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Ceremony of innocence is forgotten: Meaning is useless but necessary

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THE CEREMONY OF INNOCENCE IS FORGOTTEN--
MEANING IS USELESS BUT NECESSARY

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The problem that this thesis explores is the problem that is our age. The purpose is to help open up our age to an understanding that is a kind of innocence.

This problem and purpose are entered by exploring the philosophical problem that is meaning. Is meaning a term referring to a non-physical, non-logico-mathematical realm, thus questionable and useless; or is meaning a term referring to that which exclusively enlivens all beings (including this human being) to be set off on a particular destiny, thus fundamental and necessary?

To decide whether meaning is useless or necessary a test that is modeled after scientific testing is set up. The test is of the work that is done by just about every citizen of the United States--the spectrum from blue collar to scientific work. If this work is done without meaning and there are few problems in consequence then meaning is useless and not necessary. If there are problems then meaning may be shown necessary to alleviate those problems. The conclusion is that work is mostly meaningless as it is done today and that there are stresses or problems that seem to be caused by a lack of meaning.

It is further concluded that the enterprise is faulty. Meaning is too comprehensive for scientific testing. Thus logico-scientific thinking gives way to a meaningful thinking. This meaningful thinking, instead of relating each part to its special function within a larger part, in the way of logico-scientific thinking, relates and lets each part reverberate throughout the whole of all that is.

This poetic thinking literally surrounds the thesis and lets reverberate all the particulars within it. The particulars that are work and science and the thinking of this thesis would now reverberate throughout the whole of things.

The conclusion of poetic thinking, which is more like an evocation, is that our age is caught up in a non-reverberating understanding which cannot come to grips with fundamental problems, meaning and otherwise. Our age is without destiny. We are children who have yet to take up our work, who don't have the understanding to see our place in any sort of historical nexus. There is no living history. Neglected is a ceremony of innocence in which each is initiated into the forces of fundamental that surge and swell in the depths of all origins.
The reason that this paper has been written is to fulfill a requirement for a degree. I had nothing to say for its own right before I wrote the paper. The paper therefore does not set out to present but to explore. It attempts to explore the horizons of my own philosophic understanding. This is not an original undertaking, rather, it is just doing philosophy. Just doing philosophy, however, is not easy, and because I am a student of philosophy doing philosophy is a quite hard enough task and a-sufficient enough-goal.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM OF MEANING

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

W.B. Yeats "The Second Coming"

'Oh No!' you say, 'a whole thesis based on sentiment.' Yes!
I say, the time has come when only the coward turns his back on
sentiment; when the one who wants comfort is the one who refuses
sentiment. Yes, these are strange times. Or, I can say, innocence
is not sentiment, but the very core around which all revolves, not
the innocence of the child, but that of the truly mature--the fully
human. Whatever route I take it is significant that what I'm after
is not to be found waiting at the end of the road, glistening on
the asphalt like a newly machined dynamo. Rather the ceremony of
innocence has no road leading to it. In Melville's language it is
in landlessness alone, shoreless, indefinite as God, that it is.
Thus, if we venture we must take a certain risk. It is a risk which
demands that our normal aids be suspect. Thus, it is a risk of losing
our way such that that loss itself may not be found. No, the venture
is not to Nirvana, not to God, not to Atma (though who knows those
places may be near), rather it is to that place from which meaning
erises.
If the venture is to meaning then it seems that I've really got a quest that is significant. But there are problems which raise great doubts that this is so. Meaning is the concept which the paper takes as its theme—meaning is useless but necessary. Its necessity is based upon the inability of the world to do without it. I will attempt to show that our world needs to be meaningful and that it can only do so if we (our world) pay direct attention to meaning. The former statement, (that the world needs to be meaningful) is not so startling a problem if we realize that so much of our activity today is meaningless. Alarmingly our activities are only sustained in meaningfulness by a very thin thread, that may indeed direct them to an end, making the whole activity from beginning to end meaningful, but which is a thread that breaks all too often. The latter statement (paying direct attention to meaning) is accomplished by attaining innocence, i.e., we have access to meaning only in the way of being that is sometimes called innocence. Innocence is that which allows us to keep the thread between means and end from being broken; thus innocence preserves meaningfulness. But already it can be seen that the significance of meaning and innocence would be hard to show, and that perhaps the attempt should not be taken as it would lead to vagueness and imprecision, i.e., that meaning and innocence do not signify well enough.

Another problem is that of getting a hold on meaning and on innocence. Meaning has been discussed in philosophy. As I said, it re-
quires an argument, but eventually it will have to be surpassed. This is so not because modern Anglo-American philosophy can do without it, but because we really cannot get to it directly. Meaning is always already here. Its source is somewhere behind the scenes. We cannot get behind the scenes because almost any device we use—any tool, any plan—presents meaning as already being here. Meaning is ever before meaning; it always hides itself. Thus, though meaning provides the argument and its solution, it is a solution which leaves us unsatisfied. We just have no access to meaning. With innocence I hope to provide that access. But of course, here we are still not without difficulty, for the mode of discourse must be changed. To present innocence I must move to a poetic discourse; argumentation would crush it.

Thus the method I'm going to use is unorthodox. I want to lead the reader away from the familiar out into landlessness, i.e., into the poetic. It is only within this landlessness then that I want to create a clearing, to find a bit of "land" on which the argument 'meaning is useless' can be made; then to return back to the poetic in the end. Actually there are three attempts at the poetic: beginning of paper, beginning of the analysis of work, and at the end. That this is a dangerous attempt in philosophical thought is obvious. Instead of having the poetic lie within the rational (or at least assuming it is so) the rational lies within the poetic. That this reversal is necessary, and that it consciously be attended to, is the underlying thesis. Philosophers very often have failed to face the
poetic nature of their discourse and have presented it under the guise of science, logic, or whatever. Usually, though, the poetic is unsaid and the argument is parasitic on it. Here I want to rectify the situation by calling a spade a spade, i.e., by admitting and dealing with the poetic sources and conclusions of my arguments. The exact nature of the poetic now begs our attention. Its nature, however, must remain considerably obscure. At this time its language will merely be put in opposition to the "placed", denotative language of philosophical argumentation. Its language is rather an "unplaced", connotative language which reverberates throughout the whole of what is. It is this reverberating throughout the whole which the rational, logical, or scientific lacks and upon what the rational, logical, or scientific must remain parasitic. My poetic attempts are attempts to let this reverberation happen. If for philosophical reasons one is offended by this attempt, I can only ask that you have patience and wait for what you think the more substantive. If for poetic reasons you feel the poetic attempt crude, outrageous, or whatever, I ask on one hand for empathy and on the other I say, so what.
Innocence is the place of meaning. The ceremony of innocence is the ceremony that brings reality to the fore—the things of meaning. Meaning, innocence and reality are linked, lashed, and lodged together to brave any storm, but it is in a storm that the links weaken, the lashings unravel, and the lodging collapses. In the darkened, whirling storm care is all that saves. One must become in these times, which are our times, a worker—a creator and a preserver. One must toil for meaning by creating the ceremony for innocence to breach and by preserving the reality so revealed. One is here both the ecstatic, heaven-banging artist and the sober, plodding, watchful guardian.

No wonder of it: sheer plod makes plough down sillion
Shine, and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear,
Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermilion.¹

Such work it is, such plod it is that its fire is all there is—the inexhaustible: dancing—flame—tipped; dying—falling—dint; lying—ash—dead—suspended on a fleeting window of a moment "in a flash at a trumpets crash",² then fall and gall—that is reverberate throughout time—gold-vermilion. This is that work that prepares and opens the way for reality to speak and provides the weapons for its defense. Thus innocence is not a return to childhood. It is ahead, out on the road, among things, in the midst of dangers—not behind as something to remember with fondness. It is
past only as a guide for the future in which it will be met again, met to show what it really was and is and will be. Innocence takes us to that place which is the ultimate test for everything, the only place where everything can gather and show itself as it is. Everything breaches here like the famous Moby Dick rising a heap out of the thick blue-black spread of life—mammoth, inscrutable, with an outrageous strength before which we stand in awe and wonder; not like the technological-tooled tumult of an Ahab driven so mad in his frenzy that he strikes the sun when it insults him. Or are we like this Ahab, a darkness leaping out of light, "no light, but rather darkness visible", leaping out of the open hearth; dark, hard, cold steel smothering, squelching, crushing life's fire? No! we say, these are modern times:—steel shines in the sun and we have colorful plastic and clean electricity; we are open to the light. But it is darkness that made Oedipus innocent—blindness and damnation restored his sight and the light;...and nothing rises out of the sea for us; indeed, there is no sea. The sea has become forbidden, a mysterious monster—filled darkness reserved for those of paranoid, schizophrenic persuasion or of similar damnable behavior. Or it has been destroyed. Those sons of Ahab have vindicated their father's destruction not by launching again a great navy of ships and declaring again everlasting war with the mightiest animated mass that has survived the flood, but by putting forth steel on salt water, by putting forth land on sea, by insulating the sea from man and making toil easy—no longer wooden ships and iron men, but iron ships and wooden men; no longer a proud worker but a shamed automaton is the toiler today. Our work cannot
even match the maimed Ahab. He, at least, had a sea to sail, to be
courageous upon, to live, to die though damnable in his, as Melville
calls it, ontological heroics. That is, the sea is both material
and spiritual. So much so that in Ahab's attempts to kill (thus
create) one side—the spiritual—we discover this spiritual so
material that it kills in return. But today: a sea? no! mere water,
mere material. Our toil is for mere material? That is what we think
and that is what we are forced to act out.

We are people of the city, even the farmer today is of the city,
of the artifact, the artificial. No work can be done here.

Oh, blank confusion! true epitome
Of what the mighty city is herself,
To thousands upon thousands of her sons,
Living amid the same perpetual whirl
Of trivial objects, melted and reduced
To one identity, by differences
That have no law, no meaning, and no end—
Oppression, under which even the highest minds,
Must labor, whence the strongest are not free.

What is the artificial but the controlled, understood, one two three..., nut and bolt, cube and square, atom and neutron of reality. It is the
controllable. It is the mere, reduced, subdued, dead object. There
can be no work here for there is nothing to defend nor nothing out of
which a ceremony could be created. But it is not the case that such
a city yet exists. We are certainly, it seems, moving towards one,
and in fact many of us assume we are already there praising and
desiring complete mechanical knowledge—giving over to experts what
should be our own concern. We welcome partiality—work that is piece-
meal, thought that is specialized, having faith in the power of
techniques to cure the evils of techniques. But there is resistance
and, more important, there is meaning. But we don't work for it directly; rather it is now hidden, no...forgotten, ridiculed, so that the terms of its discourse are obscene.

I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. ...and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago.... Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene...

But we are, nevertheless, still parasitic on meaning. We are as yet in bad faith.

But this is not enough, for parasitism may be affirmed: Innocence must be shown to be that which should not be ignored; thus not merely the source of meaning. For, as the latter, we are learning it is being ignored; innocence may already be forgotten. The reality of innocence must be shown to be the highest reality, that from which everything takes it's measure. How should we show this? We should just show innocence. What is this innocence that is not a child's and gives us reality? A foolish question no doubt, but not foolish enough to say one should not ask it.

Blake gave us a sense of it in his "Auguries of Innocence":

To see a World in a Grain of Sand,  
And a heaven in a Wild Flower,  
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,  
And Eternity in an hour.  
A Robin Redbreast in a Cage  
Puts all Heaven in a Rage  

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A dog starv'd at his Master's Gate  
Predicts the ruin of the State.9  
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or Li Po:

Lazily I stir a white feather fan
Lying naked within the green wood.
I hang my hat on a crag,
And bare my head to the wind of the pines.

or Gulley Jimson:

That the soul of innocence, maidenhood,
could never be destroyed so long as it lived
in the free spirit. For it would always be
new created in real virginity. The virginity
of the soul which never allows experience to
grow stale. Which never allows custom to hide
the wonders of love.

or:....

But this is no longer an acceptable answer, if it ever was.
All that has been given so far is some talk about innocence and its
factors—e.g. reality—coupled with attempts at the poetic, and some
actual poetry by some so-called poets. This is not enough for us.
And it is obvious that whatever could be presented would never be
enough. The reality of innocence is inexhaustible. Poetry can only
hint at it. And talk about it can only be about its factors and only
a small bit there. Science, that which we trust, completely ignores
the question. Thus the modern thing to do would be to consider the
question a pseudo-question and drop it. But there is very little
reason to be modern for the sake of being modern (there is very little
reason to do anything else but try to come to grips with innocence).
But we are people of our age. We are modern. We can't return to
poetry to convince ourselves—let alone others. We must become
scientific, or at least as analytic as possible. We must form an
argument, i.e., we must delimit and put forth something that can be
tested. But not against some object; some hard, cold real, for
that would only do violence to innocence, rather, as if we were
sculptors of existence, we must move from innocence to a more
delimiting experience; one that reverberates throughout the whole
with less resonance, and then to one more delimiting and still more
until we find one experience asserting itself clear and powerful, yet
not detached from what has gone before. In fact so undetached that
it leads us back to where we started. Thus from innocence I will
move into meaning. And it is here I will sculpt my thesis: meaning
is useless but necessary.

Meaning is a word of great ambiguity. C.K. Ogden lists
sixteen different kinds of meanings for meaning. One can take this
ambiguity in two ways. One can either recoil from it in confusion
and attempt to cure the chaos by delineating very carefully various
unopposed meanings, or, if necessary, just one delineated meaning.
By using only this kind of meaning there would be great control.
Instead of having a fluctuating boundary the word would have a rigid
one. Or one can praise and affirm the confusion as richness and
fecundity. Naturally from what I have already said one would think
this is where I would take my stand, but it is not confusion I'm
after. Thus I want to affirm the ambiguity of meaning, yet delimit
-11-

it, i.e., in the delimitation preserve the inexhaustibleness of meaning. This cannot be done by a delimitation of meaning into a rigid boundary. But it can be done, if one is willing to take a risk, by caring for the boundary, by letting it fluctuate yet guarding it: not unlike the parent who sees the need for the child to adventure in the backwoods, but, instead of letting the child run free, controls the time of the adventures, and keeps an eye open on the adventures; thus exposing the child to a certain element of risk.

Thus I pick a certain use of meaning, that which is in the question "what does it all mean?". Meaning here harks to all meanings, and as it does it has no boundary, yet we are dealing with a specific question. Meaning here is pushed to its limits, but it is lodged in a question.

It is pushed so far that we can say it is beyond its limits and then forget it if it were not the case that everybody acts as if he knows the meaning of it all. Every act we do, every thought or movement demands that we know what we are doing it for; and not for just some immediate end but all the way up to and including death, and beyond, if we are so lucky as to feel responsible for the world after us. But it is not luck, it is precisely that responsibility that every act demands.

When a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but thereby at the same time a legislation deciding for the whole of mankind--in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility.13

Of course this is the radical responsibility that Sartre as an
existentialist lays upon us. It is based on freedom such that we are so free we chose what we are, not knowing a priori what it will be. We may not accept this and try to know what we are acting for before we do so, thus not legislating but leading. But the act nevertheless is crying out for direction, for its ultimate end—for meaning. Those who cannot hear that cry are merely nihilists and can be dismissed as such. But it is not from them that comes the greatest danger, rather it is from those who forget, who are overwhelmed by their inability to answer the question. They don't need to remember it because they can't answer the question "what does it all mean?". Indeed the question can't be answered, but it can be preserved and worked on.

If the question is going to be worked on then we must know what we are asking when we ask for the meaning of it all? We are asking for something more than confusion in the face of "it all", i.e., included in the all of what is there should be meaning. Thus meaning and "it all" are in the same package that we want opened, in fact I want to say they are the same thing. How so? It is not the case that what is is different from meaning? Not necessarily, for what is can only be for us if it means and meaning can only be for us if it somehow is. The two meet on the far side of our world in a way both mysterious and necessary. This had led us to that link presented earlier between meaning and reality. When we ask for any ultimate meaning, we are, at the same time, asking for reality.*

*The converse should then hold, if we ask for ultimate reality we are asking for meaning. But today this is in question if not already refuted.
Am I now trapped in idealism? Does the question I picked belong to idealism? Not quite for I have made no commitment to the subject or reason. In fact, I have rejected both, the first by using the experience of innocence—which is in the world—as the access to meaning, and the second by the poetic attempt to state my case.

But this certainly does not solve the familiar problem I'm in. There is no reality without meaning. The electron did not exist for anybody until it meant something to somebody. Only after it meant could it be said that it existed previous to it meaning something to somebody. Further, for the electron to exist for anybody its meaning has to be brought to the fore. These thoughts can lead one to attempt, as in the case of science, to get to a reality uninfluenced by the wavering subject. This attempt has certainly been rewarding, but ultimately, as I think we are seeing today, it is questionable; for it guts reality of meaning, and by doing so makes man meaningless. It is a meaninglessness though that reaches beyond today. Back in the Renaissance Shakespeare tells us:

Life is a tale told by an idiot:
Full of sound and fury signifying nothing. 14

But it is today that this meaninglessness may have come home to rest.

Camus speaks from a clear position—reality is silent.

At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world.15

Our only alternative then is to drop meaning or find the place where
meaning and reality are one, or at least are interconnected.

Thus the meaning of 'mean' in the question "what does it all mean?" is first of all a meaning of meaning. Secondly it is inexhaustible. Thirdly we all act presupposing an answer to it. Lastly it has a connection to reality. This meaning is so important, it seems, we should at the least be "working" on it. In fact, not 'at least' but at best as I will attempt to explicate later when I discuss freedom. Thus if we presuppose that we know the answer and if we don't work on it when we don't presuppose, we are parasitic, both in that things have particular meaning and that we suppose we know what we are doing. The latter (mearly supposing) can appeal only to those of us who are philosophical purists, the former (that things have meaning), though, has much more significance for the world, or so it seems.

What is this particular meaning? Heidegger gives us a sense of it.

Meaning is the 'upon-which' of a projection, in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.16

*Thus my view on reality is clearly not on the side of science, nor on the side of science's supposed opposite, existentialism. But this issue of reality is very far reaching and will only be touched on briefly here, i.e., where meaning and reality can possibly meet.
Thus, something can mean only as it rises from a fore-having. But this fore-having is not something just coming before as if we bring some information with us which makes possible new information, rather this fore-having is an after-having. For fore-having is of a project, i.e., understanding which is "a running forward in thought". Thus, the meaningful thing arises—the 'upon-which'—out of the matrix of a projection. 'Upon-which' is an unfortunate phrase. It brings to the mind a neutral physical object upon which meaning is stamped. But the 'upon-which' is of a projection and further the German word is woraufhin which opens up with connotations of before, at, towards; thus, perhaps, 'for-which' is a better translation in a sense which will become clearer later. Simply, Heidegger gives a definition of 'mean' in which the question "what does it all mean?" has legitimacy. For nothing means here unless it arises out of a matrix, the whole of which (the matrix) we would necessarily then be always concerned with. Meaning, we can now say, is that which is for the fore. The fore being in this case Dasein—the whole of the matrix.

Hence only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed with its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding.17

He means only. Man, rational animal, etc., cannot be meaningful or meaningless.* Thus only Dasein can be concerned with the meaning in

* To the extent that man, rational animal, etc., are meaningful or meaningless they are cartesian on Dasein. For those who are confused on this issue the confusion lies in the term meaning, a certain sense of it only (it will be discussed shortly) makes man meaningful.
the question "what does it all mean?", i.e., its own being, in fact:
that is its distinguishing characteristic.

Dasein is an entity which does not just
occur among other entities. Rather it is
ontically distinguished by the fact that
in its very Being that Being is an issue
for it.18

In what way is its Being an issue for it, i.e., in what way
is it for the fore? The 'for' in the phrase 'for the fore' has
the sense not only for dassein but also of Dasein. As what is
meaningful arises out of the matrix of the project it is constitut-
tive of dassein thus of the matrix from which it arises.19 What
happens here is not dissimilar to the case when a gift is given to
somebody. The gift is for George in that it will be given to him,
i.e., it will belong to him. If it is a good gift it will also be
of George. E.g., if the gift is a book about gardening and if
George appropriates the book (i.e., he does not immediately throw it
away or use it for other than its purpose) he will garden or think
of gardening either constituting himself for the first time as a
gardener or as a potential gardener or as a former gardener who will
now use, say, only a 10 per cent lime mixture on his roses. Thus
'for' means 'of' in that meaning is of Dasein when meaning constitutes,
creates dassein. In this case fore alters its sense. It is forever
before* but not as something unchanging, rather as something affected

*This is very important because though understanding can run
forward in thought, and though what is there in what is forward is
meaningful it is only so for a fore. Meaning is always ahead of
Dasein.
by meaning. And it is not an accumulative effect, but one such that meaning can overturn all that has gone before. Lastly there is a sense of 'for' which is addressed to the fore as it is before meaning. Thus I will buy a gift for George because it is George. E.g., one might say this tie has George written all over it, or seeing a tie in a store immediately announces that it belongs to George not because you are going to buy it for George but that it belongs to George even if you did not buy it for George.

Thus meaning is both of the fore in that it is the fore but also of the fore in that it constitutes the fore. And since the fore is Dasein, that which in its very being has that being as an issue for it, meaning is most significantly for the fore. It is the fore and constitutive of the fore only because it is for the fore. Thus, meaning is more like the for-which rather than the upon-which of a projection.

For Heidegger then particular meaning, e.g., the meaning of rock, is ultimately tied to the whole, in his terminology, Dasein. Thus a single thing can only be meaningful as it arises out of and before Dasein. But this may seem far too bold or just absurd to some, for is it not the case that a rock only has particular meaning? It is soft red, crumbly or any other such particular. It has various predicates which are used by people in this or that way. Nothing more need be given, it seems, if one wants meaning than to just give the use of these particulars. Thus it would seem that Heidegger is incorrect, that we don't have to appeal to the whole or Dasein in order to have meaning, for it resides merely in the use to which various
particulars can be put. Of course Heidegger is not denying particular meaning, but he is saying that it cannot exist without Dasein. Indeed one can describe the meaning of something in terms of particular meaning but this is not the only meaning that is used. Nothing would be meaningful to them if their only meaning were particular meaning.
Among many philosophers who think particular meaning sufficient I will discuss Gilbert Ryle and Willard Van Orman Quine.

In his essay, "The Theory of Meaning", Ryle approaches the problem of meaning with an assurance and objectivity that can only be a sign of health. He first puts forth the significance of the problem and the intention of his essay.

Now answers to this highly abstract question, what are meanings? have, in recent decades, bulked large in philosophical and logical discussions. Preoccupation with the theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy. We need not worry whether or not it is a disease. But it might be useful to survey the motives and the major results of this preoccupation.

From the first sentence we know that the problem of meaning is one often worked at by both logicians and philosophers. This alone, though, does not make it significant. Later on in the essay when discussing "The Theory of Philosophy" Ryle makes it very plain how significant the problem is.

Thus, by the first decade of this century it was dawning upon philosophers and logicians that their business was not that of one science among others...
Thus, it is puzzling that Ryle next says (in the first quote) that preoccupation with the theory of meaning is the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy. He stops us from the pursuit of this puzzle by saying next that we need not worry whether or not it is a disease. But the damage has already been done. Thus we are carried along without too much trouble at the end into dealing with Wittgenstein's notion of philosophy as cure.

In England, on the whole, others of its teachings (Wittgenstein's Tractatus) were applied more constructively.

that is on the medicinal virtues of his account of the nonsensical.

Ryle, I want to say, has health as the guiding force of his philosophy. This is only implicit in his work. But because he offers us nothing else, in fact is mostly silent on the subject, I want to give him the best possible guiding force, and as has been shown there is some evidence. But it is not health as a guiding force that I'm keen on showing here, rather it is the lack of any explicit guiding force, and the consequence of this. I will maintain that health is the only good possible consequence of this lack of an explicit guiding force.

The lack of any explicit guiding force is evident in his inability to give us a positive reason for accepting his position on

*Compared to the polemical use in Vienna.
meaning. Those philosophers or philosophies that do not concern themselves with meaning can be rejected without appealing to anything, including health. But when the turn is to meaning the story is somewhat different. Meinong and Husserl are rejected on the good grounds of positing a third realm (the concern of philosophy) that is different from both mental acts and states (psychology) and physical objects and events (physical and biological sciences).

If the meaning of an expression is not an entity denoted by it, but a style of operation performed with it, not a nominee but a role, then it is not only repellent but positively misleading to speak as if there existed a Third Realm whose denizens are Meanings.  

Husserl and Meinong are forced to posit a Platonic realm which is, in itself, unsatisfactory. But to be content with Meaning as a role or use24 is equally unsatisfactory. For here Ryle is led to compare the work of the philosopher with that of the cartographer.

This is, I think, why at the present moment philosophers are far more inclined to liken their task to that of the cartographer than to that of the chemist or the detective.25

The map maker can never give us what he maps, similarly the philosopher who treats meaning as use never gives us meaning, i.e., the meaning of meaning. It may have practical results in the same way a map does but it can never come to grips with meaning in the way philosophy usually wants, i.e., essentially--in the whole. The map is a sum of particulars, a series of aspects which is never the essence of the land, merely a practical extension of it. The map of meanings would be merely the sum of particular meanings, not the
essence of it. Its practical use is its value—it promotes our health. Thus philosophy changes and the problem in Anglo-Saxon philosophy is usually not about the inability of finding a meaning of meaning but denying that such a question should ever come up. Such an attitude does not answer the problem which Ryle admits is the realm of philosophy—Meaning—, but merely rejects it as nonsense, thus giving us a negative argument rather than a positive one, one that is not incorrect but not enlightening either. Aside from the fact that philosophy radically changes we can see that what Ryle is asking is that we attend to particular meanings and not address ourselves to the whole or the wherefrom of these meanings. We should map the particulars everything else is nonsense (or unhealthy?).

Ryle offers us no explicit reason to accept Meaning as role or use. Indeed his attack on the other interpretation is convincing in that there are reasons to reject it, but of his position no reason is given to support it. We are asked to accept it implicitly, as being all that we have, i.e., we must be practical. This appeal is not just indigenous to Ryle's philosophy, but to most of Anglo-American philosophy. Thus we have Carnap, after making a separation between internal questions (whose answers are determined within the framework, in our case particular meaning) and external questions (whose answers are determined outside the framework, in our case meaning), appealing not to reality for the answer to external questions, but to the practical.

On the other hand, the external questions of
the reality of physical space and physical
time are pseudo-questions. A question like "Are
there (really) space-time points?" is
ambiguous. It may be meant as an internal
question; .... Or it may be meant in the external
sense: "Shall we introduce such and such forms
into our language?"; in this case it is not a
theoretical but a practical question, a matter
of decision rather than assertion.... Or finally,
it may be meant in the following sense: "Are
our experiences such that the use of the linguistic
forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?"
This is a theoretical question of a factual,
empirical nature. But it concerns a matter of degree;
therefore a formulation in the form 'real or not?'
would be inadequate.26

Carnap almost lets reality slip in when asking whether the
linguistic forms are fruitful or expedient. He gets out by calling
this a matter of degree, altering the original concern of "real
or not?".

Quine, of course, allows us to escape such a difficulty.

Yet we do recognize a shift from talk of
objects to talk of words as debate progresses
from existence of wombats and unicorns to
existence of points, miles, classes, and the
rest. How can we account for this? Amply, I
think, by proper account of a useful and much
used manoeuvre which I shall call semantic ascent.

It is the shift from talking in certain terms to
talking about them. It is precisely the shift
that Carnap thinks of as divesting philosophical
questions of a deceptive guise and setting them
forth in their true colors. But this tenet of
Carnap's is the part that I do not accept.
Semantic ascent, as I speak of it, applies anywhere.27

Semantic ascent is extremely useful because it allows for
different people to understand and agree on the use of terms.28

But particular meaning now becomes the paradigm. For particular
meaning is the only kind that can be agreed on. And though we are now free to accept or reject whatever objects these various meanings point to, this freedom is our damnation. Either we choose in the dark and/or we choose with an implicit force guiding us.

Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory; say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged.

But simplicity, as a guiding principle in constructing conceptual schemes, is not a clear and unambiguous idea; and it is quite capable of presenting a double or multiple standard.29

But this ambiguity in the guiding force does not faze Quine.

The rule of simplicity is indeed our guiding maxim in assigning sense data to objects; we associate an earlier and a later round sensum with the same so-called penny, or with two different so-called pennies, in obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world-picture. Here we have two competing conceptual schemes, a phenomenalistic one and a physicalistic one. Which should prevail? Each has its advantages; each has its special simplicity in its own way. Each I suggest deserves to be developed.30

The guiding force is simplicity and only within that can there be differences. Thus we have a reason now to accept meaning as use. We should be guided by the practical or the simple. But this is not sufficient. Essentially Anglo-American philosophy provides no explicit reason for us to accept its tenets, or more.
important no explicit attempt is made to come up with the reason for its view. There is just no need from its point of view since what is important is the simple, the practical, that which makes sense. Only individual meaning provides this. Quine goes so far to say that there not only is no such thing as meaning, but that we can speak without a realm of entities called meanings.

I have argued further that we can view utterances as significant, and as synonymous or heteronymous with one another, without countenancing a realm of entities called meanings.31

We can do away with the word meaning by using instead synonymy and significance. The first gives us the meaning of a word by giving us a word or group of words that are synonymous with that word. The second gives us the rule or form that makes a group of words meaningful. This is strictly a grammatical manoeuvre which should be guided by simplicity considerations.32 Thus what Quine gives us is a further sophistication of meaning as use, i.e., what I have used synonymously--particular meaning. It is a further sophistication because now meaning is not merely the way words are used, but the specific way in which they are used, i.e., they are used according to a certain grammar and with a certain relation to other words either synonymous, partially synonymous or not synonymous. This is merely a more intricate description of what is in use. As such we are no longer concerned with meaning in the sense of the question "what does it all mean?", for mere description truncates that. But we are, it seems, concerned with particular meanings that point to and ask "why is this meaningful rather than meaningless?", for we now
have the rule of grammar that separates the meaningful from the meaningless. Thus Quine gives an answer to Heidegger by saying that we don't have to go to Dasein for the particular (word or sentence) to be meaningful but merely to grammar.

But even supposing that the notion of synonymy can eventually be provided with a satisfactory criterion, still this maneuver only takes care of the one context of the word 'meaning'--the context 'having meaning'. Here a parallel maneuver is in order: treat the context 'having meaning', in the spirit of a single word, 'significant', and continue to turn our backs on the suppositional entities called meanings.

Significance is the trait with respect to which the subject matter of linguistics is studied by the grammarian.33

Thus what makes a sentence meaningful is grammar. But it cannot be only grammar, i.e., pure relation as in logic. There must be some connection to reality. This is provided by 'conditioned response'.

The theory as a whole--a chapter of chemistry, ..., plus relevant adjuncts from logic and elsewhere--is a fabric of sentences variously associated to one another and to non-verbal stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response.

Theory may be deliberate, as in a chapter on chemistry, or it may be second nature, as is the immemorial doctrine of ordinary enduring middle-sized objects. In either case, theory causes a sharing, by sentences, of sensory supports.34

Conditioned response provides the connection to reality in that it provides the association between sentences and non-verbal stimuli. This kind of description of the connection to reality, though not incorrect, leaves us dissatisfied. First of all the connection is vague, even mysterious. But aside from this objection,
which may or may not be answered by science, yet very much related to this objection, conditioned response in effect says hands off reality. Conditioned response leaves us to the vagaries of reality interpretation. We are then stuck with a relativism such that we can't turn to reality to make ultimate decisions. Thus we are thrust back into accepting simplicity as our guiding force, such that in the area of meaning (or any ultimate area) we call upon simplicity rather than reality, simplicity rather than what is, simplicity rather than meaning. And ironically individual things may be meaningful, i.e., there possibly need be no recourse to the entity meaning in order to have meaning. The question now at the fore then is whether simplicity can be maintained without being parasitic. If it can then Heidegger is refuted and it is not only Dasein that can be meaningful or meaningless. And if simplicity can be maintained without being parasitic then nothing would be meaningful or meaningless, and it would be necessary to live in a world without meaning. But this would be no problem since we would already be living in such a world. Finally, if simplicity can't be non-parasitic then it may still be healthy to maintain it as a guiding force.

I will attack the position of analytic philosophy towards meaning in two ways and affirm it in one. The first attack is directed at the possibility of maintaining a non-parasitic simplicity. I claim it is impossible. First of all one did not turn to simplicity at the time one was born—rather the move arose out of a
world of varying forces—a world to which the turn to simplicity is responsible. From this world only did it become meaningful to move to simplicity. Secondly, once the move is made it is doubtful that the individual can maintain it; it is always at stake. If one allows oneself to be a part of the world with all its politics and personalities one can do little else but be complex. But even if one is somehow able to vanquish all complex forces it is in the face of these forces that simplicity exists. If they are taken away then there is no simplicity. Simplicity needs its counterpart. It needs it so much that to have simplicity as a guiding force without its counterpart would be to wallow in nothingness. Such is the feeling when the work is done, after something has been made simple. Such is the feeling after you have learned a job and must repeat it over and over again. If everything is made simple there are no more worlds to conquer and one can only die. Therefore Heidegger is not refuted. Quine offers only more evidence to his contention. In spite of himself Quine is in the world, i.e., for Quine there is meaning, something inexhaustible which he draws upon. Quine is parasitic on Dasein.

What I want to do now is affirm simplicity. This I attempt to do by showing that when one lets simplicity be one's guide one is guided by a sense of something like good health (similar to that health put forth by Ryle). By sticking to use one merely describes. No better way is there to remain outside dangers and in good health. By turning metaphysical questions into practical questions what else is being said than that health must be maintained? Nothing else. Use,
the practical, and simplicity, I want to say, are all guided by health. (Of course, one may say analytic philosophy is not guided by health. If this is the case then either it is guided by something like health or analytic philosophy is just plain evil. I will assume the former as the only possible way to affirm analytic philosophy.)

Health is peculiar to the last one hundred years of philosophy. Nietzsche of course was one of the first to maintain it. Health for him though was somewhat different than for those under discussion. Instead of steering between worlds of non-sense, the healthy man took on all and affirmed it. His health arose from some kind of overflowing strength, an affirmation of the spontaneous that pulled in one direction while the intellect pulled in the other. Affirmation overflowed everywhere. Health for Nietzsche was the ability to affirm the worst of possibilities. What is going on here is somewhat different. Health here is not affirming all but taking only what can be handled, remaining safe, practical, and simple.

This has not only happened in philosophy but also in literature. Hemingway is a prime example—the one I will use in hopes of doing as much justice as I can to health—and the quote from him earlier exemplifies very well the cutting away of "non-sense". The comprehensive health of Zarathustra now becomes a very tough, limited health. Naturally it is not dissimilar to the strength needed in war, and Hemingway's health comes after an "injury". According to Philip Young it is an injury that one has by being born into the world. 35

The world breaks everyone and afterwards
many are strong at the broken places.

This breaking, I want to maintain, is not just some exotic breaking like Jake's impotence in The Sun Also Rises, but that kind which takes place in most of us as we mature. It is the realization that one's horizons must be limited, that the dreams of childhood cannot be maintained in the face of the world. This is not--though it often is--a giving up, for "...many are strong at the broken places", rather it is a turn to the particular as that which is the only thing that can be handled. It is not Zarathustra's health because the turn is to the limited, for needed safety from the fantasy of youth.

This limitedness or simplicity is very well exemplified by Hemingway's prose. His prose is spare, he never ceased being the beginner that he was when he said,--

"I was trying to learn to write, commencing with the simplest things." 37

And what are these:

...a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion. 38

Never go to the emotion, but evoke it by giving its objects is the "...stimulus--response, behavioristic fashion that is so characteristic of Hemingway"39* Such an attitude, of course, is not peculiar to Hemingway alone, nor to literature alone. The famous phrase "less is more" of Miss van der Rohe is one example. Though it was originally intended for architecture it could well apply anywhere then and now, though there was recently (with the so-called hippies)...

*That B.F. Skinner is guided by the type of health being explicated here will be affirmed later.
evidence of change. To be modern is to concern oneself with the simple, the particular whether it be literature, art, architecture, etc.. Thus we have in our universities that process called a greater degree of specialization.

I have used Hemingway partially to explicate this notion of simplicity and its healthy quality not because Hemingway was the pure embodiment of health—which he wasn't—but because he gives the flavor of cool adventure or subdued enthusiasm to it. Never before in fiction have particular tasks become so interesting and substantial. Every act is a craft if one pays it its full regard, whether it is fishing, bull-fighting, loving, or whatever. But it is not a task that overwhelms its objects, rather the objects guide the task. Here is a rather average example:

"He's coming now," Manuel said.

Zurito sat there, his feet in the box—stirrups, his great legs in the buckskin—covered armor gripping the horse, the reins in his left hand, the long pic held in his right hand, his broad hat well down over his eyes to shade them from the lights, watching the distant door of the toril. His horses' ears quivered. Zurito patted him with his left hand.

This is so simple that one would think it requires little skill.

But in the very same way that the picador simplifies his task so does Hemingway and this takes ability.* The effort makes the simple shine forth, not any murky sentiment, or overindulgent fantasy,

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*It is so simple that it is like a rose growing in a patch of weeds; it is the quiescence of a chaotic experience, it is art. As such it becomes meaningful precisely because of that chaos—as any athletic coach knows, one wins by making the other team look chaotic.
merely the facts. There are no crutches here, no weakness only health.

Hemingway as I have pictured him presents three aspects of the simple. First there is the self-imposed limitation of maturity, second the actual simplification of one's work, third the interesting aliveness rather than the supposed mechanicalness of the simple. This is health insofar as health is the freedom from aid, for it seems there is no aid here. All there is is what is simply stated and this is enough. There is no drawing upon other powers. One is here affirmatively self-sufficient. This is not to say that there are not powers lurking outside one's self-sufficiency, whether very real as for Hemingway or ridiculed as emotive for others, but it is to say that one does not need them. Further and more important if there are needs outside the simple, e.g., happiness, they will only be gotten by diligent attention to the simple, i.e., by turning away from them. Thus, the "father" of modern Anglo-American philosophy, Bertrand Russell says:

It is common place that happiness is not best achieved by those who seek it directly; and it would seem that the same is true of the good. In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires.41

Not only then is the turn to simplicity (the facts) healthy for the individual but for the world. For the world is only healthy, it only progresses as individuals turn to simplicity.

If we now add one more factor we can get at the sense of
health I want to show as the guiding force for the turn to simplicity. It is the health of the simple itself. The more simple the thing is which one is working with the healthier it is, the more readily it can be defended—both positively and negatively—and the more it itself has a self-sufficiency that enables one to go on to other things.

Only one alteration now has to be made. For Quine and the rest, I do not think, the move to simplicity was initiated strictly by maturity, i.e., the necessity for limiting one's horizons; rather the greater influence I will assume was the success of science. Thus health, which I put forth positively, consists of an actual concern for simple things; these things, contrary to what one may think, have a full life—they keep the individual involved with them interested in them; thus healthy; further they themselves are healthy, i.e., they can be easily defended; lastly the claim is that a turn to them and a disregard of things like the good or happiness will, better than any direct technique, gain that good or happiness. As far as that thing which causes the turn to simplicity is concerned, whether it be a "cruel" world or the positive success of science, it now matters little.

Odd as it may seem, it is the last I want to affirm—the disregard of happiness as the way to achieve it. Its affirmation depends upon the second—that the simple remain interesting and "full". Now though, I will have to lay aside this pursuit. It will be picked up later when I have more material to work with. Somehow the health that must be affirmed cannot be so cavalier with meaning; such an
attitude will only lead to its loss, and the simple in itself then will not be able to sustain anyone.

Lastly, I want to again attack simplicity but in a much more general and incomplete way. I want to attack it on the level of use. If meaning is use as Ryle says, or synonymy and significance as Quine says, or anything similar then it is only good as it itself is used. That this is at the center of analytic philosophy need not be defended. Carnap has already been quoted indicating the stress on practical questions. Simplicity and language as use are only an outgrowth of this turn to the practical. The presuppositions here are enough, as I will try to show, to indicate that use has nothing whatsoever to do with meaning. It will be no great wonder then that Quine can do away with it.

Use is the utilization or employment for some aim or purpose. Thus it presupposes a self that provides the aim or purpose for what is going to be utilized or employed, and we have a subject-object split. When the object is used it is for the aim or purpose of the subject. If it happens that it is used for another object then what has happened is only that we have extended the number of objects. The group then as a whole is given aim or purpose by the subject for the subject. Though the extent to which objects can be used, i.e., have aim or purpose attached to them (gear A is to turn gear B), is potentially infinite, eventually, if the subject is sane, the aim or purpose has to get back to the subject. Thus to know truly the aim or purpose of an object (i.e., the use) we would have to know what we are, what our self is. In everyday experience this knowledge, if it
exists, is open. What we are when we feel, think, or act is given ambiguously, if at all. We are a great lover when we feel love or maybe a weakhearted fool; a cool, perceptive analyst in thought or possibly a shallow simple primitive; a strong, determined man of action or a crude, gruff bumbler. What we are is so changeable and doubtful that we are forced to abandon usually our attempts at any understanding of it. Thus, though to use something presupposes knowledge of self, we normally have no such knowledge. We beat this problem by limiting the horizon and considering the aim or purpose segmented. Thus the use of a car is to drive to school, the use of a pencil is to write, etc. Thus if we stick only to use we cut off all access to meaning. Use as it is in use has nothing to do with meaning.

But it may be useful to know oneself, and as such meaning too would then be useful. But it could only be useful for a particular use and as such would be guided by that use. E.g., as a participant in a war it would be very useful to know how much you will risk your life or how much discipline you can stand etc. This usefulness, it seems, would be very meaningful in the context of life or death, brig or no brig, i.e., in the war, for such knowledge may save you from the less desirable. But a war is not the only context and a question arises here. What is the less desirable? For is it not the case that it is only by an engagement into a situation like this—war—that you come to find out what is really the less desirable? War like anything else is a learning process. Such knowledge here, it seems, would only come in the activity. For it is in the
experience of war that you find out what is the less desirable. You find out how much you are willing to risk your life; you might find that death is far more powerful than you thought, or your ideals are weaker than you thought, or you may find that death would be welcome, or that your ideals are so strong that you will risk death for them, etc.

Thus the usefulness of knowing yourself here is parasitic on the resolution of the problem of knowing yourself which is resolved not by limiting it to a certain use but by the interaction of that use with the world, i.e., by putting use into use. If it so happens that no resolution is needed, that one has already decided that one is the use and will take the consequences, then this limited use is itself parasitic on an earlier resolution of the problem which had to draw upon something more than use, i.e., the decision to be merely that use, a decision which again has to be renewed as that use is in use.

Thus no knowledge of self can be garnered by sticking only to use, a knowledge which is presupposed in use. Meaning, because it includes the self, is outside the realm of use. As will be remembered meaning is the 'meaning' in the question, "what does it all mean?" which includes naturally the self in "it all". This question can never be asked if only use is in use. Thus meaning is useless. Its uselessness naturally demands that we now know its importance.

Thus in summary, the whole concern with meaning by these analysts is the doing away with meaning. This works since use is in use, for meaning has nothing to do with use, at least the 'use' that
has so far been treated. But it is nevertheless a parasitic endeavor. This has been shown by the attack on simplicity, the guiding force of Quine. But things are not settled because the more fundamental guiding force of health may have some value. Thus, what is raised into question by this turn to analytic philosophy's annihilation of meaning, is the real importance of meaning and of course parasitism. For the possibility is raised here that either meaning is not needed or that the best way to achieve it is to be parasitic on it. These two issues are what the remainder of the paper is concerned with.

But before we go on these problems must be solidified. Analytic philosophy has led us to ask about the significance of meaning and parasitism. The subtle interaction between them must now be clarified. Meaning at this point is ambiguous. This ambiguity must be restated and then limited. It is the 'mean' in the question "What does it all mean?" which as has been explicated is a meaning of meaning, is inexhaustible, has something to do with reality and is something we all presuppose. For our purpose this can be divided into two. First there is the question. Second there is a something.

Now there are two ways we can discuss the problem of the significance of meaning and parasitism. First we can ask whether the question of meaning is necessary. If the answer is no then one may
be parasitic. This leads us to ask about the importance of parasitism. If it is decided that parasitism is unimportant then there is still the possibility of defending meaning (though not the question of meaning since this has already been forsaken).

This could be done by showing that health is the outcome of ignoring any parasitic character, and that this is meaningful. A meaningful health depends on meaning being something and leads us to the second way we can discuss the problem of the significance of meaning and parasitism. Here we can say meaning, in itself, as something, is necessary or not necessary. If this is done, ignoring the question may or may not be parasitic. If meaning is not necessary, then the earlier concern about the question is irrelevant. But if meaning is necessary, then we are still faced with the earlier problem because meaning may best be obtained by ignoring it. Thus the task is a two-fold, but systematic task. Meaning must first be shown necessary and parasitism must be unraveled to show just what it does to attain meaning.
Now that the problem is made more specific the method can be explicated, and it is not an easy explication. In order to show the importance of meaning we are first met with the opposing views of analytic philosophy culminating in Quine's refutation of the necessity of using the word. The second opposition in attempting to find out the importance of meaning is meaning itself. This has already been mentioned as its 'already here' character. We just can't get outside meaning in order to "see" it. The first was answered by a charge of being parasitic, the second by the turn to innocence "poetically". But now we must go further. The charge of being parasitic depends on the importance of being parasitic. But parasitism is secondary. As has been shown the necessity of meaning must first be shown. The second, turn to innocence "poetically", depends on the importance of "poetry". As will be seen this is the importance of meaning. Thus the issue boils down to the necessity of meaning. It can be answered in only one place. We must go to the world to discover this importance. That is we must go to our world asking whether the world can or cannot do without meaning.

It is necessary that I defend a move to the world. This move presupposes that the problems of philosophy are not sufficient to make my case. One need go no further than parasitism to understand this. A branch of philosophy today considers this an issue of little
importance, otherwise Quine and the rest would pay, at least, some heed to it. Secondly, all we have to do is look at the various philosophies presented in the world to see that there is a great divergence and that any appeal to philosophy is an appeal to a philosophy among others. As Kant says philosophy must defend itself; it sets its own rules. Thus a problem of philosophy cannot be appealed to. But this rejection of philosophical problems is far different than a rejection of philosophy itself. And even when we go to the world we must go there philosophically.

But our world right off makes it plain where it stands: it doesn't need philosophy. Let's take that part of the thesis that states, meaning is useless. If we react spontaneously to this statement—in a way then indicative of our world—we assume it means that meaning has no worth and should be discarded. But after some thought, which our world rarely indulges in, and as was done earlier, we merely find that meaning has so far nothing to do with use. And if we turn our thoughts to this argument and remember that use can give no account of the subject that uses, which is called for in any use, we come to the conclusion that use also is parasitic—it denies what is in play. And what is in play? Meaning. The meaning of the subject is always at stake. Thus whenever we use 'use' we are parasitic on the manifold subject which becomes the subject for a particular use. Thus use has (so far) nothing to do with meaning and is parasitic on it. This happens only if we turn to thought, which is not a particular habit of our world; a world then which puts use
above meaning, which means that one must be parasitic, a move which can only be made by denying the importance of being parasitic.

'But!' you say, 'This analysis is very cursory—depending on spontaneous reaction. Our world is much more manifold than you imply.' Undoubtedly this is so. Thus there can be questions as to what are the dominant modes of being in the world, and there can be opposition to them, i.e., what the world is is a problem. Philosophy must be engaged.

The way I'm going to the world is through work, the dominant activity of that world. Two questions arise. What is that to which I'm going and how am I going? First let's try the latter.

What I will do is make a split between work and labor. Labor is further split between means and end. These splits then are what are questionable. It is not quite a scientific theory. It cannot be tested conclusively by measurable events of the world, for the simple reason that it is not a measurable event. The splits are not manifested through the senses only. And if one were to look at, talk to, and work with an individual it may not come about that one could discern the splits. Not only because one's knowledge here depends upon oneself, but because it also depends upon the worker. Thus there is not any conclusive measurable data which can establish the split between work and labor, though there is a little and it will be given.

Am I then indulging in a work that is mere fantasy, that has nothing to do with the world? No! in fact I'm dealing with a work
that is far more of the world than if it could be made into a scientific theory. It is the work that one experiences. This means that it entails what goes on in one's head as well as what one's hands do, and it includes them in the way they are—not always separate nor always joined. This supposes then a far different world than that of science, but of which science is a member. It is called by Husserl the lived world. 43

Thus, instead of going to the world with a theory of work that presupposes that world, I will attempt to enter into that world preserving that world, i.e., without presuppositions, yet with clarity. Thus the test for the splits is not some sensual given but whether or not there is clarity and whether or not work is preserved as one's own notion about work. The first, it seems, is not too much of a problem. We know what is clear. But it is a problem and will be shown so if we take up with the seemingly more obscure, 'one's own notion about work'. What does this consist of? It depends upon two things: one's own articulation of work and a vague, but accessible, experience of work. The first has various degrees of articulation depending on the individual. The second is the experiences that can be called forth when one discusses or thinks about work. In the world they blend together and are in such great flux that articulation calls forth and alters experience, and experience calls forth and alters articulation. Thus clarity is dependent upon one's own notion about work in the way that something will not be clear unless it affirms articulation, which is thus a calling forth of experience.
But, you say, something is clear if it articulates what is. It will stand above and make plain what work actually is and every man who has the facts can understand it. But this is just not true, simply because what is is presupposed as being below or out there, i.e., because there are no absolute facts. The facts of science belong to scientists. If they happen to belong to a non-scientific laborer, i.e., a carpenter, it is because he has been proselytized, and as such he will no longer be a laborer. He will be somebody who does carpentry on the side, eventually, unless he is perverted, his labor will be of science, for only then will his clarity be connected to his experience. That this kind of change (the move to scientific clarity) is what is happening to all of us need not be pursued. What need be pursued is whether it is good. This will be done later.

But there is a more pressing problem now and that is whether I have presupposed a world in my attempt to go to it. The answer is yes and no. Yes, in that I have a sense of what the world is that I'm going to. It is the way of the whole of work which as a self I experience; thus I too have my own notion about work and an attempt at articulation which both calls forth the experience (and alters it) and calls forth the articulation (and alters it). No, in that my argument rests upon a common experience of the world of work. The world I present is not thrust on the reader as true but offered to him or her. This is so because I keep my place within the world and make no attempt to get outside it. This can only be attempted as an artistic or poetic endeavor. Thus what I offer is an articulation
which then calls forth experience upon experience which is forever
testing that articulation. What I offer is an experience which is
an articulation which is none other than art, a way of allowing
people to partake in a common articulation/experience. I don't pre-
suppose a world for I am creating that world. That this is obscure
need not be said. Simply all that need be said at this time is that
I do not presuppose a world in my articulation of work because I am
always in the world in my articulation, i.e., presupposing can only
take place when one's discourse supposes that one is out of the
world, standing in a transcendental position. No such supposition
will be made.

The question now is if the lived-world has any claim upon us.
Perhaps it should just be ignored as being ugly, incoherent, incon-
clusive etc., a mess to be cleared away. That this is at issue is
certainly the case but whether or not it can be resolved is not
obvious. But it can be defended and this essay is such a defense, a
defense which will even attempt to come to some terms with reality.
This has already been hinted at. Innocence is the source of reality
and meaning, a "place" where both reality and meaning are one. This
"place" then reveals the lived-world as it is, a world damned by
freedom. But enough of this, it will come.

In summary: we must go to the world to decide whether meaning
or parasitism is significant. What this world is is a problem. By
attempting to enter into it through work I presuppose in that I have
a certain sense of what to expect, i.e., the work/labor and means/end
split, but I don't presuppose in that this is an articulation which is always at stake in the face of that world, i.e., I am in the world. Thus my work is not that of a scientist who supposes the world out there, but more like that of a poet or artist who has the world right here and dwells in it.

Now that we have the problems and the method it would be well to state the argument in whole, then on with it. The argument is my thesis: meaning is useless but necessary. It has already been established that it is useless now I must show that it is necessary, or significant, or important. Part II is the test of the world made accessible by work. A split is made between work and labor. Some scientific evidence is given but the most important evidence is garnered by an appeal to one's own experience, articulated and unarticulated. The initial probe which excludes scientific labor, shows that meaning cannot be found in labor. The next question is whether this situation has any significance, whether meaning is or is not necessary. This question takes two forms: whether meaning itself is necessary or whether a direct attention to meaning is necessary. The answer initially is to the first form of the question. There is

*Labor is close to use. The laborer uses and is used; and as will be seen labor is without meaning. Labor is the use that is in use in our world.
evidence that meaning is necessary. We find stresses in labor today that can only be overcome, it seems, if labor becomes meaningful. But this does not entail scientific labor which has its meaning in its product—science. This leads to Behaviorism. Behaviorism is an attempt to pay attention only to particular meaning at the exclusion of meaning. It is an attempt to manipulate use without meaning. There is no direct test for this position but if we go to architecture we see the same attempt to exclude meaning. Modern architecture, by being mostly technological, usually excludes meaning for particular meaning, usually is concerned with use rather than meaning. This architecture will be shown defective and the conclusion will be reached that if Behaviorism is going to be successful it must be meaningful and if it is going to be meaningful there must be direct attention to meaning. The conclusion of Part II is that in some way meaning has necessity.

Part III initially picks up some loose ends which eventually lead us to innocence. To handle the problems of architecture the natural turn is to art which, it is supposed, will rescue architecture. But art can do no such thing, because at its core it is subject to Freedom, and it cannot give meaning to architecture and labor. Only freedom can give meaning, which is disguised innocence, meaning, reality; naturally a freedom not usually articulated. It is here that it can be presented that innocence has been forgotten, but should not be.
CHAPTER TWO

THE TEST OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MEANING

Work! do it and forget. There is no way out of it unless you are a king, an aristocrat;... rich. It is a facticity like your height, nothing can change it. Man is condemned to work. To be a man is to work whether it be busting rocks or learning to read. Let us here praise those toilers that cut down the trees, spanned the waters, killed the game, built, plowed, died, sustained by a force that contracted the muscles, stimulated the brain—work. Work is what did it man! Each of us sits on the sweat and pain of millions, riding high and powerful on their sacrifice. And that is what it is, a sacrifice. You turn away from the grass blowing in the wind and enter the blackness of the mine. You forget the sweet smell of lilacs as you press on in the stillness towards your quarry. You forget the lapping of the waters against the sand as the motors vibrate and hum throughout the factory. Put on your blinders man, stop up your five windows, and only open the shades on
your work.

Older than all preached Gospels was this
unpreached, inarticulate but ineradicable,
forever enduring Gospel; work, and therein
well being.44

Before man even God worked, '...and on the seventh day he rested'.
He rested and in order for man to rest he also must work. And
what is rest, but satisfaction, the satisfaction of needs. And
from God until today this is the way.

...whatever satisfaction is possible necessitates
work, more or less painful arrangements and under-
takings for the procurement of the means of
satisfying needs.45

But this cannot be work! Work that created all that is. Such
a paltry thing is it that that dead God had to do it and it is for
the mere satisfaction of our needs. Tell this to the man-who-
busted broncs, who chased whales, who trapped beaver. Tell it to
any man or woman who busted ass and were proud of what they busted
it for, whether a piece of land or a child. Man, that is work.
'But there is no reward? There are no procured means for satisfying
needs here?' they say.

'How is such work done?'

He worked for his wages
on a Magdalene spread:
a dollar a day,
beef, beans and bread.

A tough, dirty life
a death in a ditch;
hard on the kidneys,
bad for the itch;
a man might get suntanned;
he wouldn't get rich.

Like all brave cowboys dead and alive
on riding and wind and stars he could thrive
with a home-made song to keep his heart alive.

'Mere romance', they say. 'Nobody lives on work alone. It is in
the myths that it is so. Work is the dirty, empty job that gets
all of us, and it will get you someday, you of the great romance,
but there'll be no special hurry!'

Yes, it has gotten me. It has gotten me everywhere like it
has gotten you. But it is merely work as it is for you. By forget-
fulness it is reduced to insignificance though capturing time and
spirit. It cannot sustain. It is mere labor, a job. It is not
work. 'Thus', you say, 'there is just no work'. Yes, looking
around I see nothing that looks like work. I see men laboring,
their backs bent, their eyes long, their hand out. I see women
laboring, their spirit broken, their kid gone. I see a landscape
that is a darkened plain, all the same, without name, needs satisfied
but not alive. 'But it is not so bad, merely the necessary that has
to be done so that in the future there will be no labor. And that
is right around the corner,' they say. 'But even that you have no
need to hope for, for look at what you do now, a mere eight hours, and
often less; not back-breaking, sweaty toil, but with breaks, benefits,
vacations, a mere eight hours and then you are free, and I mean free...
you have money. And if you put your son through college more money,
less toil, easy street for him, man! Think of your father; twelve
hours, no benefits, no breaks, and graveyard to escape the humilia-
tion of the bosses.' And those who worked for work's sake? They are
in the movies. We have them reduced and captured to splash, dab,
crash entertainment on the bubble tube. But are they really there? No, of course not, merely the masks. They are heroes now, merely born the way they are. 'Oh! if we could be that way!'

But we're not. They do not work. 'But is there today anything to work for?' My friend, you have been deceived, as it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be, nothing but work, and more work. You have been duped into thinking that you can escape it, fat city all the way. Today we are seekers of happiness not work as we kiss ass, prostitute ourselves for the tit, or give that tit for the smile. We pimp our goods whether it be the skill of persuasion or swinging ass; for it is a time to grab all the Gusto you can get—fuck it man! Or... 'drop out man, get with it!' But already this is not with it. Acid is too rough, it opens the pores of our world, exposing, breaking, smashing the safe little hole dug for us. 'Oh! The risk is too great, things cannot break, and shake, and crumble all asunder, exposing a nothing riding on a sea of nothing.' No! It is a time of wine again, of suds balancing sweet dreams and good times. It is a time of pity for our suffering. No!

Well then, that has had its time! My suffering and my pity for suffering—what does it matter? Am I concerned with happiness? I am concerned with my work.

But what is this work, oh Z? Yes, the lion has come, the burden lifted with a roar, but is he "...glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains."

Yes! yes, I say, but not out of dark mountains, rather into, and the glow and the strength are indiscernible.
Bent over one works, straight up one works, in the chair, on the walk, in the talk; flying, crawling, digging in the thickness of a vision, ... glancing off the shoulder the flame offers drops—sweat and stench squeezed out in libation, indifference, or exhaustion. The vision then: a rock busted by chisel, and jackhammer, and yes! John Henry your hammer, yes!, that blasted that black rock into a black myth for a black man to work on. For us all to work on no more, the steam engine won. But it merely beat man, not the rock. Before it there was the sea. There was a vision. We will sail and get a bit of this terraqueous globe. Not we will attack it with all the force that we can muster, like the Nantucketers we captured crabs and quohogs in the sand; grown bolder, waded out with nets for mackerel; more experienced; pushed off in boats and captured cod; and at last launching a navy of great ships declared everlasting war, and..., and....

The Nantucketers, he alone resides and riots on the sea; he alone, in Bible language, goes down to it in ships. 49

But yes, this is no more, nobody goes down to it in ships,...and another vision? Space, the plains: "...half sea half land, a high sun as metal and obdurate as the iron horizon, and a man's job to square the circle." 50 The vision that toil will create an island on a sea of grass, an island free, strong, incorruptible, leaving the clanging, clashing caldron of New York, Boston, Philadelphia.... 'And on to freedom lads, go west young man and build yourself a home.' And before that: hair long, buckskin greasy, mouth foul
and hands drenched in the blood of beaver—vision of pure freedom. And freedom still before: they crossed the sea to escape tyranny in the land of the free; and before, and before, and before. What is this that works, that sets oneself free with a roar and works on one's vision. The first man here knew:

...and he saw the whole world as if it were in darkness, but there was a-dawn-light coming from the east and before it the day-break star approached through the sky.

Then, behind this world of glorious light, which he knew was the real world of the spirit, he saw the dark other world filled with people as if in a swamp or quicksand, but some beginning to reach their hands out towards the light, some seeing it and some not seeing it, as with man on the trail of a mountain lion, some seeing the little places where the paws bowed down a grass or herb, and others not-seeing these places at all, but only seeing the rock and plants in a haze like one mass.  

A vision lit by an iron hammer, a canvas sail, a wooden plow, leather, land....; wrenching sweat out of this poor flesh, bowel-driven piece of earth, rippling muscular mounds, bunching bundled meat, stretching straining tendons, blistered pain, sore sickness, bleeding disease, cuts, breaks, and death giving birth to a live vision. Only this is work. "Man is the only animal who is obliged to work."  

52 Work is the only activity that makes man, man.
Thus, I have divided toil into toil with vision (work), and toil without vision (labor). Labor is concerned with the mere procurement of needs. It is time that I come down from the heights and dig in for a more thorough explication.

Labor is toil which is intrinsically insignificant. While one is doing it, one does not want to do it. Its own activity is insignificant. Thus it is done for an end, and the means to that end are not significant in themselves, i.e., intrinsically. The relationship between means and end, then, is extended. It takes considerable means to reach an end, or to put it another way, it takes considerable means/end relationships to reach an end. Let us take for an example any factory job. What is the end here? Money. If he were allowed to, the factory worker would come to the plant only to get paid. The labor he performs is something he would not want to do. Let us take washing dishes. The wife would, if she could, never touch the dishes after the meal, and only does so that the end--clean dishes--will come about.

These two examples are sickeningly obvious. But you say it need not be the case that factory work or washing dishes be insignificant. This I agree with, but it is much more difficult for these jobs to be intrinsically significant than others because their ends and means are so difficult to get together. The only way they can be intrinsically significant in themselves is if the person doing
them can get sensual satisfaction. This would take such forms as feeling the roundness and texture of the wooden handle of the hammer, or feeling the slick soap film on the glass, seeing the light reflect off and penetrate through it. In these cases the interest can be sustained for not too great a length of time. If done again and again such activities would lose their satisfaction, if they ever had any in a society that aids us little in seeing or feeling.

Work then, in opposition to labor, is intrinsically significant, thus it might include the sensual satisfaction just mentioned. Here the means are not radically separated from the ends, but are somehow conjoined, whether sensually as before or in some other way. If sensually, in the most perfect sense, then every physical event is significant. Thus every moment is significant. If there is a long range end it is forgotten or is merely at the horizon of one's consciousness. One finds oneself liking what one is doing. I'm not going to try and extend this too far because it can get very complicated. For the sensual is not merely the sensual; it is always, it seems, in connection with nonsensual elements. Thus one sees the various colors in the soap filmed glass because one has had the proper experiences without which the sensual joy of seeing the colors would not exist. Further this sensual joy may not be unconnected to ends other than cleaning the dishes—e.g., a more open horizon, a new concept of color as a painter might discover, a richer life, etc.—ends no doubt very vague but nevertheless there.

Means and ends can be joined in other ways that are not dis-
similar to this expanded notion of the sensual. Thus when we learn
to do something it can be an intrinsically significant activity.
But there must be no resentment at being forced to learn, or no
feeling that what you are learning is evil, or any such disillusion-
ment regarding the ends of the endeavor. If so one could find intrin-
sically significant something one is getting to know. But it is
still not unconnected to ends, i.e., the means and end are conjoined
(not the same), for knowledge of something is itself an end, con-
quering the unknown is an end, etc., and beyond that there is the
sensual which itself may not be entirely devoid of ends. Thus
learning is to be a centrifugal operator interestingly entails,
lifting a gate at the bottom of a top-opened cylinder, plowing out
sugar stuck to the sides of the cylinder by controlling the spin of
it with a button and the plow with your left hand. When this is
completed you set the cycle with more buttons (which spins the
cylinder again), replace the gate, then open another gate above the
cylinder which allows liquid sugar to fill the cylinder and force
itself flush against its sides. Then on to the next centrifugal, and
one more till you are back to the initial one which by this time has
finished its cycle. There is fear here—of not succeeding, of losing
fingers or arms, of wrecking the machine, if the sugar is unbalanced
the whole floor shakes and the foreman will come, etc. Thus each
step accomplished is satisfying. After a while speed becomes the

*That there are ends with the sensual is something I cannot
prove, thus I'm forced to say 'may be', but there is evidence.
goal, and it is very satisfiable when its goals are reached. Even the senses are in play. The sugar turns from brown liquid to white powder, the curve of the handle is enigmatic, and the spin intoxicating. Then, of course, there is the vision of money, of stability etc. All means and ends are conjoined here. But the final end of money, freedom, and stability is all that is left when you have finished learning. Here the center is gutted, the far away end is all that sustains, and the work of centrifugal operator is no longer intrinsically satisfiable. Now the move is to the mind, whether in imagination, or hard thinking, or in a way that tries to kill it. One is now laboring.

Building one's own house is another example of work. The end, of course, is a built house, but what is this? It is a place to live in, with, around, etc. It is not merely a shelter if one builds it himself, but a shelter, plus a companion, plus a monument, plus an ideal, etc. One uses larch instead of fir not because it is less expensive, which it isn't, nor because it is stronger, which it isn't; but because one feels more akin to larch than fir, and not just because it has so-called better aesthetic qualities—the kinship is a better aesthetic quality. One builds a splayed multi-angled roof not just because it handles snow better or allows for an aesthetically placed skylight, but because it repeats the jagged, belted peaks rising overhead. And this is not done because the peaks are merely beautiful, but because one feels akin with them; not as if one were like them, but as if one were in awe of them,
afraid of them, yet close to them as they make their mark on the sky. The end that is the house, the vision of the house, is always in mind as one works. The means and end are joined in the toil. But not merely in the way that the vision is a plan to follow, but in that the vision too is being worked on. Thus the means and end are further conjoined in that both determine each other. The larch beam must have a certain thickness and length to hold the roof, but it may be cut and reveal itself as larch not that way, but in another, thicker, longer way so that the roof must be changed. And further this revealing may be something entirely new, i.e., it was discovered in another cut, a cut which revealed to you the larch which you had never seen before. I have merely skimmed the surface.

There is usually a wife and children or a husband and children, and not only are their visions involved but the relations of theirs to yours and of course them to you are involved, all of which should go to make up your vision and your embodied one— the house—; and then there is the state, country, etc. If all of these are in the objects of toil, (and to the extent that they, others, the whole of what is, are) one works, i.e., to the extent that the objects of toil gather in themselves the whole of what is one works.

The last example is from Walden II, not because I'm a Behaviorist, but because here there is a concrete attempt to make the means and ends of toil fully integrated. Every act that a member of Walden II performs is an act for all members of Walden II in the most concrete sense. In the economic sense in that it helps to.
provide food for the table, clothing, shelter etc.; in the
pleasurable sense in that it helps provide entertainment, art,
etc.; in the hygienic sense; in the progenitive sense; etc. 'This
is what is happening now', you say, 'Sartre was talking about now
when he said we act for all mankind'. But Sartre meant essentially,
i.e., it need not be physically manifested. In Walden II one acting
for all is physically obvious. Everybody does a little manual
labor to take care of economics, everybody is not too far from, if
not downright connected, to all the other activities. Never mind
if there is some overt conditioning to get this done, i.e., behavior-
ial engineering to take care of hangups with work, sex, etc.--hang-
ups that would hinder our abilities to do our part and receive
satisfaction from it--the sense of the whole makes work intrinsically
satisfiable. There are many examples in the book where work is done
as intrinsically satisfying--from cleaning windows to stacking wood,
but not too many where the whole is actually a concern. Here is one.

Our decision to eliminate personal
aggrandizement rises quite naturally from
the fact that we were thinking about the
whole group. We could not see how the
54
group could gain from individual glory.

This shows that not only are the "leaders" concerned about the
whole, which can be explained away negatively or at least neutrally,
but that there is some sense in which the individual has the whole as
a guiding force. Whether this can be induced or not, or whether the
inducement is merely a negative one that does away with competition
and merely makes happiness possible, thus making questionable just
what this regard for the whole is, will be taken up later. Right now
all that need be garnered is that work in Walden II is integrated, thus is work rather than labor.*

Now the question is just what evidence do we have in the world that this split between work and labor takes place? Very little; the problem is that of a proper test. The division, it seems, is in what is called the mind. As such there is little if any sensual evidence for the split. Thus, to know if George is performing work or labor as he stacks bags, we would have to know in what state of mind he is in, whether his activity is integrated or not. I.e., the integration takes place in the mind. Given this there still are certain things that can be done. We can look to history and trace the origin and development of work and see if the split is there. We can go to the comments of the workers about work and see if the split is manifested there. We can go out and work and see if we experience the split, i.e., judge the split on its explanatory power. But if the first (look at history) is answered in the affirmative then we are faced with the problem of affirming an interpretation of history. This evidence, then, will be given with qualifications. If the second is answered at all it will be determined by the freedom of the workers to answer what they want, and to speak in the type of discourse they want—the interpretation of which would be necessary. Both freedoms make their answers highly

*Hannah Arendt also makes this split between work and labor, however it is a far different split than what I have presented. Labor is an effort the product of which is 'as quickly consumed as the effort is spent,' yet life itself depends upon it. The products of work, on the other hand, 'guarantee the permanence and durability without which a world would not be possible at all.'
questionable. Thus not much attention will be given such evidence. The last will be given the most attention, but it will be given not so much in the form of a proof for the split, but in the form of an attempt to find meaning in contemporary toil, i.e., this attempt will, I hope, "set" one in the experience of toil as toil.

First, then, I will give some evidence from history, i.e., anthropological evidence. For this I will borrow from Walter S. Neff. In attempting to trace the origin of work he makes a distinction between what he calls History I and History II. In the first there is no work (labor), but the products of work are still made. This is indigenous to hunting and gathering societies. Thus he cites evidence from such cultures as the Eskimo, the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert, the so-called aborigines of Australia etc. Some have already had their culture destroyed--the Eskimo--, others manage to still exist as they did--aborigines. But what is distinctive to these cultures is that there is extremely little division of labor, except between men and women, thus there is hardly a division between work and leisure.

Males are more heavily engaged in activities related to hunting and fishing and are, of course, the sole developers of the arts of warfare. Women are primarily engaged in the gathering of natural products, the fabrication of clothing and "household" implements, and the processing of foods for consumption. On the other hand, the manufacture of tools, weapons, and equipment is not otherwise a specialized function. Hunters make their own weapons and snares; women, their own implements. No one is exempt from some kind of labor, except the very young children. There are no men who are specialized solely as weapons-makers or canoe-builders, to the degree that there are priests, chieftains, or other forms of political.
or social leaders, the activities attendant on these offices are carried out extra-curricularly, so to speak. Language offers more evidence for this situation. The Eskimo's have many different words for snow but none for work. Many so-called preliterature tongues are extremely rich, even in abstractions, but work to them seems to not be an appropriate one. Work appears to be such a natural activity that it doesn't require a word. Thus it would follow that there is also no leisure, for work would be required to make the proper distinction. There is some evidence for this.

Herskovits (1952) carefully points out that the labors of primitive man are very arduous and virtually continuous. Even when the hunt has been successful and the men are presumably merely "sitting about the campfire", they are usually occupied with something—making an arrow, chipping an arrow-head, shaping a scraper, etc.

In History I then, there is no work, little division of tasks and no leisure. This does not mean that there is no happiness or pleasure, that these people are forever condemned to sweat and toil, and that it is only in an advanced society that such a good life can be obtained. Quite the contrary, it may be that they think their life very satisfying, possible much more than many today, because for them every act and thought is meaningful. Reality demands of them their acts, as such, and as long as it is reality that makes the demand there is no loss of meaning. But this is highly speculative not only in that it is possible for something like meaning to do this, and that it happens to these people in actuality. All that can be drawn from this is that we don't really
know and in all likelihood can never know if this kind of life is significant or not. Thus if we assume modern life more progressive or advanced it must be from other criteria than a significant life, or happiness, etc..

History II is naturally that history beginning with the division of labor. This takes place when a surplus can be accumulated.

A more elaborate division of labor cannot appear until the techniques of food production become sufficiently advanced so that they are capable of producing a considerable surplus over the immediate needs of the primary producer.

Now an individual is free to specialize. He can be a craftsman, priest, political leader, soldier, etc. Now all the other aspects of modern culture can arise. And, of course, we now have leisure, which means we have also work.

The difference between History I and History II then is that the former is continuous activity but no work; the latter is broken activity with work and leisure. The latter then has at its disposal the interplay of means and end which the former does not. This creates the possibility of labor. The means are no longer guaranteed to be intrinsically satisfiable. It is now possible for them to be downright disgusting, degrading, etc. In History I there is no act which is not intrinsically significant. The response is to what was considered reality and it was continuous. Thus each thing was done, not too consciously albeit, for itself, yet for an end—a very good conjoining of means and end. This does not mean that what was done was pleasurable, it may even be hateful. But in no case was it meaningless, in fact it is in all probability that its hateful
character was not very conscious, to the extent it was it would lose meaning. This is not dissimilar to work as I have explicated it. Though work is far more contemporary, and is exposed to the means/end split, thus in danger of becoming labor, the two are the same. The contemporary individual who performs work is different from his ancient brother in that he can do it only partially. His world is such that it is impossible for him to always work in it. He lives in a world where most do labor not work, and as such, to live with them and their products, whether machines or states, he must labor. In order to work then he must struggle desperately to get his world together—one broken up by labor—a feat which was already accomplished for his ancient brother. History II then does not just give us laborers but workers also. It just opens the possibility for one to be a mere laborer, a possibility not given by History I, and it makes the work of the worker exceedingly more difficult.

The split then between labor and work has historical evidence or at least a history with anthropological evidence. In the move from a hunting and gathering society to an agricultural one, man went from work to an activity that provided the possibility of labor. Thus integral to mankind is the division between work and labor. This does not mean of course that the split is here with us today. But it does mean that it may be. It may be to the extent that the world cannot do without work, i.e., to the extent that labor has not replaced work.
In pursuit of the answer to the question about the importance of meaning we were led to the world, in the form of work, as a test. If work, i.e., toil, does or does not need meaning we can make speculations about the importance of meaning. Work is no problem. Its reverberation throughout the whole guarantees meaning. Meaning is integral to work and we can say, in one sense, that work needs meaning. Labor is a different matter. It does not guarantee meaning. This would not be of much importance if labor is a rare event, but it is not. Of our toil labor predominates, so much so that work is regulated, in most cases, to relaxation. Labor thus offers a good test for the importance of meaning. If labor sustains itself without meaning then meaning loses importance and it is not necessary. Before we decide this, however, we must find out to what extent labor does or does not have meaning.

If we pursue meaning in labor we are led to asking whether it is found in the means or ends. The latter is not fruitful. There is one way that the end can be meaningful, i.e., if it is for the self. We have already discussed the difficulty in dealing with a self. Here, either we have meaning and we can claim it is negative, or it draws upon something other than labor. The self can be that which is denied in the labor (and it usually is). It is a tired, a hungry, a sexually deprived self. In other words it is a self
that lacks. It lacks food, sleep, sex, love, etc. Thus a laborer in a factory by his labor discovers a self which is really not very noble, strong, or likeable. It is no wonder then that when he is through laboring all he can do is satisfy these labor created ends. It is no wonder then that his concept of himself extends far beyond his labor. Every end that is meaningful to him is one that satisfies that which is denied in his labor. As long as the personnel manager, and the union, and management themselves think in terms of the ends of the laborer, whether pay check or easier labor, (which is just an attempt to satisfy the ends created by labor), the labor force will remain in degradation. I have gone a little far, though, and all that can really be said is that labor created ends can be in existence, and that they have little redeeming value. These need not overflow into the laborers whole life, at least I am not going to offer great evidence for this, but all you have to do is look.

These ends have a great lack of meaning. The meaning in the ends that are denied in the labor are not only circular but degrading. As such these ends are only minimally meaningful. The individual who labors under these conditions either is not aware of the circularity of his situation or is pressured to labor in it by other forces. Usually it is a combination of the two; he cannot face the absurdity of his position because of outside forces--children, sickness, etc. The current discontent, lack of morale, etc. among workers points, I think, to the dissatisfaction with this kind of life. Thus meaning in the ends, that are created by a denial in the labor, is a negative meaning and is not acceptable for affirmation.
Not only is the meaning here minimal and negative it draws upon forces outside labor. How does the self denied in labor know that it lacks? Its body tells it. Why then is it usually unsatisfied with mere rest, food, and sex? All three have almost become exotic. Relaxation draws upon a whole world of good times, whether from what one reads in "Playboy", or sees on television, or from one's own past experience. Thus boats, golf clubs, cabins are bought. The same for food, and now, of course, sex. The self denied in labor is not merely derived from the labor but from the whole of the world. Just by going to the factory a self is denied and created to be satisfied. Thus in this one class of ends of labor, it is not from labor alone that meaning is derived. Meaning here is minimal, negative, and extrinsic as well as intrinsic to labor.

The other possibility for finding meaning in the end is if this end is of greater prestige, a stepping stone upward, an accomplishment pure and simple, etc.. Such meaning however valid or invalid from a moral standpoint is outside the realm of labor. That is, the meaning is always in a context outside labor. Thus the prestige doesn't come from labor but from people, a force which exists outside labor. The stepping upward has nothing to do with labor, rather with success, a vision born out of some other milieu. The accomplishment, in-itself, is forceful for something outside labor--art, another person, etc.. Thus there is little way an end can be entirely of labor; in all cases the ends usually draw upon something outside labor. As is necessary, for the ends of labor are minimal and negative. Thus to find meaning in the ends of labor is
to find it in the self denied in labor, which is all but meaningless.

The natural turn now is to find meaning not in the ends but in the means of labor. The only possibility is by identification with labor as labor, i.e., by a putting forth of the self as that which the labor is. It can be done in three ways. The first I dub metaphysical. Here the laborer identifies with the essence of labor, a labor then which can take almost any form. It can be the guy who stacks more hundred pound bags day in and day out. It can be the accountant who handles all the hard accounts. It is that guy or woman who takes on the hardest of all tasks and wins, and this is all that counts. This kind of attitude is everywhere, or it used to be. Still though, in a factory, in school, in the office, somebody will sometime identify pure and simple with labor, and to prove it tackle the hardest there is and thrive in it--affirm it and overflow with confidence in it.

There are some good strong examples in literature. I will take three: The Yank out of Eugene O'Neill's play "The Hairy Ape", Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Jack London's Wolf Larson. O'Neill's play opens with an off-duty watch of steamship hands carousing and drinking. They are of many nationalities, some are old and some young. They work four hours on, four hours off, stoking coal into furnaces. The two main protagonists are Paddy, an old Irishman who, now that he is drunk, remembers sentimentally the times of sailing ships, and Yank, a young brute who scorns everything that isn't "now". Paddy says,
Yerra, what's the use of talking? 'Tis a dead man's whisper. (To Yank resentfully)
'Twas them days men belonged to ships, not now. 'Twas them days a ship was part of the sea, and a man was part of a ship, and the sea joined all together and made it one. (Scoffingly)
Is it one wid this you'd be, Yank--black smoke from the funnels smudging the sea, smudging the decks--the bloody engines pounding and throbbing and shaking--wid divil a sight of sun or a breath of clean air--choking our lungs wid coal dust--breaking our backs and hearts in the hell of the stokehole--feeding the bloody furnace--feeding our lives along wid the coal, I'm thinking--caged in by steel from a sight of the sky like bloody apes in the zoo! (With a harsh laugh) Ho-ho, divil mend you! Is it to belong to that that you're wishing? Is it flesh and blood wheel of the engines you'd be?

Yank. (Who has been listening with a contemptuous sneer, barks out the answer) Sure ting! Dat's me. What about it?60

Yank then goes on to establish this identification so strong that he becomes the man who turns the world.

Sure I'm part of de engines! Why de hell not! Dey move, don't dey? Dey're speed, aint't dey? Dey smash trou, don't dey? ...I move wit it! It, get me I mean de ting dat's de guts of all dis. It ploughs trou all de tripe he's been sayin'. It blows dat up! ...De engines and de coal and de smoke and all de rest of it! He can't breathe and swallow coal dust, but I kin, see? Dat's freshair for me! Dat's food for me! I'm new, get me? Hell in de stoke hole? Sure! It takes a man to work in hell. Hell, sure, dat's my fav'rite climate. I eat it up! I get fat on it! It's me makes it hot! It's me makes it roar! It's me makes it move! Sure, on'y for me everting stops. It all goes dead, get me? De noise and smoke and all de engines movin' de world, de stop. Dere ain't nothin' no more! Dat's what I'm sayin'. Everything else dat makes the world move, somep'n makes it move. It can't move wit out somep'n else see? Den yuh get down to me I'm at the bottom, get me! Dere ain't nothin' foither. I'm de end! I'm de start! I start somep'n and de world moves!...I'm the ting in coal dat makes it boin; I'm steam and oil for de engines; I'm the ting in noise
dat makes yuh hear it; I'm smoke and express
trains and steamers and factory whistles; ...And
I'm steel—Steel—steel! ...But us guys, we're
in de move, we're at de bottom, de whole ting is us.

This is labor. But it is labor expanded. Labor is here the force
that turns the world. The Yank in his identification with labor
identifies with the "...guts of all dis", and as such calls the
rest of the world to battle. He loses in a cage, crushed, when
at the close of the play he walks into the arms of a gorilla.

The quotes are long because they point beyond mere identification
with labor. They point to a world that makes a transition
from work to labor. To a man who takes up the task of this new
world with the value of the old. For Yank is really not new. He
is the oldest of the old. He wants to work not labor. The only
way he knows how is by identification with the task. His simplicity is both his strength and his weakness. It allows him to
affirm, to revel in his strength--the strength of steel--but it
cannot sustain itself in the face of the complexity of the world.
It is not the simplicity of a quine. It is not a guiding force with
which one ventures out into complexity. It is not a tool. Rather it
is the very character of Yank. As such it is the source of his
meaning and his subsequent meaninglessness. He merely sees that the
new has to be affirmed. He takes this ultimate risk in the face of
the new forces and is smashed by these forces. He creates meaning
in the midst of meaninglessness by making the mover of machines the
mover of the world. Meaning, as it turns out, is supported only by
his will, not the world, not reality. As such it tumbles and he
tumbles when he can no longer support it with sheer strength of will alone.

And the same with Wolf Larson, though here metaphysical strength is faced more directly. He doesn't have the naivete of Yank. He knows that if he is going to have meaning he must affirm not the machine, not the world, but himself. And not as somebody great--better than others--which is merely being parasitic on others, but as somebody who merely is--who moves, i.e., who is the true essence of the machine--movement.

Which is another way of expressing the joy of life in that it is alive, the triumph of movement over matter, of the quick over the dead, the pride of yeast because it is yeast and crawls.

Any sacrifice that makes me lose one crawl or squirm is foolish,—and not only foolish, for it is a wrong against myself and a wicked thing. I must not lose one crawl or squirm if I am to get the most out of the ferment.62

And what sustains movement? Pure will. Like the Yank, Wolf Larson is forced to be sustained by will in his identification with the core of the ferment (movement, i.e., pure labor), in his affirmation of the world, his attempt to gain meaning. And he, unlike Yank, manages to keep it up, even when his movement dies. Even when his body moves but a little. But it is only a novel and that real Wolf Larson (Jack London) killed himself. Thus like Yank his hypothesis turns out wrong. Labor is not the center of the world.
And who is the greatest of all willers? Zarathustra. And he must go further than any. He must affirm meaninglessness itself. And it is not mere affirmation but overflowing joy and strength in the face of a world which merely returns again and again the same. It is the will to power which sustains, which gives a meaning that is not a meaning. But what is the will to power? It is labor as Heidegger says; i.e., the will to power is merely the dynamo, or is it work? Who knows?

In, at least, two cases will is what sustains. Will is none other than the essence of labor. The only way to labor is to be willful.

The only way to be willful is to labor. But in all three cases there is more than mere labor, mere will. If there was not this extra then neither Yank, nor Wolf Larson, nor even Zarathustra would be sustained. It is an extra that speaks of will and labor as a project, a project that make the two the central reality of the universe. For Yank it is in moving the machine. For Wolf Larson it is in pure moving. For Zarathustra it may be the will to power. But they only sustain as they are made reality. To identify with the essence of labor is to make that labor the ultimate reality. The belief that labor is the ultimate reality is what sustained the three. Once this belief loses its force so does labor. These attempts are admirable, even heroic attempts in the forms given. But they have failed. The universe eventually eroded the belief that the essence of labor is the ultimate reality. The will eventually became exhausted in its attempts to make the will the ultimate reality.
Though many will still try to make labor the center of the universe (in far different forms) their attempts will have a sinister ring to them. The attempt should be abandoned. Meaning cannot be garnered by identification with the essence of labor, for the essence of labor, will, is not meaningful in itself.

The second way to affirm labor as meaningful I will call ideological. Here the individual identifies not with the essence of labor but with the role he or she performs. This can be done in two ways, first with the abstract essence of role, i.e., in a hierarchy. He or she has meaning because he or she is attaining a role on the ladder closer to the top. Thus one will become a foreman, a supervisor, an executive, a vice president. Meaning is garnered here by the prestige of the role or by the joy of superiority. The former is parasitic; all that is left is a meaning based on superiority. That this is vacuous need not be pursued.

The other way is to identify with the role of the business for which you labor. This kind of identification is legitimate only in so far as the factory or business is legitimate. This legitimacy is undoubtedly difficult to decide. To decide the legitimacy of the role of one's business in the world presupposes a philosophy about this world. Today, to present such a philosophy would be very difficult. First it is not a very popular position, especially among the young, or environmentally concerned, because of its more negative roles—the napalm of Dow Chemical, the pollution of Hoerner-Waldorf, etc.. More importantly the essence of a business is not to
perform a real live conscious role, or to make money, but to attain control, power. John K. Galbraith stresses this greatly in *The New Industrial State*. The giant corporation is not after money especially, but control. This control is not limited, thus the corporation gets larger and larger.

It is clear, first of all, that industrial planning is in unabashed alliance with size. It is the planning then that demands size. As Galbraith shows in his second chapter, technology has "advanced" to the extent that the actual planning and building of an automobile today exceeds stupendously the planning and building of those automobiles first built by Henry Ford. Couple this with the planning for its sales, costs, materials, etc., and you have a very extended plan going on. In order for it to be a successful plan then the control must expand commensurately. Size is both the product and goal of this expansion. As such the giant corporation is usurping the one greatest value of the United States--freedom. Our resources are controlled for the satisfaction of the New Industrial State. Anybody aware of what is going on in public attempts to get some control of our resources can see this power and control. Our habits are controlled by advertising to the extent that watching a good movie on television is a disaster, that driving on the 93 strip is a disaster, etc. We are bombarded day in and day out with attempts to manipulate our buying habits. Then there is our money, our political power, etc., all of which are controlled to some extent by some corporation.

As I write this Nicholas Johnson of the F.C.C. is discussing
television on the radio. Television along with work and sleep he says takes up most of our time. 'If an American is asked what he does he should answer, watch television!' Not only does it entertain, he says, but more importantly it instructs. 'A child when he goes to kindergarten has spent more time being instructed by television than the time he will spend sitting in class getting a B.A. degree.' Television shapes the values of most Americans, and most of their knowledge. In short it is the main molding force of Americans. But television, Johnson says, does not exist for the mass of Americans, but for the large corporation. The television program is bought by the large corporation not the consumer. Further it is bought not for its quality but for its ability to keep attention, without, in any way, altering the status quo. Thus the best program, and the one going for the highest price, is the one that keeps most people glued to the screen, at the same time not harming the corporate image or the philosophy behind it—materialism. Johnson supported this with statements about television writers who had races, lines, and settings altered in their scripts in order to maintain the status quo. In one case the lines of an actor were changed from 'I have nothing' to 'they have all my things', in order, it was supposed, to support materialistic values.

To consciously identify with a corporation is to identify with an organization whose main goal is control. This control demands a retention and/or increase of materialistic values, a demand we vaguely feel in places such as television. Indeed such values are
necessary to existence, but to attempt to manipulate them is a
direct attack on our freedom. And the corporation does manipulate
rather than present. We vaguely feel the demand; we don't hear it
presented straight from the source. We feel that television adver-
tisements are degrading, but we accept them, considering this vague
feeling unworthy of consideration. The demand only reaches us as a
feeling, as such it is hidden. Madison Avenue spends millions to
work within this feeling. Madison Avenue spends millions to mani-
pulate. Corporations spend millions to take away our freedom. This
is to say nothing of the hidden control that corporations attempt to
exert over their workers, other corporations, and our government. To
identify with a corporation is to deny much of the value that is
ingrained in our constitution--freedom. Such identification is
meaningless for those who accept the great importance of freedom.
For those who don't accept the great importance of freedom, freedom
will be discussed in the third part of this essay.

The last way to affirm labor as meaningful is scientifically.
Here one identifies with the object of labor--reality. Reality here
is that which the scientist "discovers" whether electron or theory.
Thus, it seems, we have something worthy of identification, a way
that labor can be meaningful. To reach any conclusion here though
demands that we detour to an examination of science. It will be
done shortly.

So far then meaning has been found absent from labor in every
case--in the ends or means--except possibly scientifically. Work
on the contrary is essentially meaningful. In order to lose meaning
there must be the separation between means and end. There must be a denial and sacrifice of the fore in order for there to be a loss of meaning. In work this does not take place. In the examples I used means and ends were conjoined. In no way was there a loss of meaning. Thus in work there is a conjoining of means and ends which is a full dwelling in the whole. Every movement reverberates throughout the whole, and the fore is spread throughout the thickness of this whole. Thus, there is no possibility of losing or denying the self, and identification with the means is not necessary. Work is meaningful.

Not only has labor (aside from scientific labor) been found meaningless, but the final type of evidence has been given for the work/labor split. The types of attempts to find meaning in labor mentioned, most of us, I hope, have experienced. Coupling this with work experiences we can see that the work/labor split has great explanatory power, and is more than likely what is happening. Couple this again with the anthropological evidence and one should be convinced of the split.
If science is excluded, do we labor today or work? As has been expressed earlier the split itself is not scientifically established, thus the answer to this question cannot be scientifically established. We may be just dealing with the wrong concepts. 'Labor' and 'work' may just not be fruitful. But I do not think so. And there is evidence to show that we labor today rather than work. In fact after I have explored science it will be seen that labor has just about conquered work completely. But now the evidence. First there is one's own experience.

From our earliest beginnings each of us is not taught work but labor. We are told usually to do something without any idea of what the end of it is, e.g., to refrain from saying certain so-called obscenities, not to go to Johnny Jones' house, not to play in the vacant lot on Rodgers street, etc... We must labor not to do such things. And they are very many. The parent can often do nothing else but keep the ends from the child, ... for the child's sake. Because this kind of activity is necessary it must be asserted in the proper way; and this is extremely difficult, if the child is ever going to do something other than labor (or play).

In earliest childhood the parent must perform the very difficult task of caring for the ends of the child in order to prevent the child from only doing labor. But how does school mean nothing else but labor? If it is difficult for the parent to sustain the
ends in the pre-school ages how can it be done now? The child is forced to do what he or she doesn't want to do. He or she is told this is necessary, but why is never fully answered. The school--the state--now guards the ends. Such a guardian is not desirable. In our age the state wants laborers not workers. President Nixon did not praise anybody but soldiers and laborers during his last election. He too is merely a laborer. If the parent could stand up to the school and the state then the problem would not be so acute. But, in fact, the parent has no chance against such a foe. The child, if he or she manages to fend off labor by the care of the parent in pre-school ages, can hardly do it when in school. Reading, writing, and arithmetic must be learned. This is done by imprisoning the kids for six or seven hours a day. If they don't obey then it is worse. Just to endure this imprisonment is labor, not to speak of all the labor that must be performed during those hours.

And then what? Get a job naturally. And this, I want to show, is labor, and here is where come some stresses. Indeed, there are stresses in school and in pre-school, but the ends are set aside, the child or student merely must wait. In a job, on the contrary, it is time to cash in. And the cashing in today is dismal. According to "Newsweek" magazine there is today a new angry attitude towards what is called boring jobs.

The sullen refrain, it sometimes seems nowadays is heard everywhere--at a Kaiser Steel Corporation plant in Fontana, California, at a blue-collar saloon in Houston, Texas, at a production worker's conference called in Atlanta by the United Auto Workers union. "The one thing I have is security", . . . .
"But it's a boring, repetitious job—nasty, hot and dirty work. I go there 'cause I have to." "It's getting to be a bore to me," grumbles... a $15,000-a-year machine-shop manager in Houston... "Everyday, for eight hours we fight that black devil-chain (the assembly line)." And even..., the retired $790,000-a-year board chairman of General Motors. wisecracked recently: "What is more boring than lugging home a big briefcase of papers to be read before going to bed every night?"

***These men and women are the new problem children of the American economy: the "alienated" workers, afflicted with the blue-collar blues, the white-collar woes, and the just plain on-the-job blahs.***

Why has this happened? Undoubtedly there are many answers to this question floating around, and being put into use. For example we could have a cleaner more colorful factory, piped in music, more automation, less rigid hours, enlightened foremans, teams, worker's cooperatives, etc. But I would want to maintain that these are only holding actions. The young worker today knows that what he does on the job is just not sufficient for a job. You can go almost anywhere and find young people with attitudes that are just anathema to any improvements along the lines given. Something more is desired. It is something seen by Karl Marx—the worker is separated from the product of his work (the end of his labor is denied him). And both the articles I read in "Newsweek" and "Life" hinted at this while pooh-poohing Marx. "Newsweek" quoted 'alienated' but mentions such techniques as "...'enrichment' programs to give workers a sense of satisfaction on the job and send them home with a feeling of accomplishment." And it ends the article with this
But all of the conferences, all of the studies, all of the books may be too late to help some workers, such as steel worker Fidencio Moreno. "I should have quit long ago," he said sadly last week. "Now my dad, he ran a bar. When he'd come home us kids would run up to him and say 'How'd it go?' My dad always had pride in his work. He'd talk about all the things the customers would say and do. Me, I go home, they don't understand a damn thing. All I do is dump a little coal into an oven. Why would my wife or my kids be interested in that?"

"Life" even goes to an absurd extreme on this issue. They end the article by affirming the present condition as a positive response by management to labor.

Whatever else it might accomplish in the U.S. such a sharing between owners and workers would largely eliminate the current costly need for supervisors and make labor unions, as they presently exist, unnecessary. It could also carry Henry Ford's industrial revolution one step further and thus confound the ghost of Karl Marx. The author of the Communist Manifesto has been proved wrong on his prediction that capitalism would never benefit the worker. Industry has set out to disprove his other forecast, that industrial workers would inevitably come more and more to hate their work.

But this will not do. Not only on the incorrect interpretation of Marx, but in the face (a fact which of course Marx anticipated) that labor cannot be made palatable by the methods prescribed. Just go to a factory, work, and you will see. The most normal attitude is to just deaden yourself in the labor and wait for the shift to end so that you can enjoy yourself. That this is absurd, has already been shown. "Newsweek" hints at this absurdity. Already we have seen their scepticism, earlier they say
On a more philosophic but no less significant level, a nation's attitude toward work is a reflection of its sense of itself. The work ethic President Nixon is so fond of celebrating involves not only a job but a way of life. Then they have inserted within this article another one on work in Japan. The Japanese come out far ahead of us philosophically. The reason for this is enlightening.

Japanese workers aren't motivated primarily by money or the prospect of climbing to the top. Basically, they work for the team. Their attitude is a throwback to feudal days when daimyo (feudal lords) protected and provided for their followers and demanded loyalty and obedience in return. Today the daimyo are gone, replaced by corporations—but the tradition of obedience remains. Company presidents often take a paternalistic interest in their employees.... As a result, the Japanese worker usually feels a deep loyalty to his firm, which almost always employs him until he retires or dies.... Japanese society encourages this by identifying a man not by his profession, but by the company he works for.

And extremely startling, if you accept polls:

A 1971 government poll revealed that almost one-third of Japanese employees felt that work was the most meaningful part of their lives.

Then there are the everyday things:

In many firms, the work day starts with group exercise, the chanting of a company song, or a slogan-packed speech by the president. Sometimes whole plants are shut so that workers and employers can go off together for company paid overnight trips.

And strikes:

As a result of this team effort, strikes are infrequent and when they occur, they are usually symbolic and end after a day; workers just care
too much that other companies will get ahead of their own. 72

The article seems to be in awe of the Japanese, at the same time condescending towards their 'philosophy' as a character trait that is primitive—derived from the days of daimyo. But the first attitude must take precedence. (If sophistication or intelligence takes precedence then it is brought into question). The Japanese worker is sustained by a force that ties means and ends together. As has been quoted the work ethic involves not only a job but a way of life. Somehow, probably because of the cultural forces that produced daimyo, the Japanese worker identifies with his corporation. That this worker can do this is indeed unusual given the attitude of the worker here who would no more identify and consider the corporation his life than cease picking up his paycheck. However, we could be justified in a condescending attitude knowing that it won't take too much time until the Japanese worker is like us. But the Japanese situation does show us what kind of thing has to be done in order to make blue-collar work meaningful. In order for it to be work instead of labor means and ends have to be tied; blue-collar work must become a way of life. Nixon is right, but as usual superficial. The work ethic he praises lacks the way of life it should be. It is still merely labor as these articles indicate. Identification with the business, with the state, that the Japanese can do is a failure in the U.S. today. Every avenue that we have to make labor meaningful is lost to us. Almost every thread that could conjoin means and ends has been broken. Watergate has cut all
but the very last.

I have assumed that labor is what these discontented workers do. There is no absolute way I can prove it. As has been expressed in the introduction there is no way. The loose logic is that they do not work, otherwise there wouldn’t be all this stress. There wouldn’t be all these bored workers. There wouldn’t be a crisis situation developing. Thus they must be laboring. Their ends must no longer be linked. There is no reason (significant end) for them to do what they do. What else causes boredom? The man who indicates that his job cannot give him pride indicates this. "Newsweek's" turn to philosophy, though incomplete, indicates this. The example of the Japanese, who have a philosophy, indicates this. For what is a philosophy but the tying together of all the ends in the job--having the whole reverberate throughout the work. And now I say tap your own experience, if you haven't already, and see that this is what must be happening; something I'm sure you already know about, but may have forgotten.

Thus most of the jobs today are labor, and if we exclude science, are meaningless. But labor, as has been indicated, is not intrinsic to certain jobs, rather it is intrinsic to the world in which they take place. Thus in the Japanese world the same job may not be labor. If we find boredom in such epic proportions in the workers of our country, it says something about our world, i.e., it labors rather than works, it is meaningless rather than meaningful.

Now a partial answer to our question can be given. Meaning is
important. The fact that jobs today are labor and that this is causing great stress in our world points to the fact that labor alone is not sufficient, which means that meaninglessness is not sufficient, which means that meaning is significant. But there still is the chance that there is meaning in scientific labor—i.e., in the identification with the "objects" of science—thus that labor may be sufficient and meaning ignored, that we can say, so what, to normal labor or cure it with science.
Science has turned out to be the most successful, thus the most significant (whether negative or positive) of man's activities. Its power and its product's power—the power of modern technology—need not be stressed. Science has been so successful that it is now the authority on reality. Every field desires to be a science, or once had ambitions in this direction. Thus, to the extent that anything is not scientific it loses credence. Science is the guiding force of our age.

But is it meaningful? Is it labor? The only way left to find meaning in labor* is through science. Thus the first question is whether it is labor or not. It need not be but invariably it is. In fact it is almost impossible that it not be labor. This is so because science militates against any sort of reverberation throughout the whole. The scientific observation is not one that reverberates, but one that is stripped of all possibility of such an eloquence. As such it is almost impossible to have a conjoining of means and ends—where in the means the inexhaustibility of the ends are present. Science demands one or a delineated end, as such it cuts off any reverberation. An examination of some of the statements of Karl Popper will make this clear.

*Indeed there may be other possibilities, and I cannot be exhaustive, but I think the viable possibilities have been given.
In his book, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, he offers the reader seven conclusions. Naturally it would be helpful if we can come to an understanding of what it means to offer conclusions.

When a twelve year old boy, let's call him Johnny, tells his friend that 'if he opens his stance he will hit better' he does this (if he is serious about his conclusion) for one or any combination of three reasons; (1) Johnny himself has done this and his hitting has improved; (2) Johnny has a theory of hitting which he is testing on his friend; (3) Johnny has a theory of hitting which includes in it this conclusion. It would be safe to say that Johnny, at his age, offers his conclusion because he has done it and it worked, or because somebody else told him about it and he is testing it on his friend. And it would be safe to say that he has no full-blown theory about hitting the baseball. This would entail things like how to hold the bat, how to swing it, etc., which he may have opinions on but which do not connect into a theory on what it takes to hit a baseball. This if carried further would get into the messy problems of individual strength, speed, wrist flexibility, mental attitude, etc.. This gets us then into the touchy problem of how much should a theory explain to be a theory. I want to avoid this problem by just saying that at level two and three a theory is in play. Now any conclusion can be fitted into one of three categories:

(1) Conclusions are offered without theory;
(2) Theories are being tested by them;
(3) Accepted theories (momentarily neither being created or tested) are behind them.

The question I want to raise is about what kind of conclusions Popper is giving us. But in order to answer this I will only discuss one of his seven conclusions. The others may or may not be similar. Popper says:

(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.
   Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.73

In one sense it could be said that theory is being created here. Popper could be offering this conclusion to the philosophic and scientific community because it works for him. Similarly we could say it is being tested by this community. Thus, instead of seeing if my friend hits the ball, we see if the philosophic and scientific community reacts favorably or unfavorably to my conclusion. But Popper gives us much more than this conclusion. He gives us a theory about theories. This is the theory behind the conclusion.

The conclusionunpacks into these theories: (1) irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory; (2) refutability is a virtue of a theory; (3) refutability is being able to be refuted by some conceivable event; (4) a refutable theory is a scientific theory; (5) an irrefutable theory is non-scientific. There are only two problematic concepts here. Refutability and irrefutability are that which can be refuted by an event and that which can't. The former belongs to science and the latter is non-science. The virtue of a theory is the refutability of a theory. This leaves theory, refutation, and event. Refutation is when an event predicted by a
theory under certain initial and boundary conditions does not consistently take place under those conditions. Thus we are left with two concepts, theory and event.

What is an event? With the Logical Positivists the event, after attempts at a phenomenalistic grounding, was the referent of observational statements. The attempt of confirmability (an early attempt by the Logical Positivists) consisted in tracing every theory back to a true observation statement or groups of such statements. But such an attempt doesn't work; it leads to an infinite regress. Popper uses the example of a news story in *The Times*. If you try to trace the origin of the story you might get 'a telephone call' or 'unnamed source' etc.; and even if you found an eye-witness how are you to believe what he says about a past event to be true? And if you saw it yourself how can you be sure? Thus we are led to attempts to ground knowledge ultimately. Descartes has the most notoriety for this attempt; but in the history of philosophy it can be seen almost everywhere. This includes the present. Phenomenalism was such an attempt by the Positivists. We can see why. Their program just doesn't hold unless they can find some way to ground something (observation) ultimately, for they had to find some place to stop in their search for the source, i.e., there had to be a source. Normally though you don't ever get as far as a source, yet you believe very often the story. Except with historical claims one rarely attempts to trace a story back to any sources, rather one uses a variety of knowledge.

Every witness must always make ample use, in
his report, of his knowledge of persons, places, things, linguistic usages, social conventions, and so on. He cannot rely merely upon his eyes or ears, especially if his report is to be of use in justifying any assertion worth justifying.74

Our knowledge is so rich in its source, (one claim being the locus of strings of claims that are infinite) that any attempt to trace back to origins is doomed to an infinite regress. No claim is finished and absolute; each points on to others.

This is why the programme of tracing back all knowledge to its ultimate source in observation is logically impossible to carry through: it leads to an infinite regress.75

But if we but switch from confirmability to falsifiability (as Popper does), then we have a chance (according to him) of handling the infinite regress. We accept the fact that there is no ultimate grounding of knowledge, including observation. In fact we use this fact. As with confirmability, observation is the focus of concern, but it is accepted as bearing on theories. Among other things the theoretical has a flexible cast. It has a tendency to fit what you want it to fit, even observation. Thus it will be decided previous to the testing what could be the observation? But not for confirmation, rather for refutation.

...observations are interpretations in the light of theories and for this reason alone they are apt to seem to support those theories in the light of which they were interpreted. But real support can be obtained only from observations undertaken as tests (by 'attempted refutations'); and for this purpose criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand: it must be argued which observable situations, if actually observed, mean that the theory is refuted. 76

Two important things are evident here: (1) though observation
is admitted to be interpretation in the light of theory it is not rejected, and (2) there are criteria of refutation which allow us to cut off the infinite regress. The first is quite straightforward, i.e., certain observations must be found that will refute the theory (though in practice it may not be at all straightforward). The second is very much, it seems, an obscure matter, but I think something can be said about it.

What decides what will be some criteria of refutability for Newton’s theory that the force of an object is equal to the product of its mass and acceleration? One possible refutation instance would be (if there are no other conditions except that the mass is near the surface of the earth) that we have a mass of two kilograms with an acceleration of four meters per second and a force that measured out at fifty newtons. What decides the refutable instance here is obviously Newton’s theory itself. It set out three concepts—force, mass, and acceleration and delineates an area in which their measurement would coincide, i.e., according to the proportion F=MA. Out of an infinite possible ways to observe object A this theory tells us to see it as force, mass and acceleration, further asking/telling us to see them as proportional, which further tells us to see them as measured. The theory delineates an area in which there will be some criteria for refutability. It cuts off the infinite regress by delineating an area of observation. But it is not only observation. The area could cover observation as well as other theories and concepts connected to the observation. Thus, in the case of Newton’s Second Law of Motion, the theory delineates the
area all the way from the observation of the measurements to the theoretical concepts force, mass, and acceleration, to the law itself. Thus; "What is an event?", the question posed earlier, is answered by: it is that area of observation delineated by a theory. Thus an event, according to Popper, is bound to a theory. Observation is still at play here but it has lost its place of prime importance in three ways: (1) not everything has to be grounded by it, i.e., the area includes other theories and concepts as well as observation, and only the ultimate ends of the theory's net need grounding; (2) it is limited by the theory to certain observations; and (3) observation is itself admittedly theory-laden. Thus the event is bound to the last and final term of our inquiry—theory.

The question that guides us here is one that asks about Popper's conclusion about what is scientific and what is non-scientific. We have seen that the conclusion reduces to the term theory. Also we have seen that it reduces to theory because the event is bound to a delineated area, and we have seen that theory is just what delineates an area. Everything, it seems, is complete. The demarcation that Popper gives us of refutability by an event and non-refutability by an event is bound to the logical outgrowth of theory. The event, as has been shown, is defined by and located in the observational area delineated by the theory. Simply, complete delineation, including the observational, is scientific, and incomplete delineation, not including the observational, is non-scientific. Theory has science and non-science built into it.
I now want to show that there is something other than theory, i.e., there is atheory; that not only are there many ways to delineate an area, but that there are other ways than delineation of grasping an area. It is well known that one can see objects in many ways. An apple can be a scrumptious, crisp bite, an explosive yet harmless throwing weapon, the product of natural factors, that which Cezanne knew better than anyone, etc. All of these 'ideas' can be theories. If so they will delineate an area, and those that can be refuted by an event are scientific and those that cannot non-scientific. But they need not. We don't have to go to a theory, yet we can say like some, e.g., D.H. Lawrence about Cezanne, that we can know the apple. Obviously there is a problem with the word "know" here. But for my purposes there is no need to pursue it. All I want to establish is that there is another way to interpret the event, and it is not scientifically theoretical, whether it is now fruitful, right, good, etc., is not at stake. Further that this other way has been and always is being experienced. Nobody as far as I can imagine sees everything as part of a delineated area. Secondly, one sees this other way in spite of the delineated area. One may delineate the area of a chair but one can still act toward it in a fashion devoid of theories. Of course all I have said here is also without theory. I have appealed to experience. Thus my third point is that there is a way to talk that is other than theory. It is like Johnny telling his friend to open his stance not because he has an accepted theory, or is in the process of testing one, but because it worked for him. One might say this is an
undeveloped theory and eventually Johnny and myself will have to make a theory out of what we say. But this is exactly what I say need not be the case. Also I want to say that it is an open question of whether or not going to theory occludes any possible attempt at understanding. In fact I think that going to theory is what occludes understanding. But this argument leads nowhere since understanding and theory seem to go hand-in-hand. In spite of these problems the conclusion still stands that there is not only theory, rather there is also atheory. To attempt to call the latter the beginning of theory, thus incorporating it in theory is to do violence to it.*

Thus a choice has to be made between theory and atheory. How? If one chooses theory then one would expect it to be justified by theory, and if one chooses atheory then one would expect it to be justified by atheory. The latter is possible I would like to claim, i.e., there is a genuine possibility of success or failure here. But not only am I not sure that it is possible, but if it is I don't have the ability at this time to work it out. And more significantly justification seems to call for theory. The former though, as usual, is more clear-cut, though still somewhat opaque. It simply cannot be justified by theory. What possible theory could justify it? The area delineated would have to reach to the core of existence. We would need a theory of theories. But even

*Remember theory is only scientific theory.
that would not be sufficient for it would still be a theory. In order to stop an infinite regress we would have to go outside theory. But outside theory is something too that is so far unable to be justified, i.e., atheory.

Yet a choice is made. For most it is theory, and even those who seemingly do not support theories, in actuality, when it comes down to justification, will call upon them. E.g., painting is diffused through and through with theory. The artist is no longer just an artist but a critic too. Every work seems to be an attempt, at least according to critics, to work out or confirm some theory. Why? The question is asked since there seems to be no criteria adequate enough to make a choice. One answer could be, and I think it is one often used and used unknowingly, is that theory speaks. It calls out for acceptance. The individual listens, that is all (of course this is atheory). But there is a more forceful justification tied to this acceptance. It is that because theory is the father of science, the success of science is the success of theory. Theories about God, astrology, cosmology, rocks, trees have fallen throughout our history by the hand of science. Today science is still doing the same. The power of science seems to be unlimited. To consider any other way than science, it seems, would be, in the face of history, nonsense. I cannot emphasize this too much.

History seems to justify science thus theory. But it is an empty justification for it is a victory within theory. Theory itself decides what is science and not science. Completeness and incompleteness thus refutability and non-refutability are necessarily
part of its own structure. Thus the victory of science throughout modern history is not justification for choosing theory over atheory, rather it is only justification for choosing science over non-science, if one has already chosen theory.

But there is some justification for theory in the historical workings of science. Science seems to be the only area where observation and logic mix. Observation is perhaps our surest access to reality and logic our best, if not our only, tool for coherence. Thus a turn to science is a turn to a place where reality is coherent. A turn to science may bring one to a sure and articulated (and interesting) reality. Such a promise justifies theory. This reason, and any similar reason, is a good one for choosing science over non-science, thus theory over atheory. But alarmingly it is atheoretical. There is no established theory of observation on which to ground the sureness of observation. There is no established theory of language on which to ground logic as the only way in which coherence exists.

The conclusion garnered here is that the choice of theory, thus science (because it follows from theory), over atheory is fundamentally atheoretical which necessarily shows that atheory has also been chosen, and even more importantly that it is more fundamental. Thus if we return to Johnny and his friend we find that Popper's conclusion is little different at its base from Johnny telling his friend to open his stance because it worked for him. His friend might find instead that he hits the ball better if he stands straightaway.
In a theory then is where the scientific has meaning lodged. Thus science can be work—it can be meaningful—if it is lodged in a theory. But it won't be the job or the particulars of the job that reverberate throughout the whole. It will be the theory itself. And it would obviously be difficult to sustain this; science is all to often labor.

Thomas Kuhn lends support to this. He divides the activity of science into what he calls normal science and scientific revolutions. The first consists of problem solving and fits into three categories: "...—determination of significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and articulation of theory—...". This is highly cumulative, steadfastly extending the scope and precision of scientific knowledge, i.e., it is based on past scientific achievements. However,

Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful finds none. As such normal science is labor. Meaning is not garnered from it but from outside it: the paycheck, fame, power etc... Or if there is a feeling that meaning does lie in matching, determining, or articulating then it is something like simplicity that allows meaning. As has been shown simplicity is parasitic on complexity and large questions loom on the horizon as to what simplicity is for. But there is, as in analytic philosophy, something to affirm here, and it will be done. We can say, though, that aside from a meaningful simplicity, science depends on an area that is confusing or complex, an area that as soon as it is simple is no longer meaning-
ful. It depends on 'novelties of fact or theory', or new areas that have as yet not been determined, matched with theory, or articulated. These areas are created by what are called scientific revolutions.

...scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. 78

A paradigm is the theory or theories, fact of facts, within which normal science works. A new paradigm, of course, calls for change, confusion, and complexity. Thus the labor that is normal science can gather its meaning within science, and science as a whole can become work, if the revolution reverberates throughout the whole of what is. But is this a normal occurrence? No, as it is difficult to conjoin means and end in science—a theory that reverberates throughout the whole of what is—it is difficult to engage in normal science conjoined to its meaning—revolutionary science. Thus normal science, Kuhn says, is the primary activity of science.

Taken as a group or in groups, practitioners of the developed sciences are, I have argued, fundamentally puzzle-solvers. Though the values that they deploy at times of theory-choice derive from other aspects of their work as well, the demonstrated ability to set up and to solve puzzles presented by nature is, in case of value conflict, the dominant criterion for most members of a scientific group. 79

Kuhn is saying then that most scientists do normal science, and if they are successful they do not find novelties of fact or theory. Thus the puzzle solving, if successful, does not lead beyond itself to revelation such as might be the case if the puzzle were an
antinomy. Rather the puzzle never manages to become an antinomy if its solving is to be successful. Because the aim of normal science only mistakenly reaches its meaning—revolutionary science—a place at which theory can reverberate throughout the whole of all that is, normal science is labor and parasitic on such things as money, fame, and power.

But Kuhn does not really show that it necessarily be the case that most scientists should practice normal science. He does not really show that such practice is merely the weakness of an age, or of an educational system, or that science merely does not get the best men and women, etc. He merely presents what seems to be a fact. I have shown, what I think is, one reason for this fact—it is difficult for theory to reverberate throughout the whole. This property of theory may be one of its most valuable properties, but it makes it difficult to retain sight of the vision (atheory) in which it is lodged. Theory, as has been shown, cuts off the fecundity of the infinite on which reverberation depends. Theory militates against reverberation. A revolutionary theory opens up and puts theory in its place, i.e., reverberating within atheory (a vision), but normal science and theory oppose such challenges. Science tends toward labor because the reverberation of theory throughout the whole is difficult.

Now the second question is whether scientific toil is meaningful or not. As it is work, of course, it is meaningful, but there is little work in science. Thus as labor can it be meaningful?
Meaning in the ends of labor have been excluded thus we are left with meaning in the means of scientific labor, i.e., if the ends are in play they are in play somehow in the means—by identification.

Identification in science is with the objects of science—supposed reality. It can be done in two ways: scientifically, and non-scientifically. The latter is done more or less subjectively, at least in the normal sense of the word, i.e., by feeling. Here one attaches oneself to the whole movement of science—it progresses. It can be defined, as Kuhn has it, by the fact that it is almost the only thing in history that can be said to progress. Thus one would here identify with science as a good, if not the best force in the world. The first problem with this is that it presupposes a notion of history and of science, both of which are problematic. Thus when it comes down to the nitty-gritty, like defending science in such areas as the H-bomb, one would have great difficulty. It would be a difficulty great enough to render identification, at the most, not very sustaining, at the least, worthless. This difficulty has greater consequences. If there is no scientific judgement on history, thus on science, one, in order to identify with science, must introduce value, which is to be unscientific, thus is to negate the enterprise with which you are identifying. The scientist cannot even judge on the value of his own enterprise, thus cannot identify with it if he or she wants to remain scientific. Value and identification and meaning must all be discarded if one is to be truly scientific. In this case of subjective identification scientific labor cannot be meaningful. Science is objective and rejects such
meaning as unscientific.

Within this perspective the only way to get meaning is to get a scientific theory of history and science. Karl Popper in his lecture published as "Clouds and Clocks" makes this attempt. The subtitle is, "An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man". Freedom for Popper is what he calls plastic control—control with feedback. Feedback is the lower levels of language plus adaption to the environment. The former being the symptomatic or expressive function (bird ruffling wing expresses that it is going to fly) and releasing or signaling function (second bird responds by getting ready to fly). Control is provided by the higher levels of language—the descriptive and argumentative. They are the means of control—of error elimination and selection. These have been developed by man in the same way that tools have. According to Popper they are a very special tool. This is now put through the model:

\[
\begin{align*}
    P_1 & \rightarrow T \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow E \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow P_2 \\
    " & \rightarrow T \rightarrow S \rightarrow S_n
\end{align*}
\]

From a problem we move to various trial solutions which are eliminated by selective measures leaving an answer to the first problem and a move to another problem. This is an attempt to answer Compton's postulate of freedom:

"...and it must also explain how freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard and something like a restrictive or selective control."
The randomness is, of course, the various trial solutions which have to be formulated by the higher forms of language, trial solutions which initially get their raison d'être from a problem which consists of the lower forms of language and the adaption to the environment—i.e., feedback. Selective control is error elimination which consists of the higher forms of language, i.e., of course, control. This leads then to a new problem. But how? What guides in order that what is not eliminated leads to a new problem? The lower forms of language and adaption to the environment. The former has to be discarded as merely emotive, thus we are left with adaptation to the environment.

The whole of what we know, according to Popper is formed by survival considerations. Man develops physically in order to survive. As he advances he adds to this development (this is what distinguishes him from the animals) by developing exosomatically, i.e., by tools. Instead of developing a heavier, tougher and sharper hand in order to chop trees he develops an ax. Instead of developing..., he develops the higher forms of language. All are tools for his survival. This sounds plausible but it is far too crude to account for man today, or for man of the last 3,000 years, and before. Popper himself says:

...the trouble about evolutionary theory is its tautological, or almost—tautological character:...there does not seem to be much difference, if any, between the assertion 'those that survive are the fittest' and the tautology 'those that survive are those that survive'.

He solves this problem by attempting to restate the theory in order
to make it less vague. But this won't do. It is not so much that it is vague, but that it is today vacuous. Who survives varies from age to age. Survival is non-tautological only when it is pinned down to an individual. But even more important, it may not even have been the individual's goal. Simply, today, evolutionary theory does nothing. Survival is not now the guiding force of man. It is rarely a problem and few problems stem from it. It is only the necessary condition for a problem. Achilles has shown this. Soldiers throughout history have shown this. All that need be done is look to ourselves. Very little are we concerned with survival. When we are, it comes unwelcomed, entirely negative. What makes life life is not our survival concerns but those that go beyond them. Survival is only necessary, not sufficient for life. And even if we transfer survival from man to theories, as Popper does, thus taking away the risk from man, survival is still vacuous, in fact more so.

This is so because of freedom. Popper wants to contain it within the bounds of evolution as merely plastic control, a control over randomness guided by survival. This may hold for the animal, but mere 'randomness' is so powerful today as to annihilate control. Freedom is so powerful as to be without guides. Freedom is so total that it itself can be rejected, and needless to say so can survival. Freedom will in the end annihilate any account that posits a built-in purpose, a teleology, for it can reject anything. This is so not because trial solutions are infinite, but because there is no absolute solution or problem. For here is precisely where freedom lies. For some death is a solution, to others a
problem, and by still others it is ignored. Popper's freedom is a pale ghost of what freedom truly is.

More soberly there are three cases against Popper's freedom and his attempt to capture the whole. First survival is not very important today. If it guided the whole it would certainly be a much more evident force. Popper does not account for this. Secondly, and tied to the former, is that we are so free for error science can be ignored even if it is largely responsible for our ability not to suffer the consequences of our errors. Poets, the man on the street, the scientist, all have "theories". Their survival depends not on the scientific environment that only determines life and death for man but on a "lived" environment. Thirdly, derived from the former, Popper cannot give an account of what is a problem or a solution, for the environment has so changed, and is so changing, that no guide for a problem or solution is evident in it. What makes this possible? Freedom! Freedom only can give an account of man, for at his core he is free. His environment is determined by freedom. The only way to give an account other than freedom and to have it hold is to take away freedom. Freedom has made us free from survival. It has made man. It has made us so free that it itself is the problem.

Thus Popper attempts to determine both history and science with evolutionary theory. Something like this has to be done in order that scientific labor be meaningful. Here we could have identified with science as that which, more than any other activity, procures our survival. But alas, it is just not sufficient, and our
freedom allows us to reject survival with the aplomb that we reject filth.

This leaves us with the last possibility, and that is to let science itself determine our identification, i.e., our self. This is the area of psychology. Psychology, of course, consists of many schools and many theories. I will cut through this problem with a bulldozer not because so many of the theories are incorrect, but they are as yet untestable, thus unscientific. Behaviorism seems to be the only psychological theory exempt. This is so, simply because the turn is not to the mind (as is usual in psychology or psychoanalysis) but to behavior. Here we can be as scientific as we can in physics.

We can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning directly to the relation between behavior and the environment and neglecting supposed mediating states of mind. Physics did not advance by looking more closely at the jubilation of a falling body, or biology by looking at the nature of vital spirits, and we do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans, purposes, intentions, or the perquisites of autonomous man really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of behavior.¹²

In psychology then, if we want to be sure of what we are doing, if we want to be scientific, which is the intention here, if we want to determine identification, thus meaning in scientific labor scientifically, we must go to behavioristic psychology. For simplicity's sake let's assume there is no problem with conditioning, that we can condition any individual to do any behavior we wish. We have now two problems. One I will call the practical problem. Altering (controlling) some behavior is not enough, we must control all
behavior. A person's behavior may be altered by positive or negative reinforcement in the clinic, but when he or she goes into the outside world there is a bombardment of reinforcement that more than likely will push the individual back to where he or she was. David Fisher who runs the Behavior Institute of Marin makes this complaint.

"There's one thing you learn when you work with human behavior day in and day out, bubbe," he says. "You learn humility. The government, the environment don't provide me with the kind of tools I need to help every alcoholic or homo-sexual who walks through the door. They don't provide any rewards for a guy who's been on a binge for five years, a guy who wakes up stinking in some alley with a hangover and no teeth. What's he got to look forward to? Has he got a wife and kids and a place to come home to? Where are his rewards? Jesus Christ, in my office I can run him through an hour of aversive reinforcement. I can make drinking extremely distasteful to him, but when he steps outside, bubbe, when he's back on the street, I've got ten-thousand bars and ten-thousand mirrors working against me. You're a skid-row bum, you look at yourself, the drool and stubble, you're gonna reach for a bottle of Ripple quick. I'm not going to tell you I can knock over an elephant with a bean blower, for Christ's sake!"

Thus in order for scientific labor to be meaningful, "identification" must be done behavioristically, but for this to be successful it must be done everywhere and to everything that it can be done to. Assuming that Skinner is right, and thus, what we call meaningful is optimum behavioral conditioning, this kind of "environment" must be everywhere, or at least be so pervasive as to overwhelm adverse conditioning. The practical problems here are crushing.

It is enough to look at our political situation to see the enormous
change that would have to take place. Simply, for behavioral conditioning to be meaningful—for identification with what behavioral conditioning creates, i.e., for the alcoholic to stay cured in the society—a great deal of control over that society must be in effect.

To answer these practical problems we are forced to a situation where we would have control over society, if not absolute, then at least a very high degree of control, something that nobody has or has had. We can find this kind of control in only one place—a utopia. Skinner's Walden II is, of course, such a place. Such a society, though, is not exempt from the complaint of Fisher. If the utopia is smaller than the whole society, then it can be adversely affected by that society. An individual, no matter how satisfied by the smaller group, as in a small town, will be extremely attracted to the more multidimensional outside world. If it is the whole society, then it may work, but this possibility is not very probable. But these problems, inherent in any utopia, will be dismissed since my concern is with meaning, i.e., the meaning or lack of meaning in Walden II. Thus I will assume that the utopia Walden II can be put into effect as it is written, or as the whole of society.

Is there meaning in Walden II? Because it is scientific, behaviorism excludes discussion about meaning. This can be done in two ways: (1) we can know that the question can't be answered, but that what it asks is that which is most important and must be cared for; (2) or we can consider the question unanswerable and reject it without caring for what it asks. Skinner does the latter.
His concern is with what I have called particular meaning—with problems of behavioral engineering. Such a concern is not with the meaning of it all, but with such particulars as finding more free time, stacking wood more efficiently or interestingly, increasing the efficiency of raising children etc. All are worthwhile enterprises but the marked differences between doing them in our society and that of Walden II is that in the latter there is no other concern except for such particulars. Even when the whole is a concern it does not extend beyond the sum of particulars. Thus, to care for the whole is to care for the efficiency of particulars, and to be concerned about how well these particulars interact. It is the task of engineers, engineers not only concerned about roads and bridges but about payment for work and the education of children. Behavior itself is engineered; as such, questions about the meaning of it all are left behind and are of no concern. Meaning would not be a concern. But this does not mean that we can conclude that there is no meaning in Walden II. Meaning, as expressed earlier, may be obtained by ignoring meaning.

In his battles with the pompous philosopher Castle, Frazier is forced to maintain that Walden II is the Good Life. He is forced to attempt to define the Good Life. But it is a definition, such that, as it is successful it fails; as it pinpoints the Good Life it becomes merely operational gutting away what we contemplate as the Good Life.

But the philosopher in search of a rational basis for deciding what is good has always reminded me of the centipede trying to decide how to walk. Simply go ahead and walk! We all
know what's good, until we stop to think about it. For example, is there any doubt that health is better than sickness?

Secondly, can anyone doubt that an absolute minimum of unpleasant labor is part of the Good Life?

The Good Life also means a chance to exercise talents and abilities.

And we need intimate and satisfying personal contacts.

Last of all, the Good Life means relaxation and rest.

And that's all, Mr. Castle—absolutely all. I can't give you a rational justification for any of it. I can't reduce it to any principle of 'the greatest good'. This is the Good Life. We know it. It's a fact, not a theory. It has experimental justification, not a rational one.84

Frazier has to backup from his operational definition finally and admits he has no rational justification for his claim that Walden II is the Good Life. He retreats to an experimental justification. This is in no way sufficient. Skinner rejects a concern for meaning, but supposes that Walden II would be the Good Life, i.e., it would be continually meaningful for anybody to live in such a place. Such a supposition is unscientific and unwarranted. It is unscientific because the supposition that Walden II is the Good Life is not testable. It is unwarranted because the Good Life, in the old sense of a good life, is a meaningful life in which meaning is
not restricted to particular meaning but entails the meaning in the question "What does it all mean?". The Good Life, if it is not to be gutted of its significance must entail a fruitful concern with meaning. *Walden II* concerns itself with meaning by having a character say; 'This is the Good Life. We know it. It's a fact, not a theory'. This fact is not a fruitful concern with meaning by Skinner, rather, it is a wishful disregard of meaning, for this fact is not really a fact it is a fiction. There is no justification for saying that *Walden II* is the Good Life, that it has meaning. Though we can't justify saying that *Walden II* has meaning we are a little hesitant when it comes to saying that if something like *Walden II* were put into effect it would not be meaningful. That is, if we had a situation in which there was no concern for meaning but a highly efficient concern for particular meaning, would we be justified in saying that this situation would not be meaningful? *Walden II* is not able to provide us with an answer here because it is fiction and at this level it must be concluded that there is no meaning. What we need is an example from experience in which meaning is sacrificed for particular meaning.' Architecture is such an example.

The most famous slogan of modern architecture is 'form follows function'. The slogan is not understood unless its terms are understood. The problem is that there has been a great range in interpretation of the term function.

The idea of function is not a simple one.
Function may be objective or subjective. There are various interrelated types of functions, such
as the practical or material needs of the occupants of a building; the functional expression of structure; the psychological needs of the occupants; the social function of architecture; and the symbolic-monumental function of architecture. Functionalism is generally associated with the first two: the practical material needs of the occupants of a building and the expression of structure. However, even some of the most radical functionalists take a broader view of function. Andre Lurcat, for example, frequently stressed the social function of architecture. ... and Le Corbusier's statement that "the business of Architecture is to establish emotional relationships by means of raw materials," implies a psychological interpretation of function not revealed by his mechanistic dictum, "The house is a machine for living in." 85

This magnanimous attitude in regards to all kinds of function, I want to claim, is a radical departure from the original meaning of the term (and has been leading to an interpretation that has increasingly become mechanical) such that the slogan now asks that the concern be with particular meaning at the expense of meaning. A cursory examination of the early history of modern architecture will show this.

Louis Sullivan, to whom the slogan is attributed, considered function to be organic. The term is vague, but what it attempts to do is stress the partaking of all functions in one harmonious whole.

...that if the work is to be organic the function of the part must have the same quality as the function of the whole, and the parts, of themselves and by themselves must have the quality of the mass--must partake of its identity. 86

Sullivan’s concern is none other than keying particular meaning into meaning. For architecture to be organic all of its functions must be able to rest (partake) in the whole. Sullivan’s student, Frank Loyd Wright, tells us what the whole is.
In Organic Architecture then, it is quite impossible to consider the building as one thing, its furnishings another and its setting and environment still another. The Spirit in which these buildings are conceived sees all these together at work as one thing.

An organic-entity, this modern building as contrasted with that former insensate aggregation of parts. Surely we have here the higher ideal of unity as a more intimate working out of the expression of one's life in one's environment. One great thing instead of a quarrelling collection of so many little things.

What Wright means by organic reverses radically our normal conception of function. If we ask the question "what is the function of a building?" then we may come close to what Wright has to mean by function (if he remains consistent with his sense of organic). Such a function he tells us is the expression of one's life in one's environment. In the building nothing is separate, but everything is a function for a unity, a single Spirit. Thus for Wright 'form follows function' only as that function is the total unifying one that is an "...intimate working out of the expression of one's life in one's environment".

Sullivan's and Wright's organic function, however, has not become the accepted interpretation of function. The interpretation has increasingly become mechanical. One of the most used examples for the slogan that form follows function is that of tools.

*This is a very interesting notion of what a building is and runs very close to what I have already said about work, meaning, and innocence.
From the stubborn perseverance of these primitive people there arose weapons, tools, domestic and agricultural appliances;...

Thus unfolds the wealth of forms determined by their function. They are all of the same kind, marked by the generating operation of intelligence, all equally pure, yes, equally perfect.

Our normal experience of tools is usually one of non-understanding. We don't examine them but use them; we don't think about them, rather we think about what it is we are using them on. As such our normal view of tools is mechanical. Regardless of how many tools we find in art shows, our world, as a whole, regards tools as instruments, such that our concern for them only extends so far as caring for their maintenance and operation. In all other cases they are usually forgotten. Modern tools exemplify this mechanical character. They are mass produced and exempt from anything superfluous to their function except in cases where there is a cultural drag, e.g., where handles on various products remain wooden.

Primitive people, however, had an obviously different view of tools. Spears were intricately carved, baskets beautifully decorated. Indeed, mechanical function was important but it was not the only function, if, in the case of primitive peoples, one can make a distinction between functions. A spear, carved to ward off evil, could, in the function of killing game or enemies, be doing just that by making the individual wielding the spear aware that there is a good and an evil way of killing game or enemies.

Thus the tools of primitive peoples are somewhat different than the tools of us moderns. If we are going to praise tools as an example of form that follows function then it can be done both
mechanically and organically, depending on whether you see the tool through the modern's or primitive's eye. Simply, the move to the tool to explain the slogan 'form follows function' is not sufficient. There is a force at work now which causes things like tools to slip away from a primitive, organic understanding to a mechanical understanding. This force is what is usually called technology.

Technology manifests itself most obviously through tools, utensils, machines and architecture. In modern architecture it has become the major force such that to differentiate architecture and technology is difficult, even for architects.

Technology is rooted in the past. It dominates the present and tends into the future. It is a real historical movement—one of the great movements which shape and represent their epoch. It can be compared only with the Classic discovery of man as person, the Roman will to power, and the religious movement of the Middle Ages. Technology is far more than a method, it is a world in itself. As a method it is superior in almost every respect. But only where it is left to itself, as in gigantic structures of engineering, there technology reveals its true nature. There it is evident that it is not only a useful means, but that it is something, something in itself, something that has a meaning and a powerful form—so powerful in fact, that it is not easy to name it. Is that still technology or is it architecture? And that may be the reason why some people are convinced that architecture will be outmoded and replaced by technology. Such a conviction is not based on clear thinking. The opposite happens. Wherever technology reaches its real fulfilment, it transcends into architecture.

Mies van der Rohe's conclusion is very difficult to understand. He says that when technology reaches its real fulfilment, in gigantic structures of engineering, it transcends into archi-
tecture. Yet, the only way, it seems, that this conclusion makes sense is if technology and architecture are the same thing, which he denies. The way to reach an understanding of this mystery is to return to the organic interpretation of function that Wright gave us. Wright says that organic unity is the working out of the expression of one's life in one's environment. The organic unity of a building includes every function such that functions can no longer be differentiated. Thus a building gathers stone, steel, glass, earth, sky and human. The last (human) is the working out of a life in an environment. The working out of a life consists of a past life moving into a future life. Such a movement is manifested in the alteration of the environment. Justice cannot be done to the interplay between the working out and the environment. This interplay is far too complex. To say that the will (the working out) or the environment controls is to be superficial. But to go further than this negation is difficult. The truth, however, must lie in the enigma of the interplay. For Wright, it can be said, the organic includes and is guided by the human. A building is a unity that is the expression of one's life in one's environment, such that this interplay of expression and environment is the gathering whole of the building.

If this sketch is applied to both Wright and Mies van der Rohe what do we find that distinguishes them? Simply, it is the stress on what is normally considered organic and technological. Wright stresses the former, van der Rohe stresses the latter. For Wright the house repeats the rhythms of the earth (flat for Illinois,
arched for a part of California) the structures of nature (cantilever), and lets in the sky (glass). Technology is merely working-in the organic both in the familiar sense just expressed and in the larger sense as the expression of one's life in one's environment. Thus, for Wright, the environment in which one expresses one's life is essentially organic and that interplay itself is but the whole which is the organic whole. However, if the environment in which one expresses one's life is technological then the whole is not organic but technological. If this takes place then the interplay changes from the expression of one's life in an organic environment to the expression of one's life in a technological environment. This change is radical. To express in an organic environment is to be subject to that environment and reach for an understanding of it. To express in a technological environment is to have created and be in control of that environment such that a reach for understanding is superfluous. The disintegration of Wright's formula is so great that both expression and environment lose meaning. The ambiguity in a 'loss of meaning' is intentional. There is both a change and a loss of meaning. How can one express in a technological environment? The need to express can only be there artificially. To express is no longer to come to grips with reality but with an already unreal environment. The meaning of expression has changed. To express is no longer a powerful, substantial call, rather it has become mixed with flagrant, emotive outpourings or a cold formalism. Meaning has been lost from 'expression'. How can we call a technological environment.
an environment? It is so created and controlled by man
that its ability to be a place does not belong to it. 'Environ-
ment' changes to a fabricated environment and loses its power as
a word that hearkens up a powerful, molding force in existence.

It is only in such an environment that technology can reach
its real fulfilment and transcend into architecture. Van der Rohe
has said that technology has meaning and a powerful form. What is
this meaning other than an expression of one's life in an
environment created by oneself and others, i.e., an expression of
one's life in an expression of one's life? And the form? What
form can there be with such an introverted meaning? Form is
something outside. It therefore needs an outside force to guide
it. If there is no such force, form is arbitrary. All that is
left which resembles an outside force is the machine, the manufactured
materials, and the surrounding, already constructed buildings. In
such an environment one expresses one's life as technological. The
interplay between the working out of one's life and the environment
(which is the building) is within the confines of a fabricated world;
as such its highest achievement is fabrication, is technology, is,
now, architecture. Architecture, since it no longer exists within
the world of nature but within the world of technology is, at its
highest apex, technological. Architecture transcends to the ful-
ilment of technology which is now the Spirit, the unity of existence,
etc. Thus van der Rohe can say that technology transcends into
architecture because architecture, in its essence, is now technology.
Function, therefore, takes on a technological meaning, and the slogan 'form follows function' changes in meaning from something that is organic to something that is technological. The question now is whether there is a loss in architecture because of this change and loss of meaning. Van der Rohe's praise of technology may indeed have merit unless architecture along his lines can be shown to be defective. There have been criticisms.

The material uninhabitability of the slums is preferable to the moral uninhabitability of functional, utilitarian architecture. In the so-called slums only man's body can perish, but in the architecture ostensibly planned for man his soul perishes.

...we ought now to pull down the buildings of Mies van der Rohe, Neutra, the Bauhaus, Cripius, Johnson, Le Corbusier, and so on, since in one generation they have become outmoded and morally unendurable.90

Certainly these quotations do not prove that architecture has now become defective. Rather they show that the interpretation of function, which is purely technological, has been under attack by some people. This criticism rarely reaches philosophical comprehension. These kinds of attacks, in their furthest dimension reach the purpose of architecture, the question of whether form does follow function, and the role of technology.

The chain of adventures undergone by those who set out in this century to learn a new architecture ends in the totally uncommitted phenomenon of an 'Absolute Architecture'. It is, adds Hans Hollein (b. 1934 in Vienna), purposeless.

"Architecture is purposeless. What we build will find its utilization. Form does not follow function. Form does not arise of its own accord. It is the
great decision of man to make a building as a cube, a pyramid or a sphere."

"Today, for the first time in human history, at this point in time when an immensely advanced science and perfected technology offer us all possible means, we build what and how we will, we make an architecture that is not determined by technology but utilizes technology..."

What do these quotations tell us? They follow a chain of logic. First, it is said that architecture is purposeless, and before that that it is uncommitted. This end has been reached by a chain of adventures begun in this century. The next statement is that form does not follow function. The chain of adventures, then, has as its guiding force the belief that form does follow function. But this is really not a good belief, according to the author of the middle quotation, for it has led to purposelessness. He says that form will find its use. This author also claims that for the first time in human history, when science has advanced and technology has been perfected, architecture can utilize technology. Architecture can now utilize technology instead of having technology determine function and form, a determination which has made architecture purposeless. He squarely refutes van der Rohe as to the importance of technology, going so far as to reject the slogan that has guided modern architecture.

But what does he have left? How is form determined? If form will find its use how will it be created? He says that form does not arise of its own accord for it is the decision of man to make a building, a cube,
a pyramid, or a sphere. We are left therefore with the highly complex term, man. With this state of affairs we may be in no better position than we were with Mies van der Rohe. With van der Rohe the problem was whether architecture as technology is really defective. The problem now moves from architecture to man. Is man as technology defective? This move is not away from the interpretation given van der Rohe but toward it. Van der Rohe's quotation was interpreted in the light of Wright's quotation. Van der Rohe made sense when the word environment, in Wright's phrase, 'the expression of one's life in one's environment', is interpreted technologically. This meaning of environment changes radically the meaning of the interplay between the expression of one's life and one's environment. The interplay becomes none other than man. When the environment changes to a technological environment man becomes technological and the interplay itself collapses.

Essentially we cannot move to man to get us out of the sterility of technological architecture for man has already been contaminated. Technology is a force of extreme power, as van der Rohe expresses. It is so powerful that it may even take away what van der Rohe thought was its real fulfilment -- buildings.

However, most consumer products are meant to be dispensable and this trend has led some polemics, notably Reyner Banham, to propose the ultimate in throwaway living where all the products including clothing are dispensed with and the artifacts--such as they are--come under the electric media incorporated under an inflatable dome.92

Technology is so powerful the real question is whether anything else is needed. The question keyed in on here is whether technological
architecture is sufficient. Though we have heard complaints against it, they merely reflect the power of technology and do not show the defects of technological architecture.

What can show the defects of technological architecture?

Technology cuts so close to the core of human existence that it puts our normal conceptions of that existence in question. If the conceptions which we normally use to make judgements about the validity of our existence are in question where can we turn?

When a term, like 'man' which is so indigenous to our understanding, is under question as to what it really means (no longer does child of God or rational animal suffice) how can that understanding judge anything? We have two roads open. We can criticise technological architecture with perseverance, that is we can stick to our guns and hope to persuade or find agreement, or we can criticise technological architecture by going to the ultimate or philosophical areas where technology itself can be questioned. The first can be criticised for being relative unless the agreement is found to be extensive. The second can be criticised for vagueness unless there is something concrete on which the ultimate area can place itself. In the case of architecture it will not be difficult to find extensive agreement in regards to the vacuity of technological architecture, and, even more significantly, there is a concrete area—the so-called urban crisis—on which to move into ultimate areas and question technology.

First I will attack technological architecture with the hope
of persuading and finding agreement. To begin, there is the job itself. It is usually labor, not work. Only when a home is built by the potential dweller does there seem to be work. For the large building, the building of our age—the skyscraper—only labor seems to be evident. Large firms with huge staffs of draftsmen, engineers, and architects divide the tasks and represent these tasks in symbolic language—blueprints. Like the task of science there is this huge non-reverberating area which, in itself, leaves little room for work. Only by keying this area into the whole can it reverberate, and this is a huge, not very easy, task. Thus architecture is subject to the same criticism as making automobiles, it makes a job that is intrinsically insignificant.

Secondly, there is the opinion expressed by many that architecture is not performing its function, that modern architecture is as yet not architecture.

In 1951 Lewis Mumford had this to say.

Once upon a time a great motion-picture palace was opened.... For at least ten minutes, but for what seemed the better part of an hour, the audience was treated to a succession of lighting effects, to the raising and lowering of the orchestra platform, and to the manifold ways in which the curtain could be lifted and parted. For a while the audience was delighted by the technical virtuosity displayed: but when nothing further seemed about to happen, they were bored: they were waiting for the real performance to begin.

Modern architecture is now in a state similar to that of the Radio City Music Hall on the opening night. Our best architects are full of technical facility and calculated competence: but from the standpoint of the audience, they are still only going through the mechanical motions. The great audience is still waiting for the performance to begin.
As has been seen the performance will not begin.

K. Lonberg-Holm in "Arts and Architecture" had this to say.

Our cities are impressive only in mere size of amorphous form.94

This was written in 1929. The Michigan Society of Architects in their monthly bulletin had this to say about the article.

His 37-year-old article reminds us...of the very slow progress that has been made in developing an architecture suited to our technological capabilities.95

The attack even extends to the ethics of architects.

I have personally felt the compromises and the platitudes of a profession refusing to admit it sold itself out a long time ago to those who rule our society. In the media, in professional articles and at professional conferences, we still speak the rhetoric of building humane places for all people. Behind it all we want to build, we want our programs to be acted upon, we want to be heard. We don't think of ourselves as agents of the oppressors, yet we are not really that far from being the Albert Speers of our time. "I sold my soul like Faust", said Speer, thinking about his past job as Adolf Hitler's personal architect, "to be able to build something great".96

But these are only quotes from different people, reputable people albeit, but still people subject to their own particular perspectives. But we need not worry that these are aberrant views. All we have to do is go outside and look. Do something you don't usually do, look at the architecture of today. What do you see? Nothing that does anything. We have made ourselves immune to neon signs, how can anything penetrate this inoculation, even if it were other than what it is? Simply, the argument is that architecture does not affect one today, except, possibly, a house
built and designed by a non-architect. Architecture is insignificant today.

The last argument to be presented in defense of the view that architecture is defective is the inability of our age to handle what is called the urban and ecological crisis. Our cities are becoming uninhabitable. They are congested, crime-ridden, etc., to the extent that people are leaving them. This would be of minor importance except that rural areas are rapidly becoming urban areas and the problems of the city extend out into the country. All of a sudden the earth is small and its resources limited. Is technology alone sufficient to come to grips with it? From all indications the answer is no, at least in America.

Typical American behavior is to solve a problem of transit congestion by creating a paralleled system that builds up new neighborhoods and redoubles the transit congestion; but no effort is made to analyze the kinds and conditions of work so that people commute less. With generous intent, Americans clear a slum area and rebuild with large projects that re-create the slum more densely and, on the whole sociologically worse, for now class stratification is built organically into the plan.... A classical example of our present genius in planning is solving the traffic jam on the streets of a great city in the West by making a system of freeways so fast and efficient with its cloverleaves as to occupy 40% of the real estate, whose previous occupants then move to distant places and drive back bumper-to-bumper on the freeways.

What this doesn't do is only point to the Americans because of their ineptness, rather it points to a new problem—the whole must now be taken into consideration. The total function must now be considered.

Can this total function be considered technological with success? It can if everything, including man, is essentially technological. It
may, there seems to be some evidence, even if man is not essentially technological. In any case both questions are as yet open. Man, as yet, has not been shown to be technological, nor has technology showed such great success that the question of whether man is technological or not is unimportant.

The problem of total function leads, if we follow it, to the ultimate question about man's function in the whole of things. It leads to the question, 'What is the meaning of it all?' Is it necessary to consider this ultimate total function in city, state or global planning? No! one might say, such considerations belong to the individual; the city, state or global planner need only be concerned with the efficiency and coordination of specific functions such as health, protection, transportation, etc. But there is evidence to show, I think, that this answer is unacceptable. Let us take one aspect of architecture--protection--and see if it leads to a more total function than efficiency; one that comes close to asking about the meaning of it all.

Protection has been the main concern of architecture. In early times a dwelling may have consisted of mud, animal skins, sticks, rocks, etc. Today the material may perhaps be more sophisticated and artificial, but the principle seems not to have varied. An individual, family or group protects itself from cold, wet, and heat by an enclosure consisting of some of the earth's material. This is a somewhat simple matter, it seems, and if it is going to reach the question 'what is the meaning of it all?' it will do so artistically or religiously. The home may take a form that is symbolical of some-
thing such that that something ties itself into the meaning of it all. Or the building may be a organic culmination such that earth, sky and mortal may be gathered in it; and in that gathering there may be a reverberation throughout the whole such that the meaning of it all is exposed. Also there may be a place preserved where one can await God, such a place may also gather the whole and expose the meaning of it all. There may be other artistic and religious ways and there may be ways other than artistic or religious to get the meaning of it all in a building but they can all be rejected now as being unnecessary and subjective.

This rejection, however, comes into question when protection provided by architecture reaches city, state or global planning. Various unconsidered factors now come into play. When city, state or global planning takes place the particular must be considered in light of a whole. To plan is to have a plan. Such a plan must go far beyond mere technological efficiency. Such questions as, 'Will the new building congest transportation?', 'Is the sanitation system adequate to receive it?', 'Is there enough water?' seem to be mere efficiency considerations. But if a city is going to coordinate these problems it will have to formulate a policy which, if not directly, implies what a city is, what its total function is.

Thus, in considering the amount of water available for a new building one would be guided by the amount used for sanitation and the amount used for recreation and individual consumption. Water for recreation is a relative consideration such that it implies knowledge about what the city is, 'Should there be a large amount of
water for recreation? Should individuals be encouraged to grow gardens and trees and flowers? Are questions solved under the knowledge of what the city is. Is this city going to be one which has athletic people and many trees and flowers and gardens or not? This kind of decision will determine the amount of water available for the sanitation of a new building as well as the amount of drinking water. It will also give form to what the city is. Many more of such decisions will give the city a function.

This move to what the city is only takes place when the materials that man uses are limited and the space within which he uses is confined. Indeed, a city may have a policy that explicitly defines what the city is without having very great limitations on space or materials. But when this limitation takes place choices must be made which determine and set forth a policy of what a city is. Thus, in the case of a limited water supply, planning is necessary and a decision reached on how much should go for drinking, irrigation, sanitation, recreation, etc., and if a new building is to be built one of those areas will be sacrificed and a decision is forced which forces in turn that the city be given some kind of form, that it take on an identity determined by planning.

If we stayed on the level of cities then there would be little that can be said about the determination of what a city is. It would be determined by various cities and be left at that. But as the individual is part of a city and is formed and controlled by it, so is the city part of a state and the state in turn part of the whole that is the earth. And there is only one earth; thus there is
a total limit to the supply of materials and space. Thus we have one unit—the earth—for which planning must take place or the limited supply of space and material be used up to the point of destruction. The consideration of survival will lead us to total planning. The prospect seems inevitable. The earth will be like one big city rather than various individual cities planning in their own particular way. The earth will have to take on some kind of form. Our spaceship will have to be going somewhere for some purpose. A plan of the whole will have to be formed in which the particular will take on meaning, and this whole will have to be explicit.

Of course, as to what will happen in the future this is a very simple speculation. It has been presented to show where planning must lead in order that the loopholes in the partial planning that takes place now be closed off. We cannot hide behind the fact that overt planning is now very partial.

City, state and global planning demands that an overt decision be reached on what a city, state or earth is. It demands that every particular be considered in the light of this total function. This function at any of the levels (especially the earth) must go beyond mere efficiency or technological considerations. At the level of the city a decision must be reached on the importance of growing flowers. Such a decision can only be technological if man's wish to grow flowers has been shown to be technological. At the level of the earth a decision has to be reached on its function. Such a question goes beyond all technological considerations unless it has
been shown that everything is technological.

This does not mean that such total functions will ever go beyond the planning level. Total function will be implicit, it will be an uncontrolled, hidden factor as long as efficiency is pursued. This may be forever for the pursuit of efficiency may never be able to reach its goal. The pursuit of efficiency may only be successful if man is, in his essence, technological. Then, of course, there will be no necessity for a more total function than efficiency.

But most evidence shows the inability of efficient or technological considerations to reach efficiency. Planning, which is the tool of efficiency, points to something far beyond mere efficiency. It points to an explicit formulation of a total function of city, state and world. As it points to this total function it points to the meaning of it all. Our urban and ecological crisis demands such planning. This crisis points to a solution beyond the reach of technology, of technological architecture. Now such words as 'good' and 'ethic' may have to be reintroduced.

We therefore, going back to Greek antiquity, propose a different line of interpretation altogether: form follows function but let us subject the function itself to a formal critique. Is the function good? Bonafide? Is it worthwhile? Is it worthy of a man to do that? What are the consequences? Is it compatible with other, basic, human functions?... We have grown unused to asking such ethical questions of our machines, our streets, our cars, our towns. But nothing less will give us an aesthetics for community planning, the proportioning of means and ends.
Present day architecture is a toil that is labor. It has suffered a great deal of criticism for its vacuity. In a new area of its field—community planning—it has been shown to be deficient and this planning points beyond technology which is the essence of present day architecture. As a test for the claim of B.F. Skinner and Walden II that the Good Life can be had (that meaning can be had) by paying attention only to particular meaning, it shows that this claim is false. Present day architecture, on the whole, has paid attention only to particular meaning and has been deficient in three areas, and it has been shown to have very little meaning. The good life cannot arise by only paying attention to particular meaning. It cannot be a fact that Walden II is the Good Life.

Is there meaning in scientific labor today? We have found the answer, for the most part, to be no. Scientific labor provides the best possibility, it would seem, for meaning; since science is that area of endeavor which has the greatest claim to reality. But it has been shown that theory and meaning are hard to mix and it is difficult for meaning to exist if the laborer attempts to see the outside world through a scientific theory or theories. But this still leaves an alternative. The laborer can turn scientific theory upon himself and see himself scientifically. This endeavor may solve the problem that is the difficulty of theory to reverberate throughout the whole and be meaningful. This attempt leads to the only real scientific psychology—Behaviorism. Behaviorism as presented in Walden II was shown, however, to be unable to solve the problem.
The Good Life (the meaning) that it claims is a fact, is a fictional fact. To test this fictional fact it would be necessary to have something take place in existence that is similar to Walden II. Modern architecture was chosen for this because, like Walden II, its guiding force is a concern with particular meaning at the expense of meaning. It, like Walden II, is technological. This technological character was shown as the result of a different interpretation of the slogan 'form follows function' than initially expressed by Sullivan and Wright. It was then shown to be a defective interpretation. The stresses of architecture today are quite pronounced. Today's architecture is sterile and there is a great crisis in urban planning. Our homes and cities are not very livable. The conclusion that wants to be drawn here is that technology is not enough and that the meaning in the question 'What is the meaning of it all?' is somehow necessary for architecture. Indeed, if planning is pursued we find that it requires an explicit understanding of the whole of things, i.e., the meaning of it all. Applying these results to Walden II we can conclude that Walden II cannot be successful unless meaningful and not meaningful unless direct attention is paid to meaning.
In Part II the work/labor split was established first. The next task was to find meaning in labor. All important areas were covered except the scientific. It was found that there is little meaning in labor today. It was also found that the toil that most of us do is labor, and that instead of being successful has caused great stresses in our world, so much so that "Newsweek" and "Life" had large articles on it. The next step was to include scientific toil. It was found that most of it too is labor. Next it was found that there is also no meaning in it, even if we grant, as in Walden II, that it become for a moment unscientific. This too is not successful, for the test of architecture that shows a lack of meaning in scientific labor shows that such labor causes stresses in our world.

What kind of conclusion can be drawn from these phenomena? On one side we can see the human endeavors of labor and architecture that lack. There should not be much disagreement here. On the other side both endeavors show a great lack of meaning. Can we now conclude that these endeavors need meaning? It seems the answer here is no. Logic prevents us. There is no logical connection, i.e., causal connection, between meaning and lack. Yet, at the same time there is this uncanny presentation that if labor and architecture somehow had meaning they would not lack. This presentation, however, as it manages to be articulated guts the sense of lack, i.e., as the
presentment becomes coherent lack is put in question, as was the case in the discussion of the urban and ecological crisis. It seemed that we were leading to a proof of the necessity of meaning as a lack in architecture becomes a crisis which is facing us as a civilization, only to be turned back when it was found that meaning may not be needed as the lack is accepted, i.e., there may be no necessity to overcome lack. The conclusion, as it stands now, is that there is an uncanny presentment but no logical proof that meaning is necessary to overcome the lack of labor and architecture.
Our immediate response to the problem of lack is that it is a relative concept. It varies depending on something else, i.e., it is not absolute in itself. One of the most relative things today is art. Art has not only this quality but another: it was once, and for many still is, the answer for meaning in architecture, i.e., it is supposed to overcome the lack of architecture. If art can be explored as the answer to the lack of architecture perhaps we can gain a foothold into this lack itself.

What is art? We see its nature in the actual work. The actual reality of the work has been defined by that which is at work in the work, by the happening of truth. This happening we think of as the fighting of the conflict between world and earth.

And what are these two areas—world and earth? World is the container which holds what we know, see, hear, feel, taste, believe, etc. Earth is that from which the world gets its foundation, that which the container sits upon. But beware of this simplicity. Speaking about Van Gogh's painting of the peasant shoes, Heidegger had this to say:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoe vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained
self-refusal in the fellow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbirth and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. 100

The world of the peasant woman is the matrix of toilsome tread, slow trudge, loneliness, uncomplaining anxiety, wordless joy, trembling, and shivering at death. The earth is the leather, the soul, the grain, etc. The surface has barely been pricked.

Discussing a Greek temple Heidegger says:

Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the mystery of that rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things physis. It clears and illuminates, also, that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth. 101

Physis is world. Like the temple it grows. But unlike the temple it need not stop growing, and its agent for growth is not only a stone cutter, architect or laborer. The world is the temple of life, one that never ceases and which has no direct agent. The world not only makes its own clearing but in that clearing lets us "see"
the earth.

What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises without violation. In the things that arise, earth is present as the sheltering agent.

And what is this that earth shelters?

The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are just there. But neither is it a merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home.

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The peasant woman, ..., has a world because she dwells in the overtness of beings, of the things that are. Her equipment, in its reliability, gives to this world a necessity and nearness of its own. By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits.

Earth, then, shelters all which rises from it without violation. When the world is so sheltered it is steadfast and sure beyond death. The world that rises, which is "created" in the art work, is the vitality by which things gain their significance—their lingering, hastening, remoteness, nearness, scope and limits. Naturally, more can be said about earth and world; the subject is inexhaustible, but this is as far as I will go.

The art work is the happening of truth out of the conflict of world and earth. What is truth?
The crucial question (viz. my "Sein und Zeit", 1972) regarding the "meaning", that is to say...the realm of projection (Entwurfsbereich), that is to say the truth, of Being and not merely of "what-is" has been deliberately left undeveloped.  

The truth of Being is the meaning that was discussed earlier, i.e., meaning. As long as truth consists merely of itself then it is not meaning, i.e., as long as truth and reality are not meaning, Being is at a distance. But these statements are highly speculative. Let us return to the art work. Out of the conflict of earth and world, a conflict which opens up to Being--"the art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings"--arises truth, i.e., meaning.

Thus art would be the answer, for art would return meaning to architecture, which is the truth of Being, which is the truth of all that is, without exceptions. It is the answer because buildings will have to perform such a total function in the future. It is the only answer possible for what Lewis Mumford thinks architecture needs.

The problem of form as I have put it to you in these examples, is plainly one that cannot be solved, even by engineering, to say nothing of architecture, merely by a systematic application of science, or by treating the machine as a religious fetish. The problem of form is not one of esthetics alone, either, though esthetics brings us into one of the inner chambers of the human personality, for a work of organic architecture must take into social and moral needs. When we talk of an organic architecture we refer to a system of order capable of bringing all these requirements into a harmonious and effective relationship. We are looking for a rule, as Louis Sullivan's French mathematics teacher put it, a rule so broad as to admit no exceptions. 105
Mumford's aesthetics is not an objection to the view of Heidegger. Art according to Heidegger is not a move into the inner chambers of the human personality. But it is so broad as to admit no exceptions, and it is no accident that a work of architecture—the Greek temple—was used as an example. Thus, this difference in aesthetics is not really the problem here, though it does point us to the problem. Aesthetics today can't even go so far as to affirm an inner chamber of the human personality, much less the expanded view of Heidegger. Art today cannot overcome the lack of architecture.

The aesthetics of today, I want to maintain, is the consequence of limiting not expanding. Further this limitation has become so narrow as to allow for nothing, and, ambiguously, everything. There are many historical roots but I will stick with the outcome of the very recent.* The current art scene, according to John Coplans, the editor of "Art Forum", was "formed" by Clement Greenberg and those of similar views.106 The fact that critics would have so much power indicates that something is amiss, but let us see what they say.

First, art today is modern. It does not cling to the past. Thus art today is Modern Art, that catch-all phrase that does not mean contemporary (for many who paint and sculpt today are not Modern artists) rather something to do with the way of painting and sculpting. What is this Modernism? Greenberg in his essay

*E.g. Courbet starting impressionism on its way with what M. Duchamp calls retinal painting. M. Duchamp reversed the trend with "concept" painting.
"Modernist Painting" considers it to be a self-critical tendency beginning with Kant.

The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself—not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence. Kant uses logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left in all the more secure possession of what remained to it. *107

Why Modernism? Is it necessary to entrench into one's area of competence? Definitely, according to Greenberg, and for historical reasons.

We know what has happened to an activity like religion that has not been able to avail itself of "Kantian" immanent criticism in order to justify itself. At first glance the arts might seem to have been in a situation like religion's. Having been denied by the Enlightenment all tasks they could take seriously, they looked as though they were going to be assimilated to entertainment pure and simple, and entertainment itself looked as though it were going to be assimilated, like religion, to therapy. The arts could save themselves from this leveling down only by demonstrating that the kind of experience they provided was valuable in its own right and not to be obtained from any other kind of activity. 108

Thus painting establishes its own area of competence. It cuts itself off from sculpture by turning to its own two-dimensional surface. It goes so far as to announce the flatness, not just maintaining the "integrity" of the picture plane. It has made

* It has been pointed out (by Albert Borgmann, my thesis instructor) that Greenberg is incorrect in believing that for Kant the discipline—logic—should be self-critical. Rather this criticism should be the task of "a priori knowledge".
itself abstract, though Greenberg claims this "...has, in itself, still not proved to be an altogether necessary moment in the self criticism of pictorial art." 109

What is important here is that Greenberg is responding to and applauding an historical movement and it is one guided by science.

Secondly, this response is one that wants to give art its own domain, one that cannot be trampled upon by science or any other domain. Simply then, Greenberg's response has great similarity to the attitude of analytic philosophy (and science). It itself, in its response to science makes itself scientific. There is no way to create an impenetrable domain. Simplicity is the guiding force here as it is for Quine. With nothing excessive, stripped of all superfluity, the word, theory or task can be solid and defensible. This is the goal that art also should seek according to Greenberg.

What is the result? Painting has lost its "essence" and is beginning, like architecture, to pass from our midst. And what is its essence? Things. And what is a thing? It is not an object. It is not a mere thing. But what a thing is need not be discussed for not only has art banished the thing, but (in consequence) is, in the practice of Conceptual Art, also banishing objects.

James Collins differentiates between two kinds of Conceptual Art. One groups deviates and the other, lesser known, questions. In the former are system, process, earth and body art, which are an attempt to rid the world of "...cultural objects with 'stable
and material—formal constituents, and to replace them with an extraordinary range of nonstable, nonmaterial, and nonformal processes and procedures. E.g. Ian Wilson merely presents himself at the gallery talking about art!

He says, "I present oral communication as an object." 111

The second group—questioners—, Collins represents with this quote from an advertisement for the English Conceptual Art journal, "Art-Language".

"Art-Language" is a journal devoted to the publication and development of a body of discourse on the theory of art... It is assumed, for the moment, that broader concerns for the relevance, function and importance of art can more usefully be served by this means than by the production of further art objects. 112

This group, very importantly, practices something very close to metaphilosophy.

Kosuth takes the jargon of metaphilosophy and applies it to art: "At its most strict and radical extreme," he writes, "the art I call conceptual is such because it is based on an inquiry into the nature of art." 113

This activity then, not only questions other art, but itself.

Thus Collins is able to say,

Whether Conceptual art should be viewed with sympathy—is no longer an important issue; more significant is whether Conceptual art is meaningful. 114

Collins, of course, is naive in that he does not know that meaning itself is in question, and to criticize Conceptual Art by what is put into question by it would not be normally enlightening. But in our context it is. Conceptual Art firstly is an outgrowth
of Greenberg's dictum. It was to discover a domain,—to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence—which demanded that it be self-critical. Being self-critical is precisely what Conceptual Art is attempting to do. It is to "...reinvigorate the flagging intellectual bases of the visual arts." Its success, however, is its failure. As conceptual art has established an intellectual basis and an area of competence it has ceased to have concrete objects and has put its artiness into question. Greenberg was right in his understanding of the power of an historical trend, but far too optimistic in thinking that he could discover an area of competence that could sustain meaning.

Art seems to resist an intellectual basis, an area of competence. Its modern history is the rejection by art of just such an attempt. Its rejection is in the form of doing away with art objects and meaning. Art's rejection of an area of competence or an intellectual basis is to let meaning seep away from it until art is meaningless.

Now, of course, meaning is in question. It is the case that art exists and is somewhat popular and viable. Maybe art has just found its area of competence and this area excludes overcoming the lack of architecture. Maybe this area of competence is to be without meaning.

But also, maybe not. Art is not that popular and viable. In fact it has increasingly become insulated, arcane and weak. Again, an activity that is relatively unsuccessful lacks
meaning, and we have some core evidence for the necessity of
meaning. But now it is time to consider why so many activities
are devoid of meaning and that meaning itself could be in question.
First, I will briefly discuss a criticism of modern art, then one
on Heidegger's interpretation of art.

Karsten Harries, taking an existential stance with regard
to Modern Art, sees it as a response to the absurd. It is Camus'
absurd that asks for meaning from a silent world. Thus either the
world conquers and meaning is forgotten, or man keeps on asking
for it, even in flight from it.

It is therefore necessary to give a
positive interpretation to the flight from
the absurd. Modern art thus appears either
as an attempt to restore to man—lost immediacy
or as a search for absolute freedom. In either
case man has given up his attempts to discover
meaning in the world of objects;...\textsuperscript{116}

Both these attempts Harries thinks are unrewarding. The first
he says yields meaninglessness, (immediacy is being).

Unmediated being casts no light on the
situation of man; its opaque transcendence
yields no meaning. The sense of the...\textsuperscript{117}
numerous turns to nausea and boredom.

The second leads to nothingness.

For fear of limiting freedom the artist
chooses to say nothing at all.\textsuperscript{118}

Harries, like Greenberg, is a victim of his ontology. He
does not have recourse to things,—the truth of Being—thus the
world is silent for him, and all that is left are objects and
freedom. His complaint of meaninglessness is also naive and
comes across as the mere desire for comfort. But what is important
is this combination of objects and freedom. To the extent that the object does not speak the onlooker is free. If the object is silent, then the onlooker is totally free. Harries already guaranteed this situation—by considering existence absurd. Thus all that is left is freedom for the absurd man. And, though he is right in that it leads to nothing, he is not right in considering it as peculiarly artistic. This kind of freedom, I want to maintain, is the essence of our epoch.

It is the kind of freedom that allows William H. Bossart to give superficially correct though essentially incorrect criticism of Heidegger. He says:

To begin with, Heidegger denies that a work of art can disclose the historical world of another people in another age, for a world is the project of a particular historical people. Thus Heidegger cannot account for the eccentric master—Redon, Ryder, Fuseli, Blake.

As one writer recently put it, the eccentric master "...is, above all, the artist hostile to categories, outside of the 'historical' necessities of tradition." The ability to be non-historical Bossart finds in other ways. Some artists are closer to others that are separated by centuries than to their contemporaries, e.g., Grünewald is closer to Van Gogh than to Dürer. Finally he ends up with those artists "...concerned primarily with the plastic means of expression which are inherent in all forms of art." This art discloses the world of art itself. In conclusion Heidegger is criticized for not giving a phenomenological analysis of art, but a prescription for what it
ought to be.

What is incorrect here? Bossart has missed the historical trend which makes either those artists he considers non-historical, historical, or that which he considers art non-art. Thus Blake and Fuseli, Redon and Ryder are very much historical. Blake and Fuseli are very much a part of English romanticism, Redon linked to them (and the French academy and early impressionists), and Ryder to American landscape painting. Indeed we could say Blake, in his poetry, and Ryder in his painting (at least, I would say) transcend time, but this is far different from being non-historical. The same goes for Grünewald and Van Gogh. There are similarities, but in no way could Van Gogh attempt a crucifixion. If he did we might assume it huge, ugly, and ponderous like Grünewald's, but the subject is just too violent for a man who had trees and chairs swirled and distorted violently. All of this of course is interpretative, but it does show that unusualness and similarity over centuries does not mean non-historical. The last non-historical artists Bossart discusses are those concerned with the plastic means of expression inherent in all art. This sounds like nothing other than Conceptual Art, or at least an early form of it. "Disclosing the world of art itself" is being self-critical, is being Conceptual, is (as we have seen) not doing art. This activity is only the final process in the termination of visual art, an end which is typified by meaninglessness. Thus, Bossart is incorrect in claiming Heidegger is prescriptive in his appeal to the non-historical, because either
this appeal is incorrect or it just makes art non-art.

What is correct in what Bossart says? Bossart is dealing with a conception of art here that is not epochal, like Heidegger's, but of contemporary art objects. Thus, he's trapped in the demise of art, and his view is distorted away from art's essence, which itself had been distorted long ago. But there is something superficially correct here. He does see art as it is being done, as it is, not as it essentially is, and we now butt head on into a sticky problem. What is essentially real, in the midst of our contemporary world, has become prescriptive. Reality is the problem, and I would like to engage this problem, but its dimensions are, as yet, far too gargantuan. But what can be said is that how reality is extremely ambiguous, so much so that it tells us nothing. There is the reality of art as Heidegger expresses it and there is another reality, and it is what is happening now. It all but cancels Heidegger's out. Why is this so? Freedom! And we are right back to Harries. Things are turning into objects, reality is becoming silent, and only freedom can prevail. Faced with contrary realities we are opting out to objects, and this is turning into freedom. We are caught in an historical trend. Thus Bossart is correct in that he stands on the side of the historical trend.*

Art, then, is not really an answer for architecture. In

* This does not make the others non-historical. They are just not at the fore-front.
fact, we could say, it is responsible for its vacuity, or more
correctly when art searched for an area of competence, architecture
ceased to transcend technology. And the problem is the historical
trend which allows this.
The discussion of art has shown modern art to be a peculiar affair. It has, in the form of Conceptual Art, attempted to rid itself of objects, yet it is part of an historical trend that increasingly sets man (and his desire for meaning) over against silent objects. Either Conceptual Art is not a part of the historical trend or it is leading that trend into unexplored territory, i.e., away from objects. Obviously Conceptual Art is at the forefront of the historical trend. After objects have become silent the next step would be to reject them altogether. The question now becomes: how should one respond to such a trend? Indeed Conceptual Art can be praised as an attempt to obtain meaning. If objects do not speak, then the inclination is to go elsewhere, even to the act of making objects, or any act. This attempt, however, seems to be a shot in the dark. A far more rigorous attempt would be to attempt some kind of understanding of the historical trend.

In the discussion of art freedom was a key term. It will be expanded now with the intention of understanding the historical movement we are in. Because the world was silent the artist could be free from it. This is the freedom of Sartre. Sartre’s freedom makes my freedom sitting here equal to that which George Jackson used to have—incarceration in San Quentin. It is the freedom of a consciousness radically separated from the world, physically as well as historically. Is this what really happens when one is free? Let us take as an example: climbing a mountain. Sartre wants us to believe that this project would be freely chosen, that
we can radically cut away our past and climb an almost vertical, an almost smooth granite face. We can according to him cut away our fear of heights, our lack of conditioning, etc., such that these factors are not in play in the choice of a project to climb the rock. Further, he wants to maintain that the project is delineated fully at its initiation, that the meaning we give the inert rock in the project is the meaning it holds. We would not need, according to him, to let the rock show us what way it would allow us to climb it. Lastly, according to Sartre, we are so free from our own body that it can be ignored, that in the climb we do not need to listen to it, to its quickening heart, its swelling, heavy legs, etc.

In what world then is Sartre’s analysis profound? Is it not in a world where there is no care given to our past, things and our body, a world in which these do not count—our world today? No longer do we have much of a limit to our projects. Some of us can yacht in 90° heat off malibu and some hours later be skiing off a glacier in New Zealand. We don’t even have time, it seems, to think our projects out. If we are not wealthy, then there is television with which we can project with a far greater freedom than the rich of only a few years ago. Further, and more insidiously, the more these projects multiply and become artificial the less are they tested. No longer are we called to answer for our projects except in the most extreme of circumstances—death, divorce, etc.—and these are even beginning to lose force. Divorce, for some, is like getting a new car. Simply it is getting so that a consistent
Life is unnecessary. Like some so-called hippies, we can change persons, as we change clothes. The world is rapidly becoming a stage play in which there are no stagehands or playwrights and the audience too is on stage. In such a play nobody has to answer for his or her role. If it gets too hard for one, he or she merely retires to the audience, or assumes a new role. Yes, we are free to choose, to climb the mountain without ties to the past (thus future) because the project matters little. It is merely one among millions.

And things, what are they today but objects--artificial, ineloquent, matter. We eat food crammed full of who knows what, frozen, stored, shipped, cleaned and finally eaten as a foreign substance. We have protective coverings of glass and plaster, steel and enamel to insulate us from the outside where things are things--where they speak as storm, cold, heat, distance, height, power, joy, etc. We have machines that rip apart these things and make them into objects for our use. Yes, the rock is mere inert matter that we give meaning to because it is only something to be used. We don't have to listen to what it says, we merely need a pulley or a helicopter.

And our body today is the same--something to be used. With the advance of medicine it looks as if we will be able to get new parts for just about everything, like a car. Is it not a machine now? Food for nourishment, athletics for health, etc., show already that we treat the body as a machine. Thus, it is treated essentially as something to be used and forgotten.
Sartre is right only as this historical trend is right, and the trend has not yet conquered completely, especially in 'primitive' activities. Thus, we don't yet climb a mountain the way he would probably describe. The project is in question by our past which is pointing toward the future. The rock speaks to us, telling us to go this way rather than that. And our body speaks the same. Or better the rock and our body get together to tell us the way. Freedom here is not a freedom from a world of silence, but a freedom to a world that speaks.

What then is freedom? To be born is both to be born of the world and to be born into the world. The world is already constituted, but also never completely constituted; in the first case we are acted upon, in the second we are open to an infinite number of possibilities. But this analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both ways at once. There is, therefore, never determinism and never absolute choice, I am never a thing and never a bare consciousness.

Is this not the freedom of art, as Heidegger has given us art?

In the struggle between world and earth the truth of Being is un-concealed. Freedom allows us to "create" a world out of the earth. It gives us a world in which to struggle with the earth, all for the sake of the truth of Being. Freedom "chooses" for man and all that is disclosed in the ensuing struggle is for the sake of the necessity of that struggle. Freedom possesses man in that we can never take it over. We can never choose absolutely freely, or have absolute predictive knowledge. Our choice and knowledge are partial, and as such, we never are sure that they are correct, good, or whatever. As such we are in the world, trapped in our projects,
and they are always pointed toward, getting sustenance from, for the sake of: the truth of Being. Merleau-Ponty had this to say about Cezanne:

But he himself was never at the center of himself: nine days out of ten all he saw around him was the wretchedness of his empirical life and of his unsuccessful attempts, the leftovers of an unknown party. Yet it was in the world that he had to realize his freedom, with colors upon a canvas. It was on the approval of others that he had to wait for the proof of his worth. That is the reason he questioned the picture emerging beneath his hand, why he hung on the glances other people directed toward his canvas. That is the reason he never finished working. We never get away from our life. We never see our ideas or our freedom face to face.124

How can Cezanne be described? Merleau-Ponty calls him anxious. Cezanne, however, is not merely a nervous man. Merleau-Ponty means by 'anxious' something more than a worry about various matters. Cezanne is anxious about his being. He is innocent in the face of himself and the world. His place with all its troubles and vexations is a place alive, a place in which he stands in wonder and anxiety. All disclosures are for the sake of what he wonders and is anxious about, i.e., Being. This is a freedom that is not a freedom from a silent world. There are two freedoms.

The discussion of freedom was done in hope of understanding the historical movement we are in. The discussion revealed two
freedoms, one which is passing away and another which is gaining ascendency. The discussion of the historical movement we are in was done in response to the inability of art to overcome the lack of architecture. The discussion of the lack of architecture was done in order to show the necessity of meaning. The necessity of meaning was never settled because lack itself had little in it that was absolute. The lack in anything could be ignored. Thus the conclusion was unsatisfactory. All that could be said was that there is an uncanny presentment but no logical proof that meaning is necessary to overcome the lack of labor and architecture. However, we can now see that the historical trend increases the relativity of lack in the same way it increases the relativity of art, i.e., in the way art is reduced to freedom from a silent world lack is a matter of freedom—from. Lack becomes merely relative, thus it can be ignored. If lack is so then necessity is also relative. The historical trend lessens considerably the force of such words as lack, necessity, meaning, etc. They too show a lack of necessity. Thus, there can be no test for the necessity of meaning unless one overcomes the historical trend we are in.

How can such a trend be overcome? One cannot overcome an historical trend. One can only engage it. It is a matter of decision.
We now know why lack has no great force in our endeavor. We are forced to engage the historical trend which we are in, not prove it wrong. The historical trend only permits particular meaning yet it is meaning which is to be discussed. Thus, to engage this trend would be to do so with meaning. How then can meaning be shown necessary because of a lack in labor and architecture? It can as it articulates and wages battle. In order that meaning do this we must see where it is in this historical trend.

The historical movement that we are in wants to restrict freedom to a freedom from something. Instead of being free for the sake of Being we now become free for the sake of ourself. How does this trend affect meaning, i.e., the 'mean' in the question 'What is the meaning of it all?'. If the world is silent, then meaning cannot arise from it. Therefore, our conclusion would be that this historical trend which sets us free from a silent world wants to seek meaning in ourselves or not at all. The first attempt has been shown defective. Labor today is mostly (if it is at all an attempt to find meaning) an attempt to find meaning in the self. The self is not lost in labor as it is in work. And, as has been expressed, there is a great separation between means and ends in labor. This is a separation which was not bridged by any of the various types of labor discussed. Whether one works
at General Motors, or in a scientific laboratory the chances are that one will be doing labor and that it will be meaningless. Meaning, in all these cases, has to come from an area outside the labor itself—the paycheck, prestige, etc. When this move is made to something outside of labor it can only be done for a self, if the world is silent. Such attempts—identification with the essence of labor, identification with the product of labor, scientific determination of the identification—have shown to be fruitless. The attempt to find meaning in ourselves, an attempt formed by the historical movement that we are in, is a fruitless attempt. Thus, if we want meaning in ourselves through labor, there will be lack. This is not relative. This lack is formed by the quest for meaning and its proof is logical. In terms of meaning our freedom—from is defective. But meaning, like lack is in question, thus, such a conclusion is circular. But that which puts these terms into question is also in question: the historical trend that gives us freedom—from.

We are left then with not seeking meaning at all. What do we seek then? We seek that which what is already meaningful "tells" us to seek. Yes! This makes sense finally. Is the whole discussion of meaning fruitless because of this sentence? To search for meaning anywhere, it seems, is absurd. Meaning is already here, if it is at all, and, as such, any quest for it is contradictory. Thus, the long quest for meaning that has been done has done nothing? The results would have been the same if the quest had not been taken? But the quest has done something that could have not
been done if it was not made. It has opened up the uncanny thought that meaning may be necessary, even if useless.

What does this mean? Does it really say something over and above the nothing that would have been said if the quest for meaning had not been taken? Meaning may be necessary. Necessary for what? For life? For well-being? Without it there are, I have claimed, stresses. There is a lack. Thus, meaning is necessary for a world that desires less stress, less lack, the kind of stress and lack that is found in the work at General Motors and in the results of Modern architecture. This necessity, however, is merely relative and without much force. But the meaning I claim that is necessary here is not just the meaning of bolting fender sections day in and day out or the meaning of a plaster box crowded against other plaster boxes but the meaning of it all which includes these two. Meaning, as differentiated from particular meaning, i.e., the mean that is in the question 'What does it all mean?', is necessary in its own right. It is necessary in a way in which necessity is not a relative term. It is necessary in a way in which necessity does not bow to the historical trend we are in.

Meaning is so necessary it is necessary in order that there be labor at all. It is not the case that one labors and meaning is added on to alleviate stress, rather it is the case that one labors because there is meaning in the labor.

How then can I claim that labor is without meaning, for it is known by everybody that this labor has not diminished in the number
of people practicing it? Labor is without the meaning that is in the question 'What is the meaning of it all?'. Yet labor must have meaning and it cannot just be particular meaning. Labor has the meaning that there is no meaning of it all. The meaning of it all for labor is that there is no meaning of it all. This is not semantic trickery. If one is going to labor today one is going to have to disregard the meaning of it all; one is going to have to assume that there is no meaning of it all. This is having a meaning of it all. Meaning is necessary.
However, it is very difficult to keep this necessity in mind and to take it seriously when our world ignores it. The meaning of it all that there is no meaning of it all is none other than paying attention only to particular meaning at the expense of meaning. This, as has been said, is to be guided by simplicity, which is to be parasitic. It is not the simplicity of a Blake who desires to see the world in a grain of sand, rather it is to pay attention to the grain of sand and forget the world. This attitude has been affirmed as being able to produce something interesting rather than merely mechanical, and something self-sufficient thus easily defensible. Further, it has been affirmed that a turn to such simples and a disregard for happiness may bring happiness. Simplicity, on the other hand has been criticized for being parasitic on complexity. Simplicity forgets complexity. It fails to acknowledge its presence. Meaning is necessary in order that simplicity can forget complexity. The meaning of it all that there is no meaning of it all is necessary in order that simplicity can be a guiding force, and thus that simplicity will bring happiness.

As we continually "see" no resistance in the world we are free to manipulate it. This freedom allows us to maintain that 'it all' is voiceless, that it has no meaning, that there is no meaning of it all. Simplicity provides a meaningful alternative. It supposes that in this abundant silence individuals will speak; and they do. The
world is silent as a whole but the particulars of the world are meaningful. Why? Simplicity provides meaning precisely because it limits. It is meaningless today to bump one's head fruitlessly against the meaning of it all. But it is meaningful to find answers to particular meanings. It is a matter of success and failure. The former is usually the more meaningful.

What is success? Is it not to do something useful? To be successful today one must do something that can be used. It can be a skill like welding or playing football or a job like being a cop or building buildings that do not fall down, or a discovery like the Salk vaccine or Big Mack, or a responsibility like being president of General Motors or a privilege like being President of the United States. What is meaningful today is the performance of a useful activity. Only this kind of toil produces success. Today, meaning faces us as that which is successful, which is useful, which is simple. This meaning is particular meaning, is the meaning of it all that there is no meaning of it all.

Thus, with use, simplicity, and a silent world, it is difficult to take seriously the thought that the meaning of it all is that there is no meaning of it all and thus, that meaning is necessary. The parasitic quality of simplicity and use has little force. Happiness is garnered by ignoring such a parasitic quality, by ignoring meaning. But the necessity of meaning is not refuted. It is merely ignored.

It can be ignored because its language is ignored. We have seen the attempted proof of meaning's necessity. It failed. Meaning's necessity cannot be proved. Only particular meanings can be proved.
Proof is the final arbiter today. Yet at the same time meaning is necessary. This ambiguity can be shown in almost any word, e.g., use.

There is nothing for which meaning can be useful. Can it not, however, be useful for being useful? Yes. But the meaning of use is now shifting. In What is Called Thinking Heidegger sees fit to use a part of a poem by Hoelderlin:

It is useful for the rock to have shafts,
And for the earth, furrows.
It would be without welcome, without stay. 125

It is useful then that nature welcomes. With its shafts and its furrows it welcomes us. It is useful to us. But is it the same use we have toward, say, a pencil? Does the pencil welcome us? No, not usually. We merely use it; we use it up. Something else seems to be happening when 'it is useful for the earth to have furrows'. It is useful here that there is a welcome. It is useful that there is a communion between humans and the earth. Useful for what? It is useful for being useful. It is useful because it binds humans to the earth in their primal communion: work. It is useful because only it can give meaning. And meaning is useful because only it allows humans to work. Without this meaning, this work, humans would not exist. You and I, him and her would be something far different if we did other than mean in our work. Man has been born to use and he can only do it as he works; as meaning arises for him as he uses. Man is the only animal obliged to work says Kant. To be man is to work. To forget this is to misunderstand what it is to be man and to move away from being a man.
This move away, this forgetting is becoming increasingly possible. To forget that work is human existence is very easy in a world that wants labor; in a world in which the meaning of words that should demand vision and spirit, strength and joy can only trip over themselves and be ignored. Use means useful for making money, for enjoying oneself, rarely for being useful: useful in the sense that it allows us to work; work in the sense that it allows us to vision and be meaningful, meaning in the sense of the 'meaning of it all'. Today there is rarely the reverberation that a word can sound through all words. Thus 'use' is to use up; 'work' is to labor; 'meaning' is particular meaning and visions are of power, domination, of control.

But we can hear that more profound language at times, in poetry, maybe; in a gesture, maybe; in a painting, maybe. Thus, there is more than one way to listen to language, in other words it will not stay still. Thus it fails to give us the absolute proof we seek. The meanings of the terms fluctuate so much that we cannot absolutely prove that meaning is useless but necessary or the contrary. The final arbiter is not proof but action, and we as a civilization are engaged and carried by a certain action that determines meaning as useless and unnecessary. This action, however, is not carried out in the midst of nothing but in the midst of a whole which sustains it, which sustains this action as meaningful. This whole is the giver of meaning. As such the attempt to come to grips with the meaning of it all is to come to grips with the whole.
that "causes" the action, thus it is an attempt to come to grips with the action.

Quine, and essentially the rest of analytic philosophy wants to engage this action from the simple, neutral ground of logic; a sort of thinking machine which attempts to put all sense experience in place in order to decide what action should be taken by simplicity and practical concerns. Thus meaning is not necessary because there is no turn to the meaning of it all to discover what action should be taken. Pragmatic concerns and/or simplicity is the closest Quine can get to the meaning of it all. This concern, however, presupposes a distinct separation of man and object and a supposition of what they and simplicity and practical concerns are. This concern, thus, cannot take the whole and leaves far too much unsaid. And more immediately important it affects what decisions will be taken today and tomorrow and the effects (bad ones) that are already manifest in such things as labor and architecture and art.

Quine is liberal enough to allow different experiments with vastly different ontologies (posit)s in order to find better ways to handle sense experience. He is in fact so liberal as to deny the distinction between synthetic and analytic so that these ontologies can encompass anything.

Physical objects, small and large, are not the only posit)s. Forces are another example; and indeed we are told nowadays that the boundary between energy and matter is obsolete. Moreover, the abstract entities which are the substances of mathematics—ultimately classes and classes of classes and so on up—are another posit in the same spirit. Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and
Thus, it should not be too much of a problem to include meaning as a posit, except that it does not help order our sense experience. However, meaning does help us decide what to do once we have ordered our sense experience if we assume for simplicity sake that meaning and ordering of sense experience are separate. Thus, to stick with Quine's ordering of man and sense experience, or logic and sense experience it would be to man's advantage to retain the posit meaning, i.e., the meaning that is in the question, 'What is the meaning of it all?' It would be to man's advantage not because it can illuminate sense experience just as science can illuminate sense experience (it cannot do it in the same way and needs the aid of science), but because it calls one to the use of sense experience. Meaning is necessary in order to be aware of what action "follows" sense ordering. In other words meaning is necessary for what is beyond sense ordering, if we assume sense ordering is separate from the actions that use it. Quine is wrong in attempting to do away with meaning.
It is impossible to do without meaning. What Quine is saying is that the meaning of it all is that there is no meaning of it all. To hold such a perspective is to engage the action of history as one engages a merry-go-round. One rides, that is all. To say there is no meaning of it all is to be unable to come to grips with the action of this age. Yes, it may be possible. The silent, frigid soul of hum, clang, and boom suspended now on the mucus and slop of chaotic mortality may just rise and sweep away ugly, dirty, mortality; for we can live with stress and lack, ... indefinitely, eternally (?). Down where the ships go is already forgotten. There are some seas still but their color is not blue, their depths not deep and their waters do not mingle with the waters of all that is. But 'may' is the word, and the 'puffed clouds, torn tufts, tossed pillows' of the sea may skate across the blue and gather in the dash, at a flash, and crash gushing, rushing blue, that will expand the seas into seas and landlessness alone will we sail. And stand at the helm like fearless Bulkington, for whom "the land seemed scorching to his feet. *** Know ye, now Bulkington? Glimpses do ye seem to see of that mortally intolerable truth; that all deep earnest thinking is but the intrapid effort of the soul to keep the open independence of her sea; ..."127 Know yes, now mortal man that it is the sea of meaning which we must sail in order to come to grips
with the action of history.

But until the storm? Maybe it has come and we were not
worthy of it. No, not until the storm, let us prepare for it.
Let us toil; let us remember. Yes, we have been at sea.

In those dark, warm, brown days when the world would shake
itself like a great, lovable hound-dog and we knew it and had
faith in it—when joyful, frightening meaning would lash out at
us as megaton reality and we were happy and afraid but knew and
had faith. But we no longer follow that great brown beast but
the blue and yellow and red of neon and enamel, and we forget that
sky and waters and flowers are what are blue; and yellow is the sun,
is the daylight, and the turned leaf of the autumn maple; and red
is the blood of the moment, the stretch of the dying horizon—death.

And in our deepest heart we remember only to forget, in order to
test our strength against the feminine softness of sentimental
innocence. But what we don't remember, and what we don't know now
is the promise of those sienna days: the promise of the blue sky
lofting, vaulting infinitely until "...all is a cheat, except that
infinite sky." 128 A blue that puts all else in shadow but which
has become a dark, evening blue sending its shadow to an encounter
under; to strangness. 129 An encounter beyond the brown days—before
and after—, an encounter that was made then a promise; an encounter
with the deep, depthless, expanseless, holy blue.

What we don't remember is the promise of a yellow sun to beat
the rhythm of the world—contrapunctal booms, days and seasons long
throughout the eons of time—to lick my body with its, oh! so thin,
flashing, fingers like a bitch its pup, cleaning it free so that it can twist, turn and tumble itself to the beat of the world. It is the heat, the warmth, the fire that raises this ash, bone, flesh to the moment, in a surge--a yellow urge--to move. Out in the sun is the flowing iris, the flickering aspen and the twisting, turning, lat-bunched, pec-stretched, abdominal--squeezed yellow torso flowering to create, then defend, to the rhythm of the world. 

What we don't remember is the promise of red, . . . . And purple, orange, and green; lavender, gold ochre, turquoise.... all gathering in brown, the holder of all that is. We don't remember the promise that this inexhaustible myriad flashing and lashing throughout the infinite whole--chaotic container of all--is to give; that this silent inexhaustible dancing flame-tipped is what all is thrown against in test. Tall, blue shiny peaks making cragged the horizon, "which fades forever and forever when I move" to which my ends must pack forever (following brook and pine and ridge) to be ends. 

These peaks, this inexhaustible myriad, this chaos is a promise for innocence.

Such an innocence though is not of the past (of children), but of the future. The child needs pride and arrogance to project, to become. The child cannot listen to the whole lest its pride slip. The child cannot listen to the whole because there is still more to reach by aggression. It is only the mature who can be innocent. It is only the mature who can let something else speak. Maturity vanquishes the child not by destroying its dreams but by following them till they lead to the place of innocence: an earlier and later
place, a place where an old man of Li Po 'died drunk trying to catch a moon in the yellow river', where penniless, sixty-seven-year-old Gulley Jimson can say yea. It is a scary, frightful, yet possibly joyous place where everything is in question, out on the edge of all that is, where everything gathers itself in infinite eloquence.

Justification you ask for! There is no justification. Innocence is not for anything except itself. Proof you ask for! Where is your proof for proof I say. Reason you say! Meaning I say. Why you say! History I say. Man must be innocent. The question is how, not why.

Innocence hovers tenuously on the horizon before us, forming, yet dispersing its clouds. As we go towards or drift away we must prepare a ceremony to storm and sea and landlessness so that a vision will call and we will listen, a vision will fill and we will act, a vision will fail and we will renew our ceremony, preparing and hoping that we are worthy of another. The ceremony is not of waiting but engaging; it is not of ease, but of sweat; it is not of carelessness, but of reverence; it is not forgetting but remembering. It is something man can do.
NOTES


2. Ibid, p.66.


6. Herman Melville, Moby Dick, "(I have not been able to rediscover the phrase, but I'm sure it is there.)."


17. Ibid, p.193

18. Ibid, p.32.


24. (as use), Ibid, p.144.


36. A Farewell to Arms, ibid, p.79.
37. Death in the Afternoon, ibid, p.172.
49. Melville, op. cit., p.77.


57. Ibid, p.52.

58. Ibid, pp.52-53.

59. Ibid, p.54.


66. Ibid, p.89.


68. *Newsweek*, op.cit., p.79.

69. Ibid, p.82.

70. Ibid, p.82.

71. Ibid, p.82.

72. Ibid, p.82.

74. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
75. Ibid, p. 23.
76. Ibid, p. 38.
78. Ibid, p. 92.
79. Ibid, p. 205.
80. Karl Popper, Clouds and Clocks, (St. Louis, 1966) p. 16.
81. Ibid, p. 23.
84. Walden Two, pp. 159-161.
86. Louis Sullivan, Kindergarten Chats on Architecture Education and Democracy (Scarab University Press, 1934) p. 34.


95. Ibid., p.22.

96. Ibid., p.22.


100. Ibid., pp.33-34.

101. Ibid., p.42.

102. Ibid., p.42.

103. Ibid., pp.44,45.


106. In a talk given in April of 1973 at the University of Montana by John Coplans.


109. Ibid., p.104.


111. Ibid., p.32.
112. Ibid, p.32.
113. Ibid, p.32.
114. Ibid, p.33.
115. Ibid, p.32.
117. Ibid, pp.154-5.
118. Ibid, p.155.
119. William H. Bossart, "Heidegger's Theory of Art" (private copy, origin unknown, but used because Bossart is a practicing painter and sculptor and teaches philosophy at the University of California at Davis) p.63.
120. Ibid, p.64.
121. Ibid, p.64.

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