American diplomatic relations with Korea (1866-1910)

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AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH KOREA (1866-1910)

by

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American Diplomatic Relations with Korea (1866-1910)

Korea is a peninsula extending out from the mainland of Asia, bounded on three sides by the sea and on the north by the Maritime Province of the Far Eastern Republic and Manchuria. Its seventeen hundred miles of seacoast is rugged and dotted with many mountainous islands and good harbors. The largest port is Fusan, one hundred and sixty-three miles from Nagasaki, Japan. It is a thriving commercial center with a population of over a hundred thousand. The capital, Seoul, is situated in about the center of the country and it has a population of over three hundred thousand.

Korea is about the size of New York state. Its climate and density of population is closely akin to that of the eastern part of the United States in the same latitude. The principal industries are mining, agriculture, and fishing with much of the mining in hands other than Korean. Korea is rich in natural resources which are ample enough to support her population. Due to the exclusiveness of the country the foreign elements have never settled there as much as in China. In 1919, the foreign nationalities in Korea totaled as follows: Japanese, 350,000; Chinese 16,682; Americans 687; English 230; French 97; Germans 53; Russians 14. Practically all of the Americans in the country are either missionaries or are engaged in the mining industry.¹

The position of Korea made it well nigh impossible for her to escape her ultimate fate. Her unfortunate location between the two great powers of China and Japan was responsible for keeping her in a constant state of invasion, vassalage and tribute. With the penetration of Russia, another factor entered which was to lead eventually to war and finally to Korean annexation to Japan. Korea was absolutely necessary for Japan's future welfare; likewise, it was necessary to achieve Russia's aim for an all year around ice free port on the Pacific. The result was inevitable.

In discussing accidental relations with Korea it is well to go back to the year 1777. In that year, Roman Catholic Christianity entered Korea by way of Peking where Korean students had come in contact with the Jesuits. Gradually the doctrines spread, until in 1836, when the first French missionary penetrated the country in disguise, there were thousands of believers. By 1864, no fewer than nineteen Frenchmen had passed the barriers of the frontiers in disguise, or landed at night on the coast. Some, of course, died in the attempt but others were always ready to carry on. The period from 1864 to 1868 may be called the turning point in the history of modern Korea, when both internal and foreign affairs began to culminate.²

The year 1866 marked the real beginning of American relations with Korea. At the beginning of that year the Korean Government began a persecution of the Christian missionaries and natives in that country. Three bishops and seventeen priests were put to death as well as many of the native converts. The missionaries, with few exceptions, were French subjects. The result of this persecution was the dispatching of the French Asiatic fleet to Korean waters.3

Before Admiral Rose reached Korea, the American steamer General Sherman went to that country on a trading expedition. It had on board three Americans, two British subjects, and a crew of nineteen Manila men as sailors.4 The vessel entered the Ta-Tong River and sailed up it to the vicinity of Ping-An, where a few days afterwards the entire crew was killed and the vessel burned. The news of the disaster of the General Sherman was transmitted to Anson Burlingame by Admiral Rose on the return of the French squadron from its preliminary reconnoitering.5 Burlingame immediately notified the State Department of the occurrence and, at the same time, protested to Prince Kung, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Korea was considered as


4. Ibid. 1867, pp. 415-16.

5. Ibid., p. 426.

Burlingame to Seward, Dec. 15, 1866: "It is my painful duty to inform you that the United States schooner General Sherman, while on a trading voyage to Corea was destroyed and all on board murdered by the natives. The news was brought to Chefoo by Admiral Rose of the French fleet....."
a tributary state of China but Kung disavowed all responsibil-
ity for the Koreans and stated that the only connection between
the two countries was one of ceremonial. 6

Burlingame also reported the case to the American admiral
on the Asiatic station with the suggestion that he inquire
into the facts and report on the same to the government at
Washington for instructions. The British admiral was like­
wise notified by the British Minister to China. In view of
the strained situation that was arising in regard to Korea and
the possible concentration of a large French and British naval
force, Burlingame wrote to Secretary of State Seward:

"My colleagues have written to their admirals
and I suppose in the spring there will be a
large fleet in Korea. The issue of all will
be the opening of the country. If my advice
can have weight, it will be that our presence
there will rather restrain than promote aggres­
sion and serve to limit action to such satis­
faction only as great and civilized nations
should, under the circumstances, have from
the ignorant and the weak." 7

Seward investigated the matter and, having satisfied
himself that Burlingame's fears were unfounded, and that no
hostile steps were being contemplated, assured the American
Minister that no such measures were necessary.

In the meantime, however, the French charge d'affaires
to China, M. de Bellonot, had taken a high handed attitude

7. Ibid., p. 426.
towards the Chinese Government over the massacre of the Christian missionaries in Korea. He told Prince Kung that the French were going "to march to the conquest of Korea" and that the "vacant throne" would be at the disposal of the Emperor of the French. Kung, of course, refused to recognize the French claim. Nevertheless, de Bellonnet kept up an arrogant and war-like correspondence for the evident purpose of intimidating the Chinese Government. 8

On October 5, 1866, Admiral Rose, who had returned to Korea, proclaimed a blockade of the Seoul River. This seemed to embolden de Bellonnet still further with the result that he sent the following note to Prince Kung:

"......Your imperial highness is probably ignorant that war, which for us is a pleasure, which the French passionately seek, is far from being detrimental to the people at large...the people of Corea are far from being hostile...[they] address us as their deliverers." 9

8 Diplomatic Correspondence, op. cit., p. 420

M. de Bellonnet to Prince Kung, July 13, 1866: "The government of his Majesty cannot permit so bloody an outrage to be unpunished. The same day upon which the King of Corea laid his hands upon my unhappy countrymen was the last of his reign; he himself proclaimed its end which I in turn solemnly declare today. In a few days our military forces are to march to the conquest of Corea, and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone, has now the right and the power to dispose, according to his pleasure, of the country and of the vacant throne."

9 Ibid, p. 423.
Prince Kung, evidently not knowing what to make of the French charges bellicose communications, turned to Minister Burlingame for advice. Burlingame told him that he had done nothing that was wrong and that if such action "called forth menaces, he could rest strong in the consciousness of good intentions, and submit, with confidence, the correspondence to the impartial judgment of the civilized world." ¹⁰

Immediately after this conversation, the correspondence of M. de Bellonet and Prince Kung was sent to each of the foreign legations in Peking. This embarrassed the French charge to such an extent that he accused Prince Kung of "ignorance of international and diplomatic usages" for publishing their notes. ¹¹

The French expedition to Korea suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Koreans who greatly outnumbered them. They then considered sending another expedition to Korea and evidently had the approval of Seward who made a verbal offer to cooperate with the French to obtain from the King of Korea satisfaction for the murder of the nationals of their respective

¹⁰. *Diplomatic Correspondence*, op. cit., p. 419.

¹¹. Ibid, p. 424

"de Bellonet to Kung, November 25, 1866:
"I have already had occasion many times to say to your excellencies that your ignorance of diplomatic and international usages has caused you to take steps and these have been wrongly interpreted in Europe. That which you have just done, in submitting our correspondence on the subject of Corea to the representatives of the powers in Peking, comes under this category."
countries. This second expedition was never sent and the United States was saved from what might have been an entangling venture. 12

Seward now turned to the question of a treaty with the King of Korea. His nephew, George F. Seward, American consul-general at Shanghai, reported the presence of some Korean envoys who had indicated a willingness on the part of their government to enter into a treaty. He requested Seward's permission for a commission to repair to Korea to attempt negotiations. 13 His request was granted and he was given a letter from President Johnson to the King, and was authorized to proceed to Korea, supported by a naval force, "to procure a treaty of amity and commerce as nearly similar in its provisions to those existing between the United States and Japan as may be found practicable and expedient." 14

12. Tyler Dennett, Seward's Far Eastern Policy, in American Historical Review, October 1922, pp. 54-57.
George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the United States, (New York, 1925) p. 194.
Foster R. Dulles, America in the Pacific (Cambridge 1932) p. 85

13. Foreign Relations of the U. S., (Washington, 1871) pp. 336-37. George F. Seward to William H. Seward, April 24, 1868: "I respectfully propose ....to proceed to Corea in order to ask for an official explanation of the Sherman affair, and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and commerce similar to those now existing with China and Japan, or such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and attainable without exercise or show of force."

In the instructions given to Seward the aims of the United States were set forth:

"The design of this government is to render your visit a generous and friendly one, reserving the question of force, if found necessary, for ultimate consideration. You will not be expected therefore to direct the exercise or make any display of force by way of intimidation, but on the other hand you will be expected to practice discretion, prudence, and patience, while firmly asserting the dignity and maintaining the demands of the United States. You will, however, give notice to the Korean Government, if you find it expedient, that this government cannot suffer the outrage committed in the case of the General Sherman to remain indefinitely without receiving proper guarantee of adequate and ample redress."

The proposed expedition of George Seward was never undertaken for he discovered that he had been duped by the so-called Korean envoys and that they did not represent the government of the peninsula kingdom. Rather, their purpose had been to steal some burial relics held in great veneration by the ruler of Korea. Mr. Oppert, the leader of the party claimed that the ultimate purpose of the expedition in gaining the possession of the relics was to extort a treaty of commerce from Korea and to make commercial intercourse the price for the return of the stolen bones, corpses, and ancestral tablets. The party was surprised by the Koreans at their work and driven off. Among the group was an American named Jenkins who went along as an interpreter and who also furnished most of the capital. Seward now investigated Jenkins's connection with the expedition and determined to bring him to trial. He was tried in the United States Consulate Court in Shanghai and charged with "making an

15. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 420
unlawful and scandalous expedition to Corea, and of violently attempting to land in a country with which the United States had no treaty relations." Jenkins was, however, acquitted on a technicality. Oppert, the leader, could not be tried as he was a citizen of the North German Confederation. 16

In 1867, the U. S. S. Massachusetts visited Korea for the purpose of investigating the Sherman affair and in 1868, the U. S. S. Shenandoah made a visit for the same purpose. Neither, however, accomplished anything. It is interesting to note that the captain of the Massachusetts was Commander Robert W. Shufclét who was to figure prominently in negotiating our first treaty with Korea in 1882. 17

The failure of the Massachusetts and Shenandoah expeditions did not deter the United States from continuing to try and open relations with Korea. On October 14, 1868, George Seward wrote to Secretary of State Seward:

"France has been unfortunate in Corea. Great Britain has hardly a greater interest at stake than we, and no grievances to redress. North Germany, with her increasing commerce and great fleets of coasting crafts, has yet no determined policy in the East.

16. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 337
We are favourably known, and all the circumstances indicate that an attempt to open the country may best be made by us." 18

This prompting by Seward was ignored until 1871. In that year, Admiral Rodgers suggested the sending of a naval expedition to that country for the purpose of opening it to foreign intercourse. The American Government finally decided to make the attempt to negotiate a treaty and to entrust the negotiations to Mr. F. F. Low, the American Minister to China, and to furnish him with a naval escort. 19 Low thereupon requested the good offices of the Chinese Government in sending a letter to the king of Korea which would serve as an introductory explanation of the mission. He was notified by the Chinese that Korea was an independent country insofar as relations with foreign governments were concerned. China took this course so as to be able to disclaim any responsibility should trouble arise out of the negotiations. 20 In discussing Korea during this period it is necessary to include China due to the relationship existing between the two countries. This relationship is hard to define for while Korea paid an annual tribute to Peking and was therefore a vassal state yet, in cases involving foreign expeditions, interventions, and other external relations, Korea was supposed to be competent enough to be able to handle

18. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 338


20. Foreign Relations, 1871-72, p. 111
her own affairs. The writer will endeavor to show this relationship as clearly as possible during the course of this paper. Perhaps the true relationship between Korea and China may be best expressed in modern language by saying that Korea was one of the "self-governing dominions" of the Chinese Empire. 21

Low's instructions were to secure a treaty looking to the protection of shipwrecked mariners. Furthermore, should a favourable opportunity appear for the obtaining of commercial advantages, the proposed treaty was to include provisions to that effect. 22


22. Ibid, pp. 334-35. Secretary of State Fish to Low, April 20, 1870: "It has been decided to authorize negotiations to be had with the authorities of Corea, for the purpose of securing a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked mariners, and to intrust the conduct of the negotiations to you. Should the opportunity seem favourable for obtaining commercial advantages in Corea, the proposed treaty should include provisions to the effect; but the President principally aims in this mission to secure protection for such seamen of the United States as may unhappily be wrecked upon those shores.... The Department relies upon you, in fulfilling these instructions, to exercise prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly the right of the United States to have their seamen protected, to avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor, and to seek in all proper ways the harmonious and friendly assistance of the Chinese Government."
Low was loath to undertake the mission for he was convinced in his own mind that it was useless and not worth while. He had endeavoured to get what information on the country that he could but with little success; he was doubtful if the good offices of the Chinese Government would prove of much value; he was not "sanguine" over the results of the expedition. However, Admiral Rodgers saw the brighter side of the affair for he said:

"The anticipations vary very much as to the reception we shall probably meet. I will hope, until facts dispel hope, that we shall meet with success. The time has come, I infer from what I learn, for the Koreans to make a treaty; and if we do not succeed now, some other power or powers will probably be more fortunate."

On the 30th of May, 1871, Low and Rodgers with six American war vessels, arrived at the mouth of the Han River, some thirty miles below Seoul. They were immediately visited by some Koreans who came on board to ascertain the object of the expedition. They were informed that Mr. Low had important business to transact with their government, which could be made known only to a person of equal rank with the Minister and who would also have to be a representative of the king. They were further told that it was the desire of the United States to establish friendly relations with Korea and that they were not there to make trouble.


On June 1, 1871, a surveying party was sent up the river to take soundings. They were fired on by the natives and in the ensuing fight two American sailors were wounded and twenty or more Koreans killed and wounded. 26 Low immediately demanded an apology but it was not forthcoming. Both Low and Rodgers decided to bide their time so as to give the Koreans ample opportunity to confess their errors and, incidentally, to strengthen their own preparations in case no redress was made. The American representatives did not seem to realize that they had probably been in the wrong in sending out a survey party in a foreign country, especially one with which we had no relations whatsoever.

The king of Korea did not send an apology but he did send a letter which evaded the issue and which showed that he did not want to make a treaty with the United States. He denied all responsibility for the Sherman affair and cited the instance of good treatment accorded to the shipwrecked sailors of the American ship Surprise in 1868. Low did not deign to reply. 27

On June 10, 1871, the retaliatory expedition started up the river. The work that it was sent to do was accomplished. Five forts were taken, which with the munitions found in them,


27. Paulin, op. cit., pp. 290-91

The Surprise was wrecked on the coast of Korea shortly before the arrival of the General Sherman. The crew was treated with civility and kindness being returned to China by way of Mukden and Niuchang. See Dipl. Correspondence, 1867, pp. 415-17.
were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty Koreans were killed while the American losses were three killed and nine wounded. That the Koreans put up a stubborn resistance can be ascertained from Low's report of the fracas:

"The Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equalled, and never excelled by any people." 28

On June 15, Low addressed a despatch to the king requesting an audience and telling him of the aims of the United States, but it was not forwarded by the Korean officials who were afraid to do so after the recent fighting. Low then sent another despatch to the court saying that he desired to communicate with the king or a high minister and threatening a "prolonged stay in the country" if he did not receive an answer. This note also was not answered. 29

Low, sensing the futility of the mission, left Korea on July 3, 1871. All his efforts had failed to induce the native government to enter into any negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty. He said: "All the evidence obtained goes to prove that the government of Corea was and is determined to maintain its original status—non intercourse with any western nation, and hostile resistance to all attempts of foreign governments to establish relations for whatever purpose." 30

He was fully disgusted for he observes: "As the case now stands, foreign governments should decide either to let Corea alone, and allow her to burn, pillage, destroy, and massacre

28. Foreign Relations, op. cit. p. 128
29. Ibid., pp. 139-41
30. Foreign Relations, op cit. p. 142
all who come within her reach without question or demand for redress, or organize and send such a force as will be able to insure success, without unnecessary risk, in breaking down the barriers that stand in the way of intercourse. No further efforts at conciliatory negotiations should be made, nor should mere demonstrations of force be attempted in the expectation that favourable results will follow." 31

Secretary of State Fish’s reply to Low’s report was rather non-committal although he did reprimand the American Minister for threatening a "prolonged stay in the country," until his note to the king was answered. 32

After the return of the Low-Rodgers expedition, the United States inaugurated a hands-off policy, as far as Korea was concerned, for several years. The visits of the French and American squadrons and their withdrawal without accomplishing their purposes cannot be said to have raised the prestige of Europeans with Korea. Rather, it was looked upon as a victory in defense of the sovereignty of that country.

The Japanese were the next to make the attempt to penetrate into Korea. To no part of the mainland of Asia did Japan lay any claim except that Korea, until 1832, had been accustomed to pay tribute to Japan as well as to China. 33

30. Foreign Relations, op cit. p. 142
31. Ibid. p. 147
32. Ibid, (1872-73) p. 129
After many rebuffs, they were finally successful in 1876 in signing a treaty of intercourse and commerce. The Chinese Government was sounded as to its disposition toward such a treaty but it disclaimed any control of the kingdom in its treaty relations. By the terms of this treaty the independence of Korea was recognized by Japan, three Korean ports were thrown open to Japanese trade, and an accredited Japanese Minister was to reside in Seoul. Its most important clause was the one acknowledging the integrity and independence of the Korean kingdom and thus disavowing the vague but traditional Chinese suzerainty over that country. 34

This furnished an entering wedge for Japan, which already had fairly definite ideas as to her future expansion and penetration of Asiatic territory. "Thus the door was opened to foreigners and the beginning of Korea's loss of sovereignty was inaugurated." 35

In 1874, the American charge d'affaires at Peking reported the removal of the regent of Korea from office. This was the ruler who had successfully defied the Asiatic squadrons of France and America and who was, in large part, responsible for the continual isolation of the 'hermit' kingdom. This report had it that the American assault on the Korean forts in 1871 had had a telling effect on the regent's pol-

34. Dennett, op cit., p. 455
John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, (Boston, 1903), p. 320.

icy of exclusion was in a way responsible for his downfall.

The Japanese-Korean treaty of 1876 again encouraged the American Government to make overtures to Korea. In April 1878, Senator A. A. Sargent of California introduced a resolution into the United States Senate, authorizing the President to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with Korea, "with the aid of the friendly offices of Japan." However, nothing came of this proposal although the friendly offices of the Japanese Government were unsuccessfully tried for at a later date.

Korea and Japan, despite their treaty of 1876, were not on the friendliest of terms. It seems highly probable that the treaty was helped along considerably by the presence of a large number of Japanese marines who accompanied the treaty commission. In 1878, rumors of coming difficulties between the two countries reached the American Minister in Peking.

36. Foreign Relations, 1874-75, pp. 253-54
Williams to Fish, March 30, 1874:
"He (the informant was a Roman Catholic bishop who had fled the country) reports that the disastrous and bloody result to the Coreans of our attack on Fort McKee was used as a strong argument with it (the Regent) of the uselessness of his resisting foreign nations, whose weapons and tactics were so superior to theirs, and their resources so great."

37. Paullin, op. cit., p. 293
United States Congressional Record, Vol. 7, part 3, 1877-78, p. 2324

Whatever the trouble was it seems to have blown over and in 1879, the Korean Government opened the port of Gensan to Japanese trade. Commenting on the treaty opening this port, our Minister to Japan, Mr. J. A. Bingham, said: "With the exception of China and Japan, Corea seems indisposed to hold treaty relations with foreign powers." 39

In 1890, an attempt to negotiate with the Korean Government was made by Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt. Shufeldt had visited Korea on the U.S.S. Massachusetts in 1867 in an endeavor to investigate the Sherman affair, but, as has been pointed out, was unsuccessful. Now it was his purpose to work through the Japanese foreign office. In answer to his request, Shufeldt was refused a direct letter to the Korean Government but did get one addressed to the Japanese consul at Fusan, one of the three treaty ports open to Japan in Korea. On arriving at this port, Shufeldt gave the Japanese consul a letter which he asked to be forwarded to the king of Korea. This missive set forth the American aims with regard to Korea but the Korean governor of the district refused to forward the letter and Shufeldt returned to Japan. 40

He next tried to send a letter to the king of Korea.

39. Ibid., p. 696

through the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was also returned with the explanation that it was wrongly addressed and also that the Korean Government was not desirous of having any foreign relations with other countries except Japan. 41

The effects of these rebuffs upon Shufeldt was that he felt that Japan was not acting in good faith. It was his contention that Japan intended to acquire all the rights and privileges in Korea and to keep all foreigners out. 42 Although his belief was daily being strengthened that he would receive no help from Japan, he did not give up hope. Through the Chinese consul at Nagasaki he got in touch with Li Hung Chang, Viceroy of Chihli and one of the most potent figures in Chinese life. Li invited Shufeldt to come to Tientsin and discuss the situation. The Commodore accepted and, on his arrival, he asked Li to use the influence of China in helping to secure a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea. Li assented to Shufeldt's request and promised to do all that he possibly could. At the same time Li "expressed the hope that .... my

Korean Minister of Ceremony to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs: "It is well known to the world that our foreign relations are with Japan, neighboring to us, which have been maintained since three hundred years, and that other foreign nations are not only situated far from us, but there has never been any intercourse with them."

42. Ibid, p. 298.
government would permit me to assist China in the organization of its navy." Of course there was a purpose to the ready acquiescence of Li to the proposals of Shufeldt and, as a tense situation existed with Russia at the time, he thought that by helping to negotiate a treaty between Korea and the United States it would be possible to create a new great power in Korean affairs that would offset the threatening dominance of Russia in Manchuria and Korea. It is entirely probable that he feared Japanese designs in the peninsula also.

With this encouragement Shufeldt returned to the United States on the U. S. S. Ticonderoga whose period of foreign service had expired. The commodore seems to have had some imperialistic ideas as to America's destiny in the Pacific and to have also had a sense of the importance of Korea out of proportion to its actual value. He even went so far as to suggest to Secretary of the Navy, Thompson that one of the good points of a treaty with Korea would be the protection of

43. Shufeldt, Ticonderoga, II, pp. 466-470, quoted in Paullin, op cit., pp. 299-301
Moore, op. cit., p. 569

44. Dennett, American Choices in the Far East in 1882, American Historical Review, Vol. 30, October 1924, p. 94
"The efforts of China indeed, to establish relations between Corea and the United States, arose from her desire to throw so important and so exposed a fragment of her territory under the moral protection that might possibly come from treaty stipulations with western states."
afforded that country against China, Russia, or Japan. 45

One wonders what Shufeldt thought a treaty of commerce and
amity meant? Fortunately, he was only speaking for himself
and not for the Government of the United States.

On November 14, 1881, Shufeldt was ordered to return to
China and renew his efforts if he should be satisfied that
he "would not meet with another repulse". The main points of
his negotiations were to be the relief of American vessels
which might be shipwrecked on the Korean coast; to obtain
trade rights at the Korean ports open to foreign commerce;
to ask for most favoured nation treatment; freedom of travel
in the interior for purposes of trade; and such privileges
of extra-territorial jurisdiction as were enjoyed by China
and Japan. 46

Shufeldt did not return to China as the commander of an

45. Shufeldt, Ticonderoga, II, pp. 484-481, cited from
Paulin, op. cit. p. 302
"The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian
Islands, the treaties with Japan, Sandwich Is-
lands, and Samoa, are only corollaries to the
proposition that the Pacific Ocean is to become
at no distant date the commercial domain of
America....If any means can now be found to get
beyond the barred gates and to reach the central
government, I am convinced that Korea could be
made to understand not only the policy of a treaty
with the United States, but its absolute necessity
as a matter of protection against the aggressions
of surrounding powers. Korea would in fact be
the battlefield of any war between China and Russia
or Japan in whichever way the nations might con-
front each other."

American war vessel but as the naval attache' of the Ameri­
can legation in Peking. At first he found Li lukewarm to
the proposed treaty but eventually a Korean envoy arrived
with the news that Korea was now willing to negotiate a
treaty with the United States. The change in front of the
Korean Government can be attributed to the personal desires
of the Emperor of China and the King of Korea. Both of
these rulers were now anxious that the treaty be promulga­
ted as soon as possible as they were getting more apprehen­
sive in regard to Japanese designs in the peninsula.

Even Li, whom Shufeldt thought did now show enough enthusiasm over
the proposed agreement, was more in favor of his plans than
the Commodore thought. The American representative had first
however, to enter into negotiations with Li before he could
make the trip to Korea.

On March 2, 1882, Shufeldt held the first of a series
of conferences with Li. The commodore refused the first
draft of the proposed treaty which stated that "Chosen, be­
ing a dependent state of the Chinese Empire, has neverthe­
less heretofore exercised her own sovereignty in all matters

47. Korean Letter Book, pp. 17-20, 42-44, 46, cited
   from Paullin, op. cit., p. 310
   "It would seem that Li's purpose was to play
   off the United States against England for "it
   was known that the Viceroy had urged the British
   Minister at Peking to inaugurate a negotiation
   with a view to a treaty between England and
   Korea."

of internal administration and foreign relations." Li stated that the above article was necessary and that it was written in at the behest of both the Chinese Government and the King of Korea. Shufeldt contended that the United States had the right to treat with Korea as a sovereign state independent of the over-lordship of China.

However, Shufeldt cabled Secretary of State, Frelinghuysen for instructions as to whether he should agree to the inclusion of the proposed article in the treaty. He received no reply so, when on March 10, Li agreed to waive the contentious article if the commodore would accept the company of a Chinese representative to Korea and also if he would state that his purpose in doing so was to ask for the good offices of China in completing the Korean treaty, Shufeldt agreed and the article was deleted.

Shufeldt's next step was to depart for Korea for the formal signing of the treaty. He boarded the U. S. S. Swatara and anchored off the mouth of the Salee River on May 12, 1882. On May 22, the treaty with Korea was signed by the envoys of both countries. Thus the peninsula kingdom finally entered into treaty relations with an occidental power for the first time in its long existence.

49. Paullin, op. cit., pp. 311-316
50. Ibid., pp. 316-19
51. Ibid., pp. 318-22
Many of the authorities in dealing with the American-Korean treaty seem to have the impression that Li Hung Chang was not any too friendly toward the proposed agreement. From the "Memoirs" of this statesman one gathers that he was strongly in favor of it. In discussing the removal of the ex-regent from Korea to China shortly afterwards he has the following to say:

"Furthermore, let it be noted for the benefit of history that an escort of my own men accompanied the American naval officer Shufeldt to Chemulpo, the entire party being carried in a ship belonging to me personally, and Commodore Shufeldt carrying from me one of the strongest letters that I have ever written. That letter was directed to Li Hsia Ying, acting King of Korea, who was urged—if he cared for the friendship of the Viceroy of Pechihli—to bring his Government to the signing of the document carried by the American naval officer. The treaty was signed; and now the Americans, because I invite the Tai-Wen-Kun to be the guest of China, call my actions highhanded—because he was the American's friend." 52

The above seems to discount the allegations made heretofore in regard to Li's withholding of support of the treaty. It will be recalled that the Tai-Wen-Kun was the ruler of Korea during the time of the French and American expeditions and was probably more responsible than anyone else for the isolation of that kingdom.

Two days after the signing of the treaty, Shufeldt received a letter from the King of Korea to the President of

the United States. This missive stated that Korea was a dependency of China but sovereign in the exercise of her home and foreign affairs. The paradoxical relations between the two countries were still in force. The letter to the President, however, was promptly pigeon-holed and never officially published in any record.

The American–Korean treaty was one of peace, amity, and commerce and navigation and contained fourteen articles. Some of its parts are interesting and worth quoting due to the fact that it was the first treaty negotiated with a western power and also because it was designed to give the United States the foothold it had sought in Korea since 1866:


54. Dennett, America in Eastern Asia, p. 464
This treaty was negotiated during the time of the anti-Chinese agitation in the United States and exclusion was becoming a major issue. Dennett says: "While the treaty was ratified, it was perhaps not exactly welcomed by Secretary of State Frelinghuysen. To the declining popularity of the Chinese in the United States may perhaps be assigned the reason why the letter of the King of Korea to the President expressing dependence upon China, was promptly pigeon-holed and never officially published in any record."
Article I

There shall be perpetual friendship between the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.

If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings. 55

Article II

After the conclusion of this treaty of amity and commerce, the high contracting powers may each appoint diplomatic representatives to reside at the Court of the other, and may each appoint consular representatives at the ports of the other which are open to foreign commerce, at their own convenience.

The Diplomatic and Consular representatives of the two Governments shall receive mutually all the privileges, rights, and immunities, without discrimination, which are accorded to the same classes of representatives from the most favoured nation.

Article III

Whenever United States vessels, either because of stress of weather or by want of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest open port in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbor....

55. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, (Garden City, N. Y. 1925) p. 106. Dennett states that "This article had been drafted by Li Hung Chang and [Chang] Li appears to have thought by the insertion of this article to have bound the U. S. to help China to retain the suzerainty of the peninsula."
If a United States vessel be wrecked on the coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on being informed of the occurrence, shall immediately render assistance to the crew, provide for their present necessities, and take the measures necessary for the salvage of the ship and the preservation of her cargo.

**Article VI**

American citizens are not permitted either to transport foreign imports to the interior for sale or to proceed thither to purchase native products. Nor are they permitted to transport native produce from one open port to another open port.

Other important provisions fixed the tariff rates, prohibited any business in opium, and gave the American consul in Korea extra-territorial jurisdiction.56

In 1882, shortly after the signing of the treaty, an insurrection occurred in Korea. The trouble seems to have been inspired by political differences as there were two parties involved—one opposed to the foreigners and the other in favor of progress from a foreign source. The leader of the rebels was Tai-Wen-Kun, the ex-regent and father of the reigning king. The revolt was the result of a conspiracy that was directed against all foreigners but the Japanese especially who were to be exterminated or expelled, and against the king who was considered too amenable to foreign influence. The legation of Japan in Seoul was attacked and a number of Japanese killed. China, fearing the consequences, rushed a force into Korea which took the ex-regent prisoner. Tai-Wen-Kun was immediately transported to China where he could not

stir up any more trouble. This was the incident previously referred to in the "Memoirs" of Li Hung Chang.

In a proclamation issued by the commanding officer of the Chinese forces in Korea, it was stated that Korea was a dependency of China. Notwithstanding this clear cut avowal of Chinese sovereignty over the peninsula kingdom, the Japanese ignored the Government of China and proceeded to deal directly with the Korean Government. A large force of Japanese troops was landed in the country, the legation was reestablished, and a treaty of peace made with Korea. Under the terms of this treaty, Korea agreed to arrest the ring-leaders of the insurrection and bring them to trial; the Japanese were allowed to send deputies to assist the Korean officials in making the arrests; the Koreans were to pay an indemnity of $500,000; and the Japanese were to be allowed to maintain a legation guard in Seoul for a year. 57

That Japan desired to be the chief power in Korean affairs is apparent in her ignoring of China in this regard. Also we need only recall their attitude in forwarding Shufeldt's letters to Korea to make the claim appear sounder. An acknowledgment of the suzerainty of China would have retarded her plans but an independent Korea would be far easier to deal with. The country of the Mikado had not as yet, come to

a true realization of the weakness of China. 58

During the Korean revolt, an American warship had been despatched to that country but its only accomplishment was the effect that such a vessel would have on the wrangling powers in contributing to the peaceful settlement of affairs. The Japanese considered the American vessel in the light of an intruder but the Koreans and the Chinese were quite friendly.

In the meantime the treaty with Korea was awaiting ratification. On December 26, 1882, Minister John Russell Young at Peking sent the following to Secretary of State Frelinghuysen in regard to the Shufeldt treaty:

"I think it very important that the United States should have a footing in Corea, and that, having opened the door, we should not close nor give any other power precedence.

I look upon our conventions with these Asiatic powers as tentative. We have very little to lose whether Corea becomes a province of China or is annexed to Japan or remains independent. The only power whose presence in Corea would affect our trade would be Russia, as the policy of Russia would be to open trade channels overland and limit the seaboard commerce.

Our convention with Corea is, commercially, a step in the path of progress, and made ....with the view of extending into Asia the advantages of our civilization. With the other powers it is political, and

58. Ibid, p. 91. American Minister to China Young to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 2, 1882: "In the case of Japan, furthermore, it is said that her policy towards the Koreans has not always been conciliatory. It has for some time been a tradition in Japanese politics that Japanese influence should be paramount in Corea. Some of Japan's ambitious statesmen have been credited with a desire to annex Corea."
is bound up with aims and schemes of western nations for aggrandizement in Asia. As we have no interest in these enterprises, as we have at heart the independence of Asiatic nations, I am anxious to see our country in a position where her moral influence can aid in maintaining the existing autonomy of China, Japan, Corea, and Siam." 59

The above is noteworthy because it shows more than any other document brought to light up to this time the policy of the United States. The American Government wanted a foothold in Korea for the purpose of acquiring trade advantages but we were going to do business in a fair manner. Although the United States recognized the independence of Korea, it did not intend to interfere in its domestic or foreign affairs. Korea would be the chief beneficiary of a treaty as it would thus be open to the advantages of western civilization and we were not as grasping as the other occidental powers which had acquired footholds in the Orient. However, Young contradicts himself in his despatch by saying that the United States cared nothing for what happened to Korea and then in the last sentence he is "anxious" to see the United States in a position where it can help Korea to maintain its independence.

The reference made to Russia is very significant. From it one would gather that that country was also making an effort to acquire a foothold in Korea. Eight years previously, the American Minister to China had mentioned Russia in rela-

59. Foreign Relations (1883-84), p. 172
tion to Korea but at that time nothing had come of Russo-
Korean negotiations. That Russia was due to become inter-
ested in her southern neighbor was a foregone conclusion
on account of their contiguity and also because the harbor
of Vladivostok was ice bound for several months of the year.
Russia's constant aim to secure an all year round open water
port is too important a consideration to be lost sight of.
Korea, in possession of a power hostile to Russia, would be
not only a barrier to warm water, but also to southern mar-
kets. Whoever controlled Korea could also control the Japan
Sea and the approaches to Vladivostok. Without Korea, Russia
had no assurance that she could hold even what she had already
obtained in Siberia, much less penetrate into Manchuria.
Russia was not, as yet, ready to move in but it was only a
question of time before she would endeavor to do so.

Minister Young, in the same despatch, reported China
and Korea had signed a treaty, the importance of which is
shown in the first sentence of the draft which defined the

60. *Foreign Relations* (1874-75), p. 172.
American Minister to China Williams to Fish, March 30,
1874: "It appears that a Russian man-of-war had
come to the eastern coast of Corea in 1864, which
remained there a long time for the purpose of open-
ing negotiations with respect to the new frontier be-
tween the countries of Russia and Corea, near Port
May and Possiet, but her mission was unsuccessful."
See also *Congressional Record*, Vol. 7, part 3, 45th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1877-78, p. 2601.
exact relationship which existed between the two countries:
"Corea, having been from ancient times, a tributary state,
the canons of her intercourse in all matters with the
government of China are fixed and need not to be changed." 61

Finally, on January 9, 1883, the United States Senate
ratified the Korean treaty and it was proclaimed in force
by both countries on June 4, 1883. 62 Mr. Lucius Foote
arrived in Korea on May 13, 1883, on the U. S. S. Monocacy
and immediately entered upon his duties as the accredited
American Minister to Korea. He received a cordial welcome
and was very pleased with his reception. He said: "They
seemed to understand and appreciate our policy in the East." 63

On December 4, 1883, President Arthur in his third an­
nual message to Congress had the following comment to make
on the treaty:

"Korea, as yet unacquainted with the methods of western
civilization, now invites the attention of those inter­
ested in the advancement of our foreign trade, as it
needs the implements and products which the United States
are ready to supply. We seek no monopoly of its com­
merce and no advantages over other nations, but as the
Chosenese, in reading for a higher civilization, have
confided in this republic, we cannot regard with indif­
erence any encroachment on their rights." 64

This announcement, when coupled with the second part
of Article one of the treaty, would seem to justify the asser­
tion that Shufeldt had previously made. Was President Arthur's

61.  Foreign Relations, (1883-84) p. 173
62.  Moore, op. cit., p. 570
63.  Foreign Relations (1883-84) p. 241
64.  Richardson, op. cit., VIII, p. 174
declaration to be construed as a desire on the part of the United States to intervene, in case of trouble, to uphold the sovereignty of Korea? While the two announcements are imperialistic in wording, the American policy in the following years was far from reinforcing the statements of the commodore and the president.

In July 1883, the Korean Government decided to send a mission to the United States and the king selected Mr. Min-Yong-Ik and Mr. Hong-Yeng-Sik as his representatives. They carried a letter to President Arthur which showed the pleasure of the Koreans over their treaty with the United States:

"The people of our countries having entered into friendly intercourse with each other, and having both on our side and yours, bound themselves mutually to continue these happy relations, we pray that the people of both our lands may live forever, without change, in peace and happiness."

President Arthur, in his reply, stated the satisfaction of the United States:

"...The United States, from their geographical position, are, of all others, the nation with which the orientals should cultivate friendship and a commerce which will prove to them and to us alike beneficial and profitable, and which must certainly increase."

The Korean embassy returned to Korea on the U. S. S. Trenton and arrived in Seoul in June 1884. Accompanying them was Ensign George H. Foulk, United States Navy, who was to be the naval attache at the American legation in

34.

South. In the resolution from the Congress pointed out that his object was to maintain the "best possible relations with the people of Korea.

One of the first acts of Admiral Young, on landing in Korea, was to send an American Minister-Section and explain his appreciation of the courtesies shown to him by the Government of the United States. He stated the importance of the trip in the following terms:

"All the bold in the daytime I went out into the light, and now I return into the dark again. I cannot see my way clearly, but I hope to succeed."37

A significant point in regard to the mission was that both of the leaders were to be the head men of the progressive parties in Korea.

On May 30, 1882, Korea and Great Britain signed a treaty of equal rights to that negotiated with America. In 1904, Korea signed an identical treaty with Italy and in 1853,

38. Korean Instructions, Vol. I, Nov. 19, 1853 (Dept. of

It is pertinent to note here that although the U. S. appointed a minister to Korea, the other powers did not. While the action of the U. S. ranked Korea with China and Japan, Great Britain appointed a consul-general, responsible to Peking; Germany and France respectively, appointed a consul and a commissaire both of which were responsible to the home office. 69

It was in 1884 that the Korean Government asked for American army officers for the purpose of training native troops. Both the President and Congress were favorable to the request but it was several years before these officers arrived in Korea. 70

In the same year the political tranquility of Korea was again disturbed by another insurrection. It was inaugurated by the attempted assassination of Min-Yong-Ik at a dinner

69. Dennett, America in Eastern Asia, p. 475

Cleveland to Congress, 1st Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1885: "No opportunity has been omitted to testify the friendliness of this Government towards Korea, whose entrance into the family of treaty powers the United States were the first to recognize. I regard with favor the application made by the Korean Government to be allowed to employ American officers as military instructors to which the assent of Congress becomes necessary and I am happy to say that this request has the current sanction of Japan and China."
given by Hong-Yong-Shik, his colleague in the embassy to the United States. An alarm of fire was given in the course of the dinner which caused all the guests to go outside. The ruse was successful and a group of men fell upon Min-Yong-Ik and inflicted several wounds on his person. The other Korean officials seeing the wounded man and realizing its significance, divested themselves of their robes and rushed away. The plot seems to have been the work of a party of students who were enraged at some reforms which Min-Yong-Ik had instituted since his return from the United States.

The next move of the rebels was to direct their energies against the Japanese residents in Seoul. A large number of Japanese were killed and much of their property destroyed. In commenting on the trouble, Foote said: "Several [Japanese] came to the legation for refuge and I gave directions that all who came should be admitted." 71 The trouble reached such proportions that the Japanese legation was again fired and the Japanese forced to leave the city for Chemulpo. The American and other ministers were called together by the King of Korea and asked by His Majesty to intercede for him with the Japanese Minister then at Chemulpo and state that he desired to maintain friendly relations with Japan. The ministers agreed to do as requested but they accomplished

nothing in their interview with the Japanese representative. 72

Shortly after this occurrence, Foote appointed Lieutenant Foulk as acting minister, an office which was soon changed to the rank of charge à affaires. 73

In the meantime, China had become engaged in a war with France. As a result of this and the Korean revolt, Japan demanded concessions equal to those of China in Korea and also demanded that Korea declare its independence of China. For the present these demands were granted.

Foulk handled the affairs of the United States with great tact and dignity while he was the acting American representative in Seoul. In 1885, he reported the arrival of a

72. Congressional Record, op. cit. pp. 333-334

73. Tyler Dennett, Early American Policy in Korea in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, March 1923, p. 7. "The Diplomatic and Consular Act of July 7, 1884, had reduced the rank of the post in Seoul to that of Minister-Resident and Consular-General. Mr. Foote, upon being informed of his reduction in dignity, resigned. The Department of State requested him to take his departure on leave so that it would not be necessary to explain to the Koreans that the post had been reduced. Foote therefore departed as if he were merely going on leave. This reduction of rank is significant of American policy. The position appears to have been created somewhat hastily in January or February 1883, when little was known about Korea. The fact that the salary was not reduced leads one to suspect that there was an indication that the American Government was reconsidering its policy and showing a disposition to seek a less conspicuous role. The fact that not even a Minister-Resident appeared at Seoul for another year and one half and that the diplomatic duties were left entirely to Foulk is further indication that the United States was seeking to avoid the assumption of influence which the King and other interested parties were seeking to thrust upon it."
Russian Charge on a Russian warship. In 1886, he offered his resignation and Mr. William H. Parker was appointed Minister-Resident to succeed him. Trouble occurred again soon after Parker's arrival with the result that marines from American, French, and Russian warships were sent up to Seoul to guard the legations. Foulk was recalled to Seoul to replace Parker who had proved himself utterly unfit for the position. Foulk evidently was in favor of Korean independence and against Chinese suzerainty. As a result of this, Yuan-Shi-Kai, the ranking Chinese official in Korea, and the Korean party friendly to China worked for his removal. Yuan also seems to have been the principal party who was responsible for the trouble which had occurred shortly after Parker assumed his post. Yuan and his party proposed to Denby, the American Minister to China, that diplomatic relations with Korea would be better if conducted through Peking. This course was approved by Denby but Secretary of State Bayard disapproved of it and declined to consider it. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government continued the demand

74. Foreign Relations, (1884) p. 358.


76. China Despatches, Oct. 12, 1885, cited from Dennett, Early American Policy, op. cit., p. 99
for Foulk's recall until they accomplished their aim. Bayard approved his conduct but, because he was persona non grata, ordered him to report back to the navy. 77

In April 1885, Great Britain occupied Port Hamilton off the southern coast of Korea. Ostensibly its purposes were to hold the island as security for the preservation of English interests in Korea and to thwart Russian designs in Korean territory. 78 Korea protested against Great Britain's action to the Government of the United States and besought Washington to use its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement of the difficulty. The Korean Government based its plea on the second part of Article I of the treaty of 1885, which stated: "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." This request was refused by Bayard on the ground that "This Government could not, of course, construe the engagement thus entered into as empowering or requiring us to decide and maintain that the acts are, in fact,

77. Dennett, *Early American Policy in Korea*, p. 100
78. Douglas, Sir Robert Kenway, "The Far East" in *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII (N.Y. 1910) The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia was very intense during this period due to the imperialistic policies being pursued by both countries.
unjust or oppressive. Such a construction would naturally render nugatory any attempt to derive good results from the engagement." 79

In January 1887, Great Britain evacuated Port Hamilton as a result of an agreement made with China which guaranteed the security of the island from seizure by any other power. 80

The Chinese evidently feared the results of foreign penetration into Korea. Yuan-Shi-Kai presented a memorial to the King of Korea to the effect that the mint should be condemned, expressed his disapproval of the opening of an American mission hospital, and decried the establishment of a model farm and the purchase of a steamer by the Korean Government. The significance of the proclamation lies in the fact that the mint, hospital, and farm had all been inaugurated under American missionary auspices or with American missionary help. The missionaries recognizing that China would endeavor to thwart their efforts now became hostile to Chinese influence. From this time forward the government which favored them was the one that they upheld. 81 Yuan

79. Moore, op. cit., p. 571
Francis Wharton, Digest of International Law, (Washington, 1887), p. 442.


81. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 570-71
further urged the king to rely solely on the help of China which alone could protect Korea from the insulting treatment of foreign nations. To bring Korea more into China's range, he also suggested that the Korean Government should abolish three of its six battalions stationed in Seoul. These demands were not acceded to. 82

In September 1887, Korea appointed an envoy to the United States, but the Chinese Government interfered before he could be sent abroad. Yuan-Shi-Kai delivered a sharp rebuke to the Korean Government for presuming to act in such a manner without the consent of China. 83 Dinsmore, Foulk's successor in Korea, protested to Yuan-Shi-Kai that the course of the Chinese Government was "surprising" and that the American-Korean treaty expressly stated the rights of each government to send diplomatic representatives to the other country. He summarizes the American position quite clearly:

"Such a course on the part of the Chinese Government could not but be surprising, when we consider that

82. Foreign Relations, op. cit. p. 256.

83. Foreign Relations, (1888), p. 434
Yuan-Shi-Kai to the Korean Government, Sept. 23, 1887: "I have received by telegram, through Tsung-Li-Yamen [Chinese foreign office] the following imperial order: "Korea is sending ministers to foreign countries. She has certainly first to ask our permission, and after getting it, to send them. This would be the way for a dependant state to act. Let the Korean Government know this as soon as possible, so that it may be able to act in accord with the imperial policy."
the treaty between the United States and Corea, largely brought about through the instrumentality of his excellency, the Viceroy Li Hung Chang, to whom all its terms were fully known, expressly provides that 'the high contracting powers may each appoint diplomatic representatives to reside at the court of the other, and may each appoint consular representatives at the ports of the other which are open to foreign commerce at their own convenience.'" 84

Secretary Bayard regretted the stand taken by the Chinese Government. However, on mature consideration, China decided to allow the Korean envoys to go to the United States on the consideration that they would present themselves to the Chinese Minister in Washington and be introduced by him to the foreign office; that the Korean envoys would yield precedence to the Chinese Minister on all occasions; and that he would always confer with the representative of China on all important matters. This the Government of Korea refused to stand for and on November 13, 1887, their representatives sailed from Chemulpo on board the U. S. S. Ossipee. On their way out of the harbor they passed six Chinese men of war sent to stop them but the fact that they were on an American war vessel prevented them from doing so. 85 They arrived in Washington on January 9, 1888, and presented their credentials to the President without any interference.

84. Ibid, p. 435
85. Senate Doc. 109, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 12
from the Chinese Minister. The attitude of the American Government was succinctly stated by Bayard when he declared: "Therefore as the United States has no privity with the inter-relations of China and Corea, we shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by their respective and independent agents." 87

The activities of the American missionaries were thought by the Korean Government to be in direct contrast to the conditions under which they had been admitted to the country. They were allowed to practice medicine, establish schools and hospitals, and to preach the gospel, but they were not supposed to interfere in the internal affairs of the kingdom. Since Yuan-Shi-Kai's memorial, previously referred to, they had been hostile to Chinese influence in Korea. Therefore, the Korean Foreign Office protested to the American Minister, Dinsmore, that the missionaries were subordinating their humanitarian purposes to those of a political nature. As Yuan-Shi-Kai was the ranking Chinese official in Korea at this time and as he had little use for missionaries, it is

86. Richardson, op. cit. VIII, p. 782
Cleveland to Congress, December 3, 1888:
"A diplomatic mission from Korea has been received, and the formal intercourse between the two countries contemplated by the treaty of 1882, is now established."

87. Foreign Relations, (1888) p. 443
Moore, op. cit. pp. 571-72
very probable that he was behind the protest. Dinsmore forwarded the complaint to Bayard who upheld the contention of the Korean Government and, in reply, addressed a note to Dinsmore notifying him of the views of the American Government on the subject. This action by Bayard tended to lessen the activities of the missionaries for the moment but in the following decade their policy of interference was again to be a cause for protest—this time on the part of the American Government. It should be kept in mind that under the treaty of 1882, the American missionaries in Korea enjoyed only the rights which belonged to all other American citizens.

Conditions remained quiet in Korea until 1893 but in that year another insurrection took place. Again the purpose of the revolt was the driving out of the Japanese. The attacks were directed principally against the subjects of the

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Bayard to Dinsmore, June 15, 1888:
"In dealing with a country like Corea, where the traditional policy for centuries has been the exclusion of all intercourse and influence, the change which has taken place within the last few years, and the entrance of Corea into the modern family of nations, necessarily involves large consequences. And while those who are engaged in the effort to implant new principles that are largely animated with the desire to accomplish much for the cause which they represent, yet it should be remembered that the attempt on their part to extend their privileges by acts of aggression, without due regard to treaty limitations and the feelings of the people, might tend to defeat their efforts and to raise opposition to their labors."
Mikado who were resident in Seoul. As a result of this, Japanese troops were landed on the coast to protect the interests of their nationals. Fearing the effects of a Japanese occupation, the Chinese Government also rushed in soldiers. The King of Korea became alarmed and begged the Chinese soldiers to leave, but they refused to do so as long as the Japanese remained. The latter refused to budge until the Chinese left. The result was a deadlock. 89

The American Government notified Minister Sill to use every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful conditions. Sill replied saying that he was doing as much as he possibly could in that direction and pointed out the stalemate caused by the intentions of both the Chinese and Japanese troops to remain in the country. He recognized the danger in the situation and suspected an "ulterior purpose" on the part of the Japanese. Japan seemed to desire war and Sill further stated that the integrity of Korea was menaced. 90

The Korean Government now appealed directly to Washington through its representative there, Mr. Ye-Sung-Soo. He was requested to ask the Government of the United States "to instruct its representatives in China, Japan, and Korea to use their efforts in averting any conflict," and "to facilitate the withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops from the kingdom." 91 Secretary Gresham acceded to the request.

89. Foreign Relations, (1894), pp. 13-21
90. Ibid, p. 22
91. Foreign Relations, (1894) p. 30
insofar as he was able to and, in an interview with the Japanese Minister to the United States, he expressed the hope that Japan would deal kindly and fairly with her helpless neighbor. The Minister answered that his government recognized the independence of Korea and was not seeking its territory, but that Japanese troops would not be withdrawn until needed reforms in the domestic administration had been made. 92

On July 23, 1894, the Japanese troops took possession of the royal palace in Seoul. Two days later, a guard from the U. S. S. Baltimore was despatched to Seoul for the purpose of protecting the American legation. On August 1, 1894, Denby cabled Gresham that war had been declared between Japan and China and that the Japanese charge d'affaires in Peking had left, placing the interests of Japanese subjects in charge of the American legation. 93

The great powers of Europe now began to take an active interest in the approaching conflict. Due to their varied interests it is entirely probable that they desired to be on the ground in order to share in the spoils should the opportunity arise. At any rate, on October 6, 1894, the


93. Foreign Relations, (1894) pp. 40-43
British representative in Washington asked the United States Government to join with England, France, Germany and Russia and intervene in the struggle between China and Japan. The basis of such an intervention would be that the independence of Korea would be guaranteed by the powers and that Japan should receive an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The President of the United States declined to act jointly with the powers but offered to act singly if called upon by the warring nations. 94

On November 3, 1894, the Tsung-Li-Yamen proposed to Denby that China would seek peace on the basis that "Japan should remove her troops from Manchuria, and China agrees that Korea, in future, shall be independent...." Denby forwarded this information to Gresham who cabled back that the President was ready to tender his good offices to bring the war to a close. On November 23, Denby sent the following message to Gresham: "Yesterday China made through me direct overtures for peace; basis, independence Korea; war indemnity ...

94. Foreign Relations, (1894) p. 70.
Richardson, op. cit. IX, p. 525.
Cleveland in his 2nd Annual Message to Congress on December 3, 1894: "Acting under a stipulation in our treaty with Korea (the first concluded with a western power), I felt constrained at the beginning of the controversy to tender our good offices to induce an amicable arrangement of the difficulty growing out of the Japanese demands for administrative reforms in Korea, but the unhappy precipitation of actual hostilities defeated this kindly purpose."

95. Foreign Relations, (1894) pp. 75-81.
However, Japan was not yet ready to stop fighting. The war had been one long string of successes for her and defeats for China. On August 26, 1894, Korea and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance the object of which was the maintenance of Korean independence and the promotion of Korean and Japanese interests by the expelling of the Chinese from Korean territory. It also stated: "Korea will undertake to give every possible facility to Japanese soldiers regarding their movements and supply of provisions." 96

This treaty of alliance shows that Japan had at last obtained the upper hand in Korea that she had so ardently desired. She was using her war with China as a pretext to derive the full benefit of her territorial ambitions on the mainland of Asia. This treaty was to be but the first step in the culmination of her future plans.

Hostilities continued until April 17, 1895 and were not stopped until the despatch of Li Hung Chang to Japan as China's official representative to negotiate for a treaty of peace. This was accomplished at Shimoneseki, Japan on April 17, 1895.

Under the terms of this treaty, the independence of Korea was recognized by both countries; China was to cede to Japan a part of Fengtien Province, Formosa, and the Pescadores.

Islands; China agreed to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels; all the old treaties between China and Japan were abrogated; new localities were to be opened in China to Japanese trade; and Japanese were to continue in the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei—until the stipulations demanded in the treaty were paid or enforced. 97

By her defeat of China and the relative ease with which it was accomplished, Japan became recognized as something more than just an oriental nation. It had learned the arts of war and civilization in thirty-four years and, when the time came, knew how to use them. This war also dispelled the idea that China might be counted on in the future as a great military power and showed the real weaknesses of the Celestial Kingdom.

The Sino-Japanese War also settled the status of Korea once and for all, as far as China was concerned. However, the triumphant position of Japan brought a new danger to the fore. The proximity of the peninsula kingdom to Japan and its immediate strategic importance made it imperative that Japan would eventually strive for full possession. As

97. Foreign Relations, 1895-96), pp. 190-203
"China recognized definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy shall wholly cease for the future."
it was she had the real control of Korean affairs for the time being. We have noticed to what extent Japanese authority predominated in the Korean-Japanese treaty of alliance of August 27, 1894. However, she was not to have complete control, as yet, because of the machinations of Russia in the same territory that she was interested in.

In the same year as the treaty of Shimoneseki, Germany, Russia, and France presented a joint request that Japan withdraw from the Liaotung peninsula; that she return Port Arthur to China; and that she make certain speedy evacuation of Wei-Hai-Wei. This shows quite clearly how the European powers looked on Japan—still as a backward nation and without the realization that she had just about come of age.

Two notable exceptions to this demand were Great Britain and the United States. The United States was not interested enough while England was evidently lying low—and thinking. It must be remembered that at this time England was practically alone in Europe and without any significant treaties with the other powers. It is highly probable that she had in mind, even then, her future alliance with Japan.

Although Japan had inserted the clause dealing with the recognition of Korean independence in the treaty of Shimoneseki, Minister Sill refused to recognize that the indepen-

98. Dennett, op. cit., p. 503
Williams, op. cit. p. 363
dence of Korea was something new. The American-Korean treaty of 1882, while not specifically stating that Korea was an independent country, nevertheless carried that implication. Acting Secretary of State Adee wrote him that his action was approved and that "the position assumed by this government toward Korea since contracting the treaty with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events. Korea's treaty independence since then has been for us an established and accepted fact." 99

In the latter part of 1895, the ex-regent, Tai-Wen-Kun returned to Korea. He immediately stirred up a revolt and with the assistance of the Japanese captured the royal palace and murdered the queen. Acting Minister Allen in Seoul telegraphed to American Minister Dun in Tokyo that the "Murderers were Japanese in civilian dress" 100 A detachment of marines were ordered to the capital from the U. S. S. Yorktown, the Russian charge also called for marines, 101 and the British Minister requested a war vessel. The ex-regent proceeded to make many changes in the administration and gave important government offices to Koreans who were

So much trouble was created that the Japanese representative, Viscount Miura, and officers of his legation and of the Japanese army in Korea were sent back to Japan. Miura was courtmartialed for complicity in the revolt but was not punished. The King of Korea was under strict duress and his life was considered imperiled. Sill wrote that "I do not recognize decrees forced from him." 103

Minister Sill went away on leave for a short time and his secretary, Mr. H. N. Allen, was left in control of the legation at Seoul. He was in a quandary as to whether or not he should recognize the government of Tai when his method of assuming control was considered. On Sill's return, the Minister immediately began to meddle in the affairs of the native government to such an extent that Olney cabled him "Intervention in political concerns of Korea not among your functions, and is forbidden in diplomatic instructions" and later "Confine yourself strictly to protection of American citizens and interests. You have no concern in internal affairs. Your actions to be taken independently of other representatives unless otherwise instructed." 104

104. Ibid, p. 973.
On December 1, 1895, due to local troubles, some Koreans fled to the American Legation and put themselves under the protection of Sill. Sill cabled to Olney asking him for authority to send them away from Korea on the U. S. S. Yorktown which was to leave Chemulpo for Shanghai. These men had risen against the de-facto government of Tai and, in trying to capture the royal palace, had been repulsed and pursued. Olney's reply to Sill's request was sharp and to the point:

"Refugees cannot be sheltered by you against officers of de facto government charged with apprehending them as violators of the laws of their country. Use of Yorktown in manner suggested is wholly inadmissible. The Department sees with disfavor your disposition to forget that you are not to interfere with local concerns and politics of Korea, but are to limit yourself strictly to the care of American interests."

Sill continued his questionable methods apparently impervious to the orders of the Secretary of State. He remained interested in the doings of the Korean authorities and backed up his fellow-countrymen—mostly missionaries—who seemed bound to interfere in matters outside of their jurisdiction. Many of these people contributed to the hopes of the Koreans that they would receive help from the

United States in their opposition to Japan. They seemed to forget that they might be raising issues for which the United States Government would be held responsible. Both Sill and the members of the American colony consistently refused to accept the fact that our government had no interest in the internal affairs of the kingdom. Affairs reached such a state that Olney was again forced to administer rebukes to Sill. His course was "noted with astonishment and emphatic disapproval." The upshot of Sill's

[As the Korean Government became more friendly toward the missionaries.]
"The missionaries repaid the confidence with a sturdy and characteristically American support of Korean claims to de facto as well as *de jure* independence. This support was, in time, a great encouragement to the Koreans. It encouraged them to oppose Yuan-Shi-Kai in the period preceding the Sino-Japanese War, and it was an even greater encouragement to the opposition which arose against the intrigues of Japan and Russia in the years that followed. That it misled the Korean people into the assumption that the American Government would, in some time of emergency, intervene and assume protectorate functions over the peninsula, there can be little doubt.

107. *Foreign Relations, (1895-96)* pp. 975-76
Olney to Sill, January 10, 1896:
"Your course in continual intermeddling with Korean political affairs in violation of repeated instructions noted with astonishment and emphatic disapproval. Cable briefly any explanation you have to make; also answer whether you intend to comply with instructions or not."

Olney to Sill, January 11, 1896:
"In your number 177 you state that the Americans
continual disobeyance of orders from the Department of State was his recall and the elevation of the Secretary of Legation, Mr. Horace N. Allen, to the post of Minister-Resident. The policy that Allen was to pursue was clearly stated by Secretary of State John Sherman in his instructions to him on July 27, 1897:

"You have been appointed to this interesting mission at a time when there is reason to believe that rival purposes and interests in the East may find in Korea a convenient ground of contention, and it behooves the United States and their representatives, as absolutely neutral parties, to say or do nothing that now resident in Seoul are exposed to much danger, apparently by reasons of the anti-Japanese opinions to which they have openly given voice and their indiscreet expressions of sympathy for the party opposed to Japanese influence. You should, on receipt of the present instructions, inform all American residents in Korea that they should strictly refrain from any expression of opinion, or from giving advice concerning the internal management of the country, or from intermeddling in political questions; that if they do so it is at their own risk and peril; that neither you or the Government of the United States can approve of such action on their part or perhaps be adequately able to protect them should they disregard this advice. They should strictly confine themselves to their missionary work, whether it be teaching schools, preaching the gospel, or attending to the sick, for which they went to the country. Use such other arguments as you properly can to discourage and stop, if possible, the habit which has steadily increased since the arrival of American citizens in Korea, of irresponsible persons advising and attempting to control, the Government of the country."

108. Minister Allen, altho a pioneer missionary himself, succeeded in keeping that class in its proper place with the result that complaints about them were practically stopped from this time forward.
can in any way be construed as taking sides with or against any of the interested powers. And such particularity would not only be in itself improper but might have the undesirable and unfortunate effect of leading the Koreans themselves to regard the United States as their natural and only ally for any and all such purposes of domestic policy as Korean rulers may adopt."

On May 10, 1898, a Russian-Japanese convention was signed which was of great importance to Korea. Both governments agreed to recognize the national rights and complete independence of that country and to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the kingdom. They also agreed that "in case Korea asks either Japan or Russia for advice and assistance, the two governments will take no steps whatever by way of appointing military instructors or financial advisers, unless negotiations to that effect have been opened and settled beforehand." Furthermore, the Russian Government recognized the preponderance of Japanese interests in the kingdom and promised not to obstruct the commercial and industrial interests existing between Japan and Korea. This convention can readily be used as an indication of Japan's aims in Korea. She was constantly strengthening her position in the peninsula and her agreement with Russia was only a


recognition of her actual position there.

Sherman's instructions to Allen proved to be quite prophetic but, instead of Korea being affected, it was China for the time being. Germany started the big parade by occupying Kiachou in March 1898. Later in the same month Russia occupied Port Arthur and Talien-wan; in April and June the British occupied Wei-Hai-Wei and Mirs Bay, Deep Bay, and adjacent islands near Hongkong; and in April, the French occupied Kwangchau Bay in southwest China. This grab by the European powers showed very clearly in what direction their spheres of interest lay. The French were strengthening their hold on Tonkin; the British were consolidating their position in Hongkong and had also acquired in Wei-Hai-Wei a naval base on the north China Coast that is still in use today; the Germans had definitely entered the colonial field in the Far East; and Russia had achieved an all year round open water terminal in Port Arthur. The Russia acquisition is of the highest importance for it brought that country into still closer relations with Korea. Already the boundaries of the two countries converged on the north and now Russia was entrenched on the tip of the Liatung peninsula in still closer proximity to Korea proper. Russia also received the right to erect fortifications and naval depots and to construct a branch line from the main trans-Manchurian

railway she had built to both of her new acquisitions. Japan, who had won Port Arthur from China and had then been forced to give it back, viewed the presence of Russia in her new footholds with deep concern. From now on, she looked upon Russia as her chief enemy with reference to Korea.

On October, 1897, the King of Korea changed his title to that of Emperor. His reason for doing so was to elevate himself to a dignity comparable with that of his neighbors, the Emperors of Japan and China. 112 On September 11, 1899, treaty relations were resumed between China and Korea after a lapse of five years. This treaty was practically the same as the American-Korean agreement of 1882. 113

For several years after this Korea was peaceful. However, on January 30, 1902, Great Britain and Japan signed a treaty of alliance that was destined to play an important role in the future of Korea. The first article of the Treaty defines the respective spheres of interest of each of the contracting powers and is therefore quoted in full:

"The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate, principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possess in China, is interested


in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissable for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbance arising either in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects." 114

This alliance was undoubtedly aimed at Russia and it was the means of bringing together two powers in a similarly isolated position for the purpose of maintaining their present possessions in the East and to strike for more when the opportunity would arise. Article III made the significant declaration that in case of hostilities the two powers would join forces and not make peace separately. From now on, Japan felt herself in a stronger position.

On March 5, 1903, The Chinese Eastern Railway was completed as far as Mukden. This was an all Russian owned railroad which entered from Siberia and traversed Manchuria. Consul Miller at Nieuchang, Manchuria reported that: "Surveys are under way for an extension of the Russian railway system into Korea, and it is rumored that construction will not be long delayed." 115 This project was bound to arouse the further apprehension of Japan for the Russian advance clearly showed what their aims were. After Manchuria would come

114. MacMurray, op. cit., pp. 324-325
115. Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 49.
Korea. A glance at the map of the Far East will suffice to show the importance of Korea's geographical position. It is clear that occupation of the country by any power carries with it facilities for domination of the waters of the Far East. The Japanese, therefore, could not view with other than the utmost alarm the prospect of their neighbor falling a prey to Russian aggression. Japan therefore made haste to propose to Russia that Chinese sovereignty be maintained; that Russia evacuate the country but retain all rights that she had acquired through treaties and conventions already published; and that Russia should recognize Japan's paramount interest as stated in the Japanese-English treaty of 1902. 116 Negotiations were carried forward but not fast enough to suit Japan. The latter country realized the menace of Russian penetration into Manchuria and considered the independence of Korea absolutely essential to the comfort and safety of her empire. 117

In the meantime, the feeling in both countries became somewhat hostile. A wave of anti-Russian feeling spread through the Japanese press. In December 1903, Japan again put the question before Russia and also stated that it would not wait more than a reasonable length of time for a reply on the ground that protracted negotiations would rebound to

117. Ibid., p. 618.
the military advantage of Russia. In the words of the American representative to Japan: "War seemed imminent unless Russia receded from her position." 118

Russia did reply by advancing the proposition that a neutral zone be created in northern Korea and that Japan should recognize that Manchuria was outside her sphere of interest. As this was unsatisfactory, war was declared by Japan on February 10, 1905. The Japanese position was stated as follows:

"The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant concern to this Empire, not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm. Nevertheless, Russia in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurances to other powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces and is bent upon their final annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of Korea and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the extreme East, we determined in those circumstances to settle the question by negotiation and secure thereby permanent peace.

"...the safety of Korea is in danger; the vital interests of our Empire are menaced." 119

Immediately after the declaration of war between the two powers, the United States proclaimed its neutrality. On February 20, 1914, President Roosevelt sent a note to Russia and Japan cautioning them to respect the neutrality of China. 120 Dennett comments that "it is significant

118. Ibid., p. 622

119. Japan Daily Times, Tokyo, February 11, 1904, quoted in Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 414

120. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 2
that thus at the very beginning of the war the American Government showed its concern for China and at the same time made no mention of Korea."  

On February 22, 1904, Japan entered into an alliance with Korea and took over some of the ports and other portions of the country with a view to facilitating military operations. This was supposedly done "with the full knowledge and consent of Korea and not in disregard or violation of her independence or territorial integrity. "This was to be reciprocated by Korea agreeing to adopt the advice of Japan in regard to improvements in administration."

This was the first of the indirect measures taken by Japan which was to eventually lead to the annexation of Korea. Marquis Ito was sent to Seoul in March 1904 as the representative of his country and was responsible for the Japanese-Korean agreement of August of that year whereby Japan was assured control of the foreign and financial affairs of that country. Korea was also to consult the Japanese Government before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign powers and all other diplomatic affairs dealing with foreigners.

121. Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 28
122. Foreign Relations, (1904), p. 437
The attitude taken by the Japanese was causing serious concern to the Emperor of Korea. Allen telegraphed to Secretary Hay on April 14, 1904, that the Emperor was looking towards America for assistance and that "he confidently expects that America will do something for him at the close of this war, or when opportunity offers, to retain for him as much of his independence as is possible. He is inclined to give a very free and favorable translation to Article I of our treaty of Jenchuan of 1882. I trust to be able to prevent a direct invocation of this treaty, however, though I am obliged to assure His Majesty that the condition of Korea is borne in mind by the United States Government, who will use their good offices when occasion occurs."

That Korea was being intimidated is clearly shown in the despatches from the American Minister at Seoul to the Department of State. Although we had full knowledge of what was going on our position was one of strict neutrality.

In August 1905, Great Britain and Japan renewed their treaty of alliance of 1902. It reaffirmed Japan's paramount interests in Korea by emphasizing the point more strongly. Lord Landsowne, the British Foreign Minister, in transmitting to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg the contents of the new agreement, said:

124. Senate Doc. 542, 64th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 12-13
"Article III, dealing with the question of Corea, is deserving of special attention. It recognizes in the clearest terms the paramount position which Japan at this moment occupies and must henceforth occupy in Corea, and her right to take any measures which she may find necessary for the protection of her political, military, and economic interests in that country...It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan." 125

This document inevitably pointed to the annexation of Korea by Japan. This statement is further strengthened when one considers that by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 the two Powers bound themselves to recognize the independence of Korea whereas in the renewal of 1905 this stipulation was omitted.

Before the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, President Roosevelt, in an effort to bring the Russo-Japanese War to a close, offered his good offices to the belligerents. To this proposal both countries agreed and on September 5, 1905, they concluded a treaty of peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. By this treaty, Russia agreed to recognize Japan's predominant position in Korea and not to interfere in any way with whatever the Japanese might do in that country.

On November 17, 1905, Japan and Korea concluded another agreement by means of which Japan assumed complete control over Korea.

control of Korean foreign affairs and Korean interests in foreign countries. This resulted in the withdrawal of the American Minister-Resident to Korea by Secretary Root and the leaving of a consul-general in charge. All direct diplomatic representation was to be carried on through the American Minister in Tokyo. By the withdrawal of the American Minister, the United States gave its sanction to the privileged position of Japan in the peninsula. In December 1905, the Korean legation and consulates in the United States were withdrawn and their powers and functions transferred to the Japanese.

It must not be supposed that the Koreans endured all this without protest. There were many riots and outbreaks occasioned by the methods the Japanese were using to control the country, but to no avail. The Government of the United States was fully cognizant of what was going on. In October, 1905, before the protectorate was assumed, Minister Morgan wrote to the State Department that "The Emperor confides to me that the Japanese representative is pressing him to arrange a protocol by which Japan assumes the complete protection of Korea. Although unwilling to do this he may ultimately be constrained to agree..." 128

127. Ibid., pp. 612-16

On October 19, the Korean Emperor despatched an American, Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, to the United States Government to plead against the harsh measures being taken by Japan. He was to ask for the intercession of the United States under the "good offices" clause of the treaty of 1882. He also carried a personal letter from the Emperor of Korea to the President of the United States. Before leaving, Mr. Hulbert saw Minister Morgan and told him of his plans. When Hulbert arrived in Washington he was refused admittance to President Roosevelt and directed to the Department of State. He was told that they were too busy there to see him. His next move was to go back to the White House again and here he was told that they knew the contents of the letter but that it would have to be handled by the State Department. As Hulbert says: "That very day, while still holding the message from the Emperor in abeyance, the

129. Herbert Croly, Willard Straight, (N. Y. 1925, p. 177. Shortly before this, Mr. Nicholas Longworth, Miss Alice Roosevelt, United States Senator Newlands of Nevada, and some other Americans had visited Seoul. The Emperor had asked Mr. Newland for advice and, in the words of Willard Straight: "The Emperor was advised by the Senator to engage the services of an international lawyer and to make a dignified protest. This didn't please him and nothing more was said until two days ago when he sent in word that he had a letter that he wanted sent to the President. (Probably refers to the letter that Hulbert carried on his mission. Morgan refused to have anything to do with it. Ito had arrived and the chances were ten to one that in the same breath he had sent a message to the Japanese saying that they could have anything they wanted...."
administration accepted as true the Japanese statement that the new arrangement was very pleasing to the Korean people, and without a word from the Korean Emperor or the Korean legation in Washington, it cabled our legation to remove from Korea. 130

Mr. Hulbert was admitted the following day and Secretary Root received his letter but stated that it came too late to be considered. 131 On the next day, Mr. Hulbert received the following cablegram from the Emperor of Korea:

"I declare that the so-called treaty of protectorate recently concluded between Korea and Japan was ex-


131. Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 304-5. "Mr. Hulbert, trailed by Japanese Detectives, reached Washington late in November, He had an interview with Secretary Root but was unable personally to deliver the Emperor's letter to President Roosevelt. The letter was, however, placed before the President and the latter wrote to Root, on November 25, 1905, as follows: 'I have carefully read the letter of the Korean Emperor handed to you by Mr. Hulbert, an American long resident in Korea, to whose hand this letter had been intrusted. I understand from you that the Korean representatives here, so far as you know, are unacquainted with the existence of such a letter and that Mr. Hulbert understands that it is the wish of the Emperor that the existence of the letter should be kept secret and nothing said to anyone about it, and particularly not to the Japanese. Of course, these facts render it impossible for us to treat the letter as an official communication, for there is no way in which we could officially act without violating what Mr. Hulbert says is the Emperor's wish. Moreover, since the letter was written we have been officially notified that the Korean Government has made the very arrangement with Japan which in the letter the Emperor says he does not desire to make. All things considered, I do not see that any practical action on the letter is open to us."
torted at the point of the sword and under duress and therefore is null and void. I never consented to it and never will. Transmit to the American Government." 132

Needless to say, the cablegram did not receive any consideration. That the State Department was fully aware of Hulbert's mission is easily ascertained when one considers the note despatched by Minister Morgan to Mr. Root on October 19, 1905, nearly a month before the proclamation of the protectorate. In this message, Mr. Morgan admits that Mr. Hulbert is en route as a representative of the Emperor. 133

133. Senate Doc. 542, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 15. Mr. Morgan to Mr. Root, October 19, 1905: "I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, an American citizen, who has been employed continuously by the Korean Government since 1896 as a teacher of English in the middle and normal schools of Seoul, will proceed to Washington, probably at once, in order to lay before the President certain statements which he believes should prove that Korea is being dealt with "unjustly and oppressively" by Japan, and that in conformity with the second clause of Article I of the Korean-American treaty of 1882, this Government is entitled to call upon the United States to exert her "good offices" on being informed of the case to bring about an amicable arrangement with the power against whose aggressions the Korean Government may lodge a protest.

"I do not know what credentials Mr. Hulbert is furnished nor with what authority he speaks, but it is not unlikely that the Emperor is acquainted with his mission and had supplied him with money with which to defray his travelling expenses. A certain portion of the foreign community supports his views and will follow his course with sympathetic interest."
On December 19, Mr. Min-Yeung-Tohan, a special envoy from Korea without credentials, presented himself in Washington and protested to Secretary Root against the Japanese-Korean treaty of November 17, 1905, on the ground that it was procured from the Emperor of Korea by duress and should therefore be ignored. Root considered the protest but could find no justification for interference under the treaty of 1882 citing the fact that he had received word from the regular Korean charge d'affaires, Mr. Kim, to the effect that the treaty in question was agreeable to the Korean Foreign Office and that he had received orders to withdraw the Korean mission and to turn over the archives and other property in his charge to the Japanese legation.

Root contended that in view of this official communication, he could not see how the Government of the United States could proceed in any manner upon the different view of the facts as presented by Mr. Min-Yeung-Tohan. He furthered stated the American position by saying:

"If, however, the difficulty of complying with your wishes were surmounted, we should be met by the fact that, on February 27, 1904, and on August 22, 1904, the Korean Government concluded with the Japanese Government treaties which are not now in any respect impeached or questioned, by which Korea gave to Japan such extensive control over her affairs and put herself so completely under the protection of the Government of Japan as to render completely impossible the application of the provisions of the treaty with the United States above quoted refers to treaty of 1882. The above mentioned treaties between Japan and Korea appear to be of such a character as practically to give Japan control over the foreign relations of Korea, and to make the latest treaty of November 17,
1905, which is now called in question, but a slight advance upon the relations of control previously existing. These previous relations of control amount to a complete bar to any interference by the United States under the treaty of 1883."

The attitude of the United States, therefore, was to be one of complete non-interference with Japanese policy in Korea. Marquis Ito admitted that the Koreans were not satisfied with Japanese control but emphatically declared that Japan would not let them break away from the Japanese "halter." The Koreans felt that they had lost their independence and they truly had.

The policy of the Washington Government is strikingly shown in the following declaration of President Roosevelt to Secretary of State Hay on January 28, 1905. He said:

"We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defense."

The above would appear to be in answer to protests received by the United States on the assuming of a protectorate in Korea by Japan. That President Roosevelt was an ardent admirer of the Japanese at this time is a well known fact. On July 23, 1905, Count Katsura, Japanese Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs had a "conversation" with a personal representative of President Roosevelt. An agreed


memorandum was drawn up which stated:

"....in regard to the Korean question, Count Katsura observed that Korea being the direct cause of our war with Russia, it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula question should be made as the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after the war, Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of entering into any agreements or treaties with other Powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite step with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war.

......[The American] fully admitted the justness of the Count’s observations and remarked to the effect that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East. His judgment was that the President would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no authority to give assurance of this; indeed [the American] added that he felt much delicacy in advancing the views he did for he had no mandate for the purpose from the President....He could not, however, in view of Count Katsura’s courteous desire to discuss the question, decline to express his opinions...." 136

Although the President’s representative had no "mandate" to discuss his views, nevertheless the memorandum was agreed to by President Roosevelt. The Japanese reaction to this

For a reproduction of a photostat of this document see Tyler Dennett, President Roosevelt’s Secret Pact with Japan in Current History, October 1924, pp. 15-21.
memorandum was one of jubilation and is very revealing.
The following is from the *Kokumin* of October 4, 1905 and
it is noteworthy that this newspaper was considered as the
official government organ:

"In fact, it is a Japanese Anglo-American alliance. We may be sure that when once England became our ally, America also would become a party to the agreement. Owing to peculiar national conditions America cannot make any open alliances, but we should bear in mind that America is our ally though bound by no formal treaty; we firmly believe that America, under the leadership of the world statesman, President Roosevelt, will deal with her Oriental problems in cooperation with Japan and Great Britain". 137

America, like England, did recognize the preponderance of Japan in Korea. On March 9, 1900, Root directed the American Ambassador to Japan to inquire if the Japanese Government would acquiesce in the American representative at Seoul being styled "agent" as well as consul-general thus following a usual precedent in the case of protected countries and facilitating business arrangements with the Japanese resident.

The Japanese Government's reply was that it was unwilling to have a consul-general at Seoul styled as an agent on the ground that the agreement between Japan and Korea stipulated that all diplomatic business was to be transacted at Tokyo and that consequently all business outside of his reg-

137. *Tokyo Kokumin*, quoted in Dennett, op. cit., p. 115
ular consular duties, would be handled by the Japanese Resident-General.

In June 1906, the Japanese took over the Korean courts; on July 24, 1907, the Government of Korea was notified to appoint as Korean officials, Japanese subjects recommended by the resident-general. Rioting continued in Korea and the whole world seemed to expect the annexation any day. Ito denied talk of annexation with the evident purpose of tempering the blow for the Koreans. He stressed the dangers of coercion and emphasized the importance of reconciling the Koreans to the Japanese regime if possible.

In July 1909, the Japanese took over the administration of justice and prisons and in June 1910, they succeeded to the police powers of Korea. All of these steps had been useful as a gradual preparation for the complete control of the country. All of these acts were important steps in the transfer to Japan of the real governmental powers in Korea. She now had direct control of foreign, military, posts and telegraphs, the judiciary and prison and police affairs, while the Korean Government had to obtain preliminary approval of the resident-general in all matters pertaining to the

enactment of laws and in all important matters of adminis-
tration.

On August 22, 1910, Korea was formally annexed to
Japan. It was stated that "His Majesty, the Emperor of
Korea, makes the complete and permanent session to His Majes-
ty, the Emperor of Japan, of all rights of sovereignty over
the whole of Korea." All treaties concluded with foreign
powers ceased to be operative but those powers which had
treaties with both Korea and Japan were to have their
Japanese treaties made applicable to the former country
wherever "practicable." Thus the diplomatic relations
of the United States with Korea came to an end.

The Japanese changed the name of the country from
"Kankoku" (Korea) to Chosen (Morning Calm). The former had
been the official designation but the reason for the change
to "Chosen" as the official name of the annexed territory
was that it did not contain as does "Kankoku", any verbal
root signifying "nation" (koku) and implying an independent
and national existence. 141

Conclusion

American diplomatic relations with Korea from 1866, the year of the General Sherman episode, to 1910, when Korea was annexed to Japan, can be said to have been influenced very little by political or commercial considerations. Our main reason for seeking relations with Korea was primarily to secure a treaty dealing with the relief of shipwrecked vessels on the coast of that country. Commercial considerations were of secondary value as is shown in the instructions given to Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt relative to the negotiations concerning the one and only treaty the United States ever had with Korea. As Tyler Dennett, an authority on Far Eastern Affairs, says:

"It is barely possible that there was for a moment... a fleeting political interest in Korea among a few Americans... This was in 1868. [Refers to Seward's proposed joint expedition with the French.] Whatever the interest, it was very limited, very secret and never reappeared... But there was less interest in the Far East among Americans in 1882 than there had been in 1868, and, so far as the American Government is concerned, the treaty of 1882 may truly be claimed is concerned, the treaty of 1882 may truly be claimed as an act of absent-mindedness...." 142

Carrying the contention forward from 1882 the interest of the American Government can be said to have become even less marked. While some of our representatives in the Far East may have shown an interest in the commercial advantages

142. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 103.
to be derived from Korea, nevertheless, they received no encouragement from the home government. Even other Governments such as Great Britain, Japan and Russia had a definite policy in regard to Korea, the same cannot be said for the United States. The following, by the Secretary of the American Legation to Korea, aptly illustrates our attitude:

"Whatever may have been the policy of Japan and the British Government, however, in keeping national policy before their representatives' eyes, the State Department confined itself to general abstractions. In so remote a spot we only guessed at home policy by the daily papers which arrived six weeks to two months late, and guided our activities by what the editors might think European nations seemed to be doing to each other." 143

The above quotation refers specifically to the period from 1896 to 1904. As our Minister was withdrawn in 1905, it is safe to say that, for the whole period of American diplomatic relations with Korea, the American Government had very little interest politically in Korea.

Dennett contends that the taproot of American policy in Asia is based on most-favored nation treatment. This was, of course, included in our treaty with Korea but its significance is unimportant. Korea was an impoverished country with little money to spend for any purpose and a preponderance of American influence there would prove to be more embarrassing than profitable. After the Japanese, the Americans were first on the ground and received preferred

143. William Franklin Sands, Undiplomatic Memories (N. Y., 1930) p. 56
locations in the foreign concessions at the treaty ports but these were subsequently given up because there was no reason for holding them.

However, our commercial interests, though trivial, were relatively greater than our political interests. In August 1895, the Korean Government granted a concession to an American company for the operation of a gold mine in the northern part of the country, and in April of the following year, the same concern received the contract for the building of a railroad from Seoul to Chemulpo. The growing hostility between the Japanese and the Russians in 1897 frightened American capital and the railroad contract was turned over to the Japanese in the following year. Outside of these concessions, American investments were exceedingly small.


145. Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 504.


"I was told by General Legendre, but have never been able to verify it, that the Emperor, worried by conflicting demands for concessions and anxious to secure some arrangement by which at least a definite revenue might be secured from natural resources if he had to alienate them, sent an offer to Levi P. Morton of all gold, copper, coal and other mines; all granite, marble and other quarries; all railway construction; all coast fisheries and all timber lands...all this was to be financed and developed by solid American capitalists on a business basis, paying a definite revenue and royalties to the Crown. I was assured that
American trade with Korea was insignificant. While we had, over the whole period of our relations with that country, a relatively greater trade than any Western nation except England, it could not begin to be compared with that of China and Japan. The following will give an idea of the American share in the Korean trade:

"American trade had reached the total of a little more than $9,500,000 in 1897. A certain amount of American produce was brought into Korea through Japanese and Chinese sources and the American firms in Korea dealt almost exclusively through Chinese and Japanese merchants. The Decennial Reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs for the years 1882 to 1891 show the Americans to have had but 2 percent of the import trade at Chemulpo (Jenchuan) one of the three Korean ports of entry. The bulk of the Korean trade was divided between the English and the Japanese with the latter steadily gaining the ascendancy." 148

Perhaps the real reason for the interest found for American capital lay with the Emperor. In almost all the

146. (cont.) the proposition had been seriously considered by Morton and only dropped because of the intervention at Washington of an European power, by whose representative it was pointed out that such a comprehensive development would amount to nothing less than a buffer between Russia and Japan (it was meant to be!) and that it might draw the United States into a position with regard to internal Korean administration which our government did not care to assume.... apparently our government was quite certain then that it wished to assume no such burdensome responsibility anywhere and Mr. Morton, so my informant said, went no further with it."

147. Dennett, op. cit. p. 580. "...in the four decades following the close of the American Civil War the trans-Pacific trade of the United States was of slight importance to the American people."

148. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 582.
American enterprises, he was directly interested as a shareholder, partner, or owner. Some American money had been loaned to the Government also. The Emperor, no doubt, was quite willing to help build up American influence in Korea and thought that this could be accomplished through financial channels. Nevertheless, what American commercial and financial interest there was in the peninsula, it declined steadily with the assumption of power by Japan.

The philanthropic interests of Americans were strong. Of 250 Americans in Korea in 1903, half were connected with missions. For whatever interests the United States showed in Korea, the missionaries can be thanked. Enough has been stated about them and their activities to give the reader a clear picture of the part they played in moulding opinion and of the grave apprehension which they caused Bayard and Olney, especially the latter. That they thought they were doing right is unquestionable but in their desire to secure a government in Korea favorable to their interests they did not seem to realize that they could be a force for evil as well as for good.

If we glance through the list of men high in the affairs

149. Dennett, Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War, p. 105

150. Dennett, op. cit., p. 104.
of the Government of the United States, we notice in their attitudes toward Korea a tremendous lack of interest on their part. Seward showed the most interest as is attested by his proposal to the French that a joint expedition be planned. Thanks to the coyness of Napoleon III's Government, this was never consummated. Shufeldt, although he was responsible for the treaty of 1882, can not be said to have had the enthusiastic support of the Department of State. Had he not personally pushed the matter the chances are that the contemplated treaty would have been dropped. Bayard, in 1885, refused to heed the Korean appeal for the use of the "good offices" of the American Government as stipulated in the treaty of 1882. Both Bayard and Olney only showed interest in Korea when they had to consider the actions of the missionaries which issue was forced upon their attention. In 1904, Roosevelt showed more interest in China than in Korea although Korea was the country most vitally affected by the Russo-Japanese War. The American State Department, from 1882 to 1907, consistently refused to be bothered when called upon by Korea under the treaty of 1882. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the American Minister-Resident to Korea in 1905, while the country was still considered as an independent nation showed that the American Government was content to let Japan go ahead with her projected annexation without a protest of any sort. The policy of the United States has been to ignore
the obligations incurred by treaty and a desire to avoid any complications which might grow out of said obligations. After all, we had no imperialistic designs in Korea; we had no class clamoring for a commercial or political foothold; we had no real and vital interests in the country; therefore, the treaty of 1882 notwithstanding, we had no business there. Thus, we departed and left Korea to her fate.
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