Possible solution to the Israeli boundary dispute

Arthur Lee Weydemeyer
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A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI BOUNDARY DISPUTE

By

Arthur L. Weydemeyer

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The purpose of this thesis is to suggest the location of a possible permanent boundary line for Israel. The boundary which will be used as a basis to work from is the 1949 cease fire line (same as pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that Israel wants to have adjusted and the one that the Arab nations demand that Israel return to. The major portion of the thesis is devoted to determining what changes in the pre-1967 War boundary are considered most necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the Arabs. The identification of changes considered most necessary by Israel consists of a three stage process. In the first stage, areas of historical/religious significance, economic importance, and military (strategic) significance for Israel in the occupied territories are analyzed. The second stage is an assessment of the integration and consolidation actions taken by Israel in the occupied territories. The third stage of the identification process consists of an analysis of public statements by the Israeli government concerning permanent boundaries for Israel. The approach outlined above represents an attempt to arrive at an accurate assessment of which areas in the occupied territories are of major significance to Israel and which are of less importance. The countering Arab position concerning the boundary of Israel is determined from statements by Arab heads of state and Palestine Liberation Organization leaders.

The major hypothesis of the thesis is that the conflict arising from Israel's demand for secure and permanent borders, the Palestinian demand for a state of their own, and the demand of Israel's bordering Arab states for return of occupied territory can be reconciled.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Historical/Religious Significance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Economic Significance</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip/West Bank</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Strategic Significance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Jerusalem</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ISRAELI INTEGRATION AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration Actions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Integration actions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Integration Actions</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation Actions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ARAB AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Developments 1967-1978</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiating Positions</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza Strip</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Negotiations</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF MAPS

1. Kingdom of Israel under Saul ........................................... 8  
2. Kingdom of Israel under David and Solomon ..................... 9  
3. Divided Kingdoms of Israel and Judah ............................. 10  
4. Expansion of Kingdom of Israel 163 B.C. to 80 B.C. ........... 11  
5. Palestine's Boundaries 1905-1923 .................................. 19  
6. UN Partition Plan for Palestine 1947 ............................... 20  
7. Sinai Territory ............................................................ 57  
8. West Bank Territory ....................................................... 61  
9. Golan Heights Territory .................................................. 67  
10. Unified Jerusalem ......................................................... 128  
11. Old City of Jerusalem .................................................... 129
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab nations is an unusually complex problem which includes religious animosity, disputed territory and suppressed nationalism among its major issues, but the key to any successful settlement of the conflict lies in reaching an agreement over the location of a permanent boundary for Israel. This concentration upon the Israeli boundary issue addresses both the major Arab demand for return of the territory occupied by Israel since 1967 and the primary Israeli demand for "secure and recognized" borders. It also confronts indirectly the question of Palestinian self determination through resolution of the boundary question along the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories. Finally, the resolution of the boundary issue provides a means of dissipating the intensity of the Arab commitment to a Jihad, or "holy war" against Israel, a war that the Arabs have vowed to continue until Israel is destroyed.

Since the Arab commitment to the Jihad stems from a deep seated resentment against Jewish intrusion into the Arab Middle East, the mere initialing of an agreement with Israel is not going to terminate the Arab desire to be rid of the Israeli presence in the Middle East. What a boundary settlement can do, though, is provide an opportunity for the more moderate Arab nations to subordinate their commitment regarding the "holy war" against Israel to an emphasis upon furthering
their own national interests. If only a few of the more powerful Arab nations can be persuaded to forgo the united Arab cause against Israel and turn their efforts to social and economic advancements within their own country, the Arab opposition would be too weak to threaten seriously Israel's existence, which is about the most security that Israel can ever hope to have in the Arab Middle East.

The purpose of this thesis, then, is to suggest the location of a possible permanent boundary line for Israel. The boundary which will be used as a basis from which to work is the 1949 cease fire line (same as the pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that Israel wants to have adjusted and the one to which the Arab nations demand that Israel return. The major portion of this thesis is devoted to determining what changes in this boundary are considered most necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the Arabs. The identification of changes considered most necessary by Israel consists of a three-stage process. In the first stage areas of historical/religious significance, economic importance, and military (strategic) significance for Israel in the occupied territories are determined.

The second stage is an assessment of the integration and consolidation actions taken by Israel in the occupied territories. The third stage of the identification process consists of an analysis of public statements by the Israeli government concerning permanent boundaries for Israel. This three stage approach should result in an accurate assessment of which areas in the occupied territories are of major significance to Israel and which are of less importance. The countering Arab position concerning the boundary of Israel is determined from
statements by Arab heads of state and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders.

The major hypothesis of this thesis is that the conflict among Israel's demand for a secure and permanent boundary, the Palestinian's demand for a state of their own, and the demand of Israel's bordering Arab states for return of the occupied territory can be reconciled. This reconciliation of conflicting demands is not an easy task. The settlement terms proposed in this thesis are not guaranteed to satisfy completely all parties involved in the dispute, and, in fact, require far greater compromise on the part of some of the parties than they have been willing to make in the past. Yet, all of the compromises involved merely ask a party to forgo a specific demand in the interest of achieving its overall objective. This is the heart of the argument behind the boundary proposal offered in this thesis; the assertion that the parties involved are unlikely to gain all of the specifics of their demands, but that it is quite possible for them to gain the substance of their demands provided they are willing to restructure their proposals along lines that are more attractive to the opposition. What this means is that Israel can gain secure borders, but it is unlikely that it can gain the territory which it considers necessary for secure borders; that the Palestinians can achieve a state of their own, though it will not be gained under the exact terms that the Palestinians desire; and that the bordering Arab nations can regain a considerable portion of their lost territory, though it is unlikely that they will be able to deploy military forces as freely
as they would like in these territories. Since the terms offered in this thesis are hypothetical, it can not be proven that either Israel or the Arab nations (and people, i.e. Palestinians) would be willing to make these kinds of compromises. What can, and will, be demonstrated, though, is that the terms proposed are very close to the maximum concessions any one party can expect to gain and still have all parties agree to the proposals.

Of course, the border issue is not going to be resolved merely by drawing a line on a map and calling it Israel's boundary. The overall settlement will require a complex arrangement of demilitarized zones, force limitations, economic arrangements between Israel and the new Palestinian state, and a host of other minor details to resolve problems which arise due to circumstances peculiar to a particular territory. These issues are peripheral to the central concern of this thesis, but will be dealt with in the course of the discussion concerning final settlement proposals.

As a final note, in an effort to avoid redundancy, various terms are used during the course of the essay to refer to the same event or area. Thus, the Arab-Israeli war which occurred between June 5, 1967, and June 11, 1967, is referred to variously as the 1967 War, the Six Day War or the June War. The Arab-Israeli war which took place in 1948 and 1949 is referred to as Israel's War of Independence, while the terms Yom Kipper War, October War and 1973 War are used to refer to the Arab-Israeli war of October 7, 1973-October 24, 1973. The term "Israel proper" refers to the state of Israel as defined by the 1949
cease fire line, while the term "Jordan proper" refers to that portion of Jordan which lies east of the Jordan River. The unified city of Jerusalem is referred to simply as "Jerusalem." The portion of that city controlled by Israel before the 1967 War is termed "West Jerusalem" while the portion controlled by Jordan prior to the 1967 War is termed "East Jerusalem."
CHAPTER II

IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Areas of Historical/Religious Significance

The discussion of the historical borders of Israel is divided into two distinct periods. The first period covers the historical boundaries of the areas controlled by Israelite tribes during biblical times, while the second covers the development of the Jewish state in Palestine from its beginnings with the Zionist movement of the 1880's until its culmination in the state of Israel as defined by the 1949 cease fire lines. Since the very existence of the state of Israel stems from unique religious and historical claims upon the land of Palestine, one might expect that historical boundaries would be a significant factor in determining ultimate Israeli borders. Such is not really the case, though, because historical boundaries of Israel have varied so extensively that everyone from the most rabid Israeli expansionist to the most militant Palestinian could find ample historical justification for whatever boundaries he believed should encompass the state of Israel. The purpose of the discussion, then, is (1) to point out the problems created by an emphasis upon historical boundaries, (2) determine those parts of the occupied territories to which Israel possesses the strongest (and the weakest) historical claims, and (3) provide enough background information about the
formation of the modern state of Israel for the reader to gain a basic understanding of the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Ancient

On the following pages are a succession of maps which give a rather clear picture of the wide flux of the boundaries of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. Although the tribes of Israel entered the area of modern-day Israel around 1200 B.C., it was not until Saul assumed control of the tribes in 1020 B.C., that the Israelites were able to establish any firm political control over the territory. As the map on page 8 indicates, Saul's kingdom was a little smaller than modern-day Israel (as defined by the 1949 cease fire lines), though Saul's domain included extensive areas of present-day Jordan. Saul died in 1000 B.C. and he was replaced by David, who made massive additions to the Israelite kingdom (see the insert map on page 9). Although the southern boundary of David's territory roughly parallels the southern boundary of Israel proper, the northern empire included portions of modern-day Lebanon, well over half of modern-day Syria and most of the western half of Jordan. David's son, Solomon, took over the kingdom in 960 B.C., and though he did not expand upon David's territory, he did consolidate and greatly strengthen Israelite control over this territory through effective political and economic organization.

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2 Ibid., p. 205.
KINGDOM OF ISRAEL UNDER SAUL

KINGDOM OF ISRAEL UNDER DAVID AND SOLOMON

SOURCE: Efrat and Orni, Geography, p. 204.
SOURCE: Efrat and Orni, Geography, p. 206.
EXPANSION OF KINGDOM OF ISRAEL 163 B.C. TO 80 B.C.

LEGEND
- Acquisitions of Jonathan and Simon
- Conquests of John Hyrcanus
- Conquests of Antiochus
- Conquests of Alexander Janneus

The harsh taxes and forced labor imposed by Solomon created considerable dissension in the Israelite kingdom and led to Jeroboam's revolt with the death of Solomon in 930 b.c. This revolution split up the Israelite empire into the Kingdom of Judah in the south under the rule of Rehoboam and the Kingdom of Israel in the north under Jeroboam. The division of the kingdom led to the temporary loss of most of David and Solomon's northern empire by 880 b.c. (see map on page 10), though some 100 years later Jeroboam II (793-752 b.c.) once again pushed the northern boundary of the Kingdom of Israel back to the Euphrates River. Following this brief revival of Israelite power, both the Israelite kingdoms began a gradual decline until they were completely destroyed with the destruction of the Jerusalem temple by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 b.c. The Israelites remained a subjugated people under various rulers until the Macreobean revolt against the Greek rulers in 167 b.c. resulted in the Israelites once again becoming an independent people. Initially, the Israelites controlled only a small area in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem, but successive Israelite rulers gradually enlarged the kingdom until the conquests of Alexander Jannaeus (107-79 b.c.) expanded the kingdom over an area slightly larger than that encompassed by the divided kingdom in 880 b.c. (see map on page 11). Following the death of Jannaeus, the Israelite kingdom again declined until it ceased to exist with the Roman occupation of the area in 63 b.c.

This very brief review of the historical borders of Israel during biblical times can only lead one to conclude that ancient historical claims do not offer a very profitable approach for resolving the boundary question of modern day Israel. In the first place, the territorial limits controlled by the Israelites fluctuated so widely that the term "historical boundaries" could apply to an area much smaller than modern-day Israel, or it could apply equally to an area encompassing all of Palestine and a sizeable chunk of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan as well. A second problem is the fact that some of Israel's strongest historical claims lie in territories in which most Israelis express little interest in. The maps clearly demonstrate that the Israelites controlled most of western Jordan throughout the existence of the kingdom, yet no Israeli government has expressed interest in retaining territory east of the Jordan River and Dead Sea. A third complication is the fact that, at one time or another, the boundary of the Israelite kingdom encompassed virtually all of the currently occupied territories except the Sinai. In most instances, though, this control tended to be of short duration. The Israelites controlled the Golan Heights only during the reign of Solomon and David and for a brief period under Alexander Jannaeus. Most of the time the Israelite kingdom did not encompass any of the Gaza Strip, though David and Solomon managed to control briefly the lower half of the area, and Alexander Jannaeus extended Israelite control over most

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4Return of the "lost" Transjordan area had been a goal of Prime Minister Begin's Likud Party (see Leonard J. Fein, Israel: Politics and People, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1968), p. 118), but the position has been dropped since Begin assumed office.
of this territory as well as a small strip of the Sinai territory along the Mediterranean coastline. This final conquest of Jannaeus marked the only extension of the Israelite kingdom into Sinai territory. The Israelite control over the West Bank area (and Jerusalem), though, remained constant throughout the kingdom's existence. This gives Israel strong historical ties to the West Bank territory and Jerusalem, but the modern-day West Bank territory is so heavily populated with Palestinian Arabs, that only the Likud government of Menachem Begin has made the area a primary consideration for retention of Israeli control. Prime Minister Begin's policy does represent a true departure, for he has always placed historical considerations ahead of security considerations, which is the reverse of traditional Israeli policy. His primary concern has been with regaining Israeli control over the biblical areas of Judea and Samaria (see page 11), which is the present-day West Bank territory. All of the Israeli governments have been determined to retain control over Jerusalem, so historical ties are always invoked as one of the primary justifications for this Israeli action.

Recent

From the time of Pompey's occupation of the Israelite kingdom in 63 B.C. until the early 20th century, Jews held no political control over any of the Palestinian territory. During this long period of subjugation, the Jewish population in Palestine slowly dwindled until the onset of the Zionist movement in the 1880's caused a revival of
Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Zionists called for the establish­ment of a Jewish state in Palestine. To accomplish this end, they undertook extensive efforts to convince Jews to return to the "lost homeland" and also attempted to negotiate a deal with Turkey to transfer political control of the area into Jewish hands.\(^5\) The Zionists' efforts resulted in a large increase of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, but their efforts to gain political control of the territory from Turkey, through purchase or other means, were unsuccessful. With the outbreak of World War I, the Allied powers worked on plans to break up the Turkish Empire following a successful conclusion of the war. The World Zionist Organization was aware of the Allied interest in dismantling the Turkish Empire, so heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the British government to sponsor the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine once the land had been "liberated" from Turkey.\(^6\) The World Zionist Organization succeeded partially in their lobbying effort, though the ultimate result of their success was the creation of the Middle East problem which still plagues that area today.

The basic problem concerning the creation of a Jewish state in Israel was the fact that the vast majority of Palestine's residents were Arab. If the British were to propose that Palestine be turned into a Jewish state, contrary to the wishes of the Arab majority in Palestine, then Britain would appear to be abandoning its belief in


\(^6\) Ibid, pp. 59-74.
democratic principles. Yet the World Zionist Organization exerted far more influence in British politics than the Palestinian Arabs did, so the British had to come up with a solution which would resolve their dilemma. The Balfour Declaration (the basic legal document authorizing Israel's existence) was designed to do just that. It reads:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Thus the term "national home" was sufficiently vague to allow the British to assure the World Zionist Organization that the "national homeland" would become, eventually, the Jewish state of Israel, while at the same time explaining to the Palestinian Arabs that the term "national homeland" meant simply that Jews could emigrate to the land of their historical roots, but not take over political control in Palestine. While this approach did get the British off the hook temporarily, it created a situation which made it virtually impossible for Britain to resolve the issue of who would gain political control over Palestine. The problems which resulted from British vacillation are discussed later on in this section of Chapter II.

The Balfour Declaration raised the issue of Palestine's boundaries. Since Palestine did not have any definite boundaries during the period of Turkish control (in fact, Palestine did not really exist during this

period), the participants at the Versaille Peace Conference of 1918 had to set aside an area to constitute the "Jewish homeland." The World Zionist Organization was asked by conference participants to submit a proposal for boundaries of this area. The request of the World Zionist Organization is shown on page 19. It should be noted that these proposals placed far more emphasis upon geopolitical considerations than historical ones. They represented a deliberate attempt to include in the Jewish state as much of the water resources, fertile soil and natural barriers in this area of the Middle East as possible. The Versaille Conference participants regarded these proposals as excessive,\(^8\) so the Palestine question was tabled until the San Remo Conference of 1920. At this conference, British, French and Italian representatives met to resolve final differences in setting up mandated territories in the Middle East. Once again the Zionists offered their Versaille proposal for Palestine's boundaries, but Lloyd George, the British representative, concluded that the historical boundaries of Palestine had never exceeded Dan in the north and Beersheba in the south.\(^9\) As a practical gesture, the French and British representatives decided to extend the southern boundary of Palestine to the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba, so that the Palestine territory would be assured of a southern port. While the rough boundaries of Palestine were agreed upon at this conference, the final

\(^8\) John and Hadawi, *The Palestine Diary*, p. 143.

\(^9\) Ibid., p. 125.
location of boundary lines was left to later deliberations between France and Great Britain.

At the San Remo Conference the three powers did decide that Syria would be under a French mandate while Great Britain would have the mandate over Palestine. When the mandate charter for Palestine was approved by the League of Nations in April of 1922, the territory of Transjordania was also included as a part of Palestine. However, Article 25 of the mandate charter gave the British the right (with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations) to withhold application of the Balfour Declaration provisions from the area east of the Jordan River.¹⁰ In September of 1922 the British, with the approval of the League's Council, created the separate territory of Transjordan and set the western boundaries of Palestine at:

...a line drawn 2 miles west of the town of Aquaba on the Gulf of that name up to the center of Wadi Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yaruk, thence up the center of the river to the Syrian frontier.¹¹

In 1923 the final border adjustments were made by giving Palestine a small finger of land along the southeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, a narrow extension of territory along Palestine's northwest corner and a very small chunk of territory along Palestine's northernmost point. In return, a small triangle of the Golan area was given to the Syrian mandate (see insert map, page 19).

¹⁰ For the complete text of Article 25, see Moore, The Arab-Israel Conflict, 3: p. 83.

¹¹ Ibid.
PALESTINE'S BOUNDARIES 1905-1923

SOURCE: Efrat and Orni, Geography, p. 233.
The United Nations Partition Plan, 1947

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to set up both a Jewish and an Arab State, and to draw their borders. The Jewish State was to be three segments, and was to exclude Jaffa (to become an Arab enclave) and Jerusalem (to be an International Zone). The Jews accepted Statehood. The Arabs not only rejected it, but at once attacked Jewish settlements in every part of Palestine.

The U.N. Partition Plan envisaged an Economic Union between the Arab and Jewish States. But rejecting the U.N. Resolution granting them statehood, the Arabs also rejected the U.N.'s call for an Arab-Jewish Economic Union.

The Zionists, of course, were upset with the loss of Transjordan from the Jewish homeland, but subsequent British policy threatened the Jews with the loss of all Palestine. Since the British government had never fully committed itself to the Zionist interpretation of the Jewish homeland in Palestine (i.e., creation of a Jewish state), the Zionists became impatient with the lack of progress in transforming Palestine into a Jewish state. Whenever the Zionists increased pressure upon the British, though, the British would respond to the Zionists' demands by taking small steps (e.g., increased integration of Jews, a larger Jewish voice in administration of the territory) in the direction of the Zionists' demands. These actions, in turn, would upset the Palestinian Arabs and inevitably lead to Arab riots in Palestine. The British would then react to placate the Palestinian Arabs, usually through retracting or reducing the gains advanced to the Jews. This would cause the Zionists to increase political pressure upon the British government, gain new concessions from the British, and start the same vicious cycle all over again. This British policy of continually avoiding the issue, of continually making and breaking promises to both sides, created such a climate of hostility between Arabs and Jews, and between both groups and the British government, that the British found the territory virtually impossible to govern by the

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13 For an in-depth discussion of this situation see John and Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, Chapters 10-16.
late 1940's. Thus the British gratefully turned the problem over to the United Nations in 1947. The United Nations solution was the partition plan of November 1947 (see map, page 20), which was accepted reluctantly by the Jews but refused by the Palestinian Arabs. The result was the 1948-49 war between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (who were supported by neighboring Arab states). The Jewish forces won the conflict and established the state of Israel within the uneasy confines of the 1949 cease fire line.

About the only conclusion one can draw from the foregoing discussion of Israel's coming into being is that the question of Israel's historical boundaries remains as difficult to resolve now as it did following the discussion of Israel's biblical boundaries. The major problem is the fact that Palestine was a created state, that its boundaries were imposed from outside and modified at the whim of those nations doing the imposing. The United Nations effort to create boundaries for Israel is a further example of this same situation. This process was reversed with the War of Independence in 1948, but the introduction of military strength as the determining factor did not resolve the boundary question satisfactorily. Since both the Arabs and the Jews possessed little military strength at the time of the War of Independence, they had to concentrate their forces on areas of major importance and simply hope for the best in the rest of Palestine.14 The result was a divided Jerusalem with two large groupings of Arabs

14See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O'Jerusalem! (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), for an account of Israel's extensive concentration upon Jerusalem objectives during the War of Independence.
situated in opposite sides of Palestine and the Jews concentrated in the center. It is not a good idea to let strength be the determining factor in the settlement of the boundary issue, because the current balance of strength in the Middle East has left Israel with far more territory than it needs or even wants, but with no more hope of resolving the boundary problem than has existed in the past. It appears that the best means of dealing with historical factors in any boundary resolution is to take historical considerations into account in areas of acute Jewish religious interest (i.e., Jerusalem and the West Bank territory) while downplaying historical claims in other areas. Any Israeli historical claims to the Sinai, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights are so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless.

Areas of Economic Significance

Although certain portions of the occupied territories offer economic attractions to Israel, the economic attractiveness alone is not going to be sufficient reason for Israel to seek annexation of a particular portion of the occupied territory, because economic exploitation would be viewed as a totally unacceptable justification for any territorial expansion by Israel, even by Israel's few friends. Israel's return of the Abu Rudeis oilfields in the Sinai in 1974 appears to be a clear cut rejection of territorial retention purely for economic gain. These oilfields were by far the most valuable piece of property\(^{15}\) in all of the occupied territories. They supplied Israel between 75-85,000 barrels of oil a day, which was close to 60 percent of the

\(^{15}\)This information concerning production of the Abu Rudeis oilfields comes from the *New York Times*, 13 January 1975, p. 14.
country's needs in 1974, and provided Israel with 250 million dollars worth of production. Since the Israeli's domestic production of oil (without Abu Rudeis) is less than 5 percent of internal consumption, the return of these oil fields to Egypt was of considerable economic consequence to Israel. Yet the Rabin government gave up these oil fields in the early stages of the 1974 negotiations with Egypt simply because retention of this area some 200 miles from Israel proper could not be reconciled with Israel's publicly stated policy of only desiring "secure and recognized" borders. If the Israeli government wants to retain the economic benefits of any portion of an occupied territory, then, it will have to find areas of economic attractiveness which can be requested for inclusion within Israel under some more acceptable justification. It is interesting to note, though, that most of the other areas of economic potential in the occupied territories are located in places which can be claimed as being strategically significant for the defense of Israel.

Sinai

Although none of the other areas of economic potential in the occupied territories begin to approach the value of Abu Rudeis, there are a few areas of economic attractiveness. In the Sinai the major economic attraction is oil. Exhaustive geological surveys, which have been made in both Israel and the occupied territories, indicate the most promising areas for finding oil are a 12 mile wide swath of the Mediterranean Sea running from Israel's Lebanon border south to El Arish in the Sinai, and in an area beginning just south of the Abu
Rudeis oil fields and running to the Sinai's southern tip. Some
geologists also believe that a good possibility for major oil deposits
exists along the Sinai's Mediterranean coastline between Barwadi Lagoon
and El Arish. The Israeli government has constructed a seismic study
site just off the El Arish coastline, another at Barwadi Lagoon, and
a third just south of El Arish. Test drilling sites have been set up
at El Tur (just south of Abu Rudeis) and in an area a few miles south
of the El Arish seismic test station.\textsuperscript{16} The Israeli government also
has announced plans for carrying out exploration drilling in waters
near Sharm el Sheihk and Ras Muhammed at the Sinai's southern tip.\textsuperscript{17}

Since the Sharm el Sheihk area is one of major strategic sig­
nificance to Israel, one can anticipate the possibility that Israel
will seek retention of this area of the Sinai under national security
claims, while quietly exploiting it economically. The Israeli actions
in the vicinity of El Arish appear to be another example of this same
strategy. Along with its potential as an oil producing region, the
El Arish "Triangle"\textsuperscript{18} is the only area of the Sinai possessing any
agricultural value. The Israeli's oil exploration actions along
with their efforts to develop agriculture in the area (described in
Chapter III) indicate a strong Israeli interest in annexing this


\textsuperscript{18} The El Arish Triangle refers to the area between El Arish and
the old Gaza-Strip-Egyptian border (pre-1967 War) to a point some 30
miles inland from the Mediterranean Sea along the pre-1967 War Egypt-
Israel border. This area is also known as the Rafiah Salient.
portion of the Sinai. Although it would be much more difficult for Israel to seek annexation of the area between El Arish and Barwadi Lagoon and the area around El Tur on the Suez Gulf coast, if the Sinai dispute were resolved with a step-by-step approach drawn out over a 4 or 5 year period, it would allow Israel time to drain off as much oil as possible from any successful exploration efforts in these two areas. The current impasse in negotiations works in Israel's favor economically in this area because it gives Israel time to complete its explorations of the Sinai and determine which areas will yield the most oil. There is no evidence, though, which indicates that Israel is deliberately stalling negotiations in order to profit economically.

Gaza Strip/West Bank

Both the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories possess little economic potential for Israel. Probably the only economic attraction of any importance in either territory is the oil potential just off the Gaza Strip coast. Other than the oil potential, Israel would gain little economic advantage from annexing either territory, in part or in its entirety. Due to the extensive Arab settlement in both territories, virtually all of the cultivable land is already being farmed by Arabs. Neither territory possesses any significant mineral deposits other than the oil potential off the Gaza coast, so the only economic asset of these territories is a large work force. Israel does not need to annex these territories in order to take advantage of the available workers (this is discussed in Chapter III), and
given the prolonged economic slump in Israel in the last few years, the Israeli economy no longer needs an abundant labor force.

**Golan Heights**

The entire Golan heights is of some economic significance to Israel due to its potential for agricultural production. Since all of the inhabitants of the territory (except some 5,000 Druze farmers living in the northeastern corner of the territory) fled during the 1967 War, Israel was left with some 400 square miles of moderate to good agricultural land. The area shows excellent potential for raising wheat, cotton and some vegetables, but its primary economic attraction to Israel stems from its potential for beef production. Since Israel is a very small, heavily populated nation, the country cannot afford to use its precious agricultural land for cattle production. Consequently, Israel spent extensive sums of money on meat imports (16 million in 1967) prior to the Six Day War. A 1968 government survey of the Heights estimated that sufficient natural pastures existed in the Heights to support the grazing of 30,000 head of cattle. This still left quite a bit of cultivable land in the territory, which has been utilized for producing wheat, cotton and vegetables.

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20 Ibid., p. 198.

21 Ibid., p. 200.
Areas of Strategic Significance

From the time that Israel first gained control of the occupied territories in June of 1967, all the Israeli governments have insisted adamantly that Israel will not return to the pre-war boundaries, and that adjustments in the 1967 boundaries would have to be made so that Israel would possess "secure and recognized" boundaries. This position of the Israeli governments leads one to conclude that the most important territories or portions of territories are those with the most strategic value for the defense of Israel. Although this conclusion is not always valid, the Israeli governments, in general, have demonstrated a much greater willingness to compromise over areas of major economic or religious significance than they have concerning areas of major strategic value. Consequently, all of the areas of major strategic significance in the occupied territories must be viewed as prime candidates for annexation or for inclusion within zones of Israeli military control. The only exception to this rule occurs in certain instances where annexation of a strategically significant area would require the inclusion of vast areas of limited strategic value. In these situations the Israeli governments have demonstrated a willingness to relinquish their hold on the area as long as no Arab opponent regains the strategic value of the position.

22The occupied territory which all Israeli governments have placed the most importance upon is East Jerusalem, which is of limited strategic value (this is discussed later in this chapter) but of immense historical and religious value. Also, in the West Bank territory, the Begin government has made religious considerations more important than strategic considerations in determining the areas in which his government is most interested in retaining an Israeli presence.
Sinai

A prime example of this latter approach is seen in the Israeli's withdrawal from the strategic passes in the Sinai. There are four strategically significant passes in the Sinai; Mitla, Gidi, Wadi Ras Sur and Wadi Garadal. The former two are the most important for Israel, since they hold the key to defense of the entire Sinai. An Israeli general estimated that an Israeli force solidly entrenched in these two passes could hold off an Egyptian force seven times larger. They are also of major strategic significance because these passes guard the most desirable invasion route between Egypt and Israel. Most of the Sinai south of these passes is a mass of virtually impenetrable mountains, while the flat coastline north of the passes is dominated by shifting sand dunes which cannot be traversed by military vehicles. Thus any Egyptian invasion force moving along this area would be confined to the one northern Sinai highway, making it an easy target for Israeli planes. An Egyptian force which made its way through Mitla and Gidi passes, though, would have relatively flat, easily traversable terrain all the way to Israel proper. The Rabin government agreed to withdraw from these passes as part of the second Egypt-Israel Sinai Withdrawal Accord of 1975, but the passes were not turned over to Egyptian forces. Under the terms of the agreement, the passes were occupied by American observers and United Nations forces, thus insuring that the strategic advantage of the Sinai passes would not be held by either side. One can anticipate that, in the event of a

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final Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement in the Sinai, that Israel will insist upon no Egyptian military forces or fortifications in these passes.

There is one other area of major strategic significance to Israel in the Sinai, along with several other areas of lesser strategic importance. Israel's major strategic concern in this territory is the Straits of Tiran located at the southern tip of the Sinai (Sharm el Sheikh). Israel is vitally concerned about this area because the military force which controls the Sharm el Sheikh area controls access through the Straits of Tiran to Israel's southern port of Eilat. The only deep water shipping channel through the Straits of Tiran is a very narrow corridor (800-1,000 yards wide) which runs along the western side of the Saudi Arabian island of Tiran, some four miles from the Sinai coastline. The shipping lane is too narrow to allow much maneuverability, so the ships passing through this channel are at the mercy of guns positioned along the Sinai coastline. If this channel is closed, Israel is limited to their two Mediterranean ports. Such a development would create considerable transportation problems within Israel, it would close down the oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashkalon, and it would deal a severe psychological blow to the Israeli's conviction that they can defend their country against Arab aggressiveness. The fact that both the 1956 and 1967 Israeli surprise attacks against Egyptian forces immediately followed an Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran points out just how much strategic significance is attached to this area by Israel.
There are three other areas along the pre-1967 War Egypt-Israel boundary that are of some strategic significance to Israel, though of considerably less importance than Sharm el Sheikh. The Israeli's are concerned about the vulnerability of Eilat, located at the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba. The pre-1967 War boundary intersected the Gulf of Aquaba only a few miles south of Eilat. Consequently, it would require only a very short advancement for an Egyptian force to capture Eilat and cut off Israeli access to the Red Sea. Several Israeli governments have expressed an interest in providing a ten to fifteen mile wide cushion between Eilat and the Egyptian border in the area.\(^{24}\) A second area of Israeli strategic interest is the northern-most part of the Sinai along the Mediterranean coast. This area would provide an Egyptian force the quickest access to the heavily populated regions of Israel, so the Israelis' have expressed interest in extending Israel's pre-1967 War boundary to include some of this territory. Given the extensive Israeli settlement efforts in this area since 1975 (discussed in Chapter III), one can expect the Israeli government to place increasing emphasis upon the strategic significance of this area. A third location that is considered of strategic significance is the crossroads areas between Eilat and El Arish. The first of these is the Abu Aweigila-Kusseima region, while the second is near Kuntilla, north of Eilat. The Rabin government wanted to retain

\(^{24}\)Yigal Allon expressed the Rabin government's interest in this area (Yigal Allon, "Israeli: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976): 48-49.), and implied that Israel should retain control of a ten to fifteen mile wide strip of the Sinai running from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aquaba.
Israeli control of these crossroads areas because they form the intersection points on the main land routes from the Sinai to Beersheba and Eilat. Although the strategic areas in this portion of the Sinai are located quite some distance from each other, the easiest means for Israel to resolve its security problems along the Sinai frontier is to extend its southern boundary ten to fifteen miles into the Sinai. The Rabin government adopted this approach, and the Begin government has taken the same position, though it advocates extension of Israeli military control into the area through the creation of a security corridor rather than annexation of territory.\textsuperscript{25}

There is one other important security consideration for Israel in the Sinai. Since there are only four major military airfields within Israel proper, the country is extremely vulnerable to a surprise attack. During the occupation of the Sinai, Israel constructed four airfields in the territory, Bir Gifgafa near the Gidi and Mitla passes, Ofira near Sharm el Sheink, Eitam near El Arish, and Etzion near Eilat (see map, page 57). The Begin government concedes that Bir Gifgafa and Ofira will have to be dismantled, but the Eitam and Etzion fields are considered vital to Israel's national defense.\textsuperscript{26} These two fields provide vital dispersal of Israel's aircraft, and they also provide needed bases for handling Israel's vastly increased air force (it is three times larger now than in 1967). From Etzion the Israeli air force is within quick striking distance of Sharm el


\textsuperscript{26}All of Begin's peace proposals call for Israeli withdrawal far beyond the areas where Bir Gifgafa and Ofira are located.
Sheikh and the entire Gulf of Aquaba, while the Eitam field provides a superb field for protecting Israel's Mediterranean coastline. To move these fields into Israel proper would be enormously expensive (one billion for Ezion alone), but they are located too far into the Sinai to be included into any security corridor. If Egypt and Israel can manage to resolve most of the other Sinai issues, one can expect the United States to pay for relocation of these bases in order to insure a peace settlement is reached.

Gaza Strip

There is no particular area of the Gaza Strip which possesses any great strategic significance, but the area in its entirety is viewed as being strategically significant by Israel. The territory juts into Israel proper and provides an excellent jumping off place for a hostile force, since it lies dangerously close to Tel Aviv and the heavily populated surrounding areas. Before the 1967 War, the presence of large numbers of Egyptian troops in the territory provided a constant source of concern for the Israeli government. Although the Israeli government might be persuaded to relinquish control over part or all of this territory, one can anticipate that Israel would be extremely reluctant to return it to Arab control if any Arab military forces are to be stationed in it.

West Bank

In the West Bank territory there are two areas of major strategic significance to Israel. The first is a string of mountains running the length of the present Israel-Jordan cease fire line, while
the second is the westernmost bulge of the West Bank area which borders the narrowest part of Israel proper. Since the West Bank territory is so close to virtually all of the vital centers of Israel, (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa), most Israeli military strategists have argued that the first line of Israeli defense against an attack from Jordan should be as close to the current Israel-Jordan cease fire line as possible. The best location for a defense line is the low mountain range located approximately ten miles west of and parallel to the cease fire line. In early 1969, the Israeli government adopted the Allon Plan which was designed to capitalize on the strategic advantage offered by this range of mountains and eliminate some of the strategic difficulties posed by Israel's narrow corridor. Under the original Allon Plan a chain of 20 paramilitary settlements was to be constructed along these mountains, 11 north of Jericho along the Jordan River and 9 more south of Jericho along the Dead Sea. These settlements were designed as a defensive line to stall any Jordanian attack long before it reached Israel proper. A crucial provision of this plan was the Israeli insistence that no Arab military forces be allowed in the West Bank area. Quite obviously, most of the advantages of the Allon Plan would be negated if Arab military forces were stationed in the populated area of the West Bank, beyond the Allon Plan security border.

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27 Israel's narrow corridor region refers to that portion of Israel proper which begins approximately 5 miles south of Tel Aviv and runs approximately 20 miles north of that city.
At the time of the Allon Plan's adoption, the Israeli government denied that this territory would be annexed by Israel, but it did state that the line encompassed by these paramilitary settlements would serve as Israel's final security boundary. The Israeli government stated simply that Israel's political boundaries need not be the same as its security boundaries, implying that Jordan might be granted sovereignty over this area as long as the Israeli military fortifications were allowed to remain in place.\(^{28}\) The Allon Plan, in various forms, has remained the basic West Bank policy for all Israeli governments since 1969. Even the policy of the Begin government, originally one of West Bank annexation, has been modified to the point that it does not differ much from the basic Allon Plan. Prime Minister Begin's policy of maintaining a continued Israeli military presence in the West Bank while granting the Palestinian Arabs administrative control over the territory's Arab residents does not restrict the Israeli military presence to a few pre-designated areas (as does the original Allon Plan), and it does provide for continued Israeli control over Israeli religious settlements in the territory.

One of the effects of the adoption of the Allon Plan was a decreased emphasis upon the strategic significance of the West Bank area lying adjacent to Israel's narrow corridor. Under the pre-1967 War boundaries, this Israeli territory presented a major concern to Israeli defense planners, because the distance between the hostile

\(^{28}\) *Time*, 7 February 1969, p. 25.
Jordanian forces in the West Bank and the Mediterranean Sea was less than 14 miles at the narrowest point and little more than 20 miles at the widest. Thus, an Arab military force in this area of the West Bank would have to advance only a very short distance to cut Israel in two. Under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, no Arab forces would be allowed in the West Bank territory, so this narrow strip of Israel becomes much less of a security liability. At the time of its adoption, the Allon Plan proved to be the most acceptable solution for defense along the West Bank front, since it did not require annexation of large chunks of the occupied territory. If Israel is denied a military presence in the mountains along the Jordan River and Dead Sea, then Israel would be forced to shift its efforts to annexation of some territory along the West Bank's westernmost bulge. In order to provide adequate security for this area, though, Israel would have to annex a strip of territory between 5 and 8 miles wide and close to 50 miles long. Even this extensive an annexation would not provide nearly the strategic advantage offered by the Allon Plan, and it would do nothing to provide security for Jerusalem and other Israeli territory bordering the West Bank.

Even under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, the Israeli governments have called for "cosmetic adjustments" in some of the more strategically significant areas along this westernmost bulge of the West Bank. The most important of these is a small finger of territory called Latrun (see map, page 61) which juts sharply into Israel proper. The tip of this area lies within a few hundred yards of the main highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This highway is
the major military supply route between Israel's major port and capital city, so unrestricted movement along this route is crucial during any Arab-Israeli war. A small guerrilla force based in the Latrun area could disrupt movement along this highway quite easily and could even block this route for a long enough period (12 to 24 hours) to restrict severely Israel's ability to conduct a short term war. Under the original Allon Plan, the area was designated for annexation, and it can be expected that in any negotiations concerning the West Bank, Israel will insist upon its annexation regardless of whatever other compromises are made. Other strategically significant sites include the small areas around Qalqilya and Tulkarm (see map, page 61). The Qalqilya area lies a little less than 10 miles from the Mediterranean, and straightening out Israel's boundary along this point would give Israel 2 more miles of leeway at Qalqilya. The Tulkarm point is the second closest point to the Mediterranean, so the Israelis' would like to widen their country slightly at this point. These three areas are about the only areas in this part of the West Bank where any "cosmetic" adjustments need be made. Any other border straightening along this narrow corridor would require extensive additions of territory to Israel proper.

Golan Heights

In the Golan Heights the entire area is considered strategically significant. Since the territory is quite small (444 square

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29 _Time_, 7 February 1969, p. 25.
miles) and borders Israel's most hostile Arab neighbor (Syria), all the Israeli governments since 1967 have indicated that they had no intention of making extensive compromises in the Golan Heights. Also, this area forms the headwaters of the Jordan River, Israel's major source of water. It is extremely important to Israel that this water supply not be disrupted. It is difficult to assess whether certain areas of the Golan Heights are more strategically significant than others, because two of the major features which determine an area's military significance, elevation and proximity to Israel proper, are not found in the same place in any part of the Golan Heights. The Heights is a sloping plateau which begins at about 500 to 700 feet above sea level along the pre-1967 War boundary and rises quickly to an altitude to 3,500 to 4,000 feet along the easternmost reaches of Israeli controlled territory. Thus, all of the high ground is located at the greatest distance from Israel proper, and since the territory slopes gradually up all the way to the current cease fire line, it is difficult to point out any one strip of territory running across the Heights that is significantly easier to defend than a point either in front or behind this designated strip. Much of the Heights is dotted with steep, rugged gorges which limit military maneuverability, but the Golan Heights terrain, in general, is not rugged enough to prevent an invading army from deploying its forces widely. Consequently, Israel could not choke off an invasion simply by controlling several key positions as is the case with the passes in the Sinai. In fact, the only good choke point is an area north of
Quneitra, between that town and Mt. Hermon.\footnote{During the 1973 War, 1 brigade of Israeli troops, supported by 100 tanks, held off 2 Syrian divisions for 3 days in this area. For an account of the battle, see Nadav Safran, \textit{Israel: The Embattled Ally}, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 286-301.}

The apparent Israeli strategy in the Golan Heights seems to be one of keeping Syrian forces as far removed from Israel proper as possible. Since the slightest compromise with the Syrians would have Israeli forces backing downhill with Syrians moving into advantageous positions above, the Israelis will probably limit any territorial concessions to the portion of the Heights farthest from Israel proper. This approach leaves a little room for compromise in the central Golan Heights area (around Quneitra) with very limited room for compromise in the northern end of the territory. Since the Israeli territory north of the Sea of Galilee is dangerously vulnerable to being pinched off against the sea, Israel cannot afford to allow Syrian troops closer to Israel proper at one point than at another. Given this situation, one can expect Israel to seek annexation of a swath of Golan Heights territory of approximately equal width along the entire length of the pre-1967 War boundary.

\textbf{East Jerusalem}

East Jerusalem is currently of some strategic significance to Israel. Prior to the 1967 War it was of major strategic significance because large numbers of Jordanian troops were stationed in that portion of the city, immediately adjacent to one of the major population centers of Israel. It is virtually impossible for a similar situation...
to develop, though, since Israel would never allow any sizeable Arab troop concentration to be stationed anywhere in the West Bank region. The area does have strategic significance for prevention of terrorist acts, even if the West Bank is demilitarized. No one in Israel wants to see the Holy City divided by barbed wire and mine fields again, but this is a possibility should the area come under Palestinian Arab control. If Israel controls the entire city, though, the anti-terrorist measures (i.e., checkpoints and electronic surveillance devices) could be placed at the outskirts of the city, allowing for unrestricted movement of Jerusalem's residents and visitors. The most acceptable means for preventing terrorist attacks in Jerusalem and entry of Palestinian terrorists into Israel happens to be one of the least acceptable political solutions for Jerusalem to the Arab states. It appears very likely that, if Israel is going to gain Arab acceptance of an overall peace settlement, compromises will have to be made in Jerusalem which could lead to difficulties in controlling movement of terrorists in and out of Israel through Jerusalem. These problems controlling terrorists may well be the price that Israel has to pay if it wants to gain other more important security arrangements in the other occupied territories.

Lebanon

The territory in Lebanon, recently occupied by Israel, is of some strategic significance now, though the long term strategic value of this area to Israel is somewhat ambiguous. In essence, Israel's continued occupation of the other territories is what led to the
problem in Lebanon. Israel's adamant refusal to accept a Palestinian state in the Middle East has been the prime motivational force for the Palestinian resistance movement. As the strength of the Palestinians grew, they became a threat to several of the Arab states out of which they operated, first in Jordan (until they were thrown out of the country following a major military effort by King Hussein's forces), and then in Lebanon. It was the alignment of Palestinian guerrillas with Lebanese Muslims which led to the Lebanese civil war between Christians and Muslims and which left Palestinian guerrillas with control over much of the area along the Lebanon-Israel border. This gave the Palestinians an excellent staging area for guerrilla forays into Israel, shelling of Israeli border settlements and the uninterrupted training of new recruits. Thus, what was a relatively peaceful boundary for Israel prior to the Six Day War has become another security problem to be reckoned with.

The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon was a response to the Palestinian presence there, but it appears that the area will not be a long-term strategic problem for Israel. As long as the Palestinian guerrillas pose the only threat in Lebanon, Israel need not be overly concerned. The Palestinians possess neither the manpower nor the firepower to threaten seriously Israel's existence, and any workable peace settlement in the Middle East is likely to dispel much of the violently anti-Israel sentiment which fuels the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However, this area could become strategically significant if the Lebanese Muslims, allied with the PLO, manage to
gain control of all Lebanon. In such a situation, Israel would have
to consider Lebanon as much of a threat as its other bordering Arab
neighbors. In fact, Lebanon might become even more dangerous, since
a Muslim-dominated Lebanon would most likely become the haven for
militant Palestinians dissatisfied with whatever peace settlement is
worked out eventually. If such a situation develops, and Israel comes
under increasing guerrilla attack from Lebanon, one can anticipate
that Israel would move into Lebanon and occupy the area north to the
Litani River. This occupation would square off Israel's northern
boundary, give Israel ample room to build solid defensive fortifications
and give access to the major water supply in the area. Currently,
Israel has shown little inclination to retain a permanent presence in
Lebanon. Much of the occupied area has already been turned over to
United Nations forces, no plans for settlements have been announced,
and Israel has not even set up a military government to administer the
area. It appears very likely that Israel will not attempt to retain
any of Lebanon in any final peace settlement.

Summary

It has already been noted that the only areas that can be con-
sidered of major historical/religious importance are East Jerusalem
and certain areas of the West Bank. There are a number of areas of
economic significance to Israel. In the Sinai, these include the
Rafiah Salient, the portion of the Mediterranean coastline between
El Arish and Barwadi Lagoon, and the area around Sharm el Sheihk.
The only other area of primary economic importance is the entire Golan
Heights territory. The areas of primary strategic significance include Sharm el Sheikh, Etzion and Eitam air bases, and the crossroads, Eilat and Rafiah Salient regions in the Sinai. The entire Golan Heights and Gaza Strip territories have to be considered strategically significant. In the West Bank, the security belt region along the Jordan River and the Dead Sea is of prime importance, while the Latrun, Tulkarm and Qalqilya areas possess some strategic significance. East Jerusalem is strategically significant for prevention of terrorist attacks, while the recently occupied territory in Lebanon is of little strategic importance to Israel now (since the guerrillas have been driven out), though it might prove valuable in the future. Some of these areas possess both economic attraction and security value, particularly the Golan Heights and Sharm el Sheikh, and to a lesser extent, the Rafiah Salient. The joint attractions of economic potential and strategic significance may not be overly important, though, since economic development tends to negate much of an area's value as a buffer zone. It is important to keep in mind these areas mentioned above during the course of discussion in the next two chapters, because all of the areas noted above are of some value to Israel, and actions taken to consolidate the Israeli presence in some of these areas and the statements made to justify this presence give a good indication of how Israel is attempting to balance off economic interests and historical considerations against strategic needs.
CHAPTER III

ISRAELI INTEGRATION AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Perhaps the most accurate indicator of Israeli intention to retain control over a particular territory is seen in the actions taken to integrate the territory with Israel proper or to consolidate the Israeli hold on the area with settlements. It is reasonable to assume that the more interested Israel is in holding on to a territory the more effort will be made to integrate the inhabitants of that territory into Israel proper and to place Israeli settlements in the territory or portions of it. Since the Israeli integration policies vary somewhat with each particular territory, quite often these policy differences serve as indicators of just how determined Israel is in maintaining control of the area. The settlement policies of the Israeli government also vary from territory to territory, and though these policies do not serve as a strong indicator of the importance of a territory in its entirety to Israel, they usually indicate which particular portions of a given territory that Israel is going to make the most effort to maintain control over.

With the exception of East Jerusalem, the Israeli's integration and consolidation actions taken before August of 1973 were fairly modest. The amount of Israeli settlement and development activity was quite limited, and the Israeli governments had been reluctant to
increase the Israeli presence. In August of 1973 the governing Labor Party changed courses and adopted a different policy as their party platform for the upcoming elections. They advocated public and private purchase of land in the occupied territories, and extensive development projects in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights territories. At the time this policy was adopted by the Labor Party, it was believed that there was little if any hope of getting any kind of peace settlement with the Arabs for at least another four years. Consequently, the Labor Party believed that the best course of action was simply to "create" the peace settlement that it wanted without worrying about the Arab's feelings in the matter. This policy announcement served as one of the primary catalysts for the Yom Kipper War, which prevented implementation of these Labor Party plans in 1973. Under the past two administrations, though, the Israeli government has moved, once again, toward a policy of creating the peace settlement it wants. The following discussion outlines the extent of Israeli integration and consolidation actions taken up to early 1978.

Integration Actions

Administrative Integration Actions

All of the occupied territories have been integrated partially into Israel, but none of the large territories (Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights) have been integrated totally as has East Jerusalem. On June 28, 1967, the Israeli government formally annexed

East Jerusalem and some of the territory on the outskirts of the city. Most of the public services, water, sanitation, telephone, electricity, and bus systems had been integrated immediately following occupation, and all barriers which formerly divided the city were torn down. Street signs were posted in both Hebrew and Arabic, extensive plans were made by the Jerusalem city council to modernize and improve the formerly Jordanian sector, and representatives from the Jordanian sector were elected to the Jerusalem Municipal Council. Finally, no restrictions were placed upon the free movement of people through the newly unified city. Residents of East Jerusalem are now considered citizens of Israel and are granted all the rights available to Israeli citizens under Israeli law.  

Since none of the other territories have been annexed, either in total or in part, they are administered by military governments set up in four separate areas. These are the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, and the "Solomon Area" comprising the Southern Sinai. These military governments are "caretaker" type governments which are designed to minimize hostility between natives and the occupying forces and to maintain a minimum level of change in the daily lives of Arab residents of the occupied territories. Each territory is headed by a military commander who has a small staff of military personnel and Israeli civilian advisors. In the sparsely populated areas such as the Golan Heights and the Southern Sinai, the military commander's Civilian Affairs Staff  

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handles most of the government functions. However, in the heavily populated areas (Gaza Strip and West Bank), the civil service bureaucracy which had existed prior to the war has been kept intact. These Arab administrators are the ones who handle all the day to day activities of government, and they are the ones with whom Arab citizens deal with in their contacts with government. This Arab bureaucracy is responsible to the military commander and is required to adhere to the general policy guidelines set by the Israeli Minister of Defense, who supervises the four military commanders governing the occupied territories.⁴

Although certain differences exist in the manner in which different territories are governed, many of these differences should be interpreted as responses to unique local conditions rather than attempts to increase or less the degree of integration of a particular territory into Israel proper. The administrative methods needed to govern the nomadic Bedouin tribesmen of the Sinai vary considerably from the complex bureaucratic structure applied in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There are a number of policies though, which serve as indicators of Israeli intentions concerning these occupied territories. The type of legal system applied is one of these indicators. In the initial stages of governing these four territories, the Israeli's retained the legal systems which existed prior to the

³All of this information concerning Israel's military governments in the occupied territories comes from Nimrod Raphaeli, "Military Government in the Occupied Territories," The Middle East Journal 23 (Spring 1969): 177-190.
Six Day War. Thus, the southern Sinai was governed under the Egyptian legal system, the Jordanian legal system was retained in the West Bank, the Syrian legal system prevailed in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip was administered under the British Mandatory legal system. By 1969, though, the Syrian legal system had been replaced by Israeli civil law in the Golan Heights. This is the only one of the four military government districts which is currently governed under Israeli civil law.4

Another location in which administrative measures indicate Israeli intentions of retaining control over the area in the Northern Sinai. Since 1972 administrative actions have been taken to "encourage" Bedouin tribesmen to leave the Mediterranean coastline area around El Arish.5 When one realizes the extent of Israeli settlement taking place in this area (a matter discussed later in this chapter), the reasons for the Israeli policy of driving out the Arabs becomes quite evident. Also, certain administrative actions taken in the West Bank indicate that Israel wishes to encourage Jordan's interest in regaining administrative control over the Palestinian Arabs of the territory. The West Bank is the only territory in which Israel allows two legal currencies (Jordanian and Israeli),6 and it is also the only


6Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p. 147. In all the other occupied territories the Israeli pound is the only legal currency.
territory in which the former owner (Jordan) pays part of the salaries of the civil administrators. To a considerable extent the extensive trade between the West Bank and Jordan renders the currency situation almost a matter of practical necessity, but the Israeli willingness to allow Jordan to continue to pay many of the civil administrators of the West Bank indicates that Israel does not mind King Hussein's efforts to maintain a Jordanian presence in the administration of the area. This activity on Jordan's part is not a practical arrangement for Israel, since Israel pays all of the West Bank civil administrators as well. The only purpose of the arrangement seems to be that it serves as a means of keeping Hussein connected with the affairs of the West Bank. Since most Israeli governments have indicated a preference for an eventual Jordanian administrative control over the West Bank, rather than a Palestinian controlled area, the Israeli acceptance of Hussein's action merely confirms this belief.

Economic Integration Actions

In the area of economic integration, the degree of integration between the economy of Israel and the economy of the occupied territory is determined by a number of factors. These include (1) the lack of restrictions concerning movement of produce and workers between the occupied territory and Israel, (2) the similarity of wages between

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7 Ibid., p. 155.

8 The Begin government has adopted a policy of returning the West Bank territory to Palestinian administrative control, though the conditions of this Palestinian control are so restrictive that Begin believes, apparently, that Hussein's stabilizing influence in the area would not be necessary.
the territory and Israel, and (3) the degree to which government benefits guaranteed to Israeli workers have been extended to workers in the occupied territory.

Under this rating system, the Golan Heights is clearly the most integrated economically of the occupied territories. Virtually no economic barriers exist between the Golan Heights and Israel. There is no restricted entry into Israel on agricultural products from the Golan Heights. In the Heights public works project employees and civil servants are paid the same rates as in Israel, while in other territories these employees receive the same salaries which existed before the war supplemented by cost of living increases. Israel's Institute of National Insurance (similar to the United States' Social Security Administration) extends the same benefits to Druze workmen in the Golan Heights as is provided to any Israeli citizen working in Israel proper. Finally, in 1968 the Israeli government decreed that all wages, fringe benefits, and old age pensions for Golan Heights inhabitants would be the same as in Israel.9

In the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai, the Israeli government has placed far more restraints on the economic integration of these territories with Israel proper. In these three territories, the Israeli's primary concern immediately following the close of the Six Day War was to revive the decimated economies of these territories and provide employment and relief for the thousands of unemployed heads of households. In each of these territories, the Israelis' developed

9Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p. 199.
public works programs, set up employment agencies, and provided relief for families which were unable to find any employment. The Israeli government provided a limited amount of capital investment to encourage the growth of some light industry in the territories, and it also encouraged limited private investment from Israeli sources. Finally, the Israeli government allowed limited numbers of Arabs from occupied territories to seek employment in Israel. All of these actions were essentially "caretaker" in nature for, initially, the Israeli government demonstrated a great reluctance to allow any more economic integration between Israel and these three territories than was deemed necessary.

The Israeli public works, job training, and welfare assistance programs are the most basic example of the initial Israeli efforts to avoid full economic integration. Since the job training programs were designed to prepare Arabs for semi-skilled jobs in the territory in which they resided, these programs minimized the economic integration between Israel and the territory receiving assistance. Unfortunately, these programs drained large financial sums from the Israeli treasury, but made only a slight dent in the massive unemployment problem in the occupied territories. The Israeli government realized that if they were to resolve the economic problems of these territories, they would have to take a much more direct role in the economic process.

In the agricultural sector Israeli efforts were largely successful. The agricultural developments of these three territories

did not suffer much at all from the 1967 fighting, so the Israelis did not have to give a massive infusion of capital to revive production. The problem that confronted the Israelis was the creation of a market to absorb agricultural produce. Since agricultural production in the Sinai was quite small compared to the West Bank and Gaza Strip volume, the Israelis were not faced with a major problem in that territory. Virtually all of the Sinai agricultural production (centered exclusively around El Arish) was absorbed within the local economy, and what little had to be exported to Israel posed no problem for the Israeli economy. Both the West Bank and Gaza Strip produced a much larger volume of agricultural goods than the Sinai did, and their traditional market sources (Eastern Europe for the Gaza Strip and Jordan for the West Bank) had been cut off as a result of the war. Since the crops produced in these two territories were the same kind of agricultural produce grown in Israel proper, the Israelis could not absorb the agricultural production from these two territories without creating severe problems within their own hard-pressed agricultural sector. The Israelis resolved the West Bank problem by reopening trade between the West Bank and Jordan, thus returning the West Bank's traditional market. Unfortunately, Israel did not have diplomatic relations with most East European countries which constituted Gaza's market. Through extensive effort, though, Israel succeeded in creating a market for Gaza Strip products in Western Europe, thus managing to revive the agricultural industry of these territories while simultaneously strictly limiting the flow of agricultural products from these territories into Israel.
The major step in resolving the occupied territories' unemployment problem was taken in 1968 when the Israeli government decided to allow much greater integration of workers from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into the Israeli job market. At this time the Israeli economy was booming and needed additional workers, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank still suffered from high unemployment, so the logical conclusion was reached. Although the workers from the occupied territories who did gain employment in Israel were paid Israeli wages, they did not gain all of the benefits granted Israeli workers under the Institute of National Insurance. Also, the number of Arabs from the territories allowed to work within Israel was strictly limited, since wages were considerably higher in Israel than in the territories. By 1969 some 12,000 from the West Bank, 4,000 from the Gaza Strip, and a scattered few from the Sinai were employed in Israel.  

To a considerable degree, the Israeli conviction that the economies of Israel and those of the Gaza Strip and West Bank would remain separate and distinct entities was unrealistic, given the conditions under which the economies operated. As Kanovsky pointed out, the Israeli decision to allow free trade between the territories and Israel (with the exception of some restrictions on agricultural products), to use a common currency (Israeli pound), to allow the relatively free

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11 Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p. 189.
movement of people between the territories and Israel, and to integrate transportation routes between Israel's coastal plain and the territories, insured the beginnings of a common market.\footnote{Ibid., p. 186.} It appears that whatever government does assume control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be forced to retain contact with the Israeli market and the Israeli employment opportunities, at least until other economic solutions could be worked out.

**Consolidation Actions**

The most concrete expression of Israeli interest in retaining a particular portion of an occupied territory is the extent of Israeli settlement and development in that area. It is doubtful that the Israeli government would undertake any extensive settlement and development programs in an area unless it expected to retain Israeli control over it under the terms of an eventual peace settlement. In the first place Israel cannot afford to spend vast sums of money on constructing settlements and moving Israeli citizens into these settlements and then abandon the settlements to the Arabs or spend additional money to return the settlers and all their buildings and equipment back to Israel. In the second place the Israeli government cannot afford the psychological cost that would result if Israel were forced to abandon areas that both the Israeli settlers in the occupied territories and the Israeli general public had expected to become part of Israel. In short, the longer that existing Israeli settlements
remain in particular portions of occupied territories, the more
difficult it will be to return to a situation which existed prior to
the ascent of the Israeli settlement effort.

As of January 1978 Israel had established over 90 settlements in
the occupied territories, and the Begin government had given approval
for more religious settlements in the West Bank. Initially, little
settlement activity took place following the 1967 War. Gradually the
Israelis' began building a few paramilitary settlements in the Golan
Heights, then in the Sinai and the West Bank. These settlements were
primarily for defensive purposes or for experimental agricultural
purposes (in the Sinai), though the bulk of Golan Heights settlements
were purely for agricultural exploitation. It was not until after
the 1973 War that the Israelis' began building settlements in earnest.
By 1975 the concept of "creating facts" became the policy of the
Israeli government, and settlement building accelerated rapidly.
Under this policy the emphasis shifted from one of limiting settle­
ments in the occupied territories in order to facilitate peace nego­
tiations with the Arabs to a policy of building the settlements in
the areas Israel wished to retain its presence in and force the Arabs
to come around to accepting the situation. The Rabin government began
this policy, and the extensive settlement activity has continued under
the Begin administration, though the major emphasis has shifted to
the West Bank under Begin, while settlement activity under Rabin was
concentrated in the Sinai and Golan Heights.
Presently, there are over 25 Israeli settlements in the Sinai. The most ambitious settlement effort undertaken by the Israelis in this territory is the creation of a new city named Yamit. Yamit is located on the Mediterranean coast in the Sinai territory just a few miles south of the Gaza Strip's southern boundary (map on page 57 shows location of Sinai settlements). The Yamit development, originally conceived of by former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan as a city of 250,000, is presently designed to be an urban regional center to serve as Israel's third major Mediterranean port and to support a large number of surrounding agricultural settlements. In December of 1975 only 23 families had moved into the "city" and only 185 housing units had been completed, but the site was being prepared for the construction of 1,300 additional housing units, as well as some commercial and industrial developments. By January of 1978 over 2,000 settlers lived in Yamit, and some 22 settlements surrounded the town. Currently in the planning stages is a new settlement program which calls for 10-15 more settlements to be constructed in the Rafiah Salient in the next 3 years. Quite obviously, Israel is moving steadily to consolidate its hold in this area.

The initial Sinai settlements consisted of three paramilitary structures located in the northern Sinai region. These are the Nahal

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SINAI TERRITORY

Yam, a fishing camp located in the Barwadi Lagoon region along the Sinai's Mediterranean coast, the Nahal Diqla, a kibbutz located north of El Arish, close to the Gaza Strip border, and the Nahal Sinai, an experimental farm located a few miles south of El Arish. These were the only Israeli settlements in this area of the Sinai until the Yamit project came into being. At the time of inception these three small settlements appeared to be little more than experimental projects, but the Yamit project will probably change these plans. The Nahal Yam is simply too far removed to be included in the Yamit development, but the Nahal Sinai and Nahal Diqla could be integrated quite easily into the Yamit project.

Of the remaining Sinai settlements, two are just south of Kusseima in the historic crossroads area, while another five are along the Gulf of Aquaba, three along the highway leading to Sharm el Sheihk and two at Sharm el Sheihk. One of the Sharm el Sheihk settlements has been in operation for several years (Ophir), but the remainder of these settlements along the Gulf of Aquaba and near Kusseima have been built since 1975. The settlements in the Kusseima region appear to be an effort to establish a presence in the strategically significant crossroads. On the other hand, the ones along the Gulf of Aquaba and in Sharm el Sheihk appear to be primarily tourist camps and resorts. Ophir, for example, is a large resort area with over 100 trailers and bungalows set up for tourist accommodation.17

16 Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p. 195.
Gaza Strip

The only Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip other than the previously mentioned agricultural settlements affiliated with Yamit are three paramilitary settlements scattered the length of the territory. The location of Gaza settlements indicates that Israel is in a good position to consolidate its hold on the areas of the Gaza Strip within the Rafiah Salient region, but the remainder of the territory evidences no settlement concentration. These three paramilitary settlements are too small and too scattered to be of much military value, so it would be quite easy to have them removed. There appear to be no plans within the Israeli government at present to expand around any of the areas of these three paramilitary camps.

West Bank

The development of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank territory was somewhat different than in the other territories. Immediately following the 1967 War, no settlements were allowed in the territory. Several of the religious parties in Israel strongly desired to create Jewish settlements in former Jewish holy areas, but were frustrated by government policy. They solved the problem by taking matters into their own hands. In early 1968 a youth group from Gush Emunim declared their intention of settling in Kfir Etzonia, halfway between Jerusalem and Hebron, with or without government permission.\(^\text{18}\)

This statement created enough public support for the action that the government was forced to allow the group to go ahead. Another major settlement in the West Bank followed a similar initiative by Gush Emunim supporters who attempted to move into Hebron in 1968. This move was opposed by Moshe Dayan (at the time formulator of government policy for governing the territory) who did not want to alienate the Palestinian Arabs living in Hebron. The Israeli government compromised by creating a new Jewish town in the suburbs of Hebron called Kiryat Arba. This town contained an initial population of 1,000 and was designed to include further expansion.

Once that the actions of the religious parties had broken the ban on settlement in the West Bank, the government modified its policy and in late 1969 began to implement the Allon Plan for settlements along the Jordan River and Dead Sea. Within a year's time, five more paramilitary encampments had been set up along the Jordan River. Between 1970 and 1973 there was little settlement activity in the West Bank territory. Following the October War, the Israeli government accelerated its settlement construction along the security belt area. By 1977 some 16 settlements were operational north of Jericho and 4 more had been constructed south of Jericho. Given the large area north of Jericho along the Jordan River, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend that Israel has achieved total domination over the area with just 16 settlements, though this is the case. For one thing

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*Israeli settlements in West Bank as of August 1977.
Israel has converted several of the paramilitary settlements into civilian agricultural settlements populated by Gush Emunim members. In several instances the Israelis merely confiscated much of the cultivable land in an area and drove out the Arab farmers. The Israeli's most effective technique has been to appropriate the few wells in the area or to dig its settlement wells in such locations as to draw off all the water from surrounding Arab wells. Deprived of their source of water, most Arab farmers living in the area were forced to leave. By the end of 1977 virtually the entire area enclosed within the "Limit of Settlement Road" (see map, page 61) is populated exclusively by Israelis, though only 900 settlers reside within the area.

Between 1973 and Begin's election in 1977, Gush Emunim pioneers had accomplished a few successful efforts at establishing maverick settlements in the West Bank, but they had never enjoyed the extent of support that the Begin government offered for their activities. Once in office, Prime Minister Begin proved much more willing to extend legal status to maverick settlements and to propose further settlements for religious party members. By 1978 settlements had sprouted up all over the West Bank; four at Kfir Etzonia, two in Latrun, two at Ramallah, one outside Nablus, and several scattered along the West Bank area bordering the narrow corridor region of

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 401-403.
22 Ibid., p. 403.
Israel proper. Under the Begin government the number of settlers in the West Bank grew to over 5,000 by early 1978. This figure is even more impressive when one realizes that Israel is finding it extremely difficult to find adequate numbers of settlers to populate all of the settlements constructed. The large Gush Emunim settlement of Kiryat Arba has dozens of apartments lying empty, which is often the case with other West Bank settlements. Even the extremely crowded housing conditions within Israel and the added attraction of very low rent in the occupied territory fail to induce settlers to move into West Bank developments. The Begin government has responded by coming up with a plan to eliminate some of the isolationist problems which deter Israelis' from moving to West Bank settlements. Some of its features include better roads, better communications and better shopping facilities. It appears that the only thing slowing down the extent of Israeli West Bank settlement under the Begin administration is the fear of American reprisal action if their objectives become too obvious.

In her article Elizabeth Monroe argues that all the Israeli governments from Meir's to Begin's were, in effect, following a policy of creeping annexation, with the objective of gaining control over a large portion (if not all) of the West Bank territory. Monroe correctly points out that all of these governments were dependent upon support from Israel's religious parties for their survival in the

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Israeli Knesset, and as a consequence had to go along with Gush Emunim demands for annexation of all of the West Bank into Israel. There is little proof that the Meir government advocated this policy, and not that much more evidence which can support this argument in the case of the Rabin government. It can be shown, however, that both the Meir government and the Rabin government encountered extreme opposition from the Gush Emunim faction of the religious parties when they adopted policies of returning portions of the West Bank containing Israeli settlers under the terms of an eventual peace agreement. The Gush Emunim opposition made it very difficult for Labor Party governments (such as Meir’s and Rabin’s) to oppose the Gush Emunim policy of retaining all of the West Bank, but it did not mean that they supported West Bank retention. Rabin did allow for more Gush Emunim settlement in the West Bank than Meir did, but Rabin followed a pattern of accepting these settlements within the confines of the security belt while discouraging them elsewhere in the West Bank. This pattern of Gush Emunim settlements is in line with Rabin’s policy of creating facts, of making the Israeli presence so dominating within the portions of the occupied territories desired for annexation (or at least retention of Israeli control) that the Arabs would have to accept the situation. It is quite possible that Rabin believed that he could trade off the religious settlements around Hebron, Ramallah and Nablus against the ones in the security belt region.

Regardless of Rabin’s intentions, his policies left a solid wall of Israeli-dominated territory along the Jordan River. Prime
Minister Begin has merely extended the policy of creating facts to a much larger part of the West Bank. In fact, Israeli settlements in the part of the West Bank outside the security belt region have been going up so fast that it is almost impossible to keep track of them (every newspaper and magazine article one reads on the subject has a different total). Somewhere between 44 and 48 settlements are now present in the West Bank, and the Begin government has a program in the planning stage which calls for 20 to 25 more in the next 3 years,\textsuperscript{25} Although Prime Minister Begin has announced his intention to return the West Bank to Palestinian administrative control eventually, his policy seems to be one of gaining Israeli control over as much of the territory as possible before the Palestinians take over. The Monroe thesis, then, is quite accurate for the Begin administration, because Begin's government has placed no restrictions concerning which areas of the West Bank can be subject to Israeli consolidation activity. The West Bank policy of Prime Minister Begin is discussed further in Chapter IV.

Golan Heights

The most consistent Israeli settlement activity has taken place in the Golan Heights. The Israeli government began building settlements in this territory immediately following the close of the 1967 War and have almost exhausted the possibilities in the territory. A 1969 master plan for the Golan Heights estimated that the agricultural

potential of the territory would allow for a maximum of 20 settlements. The fact that Israel has already exceeded this original estimate by at least 5 settlements indicates the extent to which Israel has consolidated its hold over the territory (see map, page 67). Unlike many of the Israeli settlements in other occupied territories, most of the early Golan Heights settlements were civilian rather than military. The willingness to begin immediately exploiting the agricultural potential of the territory serves as a good indication of the Israeli commitment to remaining in the area. Israel has even constructed a ski resort in the area on Mt. Hermon. Still, the Israeli presence in the area is quite small (only 3,700 by early 1968), given the fact that some 85,000 Syrians lived in the territory prior to the Israeli occupation. Yet, even this small number of civilians creates major problems for military strategists, because the territory is so small (444 square miles) that there is no way of keeping the civilians from being caught right in the middle of any fighting. The Golan Heights is also the territory most susceptible to attack. The Syrians are Israel's most hostile enemy, and they have a massive military force positioned within easy striking distance of the entire Golan Heights area. The willingness of the Israeli governments to press for settlement of this territory, despite the military drawbacks, indicates the strength of the Israeli commitment to remaining in the area.

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GOLAN HEIGHTS TERRITORY

25 settlements founded 1967-1977

1 Neve Ativ
2 Snir
3 Har Odem
4 El Rom
5 Merom Golan
6 Ein Zivan
7 Ur Tal
8 Katzrin
9 Keshet
10 Anlaim
11 Yonatan
12 Shaal
13 Gamla
14 Ramot
15 Merkaz Hisflin
16 Ramat Magshinim
17 Avni Eitan
18 Nov (Nab)
19 Geshur
20 Ellal
21 Givat Yoav
22 Merkaz Bnei
23 Neot Golan
24 Atik
25 Kfar Haruv
26 Mevo Hamma

SOURCE: Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1978, p. 3.
The particular concentration of settlements in the Heights is not always an accurate indicator of which territory is the most important for Israel. The vast majority of the settlements are located in the small area of the Heights between the southeastern shoreline of the Sea of Galilee and the Syrian cease fire line. Superficially, this would seem to indicate that this area is more important to Israel than the remainder of the Heights. Although Israel is definitely interested in expanding the small (and extremely vulnerable) strip of Israeli territory which lies along the southeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, the concentration of settlements might well be more indicative of military and agricultural conditions in the Heights than of Israeli annexation intentions. A considerable portion of the Heights north of the Sea of Galilee is used by Israel as cattle grazing land. This area is also the primary route for any Syrian military force attempting to invade Israel. Since cattle ranching does not require many settlements over a relatively large area, and military defense lines function most effectively with the least possible civilians along them, it stands to reason that the Israeli government is not going to construct very many civilian settlements in the area regardless of how much they desire to annex the territory. Yet, one can expect that the extensive settlement in this area would be the final place of compromise for Israel, simply because it is much easier to compromise in an area which would affect fewer settlers (such as the forward areas around Quneitra).
Conclusion

The Israeli integration and consolidation actions in the occupied territories point out a few general conclusions. The first is that the Israeli administrative activities are somewhat indicative of what Israel plans to do about the Arab residents of occupied territories, but in most cases they do not provide solid evidence concerning Israeli intentions regarding the final disposition of a territory. For instance the administrative actions taken in the Golan Heights indicate that Israel is willing to integrate the Druze residents of that area into Israel. The integration is quite easy to do since there are only 5,000 of them, and Israel already has a Druze population within the country which has been so thoroughly integrated into Israeli society that its members even serve in the armed forces. In the Sinai the Israeli activities in "thinning out" the Bedouin tribesmen along the northern Mediterranean coastline indicate the seriousness of the Israeli commitment to maintaining control of the Rafiah Salient area. In the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Israeli administrative activities indicate that Israel has little interest in integrating the Palestinian residents of these territories into Israeli society. Israeli disinterest in integrating Palestinian Arabs is not necessarily indicative of Israeli expansionist intentions in either the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Previous Israeli administrations made repeated efforts to "thin out" the Arab population of the Gaza Strip in order to facilitate annexation, and the recent Israeli

28See Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p. 181, and Time, 7 February 1969, p. 25, for details.
settlement activity in the West Bank, which increasingly forces out the neighboring Arabs, is just another version of the same policy.

The Israeli actions of economic integration taken in the territories show two significant results. The first is that the Golan Heights is becoming, for all intents and purposes, a part of Israel. The second, and most important, development is that the limited degree of economic integration between Israel and the two most populated territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is leading to a common market situation. Potentially, this developing common market could become very important for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When the United Nations partitioned Palestine in 1948, it envisioned separate Arab and Jewish states joined in economic union. At the time of the partition planning, the location of the Jewish and Arab populations within Palestine and disproportinate wealth of the Jews led the United Nations commission to conclude that the boundary lines drawn would, of necessity, create an impossible security arrangement, but it was hoped that the degree of economic dependence developing between the separate states would tend to minimize hostilities. Since the economic and security situation confronting the Israelis' and the Palestinians today is very similar to the 1948 situation, the developing economic dependence between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs could play a vital role in easing tensions, should West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians become independent.
In quite a number of areas the Israeli consolidation actions coincide with Israel's strategic, economic, and historical interests in the occupied territories. This is most evident in the Golan Heights. The extent of Israeli consolidation over and integration of this territory is so extensive that this strategically and economically important area virtually has become a part of Israel.

In the Sinai and Gaza Strip the particular direction of recent settlement activity emphasizes the Rafiah Salient area at the expense of the Sharm el Sheihk region and the entirety of the Gaza Strip. Previous Israeli governments placed considerable emphasis upon the strategic significance of the Sharm el Sheihk area. The Begin administration has not increased the extent of settlement in the area, has made no further efforts to exploit the oil potential in the area, and appears to be downplaying the strategic significance of it. The increasing emphasis that Israel is placing upon the security importance of the airfield at Etzion (from which planes can reach Sharm el Sheihk quickly) is an indication of Israeli efforts to find alternatives to the Sharm el Sheihk occupation. Also, it appears that Begin believes Egypt will be more willing to accept compromises in areas close to the pre-1967 War Egypt-Israel boundary than it will be to accept compromises in areas close to the Suez Canal.

One of the reasons that Prime Minister Begin is concentrating upon the Rafiah Salient region is that it has more to offer than Sharm el Sheihk. The Rafiah Salient has economic attraction for agricultural purposes, it has great potential as an oil producing
region, and even greater economic potential as Israel's third port on the Mediterranean. Strategically, the area is valuable because it provides a means of cutting off the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Under this kind of arrangement, the Gaza Strip becomes much less of a strategic liability (just as the West Bank becomes much less of a strategic liability with Israeli forces stationed in the security belt region).

Until the extensive settlement and development activity took place in the Rafiah Salient, the general policy of the Israeli governments was to call for annexation of the Gaza Strip in its entirety. With the onset of the Yamit project in 1975, the Rabin and Begin governments have modified this Gaza Strip policy.

Recent developments in the West Bank demonstrate the primacy of historical and religious considerations under Prime Minister Begin. The most important strategic location of the West Bank had been consolidated completely under Rabin, so the Begin government had no vital need to increase the Israeli presence in the territory. Prime Minister Begin's political party has always been committed to incorporating Israel's biblical regions of Judea and Samaria (essentially the West Bank), so it comes as no surprise that his consolidation efforts would center in the West Bank area. Prime Minister Begin's concentration upon the West Bank region, though, has important implications for what might happen in the other occupied territories and in the Middle East. These implications are discussed in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER IV

ARAB AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Political Developments 1967-1978

Before advancing to a discussion of specific territories, some general comments are made concerning developments in negotiations between 1967 and the present. Although the cease fire of June 10, 1967, stopped the fighting in the Middle East, it did not end the war as far as the Arabs were concerned. The Arab states viewed the cease fire as nothing more than another temporary truce in their 20 year old war against Israel. Thus, at the time of the conclusion of the Six Day War, none of the bordering Arab states had ever been willing to accept the presence of Israel in the Arab Middle East. Any consideration of the Israeli boundary issue, therefore, was out of the question. In the first peace proposal advanced following the Six Day War, Israel demanded a change in Arab attitudes and a change in Israel's boundary by initiating the "secure and recognized" borders argument. Egypt and Jordan made the first major concession in the deadlock by offering statements of recognition of Israel's right to exist as a state, and Syria finally announced willingness to accept Israel following the 1973 War. The Palestine Liberation Organization has yet to offer a concrete statement of acceptance of Israel's right to exist, though PLO leader Yassir Arafat has indicated at times that such a statement would be forthcoming if it were politically feasible (the PLO's Israel position is discussed later in this chapter).
Israel did not agree to any concessions at all until after the 1973 War, and even these concessions in the Sinai and Golan Heights disengagement agreements were moderate in scope. Of course, Israel had not been accustomed to thinking in terms of concessions to the Arabs prior to 1973. The relative ease with which Israel had won the 1956 and 1967 campaigns against Arab forces had convinced the Israelis' that the Arab forces could be easily defeated in any armed conflict. Thus the Israeli policy prior to 1973 essentially was one of sitting it out indefinitely in the occupied territories until the Arabs finally agreed to the peace terms dictated by Israel.

The Arab success on the battlefield in the 1973 War shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility, causing a traumatic reaction in Israel's domestic political scene. As soon as the October War had ended, vicious political bickering broke out between the rival right and left wing factions of the ruling Labor Party, which left the Meir government with barely enough support in the Knesset to continue governing the country. In March of 1974 an investigation assessing the responsibility for the failure of Israeli intelligence in the early stages of the Yom Kipper War resulted in the collapse of the Meir government and the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. The Rabin government replaced the Meir government, but it enjoyed no more than a two vote majority in the Knesset, so it was forced to negotiate with the Arabs while struggling for survival at home.

The Arabs, on the other hand, found themselves in the most advantageous position that they had ever held against Israel. The
Egyptians and Syrians had proven on the battlefield that the Arabs were no longer a military force that could be dismissed, and by doing so they had won a great psychological victory in the conflict (while Israel suffered a large psychological defeat). The Arab successes on the battlefield led to a new Arab unity, causing Israel to be faced with a united Arab front at the negotiating table. Finally, the Arab oil embargo following the war caused oil prices to skyrocket, bringing immense wealth to oil rich Arab nations and transforming them immediately into major political powers on the international scene.

The Middle East political situation at the time of the Sinai and Golan Heights disengagement agreements, then, showed a complete reversal of the situation which existed prior to the October War. It was the Israelis who were lacking confidence, politically divided, and fighting among themselves, while the Arabs appeared united and confident of victory. The Arab states continued to press a hard line policy concerning boundary locations, though, curiously enough, the sudden assumption of power by the Arabs led to a more conciliatory rather than a more hostile attitude towards Israel. The Sinai and Golan Heights disengagement agreements were not marked by any major concessions by either side, but they did mark the first time that either Egypt or Syria had signed any agreement with Israel other than a cease fire accord. Also, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Syria's President Assad expressed positive views toward such subjects as a signed peace agreement with Israel, demilitarized zones within their own countries, and arms limitation agreements, all of which had
been taboo prior to the 1973 War.\footnote{Assad's comments on these subjects are in Time, 3 February 1975, p. 39, and Newsweek, 3 March 1975, p. 34, while Sadat's views are expressed in Time, 3 February 1975, pp. 38-39, Time, 14 April 1975, p. 37, and the New York Times, 12 February 1975, p. 3.} At this time, though, the Arabs held the upper hand in the negotiations, and they appeared confident that Israel would be forced to give back all of the occupied territory. Consequently, they could afford to offer more concessions on peripheral issues, since a return of all the occupied territory would constitute a major diplomatic victory for the Arabs.

Although the Arabs held the upper hand in 1974, Israel realized that the united Arab front rested on a very precarious foundation. Vast differences existed between the Arab states in terms of wealth, political ideology, military strength, and economic potential, and many Arab states held long standing rivalries, disputes and outright conflicts with other Arab nations. These basic conflicts among the Arab states led to a gradual disintegration of Arab unity and an eroding of the advantageous negotiating position enjoyed by the Arabs. From 1975 on both Israel and many of its primary Arab opponents suffered through extended periods of internal (and in some cases external) political crisis, while clear-cut Israeli military superiority provided the stabilizing factor for maintaining an uneasy peace during the period.

Two major changes affecting the dispute took place in 1977. The first was the election of Menachem Begin as Israel's prime minister in June, and the second was Anwar Sadat's peace initiative in
November. The election of Begin changed considerably the Israeli negotiating position. Begin switched the major territorial emphasis to the West Bank (instead of the Golan Heights and Sinai), and in general advanced a much more hard line bargaining position. The Sadat trip to Jerusalem served as a dramatic announcement of Egypt's recognition of Israel as a Middle East nation, though Sadat did not moderate his peace proposals at that time.

The Camp David summit of September 1978 led to a major breakthrough in the Egypt-Israel dispute, as well as agreement by Sadat and Begin upon a framework for Middle East peace. Since this "framework" has not been accepted by any other Middle East nation (or the PLO), the future of this Middle East peace arrangement remains in doubt. The substance of the Camp David peace framework and the likelihood of its being accepted are discussed at length in the West Bank/Gaza Strip negotiations section in this chapter, as well as in Chapter V.

**Negotiating Positions**

**Sinai**

The arrangements agreed upon at the Camp David summit and subsequent events in Israel virtually have resolved the Sinai question. The essence of the agreement is that Israel will return the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty and remove all military forces and civilian settlements in return for Sadat's acceptance of full normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. This normalization of relations means full diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt
and no economic boycotts or barriers to free movement of goods and people between the two nations. The details of this agreement are included in Chapter V.

It should be realized that many of the "concessions" of the Camp David summit represent very little compromise in previous positions, since Egypt and Israel had been quite close to agreement in the past over the issues separating them in the Sinai. In December of 1977 Prime Minister Begin announced acceptance of Egyptian sovereignty over the entire Sinai, though he insisted that Israeli troops would remain in a security corridor region along the pre-1967 War boundary and that the Israeli civilian settlements would remain in place.\(^2\) President Sadat had accepted the concept of normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel as early as 1975, though he insisted that this development would take place only after a comprehensive Middle East peace treaty had been signed. Also, Sadat had agreed to limiting Egyptian forces in the Sinai and creating demilitarized zones, though he had asked for a reciprocal demilitarized zone on the Israeli side (which is part of the agreement).\(^3\) Finally, it was generally acknowledged that the United States would pay for relocation of the Israeli's strategic Sinai air fields in the event of a settlement between Egypt and Israel.\(^4\) (President Carter has agreed to finance relocation of Israel's Sinai airfields). The Israeli


\(^3\)New York Times, 12 February 1975, p. 3.

\(^4\)Time, 13 February 1978, p. 45.
withdrawal of its armed forces from the Sinai is a concession Israel had not agreed to in the past, but the 20 to 40 kilometer wide demilitarized zone (occupied by United Nations forces) lying west of the international boundary and the Gulf of Aquaba accomplishes the same purpose as a security corridor, so Israel, in effect, gains its objective.

Since so many of the details of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement were already close to being resolved, the agreement was reached by a trade off of one major Israeli concession for two Egyptian ones. Basically, Prime Minister Begin agreed to remove completely the Israeli presence in the Sinai (both military and civilian) in return for President Sadat's acceptance of full diplomatic relations with Israel and agreement to an overall peace framework which called for recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," rather than a specific declaration of Palestinian rights to self determination (which Sadat had insisted upon in the past).

The Camp David agreement indicates the extent of the emphasis shift between the Begin government and the previous Labor Party governments. The Labor governments since 1967 tended to place considerable emphasis upon retaining an Israeli presence in portions of the Sinai territory. All of the Labor governments adopted a policy of retaining direct Israeli control (either through annexation or some kind of leasing arrangement) over the corridor of land running along the Gulf of Aquaba to Sharm el Sheihk. The Rabin government
took the initiative in pushing Israeli consolidation actions in the Rafiah Salient area following the 1973 War, and it also sponsored much of the oil exploration in the Sinai, agricultural development in the Rafiah Salient, and the gradual relocation of Beudoin from the El Arish area. Although Begin initially adopted a policy of retaining the Sinai settlements and retaining an Israeli military presence in the Sinai, obviously Begin believed that the West Bank was far more important to Israel than any part of the Sinai.

Another reason for Begin being willing to give up the entire Sinai, though, is that he realized that the Egyptian offer to normalize relations was too important to pass up. A separate peace with Egypt is vitally important for Israel, because it gives Israel a level of security it has never experienced before. Without Egyptian troops, the Arab opponents of Israel currently are in no position to pose much of a military threat to Israel. In addition to giving Israel unprecedented security, it also leaves Israel in a most advantageous position in any future Middle East peace negotiations. The advantages Israel gains by Egypt's defection from the united Arab front are discussed later in this chapter.

West Bank/Gaza Strip

Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories are the focal point of the Palestinian issue, they will be discussed jointly. In these two territories, the negotiating positions of the opposing sides are considerably at odds. The basic belief of Prime Minister Begin concerning these territories is that they are Israeli territory and
that they belong to the Jewish people. Since there are other claims to the territory, however, the question of sovereignty should be left open at present. Prior to the Camp David summit, Prime Minister Begin's proposals included: (1) Israeli military control over the territory, (2) eventual Palestinian civilian control over Palestinian Arabs in the territories, and (3) no Palestinian state. The Arabs have countered with a basic demand for complete Israeli withdrawal (military and civilian) and self determination for the Palestinian people.

The Arab position in the West Bank is somewhat complicated because it is not entirely clear how the West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs are going to be represented in negotiations. Since the 1974 Arab summit conference, the Palestine Liberation Organization has been designated as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in peace negotiations. The PLO's public position for some time has been as follows: (1) all Palestine belongs to the Palestinian Arabs, (2) the PLO will accept nothing less than the destruction of the Jewish state, and (3) Palestine will be governed by a secular Arab government under which Jews will be permitted to remain. Privately, it appears that the PLO is resigned to an Israeli state in the Middle East, but will insist upon nothing less than complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories and the formation of

a Palestinian state. In general, Israeli governments have attempted to negotiate the Palestinian issue with Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan maintains a public position of demanding Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with the final disposition of the territory to be worked out between Hussein and the Palestinians.

The agreements reached at Camp David changed the direction of peace negotiations, though it did not change markedly the Israeli position. Basically, the Middle East peace framework worked out at Camp David was an effort to resolve the West Bank and Gaza Strip issues by circumventing the PLO. The major points of the framework are as follows: (1) Israeli military government and civilian administration will be replaced by a self-governing authority elected by the inhabitants of the two territories. (2) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modality for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the two territories. (3) Palestinians from within the West Bank and Gaza Strip (or other Palestinians as mutually agreed upon) will be allowed as members of Egypt’s or Jordan’s delegation to negotiations. (4) Parties to the negotiations will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority. (5) A withdrawal of Israeli forces will take place and the remaining Israeli forces will be redeployed into specific security locations. (6) Security arrangements will be negotiated by the parties, though a strong local police force (which could include Jordanian citizens) would be created. (7) Once the self-governing council is established,

6 Leon Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review of Books, 23 February 1978, p. 17. Peled (a retired Israeli Major General) has had numerous unofficial contacts with the PLO.
a 5 year transition period will begin. Not later than 3 years after
the beginning of this transition period, negotiations would take
place to determine the final status of these two territories and
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. This final agree­
ment is supposed to recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements."7

It is apparent that Israel has made few concessions on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip issue. Begin did agree to remove some of the
Israeli troops, but the agreement contains no provisions insuring
eventual Israeli military withdrawal from the territories, it says
nothing about Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
and it contains no guarantees of eventual Palestinian self determination.
In fact, Prime Minister Begin stated that he intended to press Israel's
claims to the territory in the negotiations for final resolution of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.8 It is apparent, then, that Prime
Minister Begin views the framework as a means of resolving the West
Bank and Gaza Strip issue without the PLO, and also a means of pre­
venting the formation of a separate Palestinian state.

The issue which lies at the heart of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip problem (in fact which is the core problem of the entire Middle
East dispute) is the question of Palestinian self determination. It
has been noted previously that the entire history of Mandated Pales­
tine was little more than a continuous struggle between Jews and

7The Washington Post, 19 September 1978, p. 16, contains a text
of the Middle East peace framework.

8Ibid.
Palestinian Arabs over ultimate sovereignty in the area. The 1948 United Nations solution to the problem recognized both sides' claims to sovereignty by creating separate nations, a solution which was acceptable to the Jews at the time. Then it was the Arabs who refused to acknowledge Israel's claims to sovereignty, forcing Israel to fight an intermittent 30 years war before Arab states began accepting Israel's claims. Now, ironically enough, it is the Israeli's intransigence which suppresses the Palestinians' desire for self determination, and which threatens to destroy current possibilities for a Middle East peace settlement.

It must be recognized that, to a considerable extent, the Begin government's opposition to a Palestinian state is as much a matter of strategy as principle. If the Israeli government accepts the concept of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories, then something is going to have to be done about the settlements in these territories, particularly the West Bank. Under any kind of Palestinian self determination arrangement, Israel has three choices of what it can do with the settlements: (1) press for annexation of as much Israeli-populated West Bank territory as possible, (2) leave the settlers subject to a Palestinian government, or (3) evacuate the settlements. The political consequences resulting from any of these choices would create serious problems for Israel. If Israel adopts a policy of annexation, it would have to take much of the West Bank territory along with it. This policy would outrage the Palestinians, require inclusion of a large Arab population within Israel's borders,
and would provide embarrassing proof of the Arabs' charge that Israel is an expansionist state. Leaving the settlements in place, but under Palestinian sovereignty, is not a viable alternative for Begin either. One could expect the Palestinian government simply to take whatever steps were necessary to convince Israeli settlers to move back to Israel (these could range from administrative harassment to outright violence, depending upon the determination of the Israeli settlers to remain). Outright evacuation of the settlements would mean repudiation of Begin's (and the Likud Party's) concept of re-establishing Biblical Israel. The reason for Begin's strong opposition to the Palestinian self determination concept, then, is quite obvious; there is no way that Begin's call for restoration of Biblical Israel can be reconciled with Palestinian self determination.

Under the Camp David arrangement, though, Begin not only avoids all of these problems, but he opens the door for accomplishing his long desired dream of making the Judea and Samaria regions a part of Israel once again. It must be realized that the Camp David framework neither limits Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank area nor contains any specific guarantee of Palestinian self determination. Prime Minister Begin has insisted that his agreement with President Carter to freeze further West Bank settlement activity applies only to the period prior to completion of Egypt-Israel peace negotiations, not through the establishment of the Palestinian self governing body, as President Carter claims. Further, Begin's statement that he intended to press Israel's claim to the territories during the
negotiations concerning final disposal of the two territories indicates his intention of gaining Israeli control over or at least unlimited Israeli access to these territories. Prime Minister Begin's earlier peace proposals contained demands which would guarantee the rights of Israeli citizens to settle in the regions of Judea and Samaria. One can expect Begin to insist upon this demand during the preliminary negotiations forming the interim Palestinian governing body. It is doubtful that Israel would be willing to grant the Palestinian governing body authority to limit Israeli land purchase and settlement in the West Bank area (unless extreme pressure were brought to bear on the Israelis). As long as Israelis were permitted to purchase West Bank territory, the Palestinians could do little to prevent the more affluent Israelis from moving into the West Bank and buying up Arab land, thus furthering the Israeli encroachment. The Israeli absorption of much of the West Bank could be accomplished through economic means, then, without having to worry about the complications caused by outright annexation.

The Camp David agreement fails to resolve the issue of Palestinian representation at the peace talks. Under the Camp David format, Palestinians are permitted in the preliminary negotiations, but only Palestinians living within the two territories can join in the talks without prior Israeli approval. This arrangement effectively eliminates the PLO since Israel would veto their participation, should the PLO decide to seek representation of the Palestinians under the current

<ref>Newsweek, 16 January 1978, p. 40.</ref>
arrangement. Yet it is going to be extremely difficult to resolve the West Bank and Gaza Strip problems without including the PLO. The vast majority of West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs are not active PLO members, but the majority of these Arabs appear to accept the PLO as their sole representative in any negotiations with Israel. Consequently, any Israeli effort to circumvent the PLO is not going to be acceptable to West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs, even if the newly elected Arab spokesmen are more representative of prevailing Arab political views in these territories than the PLO is.

It is obvious from the framework agreed upon at Camp David that Israel wanted to resolve the West Bank issue by negotiating with Jordan (which President Sadat appears to desire as well, given his recent falling out with the PLO). It is generally accepted that King Hussein of Jordan would prefer regaining some sort of control over the West Bank, but he has balked at entering the negotiations, because he could not gain sufficient Israeli concessions to placate Palestinian interests. King Hussein would have to gain nothing less than complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem before he could gain limited acceptance of a return to Jordanian control. His only alternative would be to make an attempt at gaining self determination for the Palestinians, thus attempting to accommodate the Palestinian interests by achieving what the PLO would have little chance of accomplishing. This possibility is discussed at length in Chapter V.
Israel's negotiating strategy should be rather clear by now. The key element is gaining the separate peace with Egypt, thus splitting the Arab unity and reducing the Arab military threat to manageable proportions. Once an agreement has been reached with Egypt, then Syria, Jordan and the PLO no longer represent a viable military threat to Israel. In this situation, Israel can continue uninterrupted its current West Bank and Gaza Strip policy and extend the policy of an imposed settlement to the Golan Heights and Jerusalem issues. Simply put, without Egypt, the Arabs currently are not in a very good position to gain anything more than the minimal concessions from Israel.

Golan Heights

It has been demonstrated previously that Israeli policy in the Golan Heights has stopped just short of annexation, so it would not be particularly difficult for Israel to take the integration and consolidation actions one step farther. In general, the Golan Heights policy adopted by Israeli governments prior to Begin's administration was one of near total annexation of the area, with the possibility of minor concessions being made in the farthest reaches of the area. No specific details of Prime Minister Begin's Golan Heights policy have been made public, though Begin has indicated that the Golan Heights territory is not the major concern to him that it was to previous Israeli administrations. It is very possible that Syria could gain more concessions from the Begin administration than from previous Israeli governments, though it is doubtful that Begin's concessions
would even come close to the Syrian demand for total Israeli withdrawal. With Egypt out of the picture, though, Israel is under no real pressure to negotiate with Syria. More than likely, little if any progress would be made on the Golan Heights issue, but Israel could prolong the negotiations indefinitely, so lack of progress in the negotiations would not be a major cause for concern.

Jerusalem Negotiations

In the Jerusalem issue considerable differences exist between the negotiating positions of the two sides. The Israelis have already annexed extensive Arab territory in the area and insist that the city must remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. The Arabs counter by demanding total Israeli withdrawal from the annexed Arab territory. The only concession made by either side up to this point has been the Israeli efforts taken to grant a degree of autonomy to Arab holy places in East Jerusalem. The Israelis argue that their annexation is legitimate and proper because: (1) the primary Arab concern in the area (the right to worship at the Dome of the Rock) is accommodated, and (2) the refusal of Arabs to enter Israel to worship at Arab shrines in East Jerusalem is a clear statement of the Arab nations' refusal to accept Israel as a Middle East state, so continued Israeli control of a unified Jerusalem is necessary to insure that Jews would not be denied access to Jewish holy places in the East Jerusalem area. The Jerusalem issue is so complicated, and so many different arrangements have been offered as possible solutions, that the discussion of the various possibilities will be included with
the Jerusalem discussion in the following chapter.

Conclusions

The entire Israeli negotiating strategy is dependent upon getting Egypt out of the conflict, though there are good reasons for Israel's banking so heavily upon this possibility. It must be realized that Egypt is the Arab nation which would benefit the most from a peace settlement. The Egyptian economy was on the verge of collapse before the 1973 War, and the situation has not improved much following the conflict. President Sadat was extremely bitter over Saudia Arabia's willingness to provide money to finance the Egyptian military venture against Israel, while refusing to provide Egypt with adequate financial investment for desperately needed industrial development. As Sadat correctly pointed out, it was the Egyptian lives lost in the October War which made it possible for the price of oil to quadruple, giving Saudia Arabia immense wealth. Yet, Saudia Arabia does not want an economically healthy Egypt challenging them for leadership in the Arab world, so the Saudis limit their financial assistance to keeping Egypt afloat and nothing more. Sadat has managed to attract capital from other sources, but his economy is still on the brink of disaster. By November of 1977 Egypt was so deeply in debt (over 12 billion) that outside banking interests (primarily the World Bank) made it clear to Sadat that he would have to cut defense spending (25 percent of GNP) and place revenue in productive areas or face cut

off of funds. Also, Egypt was unable to pay the 4 billion it owed to the Soviet Union for military hardware, so the Soviet Union cut off Egypt's supply of spare parts, leaving Egypt virtually powerless even to defend itself. Consequently, Sadat had to seek some sort of agreement with Israel simply as a matter of survival.

It is these economic problems of Egypt which give Prime Minister Begin confidence that his hard line policy can succeed. It is obvious that the rewards of such a policy can be great for Israel. Certainly, Begin appears to have pressured Sadat to accept a separate peace, while thwarting Palestinian demands for self determination. If Begin continues to outmaneuver the Arabs, Israel can retain control of (or at a minimum, access to) much of the territory it values, maintain military forces in most of the important security areas, and retain control of a unified Jerusalem. It is easy to understand why Israel would adopt this negotiating strategy, but it should be realized that the consequences of it very possibly could be far greater than is immediately evident.

The major problem with Israel's strategy is that it places too much reliance upon Egypt's remaining out of any future Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The chances of keeping Egypt out of future conflicts are not too favorable. One of the difficulties with the Israeli strategy is that it asks President Sadat to forfeit much of the prestige he has built up in the Arab world. If Sadat makes a separate peace agreement with Israel without gaining any reciprocal Israeli agreement to recognize the Palestinian right of self
determination, to accept the principle of withdrawal from Arab territory, and to acknowledge that different arrangements need to be worked out concerning Jerusalem, then Sadat would be regarded as a traitor by much of the Arab world. Stripped of support within the Arab world and greatly diminished in stature both at home and abroad, Sadat would stand little chance of surviving for very long. It must be realized, then, that the precarious state of the Egyptian economy is a double-edged sword. Certainly, Israel can extract concessions from President Sadat, given his present predicament, but if it goes too far it risks the possibility of Sadat being deposed and replaced by a hard line faction. This possibility is particularly acute, given the economic situation in Egypt. Sadat's efforts to shore up the Egyptian economy early in 1977 by cutting government subsidies led to extensive rioting in Cairo, which gives a good indication of just how tenuous President Sadat's hold on the government is. It is extremely unlikely that Sadat could remain in power for very long if he caved in to the Israeli demands, and it is doubtful that whoever replaced him would continue his moderate policies. In times of severe economic depression, one of the easiest means of dealing with the problem is finding a scapegoat upon which a skillful government can direct the hostility and frustration of the citizens. In this case, Israel would be the perfect target.

Another major problem of the Israeli policy is that it assumes that Israel can continue its present policy without suffering any undue domestic consequences. Since the 1973 War a number of signs have
surfaced which indicate that Israel is suffering severe consequences on the home front because of its policy. In the first place the huge demand for American arms required to continue a hard line policy has had a drastic effect upon the Israeli balance of payments. Israel's current balance of payments deficit is about 10 billion dollars, and it continues to mount because of a defense budget which consumes 32 percent of GNP. This deficit has led to several currency devaluations and major tax increases while causing inflation to skyrocket (estimated at 50 percent for this year). The net effect of all this is a drastic reduction in purchasing power of the average Israeli citizen, as well as a corresponding decline in living standards. The nation of Israel is feeling the effects of the economic squeeze and psychological strain caused by living under the constant threat of war. Jews are leaving Israel in increasing numbers, and many potential immigrants are choosing to live elsewhere (in 1976 almost 50 percent of Soviet Jews leaving Russia chose to live elsewhere). Between 1973 and 1974 alone, immigration to Israel decreased by 42 percent (32,000 versus 55,000), and by 1976 emigration exceeded immigration (20,000 to 18,600). If this situation continues, coupled with prevailing Jewish and Arab birth rates, Arabs might well outnumber Jews.

12 Ibid.
13 Elizabeth Monroe, "The West Bank: Palestinian or Israeli?", The Middle East Journal 31 (Autumn 1977), 400.
14 Ibid.
within Israel proper by the turn of the century. It is clearly evi­
dent, then, that the hard line policy is extracting an immense toll
upon Israel's domestic well being.

The final problem with Israel's current policy is that even if
Israel gains everything it wants, there is no reason to believe that
this solution would guarantee Israeli security in the Middle East. It
has already been demonstrated what the likely consequences of Israeli
policy would be in Egypt, and one could expect a similar reaction
throughout the Arab world. The complete frustration of Arab diplomatic
objectives would most likely lead to a recommitment to the Arab policy
of wiping Israel off the Middle East map, rather than the Arab's
grudging acceptance of and gradual normalization of relations with
Israel.

The gravest consequences could result from the suppression of
Palestinian nationalist ambitions and the encroachment upon Arab lands
in the West Bank. Frustrated in gaining their objectives in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinians might turn elsewhere to establish
a base of operations, particularly Jordan and Lebanon. The possi­
bility for Palestinian takeover of Lebanon has already been discussed
in Chapter II, and the potential for this takeover occurring would be
far greater if none of the Palestinian demands are satisfied by Israel.
Syria is virtually in control of Lebanon now, so if Syria decided to
support the PLO-Lebanese Muslim coalition against the Lebanese
Christians (which would be very likely if Israel shows no interest
in making major concessions in the Golan Heights), then Israel would
have to enter the war on the side of the Lebanese Christians to prevent a PLO-Lebanese Muslim takeover of the country.

The situation is Jordan also presents a great problem for Israel's current policy. The basic problem is that Jordan is a house divided. Most of Jordan's problems are a direct result of the annexation of the West Bank territory following the 1948-49 Arab-Israel War. At the time the area provided Jordan with substantial economic benefits from increased agricultural production and an extensive increase in tourism. Yet Jordan gained far more problems than benefits from its annexation action. One of the most serious drawbacks of the action was that it earned Jordan the permanent enmity of many Arab nations, because it demonstrated that Jordan used the 1948-49 War to its own advantage at the expense of its Arab neighbors. While other Arab nations involved in the war were intent upon defeating the Jews and returning Palestine to Palestinian Arab control, Jordan was concentrating upon grabbing as much of Palestine as possible. The second major drawback of the annexation action was that it created severe domestic conflicts within the country, for overnight Jordan became a nation in which over half the population was a foreign nationality (Palestinian). The Palestinians were, by and large, a far more educated and sophisticated people than the provincial, nomadic Hashemites of Jordan, so the Palestinians quickly developed a strong resentment to being governed under the Jordanian monarchial system, while the Hashemites resented the rapid incorporation of the more educated Palestinians into high administrative positions within the Jordanian
government. Jordan's problems in assimilating Palestinians became even more acute following the Six Day War. Over 225,000 fled to the East Bank (Jordan proper) during the war, and by 1973 the Palestinians made up more than 40 percent of the population of Jordan proper.

It is this massive presence of Palestinians along with Jordan's basic isolationist position in the Middle East which so complicates the Jordanian situation. Given the large numbers of Palestinians in Jordan, the PLO can force King Hussein to adopt a far more aggressive policy against Israel or risk civil war within his own country. The former situation could involve Israel directly in a war (or at least extensive guerrilla action), while the latter situation would require direct Israeli intervention to preserve Hashemite control in Jordan.

The suppression of Palestinian nationalism, then, merely replaces one problem with another potentially larger one. In fact, it is very possible that Israel would find itself facing, once again, enemies on three sides who would be eager to continue the fight against Israel (the front could expand to four sides, should a hard line group come to power in Egypt).

The likely result of Israeli diplomatic success, then, would be the placing of Israel under a permanent state of siege. It is immaterial whether or not the Arab forces could defeat Israel on the battlefield; they could cause immense casualties for Israel certainly, and force Israel to face the realization that they would have little hope of avoiding a continuous succession of costly armed conflicts with Arab neighbors. Israel would gain no more security than it had
before the 1967 War, and the Middle East political situation would remain as unstable as ever. It seems that the time has come for Israel to make a genuine effort to resolve its differences with the Arab nations. The arrangements of such a peace settlement and the means for achieving it are discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

The preceding chapters have given some indication of the magnitude of the task involved in resolving the Middle East conflict. The Israelis and the Arabs are still bitterly divided over many of the basic issues of the conflict. None of the parties involved have good reason to place much trust in the words of the opposition, and in fact can have little confidence in the strength of the commitment of their own allies. Finally, the Israelis have little reason to believe that the centuries old Arab commitment to the Jihad will die a quick death, nor can the Arabs accept any assurances that Israel is not becoming an expansionist state, intent upon swallowing up much of the West Bank and Golan Heights.

Still, considerable progress has been made. Certainly Egypt appears willing to accept Israel as a Middle East nation, Jordan appears to be seeking an acceptable means of accomodation with Israel (rather than confrontation), while even Syria and Saudia Arabia are showing signs of resigning themselves to a Jewish state in the Arab Middle East. President Sadat's surprise journey to Jerusalem in November of 1977 and Prime Minister Begin's return trup to Cairo shattered the traditional Arab insistence upon no face to face negotiations, and provided a clear signal that Egypt was abandoning a military solution to the Middle East problem. The 1978 Camp David agreement confirmed
this Egyptian policy, setting the stage for a separate peace treaty to be negotiated between Egypt and Israel.

Sinai

The final details of the separate peace are still being worked out, though the preliminary agreement reached at Camp David resolved most of the basic issues. The major points of the agreement are as follows. In the area of relations between Egypt and Israel, both sides agree to (1) full recognition, (2) abolish economic boycotts, (3) guarantee that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other nation shall enjoy the protection of due process of law, (4) explore the possibilities of joint economic development, and (5) consider the possibility of establishing claims commissions.

The territorial aspects of the agreement provide for the following: (1) return of the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, (2) withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from the Sinai, (3) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafan, Ras en Naql and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations, (4) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, with the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aquaba being recognized as international waterways for freedom of navigation and overflight by all nations, and (5) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful use by Egypt and Jordan.

The following military arrangements are agreed to in the pact: (1) no more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian
armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, (2) only UN forces and civilian police equipped with light weapons will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and Gulf of Aquaba varying in width from 20 kilometers to 40 kilometers, (3) in the area 3 kilometers east of the international boundary, Israeli forces will be limited to 4 infantry battalions and UN observers, (4) border patrol units not to exceed 3 battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the Sinai area not mentioned above, and (5) UN forces will be stationed in parts of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 kilometers of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international boundary, and in the Sharm el Sheihk area. The precise location of the boundary lines for these particular demilitarized zones is to be worked out at the final peace talks.

West Bank and Gaza Strip

This Camp David agreement also outlined a framework for an overall Middle East peace, paying particular attention to the West Bank issue. In the previous chapter it was noted that this West Bank agreement allowed Prime Minister Begin the possibility of realizing most of his territorial ambitions. The agreement did not guarantee Palestinian self determination, it did not require Israeli evacuation of settlements, withdrawal from the territory, or even eventual Israeli removal of all military forces. By merely providing for negotiation

1See The Washington Post, 19 September 1978, p. 16, for a text of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt.
of these issues, it allowed Prime Minister Begin several avenues for pursuing Israeli ambitions in the territory. Under the Camp David arrangement, Begin can press for continued Israeli control over the territory through a confederation with Israel, he can seek annexation of West Bank territory heavily settled by Israelis, or he can adopt a strategy of granting autonomy to West Bank Arabs while maintaining Israeli military forces in strategic locations and insuring Israeli takeover of desired West Bank areas through a policy of open migration of people (both Arab and Israeli) throughout all of the Palestine area. All of these policies would allow Prime Minister Begin to continue Israeli control over most West Bank areas in which Israel has shown an interest. Without the threat of Egyptian military forces, the Palestinians and Jordan would not be in a position to force many concessions from the Israelis. In short, the Camp David agreement leaves Israel in an excellent position to accomplish its ends.

The Camp David arrangements pose potentially serious consequences for the Arab side, since the agreement precluded other alternative methods of resolving the conflict. In the past most efforts for resolving the conflict concentrated upon a unified approach, one in which all parties to the conflict would meet at a single location and work out an agreement. Although a unified approach (such as the proposed Geneva convention arrangement) appeared to be most advantageous to the Arab side, Sadat's peace initiative has circumvented any possibility for a Geneva convention. Apparently Sadat realized that the unified Arab representation at a Geneva convention approach would be
102
detrimental to achieving any peace settlement, because the moderate
Arab nations would be too restricted in their actions by the hard line
block (PLO and Syria, backed by the Soviet Union) to allow for any
progress to be made. President Sadat decided to go it alone, appar­
ently, because he needed a settlement, and he knew that his chances
of getting one would be better if he negotiated separately.

Initially, President Sadat's method circumvented the hard line
elements by asking Israel merely to commit itself to a principle of
withdrawal and the principle of Palestinian self determination, with
the details of such an arrangement being worked out by the individual
states or political entities immediately involved. At Camp David
Sadat compromised his earlier approach and accepted the Israeli
statement that the overall peace settlement must recognize "the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements,"
rather than hold out for a straightforward Israeli statement accept­
ing Palestinian self determination. Since Egypt and Israel are on the
verge of concluding a peace treaty, it appears that there will be no
Geneva conference, no unified Arab front to face Israel in Middle East
negotiations. Whether they like it or not, the Arab nations are going
to have to conduct future negotiations with Israel within the frame­
work outlined in the Camp David agreement, or risk the possibility of
Israel merely imposing the settlement it wants in the West Bank should
the Arabs refuse to go along with the Camp David framework.

2This is essentially the argument offered by Robert Tucker in "The
It has already been noted that the framework agreed upon at Camp David provides an arrangement within which Israel can accomplish most of its objectives. Since this framework is likely to be the arrangement within which any negotiations take place, it is essential to take a closer look at it to see what it holds for possibilities of accomplishing Arab interests, particularly Palestinian interests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The central issue for the Palestinians is the question of self determination. On this issue the Camp David agreement, admittedly, is rather imprecise, for it merely affirms that the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements" must be recognized in any peace settlement. Quite obviously, this statement can mean different things to different people. The previous discussions in this thesis concerning the Palestinian question have indicated that Israel certainly can use this vague statement as a means of denying self determination to the Palestinians. Yet, there is another side to the statement. In an interview in January of 1978, Prime Minister Begin stated that he believed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were Israeli territory, that these areas belonged to the Jewish people, but he acknowledged that there were other claims to the territory so the question of sovereignty should be left open. Although Begin did not mention the Palestinians by name, he, in fact, acknowledged the historical identity of the Palestinian people, something which all previous Israeli governments were loath to do. This recog-

\footnote{\textit{Newsweek}, 16 January 1978, p. 40.}
nition that the Palestinians do have some claim over the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories is the first step in accepting the right of Palestinian self determination. The Camp David agreement takes this pivotal process several steps further. It specifically states that a Palestinian "governing body" will be elected to represent Palestinians in the final negotiations for resolution of the West Bank and Gaza Strip question as well as be the "autonomous government" administering Palestinian affairs in the two territories.

Taken together, these developments represent a significant step in the direction of Palestinian self determination. Now that Israel has acknowledged the historical rights of the Palestinian people in Mandated Palestine, provided for an elected body to represent the Palestinians, and acknowledged that the Palestinians' "legitimate rights" and "just requirements" be recognized, it has set in motion an irreversible process. Israel might be able to stall off the Palestinian demands for awhile, but it is almost certain that the Israelis' intense desire for peace, coupled with the Palestinians' unrelenting demand for independence, would lead to the inevitable conclusion. Indeed, most of Prime Minister Begin's own party members passionately opposed the Camp David accords precisely because they believed that it would lead to a Palestinian state.

Certainly, to proceed through the Camp David framework is a roundabout means for the Palestinians to accomplish their primary

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4 The Knesset approval of the Camp David accords irreversibly commits Israel to this position.

objective, but it might be the only politically feasible approach at the moment. If the Palestinians are to be successful in their quest for self determination, they are going to have to persuade the Israelis to accept this principle. Right now, persuasion of Israel is next to impossible. If Prime Minister Begin had returned from Camp David with a pact which recognized Palestinian self determination, he would have had no chance of gaining Knesset approval of it. With the Palestinian issues left to recognition of legitimate rights, though, Begin is free to offer his own interpretation of the agreement, claiming as he does that Israel's settlements will remain in the West Bank, that Israeli forces will remain indefinitely in the West Bank, and that no Palestinian state is in the offering. Serene in the belief that Israel's policy can continue unabated, the Israeli citizen can bask in the euphoria of the Camp David accomplishments, while putting off the hard choices which must be made to finish the task at hand. Once the Israelis become convinced that peace is both achievable and infinitely preferable to the state of siege which preceded it, one can expect Israel to become far more responsive to the Palestinians' demands for statehood. It is somewhat ironic that Israel, which gradually came into being because the language of the Balfour Declaration was sufficiently vague to appease the Palestinian Arabs,

6 I. F. Stone argues that this is precisely one of the major advantages of the Camp David accords, that it allows the Israelis to deceive themselves about the extent of concessions that they will have to make, and that it forces the Israelis to get involved in a long, drawn out process, which, in the long run, favors the Palestinian hopes of self determination. See, I. F. Stone, "The Case for Camp David," The New York Review of Books, 26 October 1978, p. 11.
might well have set the stage for Palestinian statehood by agreeing to the vaguely worded Camp David agreement of 1978.

Since the Arabs stand to lose more by avoiding (rather than entering) the negotiating framework called for in the Camp David agreements, it would be to their advantage to become involved in the peace process. The Camp David framework calls for much of the West Bank negotiating burden to be borne by Jordan, so the pivotal figure in the future of Middle East peace is going to be King Hussein of Jordan. King Hussein should agree to enter the negotiations, but he should make it explicitly clear to President Carter and the Israelis that Jordan will refuse to enter talks if Israel makes any efforts either to construct new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or reinforce the settlements already in place. Once that this message is pointedly conveyed, Hussein can take steps to outmaneuver the PLO. King Hussein should make it clear to Yasir Arafat of the PLO that continued boycotting of the peace process risks losing large amounts of West Bank territory and plays into Israel's hands (an opinion that Hussein seems to hold). Therefore, Arafat can stay out of the talks and continue his hopeless efforts at a military solution, or he can make an effort to negotiate with Israel. If Arafat does not want to seek negotiations with Israel, then King Hussein can inform Arafat that Jordan will enter the talks with the single intention of gaining an independent Palestinian state.

King Hussein can give Arafat the choice of going public with his counter proposals or having Hussein carry them to the Israelis in
private talks. Should Arafat decide to open up a dialogue with the Israelis, he does not have any choice but to give up the PLO dream of a liberated Palestine. In order even to be considered, Arafat would have to offer the following concessions: (1) acceptance of Israel as a Middle East nation, (2) agreement to normalization of relations between Israel and the Palestinian entity, (3) end terrorist activity, and (4) make a genuine effort at peaceful coexistence. In turn Arafat could demand complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, and an Israeli guarantee of Palestinian self-determination. The concessions for Arafat would be tremendous, but anything less than this would not be considered a reasonable offer by Israel. It would be to Arafat's advantage to go public with this set of proposals, gaining enormous public attention and tremendous support worldwide. With this action Arafat could gain an image as the moderate champion of Palestinian independence opposing expansionist Israel.

Regardless of the political possibilities of this approach, it is unlikely that Arafat would be willing to make so many concessions merely to enter into a negotiating process that offers no strong possibilities for Palestinian success.7 (It would be extremely unlikely that Israel would be willing to negotiate with the PLO under any circumstances.

7Arafat has conceded privately to the Saudi Arabians that he would accept UN Resolution 242 (which recognizes Israel's right to exist as a Middle East nation) if it were amended to include a statement affirming the national rights of the Palestinian people, and if the United States would support Palestinian self-determination. See, Leon Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review of Books, 23 February 1978, p. 17, for details.
circumstances, now, so Arafat may not want to risk the loss of prestige caused by offering concessions totally ignored by Israel.) Once King Hussein has made the gesture to Arafat, he would be in a position to make the move for resolving the Palestinian issue. In order to be successful, Hussein is going to have to do some astute political maneuvering, for his situation is formidable. He is faced with an Israeli government bent on gaining control of as much of the West Bank as possible, a Palestinian populace which could be expected to regard his move with outright hostility, and very little support in the remainder of the Arab world.

King Hussein's first step would be to gain support from Saudi Arabia. He would have to persuade the Saudis that the major objective of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations would be gaining an independent Palestinian state, and that he had the best chance of accomplishing this. The next step would be to announce publicly that he is entering the negotiation process in an effort to gain national rights for the Palestinian people. Of course, the Palestinians would be quite skeptical of such an announcement coming from Hussein, but it is important that Hussein get this statement on the public record, so he could gain at least a little support from the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians. The final step would be to conduct a propaganda campaign in which Hussein could attempt to swing world-wide opinion behind his effort, gain some Arab support for his policy, and alleviate some of the Israelis' fears concerning the formation of a Palestinian state.
It would be to King Hussein's advantage to conclude the initial phase of the negotiations as quickly as possible and get some kind of Palestinian self-governing body set up, which could act as a propaganda agent promoting the cause of Palestinian independence. The most important concession for Hussein to gain in this initial phase of negotiations is a signed pledge freezing new settlement construction and old settlement expansion during the transition period to autonomous Palestinian self-government. Obviously, Prime Minister Begin would not want to sign such an agreement, but the victory of getting Hussein to the negotiating table, the possibility of finally resolving the West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, and the realization that he could count upon Labor Party support to offset opposition within his own party might make this somewhat acceptable to Begin. King Hussein and President Sadat would have to bring tremendous pressure to bear upon Begin (particularly by gaining US support for this crucial clause), and it is likely that they would have to make some sort of pledge which would leave open the possibility of Israeli settlement following the moratorium. The possibility of future Israeli settlement could be accomplished by Egypt's and Jordan's agreeing to a guarantee of the free migration of peoples following the conclusion of a final peace treaty. This arrangement would circumvent the Gush Emunim's efforts to colonize the West Bank, for without Israeli government support (military, logistical and land condemnation), these groups would be unable to expand their numbers currently in the territory, thus discouraging the settlers already there.
Once a provisional Palestinian government is in place, the framework calls for a 5 year transition period, with negotiations for the final resolution of the 2 territories to take place not later than 3 years after the conclusion of the initial West Bank/Ceusa Strip negotiations. It is during this transition period the King Hussein is going to have to take the initiative. The first order of business is to gain extensive world-wide support for the Palestinian cause. The Palestinians already can count upon complete Third World support, and it would be quite simple to gain very strong support for the Palestinian cause in Western European countries (particularly with a little oil politics pressure applied). The crucial nation from which King Hussein must gain support is the United States, both in the presidency and in the public at large. It is absolutely essential for Hussein to persuade the US President: (1) that Jordan truly desires peace in the Middle East and fully accepts Israel as a Middle East nation, (2) that the only means through which this can be accomplished is the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and (3) that Jordan will coordinate actions with Israel to insure that this new Palestinian state poses no major threat to Israel or to the stability of the Middle East political situation. Also, King Hussein must conduct an extensive propaganda campaign in the United States demonstrating that the Palestinian claim to Mandated Palestine is certainly equal to Israel's claim (as has been shown in Chapter II), and that the Palestinians should not be denied what is granted to Israel. Furthermore, King Hussein has to convince the American public
that this Palestinian entity will commit itself to peaceful relations with Israel. This objective will be quite difficult to do (since most Palestinians do not appear to desire peaceful coexistence with Israel and say so in no uncertain terms), but Hussein should be able to keep the elected Palestinian governing body from making provocative statements which would sabotage hopes for independence. President Sadat's efforts on behalf of this campaign would be an important factor on Hussein's side, since Sadat has gained considerable credibility in the eyes of the American public in the last year.

Of equal importance to King Hussein is gaining strong Saudi Arabian support for this course of action. King Hussein will have to convince the Saudis that his efforts hold the best chance of alleviating the Palestinian problem which so uninstabilizes the Middle East (and which so concerns the Saudi Arabians with their large Palestinian work force). If Hussein can get momentum going in his campaign for Palestinian independence, he is in a position to gain some Palestinian support and demonstrate the potential of his policy to the Saudis. With Saudi support, Hussein is in a strong position to exert considerable leverage within the United States. The Saudis can tie American support of Palestinian self determination to oil politics, and simply tell the US President that he is going to have to exert considerable political pressure on the Israelis to accept Palestinian self determination or risk having the Saudis rejoin the side of OPEC nations pushing for much higher oil price hikes than the Saudis have advocated previously.
The third objective that King Hussein has to accomplish is to keep things under control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He has to demonstrate that the Palestinian "governing body" is a legitimate authority. Since the Camp David framework allows for Jordanian "citizens" to participate in the Palestinian security forces and calls for joint Jordanian-Israeli patrols, Hussein is in a strong position to exert force if necessary to maintain order in the areas administered by the Palestinian self-governing authority.

During the 5 year transition period several steps could be taken in the area of military withdrawals by Israel which would ease tensions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. King Hussein should agree readily to the continuous presence of Israeli forces in areas of primary security concern to Israel, namely in the security belt region along the Jordan River and along Israel's narrow corridor region. However, Hussein should insist that the remaining areas of the West Bank be protected by Jordanian-Palestinian security forces. It would be advisable for Hussein to seek a compromise on this issue and allow implementation of Palestinian-Jordanian security arrangements to be a gradual process which could be drawn out over the entire 5 year transition period, if necessary. This withdrawal of Israeli troops could be accomplished through a joint Israeli-Jordanian task force which would coordinate the transfer of Israeli military control to Jordanian control. The process could begin at the Jericho corridor between the West Bank and Jordan proper and spread gradually (within 1 year) into the areas of high Arab population and no Israeli
The next, and most important, step for King Hussein would be to gain transfer to Jordanian-Palestinian security forces control over some areas containing Israeli settlements. King Hussein could argue that if Israelis and Palestinians are going to get along peacefully, as Israel has advocated for so many years, it is important for the Arabs to demonstrate their ability to uphold the rights of Jews under Arab administrative authority. This would be a strong argument supporting Hussein's position, since an Israeli refusal to accept the proposal would provide strong evidence that Israel's primary concern is gaining control of West Bank territory rather than seeking means through which Israeli citizens can be allowed to live in West Bank areas of religious and historical significance to Jews. If King Hussein wins this point (and his chances would be quite good), then it would be best to limit transfer of settlement security to a few isolated settlements, with the ones around Ramallah and along the Dead Sea being the most likely candidates. Since most Israeli settlers have shown little penchant for relating to their Arab neighbors, it is expected that this transfer of security responsibility would convince many of the settlers to abandon the effort and go back to Israel proper.

In the Gaza Strip the arrangements would be quite similar, with the Jordanian-Palestinian security forces taking over most of the territory. The Israeli military forces could be restricted to the four paramilitary settlements in the territory, and a brigade-size force stationed along the Gaza Strip-Egypt boundary to provide security.
along this crucial area. This Jordanian assumption of security measures for much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip area should not create many problems. Jordan certainly has ample reasons of its own to prevent terrorist activity from taking place, and the aggressive suppression of any terrorist activity in its zone of control would improve relations between Jordan and the one Middle East nation (Israel) that has a strong interest in seeing that Hashemite control of Jordan continues. The only other problem in security activity is riot control, and the gradual withdrawal of the Israelis would tend to negate the cause for riots in the first place.

The conclusion of preliminary security negotiations would set the stage for the final phase of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations. By this time if King Hussein has managed to halt any Israeli expansion into West Bank territory, and even turn it around slightly with the assumption of Palestinian-Jordanian security for some Israeli settlements, he may well have ended any Israeli hopes for the gradual absorption of the West Bank territory. Failure to accomplish this absorption would deal a severe blow to the expansionist elements in Israel, and would most likely result in a swing towards accommodation and peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians as the prevailing political climate within Israel. This development, coupled with a swing of world-wide public opinion behind the Palestinian cause, would give the Arab side the momentum going into the negotiations. In this situation Israel virtually would be forced to modify its strategy from one of denying Palestinian self determination to one of determining just what
conditions it will allow Palestinian nationalism to develop under and ultimately exist in. If, however, King Hussein and the Palestinians enter negotiations in a weakened condition (due to an extreme split among Palestinians, lack of firm Saudi Arabian or American support, or Hussein's failure to curtail Prime Minister Begin's expansionist activities), then Hussein would serve everyone's interests if he simply backed out of the entire negotiating process, leaving the Palestinians to work things out with Israel. The likely result of this situation would be one of the scenarios outlined at the conclusion of Chapter IV. The best the Palestinians could hope for would be to restrict the Israeli expansion as much as possible until the Palestinian demand for a state of their own would be accepted by Israel.

In a situation in which Israel had to negotiate a peace settlement rather than simply impose one, both the Israelis and the Palestinians would be forced to abandon some long held positions. Israel would have to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state, and the Palestinians (and Hussein) would have to accept the fact that not all of the occupied territory would be returned. Once the opposing sides adopted a realistic outlook, serious negotiations could begin.

The primary issue to be resolved is the question of territory. Once a Palestinian state becomes a foregone conclusion of the Israeli government (the best that Israel could hope for would be Palestinian acceptance of independence to be granted at some point in time following the conclusion of the 5 year transition period, rather than
immediate independence), then Israel will have to decide (1) what areas it can afford to withdraw from without any problems, (2) which areas they might be able to withdraw from over an extended period of time, and (3) which areas must be annexed.

In the first category Israel could immediately include all of the West Bank areas under Jordanian control, as well as most of the Gaza Strip. Category two would include most of the remainder of the West Bank religious settlements, with the exception of the Kfir Etzonia cluster and some along the border of Israel proper in the narrow corridor region. Other areas placed in category two include the thin strip of territory running the width of the Gaza Strip–Egypt border, the security corridor region bordering the Dead Sea, and the industrial developments and settlements lying just outside the border of unified Jerusalem. Somewhere between categories two and three would be the security belt region along the Jordan River, the Kfir Etzonia religious settlement cluster, and the Tul Karm and Qalqilya regions along Israel's narrow corridor. Latrun would be the only area irreversibly committed to category three.

The West Bank negotiations present some of the greatest political difficulties for Israel, because it requires balancing its security needs and Gush Emunim's expansionist demands with the need for accommodating Palestinian interests. In the Gaza Strip the Israeli problems are less acute. The Israeli government has fewer security concerns and historical interests to accommodate, so withdrawal can be made without creating major political difficulties. Initially, Israel
should put forth its maximum demands and work back from that point. A rough estimate of this offer would be as follows: annexation of Latrun, a slight extension (2 or 3 miles) beyond the eastern boundary of unified Jerusalem, annexation of the Kfir Etzonia settlement region, to include the newly proposed town of Ephrat, annexation of a strip of territory several miles wide running the length of Israel's narrow corridor region, and annexation of the entire security belt region along the Jordan River as well as the security belt along the Gaza Strip-Egypt border. Israel would agree to withdraw from the remainder of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, with the religious settlements being left in place if the settlers desired to remain.

Of course this offer would be completely unacceptable to the Palestinians, but it would give Israel plenty of room to make concessions. One would expect the Palestinians to counter with a demand for total Israeli withdrawal from both territories, and to continue making this demand until it became obvious that the Israelis would compromise no longer on territorial matters. At this point the Palestinians would have to switch their emphasis to the issue of self determination, making it abundantly clear to Israel that if it wanted any territorial compromises from the Palestinians, then Israel would have to compromise on the issue of Palestinian independence. In this arrangement, the Palestinians would be in a good position to gain independence immediately following the 5 year transition period.

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8 A discussion about this proposed new town is contained in the Economist, 27 May 1978, p. 64.
or within a few years thereafter, and they could exert leverage to prevent unwanted restrictions upon their independence (such as restrictions on the sheer numbers of Palestinians allowed to return or exclusion of former PLO members from living in the territory).

Once both sides indicated that they would be willing to make some compromises, then Israel could begin transferring some of the areas slated for annexation into areas slated for withdrawal over an extended period. The first areas placed into the withdrawal category could be the Gaza Strip security belt, portions of the Jordan River security belt, the area immediately adjacent to unified Jerusalem and some of the territory along Israel's narrow corridor region. Withdrawal could be completed from the area immediately adjacent to unified Jerusalem within a few years (since this is not a strategic area), and withdrawal from the Gaza Strip security belt region could be implemented over a 5 year period, assuming that relations between Israel and Egypt remained friendly. In the security belt region along the Jordan River, Israel should adopt a policy of maintaining a presence only in the bare minimum needed for security considerations. Israel could withdraw from all the civilian settlements along the Jordan River, returning this land back to the Arab farmers who lived there prior to the Israeli encroachment.

This withdrawal along the Jordan River could be accomplished within a 3 year period, which would give Israel plenty of time to firm up its fortifications and improve its transportation network in the mountains above the valley floor. Withdrawing Israeli forces to the
high ground would insure minimal displacement of Arabs and leave Israel in an excellent position to block off any invasion from the west and to cut off supply lines between Jordan and Palestine in the event of major fighting between Israel and Palestine Arabs. Israel could demand annexation of the remaining security belt area, or could seek a long term (15 to 20 years) occupation arrangement, with the possibility of withdrawal being reconsidered at the conclusion of the term. The latter alternative might be preferable, since it would give Palestinians the hope of gaining control over this area eventually. If Israel were able to establish cordial relations with Jordan and Palestine in the meantime, Israel would gain more in good will by withdrawing from the area than it would retain in security by staying.

Once Israel granted the concessions mentioned above, two areas of the West Bank would be slated for annexation. The Latrun annexation is an obvious cosmetic adjustment to the border and a necessary security arrangement for Israel. It would be pointless to attempt any other kind of arrangement here. The second area of annexation is a somewhat different story. Kfir Etzonia possesses little, if any, security value, but the area is of considerable historical significance. The Israeli government is going to have to make some concession to Gush Emunim and conservative expansionist interests in Israel, and the Kfir Etzonia area appears to be the primary candidate. It was the first West Bank area settled, it represents an attempt to revive a settlement that became a monument to Jewish courage during the War of Independence, and it is an area close enough to Israel proper that
annexation can take place without inclusion of large chunks of West Bank territory (and large numbers of West Bank Arabs) within Israel. This arrangement would allow Israel to retain the four settlements in the area, as well as the proposed town of Ephrat. The annexation could be accomplished by including a small semi-circle of West Bank territory, beginning just south of Beit Jala, extending just outside Kfar Etzion, and returning to Israel proper.

With the territorial questions out of the way, Israel could concentrate upon security arrangements. Much of Israel's West Bank security would be provided by the military fortifications along the Jordan River security belt region, for the rest of its security Israel would have to depend upon demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This arrangement would not be very appealing to the Israelis (or the Palestinians either), who believe, quite rightly, that Israel could place no trust in the Palestinians to comply with the agreement. Still, the demilitarization could do an effective job of rendering the Palestinians an ineffectual military force. If the provisions of the arrangement limited Palestinians to a national police (but no military forces) restricted to sidearms and light rifles (the Russian AK 47 they now use), the Palestinians could not pose any serious military threat to Israel. They would be denied any military aircraft, motorized armored vehicles, artillery, rockets, heavy weapons (machine guns and anti-tank weapons), mines and grenades of any kind. The Palestinians would have a very difficult time of importing tanks, planes or artillery in any numbers before the Israelis became aware of it. The prob-
lem that Israel would face would be the build up of light automatic
rifles and the importation of anti-tank weapons. In any event, if
the build up reached threatening proportions, Israel could move into
the area and clean out the problem, since the Palestinians would not
have the firepower to stop them.

One of Israel's recurring fears concerning an independent
Palestinian state is that it will be taken over immediately by the
PLO. This is a legitimate concern, since one would expect that the
newly independent Palestinian state would select either PLO leaders
or individuals acting as PLO spokesmen as the new government. Israel
should adopt the view that the PLO is going to take over regardless,
and take necessary measures to keep the situation under control once
this happens. Rather than attempt to keep the PLO out of the new
Palestinian state, during negotiations Israel should make it clear to
the Palestinian negotiators (and to the PLO secretly) that Israel will
allow PLO members to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the
PLO is going to have to stop its terrorist activity and make a genuine
effort at peaceful relations between Israel and Palestine (or whatever
the Palestinians wish to call their new nation) or risk a renewal of
Israeli occupation. Undoubtedly, the situation will be tense for some
time, but if the two nations could maintain an uneasy peace for a short
time (perhaps a year), the economic forces tying the two nations to-
gether gradually would dispell much of the hostility and suspicion
which exists between Palestinians and Israelis.
Syria

One of the most important effects of Israel's policy of negotiating the individual territories separately is to isolate Syria. Once that Egypt is out of the picture and Palestinian negotiations are moving along, Syria's ability to exert pressure upon Israel becomes very limited indeed. With Syria in an isolated position, Israel could conduct the Golan Heights negotiations at whatever pace it wished. The central factor determining the pace of negotiations would be the attitude of Syria's President Assad. As long as Assad maintained his belligerent attitude toward Israel, the negotiations could be stalled indefinitely. If, on the other hand, Assad indicated that he no longer wanted to commit Syria to another war against Israel, the Israeli government could offer far more concessions in negotiations.

Initially, Israel should seek a very limited withdrawal from the farthest reaches of occupied territory in the Golan Heights. This approach would allow Israel time (roughly 1 year) to complete the Sinai arrangements as well as most of the administrative arrangements for the 5 year interim period in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, thus enabling Israel to determine what effect these developments would have upon Assad. If Assad indicated that he was opposed to the direction negotiations were taking and attempted to disrupt the process, then Israel could adopt a policy of benign neglect toward the Golan Heights issue. Should Assad indicate that he was resigned to negotiating developments, then Israel could make a serious effort to resolve the dispute with Syria.
It is very likely that Assad would see that he had little choice but to go along with the course of negotiations, since it would be quite clear that he would gain nothing by opposing them. Once negotiations begin in earnest, Israel will have to confront the great difficulties that the Golan Heights situation presents. In this area Israel cannot insure effective security precautions without territorial annexation, and any territorial annexation would eliminate any possibility for a gradual Syrian toleration of the Israeli presence in the Middle East. Perhaps the only negotiating policy that Israel can adopt in this territory is one of "a little bit of territory for a little bit of peace." Under this policy the question of total Israeli withdrawal would remain open during the course of negotiations; Israel would simply agree not to annex any territory as long as negotiations continued. The determining factor in the continuation of the negotiating process would be the response of Syria to preliminary withdrawal arrangements. As long as Syria made a conscious effort to comply with the demilitarization provisions of the preliminary agreements, curtailed all shelling of Israeli positions, and stopped all terrorist attacks originating from Syrian territory, then the negotiating process could move on to the next phase. If Syria failed to uphold its end of the agreement, Israel could break off negotiations and wait for Syria to change its attitude.

In this arrangement the areas of the Golan Heights of particular interest to Israel or of heavy settlement concentrations become significant not as areas of potential annexation but as points of with-
drawal. Thus, Israel would face minimal disruption of settlements during an initial withdrawal of several miles, though it would require giving up the superb defensive area north of Quneitra. Since the majority of settlements and one of the most important strategic locations in the territory (the first line of hills above the Huleh Valley) lie quite close to Israel proper, Israel could continue this policy of limited withdrawal over an extended period (say 10 years) before serious compromises would have to be made. These withdrawals could be done in 2 to 3 mile wide strips running the length (north and south) of the Golan Heights. As long as Syria complied with the requirements of the agreement, the process could continue, with the gradual return of Syrian residents to the area. It would be a good idea to maintain a slender (2 or 3 mile wide) buffer zone of UN forces between the Israeli lines and the areas occupied by Syrian civilians. (No Syrian military forces would be allowed to return to areas withdrawn from).

In approximately 10 years Israel would be reaching the critical point beyond which withdrawal would require relinquishing all of the high ground in the area and abandoning the settlement cluster in the southwestern corner of the territory. The amount of time that it would take to accomplish the withdrawal up to this point would give Syria ample time to indicate the kind of future relationship it expected to have with Israel and also give Israel an opportunity to assess the chances for peaceful coexistence with Syria. If Syria had been faithful in living up to the requirements of the previous agreements, then Israel would be in a position to make a final withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
The advantage of this arrangement is that it gives time for Israel's obsessive concern with security to dissipate somewhat before great demands are made upon the country. Also, it allows President Assad the possibility of regaining all of the occupied territory, which would remove most of the incentive for any further military action against Israel. The extended withdrawal period allows Israel to assess the existing Middle East political situation before entering any further Golan Heights withdrawal negotiations. Finally, it leaves Israel in a position to impose a settlement if Syria shows little inclination to opt for peaceful relations with Israel.

Jerusalem

The Jerusalem issue is by far the most difficult issue to resolve. Virtually every Israeli leader of any consequence has made it unequivocally clear that Jerusalem is the "heart and soul" of Israel. Teddy Kolleck, Mayor of Jerusalem, stated the Israeli position most accurately when he commented that for all the other occupied territories, there are Israelis willing to give them up, but it would be very difficult to find an Israeli willing to give up Jerusalem. To retain Jerusalem, though, creates enormous problems between Israel and the Arabs. The most difficult problem is that Jerusalem is a holy city for the Arabs as well, with their third most important shrine, the Temple Mount (Dome of the Rock) located within the old walled city. The second problem is that annexation requires inclusion of large

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numbers of Arabs living in Jerusalem, who have no desire to come under Israeli sovereignty. Since continuation of Israeli control over Jerusalem directly affects thousands of Arabs and indirectly affects the entire Arab Middle East, the difficulties of resolving the issue become apparent.

One of the strongest arguments that Israel has made for Israeli control over a unified Jerusalem is the fact that they have demonstrated a commitment to insuring the freedom of access for all religions to their particular holy places. When one contrasts this situation with the pre-1967 War conditions of a divided city separated by barbed wire, with the Jews denied access to the Wailing Wall and the Arab residents of Israel denied access to the Dome of the Rock, then it is easy to understand the Israelis' objections to returning the city to a situation of divided sovereignty. It would be impossible to gain Israeli acceptance of any redivision of Jerusalem, and it would be equally impossible to gain Arab acceptance of full Israeli sovereignty over the area. Since Israel is in the position of control in Jerusalem (and is unlikely to relinquish that position short of going to war), it appears that the best approach would be one of granting Israel's primary demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control, but one in which Israeli control over Arabs in the city would be limited and Arab holy places would be placed under autonomous Arab control.

The first problem to resolve would be one of determining which parties would be represented at Jerusalem negotiations. It would be best to limit the number of Arab participants to a Jordanian represent-
ative, an Egyptian representative, a small group representing East Jerusalem Arabs, and an Israeli representative. It would be advisable to bring in a Saudi Arabian representative if the Saudis could be persuaded to enter face to face negotiations with Israel. If the Saudis declined this offer, then they should have a representative who would act as a consultant member of the Arab delegation. This arrangement would provide adequate representation for Arab interests in Jerusalem, but would keep the hard line Arab faction out of the negotiating process.

The negotiations would deal with four basic issues: sovereignty, territory, administration and the holy places. Since the basic assumption underlying the peace process is the Jerusalem will remain a unified city, the most logical approach appears to be one which asks Israel to compromise in the areas of municipal administration and territory, while the Arabs are asked to compromise on the issue of sovereignty. One glance at a map of unified Jerusalem (see map on page 128) indicates that the area is far greater than is necessary to insure a unified Jerusalem. In fact the area Israel incorporated runs almost to Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem in the south. The best approach would be to redraw the city’s boundaries roughly along the following lines, In the north the line could be drawn immediately south of Ramat Eshkol and French Hill areas to the Israeli imposed eastern boundary. The eastern boundary could be kept intact (or moved slightly westward if it proves to be a particular bone of contention to the Arabs) to a point just north of Silwan, then moved
OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM

directly across to Israel proper. This boundary would include most of the built up area which makes up the contiguous city, and it would include virtually all of the holy places of any consequence. The boundary would preserve the unified city and the holy places within a single entity, while requiring Israel to give up all of its new developments in the area, except for the restoration done in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.

The administrative arrangements for governing Jerusalem would have to be somewhat complicated. A 1976 plan offered by Israel's Liberal Party proposed a form of dual sovereignty, with the separate Jewish and Arab areas being divided into relatively autonomous townships under a federated municipal government which had specifically designated powers over the individual township. This plan appears to be the most fruitful approach, though it appears that the federated arrangement could be limited to Arab townships, while keeping the Jewish areas under a unified administration. Under this arrangement unified municipal services could be continued, but the Arabs would retain considerable autonomy in managing their own affairs, with the authority of Jerusalem's municipal government being limited to strictly defined areas. In short, the Arab townships would retain all powers of government not specifically denied them by the municipal city charter. In fact it would be advisable to go so far as to restrict the use of tax revenues collected in Arab townships to the area itself,

and to offer dual Palestinian-Israeli citizenship to the Arab residents of Jerusalem.

The problem of the holy places would not be too difficult to resolve, since Israel's current arrangements leave Muslims and Christians in virtual autonomous control of their particular holy places. This arrangement could be continued, though modified somewhat according to the desires of the Christian and Arab bodies now administering the sites, and formalized by treaty. Determining the final arrangements for the Christian holy places should create little problem, but resolution of the Arab holy sites will require more complicated arrangements simply because the Arab nations that would not open diplomatic relations with Israel following a peace agreement (this would include many of them) would refuse to allow their citizens to enter Israel. This problem could be side-stepped by forming a joint Israeli-Jerusalem Arab customs station at Jerusalem's western border which could separate visitors into two groups, those desiring to enter Israel, who would have to pass through Israeli customs, and those who desired only to visit the Dome of the Rock shrine, who would be issued a temporary visa good for the Haram Sharif area only (this contains virtually all of the Arab holy places in Jerusalem). The latter customs arrangement could be administered by Jerusalem Arabs under the direction of the Muslim group tasked with administering the Dome of the Rock shrine. This arrangement would allow Arab visitors to worship at this sacred area without ever passing through Israeli customs, which is the reason for many Arabs now being unable to visit this
holy place.

**Conclusion**

With the details of the settlement proposal out of the way, two questions still remain to be answered: Will it be acceptable to the parties involved? and Will it work? The first question has been discussed at some length in this chapter. It has been demonstrated that most of the primary objectives of the parties involved would be realized. Egypt would regain the entire Sinai, Syria can regain the entire Golan Heights if it adopts a policy of peaceful coexistence, at last the Palestinians' demand for self determination is realized, and Israel is placed in a position to move from "secure" borders to accommodation of Arab interests to gain acceptance as a Middle East nation. The real problem of acceptance of this Middle East peace plan lies with Israel. Israel is asked to accept concessions that always have been unthinkable, including removal of settlements, withdrawal of military forces from strategic areas, acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, and finally acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The key to gaining any Israeli acceptance of these concessions is momentum in the negotiating process. If the pace of negotiations is such that the Israeli general public can begin to realize that genuine peace is a possibility, that Israel can be accepted by Arab nations (most notably Egypt and Jordan), then the possibility for gaining Israeli acceptance of these concessions is much greater. One factor aiding this acceptance process is that many of these difficult
concessions are put off for an extended period, giving time for a "climate of peace" to develop. This climate of peace is critical to the negotiating process. Once that the possibility of peace is realized and the hope for its accomplishment is accelerated, then the Israeli government can have much greater success in gaining public acceptance of concessions made to the Arab nations.

The final question to be answered is: Will it work? In order to understand properly the likely results of the arrangement outlined here, it should be understood that the purpose of this peace settlement is not to bring stability to the Middle East but to provide for a realignment of relationships among Middle East nations. The basic divisions among the Arab states are so great that it is pointless to expect long term stability to develop in the Middle East. What this peace settlement does, then, is provide a framework within which more practical national alignments can take place. The presence of Israel created an artificial unity among Arab states which tended to obscure the basic political and historical division among Arab nations.

Certainly it is in the interest of Jordan and Egypt to preserve Israel's strong military presence in the Middle East, for Israel can provide economic benefit for Egypt and be in a position to lend military assistance to Jordan. It is to Saudi Arabia's advantage that the most powerful Middle East nation (militarily) is a non Arab state, heavily dependent upon outside source for oil and highly developed economically, which makes it an excellent area for investment of Saudi money and a possible source of military assistance in an emergency.
Even Syria's primary concern lies in enhancing its Middle East position through continuation of its stabilizing role in Lebanon and in concentrating its defense measures against its primary enemy, Iraq.

The acceptance of Israel in the Middle East, then, allows other Arab nations to concentrate upon their own primary concerns: the domestic Economy in Egypt, the problem of the Palestinian minority in Jordan, Saudi Arabia's very real security concerns posed by radical Arab states and Iran, and Syria's concern over maintaining its position as a leader in the Arab world. The Palestinians, of course, do have something to gain from the destruction of Israel, but the effort expended in achieving such an objective would, at the very least, disrupt efforts for desperately needed economic development, and, very likely, would lead to a renewal of subjugation under Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian balance of strength is so overwhelmingly in Israel's favor that, should Palestine continue a policy of provocation, Israel could overrun the newly formed nation any time it chose to. It is very likely, then, that the signing of a final Middle East peace settlement would lead to the gradual acceptance of Israel, not because the hard line Arab states would slowly change their policy, but because the diminishment of the Israel issue would allow other historical, political, and economic rivalries to resurface in the Middle East, forcing these nations to concentrate their efforts upon more pressing issues.
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