Portugal and her islandy| A study in strategic location

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PORTUGAL AND HER ISLANDS: A STUDY
IN STRATEGIC LOCATION

by

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B.A., University of Montana, 1969

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Strategic location is a concept which deserves systematic examination. The history of Portugal and her Atlantic island possessions offers an opportunity for such analysis. Strategic location is defined as the quality of being situated on the earth's surface in such a way that location, alone or in combination with other factors, is of significance in international relations.

Portugal's early history was largely shaped by her location. Her position on the western coast of the Iberian peninsula aided the Portuguese to escape incorporation into the Spanish state and encouraged them to embark on a program of oceanic exploration that profoundly influenced the history not only of Portugal but of the entire world. Early in their ventures into the Atlantic Ocean the Portuguese discovered the Madeira and the Azores island groups--the latter themselves of immense strategic importance, since they lie near the center of the North Atlantic.

The strategic significance of continental Portugal and of the Azores has resulted in Portuguese involvement in most of the great European crises since the Hundred Years War. It has also led to the longest-lasting alliance in European history--the tie between Portugal and Britain. On many occasions British aid was crucial for the preservation of Portuguese independence. In return, Britain obtained great advantages--a useful entryway into the Iberian peninsula and a valuable naval base at Lisbon, as well as the assurance that the Azores would be in friendly hands. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the British intervened to protect Portugal against its foes. Portugal, in turn, was able to exploit her strategic location, and keep the powerful ally needed to preserve her independence.

Portugal's strategic location has played a major role in the twentieth century. The country was involved in the First World War on the Allied side. Under the leadership of Antonio Salazar, who became dictator in 1932, Portugal rendered valuable aid to the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War. During the Second World War, Salazar's Portugal remained neutral throughout, but granted the Allies base rights to the Azores in 1943 under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. That importance was underlined most recently during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the Azores base was indispensable to the American arms airlift to Israel. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974 aroused concern in other NATO capitals, proof that Portugal's location remains an important factor in world affairs.
Dedicated to

Dr. Robert T. Turner, 1917-1972

late Professor of History

University of Montana

scholar, teacher, and friend.
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PREFACE

There are nations which have been small in size and lacking in resources, but nevertheless have managed to play an important role in history. Despite her lack of many of the attributes of power, Portugal's contribution to the development of the states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean has been significant. Many diverse forces have been responsible for this, but one fact dominates all others: there can be few better examples in history of the importance of strategic location.

Portugal's position on the map, her situation on the fringe of Europe and on the threshold of the Atlantic, made it possible in centuries past for her to make a mark on the world far out of proportion to her size. When her greatness was gone, her location kept the powers of Europe interested in her fate, particularly the foremost Atlantic power of Great Britain. Today, as a quick examination of a good newspaper will attest, her location still makes Portugal a matter of concern to American strategists and foreign policy planners. After years of obscurity, Portugal and her strategic location have been highlighted by the 1974 revolution and its consequences which are still unfolding.
Geographically, there are really two Portugals--continental Portugal on the Iberian peninsula, and insular Portugal, the archipelagoes that have been part of Portugal since their discovery. These are the Azores and Madeira. The islands contain only a fraction of the total Portuguese population and land area, but their strategic significance has been far out of proportion to their size, matching if not exceeding that of the mainland. They play an imposing role in this study.

In contrast, the other portions of Portugal's once-vast empire do not figure in any important way. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau have at last gone the way of the other European colonies in Africa, and Macao and Portuguese Timor--Portugal's Asian remnants--lie outside the geographical limits which this study can comfortably include. Above all, the island groups ethnically and culturally are as Portuguese as Lisbon and their ties to the motherland appear permanent. For this reason it is reasonably safe to assume that their destinies will be linked in the future as in the past.

Portugal's location has brought her both good and bad fortune. It has assured Portugal of powerful protectors--yet it has also involved her in quarrels not truly her own. On the whole, however, location has given her advantages which have permitted her to keep some control over her own fate.
CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC LOCATION"

The attempt to apply an abstract concept to a historical situation cannot succeed unless clarity exists as to what the concept means. Seemingly simple abstractions have an annoying habit of revealing ambiguities and complexities when they are analyzed. What then is meant by "strategic location"? It may be best to begin by making clear what it is not.

Strategic importance is not synonymous with the possession of natural resources (although any source of natural riches will tend to become important in strategic calculations). The natural endowment of Portugal is and always has been unimpressive but the country is significant nonetheless. The Portuguese case suggests a brief definition of strategic importance--the quality of being situated on the earth's surface in such a way that location, alone or in combination with other factors, is of significance in international relationships.

A strategic location is obviously geographical but otherwise may be one of many kinds of physical feature. Barriers and passageways come first to mind when the word "strategy" is mentioned. Such features as mountain ranges and deserts,
which serve to separate, or straits and navigable rivers, which assist communication, and thus tend to unite, are examples of barriers and passageways respectively. It is general geographical location, however, that often provides a state with its major influence over other states. As two recent scholars of international relations have asserted:

The role a state can play in the world is strongly affected by its position on the map. Thanks to geographical location, certain states which are small in area have made a greater mark in history than larger nations endowed with far greater resources.¹

The word "communication" itself provides a clue to the meaning of the phrase, for in one way or another, almost any imaginable kind of strategic location is involved with the movement of people, goods, or information across the earth—now perhaps also beyond it. Control of a strategic location gives the power to hasten or hinder communication and even to prevent it altogether. Since men live on the land and only travel on the ocean, maritime strategy is concerned first and foremost with the control of communication.

It is only natural, then, that the first thinker to give systematic consideration to the importance of strategic location was the dean of naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan. In his famous list of the "six principal conditions affecting

the sea power of nations," "geographical location" comes first. Says Mahan:

It may be pointed out, in the first place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory by way of land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose boundaries is continental.²

By Mahan's standards, Portugal has always had the disadvantage of a long land border, but in all other ways it is a maritime nation; its interests and efforts at expansion have always been directed seaward. This would not be so if its location were other than it is. Portugal's possession of island groups in the Atlantic has allowed her to claim some of the advantages accruing to island nations. In the words of Renouvin and Duroselle:

Islands in the middle of an ocean are particularly valuable as bases--economically as ports of call on sea and air routes, strategically important as potential naval and air bases.³

The value of the Azores and Madeira is enhanced by the fact that oceanic islands are rare in the Atlantic. There are not a great many other islands in the area from which comparable economic and military advantages can be obtained. Also, since continental Portugal's seacoast faces the open

³ Renouvin and Duroselle, p. 15.
Atlantic, it has much freer access to the outside world than it would if it faced an inland sea, which would make it much easier to blockade.⁴

Other writers on naval strategy have followed Mahan's lead. Thus the most recent major work on maritime history opens with this statement:

Geography is the major determining factor in any nation's ability to utilize the sea commercially and to defend its political and economic integrity from overseas attack. Thus each nation tends to orient its political, economic and military life around the advantages of its geographical position vis-a-vis other nations.⁵

Earlier in this century one school of strategists went so far as to elevate geographical position to the key role in world history. These were the so-called "Geopoliticians." Although the founder of Geopolitics was an Englishman, Sir Halford Mackinder, the concept drew its largest following in Germany, particularly the circle associated with Karl Haushofer.⁶ There Geopolitics was used as a justification for aggressive expansionist policies, and was otherwise so unsound theoretically that the word fell into disfavor after

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World War II. The Haushofer school emphasized the need for geographical expansion by any state seeking world power, and argued that Germany must conquer the Eurasian "Heartland," i.e., the Soviet Union. Haushofer's doctrines were in addition tainted by the racialism of Nazi ideology. Also, the development of nuclear weapons and air transport persuaded some analysts that geography had become irrelevant to strategic problems. This notion is no more correct now than it has ever been. Not all discussions of the interrelationships of history and geography have been carried to Haushofer's extremes. Strategic location is only one of the aspects of this general theme, which is fascinating and deserves more attention than it has generally received.\(^7\)

Two more aspects of strategic location deserve mention. Strategic location may be either a temporary or a permanent condition. "Temporary," or short-term, strategic location is perhaps best exemplified in certain cases by military history. In war, the control of some insignificant crossroads, or some normally unnoticeable terrain feature during a brief battle may determine the fate of nations. This study is concerned with the permanent type of strategic location or that

\(^7\)Some useful studies available in English are: Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of National Power* (Princeton: O. Van Nostrand, 1944); Nicholas J. Spyckman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944); Derwent Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State* (New York: Holt, 1944). It may be significant that all these were published during World War II.
extending over a long period of time and influencing a series of historical events. The strategic importance of Portugal is of this category for it has existed now for half a millennium.

Also, strategic location is usually examined as a factor in national power, and regarded as an advantage for the state that controls it. (This is evident in the words of Mahan quoted above.) But unless the people who happen to inhabit some spot of strategic importance also possess such other assets as numbers, natural resources, industry, and commerce and skillful leadership, they may find their situation a misfortune. It can cost them their independence, or their very existence. Except for the "Babylonian Captivity" under the Spanish Crown, a period (1580-1640) which approximates one lifetime, the Portuguese have escaped this fate. To discover how and why they managed to accomplish this, it is necessary to examine Portugal's origins and expansion.

Portugal - Origins and Expansion

Portugal is the oldest nation-state in Europe, having existed within its present boundaries (with only minor border alterations) since the year 1250.\(^8\) It is not obvious why this should be so, since these boundaries do not follow

\(^8\)Don Stanislawski, The Individuality of Portugal (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959), p. 177.
formidable natural barriers. The Iberian peninsula is covered with mountain ranges and its rivers are generally un navigable but both mountains and rivers are oriented east-west, at right angles to Portugal's long border with Spain.

Yet the region of western Iberia, in which Portugal lies, has always been somewhat apart from the rest of the Peninsula. The reasons for this are a matter of controversy but the fact itself is indisputable. Before history began, the Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures in the area differed from those dominant in most of Iberia. During the Roman Conquest, the province of Lusitania corresponded surprisingly to modern Portugal. After the Empire collapsed, Lusitania became part of the Suevic Kingdom that rules northwestern Iberia rather than falling under control of the Visigoths as did most of the Peninsula. This kingdom regained a separate existence for more than a century before being absorbed into Visigothic Spain in 585 A.D. It was never forgotten, and was used as a basis for territorial claims by later Portuguese kings.

Nearly all the Iberian peninsula was overrun by the Muslims early in the eighth century. Lusitania was not spared, being conquered as early as 713 A.D. (only two years

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9 Ibid., p. 69.

after the Muslim invasion began). The only part of the Peninsula not conquered lay in the far north. Here some Christian principalities managed to cling to their independence or win it back after a brief period of Muslim rule.\textsuperscript{11}

The modern Portugal began as a county of one of these little kingdoms, when Alfonso III of Asturias (a state also called León) appointed a nobleman named Vomarano Peres to rule a frontier district around Portucale (modern Oporto) in the ninth century. By the year 938 this county had grown to a dukedom, already commonly called "Portugal." This dukedom, in 1096, came into the hands of a family of Burgundian descent. In 1143, the second duke of the line, Afonso Henriques, rebelled against his Leonese overlord and claimed the title of king.\textsuperscript{12} Not until 1179, however, was the title given recognition by the Papacy.\textsuperscript{13}

The new kingdom occupied only the northern third of present-day Portugal, for the rest was still in the hands of the Muslims, who were split up into quarrelling little states called "taifas." Until 1250, the central theme of Portuguese history was the gradual conquest of the taifas. This was, in turn, part of the general "Reconquista" of Iberia from the Muslims. In 1147 Afonso Henriques captured

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., 1:25.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 1:41.

Lisbon with the assistance of a fleet of Crusaders (mostly English) who were on their way to Palestine. The Portuguese Reconquista was completed in 1250 by the capture of the Algarve (the southern-most province of modern Portugal). A treaty in 1267 between Portugal and Castile confirmed Portuguese possession of the Algarve and fixed Portugal's boundaries substantially as they are today.\(^{14}\)

The little kingdom faced an uncertain future. Originally one of many Christian states, she saw her compatriots absorbed by the most powerful of the Iberian kingdoms, Castile and Aragon. A similar fate for Portugal seemed not unlikely, particularly since the country was confined to a narrow strip of coast and mountain, shut out from the great control tableland of Iberia by the power of Castile. Late in the fourteenth century Portugal found herself fighting for her existence against her mighty Castilian neighbor. Her independence was saved by a spectacular victory at Aljubarrota in October, 1385.\(^{15}\)

Small, remote, and hemmed in on her landward side, Portugal yet possessed an invaluable asset--her position on the Atlantic. Maritime activity had begun even before Portugal became independent. Crusaders from overseas aided the Reconquest, as has been recounted earlier. The connec-

\(^{14}\) Oliveira Marques, 1:13-73.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
tion with Britain, crucial in many periods of Portuguese history, can be traced to the capture of Lisbon in 1250. Aljubarrota was won with the assistance of English longbowmen and military advisors.\textsuperscript{16}

Portugal did not begin as a great seafaring nation, for the development of her maritime power was a slow and episodic process. The bulk of her population have always been peasant farmers, not seamen. Other regions in western Europe produced more ships and sailors, but according to one noted authority, "what compensated to some extent for the small size of the Portuguese fleet and the weakness of the economy was the Kingdom's \textit{strategic position} at the outlet from the west Mediterranean to the Atlantic, central axis of the sea lanes from Italy to Flanders."\textsuperscript{17} The country was situated at the "street corner of Europe."\textsuperscript{18}

If Portugal enjoyed a central location from the vantage point of the Atlantic, from the Iberian point of view she was isolated. This situation also had advantages. If sometimes threatened by her powerful Castilian neighbor (and by its successor, united Spain) more often she was ignored. Lying off the main pathway, she was left to manage her own affairs to suit herself. This "offside position" has been

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 1:127.

\textsuperscript{17}Payne, 1:125. (Emphasis mine.)

compared to that of Holland, another sea-oriented nation, in relation to Germany.  

To make the most of an advantage such as Portugal possessed, it is not enough simply to enjoy it passively. Instead, a natural asset should become the basis of an active policy. This requires both foresight and energy. These qualities the Portuguese applied to a systematic program of maritime exploration. The fourteenth century had not ended when Portugal began her great adventure, the expansion into the Atlantic that would one day open up the oceans, and carry Portugal's flag to the shores of Japan.

Like many great events, Portuguese expansion had tiny beginnings. Modest fishing ventures, conducted from tiny ports now deserted and clogged with silt, marked the birth of Portuguese maritime enterprise. Trade relations with other European nations also began very early. Portuguese merchants appeared in Flanders early in the twelfth century. Close trade relations with England were established in equally early times.  

The future of Portuguese seafaring lay to the west and south rather than to the north, however. In these directions lay the great mysteries and the great hopes of gain. Legends

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19 Stanislawski, p. 213.

of mysterious paradisical islands in the Atlantic Ocean had existed for centuries. Voyages down the African Coast might tap the rich gold mines whose product reached Europe by desert caravans. Hordes of pagans were known to live there, whose souls might be won for Christ. Expansion into these areas was made possible by a crucial technological breakthrough: the development of the caravel. This was the first true ocean-going vessel, the first ship sturdy and versatile enough to sail anywhere.21

The early history of the caravel is obscure, as is the history of most technological advances before very recent times. But the evidence is conclusive that the caravel originated in western Iberia, quite likely in Portugal itself. The reasons for this have a great deal to do, once again, with Portugal's location. The caravel was essentially a crossbreed between two shipbuilding traditions, that of northern Europe and that of the Mediterranean. It combined the sternpost rudder, a northern development, with caravel hull construction and lateen sails which sprang from Mediterranean (and Arab) origins.22

Portugal lay at a crossroads where ships built on the Atlantic coast met other ships from the Mediterranean. The Portuguese traded both with northern and Mediterranean


countries, particularly the maritime cities of Italy whose shipbuilding techniques were very advanced. From the Mediterranean also came the Mariner’s Compass, which made direction-finding possible in the open ocean in all weather, and other advances in navigation. Portuguese shipbuilders were thus able to combine two disparate styles of seafaring and produce something revolutionary. Early in the fifteenth century the Portuguese began to use their new ships to sail to new places.

For centuries myths and traditions of islands scattered throughout the Atlantic, "St. Brendan's Isle," "the Island of Brazil," and the "Fortunate Islands," had circulated in western Europe. Which of these were pure legend, which were based on actual discoveries in ancient or early medieval times, no one can any longer determine. But they provided a stimulus for Portuguese exploration. This led, in fact, to the first Portuguese voyage to the Canary Islands either in 1336 or 1341. Then early in the fifteenth century Portuguese voyages discovered the strategically important Atlantic islands of the Azores and Madeira.

The Atlantic Islands

Some description of these two island groups is necessary.

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23 Diffie, p. 53.
24 Ibid., pp. 56-59.
They are located far apart and differ in many ways but possess some underlying similarities. Both the Azores and the Madeiras are oceanic islands of volcanic origin, lying far from land and utterly uninhabited at the time of discovery. Both possessed considerable natural resources, were attractive to colonists, and soon came to play important roles in the Portuguese economy.

The Madeira group consists of five islands located 575 miles southeast of Lisbon and about 300 miles due west of the African coast. There are five islands in the group, only two of which--Madeira proper and Porto Santo--are inhabited. Madeira itself, 286 square miles in extent, is by far the largest. Mountainous and rugged, it lacks decent harbors. But it is fertile. Its name derives from the Portuguese word for wood, because the island was heavily forested when discovered. Today it supports a population of 266,000 persons.

Madeira was discovered in 1419 by two sea captains named Zargo and Teixeira, acting under the orders of Prince Henry "the Navigator," the famous sponsor of Portuguese exploration. "The latter," in the words of one recent author, "perceiving the strategic location of the islands, immediately

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ordered them colonized."\textsuperscript{27}

First exploited for its lumber, Madeira later became a major source of sugar. Its cane fields were the first supply available outside the eastern Mediterranean. Many of the techniques for raising sugar cane, developed there, were later applied in the sugar-growing areas of the New World. Eventually the Madeiran sugar industry was killed by Brazilian competition and disappeared in the seventeenth century. Wine replaced sugar as Madeira's chief product. The superb wines named after the island, which travel unusually well, were exported widely (especially to Britain and America) and became a major item in Portuguese foreign trade.\textsuperscript{28}

More importantly, this first of all European overseas colonies was useful as a base and a port of call for the Portuguese expeditions that gradually felt their way down the African coast.\textsuperscript{29} After the Portuguese reached India in 1498, Madeira lay on the route homeward from the east—and on the main route from Europe to Latin America.\textsuperscript{30} Portuguese vessels coming back from the Indian Ocean were actually required by law to call at Funchal, Madeira's port and capital.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{27}James H. Guill, A History of the Azores Islands (Menlo Park, Calif.: By the author, 1972), p. xxvi.

\textsuperscript{28}Duncan, pp. 26-35.

\textsuperscript{29}Guill, p. xxx.

\textsuperscript{30}Duncan, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{31}Oliveira Marques, 1:28.
Whatever the importance of Madeira in Portuguese economic and imperial history, it is overshadowed in strategic importance by the Azores. There are nine islands in the Azores group, "the sole islands which exist near the center of the North Atlantic."\(^{32}\) They lie about eight hundred miles west of Portugal. The Azores, named after the hawks (açores) that abounded there, are ranged in a ragged line stretching roughly northeast-southwest, the westernmost islands, Flores and Corvo, 125 miles from the west. Their total area is 888 square miles. All are rugged volcanic peaks of the submerged Mid-Atlantic Ridge, and one island, Pico, rises 7,600 feet above the sea.\(^{33}\)

The colonization of the Azores began later than in Madeira—logically, in view of their remoteness—under the sponsorship of Henry the Navigator. He sent Gonçalo Velho de Cabral, a gentleman of his household, to lead the first colonizing expedition to the Azores in 1439. He "realized the Azores would be ideal as advanced supply bases. Using Madeira as a forward base on the outward voyage and the Azores on the return, he could send his caravels much farther down the African coast than before."\(^{34}\)

The colonists in the Azores were soon able to export commercial quantities of a variety of products. Lumber,

\(^{32}\) Guill, p. 18.

\(^{33}\) Spain and Portugal, 4:4.

\(^{34}\) Guill, p. 58.
as in Madeira, was early exploited, and so were the fish caught in surrounding seas. Different islands came to specialize in different commodities. Sao Miguel grew wood plants (from which dye was made), oranges, and wheat.\textsuperscript{35} From the steep slopes of Pico came the best wine produced in the Azores. Terceira, the most populous island, raised large wheat crops for export.\textsuperscript{36} After trans-Atlantic commerce began, the islands developed a thriving provision trade, selling food to passing ships.

Many ships passed the Azoreans' way for a reason which was a key to their strategic as well as their economic importance. Because of the patterns of winds and currents in the North Atlantic the Azores lie on the quickest and easiest route eastwards for a sailing ship bound from America to Europe. Moreover, the Atlantic westerlies blow directly across them. Columbus, on his very first voyage, stopped at the Azores on his way back to Spain.\textsuperscript{37} Over the centuries many sailing vessels followed in his wake. Inevitably the Azores were of interest to naval planners as well as merchant seamen hoping to pick up fresh provisions. Control of the Azores contributed to the control of the Atlantic Sea lanes as a whole, since their strategic location was such

\textsuperscript{35}Duncan, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 131.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., pp. 23-24.
that they could be used to protect (or to cut) the routes to Europe from overseas. The thick concentration of shipping around the islands created a tempting target for the privateers who were a part of naval warfare in the age of sail—as in the Anglo-Spanish sea battles during the age of Queen Elizabeth. The strategic importance of the Azores developed even further as European powers built empires in the New World. Before the fifteenth century ended, the Azores were the crossroads of the nascent Portuguese empire. "More than any other geographical unit," the Azores "aided in solving many of the riddles of the Atlantic ocean."\[38\]

Portuguese expansion rapidly carried their dominion to regions never penetrated by European man. In search first of gold, then of slaves (the Portuguese began the Atlantic slave trade, which had such momentous consequences for American history), then of a way to India, the seaworthy little caravels had made their way down to the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. The rounding of the Cape by Bartolomeu Dias opened the greatest age in Portuguese history. In a decade Vasco Da Gama sailed all the way to India. He was followed by the seagoing conquistadores, Almeida and Albuquerque, who employed the technological advantages of their cannon-armed vessels and a native talent for naval strategy to create the world's first oceanic empire. They seized control

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\[38\] Guill, p. 18.
of the seaborne commerce of the Indian Ocean, operating from a network of islands and coastal bases that reached from Mozambique to the Moluccas, and whose linchpin was the Indian port of Goa. The first major western penetration of Asia, the Portuguese ventures began a new age in world history.\(^\text{39}\) All in all, it was quite an achievement for a small people on the western rim of Europe. It is unlikely that the expansion could have taken place if the Portuguese had not arisen in a location well suited to encourage maritime adventurousness and to take advantage of the advances in maritime technology that were made in late medieval Europe.

Creating such an imposing structure, the Portuguese were to discover in the sixteenth century, was far less different than the endless task of maintaining it. The empire they built was so magnificent that their small population and scanty resources were stretched to the limit just to keep it in being. Against these difficulties, to which ambitious rivals were soon added, the advantages conferred by strategic location temporarily were to prove insufficient.

\(^{39}\)For more discussion of this fascinating story, see J. H. Parry and C. R. Boxer. The Portuguese technological advantages are well explained in Carlo Cipolla, *Guns, Sails, and Empires* (New York: Pantheon, 1966).
CHAPTER II

BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL: THE ANCIENT ALLIANCE

Portugal's closest ties have historically been maintained with Britain, another maritime Atlantic power. Like any long-standing diplomatic relationship, the Anglo-Portuguese tie was complex. It included important economic elements and some degree of political influence, despite the enormous differences in political culture between the two nations. The basis of the relationship, however, was strategic. It was of vital importance to Britain, once she became mistress of the Atlantic, that Portugal and the Portuguese islands be in friendly hands.

The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance actually predates Britain's emergence as a seapower. Romantically inclined historians are fond of tracing it back to the year 1147, when a band of crusaders led by Anglo-Norman barons provided aid to the Portuguese King Afonso Henriques in his attack upon Lisbon. The crusaders' contribution proved decisive to the seizure of the future Portuguese capital. But neither this

episode nor several later instances of participation by English crusaders in the reconquest of Portugal was the result of any alliance or other kind of official arrangement between the English and Portuguese kingdoms. The crusaders involved were private adventurers and the pacts they made with the Portuguese did not concern or commit the English government.

The first official link between England and Portugal was not formed until more than two centuries after the fall of Lisbon. It was part of a sizable English intervention in the Iberian peninsula, which was in turn a by-product of the long Anglo-French struggle known as the Hundred Years War. This was more than a rivalry of two royal houses. The Hundred Years War was the first of the great duels between England and France that were to convulse the European scene until Waterloo. Like those later struggles, the Hundred Years War developed ramifications all over Western Europe and spilled over into the Iberian peninsula.

In order to enhance their respective positions, both England and France sought allies among the Iberian kingdoms. The great prize was the friendship of Castile, the most powerful of the peninsular states. Castile's sizable navy, operating out of Biscayan and Galician ports, was in a position to threaten communications between England and her footholds in France, and even to raid the English coast itself. In 1338, for instance, a joint Franco-Castilian fleet ravaged
ports along the English Channel. In this conflict England and France found themselves backing rival candidates for Castile's unsteady throne. The first alliance between England and Portugal was an offshoot of what originally was an effort in 1367 to replace a pro-French usurper on the Castilian throne. Military success (the great English victory at Majera 3 April 1367) proved barren, however, when relations between the English Commander, Edward the Black Prince, and King Pedro the Cruel of Castile, broke down. The English left the peninsula, Pedro was overthrown and murdered, and the pro-French Enrique of Trastamara resumed the Castilian throne.

Portugal became embroiled only after its rash King Fernando fought and lost a war with the restored Enrique of Trastamara. The possibility of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance first appeared when the Black Prince's younger brother, John of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster, who had advanced a claim to the Castilian throne (based partly on his marriage to King Pedro's daughter) saw Portuguese assistance as the key to realizing his ambitions. Fernando resented the disadvanta-

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5 Ibid., p. 152.
6 Ibid., p. 174.
7 C. H. Williams, "The Expedition of John of Gaunt to
geous peace terms that he had been forced to accept. On the tenth of July, 1372, Fernando signed a treaty of alliance with John of Gaunt (signed by John as "King of Castile"). The Portuguese were to attack Castile from the west as soon as John invaded from Navana. 8

Unfortunately for Fernando, the English suffered a devastating naval defeat off La Rochelle before they could launch this invasion, leaving Fernando to face Castile alone. Portugal was invaded, leaving Fernando to send desperate appeals to London. The English offered to send help (in return for a formal treaty of alliance between Fernando and Edward III) but their aid of only 600 men came too late. Fernando was forced to make peace with Castile and France and became their ally instead. 9

Thus it appeared that Portugal had been forced into the Franco-Castilian camp. Yet the first formal alliance between England and Portugal, the "Treaty of Saint Paul's," was signed only three months later! The treaty was referred to even in the twentieth century as the "oldest alliance in the world" by the government of Portugal 15 March 1912, in the person of Dr. Augusto de Vasconcelos, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Portugal. 10

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8 Russell, p. 193.
9 Ibid., p. 198.
10 Portugal, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Plain Speaking:
Fernando was playing a double game. While pretending to change sides, the Portuguese King let his envoys in London negotiate as if nothing had happened. The immediate result of Fernando's machination was a bizarre situation in which Portuguese warships took part in attacks on the English coast although a treaty of alliance existed between the two countries. Still the English kept on good terms with the Portuguese; in September, 1373, the English government directed that Portuguese were to be treated as friends. A thriving trade between the two countries was not interrupted.

After Enrique of Trastamara's death in 1379, Fernando lost no time in moving over to the English side. On 15 July 1380, the Treaty of Saint Paul's was formally renewed. King Fernando promised to assist a force of 2,000 Englishmen under Edmund, Earl of Cambridge, a younger son of Edward III, who were to land in Portugal and march on Castile. He also promised to marry his daughter to the infant English Prince Edward of Cambridge.

In July, 1381, the first English army ever to land in Portugal arrived at Lisbon. Edmund of Cambridge was a miserable commander and the expedition accomplished nothing.

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11 Russell, p. 201.
12 Ibid., p. 299.
dawdling about Lisbon for months, plundering the Portuguese peasantry. The Castilians, the original objective of the expedition, were never seriously attacked. But this fiasco illustrated for the first time one of the two ways Portugal was to figure in English strategy for years to come. In wars on the Continent, and specifically in the Iberian peninsula, Portugal was extremely useful to England as a "sally port." It provided convenient access (especially since Lisbon was the finest harbor in the peninsula) for English seaborne expeditions. Lisbon lies in estuary of the Tagus River, one of the few in Iberia that is navigable for any distance. Only Cadiz is at all comparable.

After Fernando's death in October, 1383, King Juan I of Castile made an all-out effort to conquer Portugal. The attempt aroused an immediate outburst of patriotic anti-Castilian fervor in Portugal, based on the mercantile interests in Lisbon, and signaled by the seizure of the throne by the candidate they supported, João (John) I, first of the House of Aviz. The new king immediately sought English aid. The response of the English government was unenthusiastic, but the Portuguese were allowed to recruit English troops for mercenary service. Somewhere between 400 and 700 of these troops were present at the battle of Aljubarrota in August,

13 Ibid., p. 323.
14 Ibid., p. 365.
1385, where a spectacular Portuguese victory saved the nation's independence.\(^{15}\)

In the following years on 17 May 1386, the famous Treaty of Windsor established a lasting alliance between England and Portugal. The terms of the treaty included a clause guaranteeing the House of Aviz against Castilian aggression, as well as providing that nationals of either country could trade and travel in the other country on the same basis as nationals of that country.\(^{16}\) A Portuguese naval squadron was sent to assist in the defense of the English coast.

A great many alliance treaties have been concluded after the real need for them was past, and so it was in the case of the Treaty of Windsor. Portugal's independence was effectively confirmed at Aljubarrota, and was not seriously threatened again for almost two centuries. The most important immediate result of the treaty was not particularly beneficial to Portuguese interests. In 1387 the Portuguese found themselves aiding another futile effort by John of Gaunt to make good his claim to the Castilian throne. In 1398 the Portuguese were aided by an English force in a successful defense against another Castilian invasion.\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 386.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 414. (Terms of the treaty are quoted in full in Eduardo Brazão, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance [London: Sylvan Press, 1957], pp. 31-34.)

Although the two kingdoms remained on friendly terms, fostered a flourishing trade, and linked their royal families and aristocracies by marriage, the political relations between England and Portugal diminished briefly during the fifteenth century. Portugal's great age had begun. Secure at home, the Portuguese launched their drive into the Atlantic, exploring and colonizing. For the next century and a half, Portugal stood less in need of outside support than at any other period of her history.

As Portugal turned outward, England turned inward. English interest in the Iberian peninsula waned after the death of John the Gaunt and his Castilian ambitions. After the death of Henry V, the English in France were forced onto the defensive. Eventually their efforts to subdue France ended in disaster, only their toehold at Calais remaining after 1453. Then came the thirty years of civil strife remembered as the "War of the Roses." Henry VII, who ended this era in 1485 and founded the new Tudor dynasty, was preoccupied with establishing his power at home and had no taste for renewed adventures on the Continent. His son, Henry VIII, was more venturesome and intervened in wars on the Continent during the early part of his reign, but Henry VIII's energies were fully occupied at home after his divorce of Catherine of Aragon and break with the Pope. The internal difficulties caused by England's religious transformation kept England too weak and divided to play much part in international
affairs throughout the reigns of Henry VIII's immediate successors, Edward V and Mary. (The eventual triumph of Protestantism in England introduced a factor that complicated relations with Portugal as long as religious differences mattered in international politics. Portugal, unaffected by the Reformation, remained and remains today staunchly Catholic.)

Stability at home was reestablished during the reign of Elizabeth I. Hitherto England had played only a minor role in overseas exploration and trade but now English energies were diverted to maritime enterprise on an unprecedented scale. No new era of renewed Anglo-Portuguese cooperation occurred, however, largely on account of developments within Portugal itself. Portugal reached its zenith in the early sixteenth century and thereafter went into a rapid decline. It was plagued by the same economic backwardness and religious bigotry that afflicted its Spanish neighbors. The quality of its leadership deteriorated. The Portuguese lost their lead in maritime technology to the Dutch and English and actually seem to have retrogressed in shipbuilding and navigation. The basic cause of Portuguese decline was simple overextension. The small kingdom had neither the manpower nor the resources to maintain a

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worldwide maritime empire. The revenues generated by Portugal's monopoly of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean were eaten up by the costs of enforcing the monopoly. Yet the garrisons the Portuguese could afford to maintain in their bases were tiny, and the naval forces inadequate to hunt down the interlopers and pirates from other European countries who trespassed on the Portuguese domain with increasing impunity.

Portugal was once again in need of foreign support, and England was one possible candidate for the role, although the success of the English Reformation had opened an ideological rift between the two countries. The Treaty of Windsor, after all, was still legally in force. But before any such development could come about the course of Portuguese history was drastically changed.

In 1568 Sebastian I, who had inherited the Portuguese throne in 1557, came of age and acceded to power.⁴⁹ The new king was a romantic incompetent whose one aim was to crusade against the infidel. In 1578 he fulfilled his ambition by leading an invasion of Morocco. On 4 August 1578, Sebastian (whose meager talents did not include generalship) led his army against a vastly larger Moorish force at Alcazar-Kebir. The Portuguese force was wiped out and Sebastian himself

Alcazar-Kebir was a national calamity, not a mere military defeat. Sebastian had neglected to supply his kingdom with an heir before marching off on crusade. His immediate successor was his uncle, the Cardinal Henry. Being elderly and a Prince of the Church, Henry was obviously unable to carry on the line of Aviz. Henry died in January, 1580. The strongest legal claim to the vacant throne belonged to another of Sebastian's uncles, none other than Philip II of Spain. Philip not only had the law on his side, but more importantly under the circumstances, Europe's best army. After careful preparations Philip sent the Spanish forces, commanded by the fearsome Duke of Alva, into Portugal, where they swiftly crushed all resistance. On 16 April 1580, Philip II formally assumed the Portuguese throne. Thus began the sixty-year period under the Spanish monarchy which the Portuguese call the "Babylonian Captivity."  

It should be noted that Philip's seizure of the Portug-

20 Ibid., p. 129. (Although Sebastian's body was later recovered from the Moors, a story soon spread that he had survived the battle, and imposters claiming to be Sebastian turned up in the following years. A cult of "Sebastianism" in which the King figured as a "sleeping hero" on the order of King Arthur or Barbarossa persisted in Portugal for centuries. See Boville, pp. 155-57.)

21 Ibid., p. 151.

22 Ibid., p. 155.

guese throne was not quite a "Spanish conquest." Portugal remained a separate entity, one of the collection of kingdoms and principalities over which Philip ruled. On assuming the throne Philip made pledges (which he observed scrupulously) to respect all Portuguese laws and to appoint only Portuguese to positions of authority within the kingdom. Philip was generally supported by the Portuguese nobility and clergy. The Portuguese could at least hope that they had secured the powerful ally they needed—although they had paid an exceedingly high price for his help.

Under the circumstances, however, Portugal and Portuguese interests were inevitably subordinated to her great neighbor. Portugal was dragged into Spanish quarrels, no longer pursuing any foreign policy of her own. Philip II was quite aware of the resources and strategic advantages he would obtain by absorbing Portugal into his empire and gaining them may have been his main objective from the beginning.

The international repercussions of Philip's seizure were enormous, and nowhere better appreciated than in London. The English could only stand helplessly and watch as Philip swallowed Portugal, much as they opposed and dreaded any Luso-Spanish union. The future would prove that

24 Boville, p. 154.
26 Ibid.
Elizabeth had justifiable cause for concern. Sebastian's death occurred at exactly the wrong time, from the English viewpoint. Hostility between Spain and England had not yet reached a crisis pitch, sufficient to spur the cautious Elizabeth into making an effort to revive the Portuguese alliance. The growing hostility was far enough advanced, however, to insure that a Portugal controlled by Spain would create worrisome security problems for England.

In 1585 the great war between Spain and England that had been impending for a decade finally broke out. The acquisition of Portugal by Philip was an important if not indispensable prelude to his decision to risk open war with the English. "The acquisition of Portugal meant a great increase in Spanish strength in the Atlantic," wrote the foremost authority on the Spanish Armada. 27

The important role of Portugal in the story of the Spanish Armada is frequently overlooked in accounts of that ill-fated expedition. It is a demonstration of the role of "strategic location" since no other port on Iberia's Atlantic coast could have been used by such a large fleet. If the port of Lisbon was a useful entryway into the Iberian peninsula, it was no less useful as a point of departure for an enemy bent on the invasion of England. The fleet assembled in the Tagus estuary and sailed from Lisbon harbor on 9 May 27

1588.  

The Portuguese not only provided the staging base for the "Enterprise of England," but a considerable proportion of its total strength. Ten galleons (as many as were provided by Castile) were included, as were four Portuguese galleys. Portuguese ships thus made up more than 10 percent of the Armada's total, and a much higher proportion of effective fighting units in a force that actually consisted mostly of armed merchantmen. There is no need to recount the well-known tale of the Armada. One need only note that the Portuguese contributed their share of the heavy losses suffered by the Armada; three of the ten Portuguese galleons never got home. This was the first taste of the many misfortunes that Spanish domination would bring.

The destruction of the Armada (as is often forgotten) was only the beginning of a long war, whose end neither Elizabeth nor Philip II lived to see. The Portuguese found themselves in the "front line" of this the first great naval war to be waged between western European powers.

As subjects of Philip II, the Portuguese were fair game for English privateers. Their merchant fleet was preyed upon by Drake, Hawkins and their host of imitators.

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28 Ibid., p. 245.
29 Ibid., p. 247.
30 Ibid., p. 370.
The English government did not merely aim at plundering Portuguese commerce as an incidental by-product of the assault on the Spanish. Portugal played a much more important role in its strategy. This is shown by their ambitious riposte to the Armada, the "Portugal Expedition" of 1589.

The English government was very conscious of the great advantages it would enjoy if it could somehow detach Portugal from the Spanish empire and recreate the alliance of 1386. At a stroke Spain's naval powers would be reduced. Her sea communications with the Americas would be imperiled by a hostile power in control of the Azores. At home Spanish resources would be diverted to defense of her own borders. And it happened there was in England a person who claimed to be able to do just that.

This man was Dom Antonio, the Prior of Crato, the only serious rival to Philip II for the Portuguese throne. Since he was a bastard son of Sebastian's predecessor, his claim was marred by illegitimacy. But he was preferred by many Portuguese (especially among the lower classes) as a native over the foreigner Philip II. As was related earlier, his adherents were easily beaten by Alvas Tercios, but the tenacious Antonio did not give up. Going first to France, he persuaded Catherine de Medici (the real ruler of France at the time) to lend him a fleet for an attempt to seize the

32 Oliveira Marques, 1:313.
Azores. He planned to use the Azores as his base in a bid to reconquer Portugal. (Antonio had many supporters in the islands; not for the last time the Azores were a center of dissidence in Portuguese politics.) But no sooner had Antonio's fleet reached the Azores than it was attacked and utterly destroyed by a Portuguese loyalist fleet (led by a great Spanish Admiral, the Marquis of Santa Cruz) off Terceira, in 1583.33 Antonio himself escaped.

Undaunted, Dom Antonio came to England after war began with Spain. There he made many friends among the English seadogs (including Francis Drake) and persuaded the English government that if he arrived within Portugal with an army and a fleet, the Portuguese people would rise in his behalf.34 This was to be one of the three objectives (the others: to destroy the remnants of the Armada in the ports of north Spain, and to seize one or another of the Azores) of the English counteroffensive. This took the form of a huge amphibious expedition, as large as the Spanish Armada had been with Drake himself as naval commander and "Black John" Norris, the most distinguished soldier in England, as commander on the land.35

34 Ibid., p. 283.
35 R. B. Wernham, "Queen Elizabeth and the Portugal Expedition of 1589," English Historical Review 66 (1951) (2 parts); 1:1.
After numerous delays, the English armada departed in April, 1589. With such strength and such commanders it seemed assured of success. But it proved to be as complete a failure as the Spanish Armada, although less costly in life. It suffered from the fundamental military faults of multiple objectives and divided command (there were constant disputes between the cautious Norris and the daring Drake). The overcrowded, under-provisioned English ships were ravaged by disease. The attempt to attack the Armada remnants in Corunna proved abortive.

The total failure of the operation was assured when the English army landed in Portugal (fifty miles from Lisbon) and the Portuguese people failed to rise up against the Spaniards. Like many a political emigré seeking foreign support, Dom Antonio had promised far more than he could deliver. The Spaniards held Portugal in an iron grip, and Dom Antonio looked little like a national liberator when he handed in Portugal behind an army of heretical foreigners. The English army was too small to seize Lisbon by itself, and was forced to withdraw without accomplishing anything. An attempt to sail to the Azores was thwarted by fierce storms. All the English had to show for their great effort was the capture of eighty foreign merchant ships who sailed into the Tagus estuary.

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36 Rowse, p. 285.
at the wrong time.\textsuperscript{38}

This fiasco ended any chance for an early or decisive end to the Anglo-Spanish war. A long, exhausting struggle, gradually locking the contestants into stalemate, was the inevitable result. The English were normally on the offensive, the Spanish on the defensive, with the protection of their shipping as a primary concern and they both wanted Portugal and her islands. To accomplish this, they built up an imposing system of commerce protection, involving convoys, patrolling fleets, and fortified harbors. One of the most important features of this system was the Spanish control of the Azores. Terceira was turned into a great island fortress, in whose harbor the Spanish treasure fleets could shelter.\textsuperscript{39} For reasons explained in Chapter 1, eastbound ships normally passed near the Azores.

The Azores were a risky, but profitable, hunting ground for English commerce raiders who swarmed about the islands throughout the war.\textsuperscript{40} As the Portugal Expedition demonstrated, the English were quite aware of the importance of the Azores. In 1589 John Hawkins, Drake's greatest rival, proposed a plan which England would attempt to cut off Spanish trade by keeping a squadron on station near the

\textsuperscript{38} Wernham, 2:212-213.

\textsuperscript{39} Rowse, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{40} Andrews, p. 34.
Azores to intercept all ships sailing from the islands to Spain. This scheme was never adopted as it required more ships and better organization than were available in Elizabethan England. But it testifies to the acute consciousness of the Azores' crucial role in the minds of England's pioneer naval strategists.

The last major English operation of the war was the "Island Voyage" of 1597. A fleet led by the Earl of Essex with Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh each in a command of a squadron, sailed to attack the Azores (after an abortive attack on the Spanish port of Ferrol) with the intention of seizing all except the heavily fortified Terceira. Then they would lay in wait for the annual Spanish treasure fleet, the "flota." Raleigh landed in Rayal and captured the island, while a force of Dutch troops sailing with the expedition ravaged Pico. But the expedition, hampered by quarrels between Raleigh and Essex, missed the flota by only twelve hours. Largely because of Essex's bungling, the treasure ships sailed into Terceira unscathed. A subsequent attempt to seize Sao Miguel also failed. The Essex's fleet then sailed home.

The increasingly pointless war dragged on until 1604, when the new King of Great Britain, James I, made it his

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41 Ibid., p. 19.
43 Ibid., pp. 196-203.
44 Ibid., p. 208.
first order of business to end the conflict. Portugal's status was unaffected by the peace. It was still a firmly held vassal state. The English, during the war, had received many object lessons of the dangers created by a hostile power in control of Portugal; the Portuguese learned the dire results of incurring English hostility. The lessons learned would shape the relations of the two countries in the next century after Portugal once again gained the power to pursue its own foreign policy.

Renewal of Alliance

The long Spanish domination of Portugal ended abruptly in 1640. Whatever support the Spanish monarchy had in Portugal had withered away in the total absence of Spanish protection for Portugal's overseas possessions. The Dutch particularly had preyed on the Portuguese empire, completely destroying its domination of the Indian Ocean. They had also come near conquering Portugal's richest remaining colony, Brazil. The Dutch were finally frustrated but by Portuguese efforts alone. The Spanish provided very little aid.45

The Spanish government also whittled away at Portugal's local autonomy, which Philip II had solemnly promised and generally protected. His successors were less scrupulous. The Count-Duke of Olivares, Chief Minister of Philip IV (and

real ruler of Spain) bent on reforming and centralizing the creaking Spanish empire, was especially guilty of infringing on Portuguese privileges. Olivares' policies were resented throughout non-Castilian regions of the Iberian peninsula. In 1640 the Catalans (in the northeastern corner of Spain) were driven to revolt. The Portuguese, called upon to supply troops to help in the suppression of the rising, instead revolted themselves.\footnote{J. H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 517.} On 1 December 1640, the end of Spanish domination was proclaimed and a few days later the head of the great House of Bragança assumed the Portuguese throne as Joas (John) IV.\footnote{Edgar Prestage, "The Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661," in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar Prestage, p. 130.}

Portugal's renewed independence was precarious, protected more by Spanish weakness than by the nation's own strength. The Spaniards were preoccupied for many years in putting down the stubborn Catalans, and had no resources to spare for the reconquest of Portugal. The Portuguese needed foreign assistance if they were to retain their sovereignty. This assistance they received not from England, but rather from France. Cardinal Richelieu, the archenemy of the Spanish Habsburgs, was already backing the Catalan rebels and regarded the Portuguese secession as another opportunity to weaken Spain. He was the first to recognize Portuguese
independence, although he made no formal alliance with Portugal.\textsuperscript{48}

In 1640 relations between Spain and England were amiable and the Portuguese neither expected nor received English aid. But King Charles I received a Portuguese ambassador in April, 1641, and on 24 January 1642, a treaty was signed between the two countries.\textsuperscript{49} Although Article 20 of this treaty referred to a "peace and alliance" between the two kingdoms, this agreement was primarily a commercial treaty, allowing English merchants access to the Portuguese dominions and guaranteeing religious toleration to English subjects traveling or residing in Portugal.

The year when Anglo-Portuguese ties were renewed, 1642, was also the year in which the long quarrel between the Stuarts and Parliament finally precipitated civil war. For many years to come the English (as in the fifteenth century) concentrated their energies on internal revolution and had little time to spare for foreign problems. Development of the Anglo-Portuguese relationship was effectively stalled for a dozen years.

João IV was sympathetic to the Stuart cause and even involved himself in the English civil war to a small degree. The Portuguese ambassador to England, Sousa de Macedo, arranged

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 133.

\textsuperscript{49}Brazao, p. 36.
for the supply of munitions to the Royalist forces, and served as an intermediary for Charles I's correspondence with his queen and other supporters on the continent. 50 Sousa de Macedo left England in 1646 and for five years thereafter there were no diplomatic relations between Portugal and Britain. 51 After the Royalist defeat in England and the execution of Charles I in 1649, a Royalist fleet under Prince Rupert (the great Royalist cavalry commander) arrived in Portuguese waters. Despite Portuguese efforts to maintain a neutral stance, Rupert's ships used Lisbon as a base to attack Parliament's shipping. The inevitable result was the arrival of a Parliamentary fleet (under Robert Blake, another soldier turned admiral) off the Portuguese coast. The Portuguese ports were blockaded and shots exchanged between Blake's ships and the forts guarding Lisbon harbor. 52 After some further hostilities João IV realized he could not afford enmity with the new masters of England. Prince Rupert was forced to leave Portuguese waters, and a Portuguese envoy was commissioned to negotiate a treaty with Parliament. It took three years of hard negotiations before a treaty was finally signed on 10 July (O.S.) 1654, and this agreement represented a near total capitulation of

51 Ibid., p. 140.
Portugal to England's demands. Once again the main issues were the commercial and religious rights of Englishmen in Portugal. Englishmen were given virtual extra-territorial rights on Portuguese soil, and the Portuguese government agreed to limit customs duties to 23 percent and not raise them without the agreement of the English merchants. The treaty of 1654 represented the beginning of a trend—the inexorable passage of Portugal into the English economic orbit, the development of Portugal into an economic appendage of the British empire—which would reach fulfillment in the following century. In return for their concessions the Portuguese received nothing substantial. Not surprisingly, João IV refused to ratify the treaty until April, 1657, finally doing so only after another visit by Blake's fleet.

In the meantime, the Spanish, having finally suppressed the rebellion in Catalonia, made a serious effort to reconquer Portugal. Cromwell's government could not and would not tolerate any Spanish reconquest of Portugal. This, in turn, illuminated another enduring element in the Anglo-Portuguese relationship: if Britain bullied Portugal, it also protected her. The strategic importance of Portugal permitted Britain no other course of policy.

Blake's fleet, having twice visited Lisbon to intimidate

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54 Powell, p. 282.
the Portuguese, arrived a third time to protect them (11 July 1657). Shortly thereafter Blake died, but his mission proved successful. This great (if little known) British admiral always realized that the loss of Lisbon as a strategic base to careen and water his ships would make it impossible to carry on Cromwell's cherished crusade against Spain.

Blake's visit removed the Spanish threat to Portugal only temporarily. As an additional measure of support, the Portuguese were permitted to recruit 12,000 mercenary troops in the British Isles (a policy harking back to the fourteenth century treaties) by a treaty signed at Whitehall on 18 April 1660. Before this treaty could be ratified, Charles II was restored to the English throne.

The "Marriage Treaty" of 23 June 1661, is one of the most important, if not the most important, of the pacts negotiated between Britain and Portugal. Political upheaval in England, for once, operated in Portugal's favor. The new king had reason to be grateful for Portuguese support during the Civil War, and he was betrothed to Catherine of Bragança, the daughter of João IV. Charles II's accession was soon followed by important developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations for nearly three centuries, but it also remains in

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55Ibid., p. 308.
56Ibid., p. 282.
57Brazão, p. 39.
force to this day. It ratified all the treaties between the two countries going back to 1641 but went much farther than any of them. The treaty provided for an unconditional alliance between Britain and Portugal, binding Charles II to provide troops for Portugal's defense, to send a fleet of at least ten ships to guard the Portuguese coast, and to make no treaty of peace with Spain prejudicing Portuguese interests. In a secret article Charles also promised to mediate the long war between Portugal and the Netherlands, and failing that, to defend Portuguese territory against Dutch attacks just as if it were English. In return, the Portuguese promised a large dowry for Catherine, the cession of Tangier and Bombay, and confirmation of English commercial privileges. (Tangier, which the English only occupied for twenty-two years, lay on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco and served England, while she held it somewhat as Gibraltar did later; and Bombay proved to be a useful point of penetration into western India.) These territorial cessions were unpopular in Portugal but the results of the treaty proved well worth the price. English troops sent to Portugal helped beat off yet another invasion, and by a treaty signed 13 February 1668 (largely negotiated by the Earl of Sandwich) Spain at last recognized the independence of

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The three decades following 1668 were a relatively peaceful time for Portugal. As a neutral under British protection, she avoided involvement in the earlier phases of the long struggle between Louis XIV and the other powers of Europe. Not until 1703 was the little country dragged back into the European power struggle. Portugal was reinvolved by the Spanish Succession crisis. The central issue of the crisis—whether the Spanish throne would be allowed to pass to a Bourbon, and the Spanish empire to be united with the power and vitality of France—had obvious implications for Portugal. Her independence, so recently redeemed, would be endangered if the decrepit government of Charles the Bewitched were replaced by a monarchy backed by French might. The first course of action adopted by the current Portuguese King, Pedro II, was a policy of appeasement. In June of 1701 he signed a treaty with France by which he agreed to acknowledge Philip V (Louis XIV's nephew) as rightful King of Spain, and to close his ports to the ships of Philip's enemies. In return, he received a French promise of aid against any state who objected to the treaty.⁶¹

Pedro was driven to this step because he felt unsure of


British support since Britain had not yet made up its mind to oppose by force a Bourbon accession to the throne of Spain. In a matter of months, however, the British formed the Grand Alliance with Austria and the Netherlands. Britain regarded the Franco-Portuguese arrangement of 1701 as an intolerable obstacle to the effective cooperation of the Grand Alliance. A war against France in cooperation with Austria would necessarily involve major naval operations in the western Mediterranean. Lacking any other base in the region since Tangier had already been abandoned, the British fleet was utterly dependent upon access to Portuguese ports for supplies and repair facilities. Portugal's location, whose relative remoteness from earlier struggles between Louis XIV and his foes (which had been waged mostly in Flanders and the Rhineland) had made possible years of peace, now plunged her into a very dangerous dilemma. If she offended Philip V and his mighty uncle, she would be exposed to invasion by French and Spanish forces. If she held to the treaty with France, she would be attacked from the sea, her colonies and commerce in peril from the same British seapower that formerly had protected them.

The dilemma was solved by a vigorous British diplomatic offensive. Britain was not prepared to tolerate a French-dominated Portugal and was determined to dismantle Pedro II's

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62 Ibid., p. 158.
entente with France by diplomacy if possible, or force if necessary. To accomplish their ends the British were able to call upon the talents of a remarkable father-and-son team, John and Paul Methuen. In 1702 Paul Methuen was the British Envoy Extraordinary in Portugal, a post in which he had succeeded his father in 1697. Both men had long experience in Portugal, both diplomatic and commercial, and wide contacts within the country. The British government sent Lord John Methuen (then Chancellor of Ireland) back to Portugal in 1703 with the rank of Ambassador. Lord John's primary mission was to demand the opening of Portuguese harbors to British ships. He was instructed to warn Pedro II that friendship with France would mean an inevitable break with Britain. He was to urge Pedro to join the Grand Alliance, offering to accept any "reasonable demands" for an increase in Portuguese territory, as well as to give Portugal the same security guarantees that France had extended.

The Methuens had no great difficulty in persuading Portugal to come over into the British camp. Pedro's agreement with France, inspired mostly by fear, was unnecessary now that Portugal was assured of British support. His change of front was formalized by the two "Methuen Treaties" of 1703. The first of these, a treaty of military and political alliance

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64 Lodge, p. 159.
by which Portugal adhered to the anti-French coalition, was signed on 16 May 1703; the second, a short commercial treaty which allowed free trade in English wool and Portuguese wines, on 27 December.65 By a quirk of circumstance, this treaty is much more famous than the Alliance, to which it was a mere epilogue. It soon resulted in the replacement of French claret by Portuguese port and madeira as the accustomed drink of English gentlemen. Hence it was remembered long after the War of the Spanish Succession and the diplomacy that was inspired had faded into the mists of time. It has been called "the most famous of all commercial treaties."66

At the time, however, the signing of this treaty was nearly lost in the struggles of the War of the Spanish Succession. A spectacular British-Dutch naval victory off Vigo, on the north Spanish coast, on 23 September 1702, removed the last Portuguese qualms about joining the Grand Alliance.67 The Iberian peninsula, logically enough, was to be a major theater in the War of the Spanish Succession, and Portugal played an important role in the strategy of the Allies. A central war aim of the Grand Alliance was to

65Brazao, p. 44.
66Lodge, pp. 165-66.
67Francis, p. 151.
drive Philip V from Spain and replace him with his Austrian rival for the Spanish throne, the Archduke Charles. This necessitated major campaigning by the Allies within Spain itself. For the first time since the Hundred Years War, British troops were committed on land in the Peninsula not only to protect or liberate Portugal, but to conquer Spain as well. This aim they could not hope to achieve without Portuguese assistance. They needed Lisbon as a base, access to Portuguese supplies, and Portuguese troops to reinforce them.

Before this project could be attempted, the Franco-Spanish forces, led by Philip V and the French Commander, the Duke of Berwick,\(^68\) invaded Portugal in March of 1704, intending to conquer Lisbon, and was stopped in the summer more by logistical difficulties and hot weather than by Portuguese resistance.\(^69\) In the spring of 1704 some 21,000 British and Dutch troops landed in Portugal. The British troops were led by the Earl of Galway under the supreme command of the Marquis das Minas, a Portuguese general.\(^70\) In 1706 this army marched on Madrid (most of the French troops

\(^{68}\) Actually an Englishman, the bastard son of the exiled King James II and nephew of the Duke of Marlborough, some of whose military talent he inherited.


\(^{70}\) The French forces in Spain were led by an English expatriate, the English forces by a Frenchman--Galway was a French Huguenot refugee (Kamen, p. 19).
in Spain were then besieging Barcelona) and took the capital of Spain on 27 June. But the people of Madrid refused to accept the Archduke Charles as King of Spain, and a British force led by the brilliant but erratic Earl of Peterborough, for reasons unclear to this day, failed to unite with Galway after a march from Valencia on the east coast of Spain. Galway, cut off from Portugal, had to abandon Madrid and withdraw to Valencia. The Allies' great chance to conquer Spain was wasted. The following year Galway's army was destroyed by Berwick's forces at the battle of Almansa, 25 April 1707.

The record of British military operations in Spain from the fourteenth century until the year 1808 is enough to convince the superstitious that they were conducted under some kind of curse. Again and again during the Hundred Years War, the Elizabethan wars, and now again in the War of the Spanish Succession, ambitious British military expeditions marched into the peninsula only to be undone by logistical breakdowns, quarrels between allied commanders, poor generalship, or any combination of the three. Never was failure more resounding than in 1707.

Despite defeats in Spain, the Allies won the war. Marlborough's brilliant victories in Germany and Flanders, and

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71Kamen, p. 17.
72Ibid., p. 19.
Allied control of the sea (in which their control of Portugal's harbors played no small part) canceled out failures in the peninsula. What fighting occurred in Iberia after 1707 took place mostly in Aragon. France, fighting for its life on other fronts, was unable to spare troops to attack Portugal. In the end Philip V, by the treaty of Utrecht, was recognized as King of Spain, but no union between France and Spain was permitted. Britain, now in control of Minorca and Gibraltar, depended less than before on the use of Portuguese harbors, but was also better placed than before to assist Portugal if the need arose. Nearly a hundred years passed before the nation's security was seriously threatened again.

Portugal stayed out of European conflicts for the remainder of the century, assisted by the fact that the epicenters of these conflicts were safely remote. "Portugal's distant but axial geographic position, together with its alliance with Europe's premier maritime power, enabled it to avoid major involvement." Portugal was involved very briefly in the last stage of the Seven Years War. Spain was foolish enough to enter the war on France's side after France had effectively lost it. As a result, Portugal as Britain's ally was threatened with invasion in 1762. The

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73 Ibid., p. 23.
74 Stanley G. Payne, History of Spain and Portugal, 2:404.
Alliance Treaty with Britain was invoked and a British force of six infantry and one cavalry regiments landed at Lisbon to assist in the country's defense. The whole episode was minor, important only in that it conformed with an already established pattern of active British intervention whenever Portugal seemed threatened.\footnote{Harold Livermore, A History of Portugal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), pp. 368-69.}

On the whole the eighteenth century was a prosperous period for Portugal. Trade with Britain flourished.\footnote{See H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade (London: Methuen, 1971).} For many years the ruthless but efficient Marquis de Pombal ruled as a dictator. Almost the only event in Portugal noticed by the outside world was the disastrous Lisbon earthquake of 1755, the worst ever to strike a western European city.

Like the earlier upheavals involving France, the wars of the French Revolution affected Portugal rather late. Significantly, Portugal was drawn in Britain's wake. A treaty signed between the two on 26 September 1793, required Portugal to close her ports to French ships. At first Spain and Portugal fought France together as allies, but in 1795 Spain made peace with France, changed sides, and in 1797 invaded Portugal once again. Once more a British force landed in Portugal.\footnote{Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 93.} Unfortunately for Portugal, the British
were too hard pressed elsewhere to send aid when Spain, still a French satellite, invaded again in 1801. The Portuguese were forced to sue for peace, and yield the district of Olivença on their eastern border to Spain, cede some Brazilian territory to French Guiana, and pay France a large indemnity. When Britain signed a peace treaty with France at Amiens in 1802, she failed to demand the restoration of Olivença to Portugal and Spain has kept it ever since.\(^{78}\)

This humiliation was followed by five years of peace for Portugal. In 1807 the country faced an ominous new threat to her existence, the most menacing to arise since 1661--the wrath of Napoleon himself. The Emperor of France was irritated by the large hole Portugal opened in his Continent-wide boycott of Britain known as the Continental System. Portugal in 1807 was the only continental country not dominated by Napoleon. Portugal's ports served as entry points for British goods into the Iberian peninsula, whence they were smuggled all over Europe, undermining Napoleon's grand scheme to wreck the prosperity of the "nation of shop-keepers." The Portuguese refused to close their ports to British shipping and Napoleon decided to resort to force.\(^{79}\)

Napoleon's only access to Portugal was through Spanish territory. Spain was an ally of France, albeit a reluctant

\(^{78}\)Ibid., p. 93.

one. To gain Spanish assent to an attack on Portugal, Napoleon signed the treaty of Fontainebleau with Manuel de Godoy, the Chief Minister and actual ruler of Spain, on 27 October 1807. This treaty provided for the partition of Portugal. The northern provinces were to be handed over to an Italian relative of the Spanish Bourbons, the King of Etruria, who was to become King of "Northern Lusitania," the southern province to Godoy himself as "King of the Algarves," and central Portugal to be held until the peace treaty, whereupon it would be given back to the House of Bragança if Britain restored Gibraltar and Trinidad to Spain. 80

Napoleon never intended to abide by the provisions of this treaty as will shortly be seen. He had other plans for the Spanish Bourbons. Fontainebleau won for Napoleon what he needed, a pretext to introduce large French forces into Spain. On 18 October 1807 the French general Junot led a French army across the Pyrenees and on 13 November it was announced in le Moniteur, Napoleon's official newspaper, that "the regent of Portugal (Prince João of Bragança) is losing his throne." The Portuguese were helpless in the face of French might. On 29 November the Portuguese count boarded ship and sailed off to Brazil under the escort of the British Navy. Junot entered Lisbon the next day. 81

80 Ibid.
Having disposed of the Bragancas, Napoleon turned his attention to the Spanish Bourbons. As soon as his troops had occupied Spain in force, he summoned Charles IV, the old King of Spain who had just abdicated, and his son Ferdinand VII to France and forced them to sign over the Spanish kingdom to Napoleon (the Treaty of Bayonne, 5 May 1808). Napoleon put his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. This was a fatal blunder. Even before the treaty was signed at Bayonne, the people of Madrid rose in arms against the French on 2 May. The revolt was swiftly crushed, but the "Dos de Mayo" proved only the beginning of a savage guerrilla war, a war which involved the whole of Spain.

The Spanish rising offered tempting opportunities to Great Britain. Spain, a long-time enemy, was suddenly converted into an ally. By coincidence the British had just assembled an expeditionary force (ironically, to invade Spanish South America) under a promising general who had made a name for himself in India, Sir Arthur Wellesley. Wellesley's objective was abruptly diverted from Buenos Aires to the peninsula. Wellesley's orders originally were to land in northern Spain if possible, with Portugal as an alternative. The British Navy badly wanted to retake Lisbon.

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82 Ibid., p. 213.
harbor. The actual British beachhead on the peninsula was at Coimbra in the north of Portugal, where Wellesley's troops landed on 1 August 1808. Three weeks later Wellesley defeated Junot's troops so badly at the battle of Vimeiro that the French in Portugal were compelled to surrender. Immediately after Vimeiro Wellesley was superseded by two British generals senior to him, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. These gentlemen granted Junot unbelievably lenient terms by the Convention of Cintra, 31 August 1808. The Convention caused a furor in Britain. Dalrymple and Burrard were promptly sacked and Wellesley narrowly escaped the same fate. It did not greatly matter. The British now held Portugal. Their control of Lisbon harbor provided them once again their traditional sally port into the peninsula. This advantage was to prove of crucial importance to the outcome of the peninsular campaigns—and of the Napoleonic war as a whole.

The campaigns of the Peninsular War covered a period of six years, and are far too complex and dramatic to summarize here. (Two great British military historians, Sir Charles Napier and Sir Charles Oman, published histories of


86 Glover, p. 71.
the Peninsular War, and both required many volumes for the task.) The British owed their triumph in the peninsula to several advantages. There was the Spanish guerrilla resistance, which normally tied down most French troops in the peninsula, draining their manpower and morale. There was the leadership of Arthur Wellesley (or the Duke of Wellington as he was to become), a master of logistics and defensive tactics, who knew how to make the most of limited resources. And there was British control of Portugal, which when coupled with British control of the seas, assured the British of a secure base and dependable supply lines—an inestimable advantage over the French trying to live off the barren and war-ravaged countryside of Spain. Without Lisbon the British could not have fought in the peninsula. Here, as many times before, it proved the importance of strategic location.

This fact was known by the French as well as by the British. After Vimiero they made two attempts to oust the British from Portugal. The first, in May of 1809, was frustrated by a British victory near Oporto, the battle of the Douro.\(^{87}\) The second, which was launched in 1810, was a much more massive affair, aimed at expelling the British from the peninsula once and for all. The invading army, heavily reinforced from France, was commanded by Andre Masséna, one of most famous of Napoleon's marshals. He, too, recognized the

\(^{87}\)Ibid., p. 98.
strategic importance of Portugal to all of Europe and impressed its significance upon his men. As Jean Jacques Pelet, one of Masséna's chief staff officers, wrote later:

At last we were starting on our long-announced expedition, closely watched by all of Europe. . . . It was at Lisbon that the fate of the peninsula was to be decided and perhaps the destiny of the world; if the British were forced to abandon the capital they would lose all their influence in Spain [sic]. No other part of the country offered them the same resources and advantages, and they would lose the means of maintaining their army and fomenting insurrection. Portugal would submit and Spain, exhausted and discouraged, would follow its example as soon as it was abandoned. Then England would find itself isolated and blockaded on its island. It would lose hope of renewing its intrigues with the governments conjoined in the Continental System. Then France could preserve its preponderance in Europe which could only increase with its excellent army of three hundred thousand in Spain composed of the best corps available. Any other outcome of the expedition could only bring the opposite results.88

Masséna's army of three corps of 70,000 men began its march into Portugal in August, 1810. Wellington's 50,000 British and Portuguese troops fell back before him, fighting a successful delaying action at Busaco on 27 September 1810.89 As he retreated, Wellington adopted a scorched-earth policy, destroying crops, wrecking roads and bridges, burning villages, and driving off livestock. The Portuguese National

89 Glover, p. 137.
Militia known as "the Ordenança," was called up, and waged guerrilla war against the invaders. Wellington planned to make his major stand at that one location he could not afford to lose--Lisbon. One year earlier, on 20 October 1809, Wellington had ordered his engineer commander at Lisbon to construct a line of field fortifications outside the city, explaining that "the great object in Portugal is the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our measures must be directed to this object."\(^{90}\) In accordance with Wellington's instructions the famous "Lines of Torres Vedras," an awesomely formidable set of defensive positions, was built up on the hills outside Lisbon, completely protecting the city from land attack.

Masséna's advance turned into an ordeal of starvation and guerrilla harassment as Wellington's precautions took effect. The marshal had other troubles as well; quarrels with subordinates, incredibly bad intelligence (although the French had campaigned in Portugal twice in the previous three years, they still had no adequate maps of the country and took the wrong road to Lisbon)\(^ {91}\) and lack of support from the other French armies in Spain. Massena himself was an old man well past his prime as a commander. Nevertheless he pushed stubbornly onward until his army arrived outside

\(^{90}\)Pelet, p. 142 (quotation is from Wellington's Dispatches from the Peninsula, vol. 5, p. 234).

\(^{91}\)Ibid., p. 136.
Lisbon in October, 1810, only to come face to face with the Line of Torres Vedras. As Masséna at once realized, the lines were so strong that his weakened army had no hope of breaking through them. For lack of any other alternatives, Masséna sat down outside the fortifications, hoping Wellington would attack. This Wellington had no intention of doing. His army, plus a large percentage of the total population of Portugal, sat snugly behind the Line of Torres Vedras, assured of adequate supplies and reinforcements by British sea power. Meanwhile Masséna's army, cut off from its bases by a hostile countryside, wasted away. The usual roles of besiegers and besieged were reversed. Held together by Masséna's iron determination, the French stuck it out for five months. In March of 1811 Masséna finally gave in and ordered a retreat. Pursued by Wellington's men, the French reached safety in Spain in April. In the whole campaign Masséna lost 25,000 men of whom only 1,500 died in battle, the rest lost to starvation, disease, and guerrilla ambushes.

Masséna's failure decided the Peninsular War. The French were never able to mount another attack on Portugal. In Spain they were thrown back completely onto the defensive. In 1811 Wellington advanced into Spain, and although he suffered some setbacks, he pressed steadily onward. The French position in Spain, always precarious, collapsed in 1814.

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92Glover, p. 141.
93Ibid., p. 148.
Totally defeated at Vitoria, the French retreated over the Pyrenees and the final battles of the Peninsular War were fought in southern France. Catastrophe in Russia had broken Napoleon's power in central and eastern Europe. His empire was caught in an enormous pincers, one of whose arms was composed of a vengeful Austro-Prusso-Russian coalition descending on his northern frontier, and Wellington's army driving into France from the south composing the other. The First Empire was inexorably crushed between them. Napoleon was forced to abdicate and exiled to Elba. His attempt to regain power in 1815 proved only a dramatic epilog to a story already ended.

It will always be a matter for controversy just how great the contribution of the British Peninsular campaign was to Napoleon's overthrow, particularly when compared with the disaster in Russia. That it was great, no one can deny. The Peninsular Campaign was the result of an error by Napoleon. By alienating the Spanish, Napoleon for the first time gave the British a chance to grapple effectively with his forces on land. The British would never have been able to take effective advantage of this opportunity—which they had not anticipated—if they had been deprived of a secure base on the peninsula, easily accessible to British sea power, yet far from the center of French land power. This, their ally Portugal provided. It is as clear an illustration of the role of strategic location as any in history.
In the Age of Canning and Palmerston

The end of the Napoleonic War did not restore to Portugal the tranquil prosperity she had enjoyed in the eighteenth century. The country was spared external dangers. Indeed, Portugal has not been threatened seriously with foreign invasion from 1810 to this day. What she was not spared was internal strife. The causes of this dissension, which flared up into civil war, were very deep-rooted. The entire Hispanic world on both sides of the Atlantic, was plunged into a time of troubles by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1807. Foreign invasion and occupation were followed by political chaos as deep regional and ideological rifts opened within the Iberian peninsula. On the other side of the Atlantic the long-lived Spanish empire disintegrated and Portugal parted company with her richest remaining colony, Brazil. Ultimately the problem faced by both Spain and Portugal was their inability to adjust comfortably to a rapidly changing world and to reach any kind of internal consensus on the unsettling new ideas introduced during the French Revolution.

Britain, as the dominant Atlantic power, was deeply worried by the unrest that convulsed the Iberian peninsula in the 1820s and '30s, and Iberian problems were a major concern to her foreign policy makers. Upheavals in the peninsula had serious effects on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and important implications for Britain's overseas
trade and maritime security. It is important to note the differences between Britain's Spanish and Portuguese policies. In Spain Britain's main objective was to prevent intervention by other European powers. (Her efforts to prevent outside meddling had only indifferent success.) In Portugal Britain intervened quite freely, involving herself in Portuguese internal affairs to a degree unprecedented in times of general European peace.

Events in Portugal ran in close parallel with those in Spain during the post-Napoleonic period. The liberal revolution in Spain against Ferdinand VII inspired a similar rising in Portugal. Its target was not King João VI (who with the entire Portuguese royal house had lived in Brazil since 1807) but his Regent in Portugal, Marshal Hugh Beresford (a British officer who had been placed in command of the Portuguese army during the Peninsular War). Beresford was forced to leave Portugal on 10 October 1820, and a constitutionalist regime took power in the country. 94

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, was faced with a dilemma by the revolution in Portugal. Should he recognize the new regime? And was Britain obligated to intervene? The treaties of 1386 and 1661 included clauses that could be interpreted to mean that Britain was required to repress any revolution against the legitimate Portuguese government. A more recent treaty, signed in 1810, bound

94 Payne, 2:517.
Britain to recognize only a legitimate heir of the House of Braganca as King of Portugal. Castlereagh was able to dodge the problem of recognition by taking the position that Britain could not recognize the constitutionalist regime until it knew the attitude of King João, across the Atlantic in Rio de Janeiro, towards it. Castlereagh, in keeping with his normal non-interventionist attitude in foreign affairs, refused to countenance active British opposition to the new Lisbon government. He regarded the obligations included in the earlier treaties to have lapsed due to disuse, and the 1807 treaty to have been cancelled out by the Vienna settlement of 1815. Castlereagh and his successor, Sir George Canning, argued that Britain was obligated to defend Portugal only against foreign attack.\(^95\) While taking a "hands-off" position, the British government privately put pressure on João VI to leave his luxurious haunts in Rio and return to the mother country, pointing out that if he did not do so quickly he might lose his throne. In July of 1824 the King returned to Portugal and swore to observe the new constitution.\(^96\)

But Portugal's troubles were only beginning. In 1822 Brazil declared its independence, setting up as a separate empire under João IV's eldest son, Dom Pedro. The French

\(^96\)Ibid., p. 195.
invasion of Spain in 1823 badly frightened Portugal, for obvious reasons. But Canning, on 31 March 1823, promised to carry out British treaty obligations. The French, for their part, made no aggressive moves against Portugal.97

Portugal's worst troubles, however, stemmed from the fact that the split between the liberal constitutionalists and traditional absolutists in Portuguese society ran right through the House of Bragança. João himself was quite willing to be a constitutional monarch, but his queen (a sister of the arch-reactionary Spanish King Ferdinand VII) was bitterly opposed, refusing to sign the constitution, and his second son, Dom Miguel, was a dedicated traditionalist.

In May, 1823, Miguel supported by some Portuguese troops, frightened his father into disavowing the constitution.98 This led to nearly a year of uncertainty, during which Palmella, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, asked Canning to send a force to Lisbon to put down the reactionaries. Canning refused, in keeping with the principle of non-intervention, but did send a naval squadron into the Tagus, where it could keep an eye on developments without getting involved in Portuguese internal affairs.99 On 30 April 1824, Dom Miguel carried out a coup d'état, and made his father a

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97 Ibid., p. 197.
98 Livermore, p. 413.
99 Temperley, p. 198.
prisoner. In May the old King escaped to the British fleet moored in Lisbon harbor and was able to force Dom Miguel to resign command of the army and go into exile. Without formally intervening, Canning had taken measures by which Miguel's coup, which Britain opposed, could be frustrated. In 1825 Canning was able to diminish French influence in Portugal (which was reaching proportions the British disliked) by having his ambassador in Portugal, William A. Court, persuade João to dismiss his pro-French minister, Subserra, and reassign him as ambassador to London.

In 1826 João VI died, setting off a succession crisis. The legal heir, Dom Pedro, was already Emperor of Brazil, which he had no desire to leave. Instead of assuming the Portuguese throne himself, he assigned his rights to his daughter, who was to marry Dom Miguel, provided Miguel swore allegiance to the new Portuguese constitution, the proposed "Charter of 1826." This arrangement was to be guaranteed by Britain and Austria. Canning, originally lukewarm to Pedro's proposal, decided to back it and was able to get it approved by the Conference of the Four Ambassadors in Paris on 24 July 1826. Within Portugal General Saldanha, Governor of Oporto and strongest man in the country, compelled acceptance of the

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100 Livermore, p. 414.
101 Temperley, p. 201.
102 Ibid., p. 207.
new Constitution.\textsuperscript{103}

Many Portuguese still supported absolutism, of course, and one entire regiment of the Portuguese army demonstrated their sentiments by deserting, colonel and all, over the Spanish frontier. The Spaniards, in violation not only of international law but of a treaty signed with Portugal in 1778, did not disarm and return the deserters but allowed them to remain under arms in Spain, a standing threat to the new Constitution.\textsuperscript{104} The suspicion grew that the absolutist government of Ferdinand VII intended to back the deserters in an attempt to overthrow liberalism in Portugal. Canning's reaction to this Spanish maneuver (which sounds familiar to the twentieth century) was forceful. Britain would permit no Spanish domination in Portugal, even by such subtle means as these. When Spain permitted the armed deserters to attack Portuguese territory, Canning invoked the casus foederis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 12 December 1826 Canning defended his policy in these memorable words:

\begin{quote}
Let us fly to the aid of Portugal, by whomsoever attacked; because it is our duty to do so; and let us cease our interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions--but to defend and to preserve the independence of an ally. We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall not come.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., pp. 370-372.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., p. 373.
\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., p. 582.
So saying, Canning dispatched British troops to Portugal, the first to land since the Napoleonic wars. The arrival of the Redcoats brought immediate peace. The border violations ceased at once. Since Canning had succeeded in obtaining Miguel's reluctant agreement to abide by the new Charter, the succession crisis appeared to be settled. It stayed settled only as long as the 4,000 British troops remained in Portugal, however. In 1828 the force was withdrawn. Immediately, Dom Miguel repudiated his oath to the Constitution, assumed command of the army, and seized the throne. 106

Miguel was solidly in control of mainland Portugal for three years, but the Azores refused to submit to his rule. The independent-minded islanders, in constant contact with foreign ideas because of their crossroads position, never recognized Miguel as King. When a Miguelist landing force was driven off by the inhabitants of Angra on Terceira on 11 August 1829, the islands became a rallying point for Portuguese liberals. 107

In 1831 Pedro I, the Emperor of Brazil, resigned his throne, intending to establish his niece Maria Isabella in place of his usurping brother. Pedro received active encouragement from both Britain and France, itself now a supporter of liberalism after the July Revolution in 1830. The

106 Duffy, 2:521.
107 Guill, p. 137.
new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, favored a much more activist course in foreign policy than his predecessor Canning. For this reason in 1831 and 1832 Portuguese problems took up more of Palmerston's attention than any others in Europe. 108

With British assistance, Pedro's supporters set up a "government in exile" in the Azores, whose constitutionalist policies provided an attractive alternative to Miguel's brutal regime. With the Azores as a base and the tacit support of Palmerston, who allowed him to buy supplies and hire men in Britain, Pedro was able to raise a force of 7,500 troops which landed in 1832 at the liberal center in northern Portugal, Oporto. 109 Palmerston, who had refused to recognize Miguel as king effectively prevented Miguel's fleet from interfering with Pedro's invasion by blocking his way with the British squadron stationed in the Tagus. 110 Pedro's force was immediately besieged in Oporto by Miguel's army but managed to keep its foothold. Miguel, losing his support from Spain when the absolutist Ferdinand VII died, was unable to cope with a second landing by liberal forces in southern Portugal. In July of 1833 Lisbon fell after Miguel's fleet was largely destroyed by a liberal squadron commanded by an

109 Duffy, 2:522.
110 Webster, 1:241.
English volunteer, Sir Charles Napier.  

Miguel fought on for awhile, but was completely defeated in May of 1834. The new constitutionalist government under the young queen Maria Isabella restored the constitution of 1826. Its victory would have been impossible without British aid, formalized by the Quadruple Alliance of 1834 which included Britain, France, Portugal, and the new liberal government in Spain. Liberal constitutional monarchy remained the dominant political force in Portugal for the rest of the nineteenth century. Its position was always precarious, however, the country never enjoyed real political stability. In 1846 civil war broke out once more. Palmerston, in his third term as Foreign Secretary, sent a fleet once more into the Tagus in 1847 to protect Queen Maria's government against left-wing insurgents. In a letter written to Lord John Russell on 9 August 1847, Palmerston explained the British interest in preserving the independence of Portugal, and the strategic advantages Britain derived from Portugal's location:

Those advantages are many, great and obvious: commercial, military and naval, and if we were to lose them, some of them would not be mere loss, but would become formidable weapons of attack against us in the hands of a hostile power. For instance, the naval position of the Tagus ought never to be in the hands of any power . . . which might become hostile to England, and it is only by maintaining Portugal in its separate

111Ibid., 1:370.
112Duffy, 2:523.
existence, and in its intimate and protected state of alliance with England, that we can be sure of having the Tagus as a friendly instead of its being a hostile naval station. Only fancy for a moment Portugal forming part of Spain, and Spain led away by France into war with England, and what would be our naval condition with all the ports from Calais to Marseilles hostile to us... and with nothing between us and Malta but Gibraltar... . If on the contrary the Tagus were at our command, we should occupy an intermediate position greatly impeding the naval movements of France and Spain.

Centuries of experience lay behind Palmerston's words. Portugal mattered because of her location. Even in periods of "splendid isolation" Britain maintained with Portugal relations closer and more continuous than with any other Continental state. The British intervention in Portugal in 1847 marked the last in the series of overt interferences in Portuguese affairs. Portuguese politics remained as turbulent as ever, but Anglo-Portuguese relations became less eventful. This quiet period lasted most of what remained of the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER III

PORTUGAL IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Portugal Before the Outbreak of War, 1890-1914

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Portugal enjoyed a period of relative quiet in her international relations. But this era was to end before the twentieth century dawned. Portugal remained poor and in fact constantly skirted bankruptcy. Political instability, never overcome for long, was to reach a climax in 1910. Even the vast empire that Portugal still retained, and on the African continent extended somewhat, proved very much a mixed blessing. Portugal had not the resources to administer her possessions properly, or to develop their natural wealth. The Portuguese colonies were backward and scandalously run—a situation very tempting to stronger powers disappointed by their gains in the sharing-out of Africa during the 1880s and 1890s.

The guiding principle of Portuguese foreign policy remained as it had been for years—the Alliance with Britain. Relations between the two countries were not always harmonious but no Portuguese government was willing to forego the protection that the tie with Britain provided. Not only did
dizzying changes in Portuguese cabinets leave the Alliance untouched, but the revolution of 1910, which ended the ancient Portuguese monarchy forever, harmed it not at all.

For Britain the Alliance with Portugal remained an important element in a complex, worldwide foreign policy. The strategic basis of the Anglo-Portuguese connection remained as valid as ever despite revolutionary changes in technology. In fact it took on a new importance when a new naval threat arose—the rising maritime power of Germany. The strategic importance of Portugal and its islands made it a tenet of British foreign policy that Germany must be prevented from gaining undue influence in Portugal, which might lead to Germany obtaining bases in Portuguese territory that could threaten Britain's sea lanes.

The publication in 1890 of Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Seapower Upon History* heightened British awareness of strategic location as an element of seapower. Mahan's teachings, based mostly upon British experience, were widely read in Britain and had enormous influence there.¹ For the first time naval history emerged as a field of study in its own right as Mahan traced Britain's rise to maritime dominion. Mahan emphasized the value of "geographical position" as an element of seapower, ranking it first among six principal determinants of naval power. He referred specifically to the

strategic advantages Britain had enjoyed because of its alliance with Portugal in more than one place in his book.² Mahan's view of "geographical location" as an advantage to a nation seeking power on the seas emphasized the location to that nation itself. But his keen awareness of the importance of overseas bases, and of denying such bases to a potential foe showed that the concept did not apply only to a sea power's native soil. Portugal and her islands were obvious cases of strategic base areas.

In this connection the timing of a new Anglo-Portuguese treaty is significant. This Anglo-Portuguese secret Declaration was signed on 14 October 1899, just as the new threat from across the North Sea became susceptible in Britain. The agreement was short. It simply reaffirmed that the treaties of 1642 and 1661 remained in force.³ The British, then engaged in the Boer War, obtained an immediate advantage from the treaty for it contained a clause forbidding the passage of arms and munitions from Mozambique into the territory of the Boers.⁴

Even as the British tightened their alliance with Portugal, they showed themselves willing to bargain away their country's African colonies over the heads of the Portuguese.

²Mahan, pp. 185, 190.
⁴"Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration," as cited in ibid., 1:75.
Portugal was in dire financial straits and Germany was dissatisfied with her own unprepossessing collection of African colonies. The possibility arose that Portugal might be granted the wherewithal to solve or at least alleviate her money problems at the price of ceding part of her African dominions to Germany. After negotiations which began the previous May, Britain and Germany signed a secret note on 30 August 1898, setting the boundaries of territory in Angola which would be assigned to Germany as security for a loan. The Portuguese were not consulted about the disposition of their territory, although A. J. Balfour, who had signed the agreement for Britain, piously remarked that "I have always, as you know, been of the opinion that this was quite as much for the interests of Portugal as for those of the other powers concerned." In fact, Portugal managed to scrape by without raising any loans against her African territory and the agreement never came into force. But it remains significant for two reasons.

First, the arrangement points up one important characteristic of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, or of any client-state relationship. Britain needed Portugal and Portugal needed Britain, but their alliance was not a partnership of equals. In any conflict Portuguese interests would run a poor second to those of her mighty partner. No matter how

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5 Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell (enclosure in dispatch from A. J. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles), as cited in ibid., 1:80.
much they resented the fact, the Portuguese could not defy
the will of Britain.

Second, the British willingness to accommodate Germany
in Africa did not extend to any other part of Portuguese
territory except tiny Portuguese Timor, far away in the East
Indies. Most especially it did not extend to Portugal's
Atlantic islands. When the possibility arose that a French
loan to Portugal might be secured by a lien on the customs
revenues of Portugal and the Azores, the British reaction
was immediate and uncompromising. In a dispatch sent to
Sir Herbert MacDonell, then British Minister to Portugal, on
29 November 1898, Lord Salisbury, then both Prime Minister
and Foreign Secretary, explained the British position:

The enclosure in your dispatch No. 99 Secret,
of the 15th instant, shows that, among the
revenues to be assigned to the service of
the loan for which the Portuguese Government
is negotiating in Paris, are included those
of the islands adjacent to Portugal. The
expression "adjacent islands" may include
the Azores. If it does the matter assumes
an aspect to which Her Majesty's Government
cannot be indifferent. They have no desire
to interfere unnecessarily with the arrange­
ments which the Portuguese government may
make with a view to placing their finances
on a satisfactory basis.6

Salisbury asked MacDonell to warn the Portuguese that the
Alliance with Britain committed Portugal to maintain the ter­
ritorial status quo, and that the treaty engagements would
be imperiled if the Azores were allowed to pass directly or

6Ibid.
indirectly under the control of any third power. "Since the creation of a lien on the revenues of the islands might conceivably permit such a situation to arise," Salisbury instructed MacDonell to "call the attention of the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the matter and state that Her Majesty's Government feels bound to ask the Portuguese Government to give an undertaking in writing that the Azores, without the written consent of the country, pass under the control of any third power."  

Although the loan in question was French, Salisbury took good care to let the German Ambassador to Britain, Count Hatzfeldt, know of Britain's objection to outside meddling in the Azores. The matter of the strategic location and importance of the Portuguese Islands was too great an issue to leave to chances of misinterpretation. Salisbury noted that Hatzfeldt "received this information with a rather disconcerted manner, and did not return for some little time to the easy indifference by which his conversation up to this moment had been distinguished."  

This was not the end of British concern over Portugal's Atlantic islands. In 1906 the British government was again worried by reports that "certain foreign powers" were attempting to obtain a coaling station, or special facilities

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7 Despatch of Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, as cited in ibid., 1:80.
8 Memorandum by Lord Bertie, as cited in ibid.
for coaling at Horta in the Azores. Sir Francis Villiers, then British Minister at Lisbon, was directed by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, to check into these rumors. Villiers received prompt Portuguese assurances "that no concessions had been given nor was there any intention of granting one, and that if an attempt were made to obtain a foothold in the Azores or elsewhere, His Majesty's government would certainly be informed."  

In 1908 a German naval squadron on maneuvers called at the Azores and Madeira, giving the Portuguese government very little advance warning of their visit. The Portuguese were especially annoyed at the German visit to Madeira, where the Germans showed what the Portuguese government considered a suspicious eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the Madeirans. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Wenceslas de Lima, passed the Portuguese complaints on to the British Minister, Ernest Rennie, who informed London. In a minute attached to Rennie's dispatch, W. A. Stewart, a Foreign Office clerk, remarked that, "The Germans seem to have behaved in a somewhat clumsy way in connexion with the naval visit to the Azores. They probably regard the Portuguese people as too insignificant and too Anglophile to be treated with deference by such a great power as Germany."  

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9Despatch of Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey, No. 32, as cited in ibid., 8:51.
10Despatch of Ernest Rennie to Sir Edward Grey, No. 51, as cited in ibid., 8:65.
typical of Wilhelmine bumptiousness towards other nations) Britain never quite lost her fear of a dangerous degree of German influence there.

Where the Atlantic islands were concerned, the British could become concerned over quite minor matters, such as the possibility that negotiations between Portugal and Germany over a canceled concession for a German-owned sanatorium in Madeira might lead to a German foothold there. When Wilhelm II stopped off at Lisbon in 1905 on his way to visit Morocco, Sir M. DeBunsen, the British Minister, noted with some relief that while the German Kaiser was "received with considerable pomp and splendour, it would be too much to say . . . that his Imperial Majesty's presence in Lisbon worked much popular enthusiasm." In the light of current Portuguese events, it seems the British worried too much over German influence in Portugal. Political turmoil in the country rose towards a climax as King Carlos I and his eldest son were murdered on 1 February 1908. Carlos' successor, his second son Manoel, was overthrown in 1910; since then no king has reigned in Portugal, which immediately became a Republic. The Republic was proclaimed on 5 October 1910, and on 9 October the British Minister, Sir Francis Villiers, received a note from the Republic's Foreign Minister, Doctor Bernardino Despatch of Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, No. 52, as cited in ibid., 8:65.  

Despatch of Sir M. DeBunsen to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 30, as cited in ibid., 8:49.
Machado, informing Britain that the provisional government would abide by all existing treaties and desired "to maintain and even to strengthen the friendly relations which exist between Portugal and Great Britain."¹³ No Portuguese government, whatever its political complexion, could afford to dispense with the British alliance.

Villiers was immediately instructed to carry on relations with the new Portuguese regime on a de facto basis (total nonrecognition would probably have been fatal to the Portuguese Republic). Britain wanted all powers to recognize Portugal's Republic simultaneously. Full de jure recognition did not come until 11 September 1911.¹⁴ In the meanwhile, Britain sought assurances that the new government would allow no third party any footholds in its overseas possessions. As early as 18 November 1910 Machado assured Villiers that "the Provisional Government had no intention whatever of parting with any of the Portuguese colonies. If any were acquired by a foreign power it could only be by force."¹⁵ On 28 August 1911, Grey, the Foreign Secretary, sent the British Chargé d'affaires at the Lisbon legation a telegram inquiring into a report received by the Admiralty that a German company was

¹³ Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 64, as cited in ibid., 8:72-73.

¹⁴ Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 79, as cited in ibid., 8:79.

¹⁵ Despatch of Grey to Gaisford, No. 70, as cited in ibid., 8:76.
trying to purchase two of the Azores. On 25 October, a reply came from the legation that the new Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Vasconcellos, confirmed Machado's assurances that no third power would be allowed facilities in the Azores. As for the sale of any islands, the Portuguese government had no confirmation of such a deal, but if such a report were true, "the necessary measures would be taken to prevent the occurrence of any difficulty." Nothing further transpired, and the report seems to have been groundless.

Late in 1912 the Admiralty suggested that the Portuguese Alliance could be abandoned, since no enemy could attack Portugal's strategic possessions in the face of British sea power. The Admiralty's arguments provoked a devastating counterblast by Sir Eyre Crowe, one of the principal policy planners in the Foreign Office. Crowe argued:

The Admiralty argument practically amounts to saying that the Alliance is of little, if any, value to us and that we may safely give it up, provided Portugal remains independent and her Atlantic islands are not acquired by any maritime power.

But by what other means than the Alliance is it suggested that this condition can be fulfilled? At the present moment there can be no question. I think that the Alliance and the Alliance alone stands in the way of the islands falling into other hands.

16 Despatch of Gaisford to Grey, No. 71, as cited in ibid., 8:77.

17 Despatch of Hardinge to Grey, No. 80, as cited in ibid., 8:80.

Crowe's arguments quashed any proposal to abandon the Portuguese Alliance.

Whatever other benefits the new regime brought Portugal, it did not restore solvency. The turbulent Republic, like the decrepit monarchy before it, seemed chronically on the verge of financial breakdown. Once again, the possibility arose of Portugal leasing or selling her African colonies. In December of 1911 the Germans began unofficial overtures to Britain for new negotiations to arrange a possible Anglo-German partition of Portuguese Africa. Actual negotiations began in March of 1912, and after months of hard bargaining a new Anglo-German Convention was agreed upon on 20 October 1913.\(^\text{19}\) This treaty once again restricted any cession of Portuguese territory to parts of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea. No possibility existed that Portugal could be forced to yield the Azores or Madeira.

**Portugal and the Great War**

The first war in a century to involve all Europe could not be ignored by any European state--not even little Portugal, far out on the Continent's western edge. Because of the British Alliance, Portugal found herself inevitably aligned with the Entente. Neither the terms of the Alliance, nor the interests of Britain, nor the interests of Portugal, however,

\(^{19}\)Despatch of Grey to Lichnowsky, "Draft Convention" enclosure, No. 341, as cited in ibid., 10:538-540.
required Portuguese entry into the war as an active belligerent. The Portuguese armed forces were in very poor shape and could make no major contribution to the Allied cause. Britain wanted to have Portugal remain nonbelligerent, since the services Portugal could render the Alliance had much more to do with Portugal's place on the map than with her military strength.

For their part the Portuguese remained loyal to the British Alliance, but had no desire to participate actively in the war. On 7 August 1914 Bernardino Machado, then the Premier of Portugal, announced in the Portuguese Congress that the country would continue to adhere to the Alliance with Britain. This declaration was repeated and reaffirmed several months later. Portugal's military and economic weakness was more recognizable in Portugal than anywhere else. Deep political divisions made a united national war effort impossible. Nevertheless, there were powerful elements on Portugal's political left that did favor belligerency.

The Portuguese did not fear German reprisals because they held hostages. At the outbreak of war more than seventy

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German merchant ships took refuge in Portuguese harbors.
Drastic action by Germany would mean the loss of all these vessels. In addition, the Germans did not want the Portuguese in Africa (both Angola and Mozambique bordered on German territory) added to their already formidable array of enemies there.23

Although the Germans had given evidence of interest in the Portuguese islands, any attempt by them to use them as bases was out of the question. Portugal took such a pro-Allied line that there was no possibility of German raiders being allowed access to harbors in the Azores or Madeira. As for the German High Seas Fleet, it was imprisoned in the North Sea throughout the war by stronger British forces, and had no access to the open Atlantic.

The way of a nonbelligerent ally, however, is not smooth. Such a state is in an ambiguous situation, neither truly at war or truly neutral, which has its own peculiar disadvantages. Belligerent allies are likely to make demands which arouse resentment, especially when the disparity of strength between belligerent and nonbelligerent is as great as it was between Britain and Portugal. Belligerent enemies, on the other hand, are likely to regard nonbelligerency as no more than thinly concealed enmity and treat nonbelligerent states (if they dare) with even less forbearance than they show to genuine neutrals.

23Ibid., 9:322.
All this the Portuguese were soon to discover.

Initially, armed conflict between the Germans and Portuguese occurred only in the colonial areas of Africa. As early as the summer of 1914, shortly after the battle of the Marne, the Portuguese were presented with a request by Marshal Joffre (the French Commander-in-Chief) for artillery and gunners to reinforce France's depleted artillery reserves. Although Portugal had no obligations to France and agreement with Joffre's proposal would have made Portuguese belligerency inevitable, this request had British support. In the end, some guns were quietly sent to France, although no Portuguese personnel accompanied them.

The Portuguese role in the war soon became a bitterly disputed issue in Portugal's internal politics. The extreme Republicans (Democrats) favored active belligerency, in part because they believed that Portugal would be treated with greater respect by the British if it were an active ally. The conservative Republicans (Unionists) and the Portuguese Monarchists opposed involvement, many of the latter actually pro-German. Portugal's eventual entry into the war was more a result of internal political maneuverings than of external events. The strongly pro-allied Premier Azeuedo

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24 See ibid., 9:351.
25 Vincent-Smith, p. 217.
26 Ibid., p. 218.
Coutinho was replaced in January, 1915, by a conservative
general, Pimenta de Castro, who swung Portuguese policy into
a more neutral (or even pro-German) direction. Castro,
however, did not last four months. On 19 May 1915 a naval
mutiny in the Tagus sparked a revolution which ended with
his overthrow. Castro's regime was replaced by a govern­
ment dominated by the war-like Democrats. In June of 1915
the new government offered Britain free use of all harbors in
Portugal and its possessions, asking nothing in return. The
British government was no more than lukewarm to their ally's
embarrassing eagerness. Sir Lancelot Carnegie, the British
Minister to Lisbon, had never favored Portuguese belliger­
cy, regarding the country as too poor and politically un­
stable to be an effective fighting ally. The British govern­
ment feared that Portugal might soon ask for a loan, which
Britain would have difficulty providing. There was also the
distasteful prospect that "if Portugal remains neutral she
will probably, and if she becomes a belligerent, will cer­
tainly, count on our support in making good her claim to have
a voice in the general settlement after the war and to in­
crease her territories in West and East Africa." In fact, the Portuguese government had no expansionist

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28 Vincent-Smith, p. 235.
29 Times History, 9:359.
30 Vincent-Smith, p. 227.
31 Carnegie to Grey, 19 June 1915, Despatch No. 72, secret,
F.O. 371/2440 (quoted in Vincent-Smith, p. 228).
ambitions. It hoped only to safeguard the territories it already held which it feared might be bargained away in a future peace settlement. The Portuguese remembered the Anglo-German agreement of 1913. Only if Portugal intervened, it was thought, would her empire be completely safe.\textsuperscript{32} The British government refused to do anything to encourage Portuguese intervention, or the Germans to provoke it. On 5 August 1915 Grey obtained approval for a British policy regarding Portuguese belligerency. If Portugal entered the war as a result of anything but the most flagrant German provocation, Britain would contribute the absolute minimum, under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, protecting Portugal's coasts but providing no financial or material assistance.\textsuperscript{33} The British Admiralty took a much more positive attitude towards the Portuguese than did the Foreign Office. It lost no time at all taking the Portuguese up on their offer of free use of Portuguese harbors, since it wanted to use Oporto and Lagos as bases to fight against the growing German submarine menace. In wartime conditions the Admiralty invariably got its way.\textsuperscript{34} Portugal's strategic location was to be utilized whether the country was formally belligerent or not.

The Germans quite naturally were upset that Portugal's

\textsuperscript{32}Vincent-Smith, pp. 229-230.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 231.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., pp. 232-233.
strategic location now would be utilized by the British Navy rather than their own. Nevertheless they did nothing that would provide the Portuguese a pretext for declaring war. Although the German community in Lisbon did whatever it could to undermine the Democratic regime and stir up dissension in the country, it accomplished little.\footnote{Times History, 9:346.}

Nevertheless, Portugal's entry into the war was becoming imminent. In serious financial straits, the Portuguese government desperately needed a loan. Britain in its turn was suffering from a severe shortage of shipping tonnage, and wanted very much to get its hands on the seventy-six German ships interned in Portuguese ports. At the urging of Sir Herbert Kitchener, the War Minister, the British decided to ask Portugal to requisition the ships, assuring her of the support of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance if she needed it. Linked with this request was the offer of a two-million pound credit. This offer was amended: the two million pounds would be loaned unconditionally, with a further million added if Portugal seized the ships. The Portuguese premier, Alfonso Costa, agreed to this proposition with a show of reluctance, after Britain consented to make a formal appeal to the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 24 February 1916 the ships were seized. They passed under British control although they flew the Portuguese flag.\footnote{Vincent-Smith, pp. 235-236.}
Strong German counteraction to this very unneutral move was predictable. A sharp protest note was followed by a declaration of war upon Portugal on 9 March 1916. At last Portugal was in the war. This, in turn, immediately raised a new problem: what kind of belligerent role could Portugal play?

It would not have been surprising if Portugal, like many of the minor Allied states in both world wars, had become only a nominal participant, declaring war but taking no warlike action. This course the Portuguese government immediately rejected. They were determined to send a Portuguese fighting force to the main front in France. The Portuguese interventionists, long before Portugal was brought into the war, had planned to send an expeditionary force to the Western Front. This decision was partly the result of national pride, partly of a calculation that Portugal would be taken more seriously, and her prestige in the Alliance enhanced, if her troops were actually fighting. The fate of the Portuguese empire, the interventionists argued, might depend upon a Portuguese contingent fighting in Flanders. With the interventionists in power a force was soon dispatched. On 3 February 1917 the first troops of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force landed in France—a force that consisted of two

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37 *Times History*, 17:335.
38 Vincent-Smith, p. 220.
39 Ibid., p. 230.
divisions or about 30,000 men. By this time the Allies were happy to see reinforcements from any source, and even this small and ill-equipped corps was welcome. It was assigned a sector on the British front, on both banks of the Lys River in Flanders.

Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Portuguese Expeditionary Force was composed not of the Democratic firebrands who had been eager to see Portugal at war, but of bewildered peasant conscripts who were sent off to the trenches in cloudy, muddy Flanders with no idea why they were there, or enmity for the Germans they were supposed to fight. Soon the British developed serious doubts about the combat value of the Portuguese. On 15 January 1918 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief, recorded in his diary that, "General Horne, (Commander First Army) to which the Portuguese were attached ... is anxious about the state of the Portuguese." Within a few months these doubts were confirmed. On 9 April 1918 the Portuguese made their one mark on the history of the Western Front when one of their two divisions broke and ran under a heavy German onslaught, opening a dangerous hole in the Allied line. They did not seem to have been employed in combat again.

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40 Times History, 17:357.
On the seas the Portuguese entry into the war exposed their merchant marine and fishing fleet to the ravages of the German submarines. The first Portuguese ships were sunk in December of 1916; in the same month two U-boats actually sailed into Funchal harbor and bombarded the town.\(^{43}\)

Internally the Portuguese participation in the war worsened the country's economic and social problems. Food riots broke out in Lisbon and Oporto in April of 1916, and were followed by strikes.\(^{44}\) Economic hardship led to political strife. In December of 1917 the Democrats were forced from power, and replaced by a new government, a coalition led by Doctor Sidonio Paes.\(^{45}\) Although this new regime remained in the war, it was noticeably less enthusiastic about engaging in it actively than its predecessors. The lukewarm attitude of the Sidonio Paes government may have contributed something to the Portuguese debacle in Flanders the following April.

The only real contribution the Portuguese were able to make to the Allied cause was providing bases in the Atlantic for the struggle against the U-boats. The opening of Portuguese ports to British war vessels, mentioned earlier, gave

\(^{43}\) *Times History*, 17:356.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 17:358.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 17:360.
the British Navy access to harbors in the Azores. Following a pattern centuries old, the underwater successors of the privateers found rich pickings around the islands. A secret order to an American Admiral escorting transports in the European war zone stated, "reports of enemy submarine activity indicate that the area of greatest danger is East of longitude twenty West and within a circle radius five hundred miles from Fayal, Azores." After the United States entered the war in April of 1917, American naval vessels were sent to the Azores, and by the Armistice the squadron there numbered twelve vessels. This was to be the precedent for much greater American utilization of the Azores as a base in later years. Not long after the war ended, a new kind of strategic significance for the islands was revealed when the U. S. Navy flying boat NC-4, making the first airplane flight across the Atlantic, landed in the Azores in 1919.

After the war was over almost all Portuguese were agreed that their participation in it had been a mistake. If non-belligerent ally status had been uncomfortable, belligerency had been costly and embarrassing. Portugal was too small to participate effectively in a battle of giants. The one real asset she had to offer her allies--bases (in fact her strategic location)--she could and did provide before she became a bellig-

48 Guill, p. 154.
erent. The tiny fraction, three-fourths of 1 percent, of German reparations, which Portugal obtained by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and a tiny piece of German East Africa, were hardly adequate compensation for the cost incurred by her involvement in the war. It was a lesson which the Portuguese were to remember, and profoundly influenced the policy they would follow in the next great world conflict.

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CHAPTER IV

PORTUGAL AND WORLD WAR II

The Rise of Salazar and the Spanish Civil War

The end of the First World War did nothing to ease Portugal's chronic political turbulence, which lasted far into the next decade. Over the course of time unceasing instability had its repercussions on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Relations with Britain deteriorated to the point that in 1927 Austin Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, began to doubt whether the Alliance was worth preserving. If there was any doubt on this matter, the Foreign Office's reply to a query on the subject strongly reaffirmed the Alliance's value. The tie with Portugal guaranteed Portuguese assistance in wartime which had been of value in the Boer War and the Great War, despite Portugal's weakness. The fact that Portugal was linked with Britain removed her as a possible enemy, easing the burdens of Britain's defense planners. Above all, the Alliance guaranteed Britain the use of Lisbon harbor and the Portuguese islands as naval and air bases in wartime, and barred foreigners from obtaining footholds in the islands without prior British consent. The Foreign Office argued that Britain's situation in 1914 would have been "immeasurably
more dangerous and difficult" if Portugal had been on the German side, or even completely neutral. Such a situation "might indeed have cost Britain the war."¹

These arguments plus the contention that Britain would be on very shaky legal grounds if she denounced the treaty unilaterally, changed Chamberlain's mind completely, and in November of 1927 the British Cabinet concurred in Chamberlain's new view. On 21 December 1927 Chamberlain replied to a question on the Alliance in the House of Commons with the statement that the British government had "every intention of maintaining in force the ancient Alliance between this country and Portugal."²

The question of the usefulness of the Alliance came up once again in the interwar years, when in 1936 the retired Ambassador to Portugal, Claude Russell, wrote a memorandum on the subject at the prompting of Sir Samuel Hoare, recently Foreign Secretary. Reflecting the mood of the British government during that melancholy decade, Russell assumed that Britain's primary aim was to reduce her risks and limit her involvements abroad. Russell expressed the fear that protecting Portugal's colonies might embroil Britain with one of her own dominions, South Africa, as well as with Germany,

¹Austin Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrell, PRO CAB 24/189 C.P. 255.
Japan, or Italy. Nevertheless Russell clearly noted that Britain did derive an advantage from the Alliance— in time of war Britain would have the use of the Tagus and the Atlantic islands. This advantage was hypothetical but by no means negligible.  

Once again the Foreign Office spoke up in defense of the Alliance. An official of the Western Department, C. A. E. Shuckbrugh, reiterated the arguments that had convinced Chamberlain in 1927 and added to them the assertion that Britain could expect no special rights in the Atlantic islands (even in return for a British guarantee of Portuguese possession) if she terminated the Alliance. Shuckbrugh believed that the military value of the Alliance had increased since 1927, and the naval value of Lisbon and the islands had been supplemental by their new use, as landing places for planes flying the British Empire's air routes. If Spain went communist (at this time the strongly left-wing Popular Front was in power in Madrid), a friendly Portugal would be a definite asset to Britain, even if she had once more to be guarded from invasion.  

Shuckbrugh's arguments were supported by Sir George Maunsey, Permanent Assistant Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, a higher-ranking official. The question

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3 Memorandum by Claude Russell to Anthony Eden, 29 January 1936, FO 371/20512.

appeared to be settled.5

Only a few months later, however, civil war erupted in Spain. The conflict was not merely a crisis in internal Spanish politics but in the international affairs of all Europe. Portugal was destined to play an important if generally overlooked role in the Spanish Civil War. Portuguese policy toward the Spanish displeased Britain, but Portugal clung to it nevertheless. To understand Portugal's position in the Spanish crisis—and in much else that was to happen later, one must backtrack a few years to 1932, when a fundamental change occurred in Portuguese politics—the coming to power of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.

The instability, at times verging on anarchy, that had plagued the Portuguese Republic since its inception worsened during the 1920s. Political turmoil resulted in economic collapse. In desperation the current military junta appointed Salazar, then a professor of political economy at the University of Coimbra, Minister of Finance in June, 1926.6 Salazar's first term in office was short, but he was reappointed in 1928 by the Acting President, General Carmona. Salazar's policies proved so successful in restoring financial stability to the country that he soon dominated the government. On 5 July 1932 Salazar became Prime Minister and the following year a new

5Ibid., p. 738.

constitution granted him dictatorial powers. In this unusual fashion despotism, the usual cure for anarchy, came to Portugal and one of the most durable regimes in modern European history began its long reign. Unlike most of its contemporaries in Europe and out, the "Estado Novo," as Salazar's government was called, was the creation not of a popular demagogue or a military dictator, but of a professor. It reflected Salazar's own mild-mannered but iron-willed personality. As dictators go, Salazar was neither very ruthless nor very cruel, although his power rested ultimately upon armed force and an efficient secret police, the P.I.D.E.

Salazar's own political beliefs were strongly and unmistakably right-wing. He himself was a devout Catholic, and Catholic doctrine colored his economic and political beliefs. Corporatism, a basic principle of his regime, was drawn partly from Catholic thought, partly from Mussolini's Fascist state. Salazar himself was then and later often called a "fascist," and he did admire Mussolini. In the prewar years Salazar's government took on some typical fascist trappings, such as a uniformed youth movement. But if it resembled any other European dictatorship it was not Fascist Italy, and still less Nazi Germany, but the short-lived Austrian state of Dolfuss and Schuschnigg. Salazar did share with the Italians and German dictatorships a loathing for Marxism and Communism in

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7 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
8 Ibid., p. 67.
all its forms. Anti-Communism was one of Salazar's deepest beliefs, never abandoned or relaxed throughout his lifetime.\(^9\) This belief helps explain not only his domestic policies, but his foreign policy as well.

Given Salazar's views, it should surprise no one that Portugal openly backed the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War from the very beginning. Salazar actually sent a force of 20,000 "volunteers" to fight on Franco's side. This force was one of the least-known, but by no means the smallest or least effective of the various foreign legions engaged on either side in the Spanish struggle.\(^10\) As many as 50 percent of the Portuguese force became casualties.\(^11\) Salazar's help to Franco's forces went far beyond contributing troops. He provided diplomatic and moral support, and what few munitions he could spare. The most important assistance Portugal provided was to serve as a conduit for the aid sent the Nationalists by their powerful foreign allies, especially Germany. The foremost historian of the Spanish Civil War writes, "It was through Portugal that the greater part of German aid was at first sent."\(^12\) The Civil War was not a month old when the Spanish Nationalists made their first requests for aircraft

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\(^9\)Ibid., p. 68.


\(^12\)Thomas, p. 231.
to be delivered via Portugal.\textsuperscript{13}

On 22 August 1936 the German Chargé in Lisbon, Count Du Moulin, reported to his government that a shipment of arms had been passed on to the Spanish rebels after being landed in Lisbon from German vessels. He noted that "Prime Minister Salazar removed all difficulties within a very short time by his personal initiative and personal handling of details."\textsuperscript{14} Salazar's action set the pattern for future arms shipments. Once again, Portugal was serving as a sally port into the peninsula for outside forces. Her location was once again a factor in world history. Due to Portugal's easy access to the outside world and the circumstance that Nationalist forces quickly won control of most of the Spanish territory on her borders, she was ideally situated to foster outside intervention in the Spanish fratricide. Significantly, until Germany formally recognized the Franco regime on 18 November 1936, the German Minister in Lisbon also functioned as the unofficial envoy to Nationalist Spain.\textsuperscript{15}

There was one major alteration in the pattern of centuries. This time Britain was not the foreign power intervening in Iberia. The British government feared that the

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\textsuperscript{13}U. S., Department of State, "Chargé d'Affairs in Portugal to (German) Foreign Ministry," in Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 3:14 (hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.)

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 3:53.

\textsuperscript{15}"Foreign Minister to Legation in Portugal," as cited in ibid., 3:132.
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Spanish War might be the trigger that would set off the long-expected, long-dreaded world war. Her primary objective was to keep out of the conflict herself and as far as possible to keep other powers out as well. It was impossible to reconcile Britain's aims with Salazar's wholehearted support of the Nationalist rebels. The result, inevitably, was strain on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.

When Britain and France sponsored an international effort to prevent outside meddling in Spain, Portugal had to be pressured heavily by Britain before she would agree to participate. On 18 August 1936 Salazar issued a decree embargoing the export of munitions to Spain, but included a clause which provided "that the prohibition is to be suspended should any nation adhering to the agreement enlist, directly or indirectly volunteers for either side, open subscriptions . . . , or send funds publicly subscribed. . . ."16 Since various outside powers--Germany and Italy on one side, the U.S.S.R. and Mexico on the other--were doing just that, a loophole was left through which Portugal could send any aid to Franco she desired.

Portugal did make a show thereafter of adhering to non-intervention. The country had a seat on the International

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Non-Intervention Committee, but its participation was always reluctant and balky, conditioned on strict adherence to nonintervention by all other powers, which never occurred. At times the U.S.S.R. used Portuguese involvement as a justification for its own aid to the Spanish Republicans. Portugal contributed its share to the atmosphere of hypocrisy and sham that constantly surrounded "nonintervention."

Salazar's attitude toward the Spanish War, combined with demands for greater military assistance from Britain, brought the British government once again to reassess the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. After Portugal in 1937 requested larger arms shipments and the dispatch of a British military mission to Lisbon, the British Foreign Office sought the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee replied by ordering a report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on the Alliance, and then passing the report to the Foreign Office with its endorsement. Once again the value of the Alliance was reaffirmed on strategic grounds. In the last decade the importance of Portugal's strategic location had in fact increased. Germany's rearmament, the growth of hostility between Britain and Italy, and the Spanish Civil War had raised the value of the Alliance to British naval strategy. If a hostile government aligned with Germany and Italy came to

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18 Watters, p. 86.
power in Spain, Gibraltar might become untenable. In that event access to Portuguese ports would be invaluable to the Royal Navy. The use of air bases in the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verdes Islands (off the western bulge of Africa) would be of great use for shipping protection since they formed a triangle through which much of Britain's maritime commerce must pass. The Chiefs of Staff concluded by stressing the importance of the Anglo-Portuguese tie to Britain's strategy and confirming that its maintenance was extremely important.19

On 21 July 1937 the Cabinet approved the conclusions of the C.I.D., including its recommendation that a British military mission be sent to Lisbon to counteract German and Italian influence. The sending of the mission helped keep Portugal within the British political orbit.20 Britain's assessment of Portugal's strategic value thus overrode any differences caused by the two nations' profoundly divergent attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. Any danger that a rift in the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance might develop was therefore averted.

Two other factors operated to preserve the Anglo-Portuguese tie--the course of the Spanish Civil War and the diplomatic astuteness of Antonio Salazar. Portuguese help to the Nationalists, crucial in the early stages of the

19CAB 24/270 C.P. 189, COS 602C10 1336-B.
20Stone, p. 740.
"Crusade," became less essential as the war went on. As they moved on from victory to victory, slowly grinding down their Republican opponents, the Nationalists won both German and Italian recognition, and the control of such major ports as Cadiz and Cartagena. Thereafter the Axis powers could send the men and supplies so important to Franco directly with no need to use Portugal as an intermediary. Portugal, whose essential contribution had been her service as an entryway for aid from Germany, could then move discreetly to the sidelines without fear that she would thereby weaken her friends. This reduced friction with Britain.

Salazar, whose expertise in foreign affairs was to serve his country well throughout his lifetime, never put a foot wrong. He helped the Nationalists all he could when his help was most necessary, but did so quietly enough that he avoided openly offending Britain. His adherence to nonintervention, however insincere, allowed Britain to ignore his actual support of the Nationalists. With the total victory of Franco's armies in March of 1939, Salazar could feel that he had won the best of all possible diplomatic worlds. A neighboring regime which Salazar regarded as a menace had been overthrown and replaced by one which was not only friendly but in Salazar's debt. Indeed, for this reason, one of Franco's first actions as dictator of Spain was a friendship treaty with Portugal on 17 March 1939, called
the Iberian Pact. Salazar had managed to make a vital contribution to Franco's cause without alienating the British in the process. Shortly after the Spanish crisis Salazar had publicly reaffirmed the value of the Alliance to Portugal in a speech delivered on 22 May 1939. It was, as Salazar knew full well, Portugal's mainstay in an increasingly perilous world. The Alliance was left unshaken, even strengthened, by the cataclysm in Spain.

Salazar's principal biographer, Hugh Kay, argues that his Spanish Civil War policy was not merely aimed at destroying the Spanish Republic, but was in fact "constructive and almost visionary." Kay sees Salazar's ultimate aim as the creation of an Iberian bloc which would interlock with the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and draw Franco away from the Axis. Britain would help Portugal to rearm, while Portugal would safeguard British interests diplomatically in the peninsula, strategically by his control of the Atlantic islands and important portions of Africa.

The European holocaust had been averted in Spain only to erupt, a few months after the end of the Civil War, in

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21 Kay, p. 461.
22 Antonio De Oliveira Salazar's Speech to the National Assembly, 22 May 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 20 June 1939), pp. 5-6.
23 Kay, p. 110.
Poland. World conflict once again presented Portugal with difficult problems similar to those she had faced in 1914. Her ruler, who had seen his policies triumph a few scant months before, faced new and difficult tests. Portugal was once again on the edge of a vortex. It was a foregone conclusion that Portugal's location would, unless the war proved very short or very localized (and neither circumstance was in prospect), become a factor in the struggle.

Portugal and the Allies

In 1939, unlike 1914, the foreign policy of Portugal was guided by the decisions of one man. It would not become an issue between political factions as it had during the Great War. This time there was no sentiment for intervention by any significant section of the Portuguese; the memories of the costly humiliations that followed Portugal's entry into war in 1916 were still painful. The first announcement of neutrality appeared in the Portuguese press on 2 September 1939. If ever Salazar spoke for his people, he did so on 6 October 1939 when he proclaimed Portuguese neutrality to the world in a speech before the National Assembly. Immediately after announcing "deliberation to be neutral and [the Portuguese government's] hope of maintaining peace for the Portuguese people, unless the honor of the country, her interests or obligations, should cause us to abandon that position," Salazar added, "however, we should not have re-
mained at peace with our conscience (for friends should not
turn away at times of need) if we had not reaffirmed at
that grave moment our feelings of friendship and our full
fidelity to the British Alliance." Salazar's neutrality
was thus neither absolute nor unqualified. There was no
question of abandoning the British Alliance.

The British in turn had no desire to see Portugal be­
come an active belligerent since any assistance she might
offer would be in the form of access to strategic bases
which she did not have to be a belligerent to provide. The
Foreign Office had decided in 1938, when an Anglo-German war
over Czechoslovakia seemed imminent, that Portugal should
remain neutral, and this decision was upheld in 1939.

Salazar himself had few illusions about Hitler, whose
pagan racism had little in common with his own Catholic out­
look. The Portuguese dictator might sympathize with Hit­
er's anti-communism, but even this had been compromised by
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that had preceded the war's out­
break. Britain need have no fear that Salazar would fall
under Hitler's spell.

Sir Walford Selby, British Ambassador to Portugal from

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25 Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, Speech to the National
Assembly, 6 October 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda
Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 22 December 1939), pp. 4-5.

26 Sir Walford Selby, Diplomatic Twilight 1930-1940

27 Kay, p. 67.
December, 1938 to December, 1940, did fear German influence on other elements of Portuguese society. The country was full of German agents and attempts were being made to infiltrate such strategic Portuguese organizations as the Mocidade, the official youth movement, and even more ominously, the secret police and the armed forces. The Germans were entrenched in the Portuguese economy and their efficiency earned them much admiration in Portugal. The British devoted much effort to combating German penetration, resorting to such measures as supplying munitions to the Portuguese army and opening an air route between London and Lisbon to compete with the German-run airline between Lisbon and Madrid.

Salazar, if sympathetic to Britain, was yet a strongly nationalist ruler who was determined to uphold Portuguese sovereignty and adhere more strictly to neutrality than Britain preferred. Friction inevitably developed between Portugal and her protector. The old problem of the First World War—the relationship between two allies, one of whom was a belligerent and the other at peace—returned to plague Anglo-Portuguese relations.

By 1940 dissension between the two nations had become serious enough that Selby was asked to pass a personal

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28 Selby, p. 89.
29 Kay, p. 128.
30 Selby, p. 107.
message to Salazar from Lord Halifax, then British Foreign Secretary, detailing the British position on issues that had arisen between the two countries. Salazar returned "a courteous but firm reply which emphasized his good will, but insisted on the Portuguese right to interpret her neutrality in her own best interests. On this point Salazar made clear he must reserve his complete liberty of action." Halifax pronounced himself satisfied with this reply.

Relations between the two states might have continued in this sometimes inharmonious but basically uneventful fashion if the war had not changed so drastically between April and June in 1940. In three months Germany's sudden triumphs in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France made her masters of all western Europe except the British Isles and Iberia. The arrival of German troops at the Pyrenees passes raised the possibility, distant but discernible, that the Wehrmacht might invade Portugal. Great Britain, which Portugal for centuries had regarded as her invincible protector, was in dire peril, faced with invasion itself. Germany was now master of most of Europe's Atlantic seaboard, a position far more advantageous than she had ever enjoyed in 1914-18. (Lisbon was the only important port on the Continent between Stockholm and Cadiz still outside German control.) Not only Portugal herself, but her islands in the Atlantic were potential victims of German attack.

31 Ibid., p. 111.
The German victories and fears of a German-inspired coup in Lisbon or a Spanish attack on Portugal caused the British War Cabinet on 15 May 1940 to ask the Chiefs of Staff, especially the Admiralty, to prepare a plan for British action if it should be necessary to occupy strategic points in Continental Portugal, the Azores, or the Cape Verdes. The Admiralty replied that Portugal itself would not be of much value to Germany since before taking the country she would have had to obtain control of Spanish airfields and harbors which would suffice to meet German needs in Iberia. No action in Portugal itself was recommended. The Azores and Cape Verdes must, however, be denied to the enemy since enemy forces in the islands would threaten British sea communications.  

The occupation of the French Biscay ports by German troops in June of 1940 increased the atmosphere of stark danger felt in the Admiralty. Germany now had the bases from which she could launch raids or amphibious expeditions against the Atlantic islands. Force H, the British naval squadron stationed at Gibraltar, was given the mission of protecting them. On 10 October 1940 Admiral Sir James Somerville, Commander of Force H, was diverted from an attempt to intercept the Vichy French battleship Richelieu by warning of a possible German landing. Two troop transports were kept ready to land troops in the Azores if

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32 Stone, p. 740.
Spain or Portugal were invaded; the British would on no account risk a German foothold in the islands. Hitler realized that the probable consequence of an invasion of Iberia was a British seizure of the Azores and, as will be seen, this influenced his own plans for the Iberian peninsula.

The British War Cabinet, in a desperate but resolute frame of mind inspired by the threat they faced in the summer of 1940, actually considered the pre-emptive seizure of the Atlantic islands. This course of action was rejected on 22 July since it would be unwise to precipitate matters and incur the hostility of either Iberian government. Only if actual hostilities with them broke out, or if it were clear beyond reasonable doubt that either country was about to join the Axis against Britain, would the islands be seized. Only the Cabinet itself could make the decision for such an operation. The question thus was settled for the time being, but would come up again.

Meanwhile, still another power became concerned by the fate of the Azores. The fall of France had created worrisome new problems for the United States. For the first time Roosevelt's administration had to consider whether or not it was necessary that the United States intervene in the war.

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Even if the United States kept out of the conflict she could not ignore the threat raised by a potential enemy in control of the entire European continent. It might become necessary to keep Germany from gaining footholds in the Americas. Keeping the Atlantic islands, especially the Azores, out of German hands would be vital to any such effort. Air and naval bases in the Azores, once in German hands, could be utilized to cover an actual invasion of the Western Hemisphere. As early as July of 1940 the Americans warned Portugal and Spain (who owned the Canary Islands) of its concern over the status of the Atlantic islands and received assurances from both countries that neither would allow any changes.35

In 1940 the U. S. Government concentrated above all on keeping Britain in the war. Once it was evident, by the end of the year, that Britain's immediate crisis had been overcome and that the conflict would be prolonged, the U. S. Government took steps to support the British by all means short--just barely short--of war. In rapid succession came the "destroyers for bases" deal and the passage of the Lend-Lease Act. These measures resulted in increasingly intimate Anglo-American cooperation and a slow but inexorable drift towards actual American involvement in the war.

Interestingly enough, the very first military operation

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outside the Western Hemisphere the United States planned during the Second World War was the occupation of the Azores.\textsuperscript{36} The idea for the project was actually inspired by Winston Churchill in a private message to Roosevelt sent 11 April 1941 warning that Germany might soon occupy Spain and Portugal. If that happened Britain would dispatch expeditions to the Azores and Cape Verdes. Fearing that Germans might move in before the British could arrive, Churchill suggested that Roosevelt send a U. S. naval squadron "for a friendly cruise" in the vicinity of the islands.\textsuperscript{37} The naval cruise was canceled after Salazar, fearing an American visit might be interpreted as a breach of neutrality, refused to issue an invitation. Roosevelt, however, informed Churchill on 29 April 1941 that the U. S. was setting up a naval patrol which would cover the "westerly side" of the Azores and Cape Verdes, although no planes would be flown over the islands themselves. In the same message he asked Churchill to "make it very clear to the American people" that if Britain did occupy the Azores it would be for British wartime defense only, and that Portuguese sovereignty would be restored after the war. Roosevelt's exaggerated suspicions of "British imperialism" may have been the real reason for this request, but the ostensible reason was "that as you know, most of the

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Azores are in Western Hemisphere under my longitudinal map reading." In his reply Churchill assented readily to Roosevelt's wish, although he complained that any prior warning of a British occupation might mean that "we shall be forestalled," since the Germans, "will try to synchronize any decisive move from Spain or Portugal with a stroke on the islands."38

On 27 May 1941 Roosevelt delivered a speech in which he proclaimed an "Unlimited National Emergency." In the course of this long and important address he stated:

They [the Germans] also have the armed power at any moment to occupy Spain and Portugal, and that threat extends not only to French North Africa and the western end of the Mediterranean but it extends also to the Atlantic fortress of Oakes (a port on the westernmost bulge of Africa, the capital of present-day Senegal) and to the island outposts of the New World--the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.39

Roosevelt returned to the subject of the islands several times during this speech. He warned:

Equally, the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands, if occupied or controlled by Germany, would directly endanger the freedom of the Atlantic and our own American physical safety. Under German domination these islands would become bases for submarines, warships and airplanes raising the waters that lie immediately off our own coasts and attacking the shipping in the South Atlantic. They would provide a springboard

38Ibid., 2:839-841.

for actual attack against the integrity and the independence of Brazil and her neighboring Republics.  

Roosevelt proclaimed that American policy was to resist any attempt by Hitler to expand towards the Western Hemisphere or to threaten it. Germany would not be allowed to control the seas. "We insist upon the vital importance of keeping Hitlerism away from any point in the world which could be used or would be used as a base of attack against the Americas." The Portuguese islands, as Roosevelt's earlier passages demonstrate, were prominent among these points.

Military planning already backed up Roosevelt's rhetoric. On 22 May Roosevelt met with his senior military advisors, Admiral Harold Stark and General George C. Marshall, and ordered them to prepare at once for an occupation of the Azores. Although the President believed that the landing would merely be a peaceful "takeover from the Portuguese or the British," Marshall responded that any American force should be ready to fight. Roosevelt gave Stark and Marshall "thirty days in which to have ready an expedition to sail for, and take, the Azores."  

It would have been ironic if the United States had opened its active participation in World War II by the invasion of the territory of another neutral. No such drastic

40Ibid., p. 188.
41Ibid., p. 190.
42Steele, p. 14.
step, fortunately, turned out to be necessary. The Portuguese government made it clear that the islands would be defended against all comers. Alarmed by a statement by Claude Pepper, a Democratic Senator from Florida, that the United States should occupy, among other places, the Azores and Cape Verdes, the Portuguese Minister in Washington, João de Bianchi, anxiously called on Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, on 9 May. Bianchi stressed that Portugal had neither promised nor granted bases to any other power, and was reinforcing the defenses of its island to resist attack from any quarter. Although Hull reassured the Portuguese Minister that Pepper spoke for himself only, Portugal's fears were not groundless. To underline their determination to keep any foreign forces out of the Azores, the Portuguese hastened to reinforce their garrison there.

The American occupation of the Azores was destined never to take place. The Portuguese made it plain that they would resist fiercely any attempt to occupy any of their territory. It soon became apparent that neither Portugal nor its islands were in imminent danger. A month to the day after Roosevelt called in his Chiefs of Staff to plan the seizure of the Azores, Germany invaded Russia. At once the complexion of the war was

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43 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Pepper speaking on "America and the World Conflict," 77th Cong., 1st sess., 6 May 1941, Congressional Record 87:3617.

44 F.R.U.S. 1941, 10:841-42.

changed dramatically. With the strength of the Wehrmacht concentrated against Russia, Hitler had few resources to spare for adventures in the Atlantic. In the end the U. S. troops originally intended to occupy the Azores were sent to another island far to the north, relieving the British garrison in Iceland in July of 1941.\footnote{Steele, p. 16.}

Neither Allied concern for the fate of the Azores, nor Portuguese concern for the maintenance of their neutrality entirely abated during 1941. Bianchi tenaciously sought, but never quite received, assuredance from Hull that the Americans would in no circumstances violate Portuguese sovereignty.\footnote{F.R.U.S. 1941, 2:844-848.} The United States government was not willing to give any such assurance. Although Britain had sometimes tried to restrain the United States from excessive impetuosity in the Atlantic.\footnote{Kay, p. 162.} she was at least as unwilling as the United States to risk any German coup in the Azores, as is demonstrated by a message from Churchill passed through the British Embassy to Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State (and much closer to Roosevelt than Hull) on 18 June 1941. "The British government," read the request, "desired to know whether the Government of the United States would be prepared immediately to undertake joint staff conversations with the British government to agree on plans covering the...
occupation of the Azores, to provide for a situation in which Salazar was unable or unwilling to request American or British protection.

Roosevelt, for his part, took steps to improve the increasingly prickly state of Luso-American relations. On 14 July 1941 he dispatched a personal letter to Salazar. After assuring the Portuguese ruler of "the consistent desire of the United States that there be no infringement of Portuguese sovereign control over those territories, Roosevelt offered to assist Portugal to defend her possessions against German attack, with full assurances that Portuguese sovereignty would be respected, and American forces withdrawn immediately after the war's end. He suggested that Brazil be asked to participate in any defense measures, apparently believing that Brazilian troops might be more welcome on the soil of their mother country than American forces. Roosevelt concluded by referring to his visit to the Azores in World War I when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His mention of the U.S. bases then established in the Azores and of the "close and friendly" relationships between the American forces and the Portuguese population may have been intended as a gentle hint that similar arrangements should be made again.

50 Ibid., 2:852.
51 Ibid., 2:853.
Salazar's reply was equally friendly in its tone. He wrote that "The Portuguese military authorities did not share the fear of an attack on the Azores by German forces, since control of the Atlantic is not their's." The Portuguese government, with antiaircraft guns and aviation material supplied by Britain, was confident it could defend its islands against any attack. Salazar suggested that he would accept American aid if Britain could not provide adequate supplies. Although announcing his intention of preserving Portuguese neutrality, he left a door open for future cooperation--"should [Portuguese neutrality] change in consequence of a violation of her sovereignty, the situation resulting therefrom would have to be examined in a different light and the new position would have to be defined." 

Thereafter the relations between Portugal and the United States warmed. The Azores problem lost its urgency for the time being, to be revived in a new context in 1943. When the United States entered the war in December, 1941, one of the immediate results was the escalation of the German submarine offensive. Whereas the U-boats had previously largely concentrated their attack on the convoy routes near Britain, they now operated off the North American coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the central Atlantic. The consequence was a tremendous slaughter of Allied merchant shipping. The sub-

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52 Ibid., 2:854.
53 Ibid., 2:855.
marine menace, one of the most serious dangers the Allies had faced since the beginning of the war, reached crisis levels in 1942.\(^{54}\)

Although German submarines had lurked around the Azores since early in the war, the islands hitherto had lain well south of the main convoy battlegrounds. The expansion of the U-boat offensive now made them increasingly attractive as defensive bases. The Allies needed every available port to shelter convoys and their escorts, and every available airfield to fly protective patrols and hunt down submarines. The Azores were especially useful in one regard. One of the Allies' most serious handicaps was the so-called "Black Pit," an area in mid-Atlantic which could not be protected by patrol planes flying from bases on either side of the ocean. The Black Pit had been narrowed since the war began by the use of longer-ranged planes, but in 1942 it was still 600 miles wide.\(^{55}\) In this area, U-boats could operate with relative immunity to aircraft, and here they inflicted the heaviest losses on Allied shipping. Bases in the Azores could put an end to the "Black Pit." Patrols over the central Atlantic could be flown from the islands and provide air cover for convoys from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Use of the Azores would also make it possible to use convoy

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routes further south than those currently available, a real advantage in the stormy north Atlantic winter. Convoy routes could be shortened, economizing shipping, and changed more easily to elude U-boats. Naval escorts could be refuelled in the Azores.\textsuperscript{56} Airfields in the Azores, besides strengthening the anti-submarine patrol, could be used as landing places for air transports. It was estimated that use of the Azores for this purpose alone could save yearly a million tons of shipping, plus 100 million gallons of aviation fuel.\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, the Anglo-American objectives shifted from the negative aim of denying the use of the Azores to Germany, to the positive aim of obtaining the use of the islands themselves in the anti-submarine offensive.

Nevertheless in 1942 Salazar was still unwilling to grant the Allies bases in the Azores. The possibility yet existed that Germany might retaliate for any such action by attacking continental Portugal. In 1943 the war had turned so decisively against the Germans that any invasion became very unlikely. The submarine menace had not yet been overcome, the Battle of the Atlantic raged its fiercest in early 1943, and British desire for bases in the Azores became pressing. In March of 1943 the British Naval Staff recommended, as one of four measures necessary to gain victory over the


\textsuperscript{57}Survey of International Affairs, 9:336.
U-boats, access to the Azores. As the North African campaign ended, Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of the British Naval Staff, revived a proposal that Britain should ask for the granting of bases in the Azores. The British were so anxious to obtain the bases that on 10 May:

The Prime Minister sent the War Cabinet a message saying that he would be prepared to approach the Portuguese Government for facilities and to let them know, if they made difficulties, that we intended to take over the islands. He thought that Dr. Salazar ... might find it easier to bow to force majeur than to assent to such a violation of Portuguese neutrality.

Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, vigorously objected to any such seizure, on the grounds that violation of Portuguese neutrality would alienate world opinion and tie up resources badly needed elsewhere. Eden, supported by Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador to Portugal, held that the Portuguese would respond favorably to an appeal based upon the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Churchill was not easily dissuaded from occupying the Azores outright. On 21 May 1943, he replied to Eden that "the Combined Chiefs of Staff strongly recommended that the Allies should have the use of the Azores as soon as possible, as a military necessity." The War Cabinet insisted on a diplomatic approach first, arguing that no forces would be available to occupy

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58 Roskill, 2:370.
59 Eden, p. 453.
60 Ibid., p. 454.
the Azores for two months at least. \(^{61}\) Churchill, then visiting the United States, agreed to postpone any action until his return. Back in Britain Churchill maintained, at a Chiefs-of-Staff meeting held on 7 June, that the bases could not be obtained without force or the threat of force. Eden replied that he was not against a display of force, but that a few days must be allowed for diplomacy to be tried first. He was supported by the Chiefs of Staff, and "so diplomacy had its chance." \(^{62}\)

The very next day Salazar asked Campbell for new Anglo-Portuguese staff conversations because the military situation had changed. The British Ambassador interpreted this proposal as a signal that Salazar might be ready to grant the bases. On 18 June, Eden called in Doctor Armando Montiero, the Portuguese Ambassador, and laid before him a formal request for base rights. In return Britain would aid Portugal against any German air attacks on her mainland, protect Portuguese shipping and trade, and guarantee Portuguese sovereignty over all her colonies. The same day Campbell approached Salazar, who promised to consider sympathetically the British offer. On 23 June, Salazar agreed in principle to provide the facilities, but asked for further conversations on conditions.


\(^{62}\) Eden, p. 455.
for the grant. Detailed conversations began on 6 July.

Salazar's assent turned out to be only the beginning of weeks of hard bargaining. Salazar was willing to allow bases only to British forces, and only under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The United States also wanted landing rights in the Azores, but Salazar was reluctant to let any American forces into the islands. There was nothing comparable to the tie with Britain between Portugal and the United States, and the Portuguese government had not forgotten the loud demands by influential voices in the United States only two years before, for American seizure of the Azores. Linger ing suspicions were not eased by American tardiness in accepting the same commitments as the British to unlimited Portuguese sovereignty over her possessions. The U. S. government, in 1943, began to press for commercial landing rights (for Pan-American Airways) in the Azores, to "materially shorten our communications to the Mediterranean and the Middle and Far East." Its request complicated the British negotiations for base rights.

Churchill, not a patient man at the best of times, became fretful at the pace of the negotiations. Eden recorded in his diary:

63 Ibid., pp. 455-56.
64 Woodward, p. 380.
65 Kay, p. 169.
We had a row about this [the Azores negotia-
tions] last at Defence Committee. After dinner
something of a shouting match going on for an
hour or more. W. [Churchill] maintaining that
we could have taken the islands in June, July
or August but for my insistence on approaching
Salazar, that he had himself been pleased with
progress at first, but that now it was clear
that S. was merely fooling me. I retorted that
we had been absolutely right, that we had
stopped him making unprovoked attack on an
ally and that anyway he had not been in a posi-
tion to do the last until the end of August.
Brooke [Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief
of the Imperial General Staff] said we had
gained some ships for "Husky" [landing in
Sicily] by my plan.67

Churchill, as was his habit, apologized the next morning. His
outbursts did result in the setting of 15 October as the dead-
line for the negotiations. The agreement was finally signed
on 18 August.68 Lengthy as the negotiation process had been,
there was little chance that it would prove fruitless. Salas-
zar's biographer presents personal testimony from General
Santos Costa (then Portuguese Under-Secretary for War) that
when Salazar first received the British request, he decided
at once that "The Alliance had been invoked and Portugal
could not refuse."69 The only question remaining was the
terms on which the Alliance would be fulfilled.

The Portuguese granted their aid to Britain in as low-
keyed a fashion as possible. They themselves remained neutral

67 Eden, p. 464.
68 Woodward, p. 381.
69 Kay, p. 168.
(a decision which suited the British perfectly)\textsuperscript{70} and allowed facilities at first only to the British. American requests to station 10,000 men in the islands were turned down, and when the Americans asked to send a naval air squadron to the islands, Salazar went so far as to threaten to resist its landing by force! After some months it was agreed that American aircraft could operate from the Azores--provided that they and their crews wore British insignia.\textsuperscript{71} Eventually the U. S. forces were able to build their own bases. New airfields were constructed at Santa Maria (Terceira) and Lagens by U. S. Navy Seabees.\textsuperscript{72}

By the time the Azores bases were finally obtained, the worst of the Battle of the Atlantic was over, the Allies gaining a decisive upper hand in May, 1943. But the long struggle did not end until Germany itself was overrun, and Allied aircraft based in the Azores played a key role in keeping the German submarines at bay.\textsuperscript{73} "Thus, after more than four years of war, could reliable air cover be at last provided over the

\textsuperscript{70}Woodward, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., pp. 381-383.

\textsuperscript{72}George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 142-162. George Kennan, the renowned American diplomat and historian, served as counselor in the American legation at Lisbon for a year and a half. After the death of the American Minister in 1943, Kennan, as Chargé d'Affaires was the executive head of the American legation for a considerable time, and played a major role in obtaining Salazar's consent to American forces in the Azores.

\textsuperscript{73}Morison, 9:46.
whole Atlantic north of 30°N . . . the prosecution of the Atlantic struggle had been transformed, and the U-boats suffered further and drastic discomfiture." 74

The Azores Agreement of 1943 was a landmark, but not the last significant diplomatic pact involving the Azores. Once U. S. naval forces were established in the islands, Salazar's suspicions that the Americans intended to seize the Azores were gradually overcome. On 27 March 1945 the U. S. and Portugal signed an "Agreement Regarding Air Transport Command Service to Europe Through Portugal." This agreement granted U. S. transport planes landing rights in Lisbon by way of Santa Maria Airfield in the Azores. 75 One scholar considers that the Agreement, and a later pact signed on 6 December 1945, are of greater long-range importance than the Azores Agreement of 1943. 76 The ties between the U. S. and Portugal were strengthened, and the Azores assured of a role in the worldwide network of air routes being woven across the globe, routes of primary importance in postwar communications.

The United States did not acquire base rights in the Azores easily or quickly, and having once gained them, was unwilling to give them up. On 10 September 1945 the British

74 Roskill, I:47.


government notified the U. S. of its intention to terminate the 1943 agreement with Portugal. This would mean the lapse of U. S. base privileges within nine months after termination. On 19 November the U. S. government asked British support in seeking postwar American bases in the Azores and Cape Verdes. In an aide memoire from James Byrnes, U. S. Secretary of State, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, it was stated, "It should be pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff attach the highest importance to the acquisition by the United States of rights to operate on a long-term basis, air and naval facilities in the Azores." Bevin was reluctant to see the Azores used as military bases in the postwar world, however, he wished to see the islands used only for civil aviation, and made available to the U. N. Security Council in the event of war. The British insisted that if bases were set up:

As regards the question of British participation quite apart from His Majesty's Government's vital interest in this part of the world from the strategic angle, their long-standing and intimate connection with Portugal makes it politically essential from their point of view that, if any base is to be set up in the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands before the coming into force of the World Security Organization, His Majesty's Government should participate in it as equal partners. Furthermore in view of the previous attitude of the

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77 F.R.U.S. 1945, 6:204.
78 Ibid., 6:212.
79 Ibid., 6:217.
Portuguese government over the negotiations for the establishment of wartime bases in the Azores, His Majesty's Government cannot help feeling that if the United States Government were to press for a base with which His Majesty's Government were not actively associated, they might well meet with a refusal from Portugal.\textsuperscript{80}

Even after its close wartime cooperation with the United States, Britain did not want it or any other power entrenched in the Azores.

**Portugal and Germany**

Salazar maintained diplomatic relations with Germany throughout the war. The tone of Luso-German relations was cordial (at least until the Azores Base agreement) and Salazar was on excellent personal terms with Baron Oswald von Hoynigen-Huene, the German Minister to Portugal.\textsuperscript{81} Toward Germany itself, however, Portugal clung to an attitude of arm-length neutrality. Salazar refused to provide any aid to the German war effort. When approached by Huene on 2 July 1941 with a proposal that Portugal send a volunteer unit on the lines of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front, Salazar returned an answer that deserves to rank as a classic example of the polite diplomatic rebuff. "Aside from the fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the help

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., 6:219.

in the Civil War," said Portugal's ruler, "the nature of the Spaniard was also more expansive and demonstrative than that of the reserved Portuguese." Salazar might sympathize with Hitler's "anti-Bolshevist crusade" but he did not intend to contribute to it in any way.

Given Salazar's policies, Portugal was unlikely to play any major role in German wartime diplomacy. Yet what kind of role might she play in the Reich's own military and naval strategy? Continental Portugal, far out on the western rim of the Iberian Peninsula, did have a place as a subsidiary factor in proposed German operations in Spain. Much greater attention was given, however, to Portugal's islands.

In late 1940 the Germans made plans for an operation called "Felix" aimed at seizing the vital British base at Gibraltar. One possible danger to "Felix" was a British riposte through Portugal. Control of Portugal was not absolutely essential to a successful attack on Gibraltar, but Portugal might be used by Britain, as it had been many times in the past, as a sally port into the Peninsula, with serious consequences for any German troops campaigning there. The Germans considered both diplomatic and military steps to thwart any danger from the direction of Lisbon. Contingency plans were drawn up to cope with any British landings in

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\[82\] D.G.F.P., Series D, 13:70.

\[83\] The German directions for Felix can be found in a collection of documents by Hans-Gunther Seraphim, "Felix and Isabella; Dokumente zu Hitlers Planungen bei Spanien und Portugal auf der Jahren 1940-41," Quellen zur Nuesten Geschichte 5 (1955), Heft 1:68-82.
Portugal. According to Fuehrer Directive 18, which stated the operational requirements for "Felix," "mainly mobile formations" should be provided for the possible invasion of Portugal. A marginal note opposite this clause restricted the force to mountain troops, a relatively weak type of formation. Later the Germans decided a stronger reaction force was needed, and assigned three powerful divisions to the task.

"Felix" never took place. It was frustrated by Francisco Franco's unwillingness to involve himself in a war not yet decided, the need to rescue Mussolini's forces from disaster in Greece and Libya, and Hitler's approaching invasion of Russia. On occasions thereafter the Germans did make plans to deal with possible Allied campaigns in Iberia. In May of 1941 an operation called "Isabella" was planned to seize western Spain and Portugal in the event of a British landing. The Allied invasion of North Africa ("Torch") in November, 1942, caused special alarm, Hitler fearing that it would be followed by an Anglo-American offensive in Iberia.

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86 Ibid., 6:41.

But there was no longer much that Germany could do against the Allies in the Peninsula for she no longer had the forces to spare.

German strategic interest however was by no means limited to the Iberian mainland. The Germans' concern with the Atlantic islands was at least as great, perhaps greater, than their interest in the Peninsula. It matched the concern of the British and American governments whose preoccupation with the Azores has been examined earlier. The Azores alone were of greater importance than mainland Portugal.

German interest in the Azores first appears in the record in September, 1940, when "Felix" was under consideration. In a report to Hitler dated 6 September, Admiral Erich Raeder, the Commander in Chief of the German Navy, suggested that the United States might occupy the Portuguese islands (as well as the Spanish Canaries) in connection with American entry into the war, an event Raeder believed to be imminent. On 26 September 1940 Hitler agreed that the Azores, Cape Verdes, and Canaries might have to be seized by the Air Force. In an attached memorandum Raeder pointed out the disadvantage which was to dog all German planning for operations in the Atlantic:

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88 Conference of 6 September 1940, as cited in ibid., 2:19-20.

89 Conference of 26 September 1940, as cited in ibid., 2:25.
Lack of an adequate fleet will constitute a continual drawback in case of further extension of warfare, e.g., with regard to the occupation of the Canary Islands, the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, Dakas, Iceland, etc.\(^90\)

An interesting reason for Hitler's keen interest in the Azores was revealed at another conference between Hitler and Raeder on 20 April 1941. Using the Azores as a base, the Germans could attack America with a modern plane of the Messerschmitt type.\(^91\) This would compel the United States to build up its own defenses and curtail supplies to Great Britain.\(^92\) Meanwhile, Raeder himself had cooled considerably toward the idea of an Azores occupation. He stated the operation would be risky, "but with luck could succeed."\(^93\) Then the real difficulties would begin.

A massive British counterattack was certain. The navy would be diverted from its proper offensive role to defensive escort. Even the U-boats, the main German naval offensive arm, would be tied down, effectively ending the submarine campaign. It was very doubtful whether harbor facilities in the Azores were at all adequate to speedy unloading, or whether there was adequate shelter for aircraft and supplies.\(^94\) Raeder

\(^90\)Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in ibid., 2:41.

\(^91\)Possibly the Messerschmitt 264, a long-range bomber which never went into production. See William Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

\(^92\)Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in Germany, Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:41.

\(^93\)Ibid.

\(^94\)Ibid.
advocated that Germany should not occupy the Azores herself, but influence Portugal to fortify the islands and defend them against British or American incursions—steps Portugal took without German encouragement.

Still, Hitler clung to hopes of operations in the Azores. On 22 May 1941, Raeder had to repeat his earlier arguments against occupation, but the "Fuehrer is still in favor of occupying the Azores in order to bomb the United States." 95 By the summer of 1941 German objectives in the Atlantic islands, as in continental Portugal, had become defensive rather than offensive, keyed to thwarting Allied gains.

The U. S. occupation of Iceland led the Germans to expect similar Anglo-American moves into the Azores and Cape Verdes. Due to Germany's weakness at sea, a German invasion of Iberia was almost the only countermove the Nazis could make if the Allies actually did occupy the islands. Hitler also proposed that an operational group of U-boats be held in readiness to strike back if the Allies occupied the Azores, Madeira, or the Cape Verdes. 96 But both Raeder and Admiral Karl Doenitz, Commander of the U-boats objected to this diversion of the inadequate U-boat force, and Hitler withdrew his proposal. 97

After the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria, Hitler's interest in the Azores declined. 98 The German naval

95 Conference of 22 May 1941, as cited in ibid., 1:65.
96 Conference of 25 July 1941, as cited in ibid., 2:14.
98 F. H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge
authorities realized there was no longer a chance of attacking the Azores. Raeder's report to Hitler on 22 December 1942 included the following:

The Portuguese islands are exclusively at the disposal of our enemies who use them as a base under the protection of a neutral flag. It is not strategically necessary for us to occupy these islands at the moment, although we would like to establish our own air bases there.99

The wistful mention of German air bases in the Azores is the last indication of German hopes to use those islands. Raeder must have realized that no such operation was any longer possible. The German's worst fears about the Azores came true some months later, when the Anglo-Portuguese Azores base agreement was signed. It appears the Germans learned of the agreement only when it went into effect on 12 October 1943. Their only countermeasure was a diplomatic protest delivered to Salazar on 15 October.100 There was no bombing raid on Lisbon, not even, as in 1916, a declaration of war. Nothing could better illustrate the depths to which German fortunes had sunk.

Strategic Location and Portuguese Neutrality

War in the twentieth century developed dimensions far beyond the military and diplomatic limits it possessed earlier.

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99 Conference of 22 December 1942, as cited in Germany, Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:143.

100 Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, 9:339.
It became "total," to use the common expression. Total war is waged on economic, intelligence, and psychological fronts as well as on battlefields and at conference tables.

As has been demonstrated, Portugal played an important role in the strategic maneuverings of both sides, while being fortunate enough to remain uninvolved in the actual fighting. Neutrality spared Portugal the destruction and misery inflicted on most European nations, but could not totally isolate her from a war raging on all sides. In fact, neutral status made Portugal all the more attractive a territory for the practitioners of some newer aspects of global war. Not merely neutrality, but strategic location, for Portugal's position enabled her to fill some roles other European neutrals could not.

Of Europe's neutrals, Portugal, because of her location, had the best communications with both sides and with the outside world. Shielded from German-controlled territory by Spain, she was in easy touch with the Americas. The Trans-Atlantic Clipper service, flying boats owned by Pan-American Airlines, used Lisbon as its European terminal during the war years. Portugal's capital became a European crossroads. In the words of the most authoritative study of the wartime neutrals:

After a period of bewilderment and acute anxiety Portugal emerged as the chief remaining link between Hitler's Europe and Great Britain and the Americas. British and American, as well as German and Italian airlines called at Lisbon, the American Export
Lines kept up passenger and cargo sailings until December 1941, and Spanish and Portuguese ships crossed the Atlantic throughout the war. Lisbon was the chief transshipment point for the relief supplies for prisoners of war and internees dispatched by the International Red Cross, which chartered Portuguese ships for the last stage of the journey.  

Portuguese neutrality thus was the interest of both sides, and all the more secure in consequence. The price the Portuguese paid was to see their country turned into an arena for spies. Intelligence is an indispensable war-winning weapon, and important information of all kinds is often most easily obtained on neutral soil. Portugal, with its open communications between two warring blocs and two hemispheres, became an intelligence crossroads. Agents of belligerents' spy services used Lisbon as a message center and sometimes as a headquarters for espionage in the warring countries. Of all the aspects of war intelligence operations are the least documented and the most likely to be distorted by rumor and deliberate misinformation. Nevertheless, it is easily established that Portugal was a key area for intelligence activities. The German army spy service, the Abwehr, for instance, used Lisbon as its base for espionage in Britain.  

The British used a double agent in Lisbon to feed falsified intelligence to Germany after they captured the entire German spy network in


Britain.\textsuperscript{103} When the United States entered the business of wartime espionage, one of the first overseas offices was in Lisbon in February, 1942.\textsuperscript{104}

Economic warfare is often waged in neutral countries. In relation to neutrals, economic warfare has two major objectives: gaining control of strategic raw materials and manufactured goods and preventing their export to the enemy, and use of neutral territory as a passageway through an economic blockade or preventing use in that way by an enemy. Since Portugal had little in the way of strategic raw materials to offer, her most important role in economic warfare was in relation to the Allied blockade of Axis Europe. With her Atlantic ports and islands, her extensive colonial empire, and her commerce with the Axis powers, Portugal could not be ignored in any attempt to cut off the Axis from the outside world. Before June, 1940, Portuguese commerce with Germany could be carried on only by sea; but after that date goods could be transported overland to Germany by way of Occupied France.\textsuperscript{105} As a result Britain found it difficult to interrupt traffic between Portugal and Germany by naval means, and had to rely on diplomacy. As Portugal's major

\textsuperscript{103}J. C. Masterman, \textit{The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 138-140.

\textsuperscript{104}R. Harris Smith, O.S.S., \textit{The History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 41.

trading partner, Britain was in a position to apply severe economic pressure, but negotiating with the stubborn Salazar was never easy. Eventually, the British relied upon preemptive buying, which put pounds sterling into Portuguese pockets, "and in Portugal the blockade issue never lost the character of a game of poker between hard-faced friends." 106 Whatever hardships the blockade imposed upon Portugal, were more than compensated by wartime prosperity, for as one study concludes:

To travellers from countries at war Portugal seemed an incredible oasis of peace and prosperity; no blackout; no ration cards; shops full of food and luxuries, for those who could afford them. 107

Portugal came through the war as well as any European country, and better than most. In spite of the fact that "Portugal was of crucial importance to both Great Britain and Germany" 108 because of its location, it escaped being bombed or invaded, departing from neutrality only when and where such departures suited Portuguese interests. In part this was due to Portugal's strategic importance itself; when danger was most imminent Germany would not attack Portugal because of the well-founded fear that the Allies would occupy Portugal's Atlantic islands. And the Allies would not occupy

106 Ibid., 1:528.
the islands first, in spite of powerful temptation, because of possibly unfavorable consequences in continental Portugal.

This advantage, crucial though it was, might have been insufficient if it had not been coupled with astute diplomacy. Shrewd, stubborn, and cautious, Salazar exploited strategic location brilliantly. His highly successful wartime foreign policy was perhaps the greatest service Salazar rendered his country during all the years he was Portugal's overlord.
CHAPTER V

PORTUGAL AND NATO

Portugal's Entry into NATO

The end of the war did not bring international tranquillity to the world--or to Portugal. The coalition that destroyed the Axis barely survived their enemy's destruction, and was soon replaced by two hostile power blocs. The resulting Cold War developed in the immediate postwar years. It was universally acknowledged as the dominant fact in world politics by early 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a formal alliance of the western powers, was created under United States sponsorship.

The United States was one of the two great protagonists in the Cold War struggle, the only country whose strength could outmatch that of the Soviet Union. It clearly had replaced Britain as the leading power in the Atlantic world. But the United States neither hoped nor wished to contain the expansion of the Soviet power alone. The American government wanted to share the burden with the support of an alliance of western European and North Atlantic nations. Portugal was visualized as part of this grouping from the beginning.
The western European countries, especially Great Britain, were, if anything, even more eager for the creation of an Atlantic pact than the United States, for it would end all chances that the United States would withdraw into isolation and leave them to face Russia's power alone. On 11 March 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, sent an aide memoire to the U. S. government in which he suggested there be concluded "an Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance, in which all the countries directly threatened by a Russian move to the Atlantic, could participate, for example, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, France and Spain, when it has a democratic regime."¹

The name of Portugal reappears frequently in the records of the planning that led up to the foundation of NATO. No one, of course, imagined that the Portuguese could contribute powerful military forces to an alliance, but she could be an asset in another way, as Samuel Reber, an important State Department official (Acting Director of the Department of European Affairs) pointed out in a planning conference held on 26 July 1948.

> In regard to Portugal Mr. Reber stated that this country was also important from the strategic standpoint, not only because of its position on the Iberian Peninsula, but also due to its possessions of the Azores.

Agreeing with this statement Mr. Hoyer Millar (Sir Frederic Hoyer Millar, a British diplomat stationed at the Washington embassy) suggested that Portugal might be tempted to enter such an arrangement despite its close ties with General Franco, if it could come in, as it was, on the ground floor and could be assured of U. S. support of the pact.2

During another meeting held on 2 September, George Kennan, then an important policy planner in the State Department, included Portugal with Iceland and Denmark as countries that "would be valuable in the regional arrangement primarily because of their geographic position and for the facilities they might be able to provide in the event of hostilities."3

If the United States and its west European clients were eager to see Portugal as an Atlantic alliance partner because of her strategic location, Portugal was a willing recruit. Salazar's fear and hatred of Communism had not been reduced by the passage of time. The outcome of World War II, particularly the destruction of German power and the expansion of Russia westward, inspired in him a positive alarm. He considered Russia the real victor in the war.4 Salazar also saw positive benefits that his country could gain by participation in the Cold War. It was an advantage for a small country to be courted, especially to be courted by the United States, which had such rich gifts to offer. Considerable eco-

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2Ibid., 3:203.
3Ibid., 3:226.
nomic benefits could be expected, and to be the ally of a
great power could not but increase Portuguese prestige.
Salazar had demonstrated in earlier years how well he under­
stood how to extract advantages from international crises:

Indeed, disruption in Big Three Unity, a
power vacuum and disequilibrium in Central
Europe could only stress the need to have
the big Western maritime powers permanently
entangled in the affairs of Europe. In this
case, the importance of the Atlantic would
grow again. Atlantic islands and the Portu­
guese Atlantic-oriented coast and ports
would continue to be valued highly. 5

Salazar, however, moved towards alliance in the slow and
cautious fashion which characterized his style. He did have
some reservations about the real strength of an Atlantic alli­
ance that included France and other nations which he considered
weak and unstable, and being a dedicated nationalist disliked
the implications of European federation that were raised by
the proposals for a general alliance. These misgivings were
made plain in a statement probably written by Salazar that
appeared in the Portuguese press on 30 October 1948. 6

The advantages of joining the Atlantic Pact were so ob­
vious that they outweighed Salazar's doubts. On 10 June 1949
the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh, called
on the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jose
Caeiro de Matta, and informed him that the Atlantic Pact was
completely separate from any project for European federation,

5Ibid., p. 41.
and reassured the Portuguese government that no member state could be compelled to grant base rights to any other power against its will. MacVeigh also urged the Portuguese not to allow the exclusion of Spain from the alliance (to which the Portuguese government objected) not to deter them from joining themselves.  

On 15 March 1949 Portugal, together with Iceland, Italy, Denmark, and Norway, was officially invited to accede to the Treaty. On 4 April 1949 Caeiro de Matta signed the North Atlantic Treaty on Portugal's behalf, and the country entered the Pact as a charter member. After joining the pact, Salazar took some smug pleasure in congratulating the United States for finally waking up to the Russian threat. In a conversation with Averill Harriman, then acting as a special Ambassador in Europe, on 25 November 1949, he "evinced great interest in our [the U. S. government's] relations with the U.S.S.R. Why it had taken so many years, with the loss of much precious time, to realize what the Russians were up to." Salazar hoped for more tangible benefits from inclusion in NATO. Portugal was included in the Marshall Plan (Harriman was

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10 Ibid., 4:716.
traveling in Europe as representative for the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration which distributed financial assistance
under the Plan) and sought aid not only for metropolitan Portu-
gal but for its overseas possessions.\textsuperscript{11} Portugal did not re-
ceive any great amount of money compared to other European
countries, getting only $61,800,000 (as compared with over a
billion dollars for Greece) between 1949 and 1952.\textsuperscript{12} The
greatest gains to Portugal from inclusion in NATO were politi-
cal, not economic. The country needed a powerful protector.
By inclusion into NATO, Portugal came under the wing of the
United States, the most powerful nation in the world. Al-
though the Alliance with Britain remained in force (and re-
mains in force to this day) for all practical purposes the
United States took over Britain's old role as Portugal's
patron. This change of allegiance was a small but graphic
illustration of a much larger phenomenon, the replacement of
an exhausted Britain by the United States as the paramount
power in the Atlantic world.

Portugal in her turn provided to the United States the
same service she had once rendered Britain--access to stra-
tegic bases. The United States was able to retain its wartime
landing rights in the Azores by means of an agreement signed

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, 4:715.

\textsuperscript{12}Luc Crollen, "Portugal," in \textit{Small Powers in Alignment},
ed. Omar De Raeymaker (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974),
p. 48.
30 May 1946, although formal control of the airbases at Santa Maria and Lajens was handed over to Portuguese authorities. The rationale for the extension of 1946 was the need for the United States to maintain communication with its occupation zone in Germany, but when the next extension was signed (on 2 February 1948) the reason given was significantly different:

The advantages which those facilities will achieve for the security of Europe and for the re-establishment and consolidation of world peace as well as the indirect value which the same may bring about for the common defense and security.

In less than two years the formal justification for American rights in the Azores shifted from the narrow exigencies of postwar occupation to a much broader concern with the multilateral defense of western Europe. Thus it was symptomatic of a great reorientation of American foreign policy that took place during those years.

The 1948 extension remained in force for three years, to be replaced on 5 January 1951 by the much broader "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Portugal." This treaty (as renewed in later years) remains

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15 U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and
the basis of U. S.-Portuguese relations at the present time. American and other NATO forces were granted full authority to use the Azores bases in wartime, or with mutual consultation, in time of peace. The two governments agreed to cooperate in improving and expanding the base facilities on the island, and American personnel were to be stationed at Lagens.

The provision of the Azores bases was Portugal's one major contribution to NATO. It was an extremely important contribution, however. As the 1951 treaty was signed, the Korean War raged in the Far East, and fear of an imminent Russian attack on western Europe was intense. If such an assault were actually launched, the NATO Allies would need the Azores both as a transit point for aircraft bound for Europe and as an anti-submarine base for use against the large Russian underwater fleet. They were a cornerstone of NATO strategy in the 1950s.

Portugal, after becoming a NATO member, received some American military assistance, but has never been asked to contribute to the defense of the "Central Front" in western Europe. Under the terms of the NATO pact, it is required to maintain one infantry division for possible use on the European Continent, but the Portuguese military role to the alliance


16 Crollen, "Portugal," p. 56.
17 United States Treaties, TIAS No. 2187, p. 444.
has been "Atlantic-centered," small air and naval forces to assist in patrolling the sea lanes. On 22 February 1967, following France's withdrawal from military participation in the Alliance, Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) was created. IBERLANT has its headquarters in Portugal, and its mission is to defend continental Portugal and the sea approaches to Europe within the area bounded by the Azores on the west, Madeira on the south, and the Iberian peninsula on the east. IBERLANT is a multinational force which includes contingents from the United States (its commandant is an American admiral), Britain, and West Germany as well as Portugal. Since the Portuguese army division theoretically available for NATO duty has never been combat-ready, participation in IBERLANT is Portugal's contribution to the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance. Even with American assistance, the Portuguese armed forces have remained small and ill-equipped. Luc Crollen, a Belgian scholar who has analyzed the Portuguese relationship to NATO most thoroughly, wrote in 1973:

On the whole, then, with its valuable strategically located islands, its Atlantic ports, and its communications facilities

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19 Ibid., pp. 61-62.


Portugal has certainly been a most welcome NATO partner; certainly also, in terms of manpower, training and equipment the Portuguese armed forces have been unable to live up to their commitments, since their main defense efforts lie overseas.  

Portugal plays a role in NATO very much like the role it played as a junior partner of the British empire; not a center of power itself, but a provider of vital ports and island bases due to its strategic location, which might become indispensable to an ally in crisis times.

When Portugal joined NATO and for approximately a decade afterward, these strategic advantages went unaccompanied by any serious political disadvantages. If Portugal was a dictatorship (the only dictatorship in NATO at the time it was organized) it was a mild one, and unlike Franco's Spanish regime, bore no stigma of collaboration with the Axis in World War II. Portugal's African colonies provoked little controversy at a time when most of that continent was divided up among Britain, France, and Belgium, and expected to remain under European control indefinitely.

About 1960, however, the dramatic changes in Portugal's relationship with NATO began to occur, largely for reasons which lay outside Europe. From a relatively placid and contented junior partner in the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal was transformed into an unhappy dissident. The United States, which had won access to valuable bases at very little cost

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22 Crollen, "Portugal," p. 64.
when Portugal entered NATO, soon found itself trying to reconcile serious contradictions in its foreign policies as a result of Portuguese actions.

**Strategic Asset, Political Liability - Portugal in the 1960s**

Beginning in 1956, Europe's retreat from its overseas empires, which had begun in Asia immediately after World War II, started in Africa as well. Within less than a decade, Britain, France, and Belgium abandoned their west African holdings, sometimes reluctantly cooperating with the inevitable, sometimes eagerly divesting themselves of costly burdens. In an amazingly short time, a multitude of independent sovereignties replaced a few great empires.

Portugal defied the anti-colonial trend. Stubbornly she clung to her great African colonies, in the face of world disapproval and armed revolt. The defense of Portugal's imperial holdings became the major preoccupation of Salazar's regime. It affected foreign and domestic policy alike. From 1961 onward Salazar poured all the resources his country could muster into wars against nationalist guerrillas first in Angola, then in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. He judged his allies on their willingness to support his overseas struggles and found them wanting. Disenchantment with NATO followed.

Salazar's stubbornness created an excruciating policy
dilemma for the United States government. 1961, the year of armed rebellion in Portuguese Africa, was also the year John F. Kennedy entered the White House. Kennedy had as one of his central foreign policy goals, the improvement of American relations with, and the increase of American influence in, the new states of Africa and Asia. He regarded these countries as the principal battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union. No such goal could be achieved if the United States backed Portugal's colonial wars in Africa. Failure to support Portugal, however, would also involve penalties. At first glance it might not seem that a tiny ally like Portugal could exert enough leverage to alter America's "Third World" policy. But Portugal had one powerful weapon at its disposal, the Azores base--and the 1951 Agreement would expire on 31 December 1962.

After a decade the Azores remained a critical link in America's worldwide base network. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, architect of containment, and an extremely influential advisor to the Kennedy administration, referred to the Azores in 1961 as "an air base which is, perhaps, the most important one we have anywhere." Acheson opposed

24Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75.
American involvement in the Angola issue, and was supported by the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs. In the summer of 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's military advisors, declared that the Azores would be essential to American security if trouble broke out in Berlin.²⁶

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira, took the first opportunity available to drop hints that American access to the Azores might depend upon a more favorable attitude towards Portugal, and play off the Pentagon and State Department Europeanists against the Africa supporters.²⁷ The Kennedy administration found itself compelled to follow an uncomfortable middle course, trying to avoid outraging the Third World countries and mortally offending Portugal at the same time. The great arena of anti-colonial agitation was The United Nations, and here the United States was most often faced with a decision on the Portuguese issue. Early in the Kennedy administration the United States voted favorably on a Liberian resolution advocating Angolan self-determination both in the Security Council on 15 March 1961, and in the General Assembly on 20 April.²⁸ By the end of 1962 the U. S. government was abstaining on U. N. resolutions calling for the imposition of an arms embargo and economic boycott on Portugal although the United States refused to permit the use of any military equip-

²⁶Schlesinger, p. 562.
²⁷Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75.
²⁸Ibid., p. 73.
ment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes in Africa. As Luc Crollen pointed out, "In fact, the Pentagon's fear of jeopardizing the Azores base had actually determined the limits of Kennedy's Africa policy." The United States refused to endorse Portuguese colonialism, or to give it any material support. The American government quietly pressured the Portuguese to moderate its policies. But the United States also refused to undertake any effort to force Portugal out of Africa, or to be a party to any such efforts sponsored by others. This attempt to balance strategic and political considerations could hardly satisfy either Portugal or the Afro-Asian countries, but was probably the only policy the available options would permit. It is an unusually clear example of the constraints on the foreign policies of even the mightiest power, and of the disproportionate bargaining strength of a small state which both possesses a strategic location, and knows how to use it. The strategic advantage afforded the United States by its base in the Azores was very tangible, and weighed in the balance at least as much as the vague and uncertain benefits conferred by "world public opinion." In the end the fact that the Portuguese presence in NATO was a strategic asset was more important to the American government than that it was also a political liability.

29 Ibid., p. 76.
The equivocal American policy did score one clear gain—continued American base rights in the Azores. The 1951 Agreement was informally renewed on 4 January 1963. The Portuguese exacted a stiff price for continued American use of the Azores—a loan of $48,750,000, a gift of $13,750,000—and acquiescence in Portugal's African policies.\(^{30}\)

Friction between the U. S. and Portugal lessened under Kennedy's successors. Neither Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon paid as much attention to African opinion as Kennedy had, and valued the Azores base highly. The third extension of the original 1951 Agreement took place on 9 December 1971.\(^{31}\) In return for use of the Lajens base, the U. S. government agreed to pay Portugal some $435,000,000.\(^{32}\)

In spite of the tenacity with which the United States clung to its airfield in the Azores, some considered that the base was in fact becoming obsolescent, as the size and range of aircraft increased.\(^{33}\) Events late in 1973, however, offered dramatic evidence to the contrary. The fourth major war between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out on

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 86-87.


\(^{32}\) Newsweek, "Portuguese Guinea—A Propaganda War?", 27 December 1971, p. 28.

\(^{33}\) Crollen, "Portugal," p. 54.
6 October. On 15 October the United States launched a major airlift to resupply Israel with munitions. Threatened with an Arab oil embargo, all European countries refused landing rights to American planes bound for Israel—except Portugal. Jet transports carrying munitions were allowed to refuel in the Azores—thus enabling them to carry heavier cargoes. Skyhawk fighter-bombers bound for Israel landed at Lajes, refueling again from U. S. aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. The Portuguese assisted the airlift even after the Arab oil embargo was imposed upon them, an action quite in keeping with the centuries-old Portuguese tradition of scrupulous adherence to the terms of their alliances. During the tense days of the "Yom Kippur" war, the strategic value of the Azores was dramatized as it had not been since World War II.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid an official visit to Portugal almost immediately after the end of the war (17-18 December 1973). At the Azores base, whose value

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had just been emphasized was due to lapse in February, 1974, negotiations began for its renewal. Before a new agreement could be reached, however, the first political changes in five decades—cataclysmic changes—took place in Portugal.

Serious problems were created for the United States and Portugal's other NATO partners. Overnight, Portuguese politics became a major American concern.

Antonio Salazar, for all his remarkable abilities, in the end joined the lengthy list of despots who lived and ruled too long. On 17 September 1968 he suffered a near-fatal stroke which left him comatose and paralyzed. Ten days later Salazar was succeeded as premier by Dr. Marcelo Caetano. Never recovering completely, the old dictator died 27 July 1970.

The "Estado Novo" did not long outlive Salazar. Its foundations had decayed away. Under Salazar, Portugal had enjoyed political stability at the price of repression and economic stagnation. The poorest of western European states, postwar Portugal depended heavily on tourism and the migration of workers to more prosperous countries for economic survival.

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41 Ibid., 27 September 1968.

The régime was finally ruined by the colonies to which Salazar clung so obstinately. By 1974 an army of 200,000 men was locked in stalemate with African nationalist guerrillas in all three mainland colonies. In the end the burden was more than Portugal could bear. More immediately dangerous to the government was the alienation of its ultimate support—the armed forces. Faced with the prospect of endless war, influenced by the Marxist doctrines of the very enemies they were fighting, the younger officers turned against the regime. Caetano, a well-meaning but half-hearted reformer, had none of Salazar's prestige.

On 25 April 1974 Caetano was overthrown by an almost bloodless military coup. The new government, an interim military regime controlled by the "Armed Forces Movement," pledged decolonization, establishment of democracy, and social reform. It also proclaimed its continued adherence to its international engagements, "especially with N.A.T.O."

The "Revolution of Flowers" was almost universally welcomed both at home and abroad. The establishment of democracy and the withdrawal of Portugal from its futile colonial cam-

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paings were objectives which Portugal's allies could happily support. Within months the new government, run by military men with little political experience, drifted alarmingly close to chaos and left-wing extremism. Especially disturbing to Portugal's allies was the rapid growth in power and influence of the Portuguese Communist Party, newly emerged from the underground. The Communists were well organized and had many supporters in the Armed Forces Movement.

The specter of a Communist-controlled Portugal raised some alarming possibilities. Politically, it meant increasing pressure on the unstable states of southern Europe--Spain, Greece, and above all, Italy, moving them toward the extreme left. Strategically, the loss of the Azores bases would severely damage the military capabilities of the NATO alliance. Soviet access to the islands was the most nightmarish possibility of all.

It soon became clear that the Azoreans were not in sympathy with the leftward drift of mainland Portugal. The islanders, as often in their history, were out of step with Lisbon. There was little left-wing sentiment in the Azores. The islanders were strongly tied to the United States, not only by economic benefits derived from the Lajes base, but the large Azorean immigrant communities in New England and California. A movement for Azorean independence arose, and

\[\text{47"Portugal Moves to the Left," Orbis 19 (1975):14.}\]
for the first time since their discovery it seemed possible that the islands might secede from Portugal. In Portugal itself increasingly bitter strife between the various factions which had emerged after the revolution threatened civil war. The crisis came on 25 November 1975 when a left-wing coup, in which the Communists and their allies in the government were implicated, was crushed. The influence of the left has declined greatly since. The victory of the anti-Communist Socialists in subsequent elections and the recent election of General Ramalho Eanes, who put down the November coup, as President of Portugal, has eased NATO concern with Portuguese problems. But no one is yet certain that the Portuguese revolution is over; the country still faces difficult economic problems. Its violent phase does seem to have ended—while it lasted world attention was fixed on Portugal and the Portuguese islands, whose vital role was brought forcefully to the notice of the other NATO powers, a role which was based on the importance of their strategic location.

CONCLUSION

During the Second World War Portugal's position on the edge of the Atlantic prevented its association with the Fascist powers, and kept it neutral in the first phase of the war. An Atlantic orientation obliged it to grant base facilities in the Azores to the major Western Powers, Great Britain and the U.S., at the very moment the Axis's Atlantic and Mediterranean power position had weakened considerably.

With the emergence of the Cold War and the increasing fear of a major conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe in the late forties and early fifties, the strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic islands and continental coast increased tremendously. Portugal became a vital component in Western Containment policy and in the Pentagon's plans for an aerial encirclement of the Soviet Union. . . .

Thus, Luc Crollen summarized admirably Portugal's role in world affairs during some recent and eventful years. Contained within this short passage are phrases which can be applied, however, to a much wider time span: "Portugal's position on the edge of the Atlantic;" her "Atlantic orientation," the "strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic islands and continental coast" are the keys to much of Portugal's history. Not so much her internal history, although domestic events and external pressures never remain uncon-

1Crollen, "Portugal," p. 95.
nected for long, but certainly her international history, her role in the European and Atlantic community have been determined by her location.

The definition of strategic location offered at the beginning of this study emphasized the importance of geographical position as a factor in history. A distinction was made between temporary and permanent strategic location, the latter being the condition of being so situated that location alone affects the outcome of a series of historical situations. Strategic location is most important when it involves the control of communication, the routes of movement and transportation that are utterly vital to civilized life. The Portuguese case is one of the best examples available of the influence of strategic location on the control of communications. The Portuguese were the pioneers of oceanic transportation, a role they could hardly have played if they had not first possessed a territory excellently suited to maritime ventures, and in the course of those ventures discovered and colonized a group of islands at the crossroads of the North Atlantic.

No one planned it that way, of course. Portugal's origins and early history were as much the creatures of happenstance as those of any nation, but location allowed Portugal some crucial advantages which were exploited skillfully at critical times in her history. The developments which permitted Portugal to lead the way into the Atlantic
Ocean are inseparable from her position at the southwestern corner of Europe. From their historical experience, such Portuguese empire builders as Afonso de Albuquerque derived a keen appreciation of the power inherent in properly situated islands and coastal harbors. Strategic bases were the linchpins of Portuguese dominion in the Indian Ocean, the foundation of Portugal's century of greatness.

The Portuguese empire, however, is not much more than an episode compared with the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The link between Portugal and Britain was the most enduring in European history, and the prime example of an alliance based on strategic advantages. Britain and Portugal were not held together by natural affinities. In the fourteenth century the two societies were somewhat similar, both being feudal monarchies, but over the centuries they drifted apart. Eventually they became as dissimilar in their politics, economies, and social structures as any two states in Europe. The economic advantages each country gained from the Alliance were not decisive, being merely by-products of the political alliance. Portugal could have sold her wine and sardines elsewhere; to Britain Portugal was a profitable but not indispensable market.

The Alliance was so enduring because it was based on permanent strategic factors. To Britain Portugal offered two things—the use of the splendid harbor of Lisbon and an entryway into the Iberian peninsula whenever a British presence
there was desired, and the use herself (or the denial to her enemies of the use, which might be equally important) of Portugal's islands as bases to control the Atlantic seaways. Thus the two roles, one associated primarily with continental Portugal, the other with the Azores, that Portugal played in Britain's maritime strategy.

And what did Portugal gain in return? Protection. Seldom strong enough to stand alone against outside threats, Portugal always had a powerful ally to which she could turn. On the only occasion in Portuguese history that such a threat arose and England could not offer aid, the crisis after King Sebastian's death in 1571, the result was national disaster for Portugal and ultimately increased danger for England. When Portugal won back her independence the Alliance with Britain was swiftly revived, and endured as long as Britain's power remained. Thereafter, Portugal was shielded by Britain, sometimes against her Spanish neighbor, but also against Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler.

Portugal paid a price for British protection. It is not always comfortable to be a client-state. She submitted to British economic dominance, and mostly during the early nineteenth century, some British involvement in her internal affairs. But for Portugal it was a price worth paying. Totally untrammeled national sovereignty is an abstraction and not a reality, especially for small states. In practice the British were willing to tolerate almost any Portuguese regime
that would observe the Alliance. Client status was greatly to be preferred to the most likely alternative, absorption into Spain. And as Salazar has been only the latest Portuguese ruler to prove, even the weak have their assets, which can win them much if exploited skillfully. And Portugal's great asset was strategic location.

When the United States replaced Britain in her time-honored Atlantic role, Portugal almost immediately began to play the same part, for the same reasons, in the American scheme. Demonstrably Portugal's strategic value was not simply a by-product of British greatness. No one can predict what will befall Portugal and her islands in the future. But it is a safe assumption that their strategic location, significant from the age of the caravel to the age of the C-5A transport plane, is in no danger of losing importance soon.
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