Problems and politics of Anglo-American cooperation for the World War II second front| From the Atlantic Conference in 1941 to Cairo-Teheran Conference in 1943

Richard E. Scott

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PROBLEMS AND POLITICS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION

FOR THE WORLD WAR II SECOND FRONT:

FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN 1941

TO

THE CAIRO-TEHERAN CONFERENCE IN 1943

By

Richard E. J. Scott

B. S. Municipal University of Omaha, 1954

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

JUL 20 1967

Date
Several years ago, as I read the minutes of a conference pertaining to some problems between the United States and Great Britain, I wondered about the many problems involved in any wartime international collaboration and how the leaders contrived a course of successful action. The question remained in my mind, as a kind of general topic for later study, until I was faced with the choice for thesis work.

Having been active in World War II and having been based in England during the finale of that Anglo-American enterprise, I chose to study the background and progress of the collaboration which caused, or rather, directed the forward action of which I was a part. The resulting research led to the firm realization that national interests and respective leader interpretation of those interests guide the decisions of international collaboration. In order to reduce the subject to manageable proportions, the view was narrowed to the really major figures, their formal meetings, and decisions for a primary action - the Second Front.

Just as progress in a great international undertaking requires support from the parties involved, so my work was supported by the gracious ladies of the Army Pentagon Library, who manage the reference department and who render all possible assistance in locating a vital reference, suggesting available source material, and listening to their "customers'" ideas.
Dr. Leo B. Lott, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, and thesis director, furnished valuable support in the area of ideas, expression of those ideas, and overall encouragement during the final period of compilation.

Finally, my wife kept the spirit of completion alive when all the exigencies of daily living contrived to cancel the writing effort. She had a double and re-doubled task, for once having Father at the typewriter, she then had children to entertain elsewhere, because "Daddy is studying."
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The record of relations between nations contains many examples of crises as well as periods of stability, and the eventual easing of tensions or furthering of cooperation is proportional to the satisfaction of national interests. This results from the fact that national interests are what states seek to protect or gain in relations with other states. It has been suggested that "an ideal foreign policy contains a systematic formulation of national interests in which . . . the interests have been judged against one another in terms of priorities and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against the power of the state to achieve those interests." If they act rationally, nations with common interests will cooperate so long as their action furthers respective national objectives. However, even in the best of cooperative international enterprises, where optimum commonality of purpose is vital to achievement of goals, there is still variety in approach and divergence in opinion. Even those nations which have much in common culturally, linguistically, economically, as well as in broad national interests, experience difficulty in achieving agreement in matters of policy, procedure, and goals. A case in point is that of Anglo-American cooperation during World War II.

Essentially three elements or influencing threads of philosophy extend throughout the period of Anglo-American cooperation and contribute most heavily to decisions made. The first of these influencing threads is typified by the philosophy and apparent motivation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt: his overriding concern for achieving world peace by those methods embodied in President Woodrow Wilson's original Fourteen Points. Such was Roosevelt's primary objective in the Anglo-American cooperation. His was a long range goal. He was very careful to avoid direct conflict with his domestic political adversaries, because isolationist political elements had destroyed Wilson's hope for control of war by international organization, and the President intended to avoid the Wilson type of failure.

England's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's philosophy and goals constitute the second dominant thread of influencing factors. His primary goal was explicitly stated in the first speech he made following his elevation to power. "Our goal," Churchill said, "is victory." Although the Prime Minister was admittedly a key figure along with Roosevelt in formulating the original statement regarding the international organization which we call the United Nations, he was primarily motivated by the desire to attract to his cause the somewhat large and influential segment of internationalist thought prevalent in England. This he did by encouraging the establishment of an international organization. During the early Anglo-American cooperation, the urgency of his immediate problems and the danger his country faced just for survival claimed his attention much more than did consideration of post-war actions. However, to the degree Churchill gave thought to the means
of maintaining world peace, he favored the traditional balance of power, with Britain as the balancing nation.

The third set of influences affecting the decisions described herein was voiced by the military staffs of both nations and took the form of argument over proper military strategy, politics notwithstanding. From the beginning of joint military planning, the British espoused a strategy derived from their historical experience as a nation and which was based on the concept of a strong navy to offset the deficiencies of a small army. By using their navy, they were able to mount various land offenses, attain their objective, and retire to their naval base of operations. This strategy allowed them to strike then at another place with fairly consistent success. The United States, on the other hand, was a large land power and looked upon the European war as a land war which would require large armies. The American strategy envisioned the build up of a powerful striking force with which they would mount a swift and overwhelming offensive. The nation's tremendous productive capacity would insure an adequate flow of supplies, particularly since the supply route planned by the Americans would be by way of England and would be protected by the navies of both countries. Moreover, as Allied air power developed, with the potential of blunting, or stopping entirely, the German air arm, the attack could be launched sooner than envisioned by the British. Finally, the American battlefield psychology and experience was such that their techniques of land warfare called for rapid attacks with overwhelming force.
It is not the author's intention to pass judgment on which decision should have been made or whether an alternative course of action would have been better. Numbers of people who are experts in hindsight deliberation have already done this. It is more useful to explore the way major decisions were made which led to the massive campaign called the Second Front.

Several accounts attest to the fact that production was vital to the prosecution of the war. Each nation was plagued by shortages. British capacity was strained to the limit well before the days of Lend-Lease. American productive capacity was not adequately organized and channeled at the time of Lend-Lease legislation. Therefore, the meshing of industrial and military might of England and the United States promised to be difficult. However, the essential problems lay in the realm of political and military decision making, basic strategy, and the achievement of national goals.

There seems to be general agreement among writers about the period that major differences did exist in this area of necessary cooperation. Not only were national interest of Great Britain and the United States not identical in form or intensity, but powerful

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personalities were involved. The machinery for national decision making in each case was of different design, stimulus, and operation. Variations in major policy, both political and military, were ever present in varying degree. There were numerous occasions when each party to the enterprise doubted the other's really effective contribution to planning, execution, and peace procedures.

This study deals with the political policy as well as with military plans and associated actions. Such policy and plans provide the rationale for decision not only to strike the enemy, but more importantly, where and in what sequence to strike him for most damage to his war making capability.

The Anglo-American political cooperation had a definite existence as far back as 1939, when Churchill re-entered the British Cabinet in the Admiralty, much to the satisfaction of President Roosevelt.¹ Like Churchill, Roosevelt had been prompt to realize the menace of Hitlerism, although he was far in advance of the strict neutrality sentiment prevalent at the time in American public opinion and in Congress.² Cordial relations between the United States and Great Britain were earnestly encouraged by both men. With the fall of France, Roosevelt appeared to recognize that the die was cast and that England would require all the

support the United States could provide if the British were to prevail.\textsuperscript{1} His convictions were constantly supported by encouraging and urgent messages from Churchill. The latter roared at the enemy and inspired British citizens to renewed optimism. Churchill knew, however, that Britain by herself could not be victorious and that he must acquire as a partner the former colony across the Atlantic if his stance in the face of superior force was not to be undermined. Both men had domestic problems at home which restricted their ability to make the international decisions they felt most appropriate at the time.\textsuperscript{2} Both had goals of a national caliber which had to be pushed aside at times in order to attain the cooperation essential, at least for the British, for survival. Both were strong leaders of democratic nations committed to the cause of individual freedom, but each had differing organizational forms and ideas for achieving the primary short range goal--victory, and long range goal--lasting peace.

Although political contact and agreement between the two leaders was relative simple to initiate and maintain, inter-governmental cooperation was quite another matter. Many members of the American Congress were far from convinced that their constituents desired close cooperation

\textsuperscript{1}This is evident from the early encouragement of British purchases of war supplies in spite of U.S. industry inability to furnish with any degree of timeliness the needs of its own growing military force. Then, as Britain announced the imminent exhaustion of her financial resources (November 1940), Roosevelt managed to push through Congress the Lend-Lease measure (signed into law March 11, 1941).

\textsuperscript{2}For example, the Destroyer for Bases Exchange where England traded base rights on certain British islands to the United States for fifty over-age destroyers. Respective national governments had to be convinced that necessary quid pro quo was present.
with any remaining democratic government of Europe. An anxious press as well expressed doubt that the war in Europe was America's concern.\(^1\) In addition to these strong policy doubts, American production through the summer of 1941, though potentially enormous, was insufficient to meet Lend-Lease demands or the United States military requirements. Many members of the United States military establishment were pessimistic about the United States ability to reach a stage of military readiness in time to aid the British.\(^2\) General Marshall and Admiral Stark were among those to whose lot fell the task of proving that there was not only a need, but also a way of achieving that power base. Detailed cooperation with their British counterparts was not smooth, but at least the military goals were the same. Types of experience among the two national military leaderships were different. Ideas of strategy were dissimilar. Indeed, not until 1944 did they appear to coincide, and even then, overall strategy itself was not fully agreed to by both parties. The feelings of American military people involved in the negotiations were not improved by the constant pressures of the politically-oriented Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins to provide for the "hungry" British forces from the United States military table of supply, a meagre table in the earlier days, and especially so as the Pacific Ocean war progressed. As the United States Army Chief of Staff,

\(^1\)See the digests of opinion in the *New York Post*, (September 4, 1939); and the *New York Times*, (September 8, 10, 1939).

General Marshall initiated consultations with the British military apparatus as far back as 1940 in the search for common understanding of England's needs. As requirements were established, Marshall bent every effort to meet them from such sources of supply as he found available. Hence, he was chagrined to see his hard-won supplies, obtained for previously agreed military actions, employed by the British in small, peripheral and, in his judgment, wasteful diversions.

In the interest of order, four major events, or combinations of events, will form the basis for this study. They represent key considerations during the growing Anglo-American cooperation which led to a Second Front. The paper will consider the three elements of influence stated at the beginning and pertinent aspects of each event, i.e., personalities, circumstances, and some arguments; and finally, the impact of decisions made during one event on the succeeding events of the study.

The first episode culminates in the first high-level Anglo-American conference. This summit meeting took place at Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941, and was the first wartime personal contact between the President and Prime Minister. During the week of that meeting, there evolved the declaration of principles later known as the Atlantic Charter, which contained Roosevelt's philosophy.

The second event was a conference held in Washington in December 1941. Called at Churchill's request, it is noteworthy for its achievements. The Atlantic meeting had paved the way for partnership; now the principals resumed where they left off. Churchill's
purpose in requesting the meeting when he did was to forestall any American inclination to shift their central interest from the Atlantic to the Pacific following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Now that the United States was in the war, Churchill wished to reaffirm previously agreed Allied policy. A number of important decisions were reached, such as common strategy, acceptance of a blueprint of operations, priority of the war against Germany, and a declaration to the world of an association of United Nations. However, the most vital decision and keystone to future cooperation was the decision that henceforth, Britain and America were to run the war as one entity with military staffs combined at highest level to give single direction.

The third and perhaps most influential episode in this chronology took place in Washington in June 1942. It followed in the wake of Soviet Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov's visit to Washington during which President Roosevelt had acceded to Molotov's request for a statement saying that "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." There were implications in this statement that the British were unwilling to underwrite.1 In British eyes, the Americans were insisting on a dangerous and untimely campaign which might have disastrous results. To clarify their divergent views, the two countries undertook a series of conversations which culminated in a second visit by Churchill to Washington beginning June 17, 1942. The British War Cabinet had earlier stated

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1Sherwood, p. 577.
firmly that they could not accept an invasion of France in 1942 and that if there were to be any semblance of such a second front as Roosevelt promised Molotov, it would have to be other than on the European continent. Churchill's purpose during the visit was to convince the President that a North African invasion was the answer. The eventual decision in this matter led to the well-documented sequence of decisions for follow on operations in the Mediterranean in accordance with British desires. American military leaders were chagrined, for they were convinced that build up for a 1943 cross-Channel invasion was the best strategy.

The fourth episode or set of events pertains to the difficulties and arguments which arose between Great Britain and the United States in deciding the time and manner of fully engaging Germany in a true Second Front. The Quadrant and Cairo-Teheran conferences were the means of settling the differences and making decisions for this action of major importance to the Allied cause. Difference in military strategy were involved. Both nations recognized the necessity for a cross-Channel invasion of France. However, the British envisioned an Italian campaign to remove Italy from the war and at the same time cause a German diversion of forces to Italy from other fronts. If successful, such a course of action would weaken German opposition to the massive Allied cross-Channel effort to follow. The Americans, on the other hand, proposed the cross-Channel operation for an initial assault upon the Nazi-controlled area and were impatient with their British partner for the "unnecessary delay," which would be created by peripheral activities. The resulting
compromise has the markings of the most controversial decision of the overall cooperation, and writers of political and military strategy are still divided as to which side was right.¹

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO COOPERATION

Hans Morgenthau has expressed a theory of political power which has to do with a nation's interests. He says that "the concept of national interests presupposes . . . continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through a continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic actions." The importance of national interests and the interpretation of United States and British interests by respective national chiefs were noted in the introduction. Diplomatic action may assume a variety of forms. Furthermore, it may be conducted on a quite personal and informal basis, especially by highly placed government officials. Such personal diplomacy marked the relations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during the period with which we are concerned, and most citizens of the two countries appear to have approved this close relationship as right and proper.

That these two leaders encouraged closer bi-lateral association during the late 1930's was not accidental; nor was the fellowship

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without some pattern. However, in order to illuminate the personal factors, as well as national objectives, which fostered the somewhat providential relationship, a sequence of background facts about both the President and the Prime Minister will be presented. In the process, it is appropriate that additional people who played vital roles in the Anglo-American cooperation of World War II be considered. This chapter is concerned with such facts and personalities. It is sub-divided in the interest of clarity.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Pre-War Cooperative Action and Long Range Goals

Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the United States presidential cloak of office in 1933 at a time when the Administration's problems were predominantly domestic. The Years of the Great Depression had seen the national economy virtually wrecked. At that time the average United States citizen was experiencing tenuous security. Governmental action on behalf of these people was sadly lacking.

The new President's close advisers were determined that solution of these knotty domestic issues would be the principal governmental objective. Roosevelt was in accord with their ideas for the national scene, for a basic tenet of his philosophy was "that the government should subordinate private interests to the collective good and substitute cooperation for selfish individualism. He had always hated the tremendous inequality in the distribution of wealth and ardently desired to correct it."\(^1\) However, Roosevelt had been in the Wilson government and was also

\(^1\) Hatch, p. 169.
in sincere sympathy with the tenets of humanitarian philosophy as Wilson had felt it should be applied to the world. The new President was also well aware of the international system of which the United States was a part.

During the 1933 Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt proposed that, in exchange for disarmament agreement, the United States would enter into a consultive pact. This would promise conference with signatories when one of them claimed aggression had occurred, but it would leave the United States free to decide for itself whether aggression was a fact justifying the application of economic sanctions. President Hoover had, during his latter days in office, requested of Congress legislation to empower the President to embargo the shipment of arms to aggressor nations, and in mid-April 1933 the House of Representatives passed the resolution. Roosevelt's consultive pact plus the Congressional resolution for a discriminatory arms embargo would build a special annex of the League of Nations for the United States in which it could cooperate for collective security without commitment or loss of sovereignty.

The Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, apparently fearing loss of sovereignty and resisting involvement in European power politics, amended the measure so as to remove the discriminatory clause and require instead that the embargo would apply to all parties to a dispute. Since such a law would render impossible United States cooperation in economic sanctions against aggression and, therefore, make a consultive pact
useless, rather than risk its passage, the administration dropped the resolution and it was not voted on. ¹

With this example of strong isolationist influence before him, it did not take the President long to realize the need to soft pedal his enthusiasm for world cooperation. Although he agreed with Woodrow Wilson's great plan, he was determined to avoid a public misunderstanding or run the risk of a rejection of any similar plan. Therefore, he undertook a long campaign to re-educate the American people.²

The "educational" process which ensued was fraught with problems, for a large and vocal isolationist element extended throughout the nation. Nevertheless, when Hitler announced the rearmament of Germany in 1935, Roosevelt protested and said "we cannot build a wall around ourselves and stick our heads in the sand." Then, in January 1936, he declared that "peace is threatened by those who seek selfish power."³ Still later, in 1937, when Japan, Germany, and Italy combined forces, he spoke

¹"The heart of the argument was that isolationists during the period between the two World Wars asserted the impossibility of the United States taking part in collective action against an aggressor without forming 'entangling alliances' . . . which would destroy the sovereignty of the United States and permit other nations to determine its policy and even plunge it into war against its will." Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), p. 2.


³Hatch, pp. 235-236.
out in warning and defiance as he marked the shift to direct alignment and overt planning for defense in the struggle between fascist and democratic states:

The peace loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality... the will for peace on the part of peace loving nations must express itself to the end, that nations which may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course.¹

Repercussions from diverse sources across the land resulted.

Time Magazine reported the opposition as being:

From the Wall Street Journal which front-paged an editorial 'Stop Foreign Meddling; America Wants Peace'; from World Peaceways and five other passive-peace organisations; from Senator Gerald P. Nye, sponsor of neutrality legislation; from columnist Hugh Johnson who wrote 'Well, here we are again, taking sides in a war.'²

The following week, Time added "Franklin Roosevelt's major job in Washington is to deal with the reverberations, political and international, that followed his announcement."³ Always a politically sagacious man, Roosevelt gave way before the great clamor of public disapproval. However, his convictions that resistance to dictatorship was a necessity did not change. Hence, he waited for public acceptance of the logic of his global politics.

²Time, October 18, 1937, pp. 17-19.
³Time, October 25, 1937, p. 17.
Some eighteen months later, in July 1939, the President tried again, as he urged the repeal of the Arms Embargo section of the Neutrality Act. Even the strong support of this effort by Secretary of State Hull was to no avail however, and Congress denied the request. Congressional isolationists, such as Gerald P. Nye and William Borah, remained adamant in their stand against such a move, confident that there was no danger of war. Roosevelt's determination to resist Hitler's program of European dismemberment was demonstrated by his proclamation of a Limited National Emergency in September 1939. In November, his policies achieved partial success when he succeeded in obtaining Congressional approval for changes in the Neutrality Act to permit the sale of war munitions to democracies on a "cash and carry" basis.¹

As a follow up to this success, Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, on a fact finding tour of European capitals. The tour took place just after the first of the year in 1940. Welles brought back an alarming report. There was to be a strong German offensive in the spring of that year; one the Allies were in no condition to meet. Although the President was certain that, without substantial United States aid the Allied cause would be lost, he also realized that the nation was not as yet convinced of the lesson he had to teach. The deteriorating European situation contributed to Roosevelt's decision to attempt the unprecedented third term race for office as President of the United States.

¹Of primary importance to England and France was the repeal of the embargo on sale of arms. By the time of passage, the bill had been so thoroughly debated that Mr. Arthur Krock observed that the Senate had "bored itself and the country at large." (The New York Times, October 29, 1939).
The expected German spring offensive exploded into being. The Nazis occupied Denmark in April and stormed into Norway soon thereafter. A month later, their mechanized might stunned Europe and by May 14, "pierced the thin shell of France's fortified line."¹ The Roosevelt message to Americans, until then largely ignored, got through. The country was in danger! At last, as Roosevelt spoke to the joint session of Congress on May 16, 1940, he was able to convince the nation of what he and the military staff had known for years. In addition to the sober accounting he gave of the steps needed to strengthen our military forces, he saw as vitally necessary an enormous increase in production. He set a goal more ambitious than anyone before had imagined. He was moving the nation on a course for support of warring nations. Such support would eventually involve millions of Americans under arms.

The question might be asked: What sort of man was this President who brought his nation from an attitude of isolation and strict neutrality to a conviction that the ideals of freedom were just as important in Europe as elsewhere in the world? One writer submits that the chief reasons Roosevelt was admired and trusted—loved if you will—by a preponderance of the common, ordinary citizens of the United States were his optimism, his sympathy, and his ability to take them into his confidence. They were a part of his responsibility; he did not consider himself to be their responsibility. During those early years of his administration, the President "made the unemployed, the dispossessed,

¹Hatch, p. 259.
the underprivileged feel that he cared," and the programs he sponsored did not betray those for whom and to whom he appealed. "Roosevelt believed the American society could be improved."¹ He felt the same way about the world scene, and when war came, he set out to provide a means for nations to live in prosperity and peace. His pattern was the Wilson philosophy up-dated to the needs of the current world.

Roosevelt demonstrated other attributes as well, which are not so idealistic. He did enjoy power and the exercise of it. He could be arbitrary, stubborn, and dilatory. He wore the presidency like a cloak. It was his office; it did not own him. Therefore, he manipulated the affairs of state, established goals, and was not necessarily orthodox or traditional in his methods of achieving his objectives. In foreign affairs, he sometimes strained the limits of constitutional authority, but being an astute political technician,² he shaped the broad lines of his desired policies in conjunction with the legislative body and coordinated with public opinion—as close a taskmaster as his actions would acknowledge.

The President permitted quarrels in the official family and often by-passed his cabinet officers, but there was often method in this loose


²Samuel Morison has suggested that Roosevelt "had a political calculating machine in his head, an intricate instrument in which Gallup polls, the strength of armed forces, and the probability of England's survival; the personalities of ... congressmen; the Irish, German, Italian, and Jewish votes; ... were combined with fine points of political maneuvering." Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 995.
procedure. By surveying the opinions of a large number of imaginative and competent minds at other levels of authority, Roosevelt established in his own mind a conviction as to what should be, and aligned it with what his experience and judgment as a politician told him it could be. The result was a policy, essentially his, but susceptible to adjustment as trusted members of his staff or others might suggest. It is to a consideration of one of these trusted contemporaries that we now turn.

Winston Churchill: His Background for Cooperation and Goals

Although the Roosevelt story is far from complete, it is appropriate to stop at this point, for it is during the period of late 1939 and early 1940 that the personal diplomacy so important to our study really began. We must now consider pertinent facets of the Churchillian background.

Rarely had the British people been so united in going to war as in 1939. Winston Churchill gave expression to the feelings of these people in the last speech he made as a private member of the House of Commons:

'We are fighting to save the world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man. This is no war for imperial aggrandizement or material gain. It is a war to establish on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual. It is a war to establish and revive the stature of man.'

With such demonstrated awareness of the people's feelings, Churchill was recalled to the government in an atmosphere of general

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acclaim. His dynamic energy and the fame of his anti-appeasement speeches made him the man of the hour in Britain as he returned to his old place in the Admiralty in September 1939. Heartened by a United States Presidential message of congratulations, Churchill replied at once. Thus began the long correspondence which paved the way to close understanding and personal diplomacy between the central figures of these two nations.

Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. The phrases of his speech presenting his Ministry to the House of Commons established his policy, his aim, and his dedication:

I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat . . .
Our policy? . . . to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy. Our aim? . . . it is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be - for without victory, there is no survival.1

Continuous bad news plagued the Prime Minister and the New Government: the German breakthrough, no reserves, the French defeat. But in the press of problems, Churchill informed Roosevelt that "whatever might happen, the British in their island would fight on to the end. But if the Americans were able to render assistance, 'if it is to play any part it must be available soon'."2 The pressing need was for arms. Washington received a formal British appeal for help and responded in such a way that the United States Army was deprived of


2Broad, p. 36.
all but the minimum essentials. Rifles, machine-guns, and field guns with ammunition were shipped to Britain. The American decision to take vigorous action was based on Roosevelt's evaluation of Churchill's steadfast character. The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, attested to this fact as follows: "The President and I were convinced that under Churchill's indomitable leadership Britain intended to fight on. We believed that Mr. Churchill meant what he said. Had we had any doubt we would not have taken the steps we did."¹

The American willingness to believe in Churchill might be attributable to his position of power in his nation. Certainly, as the "first" of the British Ministers, the Prime Minister (Churchill or some other) acquires power from the fact that he selects the members of his Government. Further, he alone, of all the Ministers, may make great decisions without the approval of the full Cabinet. A comparison of the Prime Minister's position with that of the American President is made as follows:

The Prime Minister, because of the concentration of responsibility in the Cabinet and the discipline of British parties, has, as a general rule, far greater powers than the President, whose freedom of action is severely limited by the separation of powers, but the President can usually exercise his powers far more independently as an individual than can the Prime Minister. The British executive is a plural executive, in spite of the predominance of the Prime Minister.²


Regardless of Churchill's influence in government by virtue of the Constitutional position he occupied, however, Roosevelt was also well acquainted with Churchill's position as a persuader in his country among the British people. Just as presidential power in the United States depends in large measure upon the individual's ability to persuade, so in the final analysis, did Churchill's authority stem from a political base dependent upon the will of the people as represented in the House of Commons. That Prime Minister Churchill could persuade and more than not convince the mass of England's population in resisting the German threat clinched the President's decision for aid. Thus Roosevelt, by his action, gave Churchill his own personal vote of confidence.

At the time Churchill formed his first Ministry, he was head of a government but not of a political party. Although it was customary for a Conservative Prime Minister to lead his Party, Churchill would not permit his predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, to surrender as leader of the Tories. A compelling reason is taken from his letter to Chamberlain: "As Prime Minister of a national government, formed on the widest basis and comprising three parties, I feel that it would be better for me not to undertake the leadership of one political party." Having made the

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1 Churchill alluded to this in his first speech to the American Congress on December 26, 1941, when he said: "I have steered confidently toward the Gettysburg ideal of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people'. I owe my advancement entirely to the House of Commons, whose servant I am . . . On any day, if they thought the people wanted it, the House of Commons could by a simple vote remove me from my office." Charles Eade, The War Speeches of The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 145.

2 Broad, p. 53.
Party administration secure by retaining its nominal leader, Churchill could devote himself to the primary task of marshalling his forces to defeat Germany. Considering himself to be especially well qualified in military matters, he assumed the post of Minister of Defense. Although it was unusual for a Prime Minister to assume responsibility for a subordinate position as well, Churchill has explained his rationale:

Power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing. In any sphere of action there can be no comparison between the positions of number one and number two, three, or four . . . It is always a misfortune when number two or three has to initiate a dominant plan or policy. He has to consider not only the merits of the policy, but the mind of his chief . . . There are always several points of view which may be right, and many which are plausible. I was ruined for a time being in 1915 over the Dardanelles, and a supreme enterprise was cast away, through my trying to carry out a major and cardinal operation of war from a subordinate position. Men are ill-advised to try such ventures. This lesson had sunk into my nature . . . At the top there are great simplifications. An accepted leader has only to be sure what it is best to do, or at least to have made up his mind about it.¹

Churchill's powers and responsibilities as Defense Minister were, like the British Constitution, undefined. Hence, they became very much what he wanted them to be; as extensive as the exigencies of the war dictated. Having his own conception of how a war should be run, he was determined that decisions should be reached swiftly, and resulting orders should be issued promptly and obeyed. During the previous war, Lloyd George had a small War Cabinet as a management tool. Churchill also had a War Cabinet, but he used it only as the executive authority. The direction of vital affairs, such as planning and control of military operations, was lodged with him through and together with the Chiefs

¹Churchill, II, pp. 15-16.
of Staff; that is, the professional heads of the three military services—Navy, Army, and Air Force. This Chiefs of Staff Committee, as it was called, was the operational authority for conducting the war. As Defense Minister, Churchill was its guiding force. The arrangement resulted in the Prime Minister's having full control over the British handling of the war. Although he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were subject to decisions of the War Cabinet and the House of Commons, he was prompt and conscientious in placing pertinent matters before these bodies. As a result, there was seldom any interference from them, and no Prime Minister before him had exercised such direct authority in the military sphere.¹

Neither did Churchill have cause to worry about his parliamentary position, at least for the first six months of his tenure as Prime Minister, for the sense of national peril silenced criticism. He had promised the nation only that his Government would be resolute against tyranny and that every effort would be bent towards ensuring national survival. Therefore, the disasters of 1940 were borne in Parliament with stolid resignation. Continued reverses of 1941 brought forth breaks in the silence, but the Prime Minister's critics found little support in the House of Commons, which registered confidence in the Government by a vote of 447 to three.²


²Broad, p. 92.
Churchill could view with satisfaction his domestic political situation, and he could be reassured in the knowledge that his ideas and vision would receive full consideration in British war councils. But the defeat of Germany required more than purely British sources could provide. The channel of communication with the American President was the Prime Minister's most valuable hope. As long as he had access to the American leader, Churchill would be able to assist in the design of Hitler's eventual destruction. Therefore, the Prime Minister was ever alert to ways for influencing his Atlantic neighbor toward active participation in the war to save mankind. Churchill's primary goal remained always one of victory.

Other Key People: Their Place in the Cooperative Role

That Roosevelt and Churchill were men of vision, politically astute, and extremely competent in achieving agreement with their points of view is evident from the several accounts of their accomplishments. Furthermore, they clearly shared a vital national interest - the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, their vision, their ability to achieve, and the realization of national interests came to fruition predominantly through the contributions of thought and action of loyal military leaders. This is not to detract from the exceptional support rendered

1See Appendix I for example of Churchill's effectiveness in this respect. It is his letter to the President dated December 8, 1940, "vigorously stating Britain's position, needs, and the war prospects for 1941 . . . . It proved a powerful advocate for the policy of Lend-Lease." (Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 920-922).
the nation during this period by those more specifically oriented to politics, such as Harry Hopkins, but in time of war political and military actions are so closely akin as to be intertwined.

The American military personalities, who stood out as key figures in the early Anglo-American cooperation, were General George Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark, Chiefs of Staff respectively for the Army and Navy. Although Marshall remained throughout the war, Admiral Ernest King replaced Stark soon after Pearl Harbor. Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox were effective Cabinet personnel, and as such were vital to proper coordination of functions between the political element and the purely military establishment.

As had France and Britain, the United States in 1939 had looked on helplessly as Germany swiftly defeated the Polish forces. In spite of Roosevelt's efforts to change the situation, the twin ills of complacency and unpreparedness which had plagued France and Britain were United States afflictions too. Marshall and Stark had little time for shoring up defenses, in spite to the American ocean defenses and modest military forces. In addition, they had to fight against great odds, for isolationist forces were still strong. Even Roosevelt recognized the necessity for moving the nation carefully or not at all. The task which Marshall faced at the end of 1939 seems unbelievable in retrospect. His biographer sums up as follows:

Seventeenth in rank among the world's armed forces, the United States Army retained from World War I only the luster of its fighting reputation. Weapons, effective in the Meuse-Argonne were obsolescent; many officers lacked proper training or had stagnated; the allotment for training in the late thirties,
amounting to approximately two per cent of the Army's appropriations, was insufficient to keep the Regulars in shape or give the National Guard a real concept of field duties; and the lack of equipment and personnel for existing units held them below authorized peacetime strength. Worse still, Congress in its legislation reflected the national conviction that enforcement of the neutrality laws was sufficient to prevent war from touching the Western Hemisphere.¹

In 1939, during the early period of American neutrality, the military men had been engaged in strengthening defenses in the Caribbean and the Atlantic. A different orientation emerged when Japan moved toward expansion in the Pacific. The fleet was ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor rather than return to the west coast bases. The United States now looked to the British and French fleets to hold the Atlantic.²

The defeat of France brought with it a problem not the least of which was guarding two oceans in the event Britain failed to hold out. Marshall, Stark, and their advisers were especially concerned at the latter prospect. Therefore, in August 1940, at the suggestion of the President, a quick tour of inspection was made of British installations by American military representatives. An optimistic evaluation of Britain's long term chances of survival resulted. More importantly, the tour fostered the conviction in military circles of


²Americans had consistently, either consciously or unconsciously, looked to England for patrol of major trade routes of the world. As far back as 1937, Lippman discussed this phenomenon of United States dependence upon Great Britain. (Walter Lippman, "Rough Hew Them How We Will," Foreign Affairs, XV, July 1937, pp. 587-594).
both nations that a periodic exchange of information between Britain and the United States was desirable and should be accomplished on a regular basis. Therefore, in November 1940, Admiral Stark formally proposed that:

The United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with the British and Canadians . . . to reach agreement and lay down plans for promoting unity of Allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war.¹

During this same period, Admiral Stark's counterpart in the British Navy, Admiral Pound, expressed the view that there should be conversations in Washington with War and Navy Department Staffs.² At first, Marshall was noncommittal concerning the suggestion. Lacking a fighting force that could contribute heavily to any offensive policy within the next eighteen months, he wished to proceed cautiously. Still, he agreed with Stark that the United States military forces needed to know something of British capability just as the British should know what to expect from the United States forces. If such information were not exchanged in advance, "we would start with no basis at all if war developed later on."³

As a result of the consensus in the United States and British military staffs, American-British Conversations (ABC) took place in Washington from January 29 to March 29, 1941.

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²Watson, p. 120.

³Pogue, p. 126.
The opening statement by the Americans at the first ABC meeting revealed that for them the conversations were:

To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.¹

To avoid any possible suggestion of official commitment by the United States, the President carefully took no part in the proceedings, and Marshall and Stark, after appearing briefly at the opening session, were absent thereafter.²

The report of the British and American representatives at the ABC sessions was later approved by the British Government, and although the President declined to give it formal United States approval, both nations treated it as a fairly specific statement of understanding by the military service leaders. In summarizing the points of agreement, we find that the United States was interested primarily in hemisphere defense and the maintenance of Britain's position in Europe. Running through American conclusions were threads of British strategy, such as operations to remove Italy from the war, a major air offensive and minor amphibious raids against German controlled areas, and the encouragement of resistance groups in occupied Europe. Only for the undetermined future could they speak of a build up for a final offensive against Germany.³ Although this document was not a formal pledge, its

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²Watson, p. 374.

³For more complete account, see Watson, pp. 376-380.
provisions went far toward specifying the type of war the United States would wage if it entered the conflict with Germany. Robert Sherwood concluded correctly that the conversations and exchange of opinions "provided the highest degree of strategic preparedness that the United States or probably any other nonaggressor nation has ever had before entry into war."¹ Thus the American military leaders laid a foundation for future war planning and cooperation with Great Britain.

At the same time early United States military coordination was being effected with Great Britain, another key American figure, Harry Hopkins, was active in a similar vein on the political front. Hopkins was perhaps Roosevelt's closest confidant and adviser. Until 1941 he had been engaged in the service of other Departments or agencies of the Government. However, beginning in 1941, Hopkins chief involvement with the President related mainly to the conduct of military affairs and included his work in administering the Lend-Lease Act. Further, and of utmost importance, were his several important missions to confer with Churchill and Stalin as the President's personal representative.²

In January 1941, while the secret ABC military discussions were in preparation, Roosevelt sent Hopkins to his first meeting with the Prime Minister. Just as those visits by United States military representatives, during the previous August, were to acquire factual

¹Sherwood, p. 273.

²Hopkins made five trips to visit Churchill and two to Stalin, the last to Stalin being for President Truman in May 1945. (See Index "Hopkins, Missions," Sherwood, p. 969).
information, so was Harry Hopkins "to gain first hand knowledge of
Britain's needs and of finding a way to fill them."\(^1\) The mission to
Churchill had its beginning in a lengthy letter from the Prime Minister
to Roosevelt dated December 8, 1940. This document vigorously stated
Britain's position and needs and war prospects for 1941.\(^2\) The President
was deeply troubled by the implications it raised for England's survival.
He knew that concerted action was required in some areas but felt much
of the problem "could be settled if Churchill and I could just sit down
together for awhile." Hopkins suggested that, since the President
couldn't be away from the country at that time, he, Hopkins, might visit
Churchill in the President's place. "If I had been to England and seen
it with my own eyes, then I might be of some help."\(^3\)

It was during this visit with Churchill that Hopkins became well
acquainted not only with the Prime Minister, but also with the moral
fiber supporting England in her ability to make war and with the British
war making requirements which the United States could support. Perhaps
the most important result of the visit, however, was the conviction he
could take back to Roosevelt:

Churchill is the Government in every sense of the word . . .
Churchill wants to see you - the sooner the better . . .
I am convinced this meeting between you and Churchill is

\(^1\)Sherwood, p. 236.

\(^2\)Churchill, II, p. 458. Also see Appendix I. The Prime Minister
has referred to the letter as being one of his most important.

\(^3\)Sherwood, p. 230.
essential . . . . This island needs our help now, Mr. President, with everything we can give them."

Summary of Prelude.

This chapter has served to provide a setting for Anglo-American collaboration, which in December 1941, was suddenly made completely overt and direct. Contacts between British and American political and military chiefs of both nations had by that time been established. Although not official, sound basic military coordination had been effected and at least informal agreement had been reached about how the United States would wage war against Germany if she became compelled to do so.

We have seen that both Roosevelt and Churchill were leaders of their nations in the literal sense of the word. Both had breadth of vision necessary to plot courses of action calculated best to serve respective national interests. Realizing that they could travel the inevitable war route more effectively as allies, they guided their national destinies to a common meeting ground.

Through personal contact, Churchill kept the President so informed of the British plans and needs that the President was able to fashion the domestic political atmosphere in the United States in a way most suited to support Great Britain's war making essentials. Although not discussed in the main body of the chapter, two examples of the President's political shrewdness in this regard are the exchange of United States destroyers for lease rights to British controlled bases;

1Sherwood, p. 243.
and the Lend-Lease Act, which enabled the United States to provide Britain the machines of war on a loan basis. Both programs of action were at such odds with the American policy of neutrality that some discussion of citizen reaction to them is appropriate here.

The Destroyer for Bases agreement of September 1940 provided Britain fifty over age destroyers in exchange for base rights to selected British owned Atlantic islands, use of which would improve the United States defense posture. The general public considered the deal an admirable bargain, even though it seemed to border on an Anglo-American alliance. The terms of the agreement were so favorable to the United States that initially there was little disposition in Congress to criticize it. Isolationist alarms were certainly sounded. For example, the St. Louis Post Dispatch ran a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and other papers on September 4, 1941, saying "Mr. Roosevelt today committed an act of war." However, the position of the isolationists was sorely weakened by their long advocacy of action to acquire bases in these same islands.

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1 "This trade gives notice that the democracies have the courage and foresight to help each other effectively." (Christian Science Monitor, September 4, 1940); The deal gave the United States "a stockade of steel to the East." (New York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1940); for public opinion generally see survey of opinion of The New York Times, September 1, 1940.


4 The Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1940, repeated a long-standing proposal to acquire British possessions in settlement of war debts.
than usual inclination to make an issue of the transaction is illustrated in the words of an unnamed Senator:

Listen, you can't attack a deal like that. If you jump on the destroyer transfer, you're jumping on the acquisition of defense bases in the Western Hemisphere. And the voters wouldn't stand for that. Roosevelt outsmarted all of us when he tied up the two deals.¹

The idea of Lend-Lease was conceived purely and simply as a means to aid Britain. The Churchill letter of December 8, 1940, to Roosevelt (see Appendix I) brought into clear focus for the President the distressing material conditions which faced England. The Prime Minister submitted essentially two propositions. First, that control of the oceans by the United States and Britain "is indispensable to the security . . . and the surest means of preventing war from reaching the shores of the United States." Secondly, "the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies."²

Roosevelt's practical answer to Churchill was the submission of a bill to Congress which would provide a program:

To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, or otherwise dispose of defense articles to the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States . . . This merchandise to be settled for as the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.³

¹ New York Post, September 9, 1940.
² Churchill, II, p. 476.
³ Excerpt from the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, as discussed by Basil Rauch, p. 295.
The isolationists immediately condemned the bill as a "blank check." Senator Burton K. Wheeler declared: "Never before has the Congress of the United States been asked by any President to violate international law ... It means war, open and complete warfare."^1

However, after a two month debate in Congress, when the final vote was taken, the measure passed by 317 to 171 in the House and by 60 to 31 in the Senate. If, as it seems reasonable to assume, Congress reflected the opinion of the country, the American people were ready to assist Britain.

Taking such action as these two examples illustrate enabled Roosevelt not only to provide more effective aid to the nation who had become America's first line of defense, but also, through the resulting massive Governmental procurement programs, he could begin marshalling his own nation's vast productive resources before the advent of an almost inevitable war.

CHAPTER III

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE: CLOSER ASSOCIATION
AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

This chapter outlines a view of the primary Anglo-American issues of the Atlantic conference, some of the processes in arriving at conference decisions, and selective impacts these decisions had upon the progressive cooperation of the two English-speaking nations in defeating the Nazis. That conference was the first of periodic personal contacts between the President and Prime Minister. It was a dynamic step in an ever growing collaboration between the two heads of government.

With the establishment of a broad framework of contacts and procedures for both Lend-Lease supply and limited military support of the British, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed in mid-1941 on the necessity for personal conversations regarding international policy. Inasmuch as the two national leaders had agreed in principle to such collaboration as was encompassed by the Lend-Lease Act, Roosevelt and Churchill were likely to be very much in accord on other courses of common action as well, such as aid to Russia, or resistance to Japanese aggression. However, personal association seemed to offer the most promise for clear understanding of, and differing approaches to mutual problems.
Harry Hopkins was responsible in some degree for bringing this face to face association to fruition. It will be remembered that he had discussed with Churchill in January 1941 the need for such a personal exchange of views between the two men. The date mentioned at that time was March or April. However, the President found it impossible to leave the country before April, and by that time the Prime Minister could not leave England because of war crises in Greece and Crete. Hence, it was not until July, while Hopkins was on his second mission to England, that early August was set as the time and Argentia Harbor in Newfoundland as the place for the Atlantic Conference.

Churchill reflected in his account:

> A conference between us would proclaim the ever closer association of Britain and the United States, would cause our enemies concern, make Japan ponder, and cheer our friends. There was also much business to be settled about American intervention in the Atlantic, aid to Russia, and our own supplies, and above all, the increasing menace of Japan.\(^1\)

Roosevelt approached the conference with firm opinions concerning what the Anglo-American relationship should be. He was also aware of the Prime Minister's desires for early American military action. Included in the President's convictions were that American production effort alone would not enable Britain to win the war. "He, Churchill, knows that to mount an offensive, he needs American troops."\(^2\) Another problem of weighty concern to Roosevelt was the matter of freedom of

\(^1\)Churchill, III, p. 427.

international trade, particularly as it was affected by Empire preference trade agreements, which had long existed. During the same conversation, from which we quoted above, Roosevelt told his son, Elliot:

"We've got to make clear to the British from the very outset that we don't intend to be . . . used to help the British Empire out of a tight spot, and then be forgotten forever. . . . America won't help England in this war, simply so she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples."

There is evidence of action to insure the presence of suitable political and military talent on each side as plans for meeting took final form. When Roosevelt learned that the British Chiefs of Staff Committee would be present, he advised the Prime Minister that he would bring Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and General Arnold. Since such representation would provide the primary "opposite numbers" on respective military staffs, Roosevelt's selections were appropriate. Later, when Churchill advised he would bring Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Roosevelt added to the American party, Under Secretary of State Summer Welles, and Averill Harriman. The latter had just returned to Washington from London where he had been sent to expedite Lend-Lease supplies to the British. Perhaps there was nothing premeditated in Roosevelt's decision to bring Harriman along, other than to have readily available the best-informed opinion; however, since the President seemed confident that the Prime Minister would urge

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1Roosevelt, p. 24.

2General Henry Arnold was in command of the United States Army air arm of that day which later became the Army Air Force. Thus, Arnold represented the United States on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as on the Combined Chiefs of Staff when that body came into being.
an immediate American declaration of war against the Nazis, Roosevelt may have deliberately planned a campaign of resistance to the Prime Minister's eloquence. Certainly, both Hopkins and Harriman were currently informed, Hopkins having arrived (with Churchill's party) from a remarkable two-day conversation with Stalin, and Harriman having recently toured British field units in Africa and the Middle East.

The business at hand was begun almost immediately on arrival of the two parties at Placentia Bay. In the afternoon of the first day, Welles and Cadogan engaged in establishing mutual understanding of major topics to be considered. The President's and Prime Minister's first meeting, before the official opening of the conference, was more for acquaintance and relaxation than anything else. Roosevelt entertained Churchill and his party at dinner that evening. Although the dinner was far from a formal conference atmosphere, it was during this time that the two leaders, and Hopkins, Welles, and Cadogan began serious discussions. Conversation was wide-ranging. However, sufficient time was spent on two main topics to insure a common basis for work by pertinent staff members. The first pertained to the growing menace of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, which the British held to be of primary concern. The second topic was the proposed joint declaration which was to become the Atlantic Charter. Detailed discussion of these subjects is taken up later in this chapter.

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1 Roosevelt, p. 24.

2 During the whirlwind visit to Moscow, Hopkins "had gained more information about Russia's strength and prospects than had ever been vouchsafed to any outsider." (Sherwood, p. 343).
Accounts indicate that Churchill held the center of attention during that first evening gathering; primarily, because Hopkins wanted the President to hear "one of Churchill's after-dinner analyses of the war situation."¹ In his eloquent manner, Churchill presented the British position, and how close to defeat his nation had actually moved. Although confident in the hardihood of his fellow citizens, he made no effort to conceal his anxiety regarding American decisions. "The Americans must come in at our side! You must come in, if you are to survive!"² When Roosevelt suggested the Russians as a factor in deterring German victory, Churchill expressed conviction that Russian resistance, though commendably sturdy and surprising, would cease in a relatively short time. The Prime Minister seems to have had two objectives at this single sitting. The first was to convince the President of the urgency in declaring war against Germany. The second was to counteract any American tendency to increase aid via Lend-Lease to Russia. Roosevelt listened but at the time made no comment in reply to Churchill's plea.

Officially, the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill began on August 11, 1941. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins, and Sumner Welles were present at the first meeting. Early in this period the Prime Minister raised the topic of Japanese military expansion in the Far East. His initial recommendation was that the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands simultaneously issue a warning to Japan that further military

¹Sherwood, p. 353.
²Roosevelt, p. 30.
expansion on her part would lead to counter measures by the three
governments named, even though such counter measures might result in
war between them and Japan. There was a corollary to this warning in-
cluded in Churchill's suggestion. It was to the effect that should
Great Britain assist the Netherlands, as a result of Japanese aggression
against the Netherlands East Indies, the President would request
Congressional authority to assist the British and Dutch in defense
against the Japanese aggression.

Both Churchill and Cadogan had already discussed the problem with
Welles and had provided him and the President copies of suggested drafts
of parallel communications along the above lines for presenting to the
Japanese government. Churchill did not think there was any other re-
maining possibility of deterring Japanese expansion farther to the south,
in which event war between Great Britain and Japan would result. Welles
has recorded Churchill's emphatic belief that "if war did break out
between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position
. . . to cut the life-lines between the British Dominions and the British
Isles unless the United States herself entered the war . . . The blow
to the British Government might be almost decisive." ¹

Both the President and Welles also felt that war with Japan should
be avoided as long as was reasonably possible. But they were reluctant
to use such a "mailed fist" approach as urged by Churchill; they thought
it might be better to provide some element of "face-saving" for the

¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941
Japanese. Therefore, rather than submit the somewhat blunt statement as proposed by the Prime Minister, they proposed to tell Japan that only withdrawal from her expansion program would justify the lifting of United States trade sanctions against her. However, the United States would, in a friendly spirit, seek to explore the possibilities for reaching a friendly understanding between the two governments. Churchill agreed to this procedure. He also concurred in the President's suggestion that the United States and Britain be prepared to advise Japan that neither the United States nor Britain had aggressive intentions with regard to Thailand. By following the above course of action, Roosevelt felt that Japanese aggression which might lead to war "could be held off for at least thirty days."\(^1\) Churchill was more optimistic, feeling that, with an expression of firm resolve to the Japanese, there was a reasonable chance for avoiding war in the Pacific altogether.

Preparation of the United States-proposed Joint Declaration was to require more time than did the discussions concerning Japan. The President was eager to issue a document that would declare the broad principles which prompted Anglo-American cooperation in the world. There would be strong political overtones in any such declaration, and these two masters of the political art applied extreme care in producing a statement which would have the desired results in respective domestic, as well as international, political circles. One example of compromise arose over Roosevelt's desire to make clear that no future commitments

\(^1\)Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 360.
had been made during the meetings. His objective was to render it impossible for isolationist elements in the United States to allege conclusion of secret agreements. Churchill understood this aspect of the President's problem, but he demurred in favor of a positive statement that discussions had been solely of "questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act."^ The President agreed with Churchill's recommended change, because he could then refer questions of secret agreements to his initial public statement.

Following this agreement on the initial statement, the two leaders turned their attention to the draft of the proposed Joint Declaration. Two points of the document were controversial in varying degree. The first concerned freedom of trade. This had been a topic of conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill during an intimate gathering the second evening of the conference. At that time, the President had emphasized his conviction that much of the backwardness in the undeveloped areas of the world was due to British Empire trade agreements, which gave England a favored position in dealing with the British Dominions and Colonies. Roosevelt had long been certain that "if we are to arrive at a stable peace, it must involve the development of backward countries . . . (and that) the structure of peace demands, and will get, equality of peoples. Equality of peoples involves the utmost freedom of competitive trade."^2 At the time of that informal discussion, Churchill had taken issue with


^Roosevelt, pp. 36-37.
the President's stand, because he felt there could be no tampering with
Empire agreements. Later, when the question was raised at the formal
session, both sides of the issue were discussed in detail. The draft of
the point in question, as presented by Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of
the United States Department of State, read as follows:

Fourth, they (the United States and Great Britain) will endeavor
to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimi-
nation and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials
of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.¹

The President and Welles voiced recognition of the adverse effect
the phrase, "without discrimination and on equal terms", might have on
British Empire preferential trade agreements. However, the phrase, "they
will endeavor to further", initiated the point; hence, there was not
implied an immediate binding obligation on the part of His Majesty's
Government. The Prime Minister indicated personal agreement with the
proposal, for he had always opposed the underlying Ottawa agreements.
He went on to point out the evils of the United States tariff walls as
well. Furthermore, both he and Cadogan agreed with Welles that phrase-
ology was not the question. Rather, the need was for "a policy of
constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the
creation of a new and better world, and that except through an agreement
upon such a policy by our two governments, there would be no hindrance
to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing . . .
trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends."²

¹Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
²Foreign Relations, I, p. 362.
However, regardless of his personal convictions, Churchill was without authority to agree upon the point as stated for inclusion in the proposed declaration. This was due to the necessity for British Government, as well as Dominion, agreement, which, if possible to obtain at all, would require so much time as to delay issuance of the declaration until after news of the meeting had been released to the world. The Prime Minister then suggested a revision in wording, approximately as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further, etc." He felt he might obtain approval from his government if such a change were made. Although Welles felt the value of the point was thus seriously reduced, if not destroyed, the President agreed to the redraft of the fourth point as recommended by Churchill.

The second point requiring resolution of differences pertained to what became point Eight in the final draft of the Joint Declaration. Although both the original American and British draft versions had included a provision for some form of international organization, the draft Roosevelt preferred omitted such reference because of the suspicions and opposition he feared such a statement would create in the United States. Churchill initially agreed to the revised text. Later, however, since he felt that some opinion in England would be disappointed at the absence of any stated intention to establish an international organization for keeping peace after the war, he proposed further modification of the text. This involved insertion of the

1Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
phrase "pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security." Roosevelt finally agreed; hence, the concluding point of the declaration read as follows:

Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic, as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten aggression outside their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Thus, the seed of the United Nations organization was first planted, not by Roosevelt but by Churchill. Point Eight in the charter, as well as the others to varying degrees, made the document historic. Although the United States and Great Britain never regarded the declaration as a formal State Paper or Treaty, through its issuance, they firmly assumed new moral responsibilities within the world. Roosevelt was eager to do just this. However, he had not felt the United States political climate was ready for a forthright statement of his desire.

The Chiefs of Staff discussions at the Atlantic Conference produced little of importance. No agenda had been prepared, and there had been no specially prepared exchange of views. The British had hoped for discussion of major problems in strategy, but the Americans, with Admiral Stark as primary spokesman, had no authority to exceed tentative agreements already made. Their main interest was in connection with

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1 Italics mine.

Lend-Lease priorities and production schedules as affected by developments on the Russian Front. In this regard, General Marshall reminded the British Chiefs of the mounting pressure upon the United States for munitions, now that Lend-Lease supplies for Russia caused a large unprogrammed and additional drain on existing production resources.¹

Since Admiral Stark at the outset requested the conference be restricted to discussions only,² he suggested that the American staff would require time to analyze the British review of the war situation. Therefore, there is little evidence of such hearty military cooperation as was enjoyed between the Chiefs of State.

However, upon return of the Chiefs of Staff to Washington, General Marshall asked the War Plans Division (WPD) to examine the British report, and to comment upon it. Several members of the WPD responded, and all who did were unanimous in their opposition to the British views. The British had stated: "The intervention of the United States would revolutionize the whole situation."³ Their rationale for such a belief included such factors as the easing of the sea-shipping losses; the ability of American forces to prevent enemy penetration in Morocco and West Africa; and the assumption that the United States could assume commitments in the Atlantic Islands. The WPD consensus can be expressed in Colonel (later General) Wedemeyer's contention that "we must not

¹Watson, p. 405.
²Watson, p. 404.
³Watson, p. 402.
become an active belligerent until we have created the means by which we can accomplish our national objectives." The staff considered that with her undeveloped army strength of those days, the United States would be of more assistance in supplying munitions.

Another British proposal had relegated the land offensive to some vague future time, following concentrated naval and air action. The latter action ostensibly would beat down German resistance to such a degree that large land forces would be unnecessary. This idea was also unacceptable to the Americans. They interpreted in the British Chiefs' review only minor attention to preparation for land operations, and instead of agreeing with the British view, emphasized that "naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost; and by weakening enemy strength, may contribute greatly to victory . . . but it should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies."2

The differences in military strategy as exemplified by the above discussion continued on a recurring basis throughout the Anglo-American collaboration until achievement of firm commitments for cross-Channel attack of Germany were eventually agreed in late 1943. Of course, there was continuing and earnest effort in both countries to compromise in the common interest. However, the military arguments, during and after the Atlantic Conference, served at least one constructive purpose. They warned the British of the strong views held in Washington, and provided

1 Watson, p. 406.
2 Watson, p. 408.
unmistakable evidence that the United States was likely to be the controlling partner in any coming alliance.

In retrospect, the primary accomplishments of the Atlantic Conference were political in nature. Most important to the success of future cooperation was that the two Chiefs of State were able to establish a deep personal relationship and firm understanding, which would be vital in the days ahead. This understanding was to enable an easy attitude in collaboration and international decision-making. Although both men may have had different objectives in mind for the declaration which became the Atlantic Charter, they mutually decided upon its content, agreed upon its implications, and appear to have tried to comply with its spirit. The degree of influence the document had on respective peoples of the world in changing the course of war-time events is impossible to assess with accuracy. However, the moral philosophy expressed bound the nations in a cause from which they never faltered until the defeat of their common enemy was assured. The move toward a Second Front had begun.
The Anglo-American parallel warnings to Japan, which Churchill recommended during the Atlantic Conference, were never made. The Prime Minister undoubtedly hoped for a strong stand by the United States against Japanese aggression.\(^1\) However, the President returned to the United States to find a middle course of warning to Japan more appropriate. This was due to recurring Japanese requests for a meeting between Roosevelt and Japanese Prime Minister Konoye, to discuss Far Eastern problems. Such meetings also failed to materialize, because the Japanese were unwilling to participate in pre-conference discussion of the fundamental principles with which such a meeting would deal. Japan's insistence on holding the meeting and leaving the "details" for later consideration created suspicion in the United States Department of State.\(^2\) Nevertheless, the record reflects consistent diplomatic effort by the United States to avoid war with Japan. The hard line was considered, as was the soft. Since a middle course was attempted, these

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\(^1\) In his account of the final conference to the British War Cabinet on 12 August 1941, he referenced the warning to Japan and concluded with "One would always fear State Department trying to tone it down; but President has promised definitely to use the hard language." (Churchill, II, p. 446).

\(^2\) Hull, II, pp. 1023-1024.

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only to have it fail, arguments for either untried extreme can be advanced. However, the reality is clear, the United States and British political and military plans for the Pacific, in existence at the close of the Atlantic Conference, were wrecked in early December 1941.

This chapter has to do with succeeding steps taken in Anglo-American cooperation during the first Washington Conference. Convened at Churchill's request, it took place during the last week of December 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. During conference deliberations, or as a result of them, Churchill's hope was realized, and decisions on grand strategy were made. Of primary concern to Roosevelt, was the firm declaration for unity among the nations allied against the Axis.

Roosevelt's primary aim was also realized by the issuance of the declaration of the United Nations. Also, agreement was reached regarding the application of unity in command for respective theaters having joint forces. Finally, it was at this conference that the Combined Chiefs of Staff became an important entity as the future executive body for the direction of the joint Anglo-American war effort, and decision was made to form the extremely vital Munitions Allocations Board. How such conference decisions were reached will be discussed and where pertinent the effect of such decisions on later cooperation will be explored.

Accounts of how Roosevelt and Churchill viewed the Japanese attack against the United States vary in detail. However, there is enough similarity in basic material to conclude that both men experienced
some feeling of relief that it had occurred. At least, now the die was cast. The firm commitment of the United States to war following the attack on Pearl Harbor solved a number of political problems for both men.

In the United States, the voices of isolationism were muted. The nation's massive production capacity could now be geared to full capacity, for production was no longer merely "a matter of aid to foreigners." Furthermore, the full development of the nation's military potential became a matter of national pride rather than a necessary evil.

Churchill could now point to the friend or partner as an ally. The two nations were no longer prevented from welding their capabilities into an effective force. In British eyes, the joint effort could best be guided by her hard experience of recent years. Churchill felt that this close merging of capabilities was even more urgent. During previous Anglo-American consultations, agreement had been reached that accounts must first be settled with Hitler in Europe. However, the violence of the Japanese attacks in the Pacific, and the disaster at Pearl Harbor raised doubts in the Prime Minister's mind that Americans would hold to the original priorities. Therefore, the foremost item on Churchill's agenda was to seek United States reaffirmation of a policy of defeat Germany first. Convinced of the necessity to pursue such a policy, Churchill and his advisory staff worked in their usual singleness of

1Robert Sherwood expresses Harry Hopkins' feelings in Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 410, "We could not have even an adequate production program until the automobile and other industries could be converted from a peacetime basis to meet the requirements of total war - until the American people as a whole, realized that production was not merely a matter of aid to foreigners, however deserving they might be, but a matter of life or death for their own sons."
purpose to prepare arguments to support this policy. At least one account reflects that Churchill's initial presentation of the subject to Roosevelt was the evening of the day he arrived in the United States.

Before the Prime Minister could bring forth his arguments, however, the President advised him of agreement: "We know them (the arguments) as well as you do. The fact is that we could beat Japan and still lose the war, but it is inconceivable that we could defeat Germany and not thereafter crush Japan."\(^1\)

This major decision of policy seems to have been easily made. It seems that Roosevelt by himself could decide the issue for his nation, now that a state of war existed. Of course this was not the case even though there was no thorough-going American political and military consultation organization in existence at that time. Although there had been some semblance of consultation between the War, Navy, and State Departments through the Standing Liaison Committee, even this committee ceased to function with any purpose after November 1940, because the President began at that time to deal directly with his chiefs of staff. He even by-passed respective Departmental Secretaries. A few officials like Harry Hopkins were normally the only persons other than the military chiefs who had access to such combined political and military discussions as the President conducted. In August 1941, the President did convene a War Council consisting of State, War, and Navy Secretaries plus the Chiefs of Staff, but this Council "hardly

\(^1\)Hatch, p. 299.
served . . . for mixing military and political views. Rather it provided the President with a platform from which to announce decisions already reached with the help of the Chiefs of Staff.¹

The decision expressed by Roosevelt to Churchill was based on extensive Anglo-American military staff conferences and such political considerations as the President wished to include. Therefore, the American military opinion that operations against Germany should have priority was in firm consonance with Roosevelt's ready agreement with Churchill. It is to be noted that there were instances where the President acted without the advice of his staff, for he liked to transact even international business on a personal basis, which sometimes led to embarrassing commitments or misunderstandings. He also had a tendency to become interested in side issues of military strategy and often might encourage courses of military action which, in the opinion of his military advisers, were dangerously divergent from a sound strategic plan. This "tangential strategy" often resulted in consternation among military staff members. Such deviation from agreed views was especially likely where sponsorship of the British cause was personally conducted by the Prime Minister, as during the Arcadia meetings, which the first Washington conference was called. The Chiefs and Departmental Secretaries often felt fortunate in being able to call upon Harry Hopkins to arrange some opportunity for persuading the President to follow through with decisions he and the Chiefs of Staff had made.

Even Hopkins was disturbed during the Arcadia meetings by the
President's inclination to accept casually some of the Prime Minister's
proposals. An incident of this sort occurred shortly after the English
visitors arrived. During an evening meeting with Churchill and some of
his advisers, Roosevelt agreed to discuss the possibility of allotting
to the British certain reinforcements originally intended for the
Philippines with the understanding that such action would take place
only if it proved impossible to get the reinforcements to General Douglas
MacArthur, who was in command of United States forces in the Pacific.
The move appeared to be practical, but it was interpreted by the United
States military staff as a British effort to write off the Philippines
in favor of Singapore. The immediate problem stemmed from the fact that
the American staff members were not appraised of the idea until the head
of the British secretariat called for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff to consider the proposal. Marshall, Arnold, and Eisenhower\(^1\)
immediately protested to Secretary of War Stimson that the President had
apparently made serious military commitments without staff advice. This,
in turn, resulted in an angry call by Stimson to Hopkins warning that
"if Roosevelt persisted in this type of decision making he would need
a new head of the War Department."\(^2\) When Hopkins found a propitious
moment to mention Stimson's concern to the two leaders, they denied that

\(^1\) At the time, Eisenhower was assigned to the Army War Plans
Division. He became Commander of the North African forces in 1942, and
was appointed Commander of Overlord in 1943 following the Cairo-Teheran
meetings.

\(^2\) Pogue, p. 265.
any such arrangement had been made. But when Stimson later read to Roosevelt extracts from a British secretary's record of the informal discussions in question, the President realized the impropriety of his action and quickly assured his military advisers that he had no intention of depriving MacArthur of men or supplies.¹

Having achieved consensus regarding the fundamental priority of defeating Germany first, Churchill could readily acquiesce to a proposal near to the President's heart. As a foundation to the future, Roosevelt had proposed that all twenty-six nations at war with the Axis accept the principles of the Atlantic Charter in a public declaration. Remembering the unhappy result of Wilson's failure to obtain international commitment while the war raged, the President wanted to obtain agreement during the period of stress and peril which existed in December 1941. Thus, the formation of the grand coalition of the Allies was among the first order of business.

Secretary of State Hull was instrumental in formulating the declaration. His Department worked out the details of the United States' draft just as they had the draft of the earlier Atlantic Charter. The first draft of the document, which was to become the Declaration of the United Nations, contained three specific points to be agreed upon by signatory nations. The first pledged the application of full governmental resources against the Axis until the latter was defeated. The second promised full cooperation to effect coordination of effort

¹Stimson Diary, 25 December 1941, as cited by Pogue, p. 266.
and resources against common enemies. The third assured that there
would be no separate armistice with the common enemy except by common
agreement of the signatory nations.

At Hull's behest, a second document was prepared which suggested
the creation of a Supreme War Council. Upon presenting this latter
document to the President, Hull said:

It seems essential to provide machinery which will effectively
coordinate the use of resources and the military effort, making
suitable allocation between theaters of war, keeping continuous
check on the execution of war plans, and if possible, achieving
unified command in theaters where this is feasible.1

Churchill has indicated that he and the President "repeating
our methods in framing the Atlantic Charter, prepared drafts of the
declaration and blended them together."2 Although the blending of their
ideas concerning the final document certainly transpired, the Prime
Minister's statement over-simplifies the process. Hopkins had some
pertinent suggestions of far-reaching significance. He felt that every
effort should be made to include religious freedom in the document.
He also made note that Russia would be reluctant to sign unless the
wording employed acknowledged that she was not at war with Japan.
Hopkins displayed remarkable sensitivity to the possible reaction of
respective allies, such as Russia and China, when he suggested that
their names be placed within the document near those of the United
States and Great Britain.3 It is revealing of the close bond between

1Hull, II, p. 1118.
3Sherwood, p. 448.
Hopkins and the President that the latter forwarded these Hopkins suggestions, as though they were his own, to Hull for incorporation within another draft of the paper.1

Secretary Hull and appropriate members of his staff incorporated the suggestions and discussed the amended document with British Ambassador Halifax prior to a conference between the President, the Prime Minister, and themselves that same evening (December 27, 1941). Halifax agreed with Hull that the provision in the document for a Supreme War Council was appropriate. Since Roosevelt and Churchill were not in agreement that such a council should be formed at the time, that provision was set aside. The remaining provisions were then handed to the Russian Ambassador, Litvinov, for comment by his Government.

Churchill had wished to substitute for the phrase "the governments signatory hereto" the word "authorities". His purpose was to permit the inclusion of the Free French, and although neither Hull nor the President wished to take the Free French into the fold in place of the Vichy government, the President had overruled Hull's arguments and agreed to the word "Authorities". Litvinov refused the change, because "the approval of the Declaration was an approval by the Government in contradistinction to the Foreign Office, and no ambassador of Russia has the power to agree to any textual change."2 Although Litvinov then cabled his Government for approval, which was granted, the agreement must

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1 Hull's account in his Memoirs, II, 1120, reflects these Hopkins recommendations as though they were the President's words. Hull gives no credit for them to Hopkins. Hence, I think he was unaware of Hopkins' part in this instance.

2 Sherwood, p. 449.
have arrived too late, for the word "Authorities" did not appear in the published Declaration. The changes in the text requested by Russia were negligible and apparently were due to her reluctance even to imply any sort of commitment against Japan.

All Russian revisions were accepted, including even her wish to substitute for the words "the defeat of members of adherants of the Tripartite Pact" the phrase "the struggle for victory over Hitlerism." The Soviet ambassador justified the latter by telling Hull "the word 'Hitlerism' with his country includes Nazism, Fascism, and Japanism."\(^1\)

That Russia's suggestions were so readily accepted is significant. For even at this early stage in relations, Roosevelt was beginning to woo Stalín's support in arranging for peace keeping capability.

By the time major revisions had been made, the Declaration of the United Nations contained two points rather than the three Cordell Hull had originally submitted to the President. They read as follows:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.\(^2\)

On the first day of the new year, 1942, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and China signed the document. The signatures for the remaining twenty-two nations, aligned against the Axis were affixed during the following day, and the United Nations Organization

\(^{1}\)Hull, II, p. 1122.

\(^{2}\)Hull, II, p. 1124.
was born. Although the signatory nations were in fundamental agreement, the objectives of Great Britain and the United States, at least, were at variance. Roosevelt was:

Serving notice that his nation would not agree to the establishment of spheres of influence, alliances, and all the other trappings of traditional diplomacy after the conclusion of the war. The President wanted to pave the way for United States leadership of a new organization of countries which would replace power politics.¹

Churchill, on the other hand, was intent on protecting British interests in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Asia. His search was still for victory. He seemed to feel, at least initially, that the British could now draw on the United States manpower and weapons as if these had been swept into a common pool for campaigns tailored to suit the interests and convenience of Great Britain. As indicated in his account of the deliberations, "the issuance of a declaration could not by itself win battles, but it set forth who we were and what we were fighting for."² Hence, he certainly had no objection to the declaration of purpose, even though his purpose might differ from that of Roosevelt.

Although decisions on grand strategy and proclamations of Allied unity were important results of the Arcadia meetings, the military staffs brought into being an equally important command arrangement for waging war by the two allies. This was in two parts: First, was an agreement by the two nations that the forces in each theater would be commanded by a supreme staff in accordance with the principle of unified

¹Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy: Beyond Utopianism and Realism (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1966), p. 73.

command. Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each nation would serve as a Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct the entire military course of the war. Such an arrangement would permit complete exchange of information between both national staffs and insure coordination at all major planning and operational activities. Churchill has suggested that future historians may consider this setting up of unified control as the most valuable result of the December 1941 meetings.\(^1\) Certainly, it was the most important from the military point of view.

General Marshall was the most firm advocate of unity in command. To his lot fell the burden of convincing not only the British, but also the United States Navy as well. His first opportunity to speak for the appointment of a single commander in a theater of operations was December 25, 1941, and was with reference to the Pacific theater. He contended that "only a commander responsible for the whole theater could decide the question of allocation of defense forces . . . We cannot manage by cooperation . . . If we can make a plan for unified command, now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles."\(^2\) He soon realized that by failing to prepare conference representatives for such close international cooperation, he might have jeopardized its acceptance. Admiral Stark was noncommittal. The British were unwilling to discuss the matter without sounding out the Prime Minister. Therefore, the next day, Marshall outlined his plan of command to Secretary of War Stimson and obtained enthusiastic concurrence. Following this, the two men obtained presidential approval and presented the detailed outline to a special meeting

\(^1\)Churchill, III, p. 686.
\(^2\)Pogue, p. 276.
with Navy Department representatives. Although there was some reluctance, Marshall's arguments won agreement. With his position now clearly outlined and supported by the President and the Navy, Marshall resumed his plea to the British Chiefs of Staff.

This time the meeting ended on a happy note with the combined staffs agreeing to the preparation of a directive for consideration by the President and Prime Minister. The latter had strong doubts that one man could effectively command such widely scattered forces as might be in the Pacific and offered a counter-proposal that each service choose its own commander and report to a Supreme War Council in Washington.¹ Lord Beaverbrook, Churchill's production minister, favored the unity proposal and quietly suggested to Hopkins that he, Hopkins, discuss the details with Churchill. The result was a private discussion arranged by Hopkins between Marshall and Churchill, whereupon Churchill summoned his Chiefs of Staff for study of the proposal. On December 28, he impressed the British War Cabinet with the urgency of this decision in the eyes of the President and told them that "General Marshall visited me at my request and pleaded the case with great conviction."² Later in the day, Churchill strongly endorsed the proposal.

The idea of a Supreme Commander in the field was followed by the conception of unity of staff for direction of the entire war effort. The British had indicated early in the discussions their willingness to

¹Hull suggested this procedure when he presented the draft of the Declaration of the United Nations to Roosevelt and Churchill. This may be the source of Churchill's idea.

²Churchill, III, p. 674.
having a single council sitting in Washington. Their original idea had been to have special appointees represent the London-based Chiefs of Staff. Since Marshall was opposed to additional levels of authority between service chiefs and political heads, he recommended delay in establishing "some sort of council." This time, it was the United States Navy in the person of Chief of Operations, Admiral King, who insisted on firm action now. King's reasoning was that unity of command in the Pacific demanded agreement by both the Americans and the British on the control organization. The result was that the conference accepted a British proposal for stationing in Washington a Joint Staff Mission to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in regular meetings with their American counterparts. Thus, the military representatives established the committee called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which directed Anglo-American strategy until the war's end. This entity became a major means of resolving strong strategic differences which later arose between the British and American military planners. Its formation had additional impact on the war effort in that it forced the establishment of a formal American Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President's direct advisory group. Secretary Stimson was especially glad to see that turn of events, for in his view "this formal organization of the staffs had . . . a most salutary effect on the President's weakness for snap decisions."¹

With the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allies provided central management for war planning and operation, but a similar management function for supply and logistics was also needed if efficient.

¹Stimson and Bundy, p. 414.
production was to be properly coordinated with operational needs. The machinery selected took the form of the Munitions Assignment Board, which came under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but which had offices in both Washington and London. For months before the Arcadia conference the British had been seriously alarmed over American failure to decide on an orderly method of allocating munitions to the military services of the United States and the Associated Powers. They were just as concerned over the delay in developing an industrial program that would insure the production needed for victory. As Churchill's Minister of Production, Lord Beaverbrook favored a committee under Hopkins to handle all problems of production - "a Supreme Command in supplies as well as in strategy."¹ As early as August 1941, Marshall and Stark, also much concerned, had tried without success to place the allocation of military material under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President attempted to solve the problem by appointing Hopkins, Marshall, and Stark as members of a Strategic Munitions Board to establish an appropriate program for allocating munitions to the United States and to countries receiving defense aid. But they had held no formal meetings before the Arcadia Conference and seem never to have met thereafter.²

Allocation of supplies is as vital to carrying out grand strategy as is the deployment of men and machines. Therefore, with Allies were

¹Sherwood, p. 470.
anxious to achieve some manageable procedure. Negotiations took place at both political and military levels of authority during the conference. Discussions were heated and for a time it appeared that agreement might not be reached.

The British had arrived in Washington with fairly definite ideas about Anglo-American cooperation in the field of production and supply, and they had an elaborate organizational plan for putting their ideas into practice. However, the sharp disagreement experienced prior to the final decision in favor of a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee caused the visitors to proceed slowly when the matter of production allocation came up for discussion. Furthermore, the British staff recognized the heavy administrative burden their original plan might place on any acceptable combined body. Therefore, General Macready of the British staff proposed an alternate plan. He and his opposite number on the United States staff, General Moore, had already agreed on the primary elements of the suggestion. The plan proposed by these two men called for pooling British and American production, which would then be divided in bulk between two Allocation Committees, one located in London and one in Washington, each serving a group of countries.

That sharp differences ensued is understandable, for such a system as proposed would essentially divide the world into two spheres of influence, with the United States and Great Britain each supporting the needs of the Allies for whom respectively they had accepted responsibility. The word "proteges" was used to describe the sponsored Allies. The United States proteges would include Latin American countries and China, and the British proteges would include France and other countries of
continental Europe, Turkey, the Arab states, and the British Dominions and colonies. Decisions affecting the distribution of supplies as between one Ally and another, or one neutral and another, might assume considerable diplomatic significance. Under a divided source of supply, individual smaller nations would tend to become firmly oriented (politically as well as practical) toward the nation which was the source of supply. This offered the potential of forming a British sphere of influence through the flow of United States produced supplies. Therefore, "few propositions could have been devised that would more quickly arouse American suspicions that the British were planning to use United States supplies to serve purely national interests."\(^1\) Marshall insisted that control would be exercised only by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from Washington. He felt that "nothing but confusion would follow from trying to create duplicate bodies."\(^2\) Field Marshall Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, agreed with Marshall, but pointed out that a decision had to be made on some system for control of supply and allocation of war material. He suggested, therefore, that the Americans join the British Staff in signing a draft resolution to the effect that finished war material should be allocated in accordance with strategic needs and that control of both London and Washington Allocation Committees would rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshall agreed, and the other American staff members reluctantly joined him in signing

\(^1\)Pogue, p. 286.

the resolution. This resolution ended the military side of the negotiations and the results were submitted to the President and the Prime Minister.

Simultaneously with the discussions conducted by the Chiefs of Staff, Hopkins and Beaverbrook were also considering the problems of production and its allocation. Early in the conference sessions, Hopkins had recommended a two man Board for the task of allocating war materials. He envisioned one American and one British representative. Such a board would be at the highest level of authority. Churchill was inclined to agree with this approach when he discussed it with his staff. His immediate purpose was assurance that the Americans would share fairly with the British. Beaverbrook favored a supreme command over supplies as well as strategy. The ideas merged toward the end of political deliberations in a proposal which Roosevelt handed Marshall only a few minutes before British and American representatives filed into the President's White House Office for the last meeting of the conference. The proposal would set up boards under Hopkins and Beaverbrook independent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, one in London and one in Washington. With only Hopkins and Roosevelt present, Marshall reiterated his views that the military must control military supplies and that if this view were not accepted, "he could not continue to assume responsibilities of Chief of Staff." Hopkins agreed with Marshall to the extent that "if the

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1 Pogue, p. 286.
2 Gwyer, p. 397.
3 Sherwood, p. 472.
organization were not established as Marshall said it should be, he could not assume responsibility in it either.\textsuperscript{1}

In the conference with Churchill and his staff which followed, the President presented the General's case, and both Marshall and Hopkins repeated their arguments. When Churchill and Beaverbrook debated the question, pointing to the possibility of disagreements, Hopkins suggested that in case of disputes, appeal could be made to the President and Prime Minister. With some reluctance, Churchill agreed to try the arrangement for a month, and Roosevelt quickly closed the bargain with "We shall call it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way."\textsuperscript{2} Although far from perfect, this was the best solution circumstances would allow, and the arrangement continued in force with very little alteration until the end of the war. Sherwood's summation concerning the Munitions Boards is appropriate: "The disputes which resulted produced minor irritations, but no serious discord. Hopkins usually moved in on these and his decision was accepted as final.\textsuperscript{3}

The Arcadia conference was a success for all participants. Churchill could look with satisfaction on the accomplishments achieved. His primary objective in asking for the meeting, reaffirmation of a Germany first strategy, had been met. Further, he had little reason to doubt that, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in existence, England would be able to draw her fair share from American production

\textsuperscript{1} Sherwood, p. 472.

\textsuperscript{2} Sherwood, p. 472.

\textsuperscript{3} Sherwood, p. 473.
and use it essentially in such a manner as the Minister of Defense might wish. Therefore, progress toward Churchill's broad goal of victory had been advanced.

The President was also in a position to view with satisfaction the Arcadia results. Not only did the United States now officially share a common cause with twenty-five other nations of the world, but one of these, Russia, might well be a key to complete success in effecting post-war peace efforts. It was also evident, in the light of British agreement to Washington control of war production, that Roosevelt had the final word and Washington was the headquarters for the joint war effort. As a result, he was almost assured of Great Britain's support in his post-war hopes. Surely, these three nations could police the world until such time as a truly competent international body could be established to maintain world peace.

Finally, the military leaders on both sides could join their political leaders in a feeling of satisfaction following the conference. They were essentially in agreement on immediate strategy. Furthermore, the American proposal for unity in command had found agreement, and a means for central strategic management of the war had been designed. Leaders from both nations very likely could forecast differences in opinion before many months elapsed. But as the conference ended, a sense of solid purpose in a common endeavor was evident, and a valuable step toward even closer cooperation had been taken.
CHAPTER V

THE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE:
STRATEGIC DIVERSION - NORTH AFRICA

Within a month after the British visitors had returned home from the Arcadia conference, military developments in Europe and the Far East put all the hard-won agreements under severe strain. The Japanese war machine was moving with such speed and confidence that both nations developed concern for the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand, not to mention the Philippines and Singapore. The reinforced Germans in North Africa were delivering staggering blows to the British forces there. The American military establishment was now overwhelmed with money, men, and authority to build an army, navy, and air force, but time was at a premium and production was still insufficient to meet the many needs. In Britain, Churchill was criticized for a variety of things, including his lengthy stay at the Arcadia meetings. About the only source of good news was the Russian Front where the Red Army was making counterattacks.

This chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the American effort to offset the above conditions, and to expedite the application of its force as soon as, and in the most direct way possible against Germany. Problems arose primarily because the strategy advocated by the Americans in this effort was in almost direct opposition to that argued by Churchill and staff. Therefore, the cooperation pledged at the Arcadia conference
received early testing. The rationale for decisions made is also of special interest to us at this time. Although these decisions were predominantly military and pertained to strategy, the deciding factors were political, and the strain caused by these decisions extended throughout the Anglo-American staffs for the remainder of the war.

Hitler's attack on Russia in mid-1941 had taken some of the pressure off Britain, insofar as danger of invasion was concerned. However, Russia exerted a steadily increasing pressure on both Britain and the United States to furnish supplies in kind and quantity not readily available. Both Roosevelt and Churchill concurred in support of the Russian demands to the extent possible. Although there are indications that Churchill retained some reservations concerning lasting British unity with Stalin, he made it clear that Britain would support Russia against the Nazi attack.

Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe . . . That is our policy and our declaration. It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.¹

Roosevelt could not at the time publicly make such a blanket offer, because his nation might not agree. However, he used his authority and influence in every way possible to comply with Russian demands on United States production, and eventually was able to bring Russia under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act.² In the early months of 1942, when Russia


was the sole successful challenger to German force, the President gave top priority to assistance to Russia even at the expense of equipping his own armed forces and of aid to Britain. Thus, it is certain that both these national leaders were in accord concerning the need and desire to support the USSR. In spite of this earnest effort, however, the combination of German U-boat attacks on shipping, and demands for defense against Japan combined to reduce the amount of materials actually delivered to Russia. Hence, as Russian forces were fighting with backs toward the Soviet capital, Stalin was insultingly vocal in his demands for a Second Front.

The Red dictator's attitude was often cause for disgust and chagrin on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill. For although he had given lip service adherence to the Atlantic Charter, and had authorized the signing of the Declaration of the United Nations, his conversation with Anthony Eden during the latter's mission to Moscow in December, 1941, lacked the elements of true cooperation. At that time he disclosed his ambitions concerning the post-war settlement. He told Eden he would demand: "... dismemberment of Germany; extension of the Russian boundary 150 miles into Poland; a Soviet hegemony in the Baltic and Balkans."\(^1\) Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed in the way these Russian political demands should be handled. Churchill wanted documented Russian agreement on such things as disputed national boundaries and extent of "Soviet hegemony" while Russia was on the defensive, dependent upon Western aid, and anxious for the Second Front. The Prime Minister felt

\(^1\)Brandon, p. 74.
that Stalin would agree to a more reasonable course of action while he was dependent upon the British and Americans for supplies. Roosevelt, on the other hand, insisted that territorial type questions be delayed until peace deliberations. The President genuinely wished for nations to comply with the terms of the Atlantic Charter, whereas, Churchill had no compunctions about making "deals" if they would lead to victory. In spite of disagreement about post-war methodology, however, both were anxious and eager to provide a Second Front or its equivalent. But the place and procedure for launching it were in question as the two nations wrestled with their several problems.

The American war planners and Departmental Secretaries also desired early action in the direction of a Second Front. Their reasons were justifiably military in nature. Stimson felt "... that the absence of such a (detailed operational) plan was a serious weakness; without it there could be no firm commitment that could prevent a series of diversionary shipments of troops and supplies to other areas more immediately threatened."^ At the White House, Stimson advocated "... sending an overwhelming force to the British Isles and threatening an attack through France."^ Soon after this expression, his view was confirmed by Chief of War Plans Division, Brigadier General Eisenhower, who said:

We've got to go to Europe and fight - and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world - and still worse - wasting time. If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.\(^3\)

^Stimson and Bundy, pp. 415-416.

^Stimson Diary, March 5, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy, p. 416.

\(^3\)Pogue, p. 304.
Such was the position taken by all the President's advisers. Their advice was soon supported by Marshall who presented a plan to the President on April 1, 1942. The latter approved it for immediate presentation to the British in London by Marshall and Hopkins. Known in American circles as the Marshall memorandum, this plan became the basis for the much discussed cross-Channel operation, thereafter advocated by the Americans. Proposed as the first major offensive by the United States and Great Britain, the operation was to begin in April, 1943, and would involve the landing of sizeable forces in France. The Americans chose France as the locale for initiating the first United States field action against Hitler because of the space thus provided for full development of Anglo-American combined land and air resources. Further, action there would provide a solid Second Front in support of the beleaguered Russians. The British were "... relieved by the evident strong American intention to intervene in Europe, and to give the main priority to the defeat of Hitler. This had always been the foundation of our strategic thought."\(^1\)

As an "emergency" action only, the American proposal also included an alternative, greatly reduced, plan that if initiated at all would take place in late summer or autumn of 1942. Although the Americans offered the smaller scale plan, only for use in the event Russia could not hold out, there were additional reasons for its having been designed. One was to provide battle experience for Americans in preparation for the big event in 1943. Another was to insure that, if there was to be combined action anywhere in 1942, it would be in a theater of the main strike and

\(^1\)Churchill, III, p. 316.
diversion of forces thus would be avoided. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with the outlines for cross-Channel action in 1943, but they warned that 1942 was another matter, which would have to be governed by developments in Russia.\(^1\) Both Churchill and Alanbrooke withheld expression of their true feelings.\(^2\) The result was that Marshall and Hopkins returned to the United States thinking the British were in complete agreement. The evident misunderstanding was most unfortunate for the reason given by Lord Ismay: "... when we had to tell them ..., that we were absolutely opposed to it, they felt we had broken faith with them."\(^3\) But an even more troublesome result was Roosevelt's implied pledge to Stalin that a Second Front would be created in Europe in 1942.\(^4\)

One reason for this pledge stemmed from Roosevelt's principal wartime objective: to obtain active Soviet participation in the United Nations organization after the war was won.\(^5\) The President had the utmost confidence in his capacity to charm Stalin out of his design for Russian expansion and World Communism. Therefore, he more than ever wanted to provide Stalin with timely and positive American support. In this way,

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\(^1\)Pogue, p. 318.

\(^2\)Alanbrooke was not impressed with the strategy involved and felt Marshall's main purpose in advocating the 1942 plan was to fit political opinion (at home) and the desire to help Russia. (Arthur Bryant, Turn of the Tide (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 288-299.


\(^4\)Pogue, p. 327.

\(^5\)Brandon, p. 73.
some sense of appreciation by Stalin might foster a personal relationship, which would permit the charm to work. George Kennan has expressed disappointment at Roosevelt's attitude by saying:

... FDR's evident conviction that Stalin, while perhaps a somewhat difficult customer, was only, after all, a person like any other person; that ... we hadn't been able to get along with him ... (because) we had never really had anyone with the proper personality and the proper qualities of sympathy and imagination to deal with him, ... that if only he could be exposed to the persuasive charm of someone like FDR himself, ideological preconceptions would melt and Russia's cooperation with the West could be easily arranged. For these assumptions, there were no grounds whatever; and they were of a puerility that was unworthy of a statesman of FDR's stature.

Kennan's conviction notwithstanding, Roosevelt certainly implied a commitment to Stalin at a time when Churchill's emissary, Admiral Mountbatten, was enroute to the United States for the express-purpose of insisting that any 1942 cross-Channel attack would be a mistake. A prior message to Roosevelt from Churchill announced Mountbatten's visit and forecast difficulties in the 1942 cross-Channel plans. In closing his message to Roosevelt, Churchill said, "We must never let Gymnast (a plan for invading North Africa) pass from our minds." The Prime Minister then secured his position with the British War Cabinet by obtaining their firm refusal to commit England to the controversial 1942 cross-Channel action. In this way, when Molotov stopped in London enroute to Russia, after his visit with the President, Churchill was able to inform the Russian Foreign Minister that the British were definitely not committed to the

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kind of Second Front implied by Roosevelt. Such deliberate action by one Ally to forestall the intentions of another would have overtaxed to the breaking point the patience of smaller men.

Having refused to support what he considered to be an unwise American proposal for 1942 cross-Channel action, Churchill was anxious to explain his position to the President. Although Mountbatten had already explained all the ramifications of such an attack and why the British were reluctant to proceed with it, the Prime Minister was never one to leave vital actions unresolved. Just as Marshall and Stimson were eager to establish a plan for early action, so did Churchill and his staff want combined action in 1942. However, they wished to take such action where it would stand the greatest chance of success and at the same time possibly support an action already in progress. This rationale brought the Prime Minister on his second journey to Washington in mid-June 1942.

It is notable that, when Mountbatten was talking to Roosevelt and Hopkins, no points pertaining to professional military planning seem to have been raised. Certainly, there were no military planners present to pose appropriate questions. The same procedure appears to have been followed when Churchill put in his appearance in late June 1942. He proceeded immediately to Hyde Park, where he met with Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins. The British Chiefs of Staff, who had accompanied the Prime Minister to the United States, were routed to Washington to confer

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2 Wedemeyer, p. 139.
with the American Chiefs. As an example of the existing divergence in opinion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were deciding against a Northwest Africa invasion even as Churchill was praising its possibilities at Hyde Park. The Combined Staff recommendation was against "any other peripheral operation that would divert attention from Bolero (the build up for cross-Channel in 1943). Any plan, however, would be preferable to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base organization, lines of sea communications, and air strength." However, what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to say never was presented at Hyde Park. Churchill's account supports the conclusion that he had long since ceased to consider the American 1942 action as the contingency or desperation measure it always had been. Rather, in his mind, Americans considered what originally had been an emergency plan, as now being a firm commitment. But he was convinced of the plan's weakness for reasons he presented as questions: "... Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required?" While these questions were being asked, there were no professional soldiers, British or American, present. Therefore, there was nobody present qualified to answer properly the Prime Minister's expressions of doubt. In reality, there may have been valid answers for the posed rhetorical questions. Several writers have recorded well-documented

1Wedemeyer, p. 148.

2Pogue, p. 330.
counter-arguments to the Prime Minister's objections. However, at the
time, and under the circumstances, he was very effective in bringing
Roosevelt around to his point of view. American military leaders viewed
the Prime Minister's performance as a deliberate stratagem to shake the
confidence of the American political leaders in their military staff,
since he used only military reasons to support his argument. No mention
was made of political or economic objectives as he built his case. In
any event, although he may have embittered some American military men,
Churchill very effectively accomplished his purpose at the time.

Some accounts give Churchill full credit for winning Roosevelt
over to the North African course of action. Others refer to Stimson's
belief that the President always was attracted to a North African
campaign. The latter appears to be more nearly accurate when con­
sideration is given to the extended activity in the French African Empire
by Robert Murphy of the State Department. When the French-German
armistice had been signed in June, 1939, Hitler had agreed that the
French-African empire would not be occupied by German troops. Rather,
it would be semi-independent. Murphy has reported that Roosevelt was
intrigued by this situation and "... believed that North Africa was
the most likely place where French troops might be brought back into the
was against Nazi Germany." As a result, from September, 1940, until the

1 General Wedemeyer is one of these. He "... ventures a long be­
lated reply", in his Wedemeyer Reports, 145-146. Also see Samuel Eliot
Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1958),
pp. 36-45.

2 "... it was the President's great secret baby." (Stimson and
Bundy, p. 425).

3 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday and
fall of 1942, Murphy was on the spot in either Africa, Vichy France, or
the Iberian Peninsula. He kept the President fully informed concerning
French-African activities and was a chief architect of the French North
African collaboration throughout the period of the North African campaign.
Thus, "French African policy of the United States Government became the
President's personal policy. He initiated it, he kept it going, and he
resisted pressures against it."1

In addition to such factors as discussed above, immediate events
also had a bearing favorable to Churchill in gaining Roosevelt's, as well
as Marshall's softening toward North Africa. At the height of their
argument, Tobruk fell. The necessity for maintaining their sea lanes and
communications with empire, and the importance of the Middle East to the
success of such an effort was understandably uppermost in the minds of
the British. Therefore, with the loss of Tobruk to the Germans, talks on
strategy had to give way to the more urgent needs of filling the gaps in
the Middle East force. Churchill's already well-stated opposition to the
1942 cross-Channel venture was now bolstered, and he "... poured out
his matchless prose ... in favor of Gymnast as a means of relieving the
crisis in the Mediterranean."2 However, regardless of the strong British
arguments and the sympathetic Presidential and military support of British
forces then fighting in Africa, there was no actual revision at that time
of plans for the major 1943 cross-Channel undertaking.

1Murphy, p. 68.

2Sherwood, p. 592.
The immediate though tentative decision, which came from these meetings, was that the build-up of forces in England would continue in accordance with plans for the 1943 cross-Channel operation, and that a firm decision regarding the 1942 action would be made following a review not later than September, 1942. However, Churchill had sown the seed of the North African idea during that June visit, and in spite of American strategic arguments to the contrary, his contentions carried the day. The final decision was made in July after Roosevelt sent Marshall, King, and Hopkins to London "... to ... come to some final agreement with the British."

The President arranged for this presidential representative contact with Churchill in July when he saw how serious was the disagreement between the British and American military leaders. Most indications were that the British would not agree to a 1942 cross-Channel attack. Knowing this, and having programmed equipment and troops for the 1942 possibility, Marshall and King began to consider seriously diverting the primary United States military effort to the Pacific. Marshall later said he was bluffing in order to prod the British into action. But King was serious and consistently advocated action in the Pacific theater in every way open to him.

Marshall advised the President by memorandum in early July that the United States Staff was considering a shift in favor of the Pacific alternative:

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1Stimson and Bundy, p. 424.
2Pogue, p. 341.
If the United States is to engage in any other operation than forceful, unswerving adherence to Bolero (build-up for cross-Channel invasion) plans, we are definitely of the opinion that we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against Japan; in other words, assume a defensive attitude against Germany, except for air operations; and use all available means in the Pacific.  

When pressed by the President for a full statement of the Pacific alternative, the service chiefs admitted that details were incomplete and that the proposed alternative would not improve the strategic situation. However, Stimson justified the desirability of the threat contained in Marshall's memorandum, as being "absolutely essential... if we expected to get through the hides of the British."  

The President may have agreed that drastic statements might be necessary to move the British staff. However, he was well aware that leaving Britain in the lurch would not further his nation's cause. Therefore, he firmly rejected the Pacific idea and indicated that the direction of primary military effort must remain toward Germany. Further, he refused to take part in arbitrary threats during discussions with the British.  

In preparation for the journey to England, Hopkins made notes of Roosevelt's thoughts concerning the action to which the United States should agree. These notes were the basis for the, final orders the party took with them to England. The President wanted very much to execute the plan for a 1942 cross-Channel invasion of France. "Such an operation

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1Pogue, p. 340.

2Stimson Diary, July 15, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy, p. 425.
would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year.\(^1\) However, if investigation of governing factors revealed insufficient support for the plan and the British definitely refused to agree to it, "I want you to . . . determine upon another place for United States troops to fight in 1942."\(^2\) That United States ground forces must fight German forces somewhere in 1942 was uppermost in Roosevelt's mind for political reasons. He would certainly gain no respect from Stalin if he permitted nearly a year to pass with no worthwhile action to relieve German pressure against Russia. Furthermore, an off year national election was scheduled for November, and his own people would be highly critical of inaction against the enemy. His military staff had already demonstrated the need for a firm program of action against which to prepare. Finally, he was obligated to early initiation of the British comradeship-in-arms; an equivalent to the already successful collaboration in plans and supply.

The President recognized the several pressures upon Churchill which mitigated against a decision for the strike against Germany. The period of decision was indeed trying on the Prime Minister's patience, for when the latter returned home from the June, 1942 meetings, he faced serious domestic political problems. Following the military disasters in Libya, the making of a revolt in the House of Commons developed, and Churchill's government faced another vote of censure. Even though he was supported heavily by the vote, the Prime Minister had to exercise extreme caution.

\(^1\)Sherwood, p. 604.

\(^2\)Sherwood, p. 604.
in committing large bodies of British force to any "sacrifice" operation, which he feared the 1942 cross-Channel action to be. His tenuous political situation demanded a victory. Further, his enthusiastic optimism, as a result of the United States entry into the war demanded that any initial Anglo-American military enterprise be an overwhelming success. Hence, when these points were added to the course of military action already advocated by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister had little choice other than to refuse Marshall's plea for 1942 cross-Channel action.

Prior to the American party's arrival, Field Marshall Dill, who by this time was the senior representative of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington, advised Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, that Marshall felt the British had provided no real drive behind the European project. Dill suggested that the British must in some way show their determination to defeat the Germans. Such warnings were of little value, however, for the British were already certain they faced a divided delegation. "Hopkins is for operating in Africa, Marshall wants to operate in Europe, and King is determined to stick to the Pacific," Alanbrooke wrote even before the party arrived.1 Furthermore, Roosevelt had already let it be known that American forces had to be in action somewhere before the Year's end. Therefore, if the British stood firm against the 1942 cross-Channel attack, the Americans would accede to British designs for an invasion of North Africa.

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1Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 341.
In accordance with the President's request, Marshall made certain of the views of his representatives in London before talking either to the Prime Minister or to the British Staff. Eisenhower and his associated were not unanimous in predicting success for the cross-Channel operation, but they thought an operation to seize the Cotentin Peninsula (of which the Cherbourg Peninsula is a part) had possibilities. They felt it might be held as a bridgehead on the continent until the larger 1943 action could be mounted. Since such an operation would have as its objective a "permanent" lodgment on the Continent, which Churchill insisted upon, there was momentary optimism among the Americans that their Ally might accept that part of the 1942 proposal. The optimism was short lived, however, for the British Chiefs of Staff believed "maintaining a lodgment" would be impossible. Alanbrooke recalled that "I had to convince them that there was no hope of such a bridgehead surviving the winter." Hence, the impasse remained.

Marshall made a final plea in order to salvage his main goal of the large 1943 landing in France. For without this as a planning objective, he would be faced again with all the pressures for diversion of forces and material he had experienced for the previous year. The Prime Minister did not himself agree with Marshall's plan, but he brought the proposal before a formal meeting of the War Cabinet, and unanimously the members voted down any cross-Channel operation for 1942. Realizing "... that a North African invasion was the only operation that would

1Sherwood, p. 608.

2Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 342.
have the full support of both the President and the Prime Minister,"¹
Marshall and King began plans for Gymnast, rechristened Torch. Hopkins
quickly advised Roosevelt that the North African campaign would be the
American Staff's choice of alternatives and urged the President to set a
date for mounting the attack not later than October 30, 1942. He said,
"What I fear most is that if we do not now make a firm decision on
Gymnast and fix a reasonably early date, there may be procrastinations
and delay."² The suspense date may well have had another stimulus, for
the election previously mentioned took place the first week in November.

In any event, Roosevelt complied with Hopkins' suggestion and told
Churchill of his delight "that the decision had been made and that orders
were now full speed ahead."³ There were further United States Staff
attempts to change the President's mind about the North African campaign.
Moreover, disagreement between British and American staffs over the time
and place of landings in North Africa was cause for vast confusion and
uncertainty during the month of August. However, the President's original
decision was final, and he made it plain that he would tolerate no un-
necessary delay in mounting the campaign. This is evident by his asking
the Combined Chiefs of Staff to tell him on August 4 the earliest date
when landing could take place.⁴

¹Wedemeyer, p. 161.
²Sherwood, p. 611.
³Sherwood, p. 612.
During the few months covered by this chapter, the Anglo-American leaders moved from the stage of declarations and agreements to the stage of action and adjustment - adjustment to each other as well as adjustment in those earlier agreements. The Arcadia meetings had concluded with general consensus on the strategy for dealing with Germany and supporting Russia. However, Roosevelt's eagerness to please Stalin by precipitately implying a Second Front in 1942 might well have alienated Churchill, were the latter not determined to use all possible American help in achieving his goal of victory. As events developed, Churchill used the Russian trap, which Roosevelt had set for himself, to force 1942 American military action in the area desired by the British. If Roosevelt's demand for action in 1942 was to have substance, the Prime Minister was quick in pointing to the locale for such action - North Africa. In the eyes of the President's military staff, the North African campaign was sadly deficient as an aid to Stalin; would do little to hasten Germany's defeat; and promised to delay interminably victory-producing action in the Pacific. It was fairly obvious that Allied differences in strategy would surely arise again. However, with the decision made, even the American Staff could agree with their commander-in-chief in his statement to Churchill following the decision for Torch: "... the past week represented a turning point in the whole war and ... now we are on our way shoulder to shoulder."1

1Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 347.
CHAPTER VI

MIDWAR CONFERENCES: THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE

General Marshall remarked in one instance that in war time, political necessity demands at least one especially important military move every year. Operation Torch was the 1942 move. The action was clearly successful, and just as the American Chiefs of Staff had predicted, once combined force was committed to the Mediterranean area, the British pressed for its continuation there as part of their original strategy for defeating Germany. The Americans stoutly resisted further build up in force for expansion of action into southern Europe and pressed instead for a massive cross-Channel invasion of France at the earliest possible date. To pursue both courses of action simultaneously was impossible. The existing military forces simply were not adequate to support both of these theaters of action.

Strong differences in strategic opinion between British and American military leaders continued as the source of their major problems in cooperation throughout 1943. These differences sometimes attained such proportions that only through summit conferences could agreement and final decision be reached in a timely manner.

\footnote{Marshall mentioned this as a lesson he learned in 1942, following the presidential decision to invade North Africa. (Samuel Eliot Morison, \textit{American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II} (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 23).}
Discussion of how such strategic policy evolved and the factors involved in achieving the necessary cooperation are the objectives of this chapter. Some of the decisions reached at Casablanca are pertinent to our study and are first in the order of discussion. It will then be necessary to move through this midwar period to several succeeding conferences before firm dates are agreed and plans are approved for the much discussed cross-Channel invasion or Second Front.

After Casablanca, the Trident conference was held in Washington during May 1943 and was immediately followed by Churchill's and General Marshall's visit to Eisenhower's North African Headquarters. Within two months from that visit, Quebec was the host city for the Quadrant deliberations. Finally, after some indecision and diversionary planning, which threatened to negate decisions made at Quadrant, a firm course of action was decided at Teheran, when Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin conferred in person for the first time.

Although agreement on military strategy was the main Anglo-American objective of these midwar conferences, progress toward the realization of respective national goals was apparent, and political motivation began to emerge with increased clarity. The latter was expected, of course, for the chiefs of the two collaborating nations were masters in the art of politics, and they had political goals which were dependent upon the success of military action.

By the time a date was set for Overlord, as the 1944 cross-Channel operation was called, plans for achieving respective national goals became clearer to the President and the Prime Minister. The taste
of victory in North Africa and its promise in Italy enabled the Prime
Minister to think more clearly of where rather than how the final
victory could best be achieved. His sense of history and his bent
toward the traditional European balance of power came into play. The
President, on the other hand, became more and more inflexibly convinced
that the course of wisdom was away from power politics. His mind was on
international cooperation, with the Big Three (England, the United States,
and Russia) policing the world immediately after the cessation of
hostilities. He wished to include China as well, if she could be brought
to sufficient status in power and prestige.

While political strategy was thus becoming more fixed, the military
staffs of both nations were gradually moving from strategic divergence
to agreement. Nevertheless, sharp differences and bitter argument
between the military staffs of both the United States and Britain con-
tinued. Still, as victory became more certain, the British inclination
to mount small military actions along the European periphery diminished.
Since the Americans had always viewed with alarm this probing or
pecking type of military action, the lessening in British advocacy of
such strategy reduced the strain on the joint military cooperation.
This change was considerably influenced by the ascendancy of American
forces. United States manpower and production grew by leaps and bounds
while the British productive capacity had passed its peak.
Casablanca: Expanded Mediterranean Action - Sicily

Although Operation Torch was unpopular with American planners, from a tactical point of view it was certainly a success.\(^1\) This very success raised a question in global strategy which, by December 1942, demanded attention from the British and American partners. The question: Should operations in the Mediterranean now stop to enable the resumption of a build-up of forces in the British Isles for a 1943 invasion of France, or should operations in the Mediterranean continue with some ultimate objective of invading southern Europe? The answer given to this question would very largely determine the disposition of British and American forces in 1943. Recognizing the unsettled condition of Anglo-American fundamental war strategy and planning, Roosevelt suggested another meeting on the highest level, with Stalin participating. Churchill was in solid agreement and, after Stalin advised his inability to leave Russia "even for a day,"\(^2\) Casablanca was decided upon as the meeting place.

The Prime Minister had no doubt concerning the correct course of Allied action. In November 1942 he had cabled the President that the "paramount task" before the United States and Great Britain was, first, to conquer North Africa and open the Mediterranean to military traffic, and, second, to use the bases on the African coast to strike at the

\(^1\)General Wedemeyer has called it "... a wasteful side show ... but a grand success." (Wedemeyer, 170). As a dress rehearsal for an invasion of Europe, the North African campaign was ... profitable." (Donald W. Mitchell, "Victory in Tunis," Current History, IV (June 1943), p. 237).

\(^2\)Churchill, IV, p. 666.
underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest time."¹ This remained Churchill's opinion in January 1943 and in his mind was the obvious immediate objective for consideration at Casablanca.

On the eve of the Casablanca conference the President's attitude on the critical issue of cross-Channel invasion of France versus continued Mediterranean operations was one of wait and see.² He favored building up United States forces in both the United Kingdom and North Africa and postponing the choice for a while. Roosevelt had no particular aversion to Mediterranean ventures and, although he did not engage in military arguments with his advisers as did the Prime Minister, he was not prepared to commit himself, even to his staff, before the conference.

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff approached the meetings without a clearly defined position but resolved not to give way to their British colleagues any more than necessary.³ Under these circumstances General Marshall could hardly bring about consensus among his people before the conference, but he felt obliged to wage a strong rear-guard action in defense of the cross-Channel invasion plan. He could thus serve notice to all that concentration of force for a major cross-Channel operation was still a cardinal objective in American strategic planning.

¹Sherwood, p. 674.
²Matloff, p. 21.
³Wedemeyer expresses the American Staff dilemma "...we had no assurance that the President would support our choice of concentration, and, on the military level, we were without agreement among ourselves as how to convince the British of the danger of frittering away our combined resources on indecisive, limited operations." (Wedemeyer, p. 185).
Whereas the Americans came to Casablanca with a small staff and with preparations incomplete, the British brought a full staff and carefully prepared plans and positions. "For every argument they advanced they were able to produce . . . plans and statistics worked out to the last detail." Further, at a meeting of the British party on the night prior to the beginning of official discussions, the Prime Minister outlined the course they should follow during conference deliberations:

They were not to hurry or try to force agreement, but to take plenty of time; there was to be full discussion and no impatience - 'the dripping of water on a stone.' In the meantime he himself would pursue the same tactics with the President. He added that he would like to see agreement reached, not only to clear the North African shore and capture Sicily in 1943, but to recapture Burma and launch a preliminary invasion of France. Nothing less, he felt, would be worthy of two great Powers and their obligation to Russia.2

As British chairman, Alanbrooke followed the Prime Minister's advice and encouraged the fullest possible expression of everybody's opinion as the Combined Chiefs of Staff sought agreement. Marshall presented American arguments. In speaking to the conference, he considered the basic question as being the extent the Allied powers should adhere to the general concept of cross-Channel action (to which all had given lip service) and the extent to which they could undertake diversions from it in the interest of helping Russia, improving the shipping situation, and maintaining the pressure against Germany and Japan. He felt that a decision for the "main plot" had to be made, for each diversion

1Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 439.
2Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 445.
from the primary plan siphoned off equipment and manpower and severely complicated production programs and troop mobilization. Marshall reviewed all the arguments the American staff had advanced since the spring of 1942 and further expressed serious doubt that decisions to extend operations in the Mediterranean while at the same time concentrating forces in the British Isles, would permit any Pacific operations at all. His position was that any Mediterranean undertaking projected for 1943 should be weighed in terms of its effects on the already critical shipping situation, the build-up of forces in England, and its role in the overall planning, to include Pacific action.\(^1\)

Admiral King's conference comments supported Marshall's argument with reference to the Pacific. He cautioned against becoming so concerned with European preparations that the Japanese might be able to consolidate their newly won positions. In his view, merely maintaining pressure against the Japanese was not enough. Rather, more resources should be allotted to the Pacific area. King's attitude was that so long as the British persisted in peripheral Mediterranean actions, why not divert forces, including landing craft, to the Pacific where Americans were facing an aggressive Japan?\(^2\) The argument which ensued left a lasting

\(^1\)See Minutes, 55th Meeting Combined Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as CCS), 14 January 1943; and Minutes, 58th CCS, 16 January 1943; as cited by Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II, The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 21-22.

\(^2\)Wedemeyer offers an analysis of King's rationale and motivation to look after American interests in the United States strategic sphere - the Pacific. (Wedemeyer, 181 and 187).
impression on the British staff about Admiral King. Throughout his diary of this period, Alanbrooke attributes Anglo-American landing craft difficulties to King's abiding interest in the Pacific war.¹

In reply for the British Chiefs of Staff, Alanbrooke took the position to which he held throughout 1943: that the British and Americans could not land on the continent in force until Germany definitely weakened. The British Chief of Staff presented three telling points. First, less than half the required divisions could be made available for a cross-Channel operation by mid-September 1943. Secondly, if preparations for that operation were made, no support could be given Russia during the summer of 1943. Thirdly, the best way to effect dispersal of German forces not only from France, but also from the Soviet front, was to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, try to knock Italy out of the war, and try to bring Turkey in on the Allied side. He went on to advocate an increase in British-American air attacks on Germany, but called for a continued build-up of forces in England in preparation for the invasion of the continent.²

The differences between the two staffs thus being clearly presented, the first four days of the conference dealt with arguing the points of view and the effects particular actions might have on various theaters. Alanbrooke indicates a feeling of despair when, as late as the

¹"I'm afraid that nothing we said had much effect in weaning King away from the Pacific. This is where his heart was, and the bulk of his Naval Forces. The European war was just a great nuisance that kept him from waging his Pacific war undisturbed." (Notes on My Life, VIII, 599, as cited in Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 446).

²See Minutes, 57th Meeting CCS, 15 January 1943, as cited in Matloff, p. 23.
fourth day, his staff had to present a new paper for discussion of the long-since-agreed basic strategic principle of defeating Germany first. He had found that the American Joint Planners now "were wishing to defeat Japan first."\(^1\) Somewhat in desperation, Alanbrooke turned to Field Marshall Dill, who was the closest of British friends to General Marshall, for possible support. Dill assumed an optimistic attitude and suggested that much progress had already been made and pointed out that some compromise on the few remaining differences would be mandatory. Since Dill had the confidence of Marshall, he was fairly well acquainted with the extent of compromise required. He told Alanbrooke that "you must come to some agreement with the Americans and . . . you cannot bring the unsolved problem up to the Prime Minister and the President."\(^2\) At this juncture in the conversation, Air Marshall Portal arrived with a proposal similar to Dill's suggestions. The result was that Dill discussed the tentative proposal with Marshall in private before the next meeting, and with minor alterations, the British proposed compromise was accepted as follows:

Operations in the Pacific and the Far East shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full-scale offensive against Japan . . . as soon as Germany is defeated. These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

\(^1\)Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 449.

\(^2\)This event is described by Alanbrooke in *Turn of the Tide*, pp. 449-450, where he "gave Dill credit for securing the agreement with the Americans on this memorable day."
prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take any opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.¹

At about the same time Alanbrooke, through Dill's good offices, was reaching a stage of satisfactory progress with his American counterpart, Churchill was able to report to the British War Cabinet that "I am satisfied the President is strongly in favour of the Mediterranean being given prime place. He also seems increasingly inclined to Operation "Husky" (Sicily)."² It appeared that the "dripping of water on a stone" was an effective procedure for the British.

Aside from strong arguments advanced by the British and the inclinations of the President and the Prime Minister, Marshall recognized certain other critical factors which cast doubt on the possibility of his 1943 cross-Channel hopes. Experience in recent amphibious operations had caused Eisenhower to revise upward the requirements for landing craft in support of a cross-Channel effort. He also felt that more troops would be required than his plans had called for in 1942 before Operation Torch.³ Another seriously limiting factor recognized by Marshall and constantly emphasized by King, was the submarine menace and the delivery of supplies to Russia. The totals of Allied shipping losses for 1942 were 1,494 ships and 7,446,204 gross tons.⁴ An immediate continuation of

¹Bryant, 450. Chester Wilmot points out that the phrase "in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" gave the Americans free rein in deciding the scope of Pacific operations. Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 121.

²Churchill, IV, p. 676.

³Minutes, Special Meeting Joint Chiefs of Staff and President, January 16, 1943, as cited by Matloff, p. 24.

⁴Churchill, IV, p. 879.
action in the Mediterranean also offered advantages on the air power side, for with all the north coast of Africa and all of Sicily in Allied hands, air strikes against more distant German targets would be possible. Control of Sicily would offer additional advantages as well, such as the prospect of releasing 225 vessels for use in the Middle East and the Pacific.

In the end, therefore, Marshall yielded, but in so doing, he "made it clear that the United States Chiefs of Staff were accepting the Mediterranean operation only as an expedient action dictated by current circumstances."^ He still intended that the main effort against Germany would be across the Channel. By way of furthering this intention, he and King together may have established one other point with their British colleagues. This was to the effect that the Pacific action would continue in a dynamic manner, and any war equipment standing idle as it awaited some possible, though indefinite, use in Europe would be moved to the Pacific. In this way, the American Army and Navy Chiefs established a possible lever for balancing forces among diversionary efforts and those of primary importance. Concentration of force for the cross-Channel effort might thus be retrieved.

From a military point of view, the decision for continued action in the Mediterranean, with emphasis on Sicilian operations as the successor to North Africa, was the result of most importance to our study. However, from the political point of view and of significance to Roosevelt's long range goals, the President's announcement that

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^Matloff, p. 25.
unconditional surrender would be required of the Axis nations was the most important result of the conference. Advanced by Roosevelt as an apparent spur-of-the-moment decision during a press conference near the end of the Casablanca deliberations, the "unconditional surrender" formula was interpreted by a number of observers as a unilateral Presidential decision. Churchill appeared to be surprised by the announcement but recovered immediately and gave the policy his full support. Nevertheless, there was considerable comment from public figures of both Britain and the United States concerning the wisdom of such a policy, and the President received unfair criticism for his so-called "impulsive" announcement. The Prime Minister has since revealed the existence of documentation which confirms prior discussion and decision regarding the policy before the President made his announcement.¹

In spite of the issues raised by the unconditional surrender formula and the long debate as to its value or detriment to the progress of the war, the principle had important consequences for the coalition. Assuredly the announcement bolstered Russian spirits, for the Western Powers thus expressed uncompromising determination to wage a fight to the finish with Germany. More important to Roosevelt, however, was that implicit in this simple formula of resolute purpose was a notice to friend and foe alike that there would be no negotiated peace, no escape clauses were to be offered. As Churchill told the House of Commons in

¹Churchill, IV, pp. 684-688. Sherwood also asserts that "this announcement of Unconditional Surrender was very deeply deliberated ... (and the President) had his eyes wide open when he made it." (Sherwood, pp. 696-697).
February 1944, "No such arguments will be admitted by us as were used by Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence of President Wilson's Fourteen Points."\(^1\) Finally, the expression of such a firm purpose served to bind more closely the fortunes and actions of the two English speaking nations as they moved forward in a great collaboration begun essentially at the Atlantic Conference. Such a philosophy of purpose fitted well the agreements and decisions reached at Casablanca. These decisions reflected the type of compromise succeeding meetings would bring as the two great powers reconciled their strategic differences into a pattern for victory.

**Trident and Its Sequel: Decision for Italy**

Planning for the invasion of Sicily had been completed by early spring 1943, and prospects for launching an attack there by early summer were promising. A course of action to follow a Sicilian victory was not clear. Churchill became justifiably anxious therefore for a firm military plan for the armed forces to follow after the capture of Sicily. For their part, the British still had no doubt whatever about what the next step should be. At Casablanca, the British Chief of Imperial General Staff, Alanbrooke, had expounded a well-developed strategy for the conduct of the war in Europe: "to begin with the conquest of North Africa so as to re-open the Mediterranean... then eliminate Italy, bring in Turkey, threaten southern Europe, and liberate France."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Churchill, IV, p. 690.

\(^2\)Bryant, _Turn of the Tide_, p. 432.
Churchill agreed with Alanbrooke, but so long as the American military staff continued their strong advocacy of cross-Channel action in place of an Italian invasion, he was certain that American agreement could be obtained only by another personal conference with the President. Accordingly, the President and Prime Minister decided on early May 1943, as the date for the third Washington conference, which they named Trident.

At previous conferences with the Americans, the British had travelled with a large staff. Such an assembly of experts provided a means for quick, detailed, and accurate answers to almost any question which might arise during deliberations. Indeed, the British preparation went much further, for their proposals were consistently worked out in great detail and were well coordinated with British foreign policy. Churchill's close relationship with his military staff insured the required balance between policy and the military decisions to enforce it.

In contrast, the Americans had arrived at the earlier conferences with small staffs and plans expressed only in general terms. Further, the American Chiefs of Staff could not be certain of the support the President might give them as various British points were raised. To illustrate the differences existing in preparation for conference activity between the British and American staffs, General Wedemeyer, United States Army Plans Division, who was present at the Casablanca conference, described the American Staff experience with the British there as follows:

\(^1\)Churchill, IV, p. 782.
They swarmed down upon us like locusts, with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants, with prepared plans to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with fair promise of continuing the role of directing strategy the whole course of the war. I have the greatest admiration for them, as I indicated above; and if I were a Britisher, I would feel very proud. However, as an American, I wish that we might be more glib and better organized to cope with these super-negotiators. From a worm's eye viewpoint, it was apparent that we were confronted by generations and generations of experience in committee work, in diplomacy, and rationalizing points of view. They had us on the defensive practically all the time.\(^1\)

The moral was plain following that conference: that the military staff of the United States, in preparing for later meetings, should not only emulate, but also improve on, British thoroughness and firmness in presenting a united front. An essential part of this preparation would be thorough, realistic staff planning on a joint basis which would permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrive at timely, binding agreements on the military course to be followed. Furthermore, these preparations would, to the degree possible, be coordinated with the White House, and advance presidential approval would be obtained. American staff officers had learned that unless the latter action was taken, military aims, regardless of how broadly or in what detail they may have been conceived, were subject to negotiation when the President and Prime Minister worked out compromises in the light of respective national policies.

As at past conferences, the British arrived at Trident with a large staff, which was well prepared and which presented a united front. This time, following Wedemeyer's suggestions, the American staff was much

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\(^1\)Wedemeyer, p. 192.
larger, much better organized, and better prepared to argue its case than at any previous gathering of the kind.

Lord Ismay, who was Churchill's Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defense, described the manner in which work at this and succeeding mid-war conferences was conducted:

Each day . . . the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff met independently. At 11 a.m., the two teams joined together for a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, accompanied by such advisers as the questions under discussion required . . . often there was a second combined meeting in the afternoon. Periodically, there were plenary conferences at the White House, presided over by the President and the Prime Minister. At these, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported progress, sought approval, and were given directions for their future work.¹

Both the President and the Prime Minister made opening speeches at the Trident gathering. Their comments succinctly exposed the essence of the Anglo-American differences regarding action in the Mediterranean area. The single most pressing question was whether to continue with the Mediterranean campaign or to concentrate on the cross-Channel operation. Churchill noted with satisfaction that "we have been able, by taking thought together, to produce a succession of brilliant events which have altered the whole course of the war."² He then proceeded to enumerate the many advantages in plans to invade Italy, his foremost recommendation. Primary among these advantages would be the loss to Germany of the Italian fleet and the twenty-six Italian divisions stationed in the Balkan countries. Churchill was also optimistic that Allied success in Italy would bring Turkey into the war against Germany and permit passage

¹Ismay, p. 295.
²Churchill, IV, p. 791.
of supplies to Russia through the Dardanelles. The Prime Minister also expressed concern in providing relief to Russia. He considered "the best way of taking the weight off the Russian front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans."\(^1\) In descending scale of priority, Churchill mentioned the need to keep large forces in contact with the enemy during 1943. He thought such action was necessary, because it was now evident that a cross-Channel attack could not be launched before 1944. Last in priority on his objectives list was aid to China and study of a long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

In his turn, the President agreed that a decision for action beyond Sicily was necessary. He was also concerned that the more than twenty divisions of Anglo-American battle trained troops be effectively employed. The President felt, however, that the cross-Channel invasion must take place as early as possible and not later than the spring of 1944. "He reiterated his frequently expressed determination to concentrate our military effort first on destruction of Nazi military power before engaging in any collateral campaigns."\(^2\) He felt that the only way to force Germany to fight and thus aid Russia was the strike through France\(^3\) as advocated by the American military staff. The President was

\(^1\)Churchill, IV, p. 792.
\(^3\)Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 503.
also very much concerned with keeping China in the war. He said that priority aid to China in 1943 and 1944 must be considered.¹

With such guidance from their highest authorities, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met on the following day (May 13, 1943). From the beginning there was an atmosphere of tension. Lord Ismay has reported that "as soon as the controversial question of future operations after the capture of Sicily came under discussion, it was clear that there was going to be a battle royal."² Admiral Leahy, the Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, presided over the initial meeting and reported British refusal to consider any major military undertaking during 1943 outside the Mediterranean. Leahy was much concerned by this British attitude, for "President Roosevelt . . . had directed me to press for a British-American invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date."³

American arguments concerning a cross-Channel attack in 1943 were well known to the British. The arguments remained essentially the same at this conference. American doubts concerning British reasons for non-concurrence with the 1943 cross-Channel venture also continued unchanged. The arguments and doubts of both nations can be summarized.

The American proposal for a 1943 attack along the French Channel coast, with the possibility of a smaller "emergency" 1942 attack, had been accepted by the British in April 1942. Scarcely a month later the British reversed themselves and, instead, pressed for the North African

¹Churchill, IV, p. 794.
²Ismay, p. 296.
³Leahy, p. 160.
campaign, later known as Torch. Resolution of the deadlock between the respective national staffs proved impossible, and the President told his staff to agree on action in some other theater where American troops could engage the Germans in 1942. In the face of British stubbornness, little choice remained for them, and the American Chiefs of Staff finally agreed to Torch, with the clear understanding that there was still to be a 1943 cross-Channel attack. (Since Operation Torch and the resulting Tunisian campaign took longer to complete than planned, the 1943 cross-Channel schedule became impossible.) In spite of this delay, the British were now proposing a sequential move to the Italian mainland which, they claimed, would take Italy out of the war. Although capitulation of Italy might well result if the British plan were accepted, the Americans were not convinced that such a victory would be a significant contribution toward the defeat of Germany. Meanwhile, support of an Italian venture would certainly preclude an adequate force build-up in England, a necessary prerequisite for a cross-Channel effort in 1944. Indeed, the Americans continued to be suspicious of British intentions to land troops in France at all. Some American staff members were convinced that Britain would postpone such a landing as long as possible, and perhaps avoid it altogether.

The British had arguments to counter the American fears. Their leaders considered the strategy they advocated as being justified by the success of Operations Torch. In their eyes, American doubt was unwarranted. The British felt that the only difference which existed between themselves and the Americans over the cross-Channel attack was one of timing. They agreed now that such an attack was the only way for delivery of the final
blow against Germany. However, British experience with opposed landings in former wars had proved costly, and they felt an attack on the coast of France in 1943 would be premature and, if launched, would result in a repetition of those costly failures of the past. During conference proceedings, Alanbrooke explained a number of times in great detail that the British wished to disperse French-based German troops prior to the launching of a cross-Channel attack. Such was the goal of so-called peripheral forays\(^1\) which his staff advocated. They were convinced that a drastic reduction in these German forces was necessary before the dual tasks of troop landings and establishment of sufficient supply and administrative bases could be accomplished. In early conference arguments, the British developed as additional prerequisites to the cross-Channel invasion air superiority and interruption of German lines of communication, which were vital between the German eastern front and France. Finally, the British argued there were deficiencies in numbers of landing craft and similar shipping capability. They insisted these were so important to the success of the cross-Channel operation that the action should be delayed, pending availability of adequate equipment.

Against such a backdrop of tension and disagreement, the doubt expressed by Alanbrooke in his diary, that any good could come of the conference,\(^2\) was understandable. With each side convinced of its respective wisdom, compromise appeared remote. Past conferences had concluded with the British winning most of their debated points, particularly in the

\(^1\)Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 513.

\(^2\)Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 504.
military arena. However, at Trident the Americans were not only better prepared to support a debate, but the staff had also been able to hold valuable preliminary discussions with the President in which they had won him over to their side. Thus the United States delegation had entered the conference in the favorable posture of being united in favor of cross-Channel operations as the highest priority for combined action.

With each conference participant well prepared and convinced of the merits of their respective positions, concerted effort was required in the search for an effective compromise. As spokesman for the British effort, Alanbrooke asserted the elimination of Italy would ease the formidable tasks attendant upon an Anglo-American force landing in northwest Europe from the British Isles. British Air Chief Marshall Portal was of the opinion that the balance of forces on the continent would change more quickly in Allied favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken before launching a cross-Channel attack. Summarizing this point of view, Alanbrooke expressed the British Chiefs' firm intention to execute the cross-Channel operation as soon as sufficiently favorable conditions would arise in 1944, but that in the meantime Allied action bearing directly against Germany should consist of intensified bombardment.1

General Marshall was again the foremost spokesman and negotiator for the United States staff on European strategy. It became apparent to him as the impasse continued that emphasis on air operations might provide a means toward compromise. Inasmuch as the British chiefs were thinking

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1Matloff, p. 129.
in terms of British bases for air attack, limited action in Italy and resultant provision of bomber bases there from which to attack Germany could be justified.\(^1\) Moreover, such limited Italian action should be possible with the forces already at Eisenhower's disposal in the Mediterranean theater.

Therefore, Marshall began to advocate the use of air strength from the Mediterranean. Responding to this relaxation in the American position, the British staff became more amenable to the cross-Channel operation in 1944 provided the Americans were willing to a scaling down of its size. The result of these conversations was a kind of "back door" approach to compromise, which provided concessions agreeable to both sides. The Americans could agree to limited action in Italy if they had a firm date against which to plan the 1944 cross-Channel invasion, albeit with lesser force. The British, in the absence of better terms, could agree with a firm date for cross-Channel operations provided the "Italian prize" could be exploited.

Once these major concessions were made, the debate concerning optimum action in both theaters could be narrowed down to the availability of strength and resources. The British first estimate of requirements for a 1944 cross-Channel action had called for 8,500 landing ships and similar craft to lift simultaneously ten divisions. Both Marshall and his chief planner, General Wedemeyer, termed this requirement a "logistical impossibility."\(^2\) After further study, the United States planners

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\(^1\) Matloff, p. 130.  
\(^2\) Matloff, p. 132.
concluded that, assuming continued Mediterranean action after Sicily, enough landing craft could be provided in England by the spring of 1944 to lift only five divisions, three in the assault wave and two in the follow up wave, in a simultaneous operation. However, they felt that that number might be sufficient.\footnote{Matloff, p. 134.} American planning estimates as finally accepted by the conference for guidance to the cross-Channel planners were thus half the original British estimate. In order to win firm British agreement to a definite operation with a definite target date, the Americans agreed to the smaller force. As a further concession, the Americans also agreed that the 1943 landing craft production rates, rather than the higher 1944 rates, would suffice as planning factors. In this way, the time for a cross-Channel operation could become firmly committed.

In return for this British concession, the Americans yielded to the British insistence for limited Mediterranean operations. The United States staff indicated their willingness to plan with the object of eliminating Italy from the war. However, no precise plan for accomplishing this was adopted by the conference. Instead, General Eisenhower, Commander in Chief for North Africa, was instructed to plan such operations on the basis of having available twenty-seven divisions of troops. The final decision for mounting the operation, however, was to be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{Matloff, p. 134.}
It must be remembered that Churchill had suggested the Trident meetings to achieve agreement on the invasion of Italy. The conference results, therefore, were disappointing to the Prime Minister. "As this was the main purpose for which I had crossed the Atlantic, I could not let the matter rest." He appealed to Hopkins for aid in obtaining a more definite decision concerning Italy from Roosevelt. Although sympathetic with the Prime Minister's anxiety, Hopkins was doubtful that the United States Chiefs would be overruled. Not to be defeated, Churchill proposed to visit the North African Headquarters enroute to England for discussion of Italian possibilities with Eisenhower, whose staff would have planning responsibility for any action taken. Roosevelt agreed that such a visit would be useful in providing Eisenhower and his staff a more complete understanding of the Trident deliberations. Therefore, when the Prime Minister expressed a feeling of awkwardness should decisions be taken in favor of the British desires, the President asked Marshall to accompany the party. ²

The time spent with Eisenhower and staff extended just over a week and had far-reaching effect on the final decision in favor of the Italian invasion. The visit also provided a unique opportunity for these high level command personnel to observe the battlefield situation at close range.

The first meeting was held at Eisenhower's villa on May 29, 1943. In attendance were Churchill, Alanbrooke, Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder,

¹Churchill, IV, p. 810.
²Churchill, IV, p. 811.
Ismay, Marshall, Bedell Smith, and Eisenhower. The visitors brought Eisenhower and his staff up to date by means of a briefing on the Trident decision. They also emphasized the fact that among the Allies only the Russian land forces would be able to produce decisive results in 1943. Following the briefing, the crucial issue, the mounting of an Italian campaign, was raised. Eisenhower's initial reaction was that if Italy was to be knocked out of the war, it should be done "immediately after Sicily and with all the means at our disposal . . . (he felt) that this would simplify his problems. If Sicily were to succeed, say within a week, he would at once cross the straits and establish a bridgehead."\(^1\)

Marshall suggested that since no firm decision could be made until the result of the attack on Sicily were known, it might be wise to set up two forces: one to plan for Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for operation against the mainland of Italy. Then, when sufficient facts for decision became available, both forces would move against the objective then decided upon.\(^2\) Eisenhower and Alexander agreed that, depending upon the ease of operations in Sicily, they would prefer Italy as the next step.

In view of the general agreement at the first meeting, Churchill "tried to clinch matters"\(^3\) at the next and last meeting on May 31. He had marshalled all the facts in a paper called "Background Notes" and had circulated it for use by all the principals before the meeting. It

\(^1\)Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 520.

\(^2\)Churchill, IV, p. 819.

\(^3\)Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 522.
is evident that the Prime Minister did his utmost to wring from Eisenhower and Marshall agreement for action against Italy which could be wired immediately to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. He was unable to win over Marshall who, although not in disagreement with the ideas expressed, would not agree to a clear-cut decision until after the attack on Sicily had begun. Following Marshall's lead, Eisenhower saw that he would have to await developments and in the light of them advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff plans and recommendations for follow-on operations. Alanbrooke recorded in his diary for May 31 "the situation is on the whole much as we settled it in Washington, which is as it should be."

Developments testify to the success of the Churchill-sponsored North African journey. Such discussions, conducted as they were by men held in high esteem by battle commanders, served to remove doubt from the minds of key people in the field as to preferred decisions. This visit is typical of Churchill's willingness to travel anywhere at almost any time in the interest of furthering the Anglo-American cause. By bringing pertinent political factors and his own personal convictions into play during the decision making process, he was able to hasten progress toward his goal. Since he commanded the respect of his fellow American allies at all levels, few Allied decisions were made and executed without his strong influence. Indeed, up until Trident, his voice appeared to be the most dominant.

That the American strategic cause made gains at Trident is attributable to better staff preparation. Even more important was Marshall's

1Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 522.
ability to present the American case to Roosevelt with such firm conviction that the President agreed. From a political point of view, the American President had a considerably freer hand in administering the United States war effort than had the British Prime Minister. Furthermore, Roosevelt had a strong tendency toward making the final decision for his country in matters pertaining to warfare. Therefore, once his military advisers gained his complete confidence and convinced him of their strategic wisdom, it became more difficult for the Prime Minister to bring the President's ideas into line with his own. We know from Admiral Leahy's account of the final Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with the President in preparation for Trident that:

It was determined that the principal objective of the American Government would be to pin down the British to a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable date and to make full preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944.1

Hence, the President deliberately decided to support his staff in obtaining British agreement to early cross-Channel operation. An official Army historian of the period has said there is no clear explanation of Roosevelt's motives for taking such a stand at the time.2 But whatever the pressures upon the President and whatever his motives, at last he and his staff were of one mind in trying to obtain decisions and plans for the American military objective - a Second Front. The success they enjoyed was sufficient as a preliminary step. The next step took place less than three months later at the first Quebec Conference, which was named Quadrant.

1Leahy, pp. 157-158.

2Maurice Matloff indicates by footnote that: "Searches of the official files in Washington and of the Roosevelt and Hopkins papers at Hyde Park have yielded no records of the meetings of 2 May and 8 May of the JCS with the President at the White House. The only record - even in published accounts - that has turned up is in Admiral Leahy's memoirs. (Matloff, p. 125).
Quadrant: A Plan is Agreed

It is interesting to note that the American strategy for cross-Channel action, and insistence upon adherence to it, became progressively firmer even as British success in obtaining an invasion of Italy developed. A strong element in this hardening of Roosevelt's support for a cross-Channel invasion seems to have been the earnest convictions expressed to him by Secretary of War Stimson following the Secretary's July 1943 visit to Europe and North Africa. His report, complete with conclusions, is outlined in detail in the Stimson memoirs. The Secretary based his arguments on several main points. First, the Combined Chiefs of Staff planning group responsible for cross-Channel planning had told him that the plan was sound, but that its time schedule could not withstand any interference from new or unprogrammed actions. Therefore, Stimson wanted to forestall any interference with the plan or its execution. Secondly, in discussions with Churchill, the Secretary of War detected a British fear that a German counterattack after landings of Allied forces in France might succeed. Stimson felt this fear dampened British willingness to mount the attack. For his part, Stimson thought assurances from the air commanders that they could block German reinforcements were adequate. General Eisenhower had made a convincing third point which the Secretary presented to Roosevelt. The General had suggested the possibility of limiting the war in Italy to capturing air bases there. The latter were of great value in prosecution of the air battle against Germany, because

1Stimson and Bundy, pp. 429-438.
2Stimson and Bundy, p. 431.
they would provide more ready access to targets in southeastern Germany.\(^1\) Such argument as the latter point was reminiscent of Marshall's arguments during Casablanca and Trident talks.

The most effective of the conclusions reached by Stimson and presented by him to the President just before the Quadrant Conference is quoted as follows:

I believe, therefore, that the time has come for you to decide that your government must assume the responsibility of leadership in this great final movement of the European war which is now confronting us. We cannot afford to confer again and close with a lip service tribute to Bolero (the cross-Channel build up in England) which we have tried and failed to carry out. We cannot afford to begin the most dangerous operation of the war under half-hearted leadership which will invite failure or at least disappointing results. Nearly two years ago the British offered us this command. I think that now it should be accepted -- if necessary, insisted on.\(^2\)

Stimson's point concerning only "lip service tribute" to Bolero was well taken, for twice had joint instructions been given to prepare a cross-Channel action only to have the force diverted--to North Africa, in the first instance, and to Sicily in the second. When these diversions occurred, the American men and equipment not required for the alternative course of action were invariably diverted to the Pacific theater.

While in the early stages of mobilization, the Americans could replenish the Bolero losses without severe impact on field operations provided the rate of build up remained slow. However, as production began to reach capacity, and as military and industrial demands for manpower increased, it would become impossible to supply forces and

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\(^1\)Stimson and Bundy, p. 433.

\(^2\)Stimson and Bundy, p. 437.
equipment to each of several high-consumption theaters. Therefore, as preparations for Quadrant were made, the military departments approached a supply and personnel crossroads. If the Pacific action was to continue on the scale already in progress at that time, then a choice had to be made for the locale of full scale action against Germany—either Italy or France—not both.

The British had consistently argued for the Mediterranean plan, and all Anglo-American actions in that theater had been successful. Hence, Churchill and staff approached Quadrant in the same conceptual frame of mind as in the past—application of whatever force was required for victory against Italy.¹

The American "crossroads" situation disturbed Marshall, for some of his army planners were beginning to fear the Mediterranean trend had gone so far as to be almost irreversible. Therefore, they were beginning to favor a settlement of differences and at least be unified with the British in one theater or the other. General Hull, Chief of the Operations Plans Division Theater Group, expressed the disturbing trend of thought in a memorandum to his chief during mid-July 1943:

Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt that the logical plan . . . was . . . across Channel by the most direct route, our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me to the belief that we should now reverse our decision and pour our resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean operations.²

¹Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 579.
²Matloff, p. 165.
General Hull and others were discouraged by the sharp contrast between original plans supporting the Bolero build-up and the actual force available in England. Their attitude is understandable when one considers that the first estimate was that the United States could have over a million men and 4,000 airplanes in England by April 1943. Actually by that date, the United States had only 109,137 troops and 873 aircraft. On the other hand, by July 1, 1943, the United States had 540,087 troops and 4,087 planes in the Mediterranean area.¹

Although Marshall and his chief planner, General Wedemeyer, never faltered in their conviction about the feasibility and necessity for a cross-Channel effort, they were pleased that, during this period of the doldrums for their planning staff, a cross-Channel plan, which had been directed during the Trident conference, was completed. A product of the combined planning staff in England, the plan was for Overlord, the eventual cross-Channel operation.² Submitted to the United States staff in Washington only a week before the conferees gathered at Quebec for Quadrant, the Overlord Plan provided Marshall a vehicle for use in attracting and holding the President's support for firm cross-Channel force and re-affirmation of the Trident agreed time of May 1944.

Thus, the plan for Overlord plus the above mentioned Stimson arguments combined to harden Roosevelt's resolve to insist upon early Channel operation during the Quadrant meetings. One other discussion contained the crowning element in Roosevelt's decision to go all out

¹Matloff, p. 166.
²Matloff, p. 168.
for the proposed May 1944 action against the French coast. That conver-
sation took place at the White House on August 10, 1943, when the Joint
Chiefs of Staff joined the President and the Secretary of War to discuss
Quadrant. The Secretary qualified a statement by the President which
had indicated that Churchill favored operations against the Balkans.
Stimson's qualification was that the Prime Minister while disclaiming
any wish to land troops in the Balkans did feel that gains were possible
there if allied supplies to the Balkans peoples could be increased.
Stimson affirmed, however, that the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony
Eden, wanted the Allies to invade the Balkans. These comments led the
President to express the philosophy underlying his conduct of the war
and his desire for the post war period. He acknowledged the British
Foreign Office's desire to forestall Soviet influence in the Balkans by
going there first. However:

He did not believe the USSR desired to take over the Balkan
States but rather the USSR wished to establish kinship with
other Slavic people . . . It is unwise (he stated) to plan
military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.^

Thus, it can be seen that Roosevelt's attention was becoming more and
more focussed on the post-war world, free of favored positions, con-
trolled by a new community of United Nations. In view of this
orientation, he could not agree with the pragmatic establishment of
one national influence (the British) in a physical position (the
Balkans) that smacked of "deals" or spheres of influence in the

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1Matloff, p. 215.
2Matloff, p. 215.
balance of power tradition. To forestall any British tendencies in this
direction, Roosevelt may well have decided that day to make the growing
power of his nation the dominant force in mounting Overlord. Such a
decision would certainly justify his expressed wish to provide "a larger
force in Great Britain . . . so that as soon as possible and before the
actual time of landing (on French soil) we should have more soldiers in
Britain dedicated to the purpose than the British."^1

Several days after these remarks by the President, Quadrant
convened. Initial discussions between the members of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff concentrated on resolving the question of whether the main effort
would be made from England or in the Mediterranean. As was usual at these
conferences, General Marshall again was the principal American spokesman,
pertinent facts being supplied him by a well-organized supporting staff.
A similar alignment was present for the British partner, with Sir Alan-
brooke as the chief British spokesman, ably assisted by Air Marshal Sir
Charles Portal.

In accordance with previous American decisions, the American
representatives proposed that Overlord be given overriding priority over
other operations in the European theater. Somewhat as a surprise to the
Americans, Alanbrooke indicated complete agreement that Overlord should
be the major offensive for 1944, but he went on to stress the absolute
necessity of first achieving the main conditions upon which success of
the plan depended:

^1Stimson and Bundy, p. 438.
(1) . . . Substantial reduction in the strength of German fighter aircraft in northwest Europe.
(2) . . . Not more than twelve mobile German divisions in northern France at the time the operation was launched, and . . . not possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions in the succeeding two months.
(3) . . . The problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters must be overcome.  

Alanbrooke insisted that the main British aim of the Italian operations was to force the Germans to shift much of their force from northwestern France to Italy, thereby weakening the German defenses in France to levels satisfactory for mounting the Overlord plan.

Such an agreeable interchange would tend to forecast smooth progress toward final agreement. This was not the case, however, for American doubts concerning the facts supporting the British provisos were evident. To begin with, Overlord called for the transfer of seven divisions from the Mediterranean to support the cross-Channel operation. Such an allocation had been decided upon at the Trident conference, and guidelines to Overlord planners had been issued. Eisenhower had indicated to Marshall that he could operate the planned limited Italian effort without the seven divisions.

The British disagreed and argued that withdrawal of the seven divisions from Italy would jeopardize the possibility in diverting German troops from France to Italy. In their view, a decision to grant "overriding priority to Overlord" would thus be "too binding." In consideration of this British objection, Marshall was able to exhibit

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1Churchill, V, p. 77.
2Matloff, p. 215.
3Matloff, p. 221.
some flexibility. Prior to the conference, Roosevelt had asked him if the seven divisions, which Overlord would withdraw from Italy, could not be replaced with seven new divisions. Marshall replied that to do so would have some adverse impact on the Bolero build up, but the principal difficulty would be encountered in transporting the new divisions. Notwithstanding, a new force could be available to the Mediterranean by June 1944.\(^1\) Nothing more had been done about this force of men, however, because of Eisenhower's indication that he could get along without them. With such flexibility available to provide a force of this approximate size, the Americans withdrew from their position of "overriding priority" for Overlord. In its place the President agreed to the more ambiguous:

As between Operations Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring success of Overlord.\(^2\)

Fearing that Mediterranean ventures might thus be permitted to drain off vital strength from the cross-Channel operation, the Americans argued for and obtained a saving clause that "all Mediterranean operations would be carried out (on the basis of) forces allotted at Trident."\(^3\)

Churchill strongly favored Overlord for 1944 provided the conditions presented by Alanbrooke were met. Additionally, the Prime Minister insisted:

\(^1\)Matloff, p. 213.
\(^3\)Cline, p. 225.
That every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five per cent to the first assault five divisions versus the three called for in the plan. This would mean finding more landing craft. But there were still nine months to go, and much could be done in that time . . . Above all the initial lodgment must be strong.¹

Always alert to insuring a strong partnership with the United States, as shown by his earnest cooperation in this argument, Churchill took another most important step during Quadrant towards settling the command of the cross-Channel action. Since the United States forces would be dominant in the Overlord operation, or would be soon after a continental bridgehead had been established, the Prime Minister recommended to Roosevelt that an American commander be designated. Although Churchill's logic was unimpeachable, previous plans had envisioned a British commander, and at least tentatively, Alanbrooke had been promised the assignment.²

In making this offer, Churchill (probably by divination) not only met the President's desire for an American commander, but he also forcefully demonstrated his dedication to the vital Anglo-American cooperation most important to his established goal of victory.

Quadrant was not the last conference in the Anglo-American cooperation; nor were the arguments finished as to distribution of forces and locale of application. However, decisions for the place, means, and time to meet Russia's continuing demand for a strong Second Front were stated at Quebec. As an individual conference of the midwar period, Quadrant was noted for relatively few unusual accomplishments.

¹Churchill, V, p. 85.
²Churchill, V, p. 85.
Decisions made there were sufficiently firm to provide dependable guidance to operational and logistical planners of both military establishments. Following these decisions, both political and military chiefs were justified in assigning their top level talent to the leadership of Overlord. All levels of authority could respond positively and with confidence to the challenge now scheduled for May 1944.

Quadrant also brought to light a marked change in Churchill's attitude toward the cross-Channel attack. A number of reasons might account for his quick agreement that Overlord must receive maximum support. He must have been impressed by Secretary Stimson's arguments during the latter's visit to England in July. The Prime Minister knew the growth rates of production and military manning in the United States. He knew that this force had to be used in an optimum manner. He also recognized the strategic logic of supporting an operation desired by a partner who would supply more than half the invasion force. The most important stimulus to Churchill's support of the May date may well have been his realization that this might be his last change to bring the massive American strength against Hitler with such devastation. Surely he was aware of the frustration and dissatisfaction the British strategic arguments (although perhaps completely valid) had caused in American circles of command. American threats to pick up the "Pacific alternative" might cease to be bluff. He could not permit that to happen, for as much as he favored the Italian action, he also knew that attack through Italy alone was not likely to defeat Germany, and decisive victory over Germany continued to be his primary goal.
Cairo-Teheran: A Goal is Reached

Toward the end of the Quadrant conference, Washington learned that Stalin had agreed to meetings in Moscow of the United States, British, and Soviet foreign secretaries. The meetings were to be exploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later conference of the three chiefs of government. ¹ During these discussions, which took place 19-30 October 1943, the Anglo-American Quadrant plans for the invasion of Europe were described by the Military Observers of the party, Major General John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow, and General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, British Chief of Staff for the Ministry of Defense. The two generals assured the Russians that at each of the successive British-American conferences from Casablanca through Quadrant the necessity of aiding the Soviet Union had been a cardinal consideration. They reaffirmed the decision of the Trident and Quadrant conferences to invade France in the spring of 1944. Deane went further and advised Russia that the United States Military Mission would keep the Soviet staff fully informed of progress in the preparation for Overlord. Later Deane told General Marshall that "the Soviet delegation appeared to be completely satisfied with the sincerity of British and American intentions."²

¹Sherwood, p. 749; Churchill, V, pp. 277-283, contains a discussion of the background of the Moscow Conference; Hull, II, pp. 1247-1280, discusses in detail the political background of the conference from the United States point of view.

Faithful adherence to this Anglo-American pledge to Russia seemed essential to the Americans not only in order to avoid strategic stalemate in Europe but also to strengthen relations of the United Nations as foreshadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference. They became uneasy, however, as various warning signals arose. Stimson has recorded "further alarms" from the Prime Minister who, through British Foreign Minister Eden, informed the Russians that a delay of Overlord for one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign failed to progress satisfactorily.

Also at about this time, General Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow, warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Americans might be confronted with a demand for expanded action in the Mediterranean. In his opinion, the Russians, although eager as ever about a Second Front, might push for more immediate relief from German pressure if such were possible as a result of enlarged Mediterranean action.

Thus by early November 1943, the American military staff believed themselves to be faced with possible modifications to the Quadrant decisions as well as reopening the whole problem of European strategy. Their concern resulted not only from the prospect of further arguments.

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1Hull, II, pp. 1280-1307. This volume contains detailed first-hand account of the political discussions and agreements at Moscow.

2Stimson and Bundy, p. 439; Churchill, V, pp. 289-293. The Prime Minister's objective was to insure Stalin understood the Italian problem which would result from moving seven divisions from Italy to England for Overlord. This Eden-Stalin discussion may have given Stalin the idea for the invasion of southern France as an adjunct to Overlord. Such a tactic was discussed at the time.

3Message, Deane to Marshall, November 11, 1943, as cited by Matloff, p. 303.
with the British, but they now had the prospect of difficulties with the Russians. Stalin had finally agreed to a date and place for a meeting of the three heads of governments. Teheran was the place, and November 28 to December 1, 1943, was the time. Since another Anglo-American summit meeting was also needed to clarify the questions concerning problems of strategy in all theaters, a combined conference was arranged. The primary Anglo-American political discussions and the routine Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings were conducted at Cairo, both before and after the political summit deliberations at Teheran. That part of the conference conducted at Cairo was named Sextant whereas the Teheran deliberations were called Eureka.

Preparations by the staffs of both nations followed the same pattern as for previous midwar conferences. Both sides were aware of the differences they had. The conference administration and techniques of procedure had become established and were well known by the conference principals, who had worked well together for considerable time. Admittedly, there were adjustments due to mode of travel (both parties travelled to Cairo by battleship), and China was represented by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and party, who attended those sessions where topics of their interest were discussed. However, the Combined Chiefs of Staff portion of the Cairo meetings was essentially routine.

The opening talks of European operations, however, were inconclusive, because each side was holding its full fire and only rehearsing its arguments for the meetings soon to take place with the Russians. This resulted from the situation to which the President
referred at the plenary meeting in Cairo on the 24th of November that final decisions would depend on the outcome of discussions with Stalin at Teheran. Roosevelt went on to say that he felt the problem was primarily one of logistics; whether Overlord could be retained "in all its integrity" and, at the same time, the Mediterranean be kept "ablaze." He anticipated that Stalin would demand continued action in the Mediterranean as well as Overlord. Just what future action in the eastern Mediterranean might be taken was, in the President's view, dependent upon the entry of Turkey into the war. This also would be discussed with Stalin. Although Roosevelt did not attempt to present American arguments at that session of the 24th, he did draw attention to the growing preponderance of the United States versus British overseas deployment.

In his turn, the Prime Minister indicated his dissatisfaction with events of the past two months in the Mediterranean. He recognized that the Italian campaign had been slowed by the withdrawal of the seven divisions transferred to the British Isles in preparation for Overlord. He also lamented the failure to bolster the efforts of the Balkan guerilla activity and the loss of the Dodecanese Islands. It was his hope that the Russians would agree on the importance of bringing Turkey into the war. He emphasized that the British had no thought of advancing beyond the Pisa-Rimini line, which should be the goal of the Italian campaign. When these objectives in Italy had been reached, the decision would be made "whether we should move to the left or to the right." Finally, while Churchill emphasized that "Overlord remained at the top of the bill," he contended that it "should not be such a tyrant as to rule out
every other activity in the Mediterranean." He considered a degree of
elasticity necessary in the use of landing craft; the scheduled transfer
of landing craft from the Mediterranean to England should be deferred for
a few weeks.1

It was not until the 26th of November, the last day of the first
part of the Cairo talks, that the Combined Chiefs were able to discuss
seriously the strategy upon which they either could or must agree. The
delay resulted from the presence of the Chinese representatives, who
from Alanbrooke's point of view "understood nothing about strategy or
higher tactics and were quite unfit to discuss these questions."2 During
this meeting, however, an item of great importance to the future operations
in the Mediterranean was thoroughly aired. On the 25th, the British
Chiefs of Staff had proposed to take full advantage of all possible
opportunities to threaten the Germans in as many areas as possible and
thereby stretch German forces to the utmost. It was important to break
the "German iron ring" that included Rhodes, Crete, and Greece. Rhodes
being the key, it should have priority in capture, but operations
against it would require more equipment from the western Mediterranean.3

1This drawing the line of essential differences between the two
staffs was accomplished during the second plenary session at Cairo and
is reflected in Minutes, Second Plenary Meeting, as they are included in
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers 1943, The Conference at Cairo and Teheran (Washington:
to as Foreign Relations 1943.

2Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (New York: Doubleday and

3Minutes of CCS 409, November 25, 1943, as cited by Matloff,
p. 354.
The British Chiefs wished to obtain agreement from the Americans to retain some of the landing craft scheduled for transfer to Overlord. The Americans, with Leahy, Marshall, and King again as primary staff spokesmen, were willing to agree but only as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Staff at Teheran. Moreover, they had insisted on the 25th that an action planned against Burma (Operation Buccaneer), which had been promised Chiang Kai-shek, and which had been allocated landing craft, must not be interfered with as a result of the additional Mediterranean actions. During the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 26th, Alanbrooke raised the matter again to advise that if the Mediterranean ventures they wished were to be carried out, and if Operation Buccaneer was also to be mounted, the date of Overlord would be delayed. He advocated "from a purely strategical aspect" that the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider "putting off Operation Buccaneer since by so doing the full weight of our resources could be brought to bear on Germany."^ Neither Marshall or Leahy could agree to accept postponement of Buccaneer for a number of reasons, but especially for political reasons involving the President's promise to the Generalissimo. Alanbrooke has noted that "Marshall and I had the father and mother of a row! We had to come to an off the record meeting and then began to make some progress."^3

The matter was not resolved prior to the meetings at Teheran, however, and the uncertainty of the availability of landing craft,

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1Minutes 131st Meeting CCS, 26 November 1943, as included in Foreign Relations 1943, p. 363.
2Minutes as footnote above, p. 364.
3Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 57.
assigned to Buccaneer, for possible use in other operations created problems which had to be dealt with at Cairo after the Teheran conference was over.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill had tried for a long time to arrange the meeting with Stalin which finally took place on 29 November 1943.\(^1\) For Roosevelt, it meant the opportunity to exercise his charm on Stalin and firmly establish Russian support, so vital to his goal of post war international cooperation as a means of peace keeping. Churchill had mixed feelings. Up until this time, and until Overlord proved successful, the Prime Minister held victory as the major goal for his nation. He consistently had refused to admit political post war connotations to his Balkan military proposals.\(^2\) His suggestions to Roosevelt had usually found warm response. Teheran, however, might bring a change, for whereas in the past the Prime Minister had been at least half owner in the partnership for victory, once Roosevelt had made contact with Stalin, the British influence might wane. On the other hand, Churchill also knew how to deal with fellow statesmen. He too was vitally interested in the Russian ability to support his cause for he realized the war was not likely to be won without the smashing power of the Red army.

\(^1\)"On December 14, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Stalin about his wish that they could meet personally . . ." This statement is contained in Foreign Relations 1943, p. 3. Same reference allocates pp. 3-107 to "Pre-Conference Papers: Arrangements for the Conference." P. 8 same reference indicates Churchill became involved in correspondence with Stalin concerning the Teheran visit in June 1943.

\(^2\)Churchill told Stalin at Teheran "We ourselves have no ambitions in the Balkans. All we want to do is nail down these thirty hostile divisions." (Churchill, V, p. 367).
Therefore, these two leaders of mighty nations approached Teheran in eager anticipation that they could collaborate with the "man of steel" to the mutual advantage of all three.

During the first Plenary session, Roosevelt reaffirmed to Stalin that Overlord was definitely set for the summer of 1944 and that during the preceding eighteen months, all military plans had revolved around the question of relieving the pressures on the Russian front. The President went further and strongly reaffirmed his opposition to any other venture which might delay the start of an immense cross-Channel invasion of Europe, reduce its force, or imperil its outcome. However, the President wanted allied forces to be used in such a way as to bring maximum aid to the Soviet forces on the Eastern front. He added that some of the possibilities might involve a delay in Overlord and that before making any decision as to future extensions of operations in the Mediterranean, he and the Prime Minister wished to have the views of Marshal Stalin. Churchill agreed that the cross-Channel invasion was the highest priority, but he was also very much concerned with the Anglo-American forces then present in the Mediterranean area. It was six months or more before Overlord was to begin and these forces could not stand idle. He felt that the first objective should be to capture Rome and the airfields to the north. Advancing to the Pisa-Rimini Line, the position could be held with a minimum of force and the surplus used to land in Southern France, move up the Rhone valley or to the northern Adriatic and northeast to the Danube.¹ He also asserted that Turkey had

¹Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 488-489.
to be persuaded to enter the war, and subsequently persuaded to seize the
Aegean islands and open the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{1}

Stalin took a different position. He doubted that Turkey could
be brought into the war, and although he felt the capture of Rome and
the specified airfields was desirable, it was not a necessity. He was
insistent in demanding the mounting of Overlord at the earliest possible
time. He added that a pincers movement was always valuable and that a
large scale operation against southern France, prior to the launch of
Overlord, would serve in a very effective manner. He felt that the area
of this supporting attack should be southern France rather than farther
to the east as was suggested by Churchill.\textsuperscript{2}

The President was easily convinced in favor of Stalin's suggestion,
for his own military staff had been advocating a similar theory of concen­
tration since early 1942. He was therefore insistent that the action
for Overlord be firmly settled and that concentration of the force
through France was the best way. His son, Elliot, who was present at
the conference, reports that the President told him that:

\begin{quote}
The way to kill the most Germans, with the least loss of American
soldiers, is to mount one great big invasion and then slam 'em
with everything we've got. It makes sense to me. It makes sense
to Uncle Joe. It makes sense to all our generals . . . It makes
sense to the Red Army people. That's that. It's the quickest
way to win the war.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}The Turkish Problem is discussed in Andre Visson, \textit{The Coming

\textsuperscript{2}Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 555-564.

\textsuperscript{3}Roosevelt, p. 185.
Churchill presented his arguments in all his eloquence, but Stalin remained adamant. He was opposed to scattering the Allied forces in the Mediterranean. The clear hard fact was that the Soviet Union had seconded the American case for Overlord. Henceforth, the Prime Minister would be fighting a losing battle for secondary operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Stalin insisted in his arguments that what had to be determined, and the points were of major importance, were: the choice of a commander for Overlord, the date for Overlord, and the matter of supporting operations to be undertaken in southern France in connection with Overlord.1

The Soviet reinforcement of the American military case, strongly presented and defended by General Marshall on the staff level, permitted the President to play more freely the middle man's role—between the other two chiefs of state. Years later Churchill, still convinced that the failure at Teheran to adopt his policy was an error, wrote:

I could have gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the prejudices of his military advisers, and drifted to and fro in the argument, with the result that the whole of these subsidiary but gleaming opportunities were cast aside unused.2

Back in Cairo on the 3rd of December, 1943, discussion of the unfinished business concerning the decision for or against Buccaneer was resumed. At the plenary session on December 4, Churchill maintained that the additional attack on southern France would require the landing craft allocated for Buccaneer.3 To support further his contention that the

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1 Minutes Second Plenary Meeting, November 29, 1943, as contained in Foreign Relations 1943, p. 537.


amphibious support for China should be withdrawn, on December 5, a newly revised estimate for the manpower required for Buccaneer was received from Admiral Mountbatten. This new estimate was so much greater than previous estimates that to mount the operation as planned would be impossible. Therefore, Marshall concurred with the British staff, and Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to the abandonment of the plan.\textsuperscript{1} Hence, the British won a point too. The partners could now join forces for Overlord. One of them, the Americans, had yielded on the Burma campaign in support of China in the interest of assuring early victory in Europe. The other, Britain, had yielded on the eastern Mediterranean operation.

Through the deliberations at Cairo and Teheran, the Anglo-American partnership solidified their strategy. The decision for a firm objective was made. Overlord became the main operation against which the two nations would bend their mutual efforts—at least in Europe. In response to Stalin's three requirements for Overlord, the President: (1) chose General Eisenhower as commander, because he felt "I could not sleep at night with you (Marshall) out of the country;"\textsuperscript{2} (2) set the date for May; and (3) agreed to Operation Anvil against southern France.

\textsuperscript{1}The new estimate was four times greater than the original. Mountbatten adequately justified the increase on a basis of immediate British and American experience in "island-hopping" operations, but cost in landing craft at the time precluded approval. (Churchill, V, pp. 411-441).

\textsuperscript{2}Sherwood, p. 802.
The midwar compromises were now a common goal. National interests were merged in the final drive for victory over Nazi Germany. The period of closest cooperation was about to begin.¹

¹An editorial of the day said: "Thus the bell that tolls out the world of Hitler and Tojo rings in a world of a possible democratic future. It rings in a world not perfect, but livable, not certain but now clearly approaching, for which the masses of common men have fought and hoped." ("Four Men Reshape the World," The New Republic, A Journal of Opinion, CIX, (December 13, 1943).)
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show in this study that national interests, as interpreted by respective leaders, have primary influence on the decisions of a cooperative international enterprise. Final decisions reflect the efforts of national leaders to attain their primary national goals as compromise becomes effective. We have seen that each of four fairly well-defined episodes or sets of events in the successful Anglo-American World War II cooperation reveal differences in opinion held by the main personalities. It is fair to add that the opinions of these people were based upon more than just the current facts with which they lived. The life experiences of Roosevelt and Churchill certainly colored their separate evaluations of world problems. Recollections of methods successfully employed before also greatly influenced the approach to solutions advocated by both men. We can't say beyond doubt how influential these recollections were, but they may have been dominant in Roosevelt's motivation. Herbert Feis calls this reference to previous experience "historical memories", and has suggested them as having impact "on some of the outstanding decisions of American wartime diplomacy."¹

That the President concurred in the Wilson philosophy is clear. However, his recollection of the Wilson failure influenced him to proceed with caution both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, at the opportune moment, he moved to express to the world the principles which would support his hoped-for system of international cooperation. The moment was the Atlantic Conference, and the pronouncement was the Atlantic Charter.

Churchill was in agreement with Roosevelt's views, but more for reasons of what he considered to be Britain's primary goal of victory than for post-war purposes. By joining the United States in the issuance of such a proclamation as the Atlantic Charter, Britain established herself in close partnership with the nation upon whose resources her goal depended. Admittedly, bonus results of good feeling toward Britain would result from the non-Axis nations as a result of this adherence to high principles. However, at the time, the Prime Minister's primary conference objective was cementing relations with "our good friend" and advancing the cooperation.

The Atlantic Conference having enabled closer acquaintance and understanding between the two principals of the Anglo-American cooperation, a real working conference logically followed the violent entry of the United States into the war. Such a conference was Arcadia, where Anglo-American grand strategy had its beginning. The politico-military decisions which flowed from that first Washington conference were

1Churchill, III, p. 447.
certainly a basis for victory plans and, as such, were satisfying to Churchill as he viewed his objectives. However, in Roosevelt's mind, another accomplishment at Arcadia was motivated by more than just a desire for victory. The agreement to a United Nations organization at that time was the President's second step toward his goal of global peace through international cooperation. Again Churchill joined in, but his goal at Arcadia was to affirm United States' commitment to a strategy of "defeat Germany first." Although Roosevelt agreed to such a sequence of action because of the military logic involved, the political climate in Europe at the time, or soon after, might well have been more important to him. We know of his eagerness to support Stalin, which stemmed in part from a desire to insure post-war Russian cooperation in peace arrangements and post-war settlements. Moreover, it is likely that the President was also vitally interested in having maximum European nations' support of his technique of insuring lasting world peace. For such additional political reasons, Roosevelt could not but agree that the war in Europe had first priority on United States' resources.

Our third event had the appearance of crisis amid cooperation. Strategy had been decided at previous conferences. Indeed, details of the combined action required as a first effort were discussed during the Arcadia meetings. However, preparation for action seemed slow to the Americans, so they made two almost simultaneously moves for positive action, one military, and the other political. The Marshall Memorandum was the military move, which, in advocating early cross-Channel invasion,
represented the American strategic philosophy of a direct approach. Roosevelt made the political move when he implied to Molotov the likelihood of 1942 Anglo-American action for a Second Front. British conviction that such action would be courting disaster brought about the Second Washington Conference and Churchill's successful efforts to divert American force to a North African campaign. The resulting compromise decision satisfied in part all three influencing factors of our study. Roosevelt was aiding Stalin as promised, although in a somewhat restrained manner; Churchill's victory cause was pursued; and military action was in accord with British strategy of attrition, while at the same time acceding to the President's political demand for "action in 1942." Success of the North African venture should thus have fostered even stronger cooperation between the two allies, but Churchill's influence and Roosevelt's somewhat arbitrary political decision for the North African campaign generated suspicion and ill-feeling in American circles toward British military strategy.

These strategic differences played a leading role in the series of events surrounding our fourth episode, during which time progressive decisions were made for launching the cross-Channel invasion and a Second Front. The basic differences had their source in respective national capabilities and experiences. Whereas, the British utilized its navy to supplement relatively small ground forces and wished, through several small military actions, to disperse large and powerful German concentrations of force, the Americans wished to mass relatively large forces in a concentrated manner, "soften up" the enemy area by air attack, and mount an invasion.
The British did not oppose a cross-Channel operation. Indeed, they agreed that it was necessary to final victory. However, the British differed with the Americans in the matter of when the attack should take place. British arguments notwithstanding, the American military leaders pressed for an early cross-Channel attack for a concentrated, quick, and decisive winning of the war. Since both the President and Prime Minister concerned themselves with bringing the Alliance through the war intact, with the hope of continuing it for purposes of peace, they concentrated on reconciling strategic differences. The result, as it emerged from the mid-war conferences, was a compromise slanted toward the American desire and was finally agreed as the Overlord Plan.

Although not discussed at length in the main body of this paper, two points, emphasized by the President throughout the mid-war period, reflect the importance he attached to early and decisive action in a Second Front. The first point was his insistence that territorial and political settlements with the Allies be postponed until after the war. Indeed, in May 1942, he intervened during Anglo-Russian treaty negotiations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concessions to the USSR, even though at the time Churchill was willing to yield to the Soviet desire. The second point reflecting the influence Roosevelt's post-war goals had on his mid-war stand on the Second Front was his formula of unconditional surrender. Although there has been strong feeling expressed, both pro and con, by a number of writers in the field, concerning the wisdom of the formula, it is preferable to accept the historian's reflection that "a statement of the only terms on which we would make peace did not mean,
as has been alleged so often, that the President's military and political aims were unlimited.\textsuperscript{1} Rather, there was to be no compromise with those who fomented war. In effect, the President wanted to drive a wedge between enemy governments and their people. His unconditional surrender statement was a dramatic slogan to serve notice on enemy and ally alike that there would be no "escape clauses" offered in exchange for peace as followed World War I. Thus, by adherence to postponement of territorial settlements and insistence upon "no strings attached" to suits for surrender, plus a decisive victory as promised by strong cross-Channel invasion, Roosevelt could appear at the peace table uncommitted. Then, from his and Churchill's dominant position within the center of a United Nations organization, they would foster the purposes, while avoiding the errors, of President Wilson's World War I experience.

\textsuperscript{1}Loewenheim, pp. 109-110.
My Dear Mr. President,

1. As we reach the end of this year, I feel you will expect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941. I do so with candour and confidence, because it seems to me that the vast majority of American citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United States, as well as the future of our two Democracies and the kind of civilisation for which they stand, is bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Only thus can those bastions of sea-power, upon which the control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans depend, be preserved in faithful and friendly hands. The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy is indispensable to the security and trade routes of both our countries, and the surest means of preventing war from reaching the shores of the United States.

2. There is another aspect. It takes between three and four years to convert the industries of a modern state to war purposes.

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1Churchill, II, pp. 475-482.
Saturation-point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can be spared from civil needs has been applied to war production. Germany certainly reached this point by the end of 1939. We in the British Empire are now only about halfway through the second year. The United States, I should suppose, is by no means so far advanced as we. Moreover, I understand that immense programmes of naval, military, and air defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly two years are needed. It is our British duty in the common interest, as also for our own survival, to hold the front and grapple with the Nazi power until the preparations of the United States are complete. Victory may come before two years are out; but we have no right to count upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible. Therefore, I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly consideration that there is a solid identity of interest between the British Empire and the United States while these conditions last. It is upon this footing that I venture to address you.

3. The form which this war has taken, and seems likely to hold, does not enable us to match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre where their main power can be brought to bear. We can, however, by the use of sea-power and air-power, meet the German armies in regions where only comparatively small forces can be brought into action. We must do our best to prevent the German domination of Europe spreading into Africa and into Southern Asia. We have also to maintain in constant readiness in this island armies strong enough to make the problem of an oversea invasion insoluble. For these purposes we are forming as fast as possible, as you are already aware, between fifty and sixty divisions. Even
if the United States were our ally, instead of our friend and indispensable partner, we should not ask for a large American expeditionary army. Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor, and the power to transport munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large numbers of soldiers.

4. The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies and for Europe. The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recovery by Great Britain fighting alone, but with the invaluable aid in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by the great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief.

5. The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift, overwhelming blow has for the time being very greatly receded. In its place, there is a long, gradually maturing danger, less sudden and less spectacular, but equally deadly. This mortal danger is the steady and increasing diminution of sea tonnage. We can endure the shattering of our dwellings and the slaughter of our civil population by indiscriminate air attacks, and we hope to parry these increasingly as our science develops, and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy. The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas. Unless we can establish our ability to feed this island, to import the munitions of all kinds which we need, unless we can move our armies to the various theatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them there, and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on till the spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by the way, and the time needed by the United States to complete her
defensive preparations may not be forthcoming. It is, therefore, in shipping and in the power to transport across the oceans, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war will be found. If, on the other hand, we are able to move the necessary tonnage to and fro across salt water indefinitely, it may well be that the application of superior air-power to the German homeland and the rising anger of the German and other Nazi-gripped populations will bring the agony of civilisation to a merciful and glorious end.

But do not let us underrate the task.

6. Our shipping losses, the figures for which in recent months are appended, have been on a scale almost comparable to that of the worst year of the last war. In the five weeks ending November 3, losses reached a total of 420,300 tons. Our estimate of annual tonnage which ought to be imported in order to maintain our effort at full strength is forty-three million tons. Were this diminution to continue at this rate, it would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time. Although we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the difficulty of limiting losses is obviously much greater than in the last war. We lack the assistance of the French Navy, and above all of the United States Navy, which was of such vital help to us during the culminating years. The enemy commands the ports all around the northern and western coasts of France. He is increasingly basing his submarines, flying-boats, and combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the French coast. We are denied the use of the ports or territory of Eire in which to organise our coastal patrols by air and sea. In fact, we
have only one effective route of entry to the British Isles, namely, the northern approaches, against which the enemy is increasingly concentrating, reaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long-distance aircraft bombing. In addition, there have for some months been merchant-ship raiders, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. And now we have the powerful warship raider to contend with as well. We need ships both to hunt down and to escort. Large as are our resources and preparations, we do not possess enough.

7. The next six or seven months will bring relative battleship strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory. Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in service in January. We have already King George V, and hope to have Prince of Wales in-the-line at the same time. These modern ships are, of course, far better armoured, especially against air attack, than vessels like Rodney and Nelson, designed twenty years ago. We have recently had to use Rodney on transatlantic escort, and at any time, when numbers are so small, a mine or a torpedo may alter decisively the strength of the line of battle. We get relief in June, when the Duke of York will be ready, and shall be still better off at the end of 1941, when Anson also will have joined. But these two first-class modern 35,000-ton fifteen-inch-gun German battleships force us to maintain a concentration never previously necessary in this war.

8. We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out of action for a while, and anyway they are not so dangerous as if they were manned by Germans. Perhaps they might be! We are indebted to you for your help about the Richelieu and Jean Bart, and I daresay that will be all right.
But, Mr. President, as no one will see more clearly than you, we have during these months to consider for the first time in this war a fleet action in which the enemy will have two ships at least as good as our two best and only two modern ones. It will be impossible to reduce our strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey, and indeed the whole position in the Eastern Basin, depends upon our having a strong fleet there. The older, unmodernised battleships will have to go for convoy. Thus, even in the battleship class we are in full extension.

9. There is a second field of danger: The Vichy Government may, either by joining Hitler's New Order in Europe or through some manoeuvre, such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against the Free French Colonies, find an excuse for ranging with the Axis Powers the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control. If the French Navy were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass immediately into their hands, with the gravest consequences to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, and also affecting Dakar and of course thereafter South America.

10. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here it seems clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-China to Saigon and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. It is reported that the Japanese are preparing five good divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary force. We have today no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation should it develop.

11. In the face of these dangers we must try to use the year 1941 to build up such a supply of weapons, particularly of aircraft, both by
increased output at home in spite of bombardment, and through ocean-borne supplies, as will lay the foundations of victory. In view of the difficulty and magnitude of this task, as outlined by all the facts I have set forth, to which many others could be added, I feel entitled, nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects, the common cause.

12. The prime need is to check or limit the loss of tonnage on the Atlantic approaches to our island. This may be achieved both by increasing the naval forces which cope with the attacks and by adding to the number of merchant ships on which we depend. For the first purpose there would seem to be the following alternatives:

(1) The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous methods of warfare, in accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935. From this, United States ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not an effective legal blockade.

(2) It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and air flotillas. The protection would be immensely more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for the duration of the war. I think it is improbable that such protection would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States, though probably sea incidents of a dangerous character would from time to time occur. Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the
Kaiser's mistake. He does not wish to be drawn into war with the United States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain. His maxim is "One at a time."

The policy I have ventured to outline, or something like it, would constitute a decisive act of constructive non-belligerency by the United States, and, more than any other measure, would make it certain that British resistance could be effectively prolonged for the desired period and victory gained.

(3) Failing the above, the gift, loan, or supply of a large number of American vessels of war, above all destroyers, already in the Atlantic is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. Further, could not the United States Naval Forces extend their sea-control of the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent the molestation by enemy vessels of the approaches to the new line of naval and air bases which the United States is establishing in British islands in the Western Hemisphere? The strength of the United States Naval Forces is such that the assistance in the Atlantic that they could afford us, as described above, would not jeopardise the control of the Pacific.

(4) We should also then need the good offices of the United States and the whole influence of its Government, continually exerted, to procure for Great Britain the necessary facilities upon the southern and western shores of Eire for our flotillas, and still more important, for our aircraft, working to the westward into the Atlantic. If it were proclaimed an American interest that the resistance of Great Britain should be prolonged and the Atlantic route kept open for the important armaments now being prepared for Great Britain in North America, the
Irish in the United States might be willing to point out to the Government of Eire the dangers which its present policy is creating for the United States itself.

His Majesty's Government would, of course, take the most effective measures beforehand to protect Ireland if Irish action exposed it to German attack. It is not possible for us to compel the people of Northern Ireland against their will to leave the United Kingdom and join Southern Ireland. But I do not doubt that if the Government of Eire would show its solidarity with the democracies of the English-speaking world at this crisis, a Council for Defense of all Ireland could be set up out of which the unity of the island would probably in some form or other emerge after the war.

13. The object of the foregoing measures is to reduce to manageable proportions the present destructive losses at sea. In addition, it is indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great Britain, and for waging of the war by Great Britain with all vigour, should be substantially increased beyond the 1,250,000 tons per annum which is the utmost we can now build. The convoy system, the detours, the zigzags, the great distances from which we now have to bring our imports, and the congestion of our western harbours, have reduced by about one-third the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage. To ensure final victory, not less than three million tons of additional merchant shipbuilding capacity will be required. Only the United States can supply this need. Looking to the future, it would seem that production on a scale comparable to that of the Hog Island scheme of the last war ought to be faced for 1942. In the meanwhile, we ask that in 1941 the
United States should make available to us every ton of merchant shipping, surplus to its own requirements, which it possesses or controls, and to find some means of putting into our service a large proportion of merchant shipping now under construction for the National Maritime Board.

14. Moreover, we look to the industrial energy of the Republic for a reinforcement of our domestic capacity to manufacture combat aircraft. Without the reinforcement reaching us in substantial measure, we shall not achieve the massive preponderance in the air on which we must rely to loosen and disintegrate the German grip on Europe. We are at present engaged on a programme designed to increase our strength to seven thousand first-line aircraft by the spring of 1942. But it is abundantly clear that this programme will not suffice to give us the weight of superiority which will force open the doors of victory. In order to achieve such superiority, it is plain that we shall need the greatest production of aircraft which the United States of America is capable of sending us. It is our anxious hope that in the teeth of continuous bombardment we shall realise the greater part of the production which we have planned in this country. But not even with the addition to our squadrons of all the aircraft which, under present arrangements, we may derive from planned output in the United States can we hope to achieve the necessary ascendancy. May I invite you then, Mr. President, to give earnest consideration to an immediate order for a further two thousand combat aircraft a month? Of these aircraft, I would submit, the highest possible proportion should be heavy bombers, the weapon on which, above all others, we depend to shatter the foundations of German military power. I am aware of the formidable task that this would impose upon
the industrial organisation of the United States. Yet, in our heavy need, we call with confidence to the most resourceful and ingenious technicians in the world. We ask for an unexampled effort, believing that it can be made.

15. You have also received information about the needs of our armies. In the munitions sphere, in spite of enemy bombing, we are making steady progress here. Without your continued assistance in the supply of machine tools and in further releases from stock of certain articles, we could not hope to equip as many as fifty divisions in 1941. I am grateful for the arrangements, already practically completed, for your aid in the equipment of the army which we have already planned, and for the provision of the American type of weapons for an additional ten divisions in time for the campaign of 1942. But when the tide of dictatorship begins to recede, many countries trying to regain their freedom may be asking for arms, and there is no source to which they can look except the factories of the United States. I must, therefore, also urge the importance of expanding to the utmost American productive capacity for small arms, artillery, and tanks.

16. I am arranging to present you with a complete programme of the munitions of all kinds which we seek to obtain from you, the greater part of which is, of course, already agreed. An important economy of time and effort will be produced if the types selected for the United States Services should, whenever possible, conform to those which have proved their merit under the actual conditions of war. In this way reserves of guns and ammunition and of airplanes becomes interchangeable,
and are by that very fact augmented. This is, however, a sphere so highly technical that I do not enlarge upon it.

17. Last of all, I come to the question of Finance. The more rapid and abundant the flow of munitions and ships which you are able to send us, the sooner will our dollar credits be exhausted. They are already, as you know, very heavily drawn upon by the payments we have made to date. Indeed, as you know, the orders already placed or under negotiation, including the expenditure settled or pending for creating munitions factories in the United States, many times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the disposal of Great Britain. The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies. While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or economic interests of either of our countries. We here should be unable, after the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to your tariffs and industrial economy. Not only should we in Great Britain suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States would follow the curtailment of American exporting power.
18. Moreover, I do not believe that the Government and the people of the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which guide them to confind the help which they have so generously promised only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately paid for. You may be certain that we shall prove ourselves ready to suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in being its champions. The rest we leave with confidence to you and to your people, being sure that ways and means will be found which future generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire.

19. If, as I believe, you are convinced, Mr. President, that the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence to the people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose.
APPENDIX II

LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE STUDY

Alexander, General Sir Harold, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

Arnold, Henry H., General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and Chief of the Air Staff.

Beaverbrook, Lord William M. A., British Minister of Production (for period of our interest).

Brooke, Sir Alan, General, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. (Referred to throughout this study as Alanbrooke. This is due to his having become a Lord in the British Government during the World War, thereafter being called Lord Alanbrooke.)

Cadogan, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.


Cunningham, Sir Andrew, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. (Replaced Admiral Sir Dudley Pound when latter died in September 1943.)


Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Eisenhower, Dwight D., General, U. S. A., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northwest Africa; designated as Commander of Overlord on December 5, 1943, with effect of designation to be at a later date; entered upon the duties of the position of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces in January 1944.

Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador in the Soviet Union for latter part of period of this study.

Hitler, Adolf, Fuhrer and Chancellor of the German Reich.

Hopkins, Harry L., Special Assistant to the President.

Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State, United States.

Ismay, Sir Hastings Lionel, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense.

Kennan, George F., Counselor of Legation in Portugal from August 1942; Counselor of the American Delegation to the European Advisory Commission from December 1, 1943.

King, Ernest J., Admiral, U. S. N., Commander in Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

Knox, Frank, U. S. Secretary of Navy.

Leahy, William D., Admiral, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy, Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Marshall, George C., General U. S. A., Chief of Staff of the Army; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Molotov, Vyacheslov M., People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Admiral, R. N., Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

Portal, Sir Charles, Air Chief Marshall, R. A. F., Chief of the Air Staff.

Pound, Sir Dudley, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff until his death in September 1943.
Roosevelt, Elliott, Colonel, U. S. A., Commanding Officer, 90th Photo Reconnaissance Wing, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; son of President Roosevelt.

Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States, March 4, 1933- April 12, 1945.

Stalin, Josif V., Marshall of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War, 1940-1945.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945-1953.

Wedemeyer, Albert C., Major General, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Southeast Asia Command. Earlier, he was the Chief Planner for the U. S. Army.

Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary of State for United States for the period of this study.
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