) The commandos have been able to carry out border incidents on almost a daily basis, though, since the summer of 1968. Their activities have been described as military pinpricks, but they have had an irritating psychological effect.\(^\text{27}\) Yet, the border raids affect the Arab more than the Jewish populations. Border kibbutzim are well fortified. Arab border settlements and camps are not. Thus much of the damage is inflicted on the allies and not the enemies.

**Socialization of Israeli Arabs**

Serious pressure has been put on the Israeli Government by some officials to initiate a policy of *fait accompli* in the occupied territories and to establish Jewish settlements in the zones that would be considered to be annexed to Israel no matter what a final settlement would bring.\(^\text{28}\) Israel's

\(^{26}\) Eighty percent of the incidents are shellings across the Jordan River. Ten percent are mine-layings along the border and only ten percent are attempted infiltrations. (See Rubenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 96.)


Government has begun this policy with its fortified kibbutz, but so far these kibbutz resemble more a temporary military settlement than a permanent, peacetime village.

Yet the Israelis have tried not to alienate the Palestinians in the occupied areas any more than absolutely necessary. They have continued or attempted to restore the local Arab administrations. Arab officials have been requested to continue their functions under the supervision of military governors. Many have remained; some have quit in protest.

Still Arab leaders in the expanded Israeli State have not been invited to play an active role in the conception or execution of economic improvement or social rehabilitation. The military authorities do not want Arab participation. And, though the military is not directly involved in future planning for the area, its opinions are respected. Israeli officials have adopted the attitude that it is too early in the planning for any Arab participation. When the plans are completed, in accordance with strictly Israeli views, and the Government is ready to implement them, then Arab participation will be invited. Thus, resettlement is not a cooperative venture, but an Israeli plan imposed on the Arabs. This lack of participation has caused some bitterness and could conceivably cause an Israeli failure to integrate these areas in the future.

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29 See Appendix B.
31 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
Nor have the Israeli Arabs been invited to participate in the present Government, even in Departments which directly affect the Arab population. The situation in the Office of the Prime Minister's advisor on Arab Affairs is typical. No Arabs are employed. Other Departments follow the same pattern. The Ministry of Education is the exception. But, the Director of the Arab Department in this Ministry is a Jew, and a Jew who does not speak Arabic.\(^22\)

Many teachers and intellectuals insist that the Israelis are seeking to wipe out a Palestinian national consciousness. Israeli educators have asserted that education in the Arab world has a fascist outlook which has sought to militarize the Arab youth.\(^33\) Thus Israel has set about to reconstruct the educational system in the occupied areas. Texts have been withdrawn from these areas until reviewed by Israeli authorities. As a result, UNRWA has had to compile and distribute volumes of teaching notes acceptable to Israel.\(^34\)

When the Israelis first suggested changing texts and teaching methods, most of the Agency's Palestinian teachers went on strike. However, the objectionable material was removed and schools now function normally with few official Israeli visits.\(^35\)

\(^{22}\) Atallah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Not Integrated," New Outlook, June, 1964, p. 27.

\(^{33}\) Peretz, "Israel's Administration," p. 342.


\(^{35}\) "Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 443.
Yet, Israeli officials' objections to textbook passages depre­
catory to Jews, Zionism and Israel caused an upheaval in most
every subject and mainly in Arabic literature, history and
geography. Educational friction was felt in both the Gaza
Strip and on the West Bank. Nearly half of the standard text­
books were banned. Students and teachers boycotting the schools
caused some to be closed for several months.36

Since the schools are back to almost normal operations, the
Israelis instruct their Arab pupils in the history of the
Jewish National Liberation Movement, but devote little time to
the liberation movements of the Arab people. The ignorance on
this subject has forced Arab youth to seek these facts from
sources hostile to Israel and over which Israeli authorities
have no control.37 Only a small proportion of the Arab youth
graduating from elementary school enjoys further education. Even
the few who do graduate from secondary schools have had diffi­
culty in finding jobs better than those available to youths
who have completed only elementary school.38 Of all the problems,
education has possibly been the worst between the Palestinians
and the Israelis.

However, time has helped to change the educational system
to one somewhat more equitable for the Arabs. There are now

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36 Peretz, "Israel's Administration," p. 343.
37 Mohammed Watad, "Arab Youth in Israel—Today and Tomorrow,"
New Outlook, June, 1964, p. 23.
38 Ibid., p. 22.
twenty Arab high schools in Israel. There was one in 1953.\textsuperscript{39} Arab youth still lack activities after school hours. No clubs, libraries or young peoples groups exist for the Arabs as for the Jewish children. At best, there are a few scout clubs which hold meetings once a month.\textsuperscript{40}

Mapam, an Israeli political party, has attempted to help the Arab youth. It founded the Arab Youth Pioneer movement, set up producer cooperatives and published progressive Arab literature. However, both its resources and effects are limited. It has been compelled to cease its activities at times because of so-called "administrative" intervention from the military government.\textsuperscript{41}

Although the Israeli Government has attempted to placate its Arab population, pending some future settlement, it has continuously refused to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian culture. Nor has the Government tried to integrate the refugees into Israeli national life.

Employment is another area of discrimination against the Israeli Arabs. Jewish children leaving school join the Army for two and one-half years. The Army provides them opportunities to learn trades and continue their studies. Once free of Army obligations, the Jews have virtually all doors of employment open.

\textsuperscript{39}Mansour, op. cit., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 24.
to them. The professional Jewish labor market is closed to Arab youth. They are left with only the limited fields of education and government clerkship. Yet, most are not qualified to become certified teachers which in turn accounts for the lower levels of Arab education. Nor are there many opportunities available in government. Of 30,000 government workers, some 300 are Arabs. This is approximately 1%. The Arab population of Israel, including the occupied areas, is now close to 50%.

Nor are Palestinian and Israeli cultures compatible. The Arab youth who has lived in the Israeli society brings back a new way of life to the conservative and traditional village life, which is still maintained in the Arab villages and refugee camps. His ideas are often rejected by heads of families. Even if the youth is economically free, he is still somewhat tied by Palestinian social traditions. Some of these youth have tried to escape the problems of reconciling the two societies by illegally crossing the border into the neighboring Arab States. Some are killed; others are caught and spend time in Arab prisons, only to be returned to Israel to spend more time in prison. However, these youth have found that it is easier and cheaper to learn a trade in an Israeli prison than in an Arab village in Israel.

The Arab Border Population

Another problem the Israelis have with the Arab border

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42 Ibid., p. 15.
population is that many of these persons have close family ties with refugees in the Arab countries. In many cases, the Israeli Arabs are but remnants of extended families, most of whose members fled. Sentiments and sympathies of the Israeli Arabs are closely linked with those of the refugees now living across the borders. This situation has created a deep-seated psychological problem of divided loyalty and emotion. Israeli authorities furthered this problem by prohibiting contacts between the Zone Arabs and their relatives and friends in Syria and Syrian parts of occupied territory. When the Arabs crossed the border illegally, Israeli police sought to enforce the regulations and violence resulted.

The United Arab Republic complained to the U. N. Secretary-General in March, 1968, in connection with the atrocities against the civilian population by the Israeli military authorities. Claims were made by the Arab States that the Israelis planned to eradicate the refugee populations in Gaza and Sinai along with the original inhabitants of these areas. A report in November, 1967, showed that 100 to 300 persons a day, mostly from

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44 Abd el Aziz Zu'bi, an Israeli-Arab deputy who belongs to the left wing Mapam Party elaborated on this feeling in a statement to the Knesset. "We Israeli Arabs form an integral part of the State of Israel. This is my belief and my desire. At the same time, we also are an integral part of the Palestinian people in the occupied areas and in the Arab States . . . . (and) We find ourselves in war between our state and our people." (See The Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 1969, p. 22.)


46 GAOR, 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General (A/7059), March 1, 1968.
the Gaza Strip were crossing into Jordan. Many stated that they had been intimidated, shot at and had had their homes demolished in attempts to force them to move.47

Israeli authorities, according to U. N. sources, also pay 10 Israeli pounds to every member of a Gaza family which indicates a willingness to leave and another 10 Israeli pounds to these families as they cross the Allenby Bridge into East Jordan. The Israelis also facilitate transportation.48

The Arabs believe that the only danger to security in the Gaza Strip comes from the Israeli effort to persuade the refugees to leave the Strip. A November, 1967, report states that 144 houses in Gaza refugee camps were bulldozed in a single night. One Israeli official acknowledged privately that security forces were tougher in Gaza than on the West Bank. Not only are houses destroyed, but also churches and hospitals. The imposition of curfews is also resorted to more often in Gaza. On January 19, 1968, the Israeli authorities imposed a general curfew on more than 200 Arabs in the occupied city of Gaza. No proper provisions were made for the distribution of food and water during the curfew.49

Reports indicate that in February, 1968, approximately

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47 GAOR, 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General (A/7048), January 31, 1968.
48 GAOR, 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General (A/7166), August 5, 1968.
49 GAOR, 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of the UAR to the Secretary-General (A/7048), January 31, 1968.
35,000 Arabs had been forced to flee Gaza for the East Bank. On leaving the Israelis had forced the Arabs to sign statements saying they were leaving voluntarily and relinquishing their right to return. The Director of UNRWA noted in his report to the 24th General Assembly that violence had become almost a continual way of life in the Gaza Strip with strikes and violence carried out by the refugees and retaliatory violence by the Israeli military.

The effects of the militance cultivated by the Egyptians among the Strip's population as well as the overcrowding in the area have caused more resentment against the Israeli occupation than elsewhere. As a result of violence and non-cooperation by the refugees, Israeli occupation authorities have felt that more stringent measures were necessary to maintain relative peace in the Strip.

On the West Bank, though the refugees have been treated more equitably than those in the Gaza Strip, the effects of prolonged hostilities have been felt in a resistance to the military occupation. As the time of occupation lengthened and the prospects of a settlement decreased, demonstrations, strikes and bombings by the Palestinians became more frequent and led to Israeli counter-measures. One Israeli occupation colonel

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50GAOR, 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of the UAR to the Secretary-General (A/7099), May 17, 1968.
has blamed the troubles on just a small percent of the population. He stated that "It's the 50 of the townspeople, the intelligentsia is who cause the trouble. They seem to see the fact of military defeat as a defeat for all their past, their great poets and philosophers—if indeed they had any. I don't know." It has been this same group which the Israeli authorities have been unable to provide employment. Combined with the Israeli attitude of ignoring the Palestinians past, the West Bank Palestinians have come to feel the same rejection from the Israelis as from the Arabs. The Arab Governments have just been more direct in their rejection of the Palestinians by not granting citizenship and by providing hardly any employment.

The problems the Israeli authorities have faced in dealing with the Palestinians in the occupied territories are not only more numerous, but more complex, than those ever faced in dealing with their Arab residents before 1967. For the Arabs in Israel, including those in the occupied zones, now total almost one-half of the population. Given the present rates of population growth, and a stable Jewish population, the Jews would become a minority in a decade in a Greater Israel including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Since the Six Day War, there have been increasing requests by officials and citizens for more

52 "Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 442.
54 Ibid., p. 51.
Jewish immigration to balance the larger Arab population.

Some Palestinian Arabs are passively resisting the Israeli administration. Others are participating in various forms of cooperation from quietly carrying on normal official functions to discussing the possibilities of a political solution with the Israelis. Few, if any, of the occupation Arabs favor integration as a minority into a Jewish State or mass emigration to more lucrative areas of employment. However, even the most moderate Palestinian leaders in Israel are unwilling to take any public stand without backing from Arab leaders abroad.55

Soon after the occupation, Israeli planners were aware that the refugee problem could not be solved outside the context of overall economic and political planning for the West Bank and Gaza. Pilot projects for refugee integration included plans to change crop patterns, to utilize the Jordan River waters more adequately and to market produce in Israel and abroad. The problem of settling the refugees is that the only land available is in the Jordan Valley which is unbearably hot in the summer. Also, many of the younger refugees are townpeople and not inclined to work the land. The Israelis have found that they cannot dump the Arabs into cooperative farming as they have the Jews. Like the Palestinians, the Israelis are divided on how any solution should proceed. Four main schools of Israeli thought have emerged:

55Ibid., p. 57.
1. intransigent—urges refusal to resolve the refugee problem until the Arabs agree to discuss a general peace. This group points out that Jordan milked the West Bank and Egypt turned Gaza into a ghetto.

2. the passive—as normal life returns to the area, they feel that the progress in Israel will filter through to the refugees. The effects should be watched before new programs are introduced.

3. the evolutionary—the Israelis would improve the way Arabs feel toward them. They should raise the Arab standard of living and promote Arab-Jewish integration.

4. the Utopian—this group has left-wing support and believes the field is open for Arab-Jewish integration at present.

The military government in the occupied areas has its own goals, which are highly respected by Israeli officials. It plans to interfere as little as possible with the daily life of the Arabs, giving them maximum freedom so they will act as a sort of bridgehead between Israel and the other Arab States. It also intends to suppress terrorism with an iron hand when it appears.

Though Israeli occupation has brought certain economic advantages to the refugees, it has also created problems. The problems have been especially related to Israel's firm determination to obtain de facto control of all of the occupied areas, despite UNRWA, the refugees or the Arab States. This policy of tightening a hold on these areas, for security reasons ostensibly, has not helped Palestinian-Israeli relations. For one thing, such a policy contradicts Palestinian goals on the disposition of these areas. It also makes the Palestinians and the Arab Governments more defensive, more militant and more determined.

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not to allow Israel's military any further expansion.

More than actual physical damage, terrorist activities have hurt Israel in terms of defense expenditures. They are adding to the already large burden of maintaining out-of-proportion regular forces and have forced the Government to spend millions of dollars on the fortification of the cease-fire lines. The Israeli defense budget of one billion U. S. dollars for 1969 was 35% of the total Israeli budget and 30% of the GNP. 58

Summary

Prior to the 1967 war, the Israeli Government made sporadic attempts to integrate its minimal Arab population. Arabs in Israel were granted citizenship, were found jobs and were compensated for lost property. Yet, they were not given status equal to the Jewish population. The jobs they held and the education they received were not equivalent to those of the Jewish population.

Following the 1967 war, Israel became the largest host country. With the influx of refugees, Israel doubled its territory, although only the "old city" of Jerusalem has been officially annexed as yet. Though the Government does not plan to evict these refugees, neither has it taken concrete, definitive steps to integrate them.

Though Israeli officials recognize that the return of

58 Rubenstein, op. cit., p. 27.
normal life is inseparable from a solution of the refugee problems, they lack a definitive program to accomplish a return to normal. Normal is not clearly defined, nor is it agreed on by the Israelis or the Palestinians. The Israelis did strive to resume trade, and to a lesser extent travel, between the two banks of the Jordan River and somewhat between Jordan and the Gaza Strip. However, both Jordan and Israel have economic and political reasons for favoring such policies, despite the existence of the refugees. Israel's surplus of agricultural products normally goes to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Without these markets, this produce would have to be absorbed in Israel. This would bring a fall in prices. Politically, Israeli officials hope that if the population of the occupied areas maintains somewhat normal contacts, it will be less restive. Jordan has been reluctant to close off her prime source of agricultural produce and feels that shutting off the West Bank might enhance a latent tendency among the refugees for self-determination.

Israel's economic prosperity and demand for manpower have made it easier to integrate the refugees than in the Arab States. Much has been done to solve the unemployment problem among the general refugee population. However, success in solving the problems of the workers has accentuated the problem of unemployment of the intellectuals. Most agree this problem is one of the main causes of bitterness.

As the refugees are concentrated in the border areas, their
lives are made more difficult by the increasing numbers of border incidents. Most refugees in Israel no longer fear the Israeli occupiers, though generally they still dislike the Jews. The refugees do seem to appreciate their situation better than life in a refugee camp, or possibly even that of living in one of the Arab States, yet they are far from being totally integrated into Israeli society, or of even being agreeable to the idea. As the Israelis cannot agree to a Palestinian dominated society, little concrete has resulted. Israeli–Palestinian relations do seem to be more amiable than Arab State–Palestinian relations, a fact which does show some sort of Israeli progress. However, until the Israelis agree to work with the Palestinians to develop concrete plans for the future of the occupied areas and of the refugees as well as agree to discuss outstanding political differences and goals, it would seem that the present situation will continue or deteriorate further.
CHAPTER VI

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB STATES

Between 1948 and the June 1967 war, four Arab Governments were hosts to the majority of the Palestinian refugees.\(^1\) In 1961 the Agency Director noted that the host countries and their governments have shown a deep understanding of the refugees' problems and sympathize with their needs.\(^2\) By 1967 much of this sympathy and understanding had disappeared.

General Arab Attitudes

Whether out of sympathy for and agreement with the refugees or whether for their own advancement, the host countries have made the job of UNRWA more difficult than absolutely necessary by some of their policies toward the Agency. Programs such as the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley project and the Sinai Desert project, both designed to provide more water for the area thus providing more farmland, have not met with any success. They have been opposed by the refugees and by the Arab States and have been successfully blocked by the Arab


Governments. 3

The host governments have sought to exploit the Agency by requesting purchases of relief supplies locally rather than elsewhere even though local prices may be higher. 4 Close Agency consultation with private employers in the area has, however, enabled vocational training courses to be adjusted to potential employers' requirements. This has opened more opportunities for Agency technical graduates, and more and more are being recruited in the neighboring Arab countries. 5 However, the Arab hosts, by virtue of their vote in the United Nations, do curtail programs which they do not deem politically desirable. Though the Agency has had some successes, there are still too few jobs in the area for all of the refugees and even for all of the indigenous populations. This will continue unless more comprehensive development measures are taken. Such measures cannot be implemented without the agreement of the refugees and of the host governments.

In all the Middle Eastern area, including Israel, the refugees can afford to work for lower wages as they are aided in their subsistence by UNRWA. This competition makes the

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refugees unwelcome in the host countries and tends to depress the already low wage rates. The situation hampers the overall development of the area, but still the Arab hosts do not choose to terminate UNRWA's presence and undertake a solution on their own. This would lose them a political bargaining advantage as the problem per se would soon have to be eradicated. The hosts, rather, have chosen to keep the refugees in restricted areas. Such was the case in Egypt where the refugees were contained mostly in the Gaza Strip. Syria has refused to accept any more. Lebanon restricts them severely. Jordan alone has granted citizenship, and has evidenced a slight willingness to investigate means of making the refugee citizens self-supporting. Even so, most of the refugees in Jordan were contained on the West and now the East Banks.

Though the refugees were initially welcomed in the Arab States, it was not long before their continued immigration turned this welcome into resentment. The number of refugees in the camps has risen steadily each year, partly from natural increase and partly from in-migration from other places in the host states to the camps as family funds have run out. A few refugees are new arrivals from Israel; more are refugees who were evicted from local Arab villages for cutting fruit trees for firewood or performing other destructive acts. Others are simply looking

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7 Ibid., p. 242.
for a more familiar and satisfying social environment and hoping to find it in the camp situation. 8

The refugees pose an internal economic, social and political problem for the host governments which in part accounts for many of the restrictions on them. The two and one-half million refugees probably have the highest level of education of any groups of Arabs in the area. 9 This too can account for some of the feeling against them. This education is oriented toward Palestine—the schoolrooms, scout groups, sport teams and other organized activities are given the names of Palestinian towns, heroes, martyrs and villages. The schools are often decorated with Palestinian pictures. 10 Thus the direction of refugee education does not provide for the refugees' integration into the Arab host states any more than into Israel.

This Palestinian socialization has not helped in bringing peace to the area. Negotiations over the years have failed largely because the governments and the refugees are determined to retain their last advantage given by their exile. This position is not particularly realistic, but rather emotional. Yet it has so far led to three wars. The current organized Palestinian raids, and Israeli reprisals, have only served to intensify


Arab–Israeli tensions.

That the military escalation will stop is doubtful. No refugees, including those who have obtained a level of living greater or equal to that held before their exile, appear able to accept the status quo with anything better than a profound feeling of bitterness, hatred and unrest. According to a former Palestinian who spent years teaching in refugee camps, most of the refugees, in the early 1960's, would have returned to their old homes if allowed. They did not feel welcome in the Arab States. Many will not agree to resettlement for this reason as well as the fact that they would probably lose their claims to lands in Palestine.\(^{11}\)

Commando raids on Israel have brought increasing misery to those states housing the refugees. From the end of the Sinai War in 1956 until the beginning of 1965, Israel used armed reprisals against only Syria. In early 1965, the Israeli–Jordanian demarcation lines suddenly became critical, largely because of the activities of Al Fatah. Since this time, Israeli troops have also retaliated against Lebanon and Egypt as a result of commando raids staged from these territories.\(^{12}\)

By 1969, if the Palestine guerrillas had not existed, the area would have been virtually at peace. Except for some incidents along the Suez Canal, all of the major Israeli retaliations


were provoked by the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{13} Israeli military retaliation has become more harsh to try to discourage guerrilla raids. The Arab States, which have felt the force of those Israeli attacks, have had to increase their military strength in order to protect themselves, from both the Israeli attacks and from the Palestinians. Thus, all three groups have become increasingly better armed.

The changes in the political and social structure of the refugee community during its prolonged exile, together with the encouragement provided by the Arab States, have brought about the commando movements. The Palestinians, through the commandos, have recently gained status as a separate entity in the Middle East, at least on the part of the Arab Governments. These Governments, attempting to strike a balance between support of the commandos and restrictions on them have often found themselves unable to act decisively in a situation of confrontation. For the Palestinians are by now as well armed as the host governments. Thus, the host governments have hesitated to back the commandos and particularly Al Fatah. This group they feel is too extremist and could eventually involve them in an undesired war with Israel.\textsuperscript{14} This feeling has persisted more strongly since the June War and seems directly related to increased commando activities.

\textsuperscript{13}“How to Break the Trust Barrier,” \textit{Newsweek}, January 20, 1969, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{14}Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation," p. 448.
From the viewpoint of the fedayeen, their greatest success has been that they have deterred Israel and the Arab States from negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Even if the Arab Governments were seriously seeking to make peace, such a peace is now almost worthless to the terrorists and to the Palestinian masses.\textsuperscript{15}

Following the 1967 war, the Governments in both Lebanon and Jordan found it necessary to devote more and more time to internal rather than regional troubles. Rioting and government crises, directly attributable to the refugees, have plagued both. The Palestinian organizations have attained a degree of political legitimacy and popularity through the Arab masses, whether conservative or radical. However, the Palestinians' idea of nationalism is opposed in varying degrees by the host governments.

Though the Palestine issue is the main thread holding the Arab Unity Movement together, it seems unlikely that the Palestinians would relinquish their new identity to a united Arab world. Thus, it seems ironic that while the Palestinian cause and the defeat of Israel are the main points of agreement in Arab Unity, the Palestinians are not and do not care to become an integral part of a united Arab movement.\textsuperscript{16}

Though the Arabs and the Israelis seem more anxious to find a solution than ever before, their desires are now negated by the Palestinians wish to prolong the conflict until Israel is


\textsuperscript{16} Grant, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48.
eradicated. The 1967 Security Council Resolution outlining a solution was purposefully vague and therefore acceptable to all parties. In the spring of 1968, Jordan and Egypt agreed to its implementation. Israeli officials later indicated acceptance. However, the States' interpretations of the Resolution did differ. Despite the unprecedented governmental agreement, the Palestinians, backed by the Syrian Government, have declared that the Resolution is completely unacceptable to them. Thus, it has remained unimplemented and largely undiscussed.\(^\text{17}\)

**Jordanian-Palestinian Relations**

In Jordan, possibly more than any other host country, the Palestinians have had a noticeable effect on the political, economic and social situations. The present Palestinian leadership has attained status in Jordanian government circles by serving the interests of the Hashemite throne. However, this is a double standard on the part of the Palestinians who have little liking for the monarchy. An autonomous Palestinian State, which they prefer, would necessitate an end to the present Jordanian Government.\(^\text{18}\)

Following the 1948 defeat, the Jordanian Government did all that it could to stifle the Palestinians' feelings of independence. Though still not having a working relationship with the Palestinians, the Jordanian officials, as a result of the Israeli


occupation of the West Bank, have been relieved of part of their problem with the refugees. Israeli officials are now forced to try to suppress this feeling of Palestinian nationalism among this group.

The refugees in Jordan were welcomed at first. Small irrigation projects were begun to provide land for resettlement. The professionals among the refugees were fitted into the expanding Jordanian Government and welfare services. Three became members of the Cabinet. Early in 1950 a law was passed providing for the assignment of state lands to the refugees for homes and farms. Some 567,000 refugees went to Jordan and comprised over one-half of the population at the end of the 1948 war.

Though a numerical majority of the Jordanian population, the refugees, even though they have full voting rights and citizenship, are treated more as a political minority. They do have a role in the Government, but it is by no means representative of their actual numbers. The Jordanian authorities, too, realized that their only hope of ever winning the refugees lay in developing an economy which would absorb them. More than a little has been achieved, much of it due to the Government's cooperation with UNRWA.20

UNRWA has been Jordan's biggest enterprise. It spends more

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money than the entire civil budget of the national government. As a result the more than 500,000 refugees have a higher level of living and education than most of the natives.21

Work opportunities have remained especially scarce in Jordan. However, the agency still has been more successful with resettlement projects in Jordan than in any other host state. As of February, 1957, the agency had completed seven resettlement projects which provided for 302 refugee families. Projects planned and underway as of that date would resettle another 105 families. Yet, the number resettled is still less than the net increase of the refugee population.22

The individual grants program in Jordan has been one of the most successful means of helping the refugees to become self-supporting. When the program was first proposed in 1954, much of the refugee population was against it as they feared it would prejudice their right to return to their homes. The beginning of the program was delayed several months. Once begun, the program still encountered considerable opposition from the refugees and its outcome was in doubt.23 However, by 1964, some 3,440 refugee families had achieved self-support through the project.

Even with the positive attitudes toward the refugees, the

Jordanian Government was experiencing a negative response. In 1957, the Middle East Journal stated that Amman was largely a Palestinian city transferred in space. Before the 1956 war, King Hussein was attempting to minimize alienation among the Palestinians. He mingled with the refugees frequently; his reception was generally warm and spontaneous. However, this reception seemed to reflect more on Hussein personally than on his office or his policies. By 1960, the Jordanian Government was considering asking the Arab League to help it curtail refugee militance. By August, 1966, the PLO was pressuring Hussein to declare Jerusalem an "Arab City" and to make it the capital of Jordan. Hussein refused, thus antagonizing PLO leaders.

The refugees' idea of an independent Palestinian homeland was partially revived by Hussein's comment that he had no objection to the creation of an autonomous state on the West Bank if it would help to promote a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The statement was later denied, but it had done its damage. It encouraged some Palestinians to take a more independent stance from the policies of Amman. The Israelis, who favored the idea, encouraged it by subsidizing one Arabic newspaper which had favored the plan. However,

24 "Developments of the Quarter," p. 164.
28 Haar, op. cit., p. 39.
as the commando groups have grown in strength and as they have encouraged the idea of liberating Palestine, the formation of a separate Palestinian state has lost much of its intrigue.

Despite Hussein's lack of control on commando operations and his less than amiable relations with the Palestinians in general, a sixty member parliament was elected on April 15, 1967, which did support the King. Shukairy, then heading the PLO, had called for a boycott of the election, but his wishes were not widely followed.29

Although such results indicate support for the King, the Palestinians have long and consistently called for political parties with platforms and an end to the Jordanian system subjecting parliament and the Cabinet to the will of the King. The Palestinians have no loyalty to the monarchy and neither intellectual, emotional nor ideological attachment to it.30

In 1967, at the same time as Jordan lost over one-third of its productive territory, the state acquired between 150,000 and 200,000 East Bank Palestinians. Nearly half of these persons were refugees for the second time.31 Most became non-productive refugees on the East Bank. Responsible Jordanians would like to see the refugees returned to Israel. Confusion exists among the refugees, although at one Jordanian government camp which received

many of the refugees in 1967, nearly all said they wanted to return to their previous residence. This enthusiasm dimmed when they were reminded that this also meant returning to Israeli rule. In July, 1968, the Jordanian Government prohibited the entry of all persons intending to remain in East Jordan. There has since been almost no legal migration to this area from either the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

The commando activities in Jordan increased following the Six Day War. They signalled the dawn of a new political era in which few doubt the commandos’ ability to oust the monarchy when they are ready. However, it would be a mistake to think of the present commandos as a continuation of the commandos earlier sponsored by the UAR and led by Shukairy. The present group is more bitter and more determined, having suffered three military defeats and some, the third dislocation. Their actions are more spontaneous and deliberate and do not need impetus from Egypt or from Syria.

More and more the Jordanian Government has been at odds with the Palestinians. The commando leaders wanted to be allowed to mobilize the Palestinians in Jordan, to organize military training, to impose taxes for their support and to fortify border villages. To Hussein, this would be tantamount to relinquishing Jordanian sovereignty over the Western part of the country.

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32 The Economist, July 8, 1967, p. 103.
33 Ibid., p. 108.
34 Nasr, op. cit., p. 40.
35 Ibid.
Hussein, rather, explained this attitude in 1967 following the war. He wanted the commandos only to be proof that a Palestinian people was alive and supported by the Arab nations, until such time as the world's conscience awoke and gave the Palestinians the right of self-determination.36

Most of the Palestinians in Jordan still support Nasser and his idea of nationalism. Yet his control over them is no longer so strong as it once was. Their enormous political power is directed against Hussein whose pro-West orientation they regard as unfriendly to their goals. In Amman and Damascus, the refugees can be found squabbling for every scarce job opening with the natives. Their presence weighs on the economic, social and political structure of not just Jordan, but of every Arab state in which they reside.

On the question of where and in what numbers the fedayeen should be allowed to operate in Jordan, Hussein ultimately backed down and gave them virtually a free hand in the border areas by the end of 1969.37 This was contrary to the expectations of many who had felt sure that he would curtail fedayeen activities. However, the weakness of Hussein's position was shown as early as November, 1968, when loyal Bedouin soldiers clamped a curfew on Amman and rounded up members of Kata'ah al Masr (Phalanx of Victory), a secretive, fringe group of fedayeen. When these

Bedouins also attacked a Fatah training camp, killing nine men. Fatah leaders alerted 7,000 armed fedayeen to stand ready to move against Amman. Though Hussein and the fedayeen had an angry meeting in Amman where Hussein declared, "If I don't rule this country, then I shall burn it," he was forced to reconsider when the fedayeen reminded him that the population of Amman, now 400,000, had been 35,000 in 1958 and they were still able to reduce it to this size.38

At the same time Sheik Akif al-Faiz, Minister of Commerce and leader of the largest Bedouin tribe threatened to withdraw his support from the Government if Hussein continued to use his loyal Bedouin troops against the fedayeen. Hussein, also under pressure from Saudi Arabia which subsidizes the Jordanian economy, promised to lift the curfew he had imposed to control the fedayeen and to allow them to keep their arms if they would keep armed men off of the streets of Amman.39

Lebanon, Syria and Egypt have fared little better in their dealings with the Palestinians, although none has granted citizenship to their refugees or displayed as positive an attitude as the Jordanian Government has. Even so, they have much the same problems as Jordan. Such refugee actions seem to support the contentions that they do not want to be integrated into the Arab countries, nor do they regard the Arabs as complete allies.

39 Ibid., p. 35.
Egyptian-Palestinian Relations

Egyptian political power in the Middle East has given Nasser more influence with the Palestinians than any other government has. However, the Egyptian Government has never wanted to assume responsibility for the refugees, as is evidenced by its allowing only a few into Egypt proper.

Of Egypt's refugees, more than 90% were channeled into the Gaza Strip after 1948 and not permitted to leave. This area was never incorporated by Egypt, but retained the frame of law and administration which existed when it was part of the British Mandate. Local Palestinian laws remained in force and many of the same officials retained their posts. This was one Egyptian method of keeping alive a Palestinian identity. Judging from Israeli problems with and approaches toward the Gaza refugees as opposed to those on the West Bank, Egypt's success was fairly high. The only proposed project, during the years of Egyptian administration to solve even part of the problem, was to pump water from the Suez Canal to irrigate the land. No one ever determined whether the water was suitable, and the Egyptian Government refused to consider the project seriously until the Aswan Dam was constructed. Even such a project, had it been completed, was calculated to settle only

40Faretz, "Israel's Administration," p. 337.
one-third of the Strip's refugees. 41

Nor did the Egyptian Government encourage self-support projects or movement out of the area. Rather, it viewed the refugees as living symbols of Arab Unity. This Unity was loosely bound by its pledge to restore Israel to Arab rule and to repatriate all of the refugees. Government imposition of job restrictions on the refugees served to keep them in the camps. The Egyptian military which controlled Gaza restricted refugee movements severely, even in the area. And, no one was permitted to leave, except for pilgrimages to Mecca. 42 Many of these restrictions were removed after the Israeli occupation in 1967.

Until March, 1958, the refugees in Gaza had no political rights. Then, the Egyptian Government set up a system allowing the Palestinians to elect 23 of 30 members of a new Legislative Council. However, all Council actions were subject to the approval of the Egyptian Government. One of the Council's first actions was to call for Gaza's membership in the UAE. This action on April 4, 1958, was never approved. 43

Under Egyptian administration, the Gaza Strip was no more than a vast refugee camp. The area, 25 miles long and five miles wide, contained approximately 238,000 refugees and 102,000 natives. Almost no possibilities for employment existed. 44

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41 "Developments of the Quarter," p. 164.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
the few hundred refugees in Egypt proper had no political rights. However, this latter group did have access to courts of law and these refugees were allowed to work and to travel freely.45

Egyptian officials have taken the attitude of not wanting the refugees. When the situation following the 1948 war stabilized, most of the refugees were concentrated in the Gaza Strip. Those remaining in Egypt proper have never received aid from UNRWA. As funds ran out, the Egyptian Government, rather than supplying aid to the refugees, requested international aid.46 Egyptian representatives at the U. N., like other Arab delegates, have criticized the Resolutions because they do not contain guarantees that there would be no further curtailment of services.47

Divided among themselves, the refugees also act as a divisive factor on the Arab Governments. The Arab League has, on more than one occasion, considered the formation of a Palestinian State. The main stumbling block, other than the refugees, is the lack of Arab agreement on where and when and how. Egyptian officials favor such a scheme. Jordan, on whose territory such a State would most likely be created, naturally opposes it.

For a short time in the 1960's Gaza was the seat of a Palestinian Government in exile. Economic advancement in the area, brought about by the United Nations Emergency Force and renewed citrus production, plus lack of Egyptian support for the idea, helped

46 GAOR, 10th Session, Special Report of the Director Concerning Other Claimants for Relief (A/2978/Add. 1), Supplement Number 15A, p. 6.
to undermine the movement. It was shattered completely by the June War.48

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Egyptian Government officials had begun setting up, supporting and encouraging fedayeen movements. The increasing fedayeen attacks, despite repeated U. N. efforts to curtail such activities since 1956, show Egyptian determination to pursue aggression against Israel, although indirectly. As a result of both east and west supplying arms to the protagonists, border incidents have multiplied since 1956. Many Egyptian officers have pressed Nasser to reply to Israeli attacks more strenuously. However, he has resisted as he is aware that the Egyptian Army is no match for Israeli military in face to face combat. He continues to let the fedayeen groups carry out the guerrilla attacks and has assisted in training the refugees for this type of warfare.49 There are also recruiting centers in Egypt as in most other Arab countries. The PLO also broadcasts daily from Egypt over its own radio station, the "Voice of the Storm."50

As a result, the Egyptians have had to defend against increasing numbers of Israeli attacks along the Suez Canal. The Canal area has been the main point of commando infiltration from Egypt.

The discussion in the early 1960's of setting up an independent Palestine Army either under joint all-Arab command or within

the framework of the existing separate armies has brought no more agreement. Rather, Jordanian representatives have threatened to walk out of Arab League meetings if such a proposal were even put on the Agenda.\(^5^1\) This idea, once promoted by Egypt, has fallen into disrepute since 1967 as the Arab States are now trying to control and curtail the commandos rather than promote more violence by them.

The commando threat has grown swiftly since the 1967 War and seems to worry the Arab hosts more than the Israelis now. Hussein in Jordan is finding the Palestinians more and more of a liability as he hears Radio Cairo call for his own assassination. Egyptian officials too have come to fear commando belligerence as it has become awkward and dangerous for them, regionally and internationally. Yet, they are at a loss on how to control it.\(^5^2\) Nasser is no longer able to denounce the commandos or to withhold funds without giving Cairo’s enemies the chance to denounce the UAR as lacking the zeal for a holy war and to accuse Cairo of aiding Israel.\(^5^3\)

**Lebanon and the Refugees**

Lebanon, though having fewer refugees than Egypt or


\(^5^2\)Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

\(^5^3\)Ibid.
Jordan, has problems equal to or greater than those of her neighbors. The political structure of Lebanon is set up on a symbiotic relation between Christians and Moslems. By official estimates the Christians compose approximately 53% of the population. However, there has been no accurate census in years. The Government and proportional representation of the country are structured on the basis of this Christian majority. To accept the Palestinians, 90% of whom are Moslems, would upset this balance. Thus, the Palestinians in Lebanon have never been given any political rights. They are not granted residence visas and must hold special identity cards or be deported. Except in very rare cases, refugees who leave Lebanon have not been granted return visas. These rules apply to all, but until 1958, they were not enforced in the case of the refugees supported by UNRWA. The Lebanese have become even more antagonistic toward these refugees and now, the Phalange Party of Public works Minister Pierre Gemayel would like to expel the refugees from Lebanon by force if it could.

As the Constitution stipulates that the president be elected from the largest religious sector, now the Christians, most Lebanese oppose resettling the refugees at all as they fear the

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Palestinians would demand a new census which would result in a Moslem majority, thus upsetting the present balance.\textsuperscript{57}

The refugees have, however, been better treated in the abstract, as the embodiment of an idea, than they have as a reality. The Lebanese people extend vocal support to the Palestinian cause, but they are not enthusiastic about the Palestinians acting on their own.\textsuperscript{58} At the outset of the May, 1958, crisis in Lebanon, the pro-West Government against whom the insurrection was conducted, warned that the penalty for refugee participation would be severe. The refugees under UNRWA care did not actively participate, although for the most part they were followers of the Arab nationalist policies of Nasser and sympathized with the goals of the insurgents.\textsuperscript{59}

Though there have been few self-support projects in Lebanon because of the lack of governmental approval, the Lebanese do expend 20\% of their national budget on the refugees. They also provide a monthly grant of 10 kilos of flour or bread and three Lebanese pounds per month per refugee.\textsuperscript{60} Too, since 1965, a number of Lebanese refugees have been able to find employment, especially around Beirut and Tripoli.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{57}Wolf, op. cit., p. 356.
\textsuperscript{59}Nezerik, op. cit., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{60}St. Aubin, op. cit., p. 253.
Since the 1967 war, Lebanese government crises caused by the guerillas have been frequent. Palestinians have been exercising effective political control in some fifteen refugee camps.\(^{62}\)

In October, 1969, the situation worsened when the Army cracked down on fedayeen for operating in populated areas supposedly barred to them by earlier agreements.\(^{63}\) This followed pro-fedayeen demonstrations in April, 1969, which precipitated a government crisis.\(^{64}\) The main battle was in early November, 1969, over the town of Hashaya, a government held village some 5,000 feet up the slopes of Mount Hermon near the Syrian border.

The capture of Hashaya would have meant that the commandos could have brought their supplies directly over Syrian roads rather than by way of mountain trails which are impassable in the winter. The capture would also have strengthened the commandos' position when and if they sat down to negotiate with Beirut.\(^{65}\) However, the Lebanese army, half Moslem and half Christian, remained loyal to the Government. Seventeen men defended Hashaya, holding off a fedayeen force of 50, killing five and capturing five without a loss.\(^{66}\)

The most recent Lebanese guerilla crisis began in March, 1970. Lebanese guerillas clashed with government troops at at least one

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\(^{62}\) "Calling the Tune," *Newsweek*, November 10, 1969, p. 47.


\(^{65}\) "Calling the Tune," p. 47.

\(^{66}\) "Lebanon: Along," p. 35.
refugee camp. The Palestinian guerillas, in addition to their control of fifteen refugee camps, have physical control of some adjoining residential areas of Beirut and Tripoli.67

The guerillas have the support of Lebanon's lower-income groups, students and leftist intellectuals. Both the Palestinians and the opposing Phalange party members, mostly Christian Lebanese, have arms. The Phalangists claim 200,000 supporters. Approximately 10,000 of these, they claim, are armed. This group claims to be defending its "Lebanese way of life" from encroachment of the foreign Palestinians. Though they do not oppose the fight against Israel, they no longer want it waged from Lebanese territory.68 So determined are many Lebanese in this belief that they are willing to arm and incur the risk of civil war to press this feeling on the Palestinians.

Though Lebanon has fewer refugees than Egypt or Jordan, it is more vulnerable to them partly because of the delicate national political balance. Part of the Government's troubles stem from the fact that the refugees are given jobs in the expanding economy, but are not accorded any legal or political rights. The fact that the commandos now operate many of the Lebanese refugee camps as commando training centers has not improved the situation. But, more of a problem as an instigator

68 Ibid.
of these troubles has been Lebanon's neighbor Syria.

The Syrians and the Palestinians

The Syrians are the most militant of the host states and the only state willing to risk an all-out war with Israel for the Palestine cause. They have brought problems to their neighbors by their unconcealed encouragement and support of the guerillas.

Nor has the Syrian Government been one of the most cooperative with Agency projects. The Government did sign an agreement with the Agency on October 13, 1952, in which it expressed a desire to cooperate in the development of rehabilitation projects for about 85,000 registered refugees, and did budget $30 million for the projects. Only two small projects materialized. These were on marginal lands and development was accomplished at very high cost. Though the projects were advantageous for the Syrian Government, they would never bring about the resettlement of all of the refugees.

In the Director's report for 1956, he noted that even if the refugees in Lebanon and Syria were to become self-supporting, the greatest part of the problem would remain as four-fifths of the refugees are located elsewhere. As in Lebanon, many of the Syrian refugees have found full or part-time work. Refugees in agricultural areas in Syria have the same opportunities for

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seasonal work as Syrians, and many in the industrial centers, especially Aleppo and Damascus, find full-time employment.\textsuperscript{70}

The Syrians, like the Egyptians, are concerned about agency support for the refugees. They have abstained on resolutions which did not contain sufficient guarantees against a reduction in agency services. Yet, in 1957, negotiations were underway for the transfer of the Rabandon agricultural settlement to the Syrian Government. The settlement housed 374 refugee families and occupied 1,496 dunums of land. Thus, the Syrian Government benefitted from another project to which it had contributed little.\textsuperscript{71}

Since 1961, relationships between Israel and Syria have been more strained than Israeli relations with other Arab states. The military incidents between these two have also been more serious. In October, 1967, the Syrian prime minister stated that "we are not sentinels over Israeli security and are not the leash that restrains the revolution of the displaced and persecuted Palestinian people."\textsuperscript{72} This comment implied to the Israelis and to the Arabs that Syrian officials would do little to curtail commando activities in the area. It also implied that the Syrian Government would not agree to any peace settlement opposed by the Palestinians.

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Dec}, 11th session, annual report of the director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (\#3212), Supplement Number 14, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{71}\textit{Dec}, 12th session, annual report of the director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (\#3696), Supplement Number 14, p. 26.

Palestinians in Syria are not citizens, but have usually enjoyed the same civil rights as Syrian citizens. They are allowed to work, to leave the country and to return. The Government has granted 60 piasters per day to registered refugees over ten years of age and 40 per day to those under ten. Local assistance and medical services have, when possible, been provided without charge.\(^73\) According to U. N. technical surveys before 1960, all of the former Palestinians could be absorbed in Syria. The cultivable area is over 14 million acres. Only six million are used at present.\(^74\)

Syria is the only one of the major host countries in which the refugees have failed to create almost insurmountable social and economic problems. There are two reasons for this—the Syrian willingness to back the commando groups rather than trying to curtail their activities and the fact that the commando activities may be planned on Syrian territory, but are staged elsewhere.

By the middle of August, 1966, reports indicated that both Lebanon and Jordan were trying to curtail Fatah activities and prevent Fatah from using their territories as bases of operation. The commandos began more and more using Syrian territory which brought about increasingly difficult Israeli-Syrian Relations. During the few years before the 1967 War,

Palestinian extremist elements located mainly in Syria advocated the overthrow of King Hussein of Jordan on the grounds that he was a pawn of the West and too soft on Israel. By late 1966, reports indicated that several Arab Governments felt insecure, largely because of commando actions and words in Syria. All were powerless to take measures against this group which was encouraged by the Syrians. The situation worsened when a new, more radical Government took power in 1966. It supported the claims of the Palestine Liberation Army which mobilized and inflamed the refugees and carried out many of the raids on Israel.

The Syrians, by late 1967, were denying the responsibility for the existence or operation of the Palestinian activists. However, the Syrians have done more in the way of providing supplies, training and encouraging these groups than any other major host country, including Egypt, in recent years. Syrian officials have denied any complicity even when Israeli representatives have lodged complaints in the Security Council. Their statements are still not so strong as those of the other Arab States which began denying involvement in commando activities several years before, and are now trying to devise means to control the commandos. Syria still remains the most receptive

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76 Yost, op. cit., p. 305.
Arab host to guerrilla demands and is currently the closest to the commando organizations politically.

Summary

The Arab Governments have been antagonistic toward the refugees since shortly after they emigrated from Palestine. Although the Governments and the people sympathize with the refugee ideal of a return to Palestine, neither officially nor unofficially have the host governments welcomed the refugees. Only in Jordan have they been granted citizenship. They are not equal to other citizens there or in any host country. The United Nations has retained the responsibility for the refugees in camps, or for about 40% of the population. Only about 20% of the refugee population has really reestablished itself in the Arab world. The remainder of the Palestinians are still a very definite fringe group. Part of this status stems from the fact that the Palestinians themselves do not want to be integrated and thereby give up their legal claim to either repatriation or compensation.

Partly because of this refugee rejection and partly because of the host governments and populations' antagonism to the refugees, little concrete has taken place in the way of resettlement. The host states still consider the State of Israel as an outsider in the Middle East. They have used the refugee problem to maintain a semblance of Arab Unity as well as to carry out their personal hatreds for Israel in an indirect manner.

By prolonging the refugee situation, they have created a
problem which they now find damaging to themselves and so far insoluble. The refugees have become armed, with the aid of the Arab States, and have become militant, both toward Israel and toward the Arab States which still refuse to grant them political equality. The Palestinians have since 1967 broadened their fight against colonialism in Israel to a fight against the colonialist Arab Governments. Today, more than ever before, the Arab States, with the possible exception of Syria, would like to find a solution to the refugee problem before they themselves are eradicated. However, because of the rising power of the Palestinians, it is becoming increasingly difficult to begin a governmental compromise. The Arab Governments are finding that now they must concentrate more on preserving their own existence than on trying to come to an agreement with Israel. It has also become doubtful whether the Arab Governments and the Israeli Government could achieve a solution even if they agreed to one on paper. For, the Palestinians, and their militant commando organizations, have taken the position that there will be no solution without Palestinian participation.

Though the Palestinians now seem to be beyond the control of the Arab States, most of the hosts are concerned with the internal and regional consequences being brought on by the commandos and are looking for ways both to solve the situation permanently and to placate their Palestinian populations in the meantime.

The Syrian Government is backing the Palestinians and presently shows little worry for the country's internal security or its
relationships with the other host governments.

The refugees' belief that time would not solve the problem is becoming more certain. Rather time seems to have hardened Palestinian determination to regain the homeland in Palestine. The refugees' actions have proved a detriment to many of the Arab States and to relationships between the various countries in the area. Yet, they also have started the Governments concerned to consider more seriously than ever before the possibilities open for a final solution to the problems.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The Palestine conflict was initially a conflict between governments in the area. The Arab Governments had one set of prerequisites for a solution; the Jews another. The Arab officials took the more legal of the two positions, basing their stands on United Nations resolutions, and particularly on the solution outlined in Resolution 194(III). They also felt that any solution should be of the total problem and not on an issue-by-issue basis. Nor would they agree to direct talks with the Israeli Government's representatives. The Israeli Government refused to take back the refugees because of security reasons as well as the influx of Jews it had absorbed both from around the world and from the neighboring Arab States. Rather, Israeli officials, prior to 1967, preferred the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab States. They also felt that the only means to a solution was direct talks between the governments involved on an issue by issue basis.

During this time of Arab-Israeli governmental deadlock on a diplomatic level, the refugees were existing in the host countries in refugee camps set up by the United Nations. Though fairly docile politically in the earlier years of the conflict, they were even then making their feelings known by their reactions
to United Nations aid. They refused to take part in any major resettlement programs as these would prejudice their right to repatriation or compensation. They preferred to keep the conflict alive by their presence as refugees rather than beginning life anew in the Arab States where they did not feel welcome. By using educational facilities provided by UNRWA, with the aim of preparing them for resettlement, they kept alive and nurtured a Palestinian culture.

Gradually this Palestinian culture became stronger. Prior to the June War and with the encouragement of the Arab States, the Palestinians began forming militant, political groups whose aim was to liberate Palestine. These groups have kept up a steady war of attrition on Israel from outside of the State's borders. However, their hopes of beginning commando activities from within Israel proper and from within the occupied areas have largely failed.

Israeli officials, particularly after the 1967 War, have taken measures to quell such activities among the Arabs in Israel. Economic ties have been maintained between Israel and the neighboring Arab States. The military has also tried to maintain the governments in the occupied areas on the former basis as much as possible. The expanding Israeli economy is another incentive to the refugees to tolerate Israeli rule. However, Israeli officials have taken no concrete, long-range steps to find a solution to the conflict or to provide the refugees with a status other than their temporary, frustrating
one of refugees. Also, when any of the Israeli Arab population has attempted sabotage or even aided the commando groups, retaliation has been swift and severe.

The Arab States, though more kinsmen of the Palestinians than the Jews, have encountered ever increasing problems with the refugees. Only Jordan, among the major host states has granted the refugees citizenship. In the other states refugees' movements are restricted; they are not citizens, and many are not allowed to work. The Arabs are now having their own problems with the refugees, and with the commando groups which they instigated. The commandos are demanding equality with the Arab Governments and are demanding they be allowed to operate from Arab territory to launch their military forays against Israel. The Arab States do not seem able to curtail this activity as the Palestinians are better armed than the hosts. Palestinian raids on Israel also bring retaliatory raids on the host countries, not just on the Palestinians. Thus, they are becoming more a military than social problem to their Arab hosts.

The Palestinians, like the Israelis, do not favor and claim they will not accept a solution which is imposed on them. At this time, several of the Arab States seemingly would like to have a solution imposed just to rid themselves of the problems they have with the refugees. The Israelis and the Palestinians both feel that the problem is two-sided. However, the sides they choose are different. The Palestinians maintain that the problem is between themselves and the State of Israel. Israeli
officials feel that the problem should be solved by the regional
governments. Yet, the Palestinians, who currently seem to be
blocking a settlement, do not appear at all willing to compromise.
And to arrive at any solution, compromise would be necessary
between the commandos, the Arab Governments and the Israeli
Government.

Especially in the past ten years, the Palestinians have
been more of a liability than an asset in finding a solution
to the Middle Eastern conflict. Although commando influence on
Israel and the host countries did affect the Arab States and
Israel's decisions to try to agree to some solution based on
the 1967 Security Council Resolution, any agreement is still
negligible. Too, although UNRWA and other organizations have
expended a great deal of money in the area, little has been
achieved except the continued existence of the refugee popu-
lations. The refugees have not helped to end the drudgery of
life in the camps nor have they contributed to the development
of the Arab Middle East. By remaining refugees they have
prolonged the Palestine conflict and have rejuvenated a Pales-
tinian culture and political entity.

In Israel, the state they are out to destroy, they have
probably been the least officious, although their nuisance value
has been more than minimal. They have consistently rejected
solutions proposed by the Arabs, by Israel and by the United
Nations. Yet, they have developed no concrete set of plans or
programs of their own. The entire case of the Palestinians seems
to rest on a negative idea—the destruction of the state of Israel as it now exists. Beyond this the various Palestinian groups are unable to agree on what form another Palestinian state should take and whether it would or would not include the present Jewish population of the area. That both the Palestinians and Israel have stated they would be agreeable to a state comprised of both Arabs and Jews, if the other group were willing to live peacefully, has proved to be no opening for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement. Such is envisioning a state in which it is dominant, not a state where Arab and Jew are equal. Thus, the current problem would just be continued, possibly in closer proximity.

To confuse the situation even more, the Palestinians refuse to accept an imposed solution and are so preoccupied with their military endeavors that they have little time to sit down and participate in any concrete discussions which might result in partial or total solution. The Palestinians also claim that any solution should be between themselves and the Israelis. The Israelis want a governmental solution. The Arabs, in a weak position and being pressured by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, seem more and more willing to try to find an agreeable solution which can be achieved honorably.

On the military level, the Palestinians originally with backing from some of the Arab states have drastically escalated the conflict. Were it not for the guerilla attacks since the
1967 war, the Middle East would have virtually been at peace.

By being so militaristic, the Palestinians have caused the Arab host states to increase their own armies and police forces both to maintain order internally and to defend themselves against the growing number of Israeli reprisals. This growing number of reprisals can be directly attributed to the increasing number of attacks made on Israel by the Palestinians.

By their militance, the Palestinians seem to have gained few allies, either regionally or internationally, at least for their means. Many still do sympathize with their plight and with their overall objective to regain Palestine, at least in the Middle East. However, by transforming the conflict from a diplomatic stalemate into a military standoff at best, the commandos have gotten publicity, but little additional support. Rather the Arab hosts are now expending more energy in trying to control the Palestinians—the same groups they were instrumental in creating—than they are in devoting time to a solution. The Palestinians have been one cause of a worsening of relations between the Arab host governments as well as between the Arab and Israeli Governments. Their actions have also shown the Israeli and Arab Governments the necessity of settling the conflict as soon as possible. Yet, because of Palestinian influence and disruptions in the Arab States, none of these Governments has felt secure enough to attempt a compromise settlement.

In addition to military repercussions, the worsening military situation has also had economic and social consequences for the
area. By forcing the Arab States and Israel to place so much money, time and emphasis on the military, the Palestinians have contributed to a slowing of the development of the entire area. They have certainly not helped agricultural or industrial development by refusing to allow major United Nations irrigation projects such as the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley program. Other effects, however, have been more indirect, but not any less damaging.

By turning UNRWA camps into guerilla training areas, the groups have earned the wrath of ever-growing segments of the international community. Indignation at this technique has meant that some of the refugees formerly eligible for relief no longer are. These refugees must be supported by the host states in which they are residing or must fend for themselves. Either method has placed the burden of their support on the host states. This has meant an increasing diversion of monies which might otherwise have been available for development of the area. National development would create jobs, some of which might be secured for the refugees. However, to many of the refugees, giving up camp life for permanent employment still indicates acceptance of a *de facto* resettlement which they oppose.

Socially the refugees have refused to integrate themselves with the host populations; nor have the host countries really wanted them. Those refugees living in Israel have had little opportunity to become integrated with the Jewish population,
although they seem more eager for equality than their counterparts in the Arab States. The refugees, rather, seem to prefer life in the security of the refugee camps to that in a strange world where they must struggle to exist. Their schools in particular have remained oriented toward the past Palestinian culture. Socialization, through education, has deliberately brought about a more conscious feeling of being Palestinian than Arab.

Though the Israelis have consistently maintained that the host countries should resettle the refugees because of close religious, social and cultural ties, the Palestinians maintain that these ties do not exist, at least to the extent thought by the Israelis. The feeling of being Palestinians, together with the discrimination encountered in the host states, has done little to generate a feeling of Arab brotherhood. Even in Israel, which seems to have fewer problems with the Palestinians than the Arab Governments, the Palestinians are definitely not equal to the Jewish population.

The social and economic problems caused by the refugees have been more a function of their political feelings and military actions than they have of pre-planned courses of action. Particularly in their relations with Jordan and Lebanon have the refugees brought near chaos to internal politics. The delicate balance on which the Government of Lebanon rests could be completely torn apart by the refugees. That in Jordan has been brought to the brink of destruction on several occasions, with
the refugees, as citizens in Jordan, waging much influence on the country. The fact that Syria and Egypt have encouraged the Palestinian forays against Israel while Lebanon and Jordan have been cool toward this activity has not bolstered the almost fictitious Arab unity. The two states which have opposed refugee military activities have had to bear the brunt of military and political repercussions both internally and externally from Israel as it is these two territories from which the major share of the attacks are launched. Both Jordan and Egypt have been prime losers of territory, especially after the June War. Each state seems to view the Palestinian problem from its own perspective rather than working together to achieve an overall settlement.

Yet, the hosts' treatment of the refugees seems to have had little affect on the refugees reactions to the hosts. Though the refugees are citizens in Jordan, they have caused as much if not more trouble there than they have in Egypt and Lebanon where they are not accorded citizenship or status. Their reactions to the hosts seem to be based on criteria other than how they are treated. The Palestinians, in fighting to destroy a colonialist situation in Israel, have seen a similar situation in Jordan and Lebanon and seem equally determined to eradicate Arab colonialism. Thus, though the Arab States would like to see the elimination of Israel as a neighbor, they are coming to feel safer having Israel on their borders than having the refugees in their own countries. Only Syria, so far, does not
seem particularly inconvenient by the refugees. The Government has been willing to support their cause and encourages their militance. Yet, few of their military activities actually take place from Syrian territory.

The participation of the Palestinians in Arab League meetings has proved another disruptive influence. The Palestine problem is, of course, on the agenda. The conference is disrupted by Arab infighting on this topic. Though the Arabs have now included the Palestinians in regional activities, the Palestinians have formed their own regional organization which excludes the Arab governments. The Palestinians want to be included in Arab affairs, yet they also want to maintain their independence from the Arab Governments. This sentiment has created a situation which the Arab Governments are now finding difficult to justify. For a people without a developed infrastructure and without a territory of their own from which to operate, the Palestinians are politically powerful to an uncommon degree. Just by threats against Israel, the Palestinians are coming to wield more and more political influence. That the host governments are not militarily or politically able to curtail them has caused many additional problems. Thus, while the Palestinians have grown stronger, the host governments have gradually realized that they have created more problems for themselves than they had while simply fighting Israel.

However, the refugees powerful position in the Middle East may not be so stable as they would like to think. Though the
hosts cannot treat the refugees as pawns presently, the Arab Governments are becoming increasingly wary of the power concentrated in the refugees' hands. Seemingly they will try to control or decrease this power as soon as they can determine how. It would still seem that if the Arabs and the Israelis were to agree to a solution, the refugees could be forced to abide by it. For the Israelis, as evidenced by their continuing war with the commandos and the Arab States, do have the military power necessary to impose a solution, if it were to be imposed only on the refugees.

It would appear, however, that a solution imposed from outside would be doomed to failure. The refugees and the Israelis are both against such a solution. The refugees and the Arab Governments blame the present problem on the United Nations and "foreign intervention" and so would not be likely to ask those who perpetrated the present problem to solve it. The refugees are fighting against Israel and colonialism and an outside imposed solution would seemingly be just another form of colonialism.

A regional solution because of the Palestinians seems closer than ever before. Yet, several major obstacles still need to be overcome before there would even be serious peace discussion. Palestinian insistence on the implementation of Resolution 194(III) is both impractical and impossible, as the Arab Governments have come to realize. On this stand, the Palestinians have few allies. Rather, the Israelis and most of the Arab Governments
have indicated qualified acceptance of the November, 1967, Security Council Resolution. Yet, little has been done to explore its possibilities for a settlement, largely because of the stand of the Palestinians against it. For the Palestinians, fearing an Arab-Israeli solution, have kept Arab internal politics unstable as well as continuing their military actions against Israel. This has left little time for either direct or indirect governmental negotiations.

The Palestinians unwillingness to compromise should come as no surprise. Their rejection for twenty years by Israel and by the Arab States has caused them to demand a separate state, preferably a state at the expense of Israel. This feeling of rejection, combined with a growing Palestinian nationalism, has provided further complications to the problem.

However, because of the lack of agreement on commando means and goals as well as the lack of militance on the part of the Israeli Arabs, it would seem probable that the Palestinians could agree to a settlement, if given their own state. Many of the Palestinians are non-militant sympathizers with the commando cause, but seem more anxious to rebuild a stable, personal life than to destroy Israel. A Palestinian state would not necessarily mean the destruction of Israel, but certainly some Israeli territory would have to be contributed. If the Palestinian and Israeli claim that they were willing to live in peace are more than propagandizing, such a state might placate the majority of the refugees, though doubtfully all of them. Such
action might reduce Palestinian influence to more moderate proportions.

Although the Palestinians have caused the Arabs and the Israelis to think seriously about a solution to the Palestine problem and to the refugee problem, they have also created a climate which is not conducive to making peace. They have forced the Israelis and the Arabs to think first of their own defense and preservation and to think secondarily of peace. Until recently, the Arab hosts have not really desired to curtail the refugees. For all have favored the same cause— that of restoring Palestine to Arab rule. Now that the Arab Governments are being threatened politically and militarily by the Palestinians, they find themselves unable to curtail refugee activities.

Whether an Arab-Israeli settlement would ever placate the Palestinians is difficult to guess. However, it would seem that with the commando movement possibly losing some of its original attraction and with a partial refugee acceptance of Israel, at least on the part of those living in Israel and the occupied areas, that the refugees too might be willing to accept a settlement short of the 1948 Resolution, or short of the eradication of Israel. However, they, like the Arabs and the Israelis, have taken such a dogmatic political position that it seems especially difficult for them to reverse it, even gradually.

Since it has not been possible to settle the issue among the
regional governments since 1948, it seems no more likely that
by adding another factor—the refugees—to the controversy that
a solution will be achieved any more readily. Although the
refugees have brought about a desire for peace, particularly
on the part of the Arab Governments, they have helped to
provide neither the means nor the conditions necessary to
concentrate on a peace settlement. Nor does it seem that the
refugees will be instrumental in bringing about a peaceful set­
tlement of the conflict, solely on their own terms, in the
near future.

The current problem still seems to be one between the
Middle East Governments. Yet, the situation is more complex
than twenty years ago. The Governments still must agree to
a compromise solution. But, if and when they do agree, and
the situation is rapidly becoming one in which they would like
to agree, they are facing a problem which did not exist twenty
years ago. Now, in addition to agreeing on a solution, the
Arab and Israeli Governments must devise the means to either
impose such a solution on the Palestinians or gain Palestinian
acceptance of a solution.
APPENDIX A

REFUGEES IN ISRAEL

Source: The Christian Science Monitor,
February 20, 1970, p. 3.
APPENDIX B

ISRAELI BORDER FORTIFICATIONS

APPENDIX C

LOCATIONS OF REFUGEES

- Now occupied by Israel
- Camp
- Emergency camp

Nonrefugee population: 2,418,000
Registered refugees: 165,927
- In camps: 87,201
- Not in camps: 81,726

Nonrefugee population: 5,621,000
Registered refugees: 151,710
- In camps: 25,511
- Not in camps: 126,226

Nonrefugee population: 111,000
Registered refugees: 388,222
- In camps: 195,598
- Not in camps: 112,224

Evacuated from Canal Zone: 350,000

Nonrefugee population: 1,420,000
Registered refugees: 747,424
- West Bank: 202,350
- East Jordan: 201,150
- Not in camps: 201,150
- In camps: 66,715
- Displaced refugees from East Jordan, West Bank, and Gaza Strip: 185,783

APPENDIX D

UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 194(III), DECEMBER 11, 1948
PARAGRAPH 11

11. RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations; . . . .
APPENDIX E

UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 (1967), NOVEMBER 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict;

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threat or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in
this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
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