Democracies and diplomats: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Foreign Service 1933-1939

Richard S. Hargesheimer

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DEMOCRACIES AND DIPLOMATS: 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE 
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE, 1933-1939

By

Richard S. Hargesheimer

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Approved by:

[Signature]
Chairman, Board of Examiners

[Signature]
Dean, Graduate School

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ABSTRACT

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The American people long have viewed the professional diplomat through jaundiced lenses. To the average American, the diplomat is an elitist, an undemocratic striped-pants boy, and a useless social ornament when not otherwise engaged in nefarious negotiations and Machiavellian intrigues. In part, popular distaste for the diplomat stems from the nature of diplomacy itself and its age-old reputation as an unsavory business. In larger measure, however, the distaste of American democratic opinion for the diplomat derives from the nation's historical experience and its presumably democratic character. Imbued with an egalitarianism that favors the amateur over the expert, Americans predictably distrust the diplomatist whose task requires special qualities not often found in the ordinary citizen. Although few Americans pay much attention to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign Service or have looked upon a diplomat, the American national experience—the way Americans have looked at themselves and others—renders popular acceptance of the professional diplomat tenuous.

Among modern American political leaders, none has personified the distaste of democratic opinion for the diplomatist more than President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He regarded the career diplomats as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the American public. As President, he displayed an almost contemptuous disregard for the Foreign Service. In selecting chiefs-of-mission—ambassadors and ministers—to guide United States interests abroad, FDR easily yielded to spoils politics, abundantly displayed his penchant for haphazard and ad hoc administrative decision-making, and demonstrated a scant regard for the Foreign Service as an instrument of United States foreign policy.

Like the majority of his countrymen, FDR seldom considered whether a nation—even a rich and powerful one—could long ignore the dictates of constructing a sound diplomatic tradition without peril to its national interests. For most of its history, the United States has relied—in peace as well as in war—upon its commercial and technological prowess to secure its interests overseas. Whether a good professional diplomatic service is compatible with the temper of a democratic society is a question Americans have yet to resolve satisfactorily.
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Diplomacy is a profession that requires of its votaries a certain amount of culture and experience in society. It is natural therefore that the diplomatic service should be recruited from that section of society which possess these qualifications.

Jules Cambon

We look at the world of diplomacy... we find that there are many places where a rugged halfback from the University of Michigan... can do a better job than any Phi Beta Kappa who ever came out of the Ivy League.

Congressman Leo W. O'Brien

1 DEMOCRACIES AND DIPLOMATS:

EGALITARIANISM AND ELITISM

Writing in The Foreign Affairs Quarterly in 1955, the diplomat-scholar George F. Kennan reflected upon "the venerable and delicate question of the compatibility of a good professional diplomatic arm with the temper of a democratic society."

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Like others before him, Kennan diagnosed a tension that strains relations between diplomats and democracies. While the art of diplomacy "requires a combination of certain special qualities" that "are not always to be found...in the ordinary man," the "egalitarian illusions" of democratic peoples "tempts them to distrust the expert and to credit the amateur."  

Kennan wrote with particular vexation of the "chronic distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of the professional diplomat. "There is no criticism of" the diplomatist "older and more ubiquitous," he stated, "than the charge" that he is an elitist, removed from the society he represents, who leans to foreign ways and modes of thought, and, hence, is unsuitable as an agent for the conduct of United States foreign relations. Although career diplomats in most democratic countries suffer some popular domestic suspicion, the American diplomatist, Kennan asserted, bears "some burdens that are unique in intensity if not in nature."  

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6 "Future of Diplomacy," 573.

7 "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 149.
In few nations has the distaste of public opinion for the diplomatist been more pronounced than in the United States. Unlike many of their counterparts in foreign lands, American diplomats have rarely enjoyed the esteem of their countrymen. At best, Americans have displayed benign indifference toward their representatives abroad. At worst, Americans have scorned, vilified and ostracized them. When not damned, American diplomats have been largely invisible.

Popular distaste for the diplomatist stems, in part, from the nature of diplomacy itself. Defying precise

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American professional diplomats have been painfully, even bitterly, cognizant of the lack of public appreciation for their profession. And there may be no better testimony to the distaste of American popular opinion for the professional diplomat than the memoirs of the diplomats themselves. Even after accounting for a natural human tendency to resent being unappreciated, the memoirs of American diplomats over the past fifty years are remarkable for their attention to the public's lack of esteem of their profession. A cursory glance at the memoirs of foreign diplomats reveals no such similar anguish on their part and is, thus, suggestive of the uniqueness of the strain between diplomats and democratic opinion in the United States. For example, see Henry Serrano Villard, Affairs at State (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), 15.


Henry W. Wriston dismisses the argument--most notably advanced by George Kennan, Jules Cambon, and Harold Nicolson--that democracy is more hostile to professionals in diplomacy than other types of government. He attributes whatever difficulties exist to the character of diplomacy itself. A university president, Wriston chaired a committee under the Secretary of
definition and associated with Machiavellian intrigue and duplicity, diplomacy easily prompts visions of secrecy and wickedness. 11

Nor is the popular American image of the diplomatist, himself, without basis in reality. During the nineteenth century, when spoils politics held sway, presidents regularly filled the diplomatic and consular corps from the ranks of the underserving—unemployed politicians, political hacks, and the lazy sons of the rich and powerful. Even after 1924, when the United States combined the two corps into a meritocratic Foreign Service, men could be found in the Service who possessed few other qualifications than Ivy League educations and connections in high society.

The roots of the "chronic distaste" of American popular opinion for the diplomatist largely arise, however, from the State in 1954 whose purpose was to broaden the base of selection to the Foreign Service to more faithfully mirror American life. His lecture-turned-book is a rebuttal to Kennan's article of 1955 in The Foreign Affairs Quarterly. Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 7-9, 47.

11 Writing about 1945 on a proposed, but never completed, book on diplomacy, the American diplomat Hugh Gibson described the "general conception of diplomacy...[as] of an intermediate state between this world and another, administered jointly by Santa Claus and the devil and functioning by miracles and hocus-pocus. It is secret and slimy and no healthy-minded man wants anything to do with it. Foreign diplomats are sinister and astute; ours are idiotic." Perrin C. Galpin, ed., Hugh Gibson, 1883-1954: Extracts From His Letters and Anecdotes From His Friends (N.Y.: Belgian American Foundation, 1955), 27.
nation's historical experience and democratic culture. In the New World, historical circumstance and democratic ideology combined to belie the acceptance of professional diplomacy. Blessed with geographical security, deeply suspicious of foreign political entanglements, and instilled with a sense of its own special world mission, the young American republic had no desire or reason to cultivate a professional diplomatic elite. In advancing its democratic mission, the United States relied--for most of its history, in peace as well as in war--upon its commercial and technological prowess, propelled by a bountiful continent and an egalitarian ethic that encouraged private individual initiative. Whenever diplomatic problems arose, the United States called forth individual leaders, not diplomatic elites, to resolve them as circumstances dictated.

Americans early rejected the aristocratic, class values associated with European society and diplomacy. Convinced that all elites were inherently undemocratic, Americans emphasized instead equality, not of status or income, but of

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12 Published over 144 years ago, the best work on the American character remains Toqueville's *Democracy In America*. See also David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Arthur M. Schlesinger, "What then is the American, this new man?" in Schlesinger, *Paths To The Present* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 3-23.


14 Heald and Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy*, 4-5; Potter, *People of Plenty*, 91, 118.
opportunity. Ensuing expansion across a continent of enormous economic wealth blurred the real distinctions that separated Americans, strengthened the ideal of equality of opportunity, and gave rise to a passionate egalitarianism espoused by political leaders and citizens alike.

Upon the wellspring of American egalitarianism, the professional diplomat is marked as a natural target of popular opprobrium. The ideology of egalitarianism promises to each citizen the freedom and the opportunity to reach the highest plateaus in society. No one is considered naturally superior to anyone else. And what most Americans regard as most American—democratic self-government and equality of opportunity—they also regard as universal models for all men.

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15 Potter, People of Plenty, 91-92.

16 If American political leaders do not share the egalitarian fervor of the citizenry, they court it and pay homage to it. Today, the public opinion poll stands as the shrine to egalitarianism in the United States, where political leaders genuflect to the tabulated chants of individual citizens. See Herbert J. Storing, "American Statesmanship: Old and New," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 88-113. Storing offers some brilliant insights into the evolution of American egalitarianism and the subsequent decline in political statesmanship—from the leadership of the Founding Fathers based upon their profound concern over the problematic nature of democracy to the leadership of modern-day politicians based upon their search for an elusive consensus among the electorate.

17 Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4.
By contrast, the diplomatist is an example of what egalitarianism is not. According to its high priests, sound diplomacy requires a sophisticated command of the world that not anyone can acquire. And diplomacy acknowledges the existence of legitimate, conflicting and divergent interests among nations. To accept professional diplomacy is to call into question the ideology of American egalitarianism.

Bounded by historical experience, American egalitarianism renders popular reconciliation with professional diplomacy tenuous. Although few Americans habitually pay much attention to foreign affairs, and fewer still know of the Foreign Service or have looked upon a diplomat, the nature of the American experience—the way Americans have looked at themselves and others—makes public distaste for the diplomatist predictable, if not inevitable. Whether aware of the Foreign Service or not, most Americans hold a view of their democratic heritage that contrasts sharply with the portrait of the diplomatist periodically painted by popular spokesmen and elected officials.

18 Twentieth century egalitarianism, with its irresistible movement toward the broadest possible base of selection, has outpaced efforts to "dearistocratize" the Foreign Service.
I

Americans, more often than not, have cast profiles of diplomats in pejorative stereotypes. As unveiled by journalists, elected officials, and other conveyers of public attitudes, American diplomats have appeared as undemocratic and un-American elitists, as smartly-dressed striped-pants boys strutting around with affected European mannerisms, as cookie-pushers catering to ladies of high society, and as useless social ornaments when not otherwise engaged in nefarious negotiations and Machiavellian intrigues. Alongside their more sinister and astute foreign counterparts, American diplomats have been portrayed as lazy and inept.

The public's image of diplomats has reflected hues of suspicion and disparagement. Writing in 1931, the self-styled savant and columnist Robert S. Allen contended that people in the United States "who have heard of the State Department at all" know of it as "a social club whose members are selected from blue-stocking Bostonians, wield their forks with their left hands, and are no more representative of American life than the Redskins" who first inhabited the land. Allen characterized the "typical" Foreign Service officer serving abroad as "a young man with glasses who has spent all his life since graduation in the rarefied atmosphere of pink teas," soiling "his hands at no manual labor more arduous than

bridge." The Foreign Service, he inveighed, places "a premium on pink peppermints and protocol" and sympathizes only with the point of view "of entrenched wealth." 20

Others before and since have echoed similar shibboleths. Robert Bendiner, a Washington correspondent who began his career in the 1920s on the State Department "beat," wrote that the social backgrounds of American professional diplomats "tend in the main to reduce democracy to an abstraction." 21 Another journalist, Joseph Alsop, commented during the 1940s that "to most people the State Department means...a lot of Anglophiles in striped pants, who have good manners and have married rich wives." 22 From the perspective of the 1950s, court-historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., agreed. He contended that "Americans had reasonably regarded" the State Department "as a refuge for effete and conventional men who adored countesses, pushed cookies and wore handkerchiefs in their sleeves." 23

20 Ibid., 146, 162.


Public identification of the Foreign Service officer with the "ugly American" gained wide notoriety upon publication of the popular novel by that name in 1958. In The Ugly American, a pompous, blundering American ambassador destroys United States credibility in a hypothetical Southeast Asian country when he loses the support of the local masses to the more cunning and skillful Communist diplomats. That the American ambassador was a politically-appointed amateur envoy, rather than a trained professional diplomat, hardly mattered. The entire Foreign Service was besmirched.

Elected representatives of the American people long have looked askance upon diplomats. Addressing his congressional colleagues in 1859, a representative from Ohio stated that he knew "of no area of the public service that is more emphatically useless than the diplomatic service—none in the world." For American commercial purposes, he expounded, "our consuls discharge all the duties that are required. The diplomatic ministers discharge no duties of a commercial character." Speaking from the same platform several years later, a senator from New York was even more defamatory. "The Diplomatic Service," he exhorted, "is working our ruin

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24 William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1958). On the publicity and notoriety that the book lent to the Foreign Service, see Congressional Record, CV, 13898; Villard, Affairs at State, 6; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 139-141.

25 Representative Benjamin W. Stanton, January 19, 1859, Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 24-25. (The quotation is from the Congressional Globe, pt. 1, 35th Cong. 2d sess., 459.)
by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies. The disease is imported by our returning diplomats...They should...be quarantined," he concluded, "as we quarantine foreign rags through fear of cholera." 26

Congress, generally, has viewed the Foreign Service through jaundiced lenses. In describing executive reorganization of the diplomatic corps in 1937, a writer for The New York Times summarized the congressional portrait of American diplomats:

Their [the diplomats] difficulty has always been to get Congress to accept them as anything better than 'cookie-pushers.' The average member of Congress, when he gave the matter any thought at all, regarded the foreign service men as amiable youths from wealthy families, who liked to dally about the world with little to do, wearing white spats and going to teas. Sometimes...Congress thought these boys ought to pay the government to let them lead their idyllic lives. 27

Presidents, especially, have regarded diplomats with skepticism. "All Presidents I have known," recalled Dean Acheson, who served under or consulted with most presidents from 1933 to 1968, "have had uneasy doubts about the State Department...Foreign Service officers seem to them cynical,

26 Senator William E. Robinson, January 10, 1885, Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 27. (The quotation is from Congressional Record, XVI, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 613).

27 Harold B. Hinton, "Career Diplomats Boosted," July 18, 1937, sec. 4, 7. That the Foreign Service has never commanded a visible voting constituency accounts, in part, for congressional indifference toward diplomats. But it does not explain the negative image that many congressmen have of diplomats.
unimaginative, and negative."

Presidents as diverse as Harry Truman and Richard Nixon have cast aspersions upon the diplomatic establishment. To Truman, "protocol and striped-pants" were "a pain in the neck." While acknowledging that a lot "of extremely bright people," many "of common sense," worked in the State Department, Truman found objectionable those officers whom he perceived "have had very little association with actual people down to the ground." To President Nixon, diplomats were simply "those fags."

In an earlier era, President Theodore Roosevelt, too, expressed doubts about diplomats. He wrote a friend that "there are a large number" of men occupying United States missions abroad "who belong to what I call the pink-tea set,

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28 Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1969), 250.


who merely reside in the service instead of working in the service." Of course, he continued, "most...embassies and legations are pink-tea places. A few are not, and in these we need real men." 32

II

To some extent, diplomats in nearly every country have experienced the charges hurled at American diplomats. Abstract, often mysterious and foreign to the day-to-day concerns of the indigenous masses, diplomacy has yielded few platitudes to its practitioners. 33

Unlike medicine, law, or any number of trades, diplomacy defies precise definition. Diplomacy is variously defined as "the management of international relations by negotiation"; as "the method by which" relations among sovereign nations "are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys"; and as "the business or art of the diplomatist." Diplomacy "is not a system of moral philosophy" or the formulation of foreign policy, but "the application of intelligence and tact to the


conduct of official relations" between governments.\(^34\) As an arcane business, diplomacy is subject to confusion and misunderstanding on part of laymen, if and when they contemplate the subject at all.

The nature of diplomacy, itself, is unlikely to render its practitioner, the diplomatist, a figure of honor and affection among his countrymen. Serving abroad in foreign capitals, the diplomatist is separate in time and place from his native land and, thus, readily acquires the status of an outsider. Functioning as a principal source of understanding between his government and another, he seeks, ideally, to reconcile and to accommodate conflicting national interests, not to impose conformity to his nation's standards or to achieve victory in any ultimate sense.\(^35\) While representing his nation's interests, he is sometimes the initiator of distasteful compromises that appear to be the abandonment of domestic-political principles. As a messenger, he is "more likely to be remembered as the bearer of bad news than good," if he is remembered at all.\(^36\)

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\(^{34}\)The definitions are taken from Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 24, 42, 53-54, 87.

\(^{35}\)For instance, see Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 573-574; Cambon, *The Diplomatist*, 79, 84; Gibson, *Road to Foreign Policy*, 42-43; Arthur Andrew, *Defence By Other Means: Diplomacy for the Underdog* (Ontario: John Degell Ltd., 1970), 56-121.

\(^{36}\)Andrew, *Defence By Other Means*, 102.
The diplomatist also has suffered from diplomacy's age-old reputation as an unsavory business. Distrusted as a matter of course in ancient times, envoys became widely associated during the Renaissance with the traits of Machiavellian intrigue, duplicity, mendacity, and deceit. Diplomacy, then, was a more handmaiden for the beginning and ending of wars than an activity for the maintenance of peaceful relations among rulers. Diplomats often richly deserved the distrust and suspicion cast upon them. As a diplomatic theorist of that period concluded, "It is better to set fire to the house of one's neighbor than to wait until he sets it to yours." The European diplomat, nevertheless, acquired considerable social status and public recognition over time. Despite his Machiavellian public image, the diplomat remained essential for the management of relations among the European states. The sheer proximity of one nation-state to another required diplomacy for the orderly conduct of international


39 Cambon, The Diplomatist, 76-78; De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 11.
intercourse. In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, called to reshape the map of Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, European statesmen agreed upon and codified standards of diplomatic practice. With the Congress of Vienna, diplomacy became a recognized, professional branch of public service in each European country.40

To be a diplomat in Europe came to carry with it a mark of social distinction. In England, for instance, the diplomatic service soon ranked with the army, the navy, and the church as "a suitable calling for the sons of the aristocracy." A similar situation prevailed in France, where "the ambition of every family" was "to have at least one member in the public service and diplomacy was the special preserve of the wealthy and titled families."41

The social recognition accorded the European diplomat largely flowed from the class structure and class consciousness of European society. Under the Old Regime, individual sovereigns, ruling by the principle of divine right, and their agents conducted diplomacy. Even then—with reason of state being the rule and aggrandizement the object of statecraft—the "ideal" diplomat was supposed to be "a man of the world,

40 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 14.

a gentleman above all things, exquisite in his manners" who "understands all nuances of speech." Not just any charlatan was thought to be capable of conducting the affairs of state.

In theory, if not always in practice, Europeans considered diplomacy to be a proper calling for the extraordinary man. Diplomacy "is a profession"—its European theoreticians and practitioners have argued—"that requires of those who practice it a certain habitude du monde." The upper classes were assumed to be the reservoir of men who, by virtue of birth and social breeding, could afford to nurture and cultivate the cosmopolitanism necessary for the conduct of diplomacy. That the diplomatic service would be filled from the ranks of the aristocratic elite was generally accepted and recognized by all strata of society.

Such never became the case in America. The European view of diplomacy, whether as idealized in theory or bastardized in practice, failed to take root in the soil of the New World. Americans came to judge themselves and others from a different cultural perspective than that which characterized the Old World.

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42 Sorel, Europe Under the Old Regime, 11, 13.

43 Cambon, The Diplomatist, 69. See also Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.
The American people early viewed themselves and the outside world through bifocal lenses. At a distance, Americans saw a world steeped in corruption, imperfection, petty wars, and class conflict. From close in, Americans saw themselves entrusted with a universal moral mission never before tried by man. That mission was to be a model to the world of democratic self-government, of the equality of all citizens and of individual opportunity.

At the center of the American model and the American historical experience was an egalitarian ethic formed and strengthened by economic abundance. All men were declared equal in the eyes of the law. No man was assumed to be restrained by status to any one station or livelihood. Despite its patent implausibility, the American creed of equality asserted the existence of a classless society, where no one was better than anyone else and where merit was the only recognized ground of distinction.

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44 This section relies heavily on Heald and Kaplan, _Culture and Diplomacy_, and Potter, _People of Plenty._

45 Heald and Kaplan, _Culture and Diplomacy_, 4; Potter, _People of Plenty_, 128.

46 Potter, _People of Plenty_, 91-110.

47 It may be a useful caveat to note today, as John Stuart Mill did in penning an appraisal of Tocqueville's _Democracy In America_, I, xii, in 1835, that "in the American democracy, the aristocracy of skin, and the aristocracy of sex, retain their privileges."

48 Potter, _People of Plenty_, 97.
The ideal of equality received sustenance from the seemingly limitless abundance of a fertile land. Abundance offered the individual the opportunity to make his own place in society and to emancipate himself from a system of status, while the ideal of equality demanded that he try. As the promise of equality and the reality of abundance diminished the real social differences and economic disparities that separated the classes, Americans came to view the existence of any class distinction or class stratification as doubly unfair and discriminatory. Having repudiated a status system, Americans refused to recognize a society, even their own, where individuals held assigned places.

49 Ibid., 91-92.

50 Ibid., 97-99, 103-105, 118. Potter argues that the boundless American continent enabled Americans to fulfill the promise of mobility, by which he means universal opportunity to move through a socio-economic scale of many levels. The promise of mobility is the companion to equality of opportunity. Potter goes on to suggest that the quest for equality of opportunity has exacted a heavy psychological price for the physical comforts it bestows: "By presenting an unattainable ideal as if it were a reality, the mobility drive has created damaging psychological tensions; by eliminating class diversity without being able to abolish class distinctions, abundance has only made subjective discrimination more galling, while making objective differentials less evident....Whereas the principle of status affirms that a minor position may be worthy, the principle of mobility, as Americans have construed it, regards such a station both as the penalty for and the proof of personal failure....The fierceness of the mobility race generates tensions too severe for some people to bear, and fear of failure in this race generates a sense of insecurity which is highly injurious." Although Potter does not contend that a system of status is preferable to a system of mobility, he would agree that American democracy and the psychoanalyst were made for each other.
The egalitarian ethic gripped Americans early and exercised an immense influence on their attitudes. Imbued with a conviction that their nascent nation enjoyed a special destiny in world history, Americans consciously rejected the models and mores of the Old World. Americans identified diplomacy, as practiced by European nations, with the advancement of special class interests at the expense of the masses, with shifting alliances and the immoral balance of power politics, with unnecessary wars, and with restrictive commercial relations among nations. For the United States to fulfill its special destiny—as a model of human equality—Americans believed their nation must be divorced from any political connection with the Old World. To join other nations in the management of international relations based upon the traditional techniques of statecraft could only pollute the American democratic mission.

America's early geographical isolation from the Old World nurtured the nation's sense of ideological uniqueness. Bounded by weak neighbors to the north and south, and "nothing but fish to the east and west" the United States suffered few challenges to its national purposes during the nineteenth century. In addition, no great war engulfed Europe from 1815 to 1914, while an increasingly friendly Great Britain

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51 Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 4-5.
52 Ibid., 4-7.
53 Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 9.
guarded the world's seas. Largely unhampered by foreign threats to their national security, Americans freely pursued their "manifest destiny" of continental expansion across a land of seemingly boundless abundance.

Geographical security and a creed of ideological purity provided poor soil for the cultivation of a professional diplomatic tradition. Americans regarded foreign policy more as an intrusion upon the domestic life of the nation than an area requiring sustained attention. Following the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1914, the United States rarely ventured abroad in the nineteenth century cloaked in the vestments of traditional diplomacy. Isolated ideologically and geographically from the entangling intrigues of the Old World, the United States largely eschewed active involvement in international politics.

Diplomacy was a marginal occupation, at best, in nineteenth century America. Betraying a minimal interest in foreign political machinations, the United States neglected to construct an institutional capacity for the conduct of foreign policy. The appurtenances of the foreign affairs apparatus—the State Department and its offspring, the Diplomatic and Consular Services—functioned largely independently of one another and exhibited all the symptoms of atrophy. Always the neglected stepchild during the nineteenth century,

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54 Ibid.
55 Heald and Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy, 6.
the State Department, symbolically enough, occupied a former orphan asylum for several years following the American Civil War. 56

Commerce and moralistic zeal were the principal instruments through which the United States approached foreign relations. With government encouragement, commercial enterprises opened foreign ports to American products and exerted efforts to break barriers to free trade, while missionaries and other humanitarian groups journeyed abroad to proselytize the heathen. In the American mind, the interests of the United States, in particular, and of humanity, in general, were synonomous; business entrepreneurs and missionaries, not diplomats, were the appropriate agents for securing these interests. 57 God and the policy of the Open Door, not diplomacy, characterized United States involvement abroad.

IV

The creation of a professional Foreign Service in 1924 bespoke no abrupt departure in the American approach to world

56 Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16.

57 While disclaiming originality, Potter suggests that Americans were correct in supposing that they "had a revolutionary message to offer" the world but were mistaken in their concept of what that message was. It was not "democracy revolutionizing the world," but "abundance revolutionizing the world"--a message that was not preached or scarcely understood by Americans. "It was not our ideal of democracy but our export of goods and gadgets...which opened new vistas." People of Plenty, 134-135.
affairs.\textsuperscript{58} Unification of the diplomatic and consular corps into a single Service emanated more from a desire to protect and promote commercial interests abroad than from a conscious effort to construct an agency for the conduct of diplomacy. Concurrently, the adoption of merit principles for admission to the new Service aimed more at democratizing America's overseas representation than in producing a special group of trained diplomatic experts.

During the nineteenth century spoils politics had dictated the appointment of nearly all diplomatic and consular agents and had given the separate services a poor public image. Spoils politics was abhorrent to the egalitarian sensibilities of Americans who recoiled at anything resembling a process of selection based upon criteria other than merit and equality of opportunity.\textsuperscript{59} Spoils politics became even more abhorrent as Americans, principally businessmen and progressives, began to awaken, at the end of the nineteenth century, to the need for competent representation abroad to fulfill the dream of democratic-capitalism.

Particularly odious to American egalitarian sentiments were the diplomats. While men of lowly stature, however incompetent, could be found toiling in the consular offices

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The development of the Foreign Service is sketched more fully in Chapter 2, \textit{infra}.
\item Cambon, \textit{The Diplomatist}, 69-76; Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152; Potter, \textit{People of Plenty}, 91-92, 97-99, 101, 103, 105, 118.
\end{enumerate}
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abroad, only men of wealth could afford to accept a diplomatic appointment to a European capital. And these amateur diplomats quickly adopted, or so it appeared, the aristocratic airs of the Old World elite.

Spoils politics, especially as it applied to the Diplomatic Service, contradicted the ideal of equality of individual opportunity. In the public mind, the adoption of merit criteria for selection to the new Foreign Service in 1924 did not reflect a preference for the expert over the amateur. Instead, it mirrored a belief that all men—regardless of wealth, family ties, or political connections—should have the opportunity to compete equally for admission based upon merit considerations alone. Americans found the spoils system repugnant not because it granted access to amateurs, but because it failed to provide equal access to all amateurs.

To open a career in the Foreign Service to a cross-section of competent, pragmatic citizens would enhance the export of both American products and the liberal-democratic experience. The new career-oriented citizen-diplomat would represent the United States to the world, and he would ensure that commercial and cultural expansion continued apace. He would also be a beacon of peaceful prosperity, since he would share with the masses in other countries a profound aversion

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60 By virtue of their lowly status and function of providing direct, tangible assistance to Americans, the consuls, as compared to the diplomats, appeared to be more democratic.
to war. Only a few Americans, mostly among the diplomats themselves, believed that the creation of the Foreign Service would spur the development of a professional cadre of expert diplomatists accepted and appreciated by the public.

The early career diplomats who helped create and shape the Foreign Service shared many of the liberal-democratic beliefs of their countrymen. 61 They advertised their contributions to the expansion of American trade; they held a liberal-capitalist world view; and they espoused the belief that trade relations should be conducted apart from international as well as domestic politics. Far from being apologists for European power politics, they subscribed to the ideals of peace, prosperity, and harmony through free enterprise and the rule of law. 62 No less than their fellow Americans, they desired to avoid dangerous political entanglements in international disputes. Finally, they detested spoils politics; they wanted to rescue American diplomacy from the rich socialites and political amateurs who dominated the old Diplomatic Service. 63

The career diplomats diverged, however, from the sentiments of the general public in at least one important

61 De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 11-26.
62 Ibid., 12, 16, 17, 19.
63 Ibid., 12.
In the eyes of the diplomats, the Foreign Service should attract and recruit the "best" individuals in American society. The ideal diplomat should be representative, not of the mainstream, but of the "best" in the country. Writing in 1922, Hugh Gibson, one of the first American career diplomats, elaborated:

We have no aristocracy in the United States and don't want it. But we have a lot of homes with 'tradition.' Some of them are simple homes--no butlers or footmen--but where the boys 'go to college'--the bills are paid--Sunday observed, good books read, and where a standard obtains in respect to private life and public policies....These are the people we want.

The early careerists believed that diplomacy was a proper calling for the traditionally prominent. Many of the early career diplomats were, themselves, descendants of old-line, Anglo-Saxon families with genteel traditions. Imbued with noblesse oblige, they thought that the members of their

64 Many early career diplomats also did not share the view of their countrymen that American democracy should be held up as a model for the world to emulate. They regarded the American brand of democratic egalitarianism as comparable --in its arrogance--to the most virulent strain of elitism. Hugh Gibson wrote: "If it is our aim to get the world organized on the model of the United States, there is one course--and only one--that holds out hope. If, as a preliminary, we put our own house in order, develop a faultless and smoothly working government, find a solution to labor and unemployment problems, straighten out the tangled and tragic problems of Negroes and sharecroppers and Okies and slums--if we do all these things...other nations may come to us...to show them how they can do as much for themselves." Road to Foreign Policy, 160.

65 Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97. See also Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 97.
class had an obligation to serve their country by conducting its affairs abroad, and to do so with wisdom, honesty, and public spirit. "I can think of no task," Gibson stated, "which would appeal" to a young gentleman "more than to use his strength and wits to look after the interests of his country in such a direct fashion" as diplomacy.  

The career diplomats also believed that sound diplomacy required qualities that were more apt to be found in men of tradition than in a random assemblage of society. Borrowed from the precepts of diplomatic practice laid down by European diplomatists, these qualities or virtues included: "Truthfulness" in taking scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the false or the suppression of the true; "precision" in not merely intellectual accuracy, but in moral accuracy as well; "calmness" in the sense of even-temperedness and exceptional patience; "modesty" in the sense of avoiding the dangers of vanity; and "loyalty" to one's government in telling his sovereign what he ought to know, not simply what he would like to hear. That the ideal diplomatist should also possess "intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage, and even tact" was assumed.  

Taken together, these qualities distinguished the professional diplomatist from the amateur.

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66 Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 97.
67 These qualities are taken from Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55-67, who catalogues and elaborates upon the attributes of the ideal diplomat that have evolved over time. See also Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 25, 232, 262.
To the senior careerists in the Foreign Service not just anyone could master the qualities required of the professional diplomat. Nor could the experience necessary to their acquisition be obtained within the boundaries of the United States alone. "Diplomacy is primarily a matter of understanding and experience," one of the careerists noted. "It distinctly is not a matter of learning. You cannot teach diplomacy." While "you can teach many things it is useful for a diplomat to know," it "does not make a diplomatist." In addition to the "natural" qualifications the would-be diplomat should possess, diplomacy required of its practitioner a long apprenticeship in the world abroad.

Under the guidance of the senior diplomats, the Foreign Service, while opening its doors to a broader socio-economic cross-section of applicants than its spoils-ridden nineteenth-century predecessor, retained an exclusive character that separated it from the American mainstream. In addition to learning the practice of diplomacy through training and

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68 Within the Foreign Service, a debate ensued over whether the profession would be marked by "generalists," who stressed intuition and sound judgement, or by "experts," who relied more upon objective analysis. Whether expert or generalist, however, the careerists agreed that certain qualities did distinguish the professional from the amateur. De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 15; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 55; Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 152.

69 Hugh Gibson, March 2, 1938, extracts from a manual on diplomacy, Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 26.

70 Thayer, Diplomat, 248.
experience, younger officers were advised to follow correct diplomatic style, and to emulate the standards of established European practitioners. In order to deal effectively with their sophisticated foreign counterparts, they were expected to present a proper and courteous appearance, maintain a proper command of language, and observe the varieties of diplomatic etiquette. To the initiated, the statesmanlike demeanor of the ideal diplomat reflected the inward virtues of suspended judgement, skeptical tolerance, and passionless detachment necessary for the sound conduct of diplomacy. In short, the young diplomatist was expected to possess and cultivate a sense of the world that almost naturally separated him, in appearance at least, from the bulk of his countrymen who remained at home.

V

The American public never embraced the Foreign Service. For most of its history, the United States had scant need, little use, and no desire to employ traditional techniques of statecraft abroad. The United States "preferred to play its role as a culture, not as a power, in the world arena." 

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71 De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 20.
72 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 62; Villard, Affairs at State, 7.
73 Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 574.
74 Franklin Ninkovich, "Ideology, the Open Door, and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History, 6 (Spring 1982), 190. The quotation is from Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic History, 3 (Spring 1979), 120.
To most Americans, diplomacy remained, at best, "a disagreeable necessity." To the extent that career diplomats were to be regarded as more than useless social ornaments, they were expected to emulate their consular brethren in assisting American commercial enterprises abroad.

Filtered through the prism of the American democratic experience, the diplomatic officer reflected an image that was offensive to the egalitarian temper. Where the career officer saw virtue in the demeanor of the diplomatist, "the average American" saw "an immaculately dressed being..., a coldly severe and superior manner," a snobbish and conceited elitist. Where the diplomats saw in the Foreign Service a professional organization dedicated to the public interest, the public saw a refuge for the privileged. By his example,

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75 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, vii.

76 Nicolson notes that, while U.S. diplomats are expected to assist private American commercial interests, during the nineteenth century "a British diplomatist would have felt sullied were he to engage in pushing the material requirements of his nationals." Diplomacy, 89. Rhetoric to the contrary, many early American career diplomats felt similarly. See Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 103.

77 General Joseph W. Stilwell noted this popular characterization of the diplomat, which he did not share, in his diary on December 7, 1943, while attending the Cairo Conference. Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (N.Y.: W. Sloan Associates, 1948), 256.

78 Referring to diplomatic services in all Western democracies in the 1930s, Nicolson noted that, while statesmen must be able to call upon the services of a thoroughly experienced staff, the "staff must also be democratized and must cease to be generally, although to some extent inaccurately, regarded as the preserve of the upper bourgeoisie." Diplomacy, 53.
the career diplomat suggested that some individuals were more "naturally" suitable for some occupations, a notion that was reprehensible to the egalitarian passions of the American people. By popular egalitarian standards, the diplomatist was undemocratic and, hence, unrepresentative of American society.

Indictment of the diplomatist as undemocratic and unAmerican has found consistent expression in the Congress. In June 1957, for example, ten members of the United States House of Representatives—five Republicans and five Democrats—introduced a resolution urging the State Department to vigorously pursue the recruitment of candidates throughout the American heartland. According to its author, Representative Leo W. O'Brien of Albany, New York, the purpose of the resolution was "to provide a massive transfusion of Main Street into the arteries of the U.S. Foreign Service."

Several congressmen engaged in a colloquy on the House floor to elaborate on the reasons for the resolution. "We are now in an era of business-suit diplomacy," Representative

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80 U.S. Congress, House 85th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1957, Congressional Record, CIII, 5301.

81 O'Brien made this statement during a floor speech two years after introducing the resolution. July 21, 1959, Congressional Record, CV, 13897.
O'Brien began, but unfortunately our diplomats "are still operating" on the "theory that if you can dangle a teacup in the proper manner...you have an edge on the fellow who mishandles" it. Occasionally, he continued, "we get some excellent people. I have in mind...John Peurifoy....His first job had a civil-service rating of laborer." In the present Foreign Service, O'Brien went on, "we have too many people...speaking the language of a special class of society and not the language of a cross-section of the American people."82

Others echoed him. Representative Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma pleaded that "if we are going to reach the hearts and minds of other people throughout the world." we must recruit the most representative examples of the American people "as members of the diplomatic corps."83 Still other congressmen asserted that the resolution would drop "the silken curtain" that separates American youth from careers in the Foreign Service; would provide the "means for the Federal Government to do as good a job as business...in providing...good will ambassadors for the United States"; would accord our "youth an equal opportunity" to become diplomats; and would bring "about a new state of democracy"

82 Ibid., 13898 and 13900, wherein O'Brien states: "You know, they say in this country, and it is an old saying, that every mother can look in the cradle and see a future President....I think all of us will agree that if the same mother looks in the same cradle seeking a future ambassador, she would have to be using trifocals."

83 Ibid., 13901.
in the diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{84}

Congresses of past and present eras expressed similar concerns.\textsuperscript{85} Fearing that American agents would become contaminated and corrupted by European values, the Continental Congress ruled that diplomats should remain abroad no more than three consecutive years.\textsuperscript{86} Two hundred years later, in 1976, Congress enacted legislation creating the "Assignment America" program. Under the program, Foreign Service officers would receive year-long assignments "working with American state and local governments and schools in an effort to give" the diplomats "a better feel for the country they represent." One of the first states to receive a diplomat was Georgia, where officials in the governor's office believed that a career officer "would be helpful" in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84}Representatives O'Brien, John J. Rhodes of Arizona, and Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, respectively. \textit{Ibid.}, 13899, 13900, 13901.
\item \textsuperscript{86}Donald P. Warwick, \textit{A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personalities, and Organization in the State Department} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 13. Like similar provisions advanced in more recent times, the rule of the Continental Congress proved impossible to enforce because of personnel shortages, exigencies of war, and other reasons.
\end{itemize}
aiding "Georgia businessmen in preparing for missions abroad to attract foreign trade and investment."  

VI

The popular stereotype of the diplomatist has endured with great resilience. Today, critics inside and outside government characterize the typical career officer as dull, routinized and antiquated, possessing an air of superiority and self-importance, and engaging in undisclosed bureaucratic chores until the next round of evening parties begins.  

Contemporary criticisms of the diplomatic establishment reflect, in part, a modern malaise generally with the societal drift toward large, impersonal and seemingly unresponsive bureaucratic organizations. Although modern criticisms of the diplomatist center more upon institutional debilities than upon individual appearances and attributes, the tension that permeates, and occasionally disrupts, the compatibility of professional diplomacy with democracy in the United States

87 Independent Record [Helena, Montana], March 11, 1976, 24. The story is from an Associated Press report.

88 For example, see John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 211-212; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 115, who quotes Galbraith's testimony before a congressional committee in June 1972.

89 Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 16-21. Many career diplomats, themselves, bemoan the unwieldy size, apparent inertia and inflexibility of the modern foreign affairs machinery, as well as the fragmentation of responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations that has accompanied the proliferation of agencies dealing with foreign policy since World War II.
lays deeply embedded in the nation's culture.

Among modern United States political leaders, none embraced the popular image of the diplomatist more fully than President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By birth, background and temperment, Roosevelt was as aristocratic as any career diplomat. He regarded the career diplomats, nonetheless, as frivolous dilettantes, out of touch with the pulse of the American public. As President, he displayed almost contemp-tuous indifference toward the Foreign Service.

Endowed with an abundance of self-confidence—reflected in his ever-present, engaging smile—and conscious of his own superiority, FDR espoused the egalitarian ideals of his countrymen as only a man assured of his own place and status could. He taught the people that his rhetoric was their

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90FDR's background is well known. That neither presidents nor congressmen, themselves, have reflected, in the aggregate, anything approaching a cross-section of the American citizenry does not seem to have affected their views on egalitarianism and diplomats. Like the Foreign Service officers they sometimes ridicule, elected officials come to their positions from a narrow socio-economic base of the populace. See William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States (4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 123-127.

91In an excellent essay on FDR, Theodore A. Wilson and Richard D. McKinzie write: "The screens...Roosevelt erected around his motives have proved remarkably durable....Obviously, in common with his generation and class, he held convictions about the nature of American society..., however, these beliefs did not comprise a rigid, all-encompassing definition of the limits within which he functioned." "The Masks of Power: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Diplomacy," in Frank J. Merli and Wilson, eds., Makers of American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 462.
opinion and that their opinion was the foundation of his policies. Like his fellow Americans, he judged others by the egalitarian standards he viewed as the hallmark of the public will, and he found the seemingly uncoiled aloofness of the diplomats wanting.

Roosevelt also enjoyed a heightened sense of his own diplomatic abilities and a belief in American exceptionalism as embodied in her economic abundance. If he could only meet face-to-face with this or that foreign leader, he often stated, he could resolve whatever differences separated them. If he could place but one American book in the hands of every Russian, he reportedly asserted, "his choice would be a Sears, Roebuck catalogue." Bounded by the dictates of his own character and the assumptions of the American experience, FDR found little of value in professional diplomacy. Whether he would have to contend with a professional diplomatic corps, however, remained

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\[92\] Potter states that FDR did more to give men a sense of status than any President since Lincoln. He then quotes Justice William O. Douglas on FDR: "He was in a very special sense the people's President because he made them feel that with him in the White House they shared the Presidency." People of Plenty, 105.

\[93\] For example, see Richard S. Harrison, "A Presidential Démarche: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Personal Diplomacy and Great Britain, 1937-1938," Diplomatic History, 5 (Summer 1981), 249.

\[94\] Potter, People of Plenty, 80. Also see pp. 120-121, wherein Potter states that one of FDR's "most irritating and successful qualities was his habit of assuming that benefits could be granted without costs being felt--an assumption rooted in his faith in the potentialities of the American economy."
problematic well into the beginning of the twentieth century. Only very slowly and hesitantly did the United States even consider developing a professional diplomatic capability.
Nations must rely upon the quality of their diplomacy to act as a catalyst for the different factors that constitute their power. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that the good quality of the diplomatic service be constant. And constant quality is best assured by dependence upon tradition and institutions rather than upon the sporadic appearance of outstanding individuals.

Hans J. Morgenthau

The diplomatic service is not what it should be, principally for the reason that it does not attract to it the best young men of the country....there does not appear to be sufficient career to justify a man of ambition to enter it.

William Phillips

The United States Foreign Service evolved along a slow and meandering path. Befitting a nation ideologically and geographically isolated from the outside world, the United States }
States devoted little attention to its foreign affairs machinery during the nineteenth century. Infested with an assortment of political appointees and temporary adventurers, the foreign affairs apparatus lacked stability, tradition, and any semblance of institutional coherence. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the expansion of American world interests illuminated serious deficiencies in the patronage-ridden Diplomatic and Consular Services and kindled a movement to overhaul the structure of United States representation abroad. During the next three decades, reformers of various hues worked to construct a permanent, career foreign service immune from partisan political influence.

Public distrust and suspicion of diplomacy and diplomats lurked prominently in the shadows of the foreign service reform movement. The primary impetus of the reform

movement derived from concerns to promote American commercial opportunities abroad, not from concerns to improve the conduct of United States foreign policy. Economic wealth, not diplomacy, served as the catalyst for the application of American power. In the American mind, however hazy, diplomats were useless and irrelevant; the use of diplomacy forebode only ill results for the country.

Except for diplomats and State Department officials, few reformers believed that a modern, efficient diplomatic service was necessary or even particularly useful. The success of the reform movement in creating a foreign service capable of employing professional diplomatic methods occurred incidentally to the larger purpose of improving the climate for American businesses overseas. The success of the reform movement did not portend public and political acceptance of the traditional practice of diplomacy.

The reform movement, nevertheless, proved beneficial to the building of a professional diplomatic capability. In the years between 1924 and 1933, the Foreign Service began to develop into a stable, coherent and capable organization. If and when American statesmen chose to

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4 Werking, Master Architects, 239-240.
engage in diplomacy, some able career diplomatists were available to assist them.\(^5\)

I

The United States foreign affairs establishment of the late nineteenth century functioned in a state of serene disarray. Largely unaltered since the administration of George Washington, the foreign affairs apparatus consisted of three disjointed entities.\(^6\) The largest branch, the Consular Service, whose agents served in major foreign cities, especially seaports, performed primarily administrative tasks, issuing visas and passports and assisting Americans engaged in international commerce. Operating in a more amorphous realm, members of the Diplomatic Service resided in the capitals of foreign nations, reporting on foreign political developments and representing the United States in its dealings with the highest levels of foreign governments. The third branch, the State Department, theoretically directed the activities of the

\(^5\)Robert H. Ferrell states: "One has only to make a list of a few of the leading diplomatic representatives of the United States during the Depression to observe the general level of excellence." American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1970. Originally published in 1957), 281.

\(^6\)The Consular Service had undergone a few minor adjustments as the result of congressional action. See Werking, Master Architects, 1-7.
other two. In reality, each branch operated independently of the others.

The foreign affairs apparatus lacked any semblance of a stable, unified institution. Although most State Department employees enjoyed the protection of civil service regulations, patronage riddled the separate Consular and Diplomatic Services. Capricious shifts in American political winds regularly propelled new consular agents and diplomatic envoys into foreign posts. In his first year in office, President William McKinley, for example, replaced 238 of the 272 consuls appointed by his Democratic predecessor.

Appointments were made to particular posts, not to a service. Even when good men received appointments, as occasionally they did, no incentive existed for them to perform in a more than a routine fashion. None of the requisite scaffolding existed for erecting a capable,

7 Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 120.

8 Katharine Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years in the State Department (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 55-56; Werking, Master Architects, 9-10.

permanent organization for the conduct of foreign relations—no provisions for selection or promotion by merit, no uniform salary plan, no training program, no retirement program.

The foreign services suffered from benign neglect. Graft and corruption characterized the normal course of business in United States consular offices. Consuls profited, sometimes handsomely, from the unofficial fees they extracted for a variety of services, fees that often far exceeded their niggardly, official salaries. Not until 1896, more than a century after its inception, was the Consular Service's overseas operation subjected to an inspection by the Consular Bureau in Washington, D.C.¹⁰ Diplomatic envoys, who of necessity were men of private means and who occupied positions less accessible to petty graft than their consular brethren, also found little consolation in their work. With little in the way of "affairs of state" to distract them, they reveled in the elegant and regal atmosphere of nineteenth-century diplomatic society, and engaged in a myriad of leisurely pursuits.¹¹

¹⁰Werking, Master Architects, 3-5.
¹¹Ibid., 121; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 15, 76.
Americans had earlier relegated diplomatic business to a position of low priority. Although the world's great powers had begun to view the United States as another world power by the late 1880s, the United States had not yet begun to think of itself as one.\textsuperscript{12} As of 1893, the United States had no ambassadors, forty ministers of legation, and less than eighty State Department employees who managed foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{13} International relations, Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge reflected in 1889, occupy "but a slight place in American politics and excite only languid interest."\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{II}

The idea that the United States should develop a professional arm for the performance of consular and diplo-


\textsuperscript{13}Crane, \textit{Mr. Carr}, 21; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 121.

\textsuperscript{14}Ilchman, \textit{Professional Diplomacy}, 23. See also May, \textit{Imperial Democracy}, 11.
matic functions germinated under the pressure of expanding American world interests near the close of the nineteenth century. Seldom isolationist in the realm of international commerce, American overseas trade and investments burgeoned in the 1880s and 1890s. By 1899 the United States held sway as the world's leading industrial nation, exporting more than it imported, while American corporations increased their capital investments overseas at a phenomenal rate. Combined with the Spanish-American War, the acquisition of colonial possessions, and a generally reascent American assertiveness, this expansionist fervor brought into sharp relief the inadequacies of United States representation abroad.

The presence of a large number of unfit, rum-soaked, tobacco-chewing consuls--uncovered during the inspection of 1896--threatened to inhibit the expansion of American commercial interests overseas. Similarly, the "constant

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16 Werking, Master Architects, 3-4, 14.
succession of temporary amateurs," who paraded as diplomatic secretaries and ministers, placed the United States at a disadvantage when dealing with the professional diplomats of foreign nations. At a time when the United States was emerging as a world economic power, the pathetic state of United States representation abroad only seemed to diminish American prestige.

The need for reform of the foreign services soon became widely recognized. Businessmen, progressives, civic reformers, and government officials—including consuls and diplomats—criticized "the system," especially the practice of rewarding "broken down politicians," "failures in American life," and sons of wealthy political patriarchs with consulates and diplomatic missions. The systematic use of patronage, the reformers reasoned, posed the greatest obstacle to the recruitment and retention of competent officers. "The system" discouraged good men from even entertaining the idea of foreign service. The solution, the reformers postulated, lay in the creation of a career

service in which recruitment, tenure, and promotion would rest upon merit, not politics.\textsuperscript{19}

Reform of the Consular Service commanded the greatest attention. Unlike the diplomatic corps, the Consular Service enjoyed a natural and powerful constituency—the American business community. Much of the pressure to remodel United States representation abroad stemmed from business concern for trade expansion. Businesses required timely and accurate information on commercial opportunities to protect and promote their overseas interests. Because of the tangible services the Consular Service rendered, businessmen and reformers, alike, recognized the concrete benefits that would accrue from a revitalized consular corps.\textsuperscript{20}

Consular Service reform also conformed well with the main currents in American society. The rapid industrialization of the American economy at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries fostered a fundamental restructuring of society along bureaucratic lines. "Organization," "businesslike efficiency," "speciali-


zation," and "scientific management," the man-like-machine concept of the industrial workplace, were the shibboleths of the day. The Consular Service—with its emphasis on the performance of routine administrative tasks and clearly delineated functions—was a natural target for reform along the bureaucratic pattern of organization.\(^\text{21}\)

Reform of the Consular Service also enjoyed popular support. The layman, nurtured on the ethics of the dominant business culture, easily comprehended the work of the Consular Service. Consuls engaged in visibly productive tasks. Consuls, much more than diplomats, dealt with Americans residing and traveling abroad, assisting them with visas and various other conveniences. Although many people questioned the fitness of consular agents, few could question their usefulness.\(^\text{22}\)

Reform of the Diplomatic Service engendered much less enthusiasm. Consistent with the ideological and geographical isolation of the United States, most Americans understood little about the responsibilities of diplomats and cared even less. To most Americans, diplomacy was an abstract and

\(^{21}\text{Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 122-123; Israel, "Diplomatic Machine," 185-187.}\)

\(^{22}\text{Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 5; Werking, Master Architects, 121-125; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 128-131.}\)
mysterious business that yielded few, if any, tangible results. The functions of diplomats mystified even intelligent, well-read citizens. The art of negotiation—the primary and distinguishing feature of diplomacy—seemingly had not been needed to insure United States security and well-being. Technological genius and military prowess, not skill at the negotiating table, appeared to have been more than adequate to secure the interests of the nation.

Diplomatic reform also faced a deeply entrenched public antipathy towards diplomacy and diplomats. Americans not only found the nature of diplomacy difficult to comprehend; many "associated diplomacy with monarchy, aristocracy, intrigue, duplicity, and war." That most American diplomats, like their European counterparts, were born into society's upper classes and appeared to regale in the "fantastical grandeur of diplomatic society," only reinforced popular distaste and suspicion toward diplomacy. The elitist class origins of American diplomats clashed with the

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24 Werking, Master Architects, 14.


26 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-26.
democratic equalitarian ethic; the serene elegance of their working environment clashed with the American work ethic. By comparison, consuls came from predominantly middle-class backgrounds and worked under conditions of uninspired drudgery. Consequently, consuls suffered little of the public opprobrium encountered by diplomats. When Americans thought about diplomats at all, they usually thought about the parasites of society; they questioned their fitness and their usefulness.

Reform of the Diplomatic Service appeared to offer no positive benefit. American diplomats performed no visibly productive tasks; they engaged primarily in the monitoring of political relations among nations. The American public and their elected representatives revealed little enthusiasm for exercising power through the vehicle of diplomacy. Debate over the efficacy of United States foreign policy was confined largely to diplomats and academics. Commerce, not diplomacy, typified American involvement abroad. Better to leave the Diplomatic Service alone than to beget an organization that might involve the United States in foreign machinations.

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27 Werking, Master Architects, 14, 121.

28 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 22-23.
Reform of the Diplomatic Service, nevertheless, had its advocates. Among the most prominent were the diplomats themselves, particularly the young men who entered the Diplomatic Service in the early 1900s. They included such future career diplomats as Hugh Gibson, Joseph C. Grew, and William Phillips. Like many of their colleagues, these men joined the diplomatic corps for reasons that held only a peripheral relationship to diplomacy—to travel, to acquire educations, to avoid careers in more mundane occupations. Unlike many of their colleagues, particularly the chiefs-of-mission under whom they served, they were not strictly political patronage appointees. They served initially as diplomatic secretaries and clerks, and many received no compensation from the government. They came from well-to-do, old-stock, Anglo-Saxon American families. Born to privilege, they possessed a sense of noblesse oblige, a belief that they were the guardians of American traditions in public life. Unlike many political appointees who entered the Diplomatic Service during that era, these men "vowed to improve the prestige and effectiveness of their Service."  

29Smith, Professional Diplomacy, 14, 76; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 2-4, 15-16, 20; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-25. In their memoirs, many diplomats admit, as Hugh Wilson did, that "ease and a measure of education had encouraged us to believe that life should have a wider scope than business alone could offer." Education of a Diplomat (N.Y.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), 4.  

30Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 4.
In search of support the diplomatic reformers adopted the arguments of the proponents of consular reform. Confronted with a poor public image, the diplomats contended that they, no less than consuls, did and could assist American business interests abroad. Only occasionally did the diplomats attempt to explain publicly the subtleties of diplomatic practice, of the need for a "certain type of expert" capable of engaging in the complicated business of international relations.  

Perhaps they could not or dared not. The United States lacked a tradition favorable to public acceptance of the tenets of professional diplomacy. Moreover, diplomacy belied precise definition; unlike law or medicine, diplomatic practice required no specialized or technically sophisticated intellectual training. And many of the career diplomats who entered the diplomatic corps in the early 1900s believed that the public was too unsophisticated to appreciate the une certaine habitude du monde of the diplomatist. 

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31 Ibid., 5, 125, 133-134, 140.
33 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6-11; Werking, Master Architects, 122.
The diplomats proposed, instead, to "hitchhike" on the consular reform movement. They focused their arguments for diplomatic reform on the need to place "the entire diplomatic system on a business basis," on the assistance that diplomats did and could provide to trade expansion.

The diplomats found allies in the Consular Service and in the State Department. The diplomats wanted the career status and benefits they saw the reformers advocating for the consuls. Elite, wealthy, and privileged men, the diplomats lacked only legislative protection to insure that "their" kind remained responsible for American foreign policy. The consuls, on the other hand, "coveted the easy social grace of the diplomats" and the status accorded them in foreign lands.

Consuls and diplomats each wanted something the other possessed. Both wanted secure job tenure and public recognition as professionals. State Department officials, in turn, wanted to achieve some administrative coordination and control over the disjointed and isolated foreign

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34 Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 141.


36 Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 131. See also Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 27; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 5.
services. All of them sought the creation of a permanent career service as a means to attain their goals. All of them courted business interests and progressive reform-minded groups for support.  

III

Early attempts to reform the foreign services achieved only mixed success. Reformers directed their efforts toward the enactment of legislation that would accomplish for the foreign services what the Pendleton Act of 1883 accomplished for the Federal Civil Service. In 1906 the Consular Service underwent a substantial reorganization as the result of the passage of the Lodge Act by Congress. The Lodge Act provided the cornerstones for a modern consular corps, but left untouched the patronage system of appointment. In the ensuing years, the work of Wilbur J. Carr, the chief of the Consular Bureau and "the architect of the modern Foreign Service," in conjunction with the support of the executive and legislative branches and the business community, established firm precedent for admini-  

37Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 132.

38The Pendleton Act introduced merit principles into federal employment, in part, in reaction to the scandals of the Grant administration.

39Crane, Mr. Carr, 77-86; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 56-64; Werking, Master Architects, 89-103.
steraing the Consular Service on the basis of merit principles. 40

Efforts to reform the Diplomatic Service lagged behind. A series of executive orders promulgated in 1905 by Theodore Roosevelt and in 1909 by William Howard Taft established the principle of qualification for diplomatic service based upon examination and granted civil service status to diplomats below the rank of minister. 41 The appointment of ambassadors and ministers—the most valued positions in the Diplomatic Service—were exempt, left to the vagaries of politics. These executive orders, moreover, served primarily as expressions of worthy intention: They neither bound succeeding administrations nor forecast the end of political considerations for appointment. 42

Career-oriented diplomats possessed no assurance that merit and experience would be rewarded. When Woodrow Wilson became President in 1912, he dismissed 37 of the 41 veteran chiefs-of-mission who had served under Taft. Of the first 51 individuals appointed by Wilson to head diplo-

40 Werking, Master Architects, 89-120, 219-238.

41 These executive orders affected the Consular Service similarly. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 89, 116-118.

42 Ibid., 118-119; Werking, Master Architects, 59.
matic missions, only four possessed any prior diplomatic experience. At the onset of World War I, the entire course of foreign service reform, particularly diplomatic reform, hinged precariously upon presidential design.

Reform of the foreign affairs machinery commanded wide support after World War I. Prior to the war, from 1906 to 1915, the United States—then recovered from the convulsions resulting from the Depression of 1893 and experiencing a deacceleration in trade expansion—retreated to domestic concerns. During the war, the demands and responsibilities placed upon the foreign services increased dramatically. With the war's end, these activities showed no signs of diminishing.

The United States emerged from the war as the world's predominant economic power. The war saw the role of the United States in the world economy shift from that of a

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debtor to that of a creditor nation. Whether the United States wanted to exercise political power commensurate with its economic status—and it was not so inclined—it had acquired a preponderant influence in world affairs. Under these circumstances, Americans demonstrated a heightened interest in foreign service reform.

Proponents of reform now lobbied vigorously for a sweeping reorganization of the foreign services. The campaign for amalgamation of the separate services, for increased salaries, for tenure, and, in short, for all of the features of a career system gained wide currency. At no point in American history was the time more propitious for a revamping of the foreign affairs apparatus.

Diplomats and consuls capitalized upon nearly every opportunity to encourage reform sentiment. They had much to gain. They were, in a sense, their own best constituency. In the years following World War I, they courted interest-group support, enlisted chief spokesmen—principally Wilbur Carr, Hugh Gibson, and Secretary of State Charles Evans

45 For the first time, American nationals had more capital invested in foreign lands and received more income from those investments than foreigners had investments in, and income from, the United States. Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 203.

46 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 31; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 4.
Hughes—to plead their case before congressional committees, and, in the classical fashion of bureaucratic operatives, they ingratiated themselves with powerful legislators. In 1919 one congressman, John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts, began to introduce bills annually to improve the foreign service, bills drafted largely by Carr and his consular associates. The pressures for reform had become almost irresistible.

In 1924 Congress responded to the demands for reform by passing the Rogers Act. Named for its chief sponsor, John Jacob Rogers, who is often called "the father of the modern American Foreign Service," the Rogers Act was the "most notable legislation ever to affect the organization of American foreign relations." The Rogers Act combined the Consular and Diplomatic Services into a single, unified Foreign Service, established competitive entrance examinations, provided for appointment and promotion on the basis of merit, and legislated numerous other provisions designed

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47 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 65, 69, 81, 115; Werking, Master Architects, 234; Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy, 31-33.


49 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Others share Etzold's view of the Rogers Act. See Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 184; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 205.
to create an attractive career in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{50} The concept of career diplomacy, spawned in the last years of the nineteenth century, had become a reality. The foundation for constructing an institutionalized capacity for the conduct of foreign relations had been laid.

IV

The success of the foreign service reform movement, however, signaled no abrupt departure in the American attitude toward diplomacy. Legislative approbation of professional status for diplomats and consuls, under the rubric "Foreign Service officer," was not synonymous with public acceptance of traditional diplomacy as represented by the Old Diplomatic Service. On the contrary, there remained among the public and Congress a deep suspicion of diplomacy and diplomats.

At the same time that World War I sparked a revival in foreign service reform, the war and its aftermath resurrected old prejudices against traditional diplomacy. Many democratic peoples blamed the European diplomat—the archetype of the professional diplomatist, the prototype American diplomats liked to pattern themselves after—for his failure to prevent the outbreak of the World War. The

\textsuperscript{50} Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 157-177; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 188-210; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 157-158; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35.
existence of secret treaties negotiated prior to and during the war, Woodrow Wilson's idealism and call for "open covenants of peace openly arrived at," and the machinations that enveloped the Versailles Conference—all prominently displayed in the press—reinforced and exacerbated popular aversion to traditional diplomacy. More than ever before, ordinary citizens, convinced that they shared with the masses in all countries a detestation of war, believed that the harbingers of war—the professional diplomats, who "represented" an elite minority and who "controlled" foreign policy—must be brought under democratic control.51

The World War marked the democratic politicization of diplomacy, a "transition from the old diplomacy to the new."52 The "old" methods of diplomacy, characterized by confidential negotiations among professional diplomats who stood above domestic political battles and partisan ideologies, became anathema in democratic countries. Elected


52 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 99, 113.
chiefs-of-state began to conduct negotiations themselves. Encouraged by their citizen constituencies, political leaders employed euphemisms such as "democratic diplomacy" and "diplomacy in the public view" to describe the transition from the "dark ages" of diplomacy to the new, sunshine diplomacy.

That the professional diplomatist had functioned largely as an instrument and not as a creator of policy mattered little. Nor did it matter that Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau had negotiated an "open covenant," the Treaty of Versailles, in strict secrecy. Diplomats everywhere had incurred the public's wrath. Elected leaders and citizens now believed "that it was possible" and necessary "to apply to the conduct of external affairs, the ideas and practices which, in the conduct of internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the essentials of liberal democracy." The democratization of diplomacy found expression in the post-World War American foreign service reform movement.

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53 Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 227.
54 Ibid., 226-227; Craig, "Diplomats and Problems," 313-315; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 43.
55 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 113. See also Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 226.
With the World War, broad masses of the American people became more attentive to foreign affairs. They saw that the Diplomatic Service had been the almost exclusive "preserve of the young and older rich with their interlocking connections of birth, education, and friendship." Merit and competence appeared to count for little alongside proper breeding, wealth, and social manners. Increasingly, reformers demanded that the recruitment base of the Diplomatic Service be broadened, that the barriers to entry be eliminated, that the Service be "democratized." The considerations that "actuated" the reformers, according to one observer, was "the danger inherent in recruiting a service from a social elite," the danger "that the demands of the majority on foreign policy might be ignored." The solution proposed by the reformers was to provide sufficient salaries to permit the "people's representatives" to enter the Service.

The Rogers Act addressed directly the issue of "democra-

56 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 32. See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 10; Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 72.
57 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 141.
58 Ibid. The pre-war executive orders eliminated neither political patronage in appointments nor elitism in the ranks of the corps. Barnes and Morgan state: "With the small salaries creating what was, in effect, a property qualification for the Diplomatic Service, the merit system was far from being effectively applied." Foreign Service, 210-212.
tization." In providing for decent, though not generous, salary increases for Foreign Service officers, and in mandating that entry into the Service be at the lowest level and that appointment and promotion be based upon merit, the act attempted to remove many formal barriers to recruitment. In amalgamating the Diplomatic and Consular Services, the act looked ahead to the day when diplomats and consuls would be interchangeable, when diplomats would embrace the egalitarian and democratic vestments of the consular agents.

American diplomats approached the enactment and implementation of the Rogers Act with caution and ambiguity. Hoping to acquire some of the public esteem enjoyed by consuls, the diplomats had worked hard to convince the public of their usefulness and to dispel the notion that diplomats were unnecessary ornaments. Time and again the

59 Prior to the Rogers Act, diplomatic salaries—excluding chiefs-of-missions—ranged from a low of $1,500 to a high of $4,000, while the highest-paid consuls received $8,000. After the Rogers Act, the salaries for Foreign Service officers—all consuls and diplomats—were the same, ranging from $3,000 to $9,000, depending upon class and grade in the Service. Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 67, 73, 76.

60 The act had been drafted by Carr and the consuls who were better organized administratively and who had more friends in Congress than the diplomats. See Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 24-25; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9; Werking, Master Architects, 161-162, 170.
diplomats had invoked the argument that "not only did a diplomat try to secure equal treatment for his nation's commerce, but among the principal reasons for political overtures and policies was the desire to maintain conditions suitable for commercial intercourse." The diplomats, however, also wanted to maintain the privileged status of their elite fraternity.

A strong sense of elitist esprit de corps had developed within the diplomatic corps since the end of the nineteenth century. From the outset of their careers, the younger diplomats shared upper-class origins and "best family" traditions. Most possessed independent wealth—a prerequisite to entrance into the Diplomatic Service since the government offered little or no compensation.

Faced with an indifferent, if not hostile, public, the diplomats found solace and comfort among their own kind. They would have in any case. The world, as one of them remarked, was their home town: They could not travel abroad without meeting someone they knew and were glad to see. With no formal process available for appointment and promotion, an informal old-boy network evolved among

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61 Werking, Master Architects, 223-224.
the diplomats based upon family, education, and social connections.  

Increasingly, too, the diplomats had become jealous of their privileges and protective of their status, which many of them equated with the best possible management of United States foreign relations. The Diplomatic Service was "like a club," one member confided to his diary in 1919. "The outsider was regarded with a faint air of suspicion, but a member, even a junior, was treated with absolute trust."  

Many diplomats, moreover, regarded consuls as unfit material for admission to the club. Although sincere in their commercial fervor, the diplomats never believed that the "lowly" consuls, who "traded" in the menial tasks of the business world, were capable of performing political


64 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 27.

work in a unified Foreign Service. The diplomats had supported amalgamation of the two services for reasons of self-interest: The consuls enjoyed much better relations with Congress than the diplomats did, and the consuls wanted amalgamation as part of the legislative package to reform the foreign services. While the diplomats cooperated in securing passage of the Rogers Act, many of them reserved for the consuls the same kind of scorn that members of the upper class reserve for the working class.

The diplomats, thus, viewed the Rogers Act with mixed sentiments. The act accorded them the professional status and career stability they had labored so assiduously to achieve. But the act did not bring with it public and political support for the sound, traditional practice of diplomacy. Nor did the act mollify public suspicion of diplomacy or raise the level of public esteem of diplomats. Finally, amalgamation--desired by consuls who resented the pretensions of the diplomats, while coveting their social graces and diplomatic positions--threatened to disrupt, if not destroy, the diplomats' elite fraternity.

66 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 9, 115; Werking, Master Architects, 223-224.
67 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 33.
The amalgamation of the Consular and Diplomatic Services proved to be the most difficult issue encountered by the nascent Foreign Service. Amalgamation meant that consular and diplomatic positions would be interchangeable, that consuls and diplomats would share equally the work of the consular and diplomatic branches. With the passage of the Rogers Act, Wilbur Carr and the consuls believed that interchangeability would be the rule. The career diplomats intended it to be the exception.

The diplomats proved the better bureaucratic politicians until at least 1927. Many of the career diplomats "grandfathered" into the Foreign Service from the old diplomatic corps were socialites: A considerable number were expert diplomatists as well. Although they lacked experience in personnel administration, they were seasoned in the realm of international politics and negotiations. They

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68 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 115; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 165, 188.

69 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 149-152, 165; Crane, Mr. Carr, 259-260; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 75.

70 Thayer, Diplomat, 272; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 26; Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 281.
translated their considerable skills into the theater of internal bureaucratic politics. The diplomats—lead by Joseph C. Grew, Hugh Gibson, Hugh Wilson, and William Phillips—gained control of the Foreign Service Personnel Board at its inception in 1924, and made it an instrument that served the interests of the diplomatic elite. For four years, the diplomats enclosed in the old-boy network, received a vastly disproportionate share of the choice posts and promotions. 71

The bureaucratic omniscience of the diplomats did not last, however. In 1927, with evidence in hand, the consuls enlisted the aid of their friends in Congress to rectify the situation. A minor scandal erupted. Although the diplomats were absolved of most of the charges leveled against them, they were also stripped of their authority on the Personnel Board. 72

Four years later, in 1931, Congress enacted the Moses-Linthicuim Act. The result, in part, of lobbying by the consuls for fairer treatment, the act improved several aspects of Foreign Service operations, building upon the structure of the Rogers Act. The act also limited the

71 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 77-78, 115-123; Crane, Mr. Carr, 281-282.
72 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 122; Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 123; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 173-196.
power of the diplomats to employ favoritism. The act prohibited the promotion to chief-of-mission of Foreign Service officers on the Personnel Board for three years following the end of their service on the board. Other provisions insured that new recruits would be members of a fused Foreign Service. By 1933 over 40 percent of the officers held dual commissions.

VI

The labor pains suffered by the embryonic Foreign Service over amalgamation faded in comparison to the improvements wrought by the Rogers Act. Elevated to the status of a career and profession, the Foreign Service began to attract a steady supply of competent applicants. In 1925, 172 candidates gathered to complete the first entrance examination administered under the Rogers Act. Two years earlier, only 36 applicants took the exam, 11 of whom passed, necessitating that the State Department accept and appoint to diplomatic vacancies nearly anyone who met

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73 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 136; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 215-216; 235-236.

74 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 123.

the minimum qualifications. 76

Business opportunities during the roaring 1920s kept some qualified individuals from applying. However, fully 282 persons received Foreign Service commissions from 1925 to 1931. Among those embarking upon diplomatic careers during this period were such able diplomatists as George F. Kennan, Charles "Chip" Bohlen, John Patton Davies, Jr., David K.E. Bruce, Loy Henderson, Henry S. Villard, and Robert D. Murphy. 77

The Service also attracted candidates from broader social and economic backgrounds. Because of the Rogers Act's provisions for salary raises, pension pay, and representation allowances, the Service was no longer closed to all of those without substantial private means. 78

Whereas, in 1923 32 percent of the members of the Diplo-

76 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 35. Forty-one persons in 1921 and 37 in 1922 took the entrance exam to the Diplomatic Service. See also Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 173; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 152, 186, 202-203; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 213, 225; Villard, Affairs at State, 57-58.

77 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 194 ftn. 3.

78 Nevertheless, some degree of private wealth was still very helpful, and no Foreign Service officer could afford to take an embassy in Western Europe on his salary alone. Hugh Gibson wrote in his diary in 1929: "Diplomacy is the one thing that interests me...But failing an assured financial future I can't see what there is to justify a decision to stay on indefinitely in diplomacy. What a pest that money has such importance!" Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 42-43.
matic Service had attended Harvard, in 1936 less than 6 percent of all recruits came from Harvard. Over 50 percent had matriculated at public universities.79

The Service, thus, took great strides in becoming "democratized." Two exceptions were blacks and women, few of whom applied and few of whom received appointments. Reflecting the prejudices of the larger American society, the Foreign Service remained an "aristocracy of skin" and an "aristocracy of sex."81

The Service succeeded, too, in dismissing a number of incompetents. The Rogers Act provided for the weeding out of inferior men. Soon after the passage of the act, the Personnel Board began to comply with this provision. As Joseph C. Grew, a member of the board, wrote to William Phillips in the summer of 1924:

A good many dead boughs have been separated from the Service through age, retirement and the abolition of the unassigned list, while other men have been given to understand that their cases will be further dealt with

in the near future. 82

By 1934, eighty-nine officers—or 15 percent of those who were in the Service in 1924—had been retired for age, disability, or incompetence. 83

More significantly, with the Rogers Act the era had passed when a change in presidential administration forecast the wholesale replacement of foreign service personnel. Merit principles, experience, and bureaucratic politics—not party politics—ruled the placement of officers below the rank of minister. The appointment of chiefs-of-mission—ministers and ambassadors—remained the prerogative of the President and, thus, a prisoner of the spoils system. However, in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge, via an executive order, instructed the Foreign Service Personnel Board to include among its responsibilities the task of recommending for promotion to chief-of-mission those Foreign Service officers who had demonstrated special ability. 84 All administrations since have followed a similar practice, although the practical results have varied from administra-


The appointment of chiefs-of-mission from the ranks of the Foreign Service soared under the Republican administrations of the 1920s. From a low of 8 percent under Woodrow Wilson in 1916, the percentage of career chiefs-of-mission climbed to 28 percent under Warren G. Harding and to 41 percent under Coolidge. By 1932, under Herbert Hoover, professional diplomats held nearly 50 percent of the top diplomatic posts abroad.

To acquire a share of the top posts abroad was as important to career development as was the Rogers Act. The mark of professional distinction for a diplomat lay in heading an embassy or legation. The actions of Republican presidents and their secretaries of state during the 1920s in promoting career officers as chiefs-of-mission reflected a growing recognition of the merits of professional diplomats over amateurs. These actions also established a precedent for future administrations to match.

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87 Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 213, 223-224, 264.
VII

Few people connected to the foreign affairs community doubted that the United States had passed a milestone in the development of a Foreign Service capable of assisting American statesmen in the conduct of foreign relations.\(^8\) A strong sense of *esprit de corps* permeated the Foreign Service, marked by the high morale of officers who now felt that they belonged to an important, established professional organization. By the 1930s it was "no longer regarded as a reward to be assigned to the Diplomatic branch, nor a punishment to be assigned to the Consular branch."\(^9\) The schism between the diplomats and consuls had largely healed, the distinctions and animosities that remained now confined to "the unreachable area of personal relations."\(^90\)

In some ways things had not changed or improved. Entering the 1930s, the State Department—a synonym for


\(^9\) Skinner, "Ten Years Under," 342. Skinner, himself a consul in the old Consular Service, went on to suggest that "the time is not far distant when an officer who is proficient in only one branch of the Service cannot hope to reach the highest ranks."

\(^90\) Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 183.
the foreign affairs establishment—was still "small, placid," and "comfortably adjusted to the lethargic diplomacy" of the 1920s. Endowed with economic abundance and technological superiority, the United States maintained a traditionally nonassertive, if not inactive, foreign policy.

The activities of the Foreign Service officer reflected the relative serenity of American foreign relations. One of the best of the early American diplomats, Lewis Einstein, wrote in contemplating retirement in 1930:

> After more than eight years passed at Prague, I was somewhat tired of the monotony of diplomatic life. Such glamour as it ever possessed for me had long ago worn off, and though I liked the work, when work there was, I was bored by diplomatic entertainment and the continuous obligation of attending tedious banquets and talking to tedious people.\(^92\)

\(^91\) David F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull (1933-1944)," in Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 188. Beaulac, a career diplomat serving in Haiti in 1927, recalls: "Life had been gay and easy. I had swam, played golf, and driven about the country, usually in the company of other Americans. My work, while never arduous, had been instructive." Career Ambassador, 105.

\(^92\) A Diplomat Looks Back (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 207.
The genteel and slow-moving world of American diplomacy remained unaltered from that of an earlier era.  

Nor had the American public significantly altered its view of diplomats. More than before, perhaps, diplomats invoked in the public mind visions of boys with white spats, tea drinkers, and cookie pushers. The results of the Rogers Act in eradicating social elitism from the ranks of diplomats had not conformed with public expectations. Being a diplomat in the United States, imbued as its citizens were with the egalitarian ethic, carried no special distinction. Being a businessman did. By contrast, being a diplomat in Europe, where class distinctions were more pronounced, had always been considered a suitable calling for the sons of the aristocracy. Only in the 1920s

93 Beaulac again recalls: "The State Department was all too backward in coming forward and insisting that its needs be met...I recall that at one of my posts I received an instruction in which the Department noted, gravely, that during the preceding quarter my expenditures for toilet paper had averaged 20 percent higher than for an earlier quarter. I was asked to submit an explanation. I was forced to reply, equally gravely, that the temporary increase in expenditure for this item was owing to the circumstances that the officer in charge had had recurrent attacks of diarrhea during the period under review...of course, this was a reflection of the period in which we lived." Career Ambassador, 107-108.

94 Diplomats who wrote memoirs about this period universally agree on this point. Of course, they were particularly sensitive to it, perhaps overly so. Perhaps, too, their expectations of the Rogers Act were not matched by the results. For example, see Villard, Affairs at State, 1, 2, 5-6; Thayer, Diplomat, 72.
did businessmen in Europe begin to approach the public status accorded diplomats.  

Nor had American diplomats adequately defined the job of a Foreign Service officer. In explaining the professional practice of diplomacy to businessmen, laymen and politicians, the diplomats spoke of the "ideal qualities" of the diplomatist as delineated by twentieth-century European practitioners, the qualities that differentiated the professional from the amateur diplomat--truthfulness, precision, calmness, modesty, and such things as sound judgment.  

With no tradition of diplomacy by which to measure professionals and amateurs, Americans found it difficult, if not impossible, to understand why diplomacy, more than other occupations, required "special" expertise. Diplomacy remained an abstraction to most Americans, while the diplomats, themselves, had to build their own tradition, borrowing much from the Europeans.

The United States, nevertheless, had framed a solid,  

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Norton, "Foreign Service Organization," 51-52. Norton also states: "The executive personnel of the European foreign offices is such as to command the respect of public opinion....The executive personnel of the State Department, while it includes men of unquestioned ability and while it is characterized by a high average of devotion to the public service, is little known to the public and is frequently subjected to hasty and ill-informed criticism." Ibid., ix.

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Schulzinger, _Diplomatic Mind_, 101, 141.
institutional structure for the conduct of foreign relations. During the 1920s the Foreign Service built upon this framework. The older diplomats instilled in new recruits the traditional, time-honored—if not always practiced—view of diplomacy, and encouraged them to develop a "realist" outlook on world politics. 97

By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presidency, the Foreign Service was confident, stable, and improving. No one, however, could have foreseen the effects of the Great Depression and of the attitudes and concerns of a new Democratic President upon the infant Foreign Service.

97Ibid., 81, 87-88, 98.
A rule compelling everybody in all Embassies and Legations to work eight hours a day--five days a week--would be the kind of cyclone which would be heard round the world!

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

3 THE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER FDR, 1933-1939: DEPRESSION AND PREJUDICE

The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt proved to be an inauspicious environment for sustaining the development of the United States Foreign Service. FDR's attitude toward career diplomats, his lack of enthusiasm for professional diplomacy, coupled with the exigencies of the Depression, stymied the cultivation of a Foreign Service capable of assuming a leadership role in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy.

When FDR assumed office on March 4, 1933, the Great Depression was at its nadir. Millions of unemployed people haunted the nation's streets. Farmers were desperate. Bank failures were endemic. Bewilderment borne of prolonged desperation gripped the country, while the

machinery of government seemed hopelessly stalled, unable to combat the misery.

President Roosevelt naturally focused his energies on the Depression at home for most of his first seven years in office. Confronted with unprecedented economic deprivation, most Americans evinced little concern for the crises brewing abroad in the Far East and Europe. If anything, the Depression exacerbated the inclination of most Americans to blame the Europeans and the munitions manufacturers for World War I. Many Americans vowed not to permit the United States to engage in another foreign imbroglio. Whether from political reality or personal conviction, Roosevelt, too, revealed little interest in employing the power of the United States to halt the world's descent toward chaos.

FDR also embraced deeply-entrenched, popular prejudices against career diplomats. He regarded the Foreign Service as a playground for dilettantes and socialites. As the Depression forced severe retrenchment upon the nation's diplomatic resources, Roosevelt looked upon the plight of the Foreign Service with almost haughty scorn. He displayed little regard for the efficacy of a professional diplomatic corps.

Even a more favorable climate would not have compelled
Roosevelt to assume an active interest in strengthening the Foreign Service. Although the Depression would have affected adversely the strength of the Service under any administration, Roosevelt's demeanor toward diplomats, as well as his peculiar administrative habits and supreme confidence in his own diplomatic abilities, militated against a diligent concern on his part for maintaining a vigorous Foreign Service.

Roosevelt's treatment of the Foreign Service augured ill for the application of American influence abroad. The President's ability to exert leadership in foreign affairs, if and when he should choose to do so, rested in part upon the health of the Foreign Service. Similarly, the ability of the Foreign Service to respond to changes in the international environment depended in part upon its institutional vitality. That the record of United States diplomacy during the 1930s is one of singular failure can be attributed, in at least some small measure, to FDR's disdain for the Foreign Service he inherited from his predecessors.²

The Depression shattered the normally imperturbable administration of the Foreign Service. Amidst the depths of the Depression, the Service suffered a pervasive retrenchment in its operations. Although the Service experienced a restoration of sorts after 1935, the wounds inflicted upon it healed slowly and incompletely.

Reductions in appropriations were most severe. In 1933 the New Deal administration, with the assent of Congress, slashed the State Department's budget by 33 percent. The decimation of the budget—along with across the board pay cuts of 15 percent, the curtailment of rental allowances by 65 percent, and the devaluation of the dollar as the United States abandoned the gold standard—effectively reduced the salaries of Foreign Service officers serving abroad by over 50 percent. Congress restored most of the salary reductions and rent subsidies by the end of 1935. Not until 1938, however, did the State Department receive an appropriation that approached its 1932 level of funding, only then to suffer a reduction of nearly $1,000,000, or 6.25 percent of its allocation, in 1939.  

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3 Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 217-219. See also FDR to Jesse Isidor Straus, July 11, 1933, FDR to Ruth Bryan Owen, November 17, 1933, and Claude G. Bowers to FDR, December 13, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 329, 514, 528-529; and FDR to Bowers, February 5, 1934, Elliott
Recruitment virtually halted. Entrance examinations, suspended in 1932, resumed again only late in 1935. The number of officers, arbitrarily reduced by 10 percent in 1934, did not reapproximate the 1932 level of 762 until the eve of World War II, when the complement of officers reached 723.

Individual career advancement nearly ceased. All promotions within the Service were suspended from 1931 through 1935. Young officers far from retirement filled the top four classes of the corps. In 1934, for example, the average age of all Foreign Service officers was 40.25 years.

Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (2 vols.; N.Y.: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), I, 389-390. The State Department's appropriations were approximately $18,000,000 in 1932; $13,500,000 in 1933; $16,000,000 in 1936; $16,600,000 in 1938; $15,600,000 in 1939. August C. Miller, Jr., "The New State Department," American Journal of International Law, 33 (July 1939), 518. See also Hugh Gibson, "Diplomats Pay to Work," The Saturday Evening Post, 209 (May 8, 1937), 49.


Although few diplomats resigned for the perils of the breadlines, they could hardly feel sanguine about their careers.

The high morale fostered in the years since the Rogers Act deteriorated. Foreign Service officers, but especially politically-appointed chiefs-of-mission, flooded the State Department and the White House with letters describing hardships. One typical letter reported that a vice consul "has had to borrow money to send his wife and child home to live with her people while he lives in a cheap furnished room." 6 Another noted that a diplomatic attaché "has gone home on leave completely broken in health, largely because of the difficult and arduous work that he has performed without vacation during the past two years." 7

Home leaves at government expense, indefinitely discontinued in 1932, placed officers abroad in a state of virtual exile. Sixteen officers, a State Department spokesman told a congressional committee in 1936, had not returned to the United States in seven years. Many others had served abroad for over three years without leave, although the Department regarded a three-year exile as long enough.

7 Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 465.
Few officers could afford the transportation expenses. Fewer still could afford the luxury of a savings account. In 1936 the government reinstated home leave provisions, but allocated only $35,000 for that purpose.  

The distress of the Service was acute. To Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, who had served in the State Department since 1892, "the distress of the Foreign Service [was] greater [in 1934] than at any time within the memory of those of us in the Department." Secretary of State Cordell Hull concurred. "Much of the Foreign Service," he testified before Congress in April, 1934, "is now more or less in a state of demoralization so far as actual efficiency is concerned."  

The plight of the Foreign Service severely handicapped the efficient management of foreign affairs. The Service confronted a retrenchment in resources at the same time that it faced a substantial increase in demands and responsibilities. With the Depression thundering across national boundaries "like a global tornado," the comparative serenity 

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of the 1920s evaporated. Tumultuous international conditions, sparked by crises in the Far East and Europe and fanned by the Depression, expanded dramatically the work-load of the State Department at home and abroad. From 1929 to 1939, dispatches between the Department and the diplomatic missions abroad increased tenfold. Nearly every day, Secretary of State Hull recalled, proved hectic, "being hopelessly crowded with emergency problems calling for feverish activity."

Limitations in personnel posed the greatest problem. Carr calculated that each of the 47 diplomatic missions and 271 consular offices abroad required four to eight officers: As of 1934, when the number of officers in the classified Service numbered 688, an average of no more than two could be assigned to each post. Three of the most critical posts--Berlin, Paris and London--had four, five and six officers respectively. In addition, the Service

11Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 9.
14Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 358. Hull notes that there were 7 officers in Paris. That number was soon reduced to 5. Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, ibid., 465.
employed 3,600 secretaries and clerks, an average of ten per post.  

More staff is not necessarily synonymous with more efficient administration. Today the embassies in Bonn, Paris, and London each employ over 1,000 people. The State Department employs over 500 people—nearly the equivalent of all Foreign Service officers in 1933—just to sort and distribute the mail. Whether the Department functions more effectively today than yesterday is questionable. More staff often translates into more work and more burdens, not into more efficient operations. Today, at least, small may be beautiful and even desirable.

More might have been better during the 1930s, however. With world conditions descending toward chaos, the State Department was, as it is today, the smallest of the federal departments. In 1935 all State Department employees in Washington, D.C., could assemble together on the steps of the Executive Office Building for a photograph. At no

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15 Hull to FDR, January 14, 1935, ibid., 358.
17 Harr, Professional Diplomat, 95.
time during the 1930s did the annual appropriations of the State Department equal more than 1 percent of the funds allocated to the United States military, which, at that time, ranked behind the army of Yugoslavia in efficiency and preparedness.18

The adversity that afflicted the Foreign Service largely reflected the exigencies of the Depression. Faced with the lingering spectre of between 12,000,000 and 18,000,000 unemployed workers, the New Deal administration necessarily diverted available resources to combating the domestic crisis. Domestic federal employment projects sprouted like weeds in vacant lots, particularly during the famous "First 100 Days" of the Roosevelt administration. Wilbur Carr, charged with the unpleasant responsibility of being budget officer for the State Department, acknowledged that the Depression forced austere economic measures upon the nation's diplomatic machinery.19


19 Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
Privately, however, Carr faulted President Roosevelt. Carr perceived the President as "out of sympathy" with the Department and the Foreign Service and, therefore, unresponsive to requests for greater support on appropriations. In part, Carr's incrimination of FDR revealed his own frustration at having to inflict radical economies on the structure he had labored so long and hard to construct. Reverentially attached to the well-being of the Service, Carr acquired during the Depression an unjustified reputation within the Foreign Service for not doing enough to convince Congress of the need for additional funds. For Carr administration of the Service under FDR was a nightmare.

Carr's personal distress also reflected a more fundamental human condition. People react to crises in several different ways. Sometimes a crisis produces a despondency, a sense of hopelessness, a feeling that personal survival is all that matters. Sometimes a crisis produces exhilaration, a sense that a challenge exists to be conquered, a renewed feeling of altruistic purpose. Not infre-

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20 Ibid.
quently, the most dire circumstances can provoke in people a renewed vigor, a desire to challenge and to overcome the worst of situations—especially if they can be assured that their determination is appreciated and supported by their leaders.

II

FDR approached the predicament of the Foreign Service with cavalier indifference. As one ambassador correctly suspected, the President believed that the diplomatic corps was "overstaffed, underworked and overpaid; that the average career man [was] a tea hound and a lounge lizard." 22

Secretary of State Hull repeatedly attempted to convince the President otherwise. "The employees of the Foreign Service," Hull wrote FDR on January 31, 1934, "have suffered losses out of all proportion to those which other employees of the Government have suffered." 23 A year later, with no remedy in sight, and even more reductions forecast in diplomatic personnel, Hull predicted dire consequences for the future of the Service. In a letter to Roosevelt,  

22 Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 464.
23 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 621.
he explained:

There have been no promotions in class or filling of vacancies created since 1932. These drastic reductions in personnel without the recognition of efficient service through normal advancement in class as the law contemplates will, I fear, have a demoralizing effect upon the most capable men in the Service and produce a condition which it may be difficult to repair.

Hull questioned the wisdom of further reducing the corps at a time of growing international tension. Instead, he urged that new candidates be recruited, noting that "it takes time and patience to make a really good Foreign Service officer out of a raw recruit."

Hull then implored Roosevelt to obtain a supplemental appropriation for the Service. He assured FDR that Congress would be receptive to such a request:

It is my considered judgment that if we are to try to have a live, energetic Foreign Service personnel capable of meeting what I believe to be the need of the present situation it would be distinctly in the public interest if you could see your way clear to restoring all or as much as possible of the $200,000 reduction made in appropriation for salaries of Foreign Service officers by the transmission to Congress of a supplemental estimate to that effect. This is not only my judgment, but when I and my assistants appeared before the Appropriations Committee of the House the importance of this action was urged repeatedly upon us by members of the Committee.... Of course, we declined to
discuss and in no way advocated a change in the amount which you recommended to be appropriated.\textsuperscript{24}

Roosevelt replied briefly, sarcastically to his Secretary's lengthy and earnest plea. He would consider requesting an additional appropriation, but he was confident that "a greater part of" the reduction in the proposed budget could "be covered by reducing the staffs in the Embassies and Legations especially." FDR concluded: "A rule compelling everybody in all Embassies and Legations to work eight hours a day--five days a week--would be the kind of cyclone which would be heard round the world!"\textsuperscript{25}

Knowledge of Roosevelt's attitude soon percolated through the ranks of the Foreign Service. Several diplomats ventured to transform the President's views. Jesse Isidor Straus, an old friend and politically-appointed ambassador to France, wrote in the spring of 1935 that he discerned, "from various sources," that the President was "being filled up with stories about the iniquities of the diplo-

\textsuperscript{24}January 14, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 358-360. Carr probably drafted Hull's letter to FDR. Crane states that Carr appeared before the House Appropriations Committee on January 4, 1935, and that following the hearing he felt compelled "to edit and amplify his [Hull's] statement to make it count for something." Presumably, the statement is Hull's plea to FDR. Mr. Carr, 315. In any case, it is hardly novel for a subordinate to draft a letter or statement for a superior's approval.

matic service." Contrary to the portrait of diplomats lounging on the public dole, Straus asserted:

Those with whom I have been associated..., and those whom I have had the pleasure of meeting..., are a lot of serious-minded men who are most attentive to their duties and spare neither time nor thought in their endeavors, sometimes under very trying and difficult conditions....Long hours mean nothing to them.

Straus regretted that in some circles the view prevailed that a display of physical activity during prescribed hours was the prime gauge of efficiency. "Most of the information so necessary to all of us," he revealed, "is gained outside of office hours." 26

Another ambassador and long-time acquaintance wrote to Roosevelt in a similar vein. After echoing Straus' sentiments, Jefferson Caffrey sought to dispel the notion that social prestige and fraternization were unnecessary accouterments of the diplomatic profession. Caffrey, a career officer of twenty-four years experience, explained that a diplomat's "efficiency" depended upon prestige, as well as intelligence and personality. He defined "prestige" as the respect and esteem in which an officer is held by the country to which he is accredited. Whether palatable to us or not, he continued, foreigners often measure prestige by such external trappings as an envoy's mode of living and social habits. Without prestige an officer's efficiency is

26 April 9, 1935, ibid., 464-466.
reduced, for successful diplomacy depends largely upon personal contacts, and results are obtained by mutual understandings fostered through associations outside of the office.

Caffrey then invoked an old stance of the diplomats. By "successful diplomacy," he asserted emphatically, "I mean, on the one hand, direct results in thousands and millions of dollars to American interests and, on the other, results in the way of confidence and good will on the part of foreign people." Caffrey believed that much of diplomacy consisted of cooperating with American businesses. "I take this Foreign Service business seriously," he concluded, "and I believe that an efficient Service is worth saving and fighting for."27

Roosevelt's attitude toward the American foreign affairs community remained unshaken. He treated the State Department and the Foreign Service, as institutions, less than graciously. In 1939, for instance, Roosevelt asked Harry Hopkins, his confidant and secretary of commerce, to investigate the contention of the State Department that the costs of living in Venezuela exceeded that in Washington,

27 March 8, 1935, ibid., 435-537. For a brief portrait of Caffrey, which notes his support of American business, see Herbert Herring, "The Department of State: A Review With Recommendations to the President," Harper's, 174 (February 1937), 234.
D.C., by 100 percent. The subsequent report verified the State Department's figure. FDR read the report, according to one insider, "with utmost interest" and "with some disappointment that he had not caught the Foreign Service off base." 28

III

Roosevelt viewed State Department officials and Foreign Service officers, as a class, with hearty disdain and distrust. 29 He held a mental picture of the State Department "as a haven of routineers and paper shufflers." 30

28 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (N.Y.: Grosset & Dunlap, 1959), 116-117. See also Stuart, Department of State, 326.

29 William L. Langer and Everett S. Gleason were among the first scholars to suggest, from a reading of official sources, that FDR was prejudiced against career diplomats. They contended, however, that "it would in fact be a mistake to underline the President's suspicions." The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 8. But it was not and is not. The number of career diplomats who have commented upon FDR's deep-rooted prejudice against diplomats is such as to constitute almost an oral tradition in the diplomatic community. For instance, see J. Rives Childs, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near East (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), 109; Ellis Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The Recollections of a Career Diplomat (N.Y.: David McKay, 1968), 296; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 215-216; Villard, Affairs at State, 69; Thayer, Diplomat, 73-74; John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1971), 114; George Kennan, "Future of Diplomacy," 567.

He believed the Foreign Service was rife with holdovers from the old Diplomatic Service who had received appointments more for social reasons than for practical considerations. Along with Harry Hopkins, he reveled in calling the diplomats "cookie-pushers," "white-spat boys," "tea-drinkers," and "snobbish Europeanized expatriates." He loved to crack jokes about the diplomatic establishment. One of his favorite, oft-repeated to anyone who would listen, was "here's a typical State Department letter; it says nothing at all."

The popular stereotype of diplomats as undemocratic, un-American and, therefore, unrepresentative of American life found consistent expression in FDR's dealings with the Foreign Service. Shortly after his inauguration in 1933, Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of State Hull in regard to representatives sent abroad to attend meetings of international conferences and congresses:

It seems to me that we have an opportunity here to get in new blood and I hope you will work up lists that will be more representative of this country than some of the lists I have seen in the past.


32 Manchester, Glory and Dream, 347.

33 March 20, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 27.
Roosevelt did not elaborate upon what he meant by "more representative of this country."

FDR evidently feared that the lists might be comprised of a large number of diplomats. In fact, the lists Hull contemplated, as he had informed the President earlier, were largely of "individuals outside of the Government service selected because of their particular knowledge of subjects," including scientists, educators, economists, and humanitarians. Most of the conferences attended by delegates on these lists were nonpolitical and relatively unimportant: The United States participated in seventy-five such conferences in 1936 alone.

Roosevelt preferred to approve personally the names of all persons who represented the United States abroad in any capacity. In November 1934, Undersecretary of State William Phillips suggested to FDR—"with a view of saving your time and expediting business"—a simple plan for designating persons to attend the technical but nonvital international meetings. With no explanation, Roosevelt appended a note to Phillips' memorandum stating that he preferred "the present practice as it keeps me 'au courant.'"

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34 Ibid.
35 Dennis P. Myers, and Charles F. Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department," American Journal of International Law, 31 (October 1937), 716.
36 November 9, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 266.
FDR believed that the career diplomats were "out of touch" with American life. He reasoned that the diplomats, elitist by birth and abroad too long, acquired unAmerican habits, mannerisms, and thoughts. "Ever since he had been in Washington," Roosevelt told Secretary of State-designate Edward Stettinius in 1943, he had tried "to reorganize our Foreign Service so that these professional diplomats knew something about America." FDR "felt diplomats should be recalled and sent to Tennessee for a year" so that they could better represent America abroad. 37

Like most of his countrymen, Roosevelt never questioned whether the "unAmerican habits" of American diplomats impaired their ability to serve United States interests. He simply assumed that if the diplomats failed to reflect the mores of the ordinary American, they misrepresented the United States to foreigners. Roosevelt's attitude, like that of the general populace, revealed the American penchant for proselytizing American democratic life. Only Americans, the national conscience rationalized, could represent American democracy and, hence, United States interests abroad. Diplomats, by definition, were not Americans.

Ironically, amateur American diplomats have succumbed

37 Weil, Pretty Good Club, 145.
more readily to foreign ways and thoughts than professionals. The classic example is Walter Hines Page who served as Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to the Court of St. James's during World War I. Much to Wilson's dismay and the Ambassador's own loss of influence with the President, Page became a convinced Anglophile. 38

FDR, himself, expressed to his intimates his shock and surprise over Joseph Kennedy's Anglophilic conversion in 1938. Roosevelt had appointed Kennedy -- a man of very definite campaign contributions and indefinite personal qualifications -- ambassador to London, in part, because he could "trust him." Kennedy, the President felt compelled to remark after the Munich Conference, "had been taken in by Lady Astor and the Cliveden set." He unfailingly misrepresents United States policy to the cabinet of Neville Chamberlain. "Who would have thought," Roosevelt exclaimed, "that the English could take into camp a red-headed Irishman!" 39


Roosevelt never could understand it. To recognize the relationship between a diplomat's external demeanor and his ability to represent his country requires some subtlety of thought. The function of the diplomatist, as the professionals know, "is not to serve as a museum exhibit" of the external qualities of his countrymen. Rather, he is "to constitute an effective channel of communication with other governments" and to be "a perceptive observer of life in other countries." In so performing, the sensitive diplomatist can hardly avoid "acquiring outlooks, habits of mind, and occasionally mannerisms" that distinguish him from his fellow nationals. In large measure, the diplomatist's usefulness rests in his ability to place himself in the position of the other man, to understand the interests and motives of his counterparts so that peaceful accommodations can be reached without damage to anyone's national interests. The "differentness" that separates the professional diplomatist from the amateur, as well as from his countrymen, is not, therefore, synonymous with disloyalty or an absence of


patriotism, although American laymen and politicians often assume as much.

Many American career diplomats, returning after long years abroad, did find themselves "out of touch" with American life, but not because of any disloyalty or foreign attachments, as FDR presumed. Rather, these diplomats experienced estrangement and alienation in much the same manner, but to a far greater degree, as the person who returns to his hometown after a long absence: The changes he sees appear to him more extensive, more stark, and less comprehensible than they appear to his high school classmate who had never departed and who had gradually adjusted to the changes as they occurred. Years of shuffling from one foreign capital to another did make "rootless expatriates" of many diplomats.

Few career diplomats have described the feelings of diplomatic "expatriatism" more eloquently than George F. Kennan. Following a summer's visit to his hometown in Wisconsin in 1936, he wrote:

I came away...aware that I was no longer a part of what I had once been a part of--no longer, in fact, a part of anything at all. It was not that I had left the world of my boyhood, although this too was true; it was also that this world had left me. It had left everyone else, for that matter; but its departure had been sufficiently gradual so that those who remained had been less aware of its passage, and had adjusted in
varying degrees to the change. I, like all other expatriates, simply had been left behind.

These feelings were only the first strong reminder of a reality which affects the situation of almost every professional diplomatist. Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of my country....I, not being a part of it, would nevertheless understand it. It, being still to some extent a part of me, would nevertheless not understand me. I would continue to pay it my loyalty.... What else, after all, could I be loyal to? 41

To President Roosevelt, another loyalty existed, loyalty to the Democratic party, a loyalty equal to or synonymous with loyalty to the United States. To it, FDR found the loyalty of the career diplomats woefully deficient.

Roosevelt judged the career diplomats to be unsympathetic, if not hostile, to his New Deal programs. He also believed that they were Republicans at heart. 42 More than any other perception FDR held about the loyalties of career diplomats—-and he rarely questioned their national patriotism--his view that they displayed less than enthusiastic-


tic allegiance to the New Deal rankled him.\footnote{On at least one occasion, however, FDR compared the career diplomats to Bolsheviks, only partially in jest. FDR to William C. Bullitt, February 5, 1935, Orville H. Bullitt, ed., \textit{For the President: Personal and Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 102. On another, FDR seriously suggested that an \textit{Atlantic Monthly} article entitled, "Worse Than Arnold," an account of the machinations of Dr. Edward Bancroft during the American Revolution, be required reading for all Foreign Service officers. FDR to Hull, December 17, 1935, Nixon, \textit{FDR and Foreign Affairs}, III, 126.}

He expressed his displeasure openly upon several occasions. For example, in a letter to Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey on March 20, 1935, FDR admonished: "I know you will realize that the only real complaint is against those in the Service" who "care mighty little about what is happening in their own country" and who "take very little interest" in "the masses in the countries to which they are accredited." Roosevelt continued:

One of our very important new agency heads [Harry Hopkins, then chief of the Civil Works Administration] went abroad last summer and saw several of our Counselors [sic] and Secretaries and not one of them asked any questions about how our big efforts, such as Relief and NRA [National Recovery Administration] and AAA [Agricultural Adjustment Act], were working out. They had neither the knowledge nor the desire to learn,
and yet if they had known they could have been far more interesting in their contacts with foreigners. 44

Roosevelt wholeheartedly believed that the career diplomats were political conservatives, as he understood the term in regard to domestic politics.

To extend the presumed political conservatism of the diplomats in domestic matters to the realm of foreign affairs was a short leap in political faith for FDR. He deduced that the professional diplomats in the State Department were generally critical of his foreign policies. In his suspicions, FDR received constant reinforcement from the ardent New Dealers in his entourage, especially the internationalists who, like the First Lady Eleanor, urged the President to take a stronger stance against fascism abroad. When such a stance failed to emerge, the internationalists concluded, as did FDR, that the career diplomats deliberately conjured up obstacles to place in the path of whatever foreign policy initiatives the President might

44 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 450. Hopkins is not identified in FDR's letter or in the accompanying notes as the agency head who went abroad. However, it is clear that the reference is to Hopkins. See Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship Based on Eleanor Roosevelt's Private Papers (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1971), 571.
The charge that the career diplomats were politically conservative, if not anti-New Deal, contained some truth. The pre-Rogers Act career diplomats had witnessed the successful evolution of their profession under the auspices of Republican, not Democratic, administrations. In addition, their patrician backgrounds inclined them, almost naturally, toward conservative modes of thought.

The post-Rogers Act diplomats, on the other hand, possessed no vivid memory of how and under whom the Foreign Service evolved. They were more democratic and less aristocratic than their diplomatic forefathers. They also were less fraternity-oriented, less ideologically-inclined, whether conservative or liberal, and less imbued with an elitist sense of noblesse oblige than their pre-1924 cousins. The younger diplomats were more institutionally-oriented: They had joined and always had belonged to a recognized, professional organization. They could claim, with some justification, that they had no politics.

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45 Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 571. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 91; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1979), 138.


The memoirs of U. S. diplomats also reveal these distinctions. For example, compare Wilson, Education of a Diplo-
Both generations of diplomats, moreover, eschewed direct participation in domestic partisan politics. Both owed their allegiance to the United States, whether under Republican or Democratic administrations. Both gave their allegiance to a professional diplomatic ideal. The only evidence FDR possessed of the diplomats' Republican sympathies was their association with past Republican administrations as Foreign Service officers.

IV

FDR's suspicions about the diplomats reflected more than a question of simple political partisanship. His distrust mirrored a fundamental strain between democratic politicians and professional diplomats, a strain nowhere more acute than between American presidents and diplomats, a strain nowhere better exemplified than between FDR and the career diplomats.

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However, many a diplomat did not hesitate to ingratiate himself with influential politicians; many also conducted strong letter-writing campaigns on their own behalf whenever it seemed that a change in presidential administrations placed their positions in jeopardy. For examples, see Werking, Master Architects, 245; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 79-82.
Roosevelt and the career diplomats operated from diverse, even conflicting, perspectives. Like most presidents, FDR viewed foreign affairs from a predominantly domestic, political vantage point. As President, he was both the nation's leading domestic politician and the nation's chief foreign policy maker. Elected to office by popular mandate, Roosevelt equated his New Deal policies, and even himself, with the national interest. Accountable to a democratic electorate, he realized that his personal survival depended upon how well he fared in foreign as well as in domestic affairs.

From such a perspective Roosevelt tended to be opportunist. He regarded domestic political considerations, with all of their ramifications and constraints, as necessary antecedents to the formulation of foreign policy. If and when the public became attentive to foreign affairs, he would look for opportunities abroad that would enhance or, at least, not diminish his reputation with the voting public. The image presented would be as important as the substance achieved.

48 For a good discussion of the differences in the perspectives of presidents and professional diplomats, see Monteagle Stearns, "Making American Diplomacy Relevant," The Foreign Affairs Quarterly, 52 (October 1973), 153-167, especially 159-162. See also Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 138.
The career diplomats, by contrast, focused exclusively on foreign affairs. Like most diplomats, the Foreign Service officers of the 1930s regarded domestic political considerations as unwarranted and unhealthy intrusions in the conduct of foreign relations. They abhorred the thought that temporary shifts in democratic opinion at home could abruptly alter the course of United States policy abroad. They had no domestic political constituency: Their constituency was an abstraction—the national interest. To the impulses of democratic passion, whether of mass opinion or of highly organized interest groups, the diplomats preferred a consistent policy, "founded on the interests of the nation as a whole and the needs of world peace and stability." 49

From such a perspective the diplomats instinctively tended to be conservative. They were prone to emphasize risks over opportunities, to delineate the costs of presidential initiatives abroad. 50 They yearned, moreover, for a "high concentration of authority behind them," for an administration that knew what it was doing, that provided clear and consistent direction in foreign policy matters, that allowed them to operate with certainty and authority

49 Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 149-151.
50 Stearns, "Making Diplomacy Relevant," 160.
in the application of diplomacy abroad.  

Illustrative of the strain in the perspectives of Roosevelt and the diplomats was the President's admonition to Ambassador Caffrey about "those in the Service" who "take very little interest" in the "masses in the countries to which they are accredited." For FDR, the rhetoric of democracy played just as well abroad as it did at home. The era of "democratic diplomacy" was in full bloom. If the diplomats were democratic instead of aristocratic, they would share the President's concern--albeit that of the patrician class--for the masses at home and abroad. If the masses at home figured prominently in his foreign policy calculations, surely the masses abroad counted similarly in the calculations of his foreign counterparts.

The diplomats displayed little congeniality for the masses. They dealt principally with the established authorities abroad, the official representatives of foreign governments. They functioned to reach accommodation, not to foment domestic political change. Most of the diplomats adhered strictly to the view that to cultivate the masses, whomever they might be, would be to interfere in the domestic affairs of foreign nations. American diplomats knew that their foreign counterparts resented, no less than

51 Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," 149.
themselves, the intrusion of democratic opinion in the affairs of state.

Many American diplomats, nevertheless, sought to ascertain the pulse of opinion groups in foreign lands. They regularly visited with and sought information from a variety of unofficial, as well as official, sources. Correspondents, for instance, were always a prime source. No less than the foreign diplomats who reported on events in the United States, American diplomats realized that their superiors in Washington would be interested in the internal affairs of the nations to which they were accredited. To anyone in Washington who cared to read them, the dispatches of American diplomats were replete with information on "the masses."52

Neither Roosevelt nor the career diplomats ever appreciated the perspective of the other. Roosevelt—as a politician—thrived on action; he strived to change institutions, in image if not in substance. The diplomats—as professionals—yearned for stability and consistency; they sought to preserve institutions, not to reform them.

52See the volumes in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1933-1939 (29 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949-1957), passim. Others have remarked favorably upon the overall quality of American diplomatic reporting from abroad during the 1930s. For instance, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 125.
Roosevelt's personal style and administrative methods precluded him from reaching a modus vivendi with the Foreign Service. His habits and behavior were antithetical to the diplomatic mind. Temperamentally flexible but often impatient, FDR's intellectual processes were "intuitive rather than logical." He often "thought lazily and superficially." He rarely thought through his position on a particular subject until some concrete action on it was presented to him for his approval or disapproval. Generally distrustful of so-called "experts" and genuinely indifferent, if not antagonistic, to systems of any sort, Roosevelt preferred to act in all matters by improvisation and intuition.

He deliberately fostered inconsistency, confusion, and Byzantine intrigues among his subordinates. He created overlapping administrative empires in competition with each other.

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54 Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 258.

55 Historians agree on very little about FDR. Like FDR's contemporaries, historians generally view FDR favorably or harshly. However, almost all agree upon his unorthodox administrative methods. See Clarke A. Chambers, "FDR, Pragmatist-Idealist: An Essay in Historiography," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 52 (April 1961), 50-55.
other and delegated incomplete and uncertain responsibilities to his lieutenants. Few people inside or outside government ever could decipher, to their satisfaction, the overall direction of the New Deal. Only FDR knew, and one might question whether even he knew, what initiatives his administration was forging at any given moment.

The President's peculiar administrative style emanated from a compulsion to hold power securely in his own hands. His administrative methods linked access to information and the power of decision-making to his own survival and authority. Few presidents, moreover, have possessed a sharper sense of personal power or more faith in their competence to use it than FDR. Whether in domestic or foreign affairs, Roosevelt evinced a supreme confidence in his own power of persuasion, divorced from any systematic or coordinated planning.


57 Neustadt, Presidential Power, 161.
Roosevelt held a highly personalized view of diplomacy, adapted from his domestic political triumphs. He believed that his considerable personal charm, if applied in face-to-face negotiations with foreign leaders, best could resolve differences and rectify misunderstandings. "I know you will not mind my being brutally frank," he once wrote Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "when I tell you that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department." About the same time, FDR also told Hopkins that "if I give" Stalin "everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace." Convinced that he could deal with foreign statesmen as he dealt with his own countrymen, Roosevelt never distinguished between the conduct of domestic and foreign policy.


59 May, The "Lessons" of History, 23. FDR's penchant for personal diplomacy was evident at least as early as 1933. Herbert Feis quotes FDR from the Morgenthau diaries of March 9, 1933, in regard to the negotiations with the Soviet Union over recognition: "Gosh, if I could only, myself, talk to some one man representing the Russians, I could straighten out the whole question." 1933: Characters in Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 309. On FDR and Mussolini, see Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 145.
Nor did Roosevelt ever seriously consider the implications of his unorthodox methods for the implementation of foreign policy. That his penchant for indirection and inconsistency—however conducive to the control of the bureaucracy and to the exercise of leadership in domestic affairs—merely left both friends and foes, including the State Department, uncertain about American intentions in foreign relations never troubled him. 60

He contented himself with occasional fulminations about the static nature of bureaucracies. To the head of the Federal Reserve Board, for instance, he commented:

The Treasury [Department] is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want....But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy and action of the career diplomats and you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the N-a-v-y....To change anything in the N-a-v-y is like punching a feather bed. 61

60 For a critical view of FDR's administrative methods as they applied to foreign affairs—views which contrast sharply with the laudatory views of Schlesinger and Neustadt on FDR—see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1969), 734; Campbell, Fudge Factory, 98-100; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of Power," 474-475.

61 Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 182.
Devotedly scornful of established routines, FDR regarded all bureaucracies as behemoths of inaction and ineptitude against which he had to battle.

More so than most bureaucracies, the diplomatic establishment was of little use in FDR's eyes. During the better part of his first two terms in office, the Depression at home occupied his energies and diverted his attention from all but the most pressing of foreign crises. Supremely confident of his own abilities, Roosevelt adhered comfortably to his deeply-entrenched prejudices against career diplomats.

VI

Roosevelt formed his impressions of career diplomats during the pre-Rogers Act era. As President Wilson's assistant secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, FDR had opportunity to view the foreign services. As President, he regarded a few remnants of the old diplomatic corps as representative of the new Foreign Service. That Republican administrations largely created and nurtured the Foreign Service did not ameliorate his suspicions. In a conversation in January 1935 with Edith Rogers, widow of the sponsor of the Rogers Act and a Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Roosevelt discussed the Service in terms of its inadequacies as of 1919. Rep-
representative Rogers subsequently reported to Wilbur Carr that FDR was "definitely unfavorable" to diplomats, although he thought "consuls were good." She concluded that President Roosevelt possessed "no clear picture of the Foreign Service." 62

The Service had changed significantly since 1924. It was, for instance, much less elitist and more receptive to men of diverse social and economic backgrounds. To officer George S. Messersmith, who began his career as a consul in 1915 following several years as a high school teacher and who lacked independent wealth, the Service had become by the mid-1930s "unquestionably as democratic as one could be devised." 63

Additional reforms, nevertheless, beckoned for attention. A malaise born of long-standing public opprobrium toward diplomats and reinforced by economic deprivations stemming from the Depression haunted the Foreign Service. Acute sensitivity to the lack of public support for their profession embittered many diplomats. 64

62 Crane, Mr. Carr, 314.
64 The articles by Kennan, cited supra, are prime examples.
In addition, internal divisions, competition for primacy in foreign affairs with other federal agencies, principally the Department of Commerce, and a deeply-held feeling among diplomats of the need to protect themselves from a hostile environment inhibited innovative thinking about the conduct of diplomacy and weakened the diplomatic establishment at a time of increasing international tension.®

The need for leadership to restructure the foreign affairs bureaucracy and to instill in it a renewed vigor was clear.

President Roosevelt chose to ignore the need. He never looked beyond the superficial portrait that he drew of diplomats as cookie-pushers, tea-drinkers, and idlers. He saw only the outward appearances, not the inward substance of diplomacy. He never seriously considered reexamining his indictment of the diplomatic profession. Nor did he proffer any positive antidote for the ills, real or imagined, that he judged beset the Foreign Service.

FDR was more inclined to discipline the diplomats than to reform the Foreign Service. In 1936, for instance,®

®The United States foreign affairs bureaucracy was small and compact, even by the standards of the 1930s, reflecting, no doubt, the passive role the U.S. played then in world affairs. It is a mistake to equate the present bureaucratic apparatus with that of the 1930s, as Wilson and McKinzie do. "Masks of Power," 475. They refer to "the chaotic foreign affairs bureaucracy," a description more relevant to modern times.
Roosevelt suggested to Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore that "we should have a definite rule that hereafter the President will not reappoint to the Foreign Service any former officers...who have resigned and become officials of the [State] Department." He further suggested that "we should discourage appointing any Foreign Service officer as officials of the Department."  

Previous administrations periodically assigned Foreign Service officers—a few, not all—to tours of duty in the State Department to benefit from their expertise. Such a tour also provided the officer with an opportunity to live in the United States for an extended period of time. Most were senior officers. By law, an officer whose stay in the Department exceeded four years had to resign from the Service: Upon presidential authorization, he then could become an official of the Department or be reinstated to the Service. 

In seeking to abolish this practice, infrequent as it was, Roosevelt offered no rationale. He simply wanted to prevent, one might surmise, the "cohabitation" of Foreign

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66May 27, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 314. See also FDR to Rudolph Forster, Executive Clerk, White House Offices, May 23, 1936, ibid., 310.

Service and State Department personnel, who easily came to share common perspectives. Had the President possessed positive intentions, he would have expressed them. He did not. Although limitations in the number of competent experts available to fill Department slots prevented the implementation of Roosevelt's "definite rule," his suggestion characterized his approach to the need for improvement of Foreign Service operations.

Roosevelt sought to punish the diplomats in other ways as well. He held no animosity toward Foreign Service officers who performed consular functions. Like the average American who knew anything at all about the Foreign Service, FDR distinguished between diplomats and consuls. He believed that the latter were hard-working, unpretentious men who provided useful services to the nation. Early in 1935 Roosevelt ordered the State Department to inform those diplomatic officers of pre-Rogers Act vintage who had no consular experience that the President expected their transfer to the consular branch as part of their training requisite to consideration for promotion to a ministerial post. He would consider no diplomat, whatever his background, for chief-of-mission status unless the diplomat
had consular experience.\textsuperscript{68} Ostensibly, FDR wanted "all diplomats to have at least one consular assignment in order to gain administrative experience and make contact with the business world."\textsuperscript{69} In actuality, he wanted to humble the diplomats, to extract punitive retribution for their elitist demeanor.

The protests FDR received over his policy on diplomat-consul interchangeability surprised him. He anticipated resistance from the senior diplomats. One of the first to question the President's wisdom, however, was Jesse Isidor Straus, the head of Macy's department store whom Roosevelt had appointed ambassador to France. From Paris, Straus wrote to FDR in April 1935:

\begin{quote}
I understand that an effort is being made in the various appointments in the Foreign Service to insist upon experience in both branches [diplomatic and consular] of that service. Of this in theory I heartily approve, provided, however, that there is a realization that there is a difference in type, in background, in acquaintanceship with social amenities and customs that must be observed. A good administrative type may be a first class Consul or Vice Consul, but often he is not at all fitted for a service in which social
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{68}Hooker, Moffat Papers, 124; Crane, Mr. Carr, 318-319. See also Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 210; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 212-213; Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 183; Jefferson Patterson, Diplomatic Duty and Diversion (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1956), 187, 206.

\textsuperscript{69}Hooker, Moffat Papers, 124.
contacts are essential, whether the envious, devoid of certain characteristics, admit it or not.70

A man of impeccable business credentials and limited diplomatic experience, Straus perceived that less than pragmatic motives inspired the President's policy. He also perceived a difference in the abilities and functions of diplomats and consuls.

Roosevelt soon retreated from his strict policy on interchangeability. In September, Nicholas Roosevelt, a distant Republican cousin of the President's and a former chief-of-mission under Hoover then working on the editorial staff of the New York Herald-Tribune, added his voice to the list of protesters. With a list in hand of proposed transfers in the Foreign Service, which he may have obtained surreptitiously, Nicholas questioned FDR's foresight at a time when new crises arose abroad almost daily. In particular, he wondered about the wisdom in transferring Jay Pierrepont Moffat, chief of the Department's Division of Western European Affairs, to Sidney, Australia, as consul general.71 FDR replied that

70 April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 467.

71 Notation, ibid., III, 10.
"Moffat was delighted to go" but that "no other shifts" would occur "in the present emergency." 72

The career diplomats, themselves, were slow to react publicly to the president's directive on transfers. Although the senior diplomats, especially, never embraced the concept of interchangeability with consuls, they had accepted it in principle by the time FDR ascended to the White House. In part, the "scandal of 1927" had forced them to accept transfers as a reality. They also had employed the argument that diplomats, no less than consuls, could and did assist American businesses overseas: They had done so as a means to the end of achieving career status for their profession; they could not now comfortably argue for the recognition of distinctions between diplomats and consuls, distinctions they had worked to blur.

Distinctions did exist, however. Most Foreign Service officers, whether they served in the diplomatic or consular branch, knew as much. Yet, they had never deigned to define publicly the differences in diplomatic and consular work. 73

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72 FDR to Nicholas Roosevelt, September 19, 1935, ibid., III, 10. Moffat felt the policy on transfers "was fine only if the diplomat was a poor organizer." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 124.

73 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 122.
Nearly all officers, whether distinguished for their administrative or analytical abilities, coveted the diplomatic rank of chief-of-mission. Nearly all of them also believed that American laymen and politicians were incapable of understanding diplomatic functions apart from consular work. Too often the public had revealed scorn for diplomacy. The officers had preferred, therefore, to deal with the distinctions between diplomatic and consular work through internal bureaucratic processes.

The Foreign Service finally addressed the issue of diplomatic versus consular work in an article in *The Foreign Affairs Quarterly* published in January 1936. The author of the article, G. Howland Shaw, a young career officer, argued that excessive attention had been focused upon the administration of the Foreign Service to the virtual exclusion of the more vital elements of work and personnel. "We must now face a fact that for eleven years we have endeavored to conceal. The work of the higher positions in the diplomatic branch differ from that of the average comparable positions in the consular branch." The diplomatic branch, Shaw explained, afforded greater opportunity for individuality,

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74 Ibid.

75 Shaw, "American Foreign Service," 323-333.
initiative, and imagination, whereas the consular branch required organizational and administrative skills. He deplored the concept that shuffled diplomats into consular positions and vice versa. The emphasis in consular work is on the perfection of individual problems, rather than on analytical thought or deduction based on broad trends; a man who is a first-rate administrator does not necessarily make a first-rate ambassador, any more than the possession of those qualities that make an outstanding ambassador guarantees success in administering a large and complex consular office. "Such differences of aptitude and therefore of function are recognized in other lines of work," Shaw wrote. "Why should they not be recognized in the Foreign Service?" He then offered several suggestions for the development of officers according to their interests and abilities.76

In part Shaw's article signaled the healing of the schism that had existed between diplomats and consuls since at least 1924.77 He articulated the views of the post-Rogers Act generation of diplomats, officers who had little stake in the quarrels that beset the older diplomats. The

76 Ibid., 327-332.

77 Heinrichs provides a detailed analysis of Shaw, his career, and his article in relation to the Foreign Service. "Bureaucracy," 154-179, 185-188, 192-200.
new, younger group of officers identified themselves exclusively with the Foreign Service. 78

In his article, Shaw set aside the old battles and offered a new direction for leadership within the Service. Indicative of the support for Shaw's thought among officers was the plea of one amateur ambassador that FDR appoint Shaw as chief of Foreign Service Personnel. "The morale of the Service," Ambassador William C. Bullitt wrote to Roosevelt in May 1937, "is becoming more demoralized every day and nothing could turn the tide of discouragement so quickly and completely as his [Shaw's] appointment." 79

In part, too, Shaw's article reflected an attempt to explain the mission and needs of the Foreign Service to an audience outside of the diplomatic community. "The work of the American Foreign Service," the article began, "has often been shrouded in mystery. In reality there is nothing mysterious about it." Shaw proceeded to describe the work of the Foreign Service and the historical and current constraints under which American diplomats functioned. He also offered several suggestions for reforming the management

78 Shaw entered the Diplomatic Corps in 1918. Ibid., 185-188.

79 May 5, 1937, Bullitt, For the President, 212. Shaw was appointed chief of Foreign Service personnel later that year.
of the Service. 80

The article garnered a wide readership within the diplomatic community. Whether President Roosevelt read the article or contemplated its recommendations is doubtful. No evidence exists to suggest that he did. The State Department and Foreign Service did implement several organizational reforms during Roosevelt's second term. The President's role in instigating these reforms was negligible.

VII

The major impetus for reform of the foreign affairs bureaucracy originated from within the State Department. 81 Under the direction of Secretary Hull, the Department quietly began to formulate plans for reorganizing its internal operations in 1935. Policy formulation always had interested Hull more than matters of administration. He recognized that the Department could not devote serious attention to formulating sound, long-range policies without a more

80 "American Foreign Service," 323, 327-332.

81 See Moore to FDR, December 15, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 541; "Hull Reorganizes State Department," The New York Times, May 27, 1937, A3. The Times article noted that a quiet reorganization had been underway in the Department for the past two years.
efficient system of meeting the demands of immediate problems. Although the Department "was excellently informed about its trees," it "had no time to care for the woods entrusted to it." And to Hull, the era had passed when the United States could afford to treat policy merely as a response to a crisis.

A series of departmental orders issued in May and August 1937 transformed the State Department's internal operations. These orders rearranged and reduced the geographical divisions in the Department. A new division of European Affairs, for instance, absorbed the old division of Eastern European Affairs, while a division of American Republics consolidated the divisions of Mexican and Latin American Affairs. The orders also created, with congressional approval, several new advisory positions and the office of counselor. Through reorganization, the Department's hierarchy hoped to provide more time for personnel to devote to

82 Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224.
83 Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department," 714.
84 Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 224-225; Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department, 713-714; Miller, "New State Department," 500-501.
the consideration and formulation of broad governmental policies.\(^85\)

The Department remained a compact and a highly integrated organization. In marked contrast to most reorganizations of governmental agencies, the reorganization of the State Department did not result in the hiring of additional personnel. Nor did the Department receive additional appropriations to implement its plans. Indeed, Hull claimed that his efforts to reshape the Department had resulted in the "weeding out" of forty to fifty inferior officers through voluntary or forced resignations since 1935.\(^86\)

The reorganization of the Department did produce, however, a substantial shuffling of personnel. Reorganizational schemes often contain a hidden agenda to shift personnel.\(^87\) Such may have been the case, at least in part,

\(^85\) George Messersmith returned to the Department as an assistant secretary of state in 1937 after a tour as ambassador to Austria and played a crucial role in the reorganization planning and implementation.


of the changes implemented by the Department. Beginning in 1938, several Foreign Service officers—mostly of the younger generation—received transfers to the Department where they became chiefs of various divisions. G. Howland Shaw, for instance, became chief of Foreign Service Personnel. Simultaneously, several older officials, including Carr, received assignments abroad as chiefs-of-mission. 88

The reorganization of 1937 preceded a more significant development that occurred on the eve of World War II. For two decades the Department of State had faced the steady encroachment of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce into the area of foreign relations. Both departments operated their own independent foreign services. The Commerce Department, especially, had involved itself increasingly in questions of a political nature, instead of simply providing liaison support to American businesses overseas. Responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations had become fragmented. In 1936 the State Department initiated a concerted effort to establish its control over foreign affairs. 89

88 Myers and Ransom, "Reorganization of the State Department," 506-507; Miller, "New State Department," 716-717; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 130-131. See also Chapter 5 infra.

89 For example, see Moore to FDR, December 15, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 541; Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 225.
The State Department realized its objective with congressional approval of President Roosevelt's executive reorganization plan in 1939. The President's plan instituted a broad reordering of bureaus and agencies within the executive branch. Among the changes in his plan was the amalgamation of the foreign services of agriculture and commerce into the United States Foreign Service under the supervision of the secretary of state. With amalgamation, the State Department finally assumed the dominant role for the conduct of American foreign relations, a role envisioned for the Department in the Rogers Act of 1924.\textsuperscript{90}

Roosevelt's support for the State Department's position in the reorganization plan was not quixotic. Roosevelt harbored no ideals about how and why foreign affairs should be consolidated under the direction of the State Department. His support derived from less loftier motives. From a professional and bureaucratic perspective, the fragmentation of authority and responsibility for foreign affairs was wasteful and unwieldy. From FDR's perspective, Herbert Hoover's old department—the Department of Commerce—was partially responsible for the Depression. More than to

\textsuperscript{90} Heinrichs states: "As a result of these developments (and others), the Foreign Service on the eve of World War II was stable, confident, and improving. This was perhaps the most favorable position it would ever achieve." "Bureaucracy," 200. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 222-223.
grant firm control in foreign relations to the diplomats, Roosevelt wanted to weaken the powerful position the Commerce Department had enjoyed with American businesses since the 1920s. Including the foreign service of the Agriculture Department in his reorganization plan merely served to conceal his motives. He always intended to be his own secretary of state.

VIII

President Roosevelt demonstrated scant regard for the Foreign Service bequeathed to him by his predecessors. In 1933 he inherited a young, imperfect, but steadily improving professional diplomatic corps. Under his administration, the development of the Foreign Service virtually halted. Retrenchment and restoration, devoid of any significant departures or progress, marked the path along which the Service traveled under the New Deal. By the time of the opening salvos of World War II, the Service had changed little since the 1920s.

Members of the corps were less illusioned, less enamored with diplomatic life, more inured to hardships, and more professional in their orientations. The Service

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91 Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 215.
92 Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 188-201.
was also vastly understrength, given the new demands placed upon it. As the result of economy measures and highly selective recruitment, the Service had only grown by 30 percent since the Rogers Act. Many officers were near retirement. Despite the presence of many talented diplomats within the Service, the future augured the onset of anemia. The Service suffered from the lack of life-sustaining transfusions—the infusion of new recruits, who require years of training and experience to develop into professional diplomats, and upon whom the future institutional capacity of the nation to conduct diplomacy rested.

Underlying the lack of development sustained by the Foreign Service was FDR's prejudice against career diplomats. The Depression forced austerity on the Service and inhibited Roosevelt from assuming a more active role in foreign affairs. The Depression did not shape his behavior regarding the Service. The Depression was more a situation that constrained the making of foreign policy than it was a factor that conditioned attitudes toward the machinery responsible for implementing policy. With rare exception, FDR confined his interest in the Foreign Service to admonishing certain characteristics that he perceived in diplomats.

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93 Ibid., 201.
Roosevelt's prejudices against the Foreign Service reflected traditional, popular American attitudes toward diplomats and diplomacy. He personified the "chronic distaste of democratic opinion for the image of the professional diplomatic agent." He suspected career diplomats for their isolation from the mainstream of American society, for their mode of dress and social mannerisms, and for their presumed leanings toward foreign ways and thoughts. He sometimes thought that career diplomats should reimburse the government for allowing them to lead their idyllic lives. Although he liked consuls, whom he judged by little more than their presumed appearance, he associated the Foreign Service with the unflattering popular image of the old Diplomatic Service.

Like the average American FDR seldom subjected his prejudices against diplomats to critical analysis. He considered the Foreign Service unrepresentative of American society and less than suitable as a vehicle for the promulgation of United States foreign policy. Combined with his haphazard administrative methods and penchant for personal diplomacy, his attitudes bespoke a lack of concern for the development of an institutional diplomatic capability. He simply had little use for the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service, nevertheless, still conducted the
bulk of the nation's diplomacy under FDR. How well American diplomacy fared during the tumultuous years prior to World War II depended, in part, upon the chiefs-of-mission that FDR appointed to head the embassies and legations abroad. In the matter of appointments, no less than in other aspects concerning the Foreign Service, Roosevelt found little to attract him to professional diplomats.

On the eve of World War II, the President cordially ridiculed career chiefs-of-mission in a memorandum to Secretary of State Hull. "You get to be a Minister if (a) you are loyal to the Service, (b) you do nothing to offend people, (c) you are not intoxicated at public functions."94 Although FDR was partially correct, he might have added, in fairness, another compendium of qualifications for selection as chief-of-mission, to wit, if you possess no diplomatic experience, you are a loyal Democrat, and you have contributed to the campaign coffers.

During a press conference in the executive offices of the White House on July 12, 1933, a reporter queried President Roosevelt regarding reports that he had encountered "difficulty in finding enough rich Democrats to fill the diplomatic posts." FDR replied bluntly. "Now don't you believe it. I have in the diplomatic folder, I think there are two hundred and fifty or three hundred names of deserving Democrats who would like to have places under any condition, salary or no salary." As an afterthought, Roosevelt added: "Then, for instance, just to give you an example, we have career diplomats. Of course, we are going to keep them in."  

President Roosevelt deviated little from traditional ways of selecting men to represent the United States abroad.


2Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
Like most presidents before and since, he reserved the most prestigious and important diplomatic posts for loyal partisans. Although he appointed nearly as many career diplomats as deserving Democrats to head diplomatic missions, he relegated the career chiefs to the least desirable and least significant posts.

That career officers headed a proportionate share of the diplomatic missions derived more from the tenacity of State Department officials than from the beneficence of the President. Like most Foreign Service officers before and since, the career diplomats and their colleagues in the Department viewed the appointment of chiefs-of-mission with particular sensitivity. Chief-of-mission status represented the highest mark of professional distinction within the diplomatic community.

The appointment of amateurs denigrated the office in the eyes of the diplomats and their foreign counterparts. The appointment of amateurs also augured for the relinquishment of a measure of professional diplomatic control over foreign policy. Amateurs owed their loyalty to the White House, not to the Foreign Service. With political acumen born of earlier struggles to enhance their profession, the diplomats engaged FDR and his patronage advisers in a battle over appointments.

President Roosevelt established and maintained the boundaries within which the struggle ensued. In typical Rooseveltian fashion, he allowed the proponents of patronage and
the proponents of professionalism to compete for his favor in the selection of envoys. He delegated responsibility to both factions for recommending nominees, while reserving final authority for the selections to himself.

Roosevelt never cherished the idea of appointing career diplomats to American legations and embassies. In the end, the precedent of appointing career diplomats as chiefs-of-mission, established during the 1920s, contributed to the relative success of the diplomats as much as any other factor. The ratio of approximately equal career-to-noncareer appointments, reached under Hoover in 1932, remained unchanged under the New Deal. After 1944 the proportion of career chiefs-of-mission again rose steadily. By 1960 career diplomats filled 71 percent of the United States missions abroad.

Had Roosevelt wanted to, he could have appointed substantially more career diplomats as chiefs-of-mission. Despite the pressures of patronage, the opportunity to do so existed, particularly after 1936. Then, with the increasing erosion of world peace, even the President's dispensers of patronage would have approved. Instead, little changed. Imbued with a commanding assurance of his own diplomatic abilities, Roosevelt viewed the need for experienced representation abroad in the same light that he viewed the
value of a healthy Foreign Service.

Loyal Democrats and Roosevelt supporters awaited the advent of the New Deal with eager anticipation in 1933. FDR's triumph of the previous November ended twelve years of Republican dominance of the White House. With the long drought over, the Democratic faithful looked forward to a hearty feast at the trough of political patronage. Rarely in the history of the United States, one commentator wrote, had a national administration faced so much pressure from hungry job-seekers.³

The President-elect was inclined to satisfy them. FDR harbored few qualms regarding the application of spoils politics. A tireless, adroit player of the patronage game, the former New York Governor well understood the strategies of job distribution. Shortly after the election, Roosevelt informed his closest associates that, while he would not accept "political suggestions" for cabinet appointments, loyalty and campaign contributions naturally would be among the criteria for many other appointments.⁴

³Harold Brayman, "Roosevelt and the Spoilsmen," Current History, 41 (October 1934), 17.
⁴Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1947), 123.
FDR especially wanted the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" men to receive just awards. Known by the acronym RBC, the group numbered thirty-four. While many traditionally large Democratic contributors waited until after the Chicago nominating convention to commit themselves, the RBC group thoroughly won Roosevelt's devotion by pledging considerable financial assistance to his bid for the nomination. Following the election, FDR's close advisers formed an informal committee for the purpose of "taking care" of the RBC people. As one adviser, Edward J. Flynn, remarked: "There was more or less tacit understanding between the President-nominate and us that wherever possible they should be taken care of." Seven members of the RBC group later sought and received prestigious diplomatic appointments.

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Gunther states: "Roosevelt was a long-minded man. To the end of his life he maintained a zealous loyalty to almost all members of the small original clique of his supporters, and indeed to most others who came out for him before the actual nomination....Conversely, he never forgave some leading Democrats who opposed him, or were lukewarm, before the Chicago Convention. It is striking in the extreme that he never gave any really big job to any Democrat, no matter how eminent or potentially useful, who did not think he was fit to be President in 1932." Roosevelt in Retrospect, 265.

6 The 7 immediate members of the RBC group who received diplomatic assignments were: Judge Robert Bingham, Joe Davies, Joseph Kennedy, Breckinridge Long, David H.
The task of assembling information on deserving Democrats fell to James A. "Big Jim" Farley. A strapping, genial, redheaded Irishman and former New York boxing commissioner, Farley had worked "with furious energy" as chairman of the Democratic National Committee during the 1932 campaign. Following the election, Roosevelt slated Farley for postmaster general, a position traditionally held by the "keeper of the plum tree." Roosevelt's advisers concurred with the choice of Farley as the administration's chief dispenser of spoils: No other man knew more about who ought to be rewarded and why.⁷

Farley plunged into his job as "captain of spoils" with unabashed enthusiasm. Flouting custom, he publicly proclaimed that his job was to reward the politically deserving. In regard to the customs patrol along the Mexican border, Farley announced to the press that "Democrats would look just as well riding horses as Republicans."⁸


Morris, Laurence Steinhardt, and Jesse Isidor Straus. Several others, just as loyal to FDR, but on the fringe of the RBC group also received eminent diplomatic posts. See chapter 5 infra.
He openly systematized patronage procedures. Not content to rely upon memory alone, Farley developed an elaborate filing system. He established a folder for every person who sought a position, and he maintained numerous lists of political loyalists and their preferences. One list—the Preferred List—comprised the names of those who qualified for major appointments by virtue of their political loyalty and munificent financial donations to the campaign coffers.

The Preferred List included many potential candidates for chief-of-mission posts. Like nearly all administrations before and since, the New Deal administration regarded ambassadorships as prize plums with which to reward the more generous campaign contributors. The Preferred List was also the one patronage list that commanded FDR's assiduous attention. He was its principal compiler.

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9Ibid., 17-20; New Dealers, 244-246.


11Ibid. Many presidents have maintained a Preferred List—at least in the twentieth century. For instance, an eyewitness recounts how President Eisenhower, glancing down the list, recalled that he had promised Senator Aiken of Vermont to appoint the first person from that state who made the Preferred List to a particular vacancy. Reportedly, Ike casually stated: "Take him--take this fellow from Vermont." U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974,
Foreign Service officers were naturally apprehensive of their fate under the new Democratic administration. Prior to Roosevelt's inauguration, word circulated throughout the State Department that the President-elect distrusted professional diplomats and viewed the development of the Foreign Service during the 1920s with a jaundiced eye.12

Most officers were assured of job security by law. The Rogers Act had granted career status to the diplomats, and no public official seriously considered undoing what the Rogers Act had accomplished. Nevertheless, the President's biases, as well as the pressures of patronage, appeared to limit the prospects for promotion to the rank of chief-of-mission for many career diplomats.

Career diplomats who served as chiefs-of-mission under President Hoover awaited the commencement of the Roosevelt administration with particular anxiety. Technically, these officers were without legal protection. United States ministers and ambassadors served at the pleasure of the President; they were his personal representatives to other

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12 Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72, 79.
chiefs-of-state. Once a diplomat accepted an appointment as a chief-of-mission, he was no longer regarded as a Foreign Service officer under the law. If a President replaced him with a political appointee or with another diplomat, he could be readmitted into the Service only upon authorization of the President. In 1933 rumors abounded that President Roosevelt intended to dismiss all chiefs-of-mission who had had close ties with the Hoover administration.\(^\text{13}\)

To the diplomats who held chief-of-mission posts in 1932 the advent of the New Deal invoked nightmarish visions of the last Democratic regime. In 1913 the administration of Woodrow Wilson virtually obliterated the progress achieved in appointing only professional diplomats as chiefs-of-mission. Wilson and his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, dismissed nearly all of their predecessor's veteran, as well as political, ministers and ambassadors.

The appointment of Raymond Moley as an assistant secretary of state only served to heighten the disquietude

\(^{13}\) Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360; Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-323.
of the professional diplomatic corps. Temporarily vacating his position as a professor of government and political science at Columbia University, Moley joined the Roosevelt entourage early in 1932, and quickly established himself as the leader of Governor Roosevelt's "Brain Trust." A man of strong views, exaggerated self-importance, and phenomenal tactlessness, Moley held an intense antipathy toward career diplomats, whom he beheld as rather elegant, pro-British, white-spats boys.  

Roosevelt ensconced Moley in the State Department more for reasons of personal convenience than for matters relating to foreign affairs. Congress provided no funds for White House assistants until 1939. The President wanted his chief trouble-shooter where he could be reached quickly. Besides a salary, the position of assistant secretary of state provided Moley with an office adjacent to the executive offices of the White House. In appointing Moley to the State Department, Roosevelt neither consulted with Secretary Hull nor defined Moley's duties.  

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14 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (N.Y.: Harper Brothers, 1939), 131, and "Shake-Up," Newsweek, 10 (July 17, 1937), 44. See also New Dealers, 324-329; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt III, 317-318; Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 204.  

15 Feis, Characters in Crisis, 100; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 135, 363-364.
One of Moley's informal tasks was that of ousting from the State Department all Hooverites. Upon his appointment in March 1933, Moley immediately discerned that "the New Deal desperately needed friends in the State Department." On March 6, Moley conducted a brief press conference during which he announced that he "would certainly work to clean out the Department of all Republicans." When several reporters responded that career diplomats had "no politics," Moley declared that anyone who had served in the Hoover administration had politics.

II

The prospect of a massive infusion of politically-appointed amateurs into the diplomatic ranks deeply disturbed Secretary of State Cordell Hull. A distinguished trim-looking gentleman of sixty-two, Hull was in the twilight of his career in public service when Roosevelt tapped him to head the State Department in 1933. For twenty-three years, Hull had served loyally the state of Tennessee and the Democratic party as a U.S. congressman and senator. From 1921 to 1924, he had held his party's national chairmanship. A lawyer by training, Hull was also idealistic. As secretary of state,

16 Moley, After Seven Years, 114.

17 Diary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90.
he aspired to be an elder statesman of the stature of a Thomas Jefferson or of a John Quincy Adams. He profoundly wanted to be above politics.

Hull long had believed that United States foreign affairs "should not be the football of domestic politics." As a congressman in 1914, he had witnessed the Wilson administration's blatant use of spoils politics to fill diplomatic missions.

I could not but remember [Hull wrote] the long line of suitcases stretching along the corridor wall outside of William Jennings Bryan's office when he became Wilson's Secretary of State. They belonged seemingly to every Tom, Dick and Harry from the 'sticks' who had been his friends and had done Democratic service. These men came straight from the railroad station to this office, without even going to a hotel, feeling sure that he would instantly create jobs for them.19

The portrait of a secretary of state actively engaged in patronage politics was repugnant to Hull.

The Secretary held professional diplomats in high esteem. The knowledge and political wisdom of those career officers Hull met in the early days of the New Deal administration, and later, impressed him. Although bereft of


diplomatic experience himself, he appreciated the advantage of experience in the conduct of foreign policy, especially in times of acute international tension. "It matters not how brilliant an appointee may be," Hull stated, "he is helpless when deep-seated questions arise in rapid succession about whose background he knows little or nothing."20 The inexperienced amateur envoy, Hull thought, was more apt to be a liability than an asset in the conduct of United States foreign relations.

Hull had no intention of sanctioning the wholesale replacement of professional envoys with amateurs. Early in the spring of 1933, he recommended to Roosevelt that diplomatic appointments be divided equally between career and noncareer men. The Secretary had hoped that his recommendation would counter those presidential advisers who urged that "sweeping changes" be made in the Foreign Service to accommodate deserving Democrats.21 Hull was sufficiently realistic to appreciate the improbability of preventing the bestowal of some diplomatic posts as political rewards. If the status quo could be preserved, if the precedent established during the 1920s of appointing career officers to at least half of the posts could be

20Ibid., 181, 188-189.
21Ibid., 179, 181-182.
maintained, the Secretary would be satisfied.

President Roosevelt responded equivocally to Hull's proposal on diplomatic appointments. Ingeniously indirect with people on nearly all matters, FDR neither approved nor disapproved Hull's prescription. To Roosevelt, who displayed dogmatic inconsistency, a proposal to establish a policy on diplomatic appointments, however broad, appeared too staid, too implacable. Instead, the President indicated to Hull that he would entertain suggestions on diplomatic appointments from the State Department as well as offering his own recommendations from time-to-time.

With his recommendation to FDR on diplomatic appointments, Hull ended his active participation in the selection of chiefs-of-mission. He early decided not to concern himself with appointments. As befitted a secretary of state, he preferred to concentrate upon broad policy matters and

22 From Hull's recommendation, Warren Ilchman concludes that FDR and Hull early agreed upon a rough balance between career and noncareer appointments. Ilchman provides no other documentation to support his contention, which he employs to support his claim that "every administration and its Secretary of State in the period [1924-1939] advanced the cause of professional diplomacy." Moreover, Ilchman states that Hull had "a strong voice in the appointment of ambassadors and ministers." Professional Diplomacy, 212-213.

23 Hull, Memoirs, I, 200-201. See also Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 22.
to leave administrative affairs to his subordinates. 24

Hull also disliked making direct representations to
the President. A proud man with a reservoir of humility who
endeavored to avoid confrontation, Hull despaired early
of Roosevelt's disregard of him. More than once Hull
complained about "that man across the street who never tells
me anything." 25 In his twelve years as secretary of state,
a tenure unmatched by any other secretary, Hull received few
invitations from FDR to discuss foreign matters. During
World War II, FDR almost totally ignored him. 26

24 Moley, First New Deal, 241. See also Beatrice Bishop
Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids,
1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (N.Y.: Har-
court, Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 110; R. Walton Moore to
Bullitt, May 20, 1937, Bullitt, For the President, 214.
Then an assistant secretary of state, Moore wrote Bullitt
in regard to the selection of a successor to Undersecretary
of State Phillips: "I can also understand in what a sweat
the Secretary has been involved for several months, in view
of his disinclination to deal with the matter of appointments."

25 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 459.

26 The cordial but distant relationship Hull had with
FDR is well-known. Numerous contemporaries and historians
have described the details. For instance, see Crane, Mr.
Carr, 310, 324-325, 357; Hooker, Moffat Papers, 93, 108;
Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil
War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 18-21;
Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 184-207; Pratt, Cordell Hull, I,
Hull's influence with Roosevelt was marginal. Domestic political expediency, not foreign policy, had bound Roosevelt and Hull together. In his years on Capitol Hill as a congressman, Hull had acquired many important friends. "Judge Hull" from Tennessee would be, FDR reasoned, a politically valuable member of his cabinet, dominated as it was by Northern liberals. Roosevelt always intended to be his own secretary of state.27

To discuss appointments with FDR and his political cronies ventured to be an unpleasant experience for Hull. In Hull's opinion, petty politics too often guided Roosevelt's actions.28 Besides, Hull was not familiar with the qualifications of many of the members of the Foreign Service who might be worthy of promotion to chief-of-mission status. Consequently, he entrusted to his undersecretary of state the responsibility of conferring with the White House on diplomatic appointments.29

The position of undersecretary of state has become over the years a post comparable to that of the executive officer

27Drummond, "Cordell Hull," 194-196; Crane, Mr. Carr, 310; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 459.
28Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-20.
of a ship. Whereas the secretary is the captain, the undersecretary is in charge of day-to-day operations, including recommending to the captain the placement of subordinates. Today, the position of undersecretary is one of great responsibility, reserved for men of high professional calibre, whether from within or outside the Foreign Service.  

The role of the undersecretary was still largely experimental in 1933. Then, the undersecretary could receive or assume any number of responsibilities. Of the nine men who had borne the title since the creation of the office in 1919, six had been political appointees and three had come from the ranks of the diplomatic corps. Foreign Service officers considered the office more as a stepping-stone to higher posts abroad than a major appointment at home. Although ranked number two in the hierarchy, the undersecretary received $1,000 less in salary than the four assistant secretaries.  

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30 Harr, Professional Diplomat, 107, 334-335. Chester Bowles noted that as undersecretary in the Kennedy administration, he was given primary responsibility for recruitment of chiefs-of-mission. Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), 315.  


As a condition for accepting the secretaryship, Hull insisted that his chief lieutenant be a person of experience who knew the diplomatic world. Hull appreciated his own limitations in diplomacy. He also held an aversion to the social amenities that accompanied the life of the nation's number one diplomat, as well as to the administrative responsibilities of a cabinet officer. He hoped that the undersecretary would attend to the necessities of diplomatic entertainment and to administrative matters. Hull's stipulation also eliminated Raymond Moley as a contender to the office. With Hull's warm endorsement, Roosevelt chose William Phillips.  

Phillips served as undersecretary through most of FDR's first administration. In 1936 he received an assignment he had long coveted, the ambassadorship to Rome. Phillips' replacement as undersecretary was Sumner Welles, then assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs.

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Both Phillips and Welles could be counted upon to defend the interests of the Foreign Service. Both were career diplomats with distinguished records of service. Between them in 1933, Phillips at age 55 and Welles at 41 possessed a total of 47 years of diplomatic experience.

William Phillips epitomized the American professional diplomat. Described by a contemporary as "the career man's perfect picture of a diplomat," Phillips combined many of the attributes that marked the demeanor of the sophisticated, cosmopolitan diplomatist of the old world. He possessed complete self-assurance masked by an appealing shyness; he displayed a capacity for gracefulness under any circumstance and in any language; he was able "to say yes and no with such distinction as to leave one in doubt as to whether the sun sets in the east or west."\(^\text{36}\) Warm, friendly, and courteous, Phillips was also tenaciously loyal to the Foreign Service.

Phillips was one of the "founding fathers" of the

Foreign Service. A member of a wealthy Boston Brahmin family and a great-nephew of Wendell Phillips, the abolitionist, he decided during his senior year at Harvard to seek a career in diplomacy. Like many American diplomats of his generation, Phillips found the prospect of a family business career too confining, too much a life of ease. Imbued with a sense of *noblesse oblige*, he responded to the call of progressives like Theodore Roosevelt to entertain service in the public interest. In 1903 he entered the Diplomatic Service as a private, nonsalaried secretary to Ambassador Joseph H. Choate in London. Eager and intelligent, Phillips heeded every opportunity to learn diplomatic procedure and to cultivate contacts in diplomatic society. That he counted among his early friends Franklin D. Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Cordell Hull helped assure him of a long diplomatic career.

Phillips rose rapidly among the diplomatic ranks. In 1907 he became chief of the newly-created Division of Far Eastern Affairs within the State Department. In December

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Phillips' career can be traced in his *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). See also Schulzing-er, *Diplomatic Mind*, 54-58; Werking, *Master Architects*, 131. Feis states of Phillips: "His presence provided signs of continuity in the State Department; his dress, gentlemanly manners and direct talk reminded me of what I had found admirable in the upper reaches of Boston society when I was a student at Harvard....Phillips' assignments in other lands made him feel closer to people of another race, religion or color than the usual members of the Boston society to which he belonged." *Characters in Crisis*, 100.
1908, President Theodore Roosevelt elevated him to assistant secretary of state. At the same time, Phillips gained admission to the select social group of the President's friends known as the "tennis cabinet." In 1920, after several years in which his career followed a more erratic course, Phillips received his first chief-of-mission post, that of minister to the Hague. From 1922 to 1924, he served as undersecretary of state, the Department's fourth, and played a major role in securing the creation of the career service.

Even more so perhaps than Phillips, Welles "was the quintessential diplomat." In the words of commentators and peers alike, he possessed "a firm hold on everyone of the diplomatic virtues." Welles combined studiousness with worldliness; cosmopolitanism became him naturally. Six feet three inches tall and always impeccably dressed in Savile Row suits, Welles presented an impressive figure. 38

Fourteen years junior to Phillips in age, Welles' rise

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in the diplomatic corps was meteoric. He entered the old Diplomatic Service in 1915 as a private secretary, carrying with him a letter of recommendation from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. In six years Welles became chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, the youngest divisional head in the history of the State Department. Welles was then twenty-nine years old. During the 1920s he served the Republican administrations as an adviser on the volatile situation in the Dominican Republic. He also published a creditable two-volume history of that country in 1928. 40

The appointment of Phillips and Welles to positions in the New Deal administration was almost axiomatic. FDR enjoyed a special relationship with both. During the Wilson administration, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt dined often with William and Caroline Phillips, firmly cementing a friendship that had begun almost twenty years earlier by virtue of shared backgrounds. Similarly, Welles shared with FDR, as well as with Phillips, a Groton and Harvard education, security of wealth, high social standing, and mutual friends. Moreover, Welles had served as a page at

the Roosevelt wedding in 1905.41 Among all State Department officials, Welles was Eleanor's favorite, one of the few inhabitants of Foggy Bottom she trusted.42 The trust FDR embraced for Welles and Phillips derived not from their credentials as career diplomats but from the comfortable friendship, erected upon common foundations, each had developed with FDR over many years.43

Roosevelt knew he could rely upon the fidelity of Phillips and Welles to the New Deal. Neither was in the employ of the Hoover administration when FDR achieved his victory in 1933. Both were unemployed. After serving as the first American minister to Canada under Coolidge, Phillips found himself replaced by a political appointee soon after Hoover assumed office. Rather than reenlist in the Foreign Service, Phillips opted for a few years of retirement.44 A similar experience found

41 Traina provides one of the best, short analyses of the FDR-Hull-Phillips-Welles relationship. Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-23. While Hull and Phillips got along well together, Hull and Welles did not. Welles often dealt directly with the White House, bypassing Hull to the latter's intense displeasure.

42 Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 375. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 130-131.

43 Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 22.

44 Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 296-298; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 149-155.
Welles acting as FDR's unofficial adviser on Latin American affairs during the 1932 campaign. Both hoped, however, to return to government service under FDR. Both also contributed to FDR's campaign, Welles' $2,500 donation topping Phillips' lesser offering of $1,000.45

IV

The knowledge that Phillips had assumed responsibility for the State Department on appointments revived the sagging spirits of the career diplomats. During his lengthy diplomatic career, Phillips had survived the purges that usually accompanied a change in administration. He had served under both Republican and Democratic presidents. Whenever his career had appeared in jeopardy—as it occasionally had—he had managed to reappear, often in a better post, much to the envy and admiration of some of his less fortunate colleagues.46

Phillips was a seasoned bureaucratic in-fighter. He understood that internal, bureaucratic politics—more so than

45 Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in a Depression Year," American Political Science Review, 27 (October 1933), 782. See also Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 206 ftn. 54.

46 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46, 57-59, 62-68, 100, 155.
electoral politics—was a tough business, that one had to identify the games, the players, the conditions, and the bargains, and act accordingly to succeed. To the advice that the British diplomat Humphrey Trevelyan offered his colleagues, Phillips would have nodded knowingly. Only half facetiously, Trevelyan wrote in 1973:

A diplomat should...above all, seek to pack the department with his friends. If he achieves this, he need have no thought for the morrow. His peccadilloes will be suppressed before they come to the ears of ministers perennially nervous of the press; his errors of judgment will be forgotten; his unfulfilled prophecies will be lost in the files; all will be given unto him.  

Phillips, like many of the first generation of American career diplomats, acquired a knowledge of the politics of survival in an era of blatant spoils politics.

Phillips was a charter member of the American diplomatic old-boy network. Whenever he had been in a position to do so, he saw that his fellow diplomats received preferential

47 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 151. Graham T. Allison states: "The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat..., each player's basic operating style..." Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 166.

On the modern-day Foreign Service, Harr notes: "Elitism is manifested in the essentially defensive posture of most FSO's in regard to the Service. If one is a member of an elite group there is a strong tendency toward having a stake in protecting the elitism of that group. This is done in a number of ways." Professional Diplomat, 209.
treatment. He also had found occasion to enlist the support of influential people, including a U.S. senator from his home state of Massachusetts, on his own behalf as well.48

Throughout his career Phillips managed to remain on the 'good side' of his colleagues and co-workers. In contrast to FDR, Phillips treated Hull with great deference, thereby earning him the Secretary's respect.49 "I found it pleasant to work with and for the new Under-Secretary," Herbert Feis, the Department's economic adviser, remarked.50 Although Phillips was to confront Farley and Moley on appointments, they never expressed rancor toward him. FDR's undersecretary of state could be beguiling.

Phillips prepared to do battle with the Farley-Moley patronage cartel soon after assuming his position as undersecretary of state in March. With Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur Carr, Phillips reviewed the status of the incumbent chiefs-of-mission. Carr, who served as the chief

48 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 45-46. See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 57, 171 fn. 28; Werking, Master Architects, 144; Kottman, "Hoover and Diplomatic Assignments," 287 fn. 8; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 19, 73-74.

49 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 185; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 77, 79.

50 Feis, Characters in Crisis, 100.
administrative officer of the Foreign Service, had prepared a detailed report on all of Hoover's chiefs-of-mission in anticipation of whatever changes the new administration might contemplate. In reviewing the report, Phillips and Carr designated in each case which chiefs could be regarded as patronage appointees in any sense, which ones--amateurs and professionals--the President probably would want to replace, and which posts might yield opportunities for the appointment of career officers. Their list was no less detailed or less meticulously devised than the patronage folders maintained by Farley.

Phillips and Carr presented together a formidable front to the dispensers of political patronage. No one knew the State Department and the Foreign Service better than Carr. After entering the Department in 1892, he had gradually acquired, through diligence and devotion, command of the administrative structure of the foreign affairs bureaucracy. By 1933 Carr had had forty-one years in the Department under eight presidents. Like Phillips, Carr had always worked to take care of "his boys," those who shared his concern for the diplomatic machinery.52

51 Crane, Mr. Carr, 311-312, 326.
52 Ibid. See also Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 47; Werking, Master Architects, 88-90.
Once before, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency, Phillips and Carr had collaborated on appointments. Phillips then was a member of the diplomatic branch, while Carr headed the Consular Service. At the latter's request, Phillips had assumed the task of presenting suggestions on consular appointments to Secretary of State Bryan. In contrast to Wilson's purge of the chiefs-of-mission, most veteran consular agents were retained.\footnote{Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 60, 66.}

The task of dealing directly with Roosevelt and Farley belonged to Phillips. During FDR's second administration, Welles would adopt the same role. In contrast to Carr, and to Hull as well, Phillips and Welles knew how to talk to Roosevelt. They possessed the kind of precision, alacrity, and self-assurance that FDR admired, and which Carr and Hull, both slower, more circuitous and cautious, lacked. Indeed, Roosevelt preferred to discuss foreign policy with Phillips and Welles rather than with Hull.\footnote{Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 19-23.} Thus, as the administration marshalled its forces to combat the Depression in 1933, Phillips assumed the role of challenger to the ward-heelers.

The competition for leverage with the President on appointments proved keen. Moley vividly recalled the
imbroglio that developed between Phillips and Farley. While retaining final authority on all appointments, FDR directed Farley to confer with Phillips on diplomatic vacancies. In the meantime, Phillips bypassed Farley. Phillips consulted directly with Roosevelt, offering several suggestions for chief-of-mission appointments. When Farley learned of Phillips' maneuvering, he "raised the roof." With gentlemanly tact, Phillips then agreed that he and Farley should confer on all prospective appointments.

The encounter between the old-boy network and the ward-heelers over appointments had only just begun. Phillips' "preference for career boys" soon proved "so overpowering" that Farley--who oversaw dispensation of patronage throughout all of government--finally demanded that Phillips consult with Moley "before he made any moves." Farley "turned over to" Moley "his complete file on diplomatic prospects, designating in each case what they had contributed in effort and money to the 1932 campaign." He asked Moley to use his influence with Phillips and Roosevelt "in providing suitable appointments for these people."^55

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^55 Moley, After Seven Years, 131 and First New Deal, 242. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 71-74. For examples of Phillips' large role in the matter of appointments, see Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50-51, 301, 303, 361, 459, 492; II, 560.
Moley's position was clear. He did not intend to permit Phillips "to ignore every last one of the campaign contributors."\textsuperscript{56} Moley held "that appointment as a reward for political service" was neither wrong nor undesirable. Nor did Moley believe that "a career man [was] per se preferable to an amateur."\textsuperscript{57}

Less certain was Moley's tenure in the Department. Invading the confines of a bureaucracy, however small and compact, poses some risks. Bureaucratic routines are not easily disrupted. Nor are bureaucratic loyalties readily undermined. For the bureaucratic novice, caution is well-advised. As a university professor, Moley should have been better versed in the mores of bureaucratic politics. He was not. Instead, he had challenged publicly the "rights" of the career professionals to retain their jobs from one administration to the next.

The professionals in the Department set about immediately to undermine Moley. They convinced Hull that, whereas they were loyal to him, Moley was not. Hull required little convincing. The Secretary respected loyalty, a trait he, himself, possessed in abundance. He also believed that

\textsuperscript{56} Moley, \textit{After Seven Years}, 132.

\textsuperscript{57} Moley, \textit{First New Deal}, 242.
Moley intended to construct his own cadre of followers within the Department, separate and apart from the Secretary of State. Moley lost no time in providing ample evidence to confirm Hull's suspicions. In marauding between the White House and the State Department without the Secretary's knowledge, Moley soon earned Hull's lasting enmity.  

The celebrated estrangement between the two during the London Economic Conference in July 1933 sealed Moley's fate. When Moley implied via an indiscreet cable to Roosevelt that Hull was incapable of leading the American delegation to the conference, the Secretary erupted with full fury. Roosevelt was forced to choose between Hull and Moley. He chose to dismiss Moley. In describing Moley's ouster to his associates, Hull pulled his forefinger across his throat and stated: "I cut the son of a bitch's throat from ear to ear." With Moley's departure, there was "an unanimous sigh of relief from everybody in the Department," Sumner Welles informed a friend.

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58 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 481; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 78.

59 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 491-495.

60 Weil, Pretty Good Club, 78. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 493-494.

61 Welles to Norman Davies, August 1933, Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, II, 232.
The jubilation within the Department, however restrained, was premature. Well into 1935 Moley continued to consult with and advise the president on numerous matters from his position as editor of a new magazine, Today. By his own account, he spent 132 days in Washington after his resignation. On a few occasions he used his connections to influence diplomatic appointments. Gradually, however, Moley became less sympathetic to the New Deal. His influence waned. By 1937 he was a conservative opponent and no longer of value to Roosevelt.62

V

The spiritual departure of Moley from the ranks of the New Dealers left Farley virtually alone to deal with the State Department in the years prior to World War II. FDR, of course, continued to have the final decision on all appointments. Even he realized, however, that Farley was no match for Welles and the career boys, especially in the latter's backyard. Late in 1937 Roosevelt asked Adolf Berle, one of his original "Brain Trusters," to accept an appointment as an assistant secretary of state. The President told Berle that the State Department needed a New Dealer, that "Hull was magnificent on principle but timid," while

62Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 494. See also Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, II, 549; New Dealers, 328.
"Sumner was fundamentally a 'career man.'"  

Berle accepted FDR's offer. Treated as an outsider by his colleagues in the Department, the abrasive Berle was neutralized if not ignored. He provided no assistance to proponents of patronage in the matter of appointments.  

Farley encountered less and less support for his job of rewarding the party faithful as the crises in Europe became more acute. One friend of Farley's and the President's, William C. Bullitt, objected strongly to the practice of selecting diplomatic chiefs based upon their campaign largesse. Although not bereft of diplomatic experience, Bullitt, himself, was not a career diplomat. Appointed by FDR as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1933 and to the embassy in Paris in 1936, Bullitt maintained a close confidential relationship with the President until at least 1939. On December 7, 1936, Bullitt wrote to FDR:

Jim Farley has just passed through Paris.... In talking with Jim, I tried to convince him (and I believe I did) that the situation in Europe today is too serious for him to suggest the planting of duds in diplomatic posts in order to repay them for contributions to the campaign fund.

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63 Diary entry, December 10, 1937, Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 151. See also Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 181-182

64 For instance, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 78.
Supremely confident of the wisdom of his advice, Bullitt further noted: "Jim said that he agreed with me, and we went on to discuss how it might be possible...to get rid of...the men who are not fit to hold their present jobs as chiefs-of-mission." 65

Bullitt submitted a simple plan to Roosevelt with Farley's concurrence. FDR should issue "at once" a circular instruction from the State Department requesting that all chiefs-of-mission submit their resignations to the President no later than January 15, 1937, under the pretext that the date of the presidential inauguration had been changed from March 4 to January 3. In this manner, Bullitt submitted, the President could do with the chiefs as he pleased without having to engage in the unpleasant task of requesting individual resignations. 66 Bullitt believed, as Farley evidently told him, that while FDR "would be glad to get rid of" a number of incompetent chiefs, he "would hesitate to ask for their resignations." 67

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65 Bullitt, For the President, 194-195. See also Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 528-529. "Genial Jim" Farley, incidentally, was well-liked by many people, a natural salesman who rarely worried about consistency.

66 Bullitt, For the President, 195.

67 Bullitt to R. Walton Moore, December 8, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 545.
Roosevelt accepted Bullitt's idea. By custom, not law, chiefs-of-mission often offer their resignations when a new president is inaugurated. In following Bullitt's recommendation, Roosevelt suggested the issuance of a general circular requesting the resignations of all chiefs. Whether inadvertently or by design, the President's suggested wording applied only to those "who belonged to the career service," and not to the amateurs.

The State Department was quick to decipher the flaw in the Bullitt-Roosevelt plan. Within five days of receiving a draft of the circular, Acting Secretary of State R. Walton Moore, a confidant of Hull's, sent the President a letter, along with a memorandum prepared by the chief of Foreign Service Personnel.

The letter and memorandum tactfully presented the following points.

1. The President's circular referred "only to those who belonged to" the career service.

2. Career chiefs-of-mission who resigned "would lose their retirement rights if they broke their service by retiring at the end of a presidential term."

3. "Should a career chief's resignation be accepted, the President would have the authority to reinstate him to the classified Foreign Service." However, "at this moment" only "seven reinstatements to Class I would be permissible" under the law, whereas there now were twenty-five career officers.

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serving as chiefs-of-mission.

(4) The reinstatement appointments might have to be confirmed by the Senate.

At a minimum, the Department wanted FDR to alter the circular on resignations to account for the peculiar circumstances of the career chiefs. 681

Roosevelt replied four days later in a manner perfectly suitable to the diplomats. To Moore, he penned a brief message:

In regard to resignations of Chiefs-of-Mission, it seems best to do nothing further in regard to the career men but the non-career Chiefs should, of course, submit their resignations as has always been done in the past. 69

Whether accidental, or planned by one party and reacted to by the other, this procedural duel rebounded to the advantage, however slight, of the career diplomats. Theoretically, the result portended more potential vacancies in diplomatic posts. On a more mundane level, even the President's most trusted adviser on patronage--Jim Farley--apparently had become reticent about anointing political hacks with key chief-of-mission slots.

681 Moore to FDR, December 24, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 556-557.

69 December 28, 1936, ibid., 558.
The initial skirmish over appointments produced a standoff of sorts between the ward-heelers and the old-boy network. Of the 51 diplomatic missions maintained abroad by the United States, career diplomats headed 24 or 47 percent after FDR's first year in office. An assortment of campaign contributors and amateurs filled the remaining 53 percent of chief-of-mission slots. By the end of Roosevelt's first term, these figures remained virtually unchanged: Career chiefs-of-mission held 25 or 48 percent of the missions. Of the 29 individual career diplomats who received chief-of-mission commissions from 1933 to 1936, ten served in more than one post; four others retired or resigned before 1936. By comparison, of the 31 individual political appointees who headed diplomatic missions during the same period, five served in more than one post. Another five moved on to other challenges after brief tours as diplomats.

Amateurs dominated the more prestigious and important diplomatic missions. The initial appointees to Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union,

The statistical breakdowns on the diplomatic appointments were calculated from information in U.S., Department of State, State Department Biographic Register, 1933-1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932-1941), and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973. Most
Belgium, Poland, Austria, as well as to three of the four Scandinavian countries, were amateurs. Although professional diplomats held the two most important Far Eastern posts--Japan and China--most were relegated to Latin America. That Japan and China were virtually at a state-of-war in 1933 made even FDR reticent about sending glove manufacturers or toy tycoons to those countries. Of the 20 Latin American countries in which the United States maintained missions, fourteen opened their doors to career chiefs-of-mission in 1933.

That amateurs received the best diplomatic assignments presaged no break with traditional practice. With rare exception, all presidents have practiced the custom of rewarding generous campaign contributors, who possess little or no diplomatic experience, with ambassadorial appointments. President Richard Nixon, for example, bestowed upon generous campaign donors fifteen of the most prestigious embassies, with Paris and London heading the list for $300,000 and $254,000 respectively. Under Nixon, the "price" for even the less esteemed missions appeared to run to five figures, prompting The New York Times to declare that "every

of the statistical calculations can be traced from a careful reading of the appendices to this thesis.

71 For examples, see Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 3-14.
four years" the United States "auctions off its embassies in Western Europe and in a few other agreeable areas to the highest bidders." 72

FDR was no exception. He employed the spoils system pervasively in selecting diplomatic envoys. While foreign affairs commanded little of his attention during his first administration, he fully recognized the relationship between ambassadorships and domestic politics. To reward loyal followers with glamorous foreign posts was to retain loyalty to his domestic programs and to himself.

In 1936 Roosevelt asked many of his ambassadors—all loyal and deserving Democrats—to return to the United States to assist him in his reelection campaign. Ironically, nearly all of them had come to regard their diplomatic assignments more seriously than did the President. "I think you ought to consider," one politically-appointed ambassador wrote, much to Roosevelt's chagrin, "the...political effect...of letting a number of men from key posts in Europe return to participate in political activities during a period" that "is more dangerous than any since 1918." 73

72 April 4, 1973, A42.

73 Breckinridge Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 254-255. See also FDR to Lincoln MacVeagh, May 23, 1936, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, I, 592; Grenville T. Emmett to FDR, February 26, 1936, Jesse Isidor Straus to FDR, May 1936, Robert W. Bingham to FDR, September 2, 1936, Claude Bowers to FDR, October 29, 1936,
Nevertheless, the practice of conferring celebrated missions upon political loyalists remained intact.

Roosevelt also recognized the distinction between the prestigious and the dreary diplomatic posts. Beneficent campaign contributors often balk at accepting appointment to missions outside of Western Europe and Scandinavia. Consequently, a president can employ the less desirable assignments—in Latin America and Eastern Europe, for example—for other purposes.

Again President Roosevelt proved to be no exception. Sometimes he was ingenious. In the autumn of 1934, for example, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes complained to Roosevelt about a politically-appointed official in his department who had become particularly troublesome. Inclined not to offend anyone—FDR rarely could dismiss anybody outright—the President wrote to Hull in a "private and confidential" memorandum: "Do you think it would be a terrible thing to send this man as Minister either to Ireland or Albania? I really think we should help Ickes." 74


74 October 8, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 230. Hull's reply is not recorded in the public documents.
That career diplomats received a predominant share of the Latin American missions thus foretold no great departure from past practice. Much has changed since the New Deal in regard to the status and amenities associated with United States diplomatic missions throughout the world. During the 1930s and before, however, Foreign Service officers regarded, with some justification, Latin America as "the graveyard of American diplomats." Most Latin American posts then were unhealthy, desolate, and poor, lacking in comfort and prestige.

Hugh Gibson aptly summarized the low esteem in which diplomats held Latin American posts. A distinguished career diplomat, Gibson had received the ambassadorship to Belgium under Coolidge in 1927. Hoover had retained him there. Upon his transfer to Brazil by FDR in 1933, he wrote a friend:

It's dreadful how the sins of your youth come home to roost. All my life I've preached to the other [career] boys that when they were honored with an appointment to Latin America they must dash away with courage high and hearts aglow...and when I was offered Rio I took one big gulp and sent off a telegram of

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Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 135. According to Schulzinger, the Foreign Service Personnel Board relegated the poorer diplomats to Latin America in the 1920s. Diplomatic Mind, 95, 113.
appreciation. However the diplomats felt about Latin American posts, they were often the only ones "available" for those who aspired to chief-of-mission status.

Roosevelt differed little from his predecessors in sending the career diplomats to Latin America. Fourteen of the 24 career chiefs-of-mission under the New Deal in 1933 were in Latin America, while 15 of the 25 career chiefs under Hoover in 1932 were similarly ensconced.

The Republican administrations of the 1920s, however, had improved considerably upon the performance of their predecessors in appointing career diplomats as chiefs-of-mission. Hoover, for instance, announced prior to his inauguration that he believed career diplomats were preferable to amateurs. Although he selected his share of worthy politicos, he did appoint career diplomats to Belgium, Italy, Norway and Poland. By comparison, the proportionate rise in the number of career diplomats

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76Gibson to William R. Castle, May 11, 1933, Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 54.


selected to head missions in the 1920s was not sustained in the 1930s.

Throughout the process of appointments Roosevelt assumed a characteristic posture. He retained the final authority over all nominations, while playing the role of mediator between the old-boy network and the ward-heelers. He allowed both factions to compete for his favor and to believe that they each commanded his bidding.

Aware that career diplomats received nearly 50 percent of the diplomatic posts in 1933, Joseph C. Grew, a first-generation professional diplomat, expressed great enthusiasm for the President: "Isn't it fine the way the President is supporting the career diplomats? Some day that will cease to be a term of opprobrium in the United States." Stationed in Japan, Grew was neither privy to the machinations surrounding the appointments nor totally accurate in his reflections.

One close observer of the process more accurately reflected the President's manner in steering a course between the proponents of patronage and career appointments. Caroline Phillips, the wife of the Undersecretary, confided to her diary in 1933:

79 Grew to Norman Armour, September 11, 1933, Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 362.
Franklin R. is rather ruthless and thinks only of handing out diplomatic plums to some of the many hungry Democrats just to be relieved from their ceaseless clamoring. Mrs. Phillips' statement also expressed her husband's frustration in not being able to secure more favorable posts for his colleagues.

The success of Undersecretary Phillips in protecting the interests of his colleagues during FDR's first term was indisputable, nevertheless. Only seven of the 25 career diplomats serving as chiefs-of-mission under Hoover failed to receive appointments under FDR: five of the seven voluntarily resigned or retired; another became an assistant secretary of state, while a cloud enveloped the removal of only one. Moreover, seven diplomats, four of whom had prior experience in the consular branch of the Service, received their first ministerial post between 1933

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80 Diary entry, April 9, 1933, Weil, Pretty Good Club, 71.
81 Robert Woods Bliss, Edwin V. Morgan, Charles C. Eberhardt, John W. Garrett, and Irwin B. Laughlin retired or resigned. Jefferson Caffrey became an assistant secretary of state. Why F. Lamont Belin left is unclear; the Senate failed to confirm his appointment under Hoover in 1932 to a different post, after which information is sketchy. State Department Biographic Register, 1933-1934, 124, 127, 163, 174, 205, 225.
Whether these officers retired voluntarily is also unclear. FDR did force out several State Department officials, including William R. Castle, a man much respected by the career diplomats, who was a close friend of Hoover's.
and 1936. Of the 18 "Hooverite" professional chiefs who survived the anticipated purge, 12 were retained initially in the same post in which they served Hoover, while the other six received different chief-of-mission assignments. Finally, all but two members of the old-boy network survived through 1936. Upon their own turf, the old-boy network—buttressed by the homework of Phillips, Carr and Hull—proved difficult to dislodge.

VII

Sumner Welles performed equally well in securing appointments for the career diplomats during FDR's second term. As assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs from 1933 to 1937, he assisted Phillips in procuring suitable appointments for Foreign Service officers, especially to the more desirable posts in Latin America. As undersecretary of state, a position he held from 1937 to 1943, Welles continually urged upon the President the appoint-

82 Sheldon Whitehouse resigned on December 8, 1933, soon after being transferred to Columbia. Francis White retired on November 30, 1933, 5 months after being transferred from Latin America to Czechoslovakia. White, in particular, was dissatisfied; he knew little about Eastern Europe, but was considered an expert on Latin America.

83 For example, see FDR to Hull, October 29, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 248. FDR begins: "I enclose suggestions made by Sumner Welles for Diplomatic transfers."
ment of career officers as chiefs-of-mission. He also embarked upon a campaign to raise the status of the American missions in Latin America—fourteen of which were legations in 1933—to embassies, a step in image building warranted, in part, by the Good Neighbor policy. By 1943 all United States missions in the Southern Hemisphere were embassies.  

Insiders dubbed the men elevated from ministers to ambassadors in Latin America "Sumner's shambassadors."  

Welles championed the cause of the career diplomats in the press as well. He maintained a close relationship with syndicated columnist Drew Pearson, and he occasionally consented to interviews with sympathetic journalists. In an interview with a former State Department official that appeared in The New York Times on August 22, 1937, Welles remarked:

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84 Nine of the legations were raised to embassy status between 1941 and 1943. United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, passim. Some authors imply that all of the Latin American posts became embassies in the 1930s. See Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 88-89; Robert Freeman Smith, "The Good Neighbor Policy: The Liberal Paradox in United States Relations With Latin America," in Leonard P. Liggio and James T. Martin, eds., Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1976), 70. That most of the legations became embassies after the beginning of World War II suggests that the exigencies of the war and America's relations with Latin America, more than the Good Neighbor policy, incited the changes.

85 Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 89.
There is not much use in the government's spending money on a career service unless the best men get a chance to serve in the best posts. The President supports this policy. 86

More than FDR's "policy," Welles' statement reflected his own efforts. Although career officers received appointments to the important embassies in Rome and Berlin in 1936 and 1938, respectively, few other advances in the career position occurred during Roosevelt's second term.

The relative position of the career diplomats remained unchanged from FDR's first term. Of the 25 incumbent career chiefs as of July 1, 1936, nine resigned or retired prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. An equal number—six of whom had served in the consular branch—received their first chief-of-mission posts during the same period. Thirteen of the remaining 16 served in more than one capital. Only three—Joseph Grew in Japan, Nelson T. Johnson in China, and William Phillips in Italy—served the entire 30 months of FDR's second term prior to World War II in the same country. However, the number of career officers in chief-of-mission positions—25—remained the same. 87

86 Wel, Pretty Good Club, 130.

87 Ilchman contends that in FDR's second term "the career position was advanced." Professional Diplomacy, 213.
VIII

Given the circumstances, Phillips, Welles, and their associates proved capable of matching the acumen and zeal of the ward-heelers. Within the general boundaries of the most and least desirable missions available, the diplomats managed a semblance of control over appointments.

Within these confines, too, seniority and preference counted. Of the 42 individual career diplomats who received chief-of-mission appointments between 1933 and 1939, three had entered the diplomatic profession prior to 1900, 32 had embarked upon a diplomatic career between 1900 and 1915, and seven had become diplomats between 1915 and 1920. For the most part, the senior diplomats—members of the old-boys club of the pre-Rogers Act era—received preferential consideration in appointment to the few desirable posts "open" to the diplomats. At one time or another, for instance, Hugh Gibson held the Belgian post, Hugh Wilson headed the embassies in Berlin and Berne, Leland Harrison also filled the Swiss post, and Phillips served in Rome. Twenty-two of the 42 career chiefs, moreover, had held one or more positions within the State Department—as assistant secretary of state, as division chief, as a member of the Foreign Service Personnel Review Board—during the 1920s.
Bureaucratic patronage operated upon the Foreign Service from within in much the same manner as political patronage operated upon it from without. In 1969 Foreign Service officers listed three factors that they regarded as important to the advancement of their careers. These factors were, in order: (1) friends in the State Department; (2) experience in Washington, D.C.; and (3) political connections. While never so publicly blunt, their precursors, the "founding fathers" of the Foreign Service, would have agreed.

Members of the old Consular Service, however, were neither overlooked nor ignored by their colleagues in the Department. Of the 42 career chiefs, 17, or 40 percent, had served in the old Consular Service. Another six chiefs had held consular positions for brief periods. Of the 16 officers elevated for the first time to chief-of-mission status, nine came from the consular branch of the Foreign Service. If hostility still prevailed between diplomats

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88 Harr, Professional Diplomat, 213.

In the fall of 1932, Hoover submitted a number of nominations for chief-of-mission appointments, many of them career officers, to the Senate for confirmation. The Senate refused to confirm them, preferring instead to await the outcome of the November election. This may have been an attempt by Hoover, perhaps in cooperation with the career diplomats, to limit—or at least to make more difficult—FDR's use of patronage to fill diplomatic posts. On Hoover's nominations and the Senate's refusal to confirm, see United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, passim.
and consuls, it was not in evidence in chief-of-mission appointments.

The absence of post-Rogers Act diplomats on the list of career chiefs-of-mission conformed with the natural order of career advancement. Their absence alone revealed no antagonism or undue influence on the part of the senior diplomats. Generally, 15 to 20 years of experience was, and is, regarded as an appropriate apprenticeship prior to the attainment of the higher positions in the diplomatic profession, as it was, and is, in many other occupations. As of 1936, for example, diplomats who joined the Foreign Service between 1924 and 1927 were, on the average, 31 to 35 years of age with between eight and 11 years of experience. The median age of the career chiefs-of-mission under FDR was 52.5 years. On the average, each possessed 23.5 years of diplomatic experience at the time of their appointment. 89

The achievement of the diplomats in retaining nearly half of the top positions abroad owed much to their persistence and perspicacity. In openly supporting the appointment of diplomats, Secretary of State Hull established a positive climate within the Department, while Phillips and

89 The medium and average statistics were calculated from information in the State Department Biographic Register, 1933-1940. These statistics can also be calculated using the information in the appendices to this thesis.
Welles exerted their influence with the President. At the same time, the diplomats employed the techniques of the lobbyist, encouraging and cajoling their colleagues and sympathizers to speak and write to FDR on their behalf.  

Carr's early preparation, too, was invaluable. The list that he mainly devised and that Phillips used as a guideline demonstrated prescience. By the end of 1933, for instance, New Deal political appointees largely filled the same posts that Hoover's political appointees had headed. Career diplomats similarly received appointments to the same missions. Only 17 of the 51 posts changed complexion—from career-to-noncareer and vice-versa—from 1932 to 1934. Even then the changes were almost evenly divided between amateurs and professionals. Although shifts in chiefs-of-mission occurred frequently thereafter, the ratio of career-to-noncareer appointments remained stable.

Precedent also contributed immensely to the relative success of the career diplomats. By 1932 they held 49 per-

90 For examples, see Weil, Pretty Good Club, 79-82; Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50; Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189-190; Werking, Master Architects, 245; Kahn, China Hands, 136; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 90, 284-286.

91 Nine were noncareer; 8 were career.
cent of the legations and embassies. Whatever the public thought of professional diplomats, the practice of filling nearly all missions with patronage appointees had become less and less acceptable.

The practice of patronage, generally, had fallen into disrepute. The more the federal government intervened in the lives of its citizens—whether required or called upon to do so—the more the citizens and the press demanded that government personnel be selected on the basis of "merit." Under the pressures applied by progressives and "good government" types, merit system coverage of federal employment increased from 10 percent in 1884 to over 70 percent by the end of World War I. In 1924 Congress placed all diplomatic positions below the rank of minister under merit coverage. Chiefs-of-mission, like cabinet officers, have never been

Jay M. Shafritz, Public Personnel Management: The Heritage of Civil Service Reform (N.Y.: Praeger, 1975), 24. Shafritz notes: "American presidents during the reform period typically entered office taking full advantage of their patronage perogatives and left office with extensions of the merit system to their credit. This was the case from Arthur to Wilson....lame duck presidents being succeeded by someone of a different party would 'blanket in' large numbers of employees in order to reduce the amount of patronage available to the opposition party....civil service rules,...made it easier for retiring American presidents...to extend the classified service to cover their party friends."
included. They represent the President. Nevertheless, the view that the highest diplomatic positions should be filled by men of experience and training gained currency during the 1920s as more and more career diplomats achieved chief-of-mission status.

The heyday of brazen spoils politics had passed by the time FDR became President. The open display of patronage dispensation by Jim Farley attested more to the strength of FDR's electoral mandate in 1933 than it presaged popular acceptance of a return to the spoils system of an earlier era. Moreover, Secretary Hull's recommendation to FDR to divide the diplomatic appointments about equally between career and noncareer appointees revealed more than a fear of flagrant patronage: Hull's suggestion also reflected the precedents established and followed during the 1920s. While less unfavorable publicity attended FDR's use of patronage than would later plague his successors, its use was no longer followed by general public acquiescence.

Roosevelt discovered as much soon after his inauguration. On March 29, 1933, George McAneny, president of the

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93 In 1955 Congress created the rank of Career Minister, thus providing some merit coverage protection to FSO's who became chiefs-of-mission. Whether this protection, like that afforded academics through tenure, is desirable is another matter altogether.
National Civil Service Reform League (NCSRL) -- a citizens organization comparable, in the context of its time, to Common Cause of today--wrote FDR on behalf of the League. McAneny enclosed a list of Foreign Service career officers and urged FDR to retain them as chiefs-of-mission.94

Roosevelt responded circuitously. Faced with pressure from an attentive citizens group, his reply was also devious.

Thank you for your letter...with its memorandum. Some day I hope to have a chance to talk over the Foreign Service with you. May I suggest that as one who helped in getting the 'career service' established, I am anxious that it be maintained--nevertheless, the situation is not so delightfully simple, so far as merit and good government are concerned, as the memorandum suggests!95

Since 1908 FDR, himself, had belonged to the League and its predecessors. He may have offered more support for the creation of a "career service" than the average League member, who probably limited his support to writing a letter to his congressman. If so, the record is strangely silent.96

94 Notation in Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 40.
95 FDR to McAneny, April 4, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 40.
96 For instance, there is no mention of the Foreign Service or of professional diplomacy in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (2 vols.; N.Y.: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948). Nor are there any such letters during the years 1928-1933 in the third volume of E. Roosevelt's series.
Roosevelt was cognizant, in any event, of the power of precedent. To ignore it would be to risk at least a modicum of public disfavor as well as to court accusations that he had failed to abide by the standards set in motion by his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, thirty years earlier. During his press conference of July 12, 1933, FDR indirectly acknowledged the presence of precedent. Career diplomats, as well as deserving Democrats, he said, would receive consideration for chief-of-mission assignments.

He then offered to elaborate. With perhaps the Carr-Phillips list or the NCSRL list sketched in his mind, he remarked:

As a matter of fact, on the total thing we filled quite a lot of places and there are still quite a number going to be changed..., there are quite a number of posts where the individual who happens to be there, irrespective of whether he is a political appointee, is doing special work and I may want to keep him on to finish up the special work. There are half a dozen cases of that kind and, of course, those political appointees will be replaced in time. I think I told Bill Phillips to go ahead and make three or four changes.

If there is some political appointee carrying on special business..., I may want to keep him on until possibly the fall and, when he goes out, I may move a career diplomat from some other place into his place....it means that his place will be filled either by a career diplomat, or by a political appointee.
Roosevelt concluded that "it would take me probably the balance of the year to get the diplomatic posts more or less permanently straightened out." 97

IX

FDR never succeeded in "permanently" straightening out the diplomatic assignments. Numerous influences, including his personal predilections, the demands and the choices of political contributors, and the preferences of the career diplomats kept him busy shifting and shuffling chiefs-of-mission in almost spasmodic fashion.

Roosevelt played a variation of musical chairs with United States legations and embassies. In seven years, from 1933-1939, he presented 132 chief-of-mission nominations to the Senate for confirmation, 75 during his first term and 67 during the first three years of his second. Although great variations occurred in the length of each appointee's tour, the average time spent in any single post by a chief-of-mission amounted to 2.5 years. A total of 84 individuals, 42 amateurs and 42 professionals, served in chief-of-mission posts. Of the career diplomats, 22 served in only one post, 15 served in two posts, three in three posts, and two in four posts. Of the amateurs, 26

97 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 301.
served in one mission, 11 in two missions, and five in three missions. Stated differently, 23 of the posts changed chiefs twice, 18 posts experienced a change in command three times, and six posts had four chiefs-of-mission. In only six, or 10.5 percent of the missions, did a single chief-of-mission serve the entire seven years.98

One well-travelled amateur chief thought that FDR had "borrowed [his appointment procedure] more or less from the football field."99

The process of appointing chiefs-of-mission basically bored Roosevelt. He focused his efforts on controlling the effects of the Depression. If and when foreign affairs demanded his attention, he could, he believed, employ his own diplomatic abilities to lead the nation. Others would follow. If necessary, American technology—navy ships, planes, lend-lease—might have to be used.100 Except as rewards to loyal supporters, a retinue of ambassadors

98Those missions were China, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Japan and Mexico. Amateurs headed all but China and Japan.


100Until at least the fall of 1941, FDR believed that, if his personal diplomacy failed, American technology could render all necessary assistance to American allies in their battles against fascism. See Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 138.
and ministers was of little value to FDR. For the most part, the appointment of envoys was a necessary chore.

Sometimes, however, the chore appeared to be more trouble than it was worth. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, for instance, recounted a conversation he held with Roosevelt on March 26, 1937:

The President called me last night from Warm Springs....The President said that he was spending a dull evening trying to shift a lot of ambassadors and ministers. I told him that I had not supposed he had many vacancies to fill. He said that he hadn't but that many of those now occupying diplomatic posts wanted to be sent somewhere else. He didn't seem to find it even amusing. 101

Hesitant about firing anyone, particularly campaign contributors, and unwilling to appoint a greater number of career chiefs, Roosevelt preferred to steer a middle course.

Roosevelt often steered his course, however, without benefit of compass and rudder. 102 A close examination of FDR's appointments--who they were and how they came to occupy the diplomatic missions--reveals neither a well-defined purpose nor an underlying pattern in the selection of the nation's principal representatives overseas.

101 Diary entry, Secret Diaries, II, 102.
102 Freidel contends otherwise. Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 357.
No clear design or systematic search for talent guided FDR in the appointive process. Reflective of his enigmatic administrative methods, Roosevelt left the appointment of chiefs-of-mission exposed to shifts in the wind of circumstances and the gusts of personalities. ² Happenstance and chance occurrence often were as decisive as any other influence in determining who occupied which diplomatic post when.

¹ Roosevelt in Retrospect, 128.

² Herbert Feis states about policy making under the New Deal that "the flexibility of procedure they [FDR and Moley] preferred left the formulation of our policies more exposed to temporary shifts in the wind of circumstances and the gusts of personalities." Characters in Crisis, 111-112.

Some historians contend that FDR gave great care and thought to the selection of his top administrative officials, including his chiefs-of-mission. Most prominent among those historians is Frank Freidel who states that the selection of FDR's chiefs "was a task of large purport....They must be both loyal and competent, yet their appointments must enable Roosevelt to repay some of his political debts....while Roosevelt measured candidates by standards of idealism in part, he acted even more on the basis of common sense....Roosevelt's appointments demonstrated that he basically favored international cooperation....In his political appointments, Roosevelt sent distinguished men to the more important posts." Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 137, 359-360.
Spoils politics and a score of factors unrelated to foreign affairs determined the selection of most of FDR's amateur chiefs-of-mission. Roosevelt rarely considered or attempted to predict the future performance of those amateurs whom he annointed with diplomatic appointments. For the amateur candidate who possessed the appropriate political credentials, the lack of any special diplomatic qualifications posed no barrier.

Beyond employing chief-of-mission appointments as a patronage vehicle, FDR demonstrated little interest in the selection of United States envoys. In appointing career diplomats to a number of ambassadorial and ministerial posts, Roosevelt generally relied upon the advice of his chiefs in the State Department, principally Secretary Hull and Undersecretaries Phillips and Welles.

Within the State Department, bureaucratic politics—in the cloak of the old-boy network—influenced the selection of many a career chief-of-mission appointee. More obscure from public view and slightly less insidious than political patronage, bureaucratic politics differed from spoils politics primarily in its inherent outcome. Those who achieved chief-of-mission status through bureaucratic politics possessed—by virtue of their positions as career Foreign Service officers—experience and training in foreign affairs that most amateurs lacked.
Like many other processes peculiar to politics, the appointment of chiefs-of-mission under FDR was systematic only as to fundamentals. As often as not, a host of influences, none easily charted, dictated the results of the appointive process. Neither political patronage in the case of the amateur appointees nor merit, strictly defined, in the case of the career appointees was necessarily the first or only criterion in appointments.

Nor was President Roosevelt necessarily unique in his approach to appointments. Few presidential administrations have employed systematic strategies in the selection of chiefs-of-mission. If anything, the story of FDR's appointees reflects a model—a model of the use of spoils, of the haphazard and diffuse influences that govern the process, of the "subtle intricacies and...windfall patterns of the appointive process."  

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Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies, 375. Commissioned by the U.S. Senate in 1976, this is the best single study available on presidential appointments to major federal positions.

No single study exists on the appointment of chiefs-of-mission. But, examples abound, scattered throughout a number of publications, of the unsystematic and haphazard manner in which presidents have chosen individuals to represent the U.S. abroad. For examples, see Etzold, Conduct of Diplomacy, 19-20; Werking, Master Architects, 10-11; Melosi, "Amateur Diplomats During the Administrations of Woodrow Wilson," passim; Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (N.Y.: Random House, 1975), 787; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 13; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 438; "Ex-Nixon Lawyer Pleads Guilty to 2 Political Fund Charges,"
Typical of the consideration Roosevelt accorded many political appointments was his selection of Robert W. Bingham for the prominent London embassy in 1933. Colonel Edward M. House had recommended Bingham, a millionaire Louisville newspaper publisher, for secretary of state. Roosevelt, however, was personally unfamiliar with Bingham. In eliminating him from consideration for the top post in the Department of State, FDR told Moley that "frankly...he knew little or nothing" about Bingham "except the facts" of his liberal journalism and his substantial campaign contributions. Moley thought, nevertheless, "that Bingham's very obscurity, so far as national politics was concerned, intrigued" Roosevelt. The President "spoke laughingly of the 'stiff dose for the international bankers' Bingham's appointment" as secretary of state "would be." 

In appointing Bingham to London, perhaps FDR had in mind


5 Moley, After Seven Years, 111-113. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 144.
the "international bankers," whom he found less than enchanting. Bingham's two immediate predecessors to the Court of St. James's were Charles G. Dawes and Andrew W. Mellon—both well-known multimillionaire financiers selected by Hoover. That Bingham was one of the few newspaper publishers to support FDR's candidacy may also have influenced the President's decision. Roosevelt always was acutely sensitive to the press.

Bingham's principal qualification, nonetheless, was his high standing on the Preferred List. An original member of the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" or RBC group, Bingham had mailed a contribution of $1,000 to FDR on October 31, 1931, one of the earliest donations to the New York Governor's bid for the presidential nomination on the record. Bingham followed his early gesture of support with a more generous

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6For example, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 397; Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (N.Y.: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 79.


offering of $15,000 in 1932. Bingham, thus, was available, and Roosevelt wanted to replace Hoover's ambassador to London as quickly as possible. The World Economic Conference was scheduled to convene in London in July, and the President wished to disassociate himself from his predecessor, symbolically if not substantively.

More perplexing was Roosevelt's appointment of Joseph P. Kennedy to succeed Bingham. Seriously ill, Bingham returned to the United States for treatment late in 1937. Bingham's resignation was imminent—he soon died—but not yet official when Kennedy began lobbying to replace him. Roosevelt,

9 Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.

10 Early in March 1933, FDR penciled a note to Hull: "How about inquiring if Judge Bingham will be acceptable as Ambassador to Great Britain? If OK I can appoint him at once & the quicker he goes over the better—don't you think so?" Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 360.

Hull agreed. He later stated: "Daniel C. Roper [Secretary of Commerce] and I had been interested in Bingham in view of his fine career generally and his great support of Roosevelt. I never knew whether our recommendation was the influence that tipped the scales for Bingham's appointment to London, or whether Mr. Roosevelt had made the decision on his own at the same time." Hull, Memoirs, I, 182.

11 During Bingham's tour, Norman Davis, one of FDR's early, official, roving ambassadors-at-large, conducted the major share of diplomacy with the British, leaving the Louisville publisher with only secondary diplomatic duties. For examples, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 105-106, 114-116, 130-131, 359, 372-380.

At one point, Bingham had had 337 days of home leave in less than three years. Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 569 ftn. 1.
almost inadvertently, yielded to his blandishments.

Roosevelt personally disliked Kennedy. Only grudgingly had the President agreed to appoint him to a position in the administration in 1934. Kennedy, however, had contributed substantially in money and in time to Roosevelt's presidential campaign.

Kennedy was one of the few influential members of the business community to actively support FDR's first bid for the presidency. The son of an Irish-Catholic immigrant, born and raised in Boston, Massachusetts, Kennedy pursued a spectacular career in the world of finance. By 1930 he had amassed a fortune of nearly $10,000,000. Nominally a conservative Democrat, he sided with Roosevelt in 1932 because he knew that Hoover would lose and that the New Deal would demand reform in the financial practices of Wall Street. "It was," Kennedy said, "good politics to be on the side of the angels."

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13 Whalen, Founding Father, 128-129, 137; Moley, First New Deal, 380-382.
Kennedy expected a reward for his campaign efforts. He had good reason. He contributed $25,000 directly to the Roosevelt coffers, lent the Democratic party another $50,000, and raised $100,000 more among his friends, many of them Wall Street financiers. In addition, the aggressive and shrewd Irishman proved valuable in mollifying the fears of William Randolph Hearst, the isolationist newspaper magnate, concerning FDR's alleged internationalism, and he helped persuade Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Detroit radio priest, to support the Roosevelt cause. For his endeavors, Kennedy wanted and anticipated the position of secretary of the treasury.

President Roosevelt, however, hesitated to admit Kennedy into the administration. He thought Kennedy too independent and too strong-minded. Kennedy, Roosevelt told Farley, could not have the treasury post because he "would want to run the Treasury in his own way, contrary to my plans and views."

Whether Kennedy would receive any position in 1933

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14 Whalen, Founding Father, 119; Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 75.

15 Whalen, Founding Father, 113-128; Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 70-78; Moley, First New Deal, 380-382.

appeared doubtful. Roosevelt's personal secretary and close
cfidant, Louis McHenry Howe, detested Kennedy, as did the
President's wife, Eleanor. Together, they formed a formidable
wall between Kennedy and government service. For several
months following the inauguration, President Roosevelt com-
communicated only infrequently and informally with Kennedy. 17

The New Deal administration's neglect of him irritated
Kennedy. He privately exchanged abuse of FDR with William
Hearst, and he confided to Raymond Moley his amazement that
he had ever supported the President. Still, a position in
the upper echelon of government would help relieve the frus­
tration that Kennedy, the Irish immigrant, always felt at
failing to be accepted as a social equal by the Boston
Brahmins.

Kennedy continued to seek a position in the New Deal.
He requested Moley's assistance. He even offered to supple­
ment Moley's income so that the Assistant Secretary of State
could live in Washington in a manner more suitable to his
status. 18

17 Whalen, Founding Father, 131.

18 Moley, First New Deal, 381-382. Moley quickly adds
that he did not regard Kennedy's offer as a bribe. See also Whalen, Founding Father, 138-141; Beschloss, Uneasy
Alliance, 79-88.
Moley eventually secured Kennedy's entrance into the administration. Believing that Kennedy richly deserved a reward, Moley repeatedly reminded FDR of his "obligation" to the generous financier. Finally, in June 1934, an opportunity to help Kennedy appeared. Moley "was able to override both the prejudice of Howe and the reluctance of Roosevelt." Kennedy became Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a new agency created to oversee Wall Street operations.

Service as head of the SEC and, in 1936, as chairman of the United States Maritime Commission failed to satisfy Kennedy's ambitions. He continued to hope for a cabinet post. Barring that, he sought a prestigious embassy. In 1936 he again campaigned vigorously and contributed handsomely to Roosevelt's election.

A year later, when Bingham became incurably ill, Kennedy moved quickly to claim the London embassy. He bluntly informed James Roosevelt, the President's eldest son whose friendship he had assiduously cultivated, that he wanted the London ambassadorship when Bingham died or resigned. James

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19 Moley, First New Deal, 381-382, 519.
20 Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 123-128.
   Business support for FDR was less in 1936 than in 1932. Business campaign contributions to FDR's campaign, which were 25 percent of FDR's total in 1932, amounted to only 4 percent in 1936. Kennedy was one of the few prominent businessmen who continued to support the President. Manchester, Glory and Dream, 139.
promptly delivered the message to his father and personally endorsed Kennedy's candidacy.

President Roosevelt apparently consented to Kennedy's wishes without much thought. Besides, he had tired of Kennedy. He considered him a "prima donna." He often complained to his associates that "the trouble with Kennedy is you always have to hold his hand...he calls up and says he is hurt because I have not seen him."²¹ Perhaps the thought flashed through FDR's mind that a Kennedy in London was preferable to a Kennedy in Washington.

FDR soon had second thoughts. Liberals within the administration, having learned of Kennedy's pending appointment, urged the president to select someone else. They regarded the business tycoon as a rich man, untrained in diplomacy, who aspired to be the first Catholic President of the United States.²²

Roosevelt momentarily yielded to the pressure. Employing James as an emissary, he suggested that Kennedy accept

²¹ Diary entry, October 9, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary, I, 692. See also, diary entry, April 13, 1935, Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, I, 241; Farley, Farley's Story, 198.

²² For instance, see diary entry, April 17, 1938, Ickes, Secret Diary, II, 370, and Krock, Firing Line, 399. Hull clearly indicates that Kennedy was not his choice. Hull, Memoirs, I, 200.
the secretaryship of commerce instead of the ambassadorship.

Kennedy reacted angrily. "You know what Jimmy proposed!" Kennedy exclaimed to New York Times columnist Arthur Krock. "That instead of going to London, I become Secretary of Commerce! Well, I'm not going to. FDR promised me London, and I told Jimmy to tell his father that's the job, and the only one, I'll accept." 23

James Roosevelt, in the meantime, authorized Krock to publish the fact of Kennedy's appointment. It was a big news story, for Kennedy was the first Roman Catholic chosen to represent the United States at the Court of St. James's. Kennedy was also Irish. Traditionally, presidents had appointed men of Anglo-Saxon ancestry and of Protestant faith to London.

The publication of Kennedy's appointment infuriated FDR. Bingham had not yet resigned. When Bingham died shortly afterwards, the President accused Krock of hastening his death by publishing the story of his replacement. 24

Roosevelt, nevertheless, commissioned Kennedy to succeed Bingham. His son, James, who made promises that seemed to

23Krock, Firing Line, 333.
24Farley, Farley's Story, 126; Krock, Firing Line, 333.
have special authority but did not, had guaranteed Kennedy the London vacancy. Having given no prior consideration to Bingham's replacement, the President confirmed, without much reflection, his son's pledge.

Had FDR reflected upon his choice of Kennedy, he might have realized the inappropriateness of dispatching an Irish Catholic, who was also liberally profane, to London. Perhaps the very inappropriateness of Kennedy's appointment amused Roosevelt. The President was not above wagging the British lion's tail. That Kennedy was a Democrat and campaign contributor should not have weighed heavily with FDR in 1937. Then, the theoretical maximum for any President was two terms. Unless FDR already contemplated a third term, Kennedy's support was not needed. The precise reasons, if any, for Kennedy's appointment remain securely buried.25

25 Kennedy's biographers offer an assortment of reasons for his appointment, most of which cite Kennedy's business and administrative qualifications.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., recorded in his diary on December 8, 1937, that FDR "considered Kennedy a very dangerous man and that he was going to send him to England as Ambassador with the distinct understanding that the appointment was only good for six months and that, furthermore, by giving him this appointment, any obligation he had to Kennedy was paid for." Beschloss, Uneasy Alliance, 157. Kennedy remained in London for nearly 3 years, until October 1940.
The first envoy chosen for the historically important embassy in Paris possessed solid political credentials. The circumstances that compelled the designation of Jesse Isidor Straus, however, were accidental, if not fortuitous.

Straus fully anticipated a position in the New Deal administration, although not the Paris embassy. A lifelong friend of FDR's and president of Macy's department store, Straus had organized the Roosevelt Business and Professional Men's League in 1932 and had contributed $10,000 to the Democratic coffers. Through Louis Howe, Roosevelt had promised Straus the secretaryship of the Department of Commerce, a cabinet seat the department store executive coveted. His uncle had held the same position in Theodore Roosevelt's administration.

The old Wilson wing of the Democratic party, however, wanted one of its own to receive the top post in the Commerce Department. They pressured Roosevelt to appoint Daniel C. Roper. Early in March 1933 Roosevelt succumbed.

Unfortunately, no one bothered to inform Straus of the change in FDR's intentions. When Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who

26 Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782.

had been denied the chief post in the Department of Agriculture, told Straus that he, too, would not be in the cabinet, Straus became irate. Upon learning of Morgenthau's unauthorized communication and of Straus' resultant displeasure, Raymond Moley immediately informed Roosevelt.

The President in turn hastily phoned Straus. In an effort to soothe his friend's vexation, Roosevelt offered Straus the prestigious ambassadorship to France. Straus hesitated for a few days, consulted with his family, and finally accepted the appointment.  

The president's impulsive decision to appoint Straus to Paris evidently confronted him with another embarrassing situation. Reputedly, he had offered the Paris embassy to as many as two other aspirants. One of them—William C. Bullitt—had hoped for the appointment and had received the recommendations of at least two of the President's friends. Bullitt later contended that he withdrew his claim to the Paris mission so that Roosevelt could appoint Straus.  

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28 Moley, After Seven Years, 124-125, and First New Deal, 73, 75, 271. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 145, 152-153.

29 According to Louis B. Wehle, FDR had slated someone else for the Paris post as early as December 1932. Wehle, Hidden Threads, 119.

30 Colonel Edward M. House to Bullitt, February 23, 1933, Bullitt, For The President, 30-31. See also Farnsworth, Bullitt and the Soviet Union, 86-87. At a minimum, Howe appears
ever accurate Bullitt's contention, his worldly experience and friendship with FDR made him a likely successor to Paris when Straus died of cancer in 1936.

William C. Bullitt was no diplomatic neophyte. Although technically not a career diplomat, he had experienced a wide and spectacular involvement in the diplomatic world. Born into a wealthy and prominent Philadelphia family in 1891, Bullitt was graduated from Yale, attended Harvard Law School, and traveled extensively in Europe as a correspondent for the Philadelphia Public Ledger.

Upon returning to the United States in 1916, the short, prematurely bald, and vivacious journalist met President Wilson's chief adviser, Colonel Edward House. Impressed with Bullitt's background and exploits, House secured him an appointment as a special assistant to Secretary of State Robert Lansing in 1917. Two years later Bullitt accompanied President Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference as chief of the American delegation's Division of Current Intelligence.

The Peace Conference proved to be a portentous diplomatic sojourn for Bullitt. In February 1919 President Wilson sent him on an "unofficial," secret mission to Moscow to

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31 For details on Bullitt's career, see Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union.
determine the conditions under which the Bolsheviks would negotiate peace. Three weeks later Bullitt returned to Paris with what he believed was a realistic Soviet proposal for peace. He had negotiated directly with Valdimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. For reasons still obscure, Wilson declined to receive his secret emissary, and David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, publicly repudiated Bullitt. Bitter and disillusioned, Bullitt resigned from the American peace delegation.

Bullitt's pique toward Wilson knew few bounds. Since the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he had followed closely the activities of the Bolsheviks. Idealistic and intensely romantic, he pictured the Bolshevik movement as the vanguard of world liberalism. He envisioned the Soviet as a "brotherhood, a spiritual conversion, indeed a state of grace." Bullitt concluded that Wilson had failed to understand his own pronouncement that Russia was "the acid test" of the good will of the allies. He believed that the failure of the allies to reach a modus vivendi with the Bolsheviks planted the seeds of international chaos and doomed the League of Nations to failure.

32 Ibid., 12-14. Farnsworth states that Bullitt's report on the Bolsheviks "was the product of a one-week sojourn and a preconceived belief that what he would see, he would like." She also quotes the reaction of the British diplomat-historian Harold Nicolson to Bullitt's trip and report. He said: "I blink politely." Ibid., 44-46, 51, 54-55.
Bullitt decided to publicly castigate Wilson and the League of Nations. In the fall of 1919 he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by the Republican Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge. Bullitt's testimony proved valuable to Lodge, a critic of Wilson, in his efforts to discredit the President, the Treaty of Versailles, and the League.

Bullitt's act of indiscretion also proved to be his nemesis. Like many figures in classical antiquity, Bullitt had tempted fate without thought of the consequence of his action. Whatever his motivations, he succeeded in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in destroying a favorable impression he had created while working in the State Department. Many Democrats swore never to forgive Bill Bullitt.

Retiring to Europe in 1920, Bullitt planned to loaf and watch the world fall apart. He resumed the life of a dilettante, traveled extensively, married the widow of the American Communist, John Reed, and collaborated with Sigmund Freud on a critical psychoanalytical study of Woodrow Wilson. In addition, he remained abreast of foreign affairs and formed a wide circle of highly-placed friends.

Bullitt always hoped that his role in the events of 1919 would be forgotten. With Republican domination of the White House obviously at an end in 1932, he yearned to reenter government service. In October one of Bullitt's friends, Louis B. Wehle, a prominent New York attorney and Harvard companion of Roosevelt's, arranged an interview for Bullitt with the Democratic presidential nominee.

Wehle judged that Bullitt and Roosevelt "immediately" became friends. He perceived that Bullitt shared a "temperamental congeniality" with FDR. Like Roosevelt, Bullitt was charming, brilliant but erratic, boldly intuitional, and contemptuous of the traditional bureaucracy of foreign affairs.

Roosevelt, nevertheless, hesitated to include Bullitt in his coterie of official advisers. Following the November election, he had sent Bullitt to Europe on two "unofficial" fact-finding missions. Bullitt had indiscreetly informed a friend of his role as a secret emissary. The press had learned of Bullitt's trips and had reported them with ample, and in Roosevelt's eyes, undesirable publicity. Obviously irritated, FDR may have recalled Bullitt's earlier transgression and suspected his reliability. Bullitt feared that

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34 Wehle, Hidden Threads, 112-115; Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 77-80.
he had harmed irreparably his opportunity to obtain a diplomatic post. 35

The man responsible for recruiting numerous New Dealers, however, was "very favorably" impressed with Bullitt. Raymond Moley found Bullitt interesting, well-informed, and anxious to serve the New Deal. He thought Bullitt could "help infuse new life into the career service." 36

To secure an appointment for Bullitt, Moley had to overcome the opposition of Undersecretary Phillips. Late in March, Moley prepared a memorandum concerning an appointment for Bullitt, which the President initialled. Thus armed, he "went to Phillips, who thereupon showed more emotion than I knew he was capable of." Phillips "bitterly reminded" Moley that Bullitt had been "disloyal" to the Wilson administration. Moley retorted that Wilson had wronged Bullitt. After further "customary tussles," Moley and Phillips agreed that Bullitt could be appointed as a special assistant to Secretary of State Hull. Moley's office prepared Bullitt's commission, and on April 20 FDR signed it. 37

35 Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 84-87. See also Bullitt to Governor Roosevelt, January 14, 1933, Bullitt, For The President, 24-25.

36 Moley, After Seven Years, 102; Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 88.

37 Moley, After Seven Years, 102, 164.
Phillips believed that Roosevelt allowed Bullitt into the State Department in order to facilitate United States recognition of the Soviet Union. Early in the spring of 1933, the President had decided upon recognition. He may have recalled Bullitt's earlier enthusiasm for the Russians.  

Roosevelt apparently regarded Bullitt as a likely prospect for the Moscow embassy. As early as December 1932, FDR concurred with Louis Wehle that Bullitt would make a good ambassador if and when the United States extended recognition to the Soviet Union.  

When recognition became imminent in November 1933, Roosevelt sought and received Hull's approval to appoint Bullitt as ambassador to Soviet Russia. As if to relieve any doubts, Roosevelt detained Phillips after signing the recognition documents on November 16 and asked the Undersecretary his opinion of Bullitt. Phillips tactfully praised Bullitt's role in the recognition negotiations.  

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38 Farnsworth, Bullitt and Soviet Union, 88-89.
39 Ibid., 107; Wehle, Hidden Threads, 119-120.
41 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 258.
The next day Roosevelt announced Bullitt's appointment as the first American ambassador to the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{42}

Bullitt seemed a logical choice. He had played a role in the negotiations that led to the resumption of U.S.-Russian relations. He was familiar with many of the Russian leaders and was well-regarded in Soviet circles. Maxim Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, who negotiated the recognition agreement for the Soviets, had expressed to Bullitt in June his wish that Bullitt would be chosen.\textsuperscript{43}

His appointment to Moscow surprised Bullitt. State Department officials had discreetly groomed John V.A. MacMurray for the Soviet post. They had engineered his appointment as minister to the "Russian affiliations" of Riga, Estonia, and Lithuania in April 1933, presumably the first leg on his journey to Moscow.\textsuperscript{44} A respected career

\textsuperscript{42}Roosevelt Press Conference, November 17, 1933, Nixon, \textit{FDR and Foreign Affairs}, I, 494.

\textsuperscript{43}Farnsworth, \textit{Bullitt and Soviet Union}, 108-109.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{The New Dealers}, 386.
officer and former minister to China, MacMurray was well-versed on the Far East, an area of major concern to the Soviets. On the other hand, Bullitt, whose knowledge of Western Europe was extensive, knew little or nothing about the Far East. He had hoped to be appointed to Paris, where he had friends in influential circles and where the social life was more palatable.

The Soviet assignment, nonetheless, delighted him. Fourteen years earlier his government had repudiated his negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Now that government had selected him as its chief agent to establish cordial relations with the Soviet Union. This ironic twist in events appealed to his romanticism, to his sense of diplomatic intrigue. For Bullitt, his second sojourn to Moscow represented a special triumph.

Misunderstandings and personal differences, however, soon led to an annulment of Bullitt's honeymoon with Russia's leaders. He became a bitter critic of the Soviet regime. His expectations of grandiose accomplishments eviscerated,


46For example, see Bullitt to FDR, January 1, 1934, Bullitt, For The President, 61-73.
Bullitt decided late in 1935 that he would not remain in the Soviet Union much longer.\footnote{R. Walton Moore to FDR, December 27, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 143-144. See also Bullitt, For The President, 115-163.}

Once again Bullitt focused his ambitions upon the Paris embassy. In March 1936, Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore told Bullitt that he had discussed with the President Bullitt's desire to become the ambassador to France. Two weeks later, Moore inquired of Bullitt: "Very confidentially, of course, I wish to ask you whether you would care to go to Rome...with the prospect of going from there to Paris.... I think there is a probability of [Breckinridge] Long [ambassador to Italy], and a possibility of Straus retiring."\footnote{Bullitt, For The President, 157.}

Bullitt replied to Moore that he preferred Paris "infinitely" to Rome.

Life in Italy would, of course, be extremely pleasant in contrast to the extremely unpleasant life here, and I should like the climate. But I do not feel that there would be any outlet for the energy which is, at the moment bursting within me.... Another consideration weighs heavily with me and is perhaps controlling: I want Anne [his daughter] to have an American education and I want to be with her....I should not hesitate to take Anne to Paris where there are good American schools; but she could not find an American education in Rome and I
am certain that she would not be happy there. Paris, I should prefer infinitely to Rome. 49

He would wait until Paris became available. In the meantime, he would return to the United States to campaign for FDR's reelection.

Bullitt possessed more impressive credentials for the Paris ambassadorship than the usual amateur candidate. Although a consistently controversial figure, he was conversant in German and French and, already in 1936, on intimate terms with several high-ranking French officials. Equally important, he had developed a close relationship with the President. 50 Bullitt had only to wait until Straus resigned to realize his aspirations.

Without apparent reservation Roosevelt granted Bullitt carte blanche to succeed Straus in Paris. On August 18, 1936, Straus tendered his resignation to the President. Straus had intended to retain the ambassadorship, but his physicians ordered him "to have a complete rest for six months," and he believed it was "imperative to keep the Embassy staff at its full complement." 51 On August 25, Roosevelt accepted Straus'
resignation and announced Bullitt's appointment as the new ambassador to France. 52

On that same day Roosevelt also granted Joseph E. Davies his choice of available embassies. Davies chose to succeed Bullitt in Moscow. Unlike the license granted to Bullitt, however, Davies' contained no testimonials to diplomatic experience. His wife wanted to be an ambassadoress, and he had rendered valuable services to Roosevelt's campaigns. In sending Davies to Russia, FDR repaid a political debt.

Handsome and gregarious, Joseph Davies combined a successful career as a businessman-lawyer with an active role in Democratic politics. 53 Born in Watertown, Wisconsin, he was graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1901. Nine years later he became chairman of the Wisconsin Democratic Central Committee and, in 1912, he managed Woodrow Wilson's campaign in the midwestern states. He then served as Wilson's commissioner of corporations and as the first chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. After failing in a bid for a United States senate seat in 1918,


Davies resumed his lucrative law practice.

Davies again entered the political arena in 1932 to campaign for Roosevelt. While serving in the Wilson administration, he had become an enthusiastic admirer of FDR.

Membership in the "Roosevelt-Before-Chicago" club subsequently entitled Davies to a position in the New Deal administration in 1933. He refused an appointment, however, prompting FDR's secretary to send him an autographed photo: "To Joe Davies, the wonder man, who didn't want a job—with tears of gratitude from Louis McHenry Howe." Approximately 60 percent of Davies' fortune, estimated in the millions, had evaporated in the 1929 stock market crash, and he preferred to recoup his losses at law.

Three years later Davies' financial position changed considerably. In December 1935, his first wife divorced him. A few weeks later he married Marjorie Post Hutton, the wealthy General Foods heiress.

Davies now prepared to assume his place in the Roosevelt administration. As vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, he worked vigorously during the 1936 campaign. He and Mrs. Davies reportedly contributed $17,500 to the Roose-

54 Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1941), xi-xii.
velt campaign chest. 55

During the campaign Washington buzzed with the rumor that Davies' wedding present to the new Mrs. Davies would be to make her an ambassadoress. It was. With Mrs. Davies aspiring to enter Washington political life, the earlier reluctance of Joe Davies to accept a political appointment vanished. At a dinner party in New York, he told Stephen Early, the President's press secretary, that an ambassadorship would be a suitable reward for a lifetime of Democratic service. 56

Before the campaign ended Roosevelt casually permitted Davies to claim the Moscow embassy. On August 25, Steve Early summoned the fifty-seven year old attorney to the White House "to discuss" a diplomatic appointment with the President. During lunch, FDR asked Davies to name the embassy of his choice. Davies responded: "Either to Russia or Germany." They were, in his opinion, "the two most dynamic spots in Europe." For many reasons, Davies continued, "neither Mrs. Davies nor I would like to go to Paris." Roosevelt then said that he, himself, "would mighty well"


like to see Russia. He suggested that Davies proceed to Moscow with the possibility of transferring to Berlin within a year.57

The announcement on November 16, 1936, of Davies' appointment created a furor in the liberal press. Several journalists predicted that Davies—the president of Washington's swankiest country club, a millionaire corporation lawyer, and an avowed "capitalist"—would clash violently with the leaders of Soviet Russia. Mrs. Davies supplied further fuel to the journalistic outbursts when she commenced "the mission to Moscow" by carting along 30 trunks, 50 pieces of smaller luggage, 6 personal servants, 2,000 frozen Birds Eye pints of cream, and 25 freezers.58 Her display of conspicuous consumption also elicited a comment from a Soviet spokesman in New York. "Contrary to popular belief," he stated, "there are cows in Russia."59

Davies candidly attributed his appointment to politics and

57 Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 91.


to his friendship with the President. There was little else to recommend him. His background touched only the periphery of diplomatic experience. Except for a brief stint as an economic adviser to Wilson at Versailles in 1919, Davies could claim experience in international affairs only through his legal clientele. His clients had included the governments of Mexico, Peru, Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Davies, nevertheless, considered his legal work "a training ground for diplomacy." When queried about his qualifications as he and Marjorie embarked upon their voyage to Communist Russia, Davies replied: "I am a corporation lawyer with a liberal outlook." Although he expected to be in Russia only a short time--FDR had persuaded him to look forward to the embassy in Berlin by the fall of 1937--he also expressed optimism about his ability to induce a thaw in the icy atmosphere that had marked United States-Soviet relations since 1935.

Roosevelt was less sanguine. He did not expect, in 1936, a significant amelioration in relations with Russia. He had appointed Davies to Moscow to honor a political debt. In announcing to his cabinet the appointment of Davies, the President--who "would mighty well" like to see Russia himself--laughingly remarked that "three or four months in

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60Davies, Mission to Moscow, xi-xiii.
Moscow would be all that Mr. and Mrs. Davies could stand in that country." When he suggested to Davies that he consider an early transfer to Berlin, where the incumbent ambassador was about to resign, FDR may have been thinking of his earlier difficulties in finding an envoy to serve in that post.

Filling the Berlin embassy in 1933 posed special problems for Roosevelt. Democratic campaign contributors evinced no interest in an appointment to Germany. The glamour of the Berlin mission had vanished with the ascent of the Nazis. In the course of three months, Roosevelt offered the German post to four men and considered at least five others before he appointed a southern historian with whom he was only vaguely familiar. None of the potential appointees was a professional

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61 Diary entry, November 20, 1936, Ickes, Secret Diary, II, 7.

diplomat.

The search for an ambassador to Nazi Germany began on March 9, five days after the inauguration. With the Berlin embassy, Roosevelt hoped to appease the demands of the conservative wing of the Democratic party for spoils. He first offered the embassy to James M. Cox, his presidential running-mate in the 1920 election. Citing the obligations of his publishing business, Cox declined. FDR next approached Owen D. Young, the millionaire founder of RCA and chairman of the board of General Electric, who also declined. He then considered Newton D. Baker, an eminent corporation lawyer, until Secretary of State Hull mentioned that the German government might refuse to accept Baker. Baker had served as Woodrow Wilson's secretary of war during World War I.

Roosevelt next concocted a clever patronage scheme. With one or two simple maneuvers, he would fill both the Berlin embassy and a U.S. senate vacancy. He would appoint Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York, a Hearst protegé, to Germany; Governor Herbert Lehman of New York then would select

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63 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 187-188. See also FDR to Cox, March 9, 1933, Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, I, 337-338; Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 143 fn. 1.
64 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 188.
65 Ibid. See also FDR to Hull, April 20, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 58.
Edward J. Flynn, one of FDR's most trusted political advisers, to replace Copeland in the Senate. As the President stated, in unveiling his plan to Flynn:

He had not yet appointed an Ambassador to Germany ...he had heard that Mrs. Copeland was rather 'fed up' with the life in Washington and that she was very eager to have the Senator receive a major diplomatic appointment. If the German appointment were offered Senator Copeland, the President felt, he would most certainly accept it...This would create a vacancy in the Senate, and Governor Lehman ...would have the power of appointment.

Flynn said he "should be happy to" accommodate the president. Copeland, too, agreed "to go along." He would accept the ambassadorship to Germany, subject to Roosevelt's stipulation that Lehman first guarantee Flynn's senate appointment.

The plot failed to materialize, however. Indeed, the plan almost rebounded to Roosevelt's detriment. Lehman felt obligated to obtain the approval of former New York Governor Alfred E. Smith on the senatorial appointment. Smith, who harbored great animosity toward Roosevelt, equivocated in sanctioning the nomination of Flynn. When Smith finally indicated that he wanted the Senate seat himself, FDR abruptly aborted his scheme. The President then "urged" Flynn "to go to Germany." After discussing the matter with his wife, Flynn, like the others before him, declined.66

66Flynn, You're The Boss, 146-148; Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 188-189.
When his patronage machinations failed to produce an ambassador to Germany Roosevelt directed his political advisers to find a candidate. In May, two of them, probably Louis Howe and Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., submitted to the President the names of four liberal academicians. 67

Obviously desperate, Roosevelt agreed to consider them. On May 17, he asked Phillips and Hull what they knew of the four individuals, three of whom were university presidents. FDR added that he wanted a prompt reply. The next day Phillips responded. Neither he nor Hull was personally familiar with the four candidates. 68 Roosevelt, subsequently, offered the Berlin post to none of them.

Nearly three months had lapsed since the search for an ambassador to Germany began. On June 7, Roosevelt conveyed his frustration to a small group of advisers. He faced in-

67 The four candidates were: Ernest M. Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College; Glenn Frank, president of the University of Wisconsin; William Mather Lewis, president of Lafayette College; and Harry Emerson Fosdick, a theologian.

68 Phillips to FDR, May 18, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 142-143. Why FDR failed to seek more information about, or to consider further, William Mather Lewis is puzzling. As Phillips noted in his letter to FDR, Lewis was 53 years old, had studied in Germany prior to the World War, was reputedly a fine speaker and sound administrator, and was a wealthy Democrat.
creasing pressure to fill the Berlin embassy: Hoover's ambassador to Germany, Frederic M. Sackett, had retired at the end of March; if the Senate adjourned prior to confirming a replacement, a new envoy would not receive a salary before the next session of Congress. The latter loomed as an important consideration in finding someone willing to serve in Berlin; several men of wealth had declined the nomination. Nazi Germany, moreover, appeared hostile to the United States. An ambassador, Roosevelt concluded, had to be found soon.

Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper immediately responded to the President's expression of exasperation. "How about William Dodd?" he asked. Dodd was a good friend of Roper's and a fellow North Carolinian. His specialty was American history, but he knew Germany well, having acquired a Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig in 1898. "Dodd would be astute in handling diplomatic duties," Roper told Roosevelt, "and when conferences grew tense, he would turn the tide by quoting Jefferson." 69

Roosevelt reacted enthusiastically to Roper's suggestion. Although he only knew Dodd vaguely, if at all, and was unfamiliar with his reputation as an historian, FDR phoned him the

69 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 190. See also Daniel C. Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life (N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1968), 334-335.
next day, June 8. "This is Franklin Roosevelt....I want you to go to Germany as Ambassador."  

Overwhelmed, Dodd requested time to contemplate the appointment. He also wanted to confer with officials at the University of Chicago, where he was a faculty member. The President replied: "Two hours, can you decide in that time?" Roosevelt added that Dodd's "work as a liberal and as a scholar" were the main reasons for his "wishing to appoint" him. "I want an American liberal in Germany as a standing example....You may return [to the United States] in the winter of 1934, if the university insists."

Dodd's superiors at the university urged him to accept the appointment. Two-and-a-half hours later, on the afternoon of June 8, Dodd returned the president's call and accepted the appointment.  

The quest for an envoy to Nazi Germany had ended.

The effort expended to find an ambassador to Germany hardly matched the insignificance that Roosevelt attached to

70 Diary entry, June 8, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 3.
71 Ibid., 4. See also Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), 10-11.
the Berlin post. The President initially sought to pacify the claims of conservative Democrats for patronage. He offered the post to Cox and to Young, and he considered Baker. None of them was close to him personally. Nor did FDR feel particularly indebted to them. Cox had supported Baker for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, while Young had remained neutral during the Chicago convention. Of all the candidates Roosevelt considered, only Flynn was a personal friend, and FDR offered him the post only after his plot to appoint Senator Copeland failed. Roosevelt had wanted to see Flynn in the Senate, not in the Berlin embassy.

72 Historian Frank Freidel unconvincingly argues otherwise. About the Berlin post, he states: "For no other diplomatic appointment were so many candidates so carefully considered." Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 361. About the selection, FDR, himself, publicly hailed Dodd's appointment to Berlin as the end of a careful search for just the right man. Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 190.

Offner offers a slightly different assessment. He contends that FDR "delayed" his selection of an envoy to Berlin because "he wanted to get a closer look at the activities of the new German government, and he regarded the Berlin post as of 'special importance.'" American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 54.

William E. Dodd became ambassador to Germany "by default." Unable to dispose of Berlin as a patronage plum and anxious to appoint somebody, Roosevelt leaped at Roper's suggestion of Dodd. Yet, FDR hardly knew Dodd, and he was not especially fond of Roper, whom he had appointed secretary of commerce at the expense of his friend Jesse Straus. Because he nurtured a deep prejudice toward professional diplomats, Roosevelt never considered a Foreign Service officer for Germany.

Amateur diplomats often are selected for reasons of politics. Dodd was a conspicuous exception. His forays into partisan politics had been brief and unobtrusive. He had participated actively in Woodrow Wilson's two presidential campaigns. In 1932 he had championed the nomination of Newton Baker and, after the convention, the election of FDR. During the Democratic hiatus of the 1920s, Dodd had immersed himself in the study of the past. He was not, in 1933, well-known politically, and his donation to the Roosevelt cause was a meager $25.

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73 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 171, 195.
74 Ibid., 195.
75 Diary entry, November 25, 1935, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 278; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 728.
The historical past more than the political present had engaged Dodd's attention. In thirty years he had produced eight historical monographs, had edited six others, and had published scores of articles. From 1905 until his appointment to Berlin, Dodd had taught at the University of Chicago, where he had earned the respect of his colleagues for his teaching ability and for his critical treatment of the weaknesses and virtues of his native South.  

Prominent in Dodd's works was an abiding faith in the common man and in the ultimate righteousness of democracy. To Dodd, Thomas Jefferson, with his "boundless faith in the masses," was the "greatest American idealist."  

Dodd often looked nostalgically upon the rural simplicity of America's Jeffersonian past. He regarded the cities, such as Chicago, as "no suitable place for humans," and he once proposed, as the solution for the economic crises of the 1930s, the transfer of millions of people from the industrial centers to the country. He appreciated, however, that it

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77 For instance, see William E. Dodd, Statesmen of the Old South (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1926), 55, 67, 82.
would be "no easy job to transfer unwilling and miseducated city folk to small farms all about the country." 78

At the time of his appointment to Berlin, Dodd appeared destined to spend the remainder of his life in the quiet pursuit of historical truths. He had neither sought nor expected a major diplomatic assignment in the New Deal administration. He was sixty-three years old, near retirement from regular academic duties and had not spoken German on a consistent basis for thirty-five years. His colleagues had just bestowed upon him one of the highest honors of the history fraternity--the presidency of the American Historical Association. 79

Secretary of State Hull, moreover, expressed reservations about Dodd's appointment. Although Hull was well-acquainted with and fond of Dodd, he questioned his effectiveness. The Secretary feared that Dodd, who was outspoken in his internationalism, might "get out of bounds in his excess of enthusiasm and impetuosity and run off on tangents every now and

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79 Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 10-12; Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 194.
then, like our friend William Jennings Bryan."

Roosevelt ignored Hull's qualms. He submitted Dodd's nomination to the Senate, and that august body dutifully and unanimously confirmed the history professor's appointment on June 13. In discussing the Berlin assignment with Dodd, prior to the latter's embarkation for Germany on July 6, Roosevelt encouraged the Jeffersonian-Democrat to believe that his President wanted him to represent a "living sermon on democracy" to the Nazi "Hun."

With Dodd's departure, Roosevelt figured he had finally more or less permanently straightened out the Berlin appointment. It was not to be. More than any other diplomatic assignment, the Berlin post became—for Dodd, for the men subsequently offered it, for the man later appointed to it—a source of unfulfilled expectations, unforgivable effrontery, vindictiveness, personal tragedy, and cruel machinations. In the middle of the disorder and confusion stood Roosevelt, the ringmaster praised by some and maligned.

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80 Hull, Memoirs, I, 182. To what extent Hull's qualms might have been the product of hindsight is uncertain.

by others for his haphazard methods of administration. Throughout the course of events that enveloped the imbroglio over American representation in Berlin, Roosevelt chose the twisted path of uncertainty and appeasement over a course of decisiveness and compassion.

Within six months of his arrival in Berlin, Dodd's ambassadorship ensued upon a downward spiral from which it never recovered. A passionate Democrat of guileless character who embodied the virtues of rural simplicity that had bound him to the teachings of Jefferson, Professor Dodd quickly found the Nazis totally repugnant. Hitler "is such a horror to me," Dodd remarked to British Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps following the infamous Nazi Blood Purge of June 30, 1934, "I cannot endure his presence." From the outset of his appointment, Dodd had mounted the crucible of democracy against Nazi tyranny only to be met by protestations of helplessness from the State Department and by displays of mockery from German officialdom. Six times during his four-and-one-half year nightmare in Berlin, Dodd thought out loud about resigning. Each time he resisted the temptation, hoping

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82 Although Dodd's biographers interpret his performance differently, all agree that Nazi Germany exacted a heavy toll on him psychologically and physically.

83 Diary entry, July 13, 1934, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 126. See also Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 148; Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 237.
he could propel Germany—a country he loved—back on the road to democracy and decency. After 1935, however, he refused to speak to any of the high Nazi officials. Despondent and broken, Dodd, nevertheless, was reluctant to leave.  

Roosevelt should have encouraged Dodd to resign. He permitted him to remain, although he was fully aware of the deterioration in his ambassador's mental and physical well-being. Instead, FDR quietly allowed it to be known in the autumn of 1936 that the Berlin post soon would be vacated. He convinced Davies, upon appointing him to Moscow in November, that he would be transferred to Berlin before the following September. About the same time, with Berlin in mind, Ambassador Hugh Wilson in Switzerland wrote Hull to explain that FDR personally had promised him one of the plum posts available to a career Foreign Service officer. By the spring of 1937 the enchantment of Moscow had worn thin for the Davieses, especially Mrs. Davies. They began to look forward to Berlin, the "nerve center" of Europe as Ambassador


86 Ibid., 90.
Davies described it. In April Roosevelt set in motion arrangements to fulfill Davies' desire.

Roosevelt's intentions remained unknown to Dodd. In August the Ambassador returned to the United States for consultations. A tacit understanding existed between Dodd and FDR that the former might elect to retire in the fall. However, Dodd easily persuaded Roosevelt to allow him to remain in Berlin indefinitely. Dodd hoped that FDR would agree to replace him with James T. Shotwell, a professor of history at Columbia University and a known internationalist. Hope sprang eternal in Dodd. They did not establish a firm date for Dodd's resignation.

A dilemma of Roosevelt's own making now presented itself. What could he do with Davies, who was then in Washington, about to leave on a tour of Europe, and who expected to receive the Berlin post upon the conclusion of his journey? Shortly before Davies' departure, Stephen Early, the President's press secretary, took Davies aside and explained to him that what he was about to say was not intended as a reflection

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87 Davies, Mission to Moscow, xii-xiii, and diary entry, May 7, 1937, 142; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 237.

88 Diary entries, May 19, 1937, August 11, 1937, October 19, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 409, 426, 428-429. See also Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 308-309; Offner, American Appeasement, 205.
on FDR's character. A busy President, Early continued, might forget a promise to transfer a friend from one post to another unless he had committed it in writing. Berlin was no longer a certainty. 89

Davies remained confident, nevertheless. He assured Early that he believed the matter would be settled to everyone's satisfaction once he returned to Washington from his European trip. 90

Events and the President's personal predilections soon conspired to produce a situation which satisfied no one. The press denounced Davies' voyage with satirical articles about the "boondoggling" of "our freshman" envoy to Moscow. Roosevelt reacted angrily: He insisted that Davies forget about returning to Washington, that he concentrate on his Moscow assignment until late fall. 91

In the meantime, the German government confidentially informed the New Deal administration that Ambassador Dodd would no longer be considered persona grata in Berlin. However morally correct, Dodd—who had not spoken with the Nazi

89 Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 238-239.
90 Ibid., 239-240.
91 Ibid., 238-240.
leadership in twenty-one months—impetuously objected in September to a State Department decision authorizing official United States attendance at a forthcoming Nazi Party Nuremberg rally. Dodd's strong letter of protest to Secretary Hull appeared in the press, much to the Department's embarrassment and the Nazi government's anger.  

At the same time, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles began maneuvering to install a career officer in Berlin. In October Welles presented a list to Roosevelt of potential successors to Dodd. Hugh Wilson's name headed the list. Davies' name was not on the list at all.

Roosevelt procrastinated for nearly a month. He evaded action. Late in September he had informed the German government that Dodd would be relinquishing his post before the end of the year. In early November he left Dodd with the distinct impression that the Ambassador would be allowed to

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92 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 313; Offner, American Appeasement, 208-209; diary entry, September 4, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 427.

93 Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 240-241. See also diary entry, November 22, 1937, Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 148. Dodd reports that FDR told him that his eventual successor to Berlin would be either James T. Shotwell "or a service man, Hugh Wilson." Diary entry, October 19, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 428.

remain in Berlin until March 1, 1938. Dodd did not want the Nazis to believe that he had succumbed to their demands. Neither Dodd, who had returned to Berlin, nor Davies, who was still inhaling the ocean air, knew what the president had in mind. Neither, perhaps, did Roosevelt.

On November 22, 1937, Roosevelt acted. In rapid succession, he altered the complexion of three embassies. Through the State Department he informed Dodd that, while he regretted "any personal inconvenience which may be occasioned you," the Ambassador must arrange to leave Berlin, "if possible, by December 14 and, in any event, not later than Christmas." Almost simultaneously, Roosevelt announced Hugh Wilson as Dodd's replacement, offered Davies the embassy in Brussels, and "fired" Hugh Gibson, then the ambassador to Belgium. The embassy in Moscow, where Davies had spent very little time, was to remain vacant until March 23, 1939.

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95 Diary entry, November 3, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 430.
97 Hull to Dodd, November 22, 1937, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. See also Offner, American Appeasement, 210; Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 314.
The announcements stunned Dodd. He felt deceived and cheated. With some justification, he blamed Welles and the State Department—with whom he frequently had traded insults—for his dismissal. Dodd also came to realize that he was unsuited to serve in Berlin. By January 1938, he "doubted if any American envoy who held his ideals of democracy could represent his country successfully among the Germans at that time."  

Dodd never blamed the President. However, Roosevelt's role was disturbing. He never informed Dodd of his intentions before he acted. Not everyone comprehended Roosevelt's penchant for indirection, least of all the university professor from North Carolina who believed that his President wanted him in Berlin. FDR knew that Dodd, for his own welfare, should have resigned long before he was summarily forced to. At a minimum, Roosevelt could have offered to transfer Dodd to another, less demanding post as he willingly did with others. Perhaps, as one student of the period thought, FDR "took curious delight in maintaining a Jeffersonian Democrat in the Third Reich."  

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99 Diary entries, November 23, 1937, December 23, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 433-434, 443. See also Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, 358, 360.  

100 Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin," 454.  

101 Offner, American Appeasement, 211-212.
Davies greeted the news of the offer of the Brussels post with near disbelief. He immediately cabled Hull. While he would serve wherever the President sent him, "certain factors"—his wife's desire to reside in Berlin or Paris—necessitated that he consult personally with FDR before consenting to a change in assignment. He said he would conclude his trip promptly and return to Washington. Upon conferring with Roosevelt in December, Davies emerged despondent. He had lost his case. Roosevelt persuaded him to accept the Belgium mission: It was an "important listening post" on European events, and the President needed him there.

Roosevelt's rationale for replacing Dodd with Wilson offered Davies little solace. During their conversation, FDR explained that "it was perfectly clear that there was no possibility of doing anything to divert the forces of Germany which...were driving inevitably to war." Under these circumstances, Roosevelt argued, he wanted "the Berlin appointment to be distinctly formal for conventional representation only. A career appointment would be one that would" satisfy this requirement. Besides, the President intoned, "the appointment of a colorless career man" would signal to Berlin that the


103 Ibid., 289; diary entry, November 23, 1937, Davies, Mission to Moscow, 254-255.
United States had become increasingly dissatisfied with the Nazi regime. 104

The State Department may also finally have persuaded the President that nothing could be accomplished in United States-German relations while Dodd occupied the embassy. Since at least 1934, officials in the Department had grown tired of Dodd's habitual diplomatic transgressions, however genuine his moral outrages over Nazi excesses, and of his constant denunciations of the evils of the career service. Early in 1936 Undersecretary Phillips pointedly asked FDR: "What in the world is the use of having an ambassador who refuses to speak to the government to which he is accredited?" 105

Eleven months later, on November 8, Ambassador Bullitt

104 Diary entry, December 8, 1937, Davies, Mission to Moscow, 255-256. See also Farley, Farley's Story, 112; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 241-242. Ambassador Dodd received word on November 30 that Hugh Wilson was to be appointed to Berlin. According to Dallek, the State Department regarded Wilson as "a colorless, smooth career man" who could "get contacts worked up again." Democrat and Diplomat, 314.

Petrov contends that Hull "vetoed" Davies appointment to Berlin because he "did not want to have there a strongly opinionated and unpredictable politician, not subject to effective State Department control." A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971), 96 ftn. 3.

105 Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat, 271.
chimed in with a recommendation. A bitter opponent of the Soviet regime, Bullitt then sought an improvement in Germany's relations with the Western democracies.

When Dodd leaves Berlin I think you should select your man for that post with extreme care. As Hitler does not speak anything but German any Ambassador of ours there who does not speak German perfectly will be useless. That qualification rules out most of the men who have been mentioned for the post. (Incidentally, Joe Davies' German is, I understand, lousy). I wish I had someone better to suggest, but I can think of no one better than Hugh Wilson, who has been for many years our Minister to Berne. His German is perfect and in spite of the fact that his connections are largely Republican and that his wife especially is no lover of the Democratic Party or you or myself, I can not think of anyone else who could begin to establish the really intimate and confidential relationship we need with the bosses in Berlin, which will be essential if we are to accomplish anything.106

Whether Bullitt's suggestion affected Roosevelt's eventual decision remains a mystery. Perhaps Roosevelt simply consented to the State Department's choice of Hugh Wilson because his instincts told him that the chances of a rapprochement with Germany were negligible.107

106 Bullitt to FDR, Bullitt, For The President, 181.

107 The State Department first urged the selection of Hugh Gibson to replace Dodd, a move spurred, perhaps, by FDR's intention to replace Gibson, then ambassador to Belgium, with Davies. See diary entries, November 23, 1937, November 30, 1937, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 434-435.
Whatever FDR's inclinations, his appointment of Wilson signaled no rapprochement with the career diplomats. When FDR assumed office in 1933, Wilson occupied a high place on the Roosevelt-Moley "hit list." Only the intercession of Hull, Phillips, and Norman Davis kept Wilson from being ousted along with several noncareer State Department officials who had served under Hoover. A member of the old-boy network who had been on the Foreign Service Personnel Review Board, Wilson became minister to Switzerland in 1927. FDR retained him in Berne until 1937, when the State Department recalled him and promoted him to assistant secretary of state. A polished and steady, if undynamic diplomatist, Wilson possessed the qualifications for affecting an amelioration in United States relations with Germany were such an improvement a possibility. Welles, undoubtedly, engineered Wilson's appointment.

Whatever the Department's expectations, Hitler was unamenable. Relations degenerated rapidly. In November 1938—less than a year after Wilson received "one of the plum posts"—the administration recalled him permanently as a pro-

108 Hull, Memoirs, I, 182; Eagles, "Ambassador Davies," 242 ftn. 76; diary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90.

109 On Wilson's career, see Wilson, Education of a Diplomat, 1-7, 10, 97-98; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 75-76, 137, 196; Offner, American Appeasement, 214-215.
test over Nazi atrocities. 110

Davies fared much better in the meantime. He satisfied his wife's desires while simultaneously serving his country. Barring Berlin, Mrs. Davies had much preferred Paris to Belgium. While accredited to Brussels, she and Mr. Davies spent most of their time mingling amidst the high society of Paris and London. 111

The envoy Davies replaced in Belgium suffered a less fortunate fate. Roosevelt abruptly requested his resignation. He dutifully offered it. In the process, the United States lost the services of a superb diplomatist.

Hugh Gibson possessed an impressive diplomatic record. Educated at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris, he entered the Diplomatic Service in 1908. During World War I, he served as first secretary of the legation in Brussels, where he met and became close friends with Herbert Hoover, then in charge of United States humanitarian relief efforts in Belgium. Gibson's performance as secretary, along with

110 Offner, American Appeasement, 89-90, 272-273; diary entry, November 14, 1938, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 222.
the recommendations of Hoover and Colonel Edward M. House, convinced President Wilson to appoint him as the first American minister to Poland in 1919. At thirty-six years of age, Gibson was the youngest chief-of-mission in the Diplomatic Service. During the 1920s, Gibson held the ministerships to Switzerland and Belgium and represented the United States in international disarmament negotiations. His colleagues also designated him as their chief spokesman in testifying before Congress on the need for a career foreign service, a task he performed with charm, wit, and inspired eloquence. 112

Gibson received high marks from his peers and contemporaries. Jay Pierrepont Moffat observed Gibson while serving under him in Poland in 1919:

He had a scintillating mind and a razor-like wit...tempered by a keen sense of fun. He knew Europe as did few Americans; he was on terms of intimacy with the key men in a dozen foreign offices; his use of French was not only fluent, but so accurate that he could convey shaded meanings. 113

112 Biographical sketches of Gibson are in Galpin, Hugh Gibson, xii-xv; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 62, 71-72; Werk- ing, Master Architects, 159, 168; Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21; Pearson and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 173-175; Hooker, Moffat Papers, 10-11.

113 Hooker, Moffat Papers, 11. See also Wilson, Education of a Diplomat, 95.
As one journalist, who more frequently than not criticized career diplomats, wrote in 1939, Gibson "was not a diplomat who needs to defend his credentials." 114

Gibson maintained a healthy perspective in regard to his own career. Unlike many of his colleagues, he possessed no great reservoir of independent wealth. Once, with the rumor circulating among his peers—a rumor later regarded as a fact by journalists and historians—that he had had to refuse an appointment to the embassy in Paris because of the vast personal expense that post entailed, he wrote a friend: "No, I did not accept the Embassy in Paris—and one reason which helped me a lot to reach that decision was that it wasn't offered to me." 115 Unlike many an amateur diplomat, Gibson suffered little from the vice of personal vanity—a necessary "failing" given the course his career took under the New Deal.

FDR's ascendance into the White House in 1933 threatened Gibson's career more than that of any professional diplomat.


115 Gibson to Gilchrest B. Stockton, April 20, 1929, Galpin, Hugh Gibson, 41. One, for example, who treats the rumor of Gibson's appointment to Paris as a fact is Weil, Pretty Good Club, 21. Weil provides no documentation. See also Hulen, Inside the Department, 100-101.
As a close friend of Hoover's, Gibson was regarded as automatically anti-New Deal by Roosevelt and his coterie of loyal Democratic advisers.

FDR had not always held Hoover and Gibson in such low repute. In 1919 the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy wrote kindly to Gibson about Hoover:

I had some nice talks with Herbert Hoover before he went west for Christmas. He is certainly a wonder, and I wish we could make him a President of the United States. There could not be a better one.\textsuperscript{116}

Much had changed in the intervening years. In 1933, with Gibson's association with Hoover clearly in view, FDR targeted the diplomat for an early retirement. There was, Moffat recorded, much pressure for Gibson's job.\textsuperscript{117}

Phillips and Hull intervened to provide Gibson with a reprieve. Cognizant of his liabilities, Gibson wrote to Phillips on April 5, 1933, requesting that he be transferred to Istanbul in the event that he was removed from Brussels, a post he had headed since 1927. To no avail, Phillips relayed Gibson's request to FDR.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}Krock, \textit{Firing Line}, 129-130.

\textsuperscript{117}"I understand," Moffat confided to his diary on March 6, 1933, "that the pressure for Hugh Gibson's job is very serious, and that there had even been some attempts to undermine Hugh Wilson." Hooker, \textit{Moffat Papers}, 90.

\textsuperscript{118}Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, \textit{FDR and For-
The best Phillips and Hull could attain for Gibson was the embassy in Brazil. Hull had opposed Gibson's removal from Belgium, Moffat wrote Hugh Wilson, "in the highest quarters" of the government, "but other views prevailed." As Allen Dulles informed Gibson, FDR demanded a clean break with the policies of the past. "I would guess that FDR felt that you were so closely identified with carrying out Hoover's policies in European disarmament and other matters that he preferred to have you in South America." Gibson had spent only two of his thirty years in diplomacy in Latin America. Although he read Portuguese, he could not speak it. He accepted the new assignment.

The White House had announced Gibson's replacement to Belgium without first informing him of his own fate. For FDR this was a common, if not painless, procedure. On March 9, five days after the inauguration, Roosevelt told Hull that David Hennen Morris would be sent to Belgium. An old friend of FDR's, Morris, a New York lawyer, was an original member of the RBC group. He contributed at least $5,000 to Roosevelt's nomination and election. Deserving of a

eign Affairs, I, 50-51.

119 April 19, 1933, Pratt, Cordell Hull, I, 396 ftn. 17.
120 April 20, 1933, Weil, Pretty Good Club, 72.
121 State Department Biographic Register, 1937, 190.
choice post, Morris reportedly refused Berlin in favor of Belgium. He served in Brussels until 1937.122

Roosevelt eventually ousted Gibson from the Service altogether. For reasons that are obscure, FDR first returned Gibson to Belgium in July 1937, about the same time he encountered serious difficulties with Dodd and Davies over Berlin. From Paris, Ambassador Bullitt expressed great displeasure with Gibson:

You may or may not remember that it was your humble servant who, when everybody else wanted Gibson kicked out of the Service because he was Hoover's best friend, stood up for him and advised you to keep him in the Service. I have nothing personal against him but it seems to me bad ball when an Ambassador straight from headquarters does not cooperate to the extent of coming in even for a conversation. Gibson, of course, loves you, myself and all other Democrats in the same manner that Mr. Hoover does and I think that whoever sold you that baby as an ambassador in Europe was not especially wise.123

However influential Bullitt's pique, the end for Gibson was near.

122 Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 782; Moley, After Seven Years, 37; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, 172; FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21; The New York Times, March 17, May 5, and May 11, 1933, 15, 7, 20, respectively.

123 Bullitt to FDR, July 23, 1937, Bullitt, For The President, 224.
FDR announced Davies' appointment to Belgium ten months after Gibson arrived in Brussels. Whether Roosevelt considered the appropriateness of sending the once-divorced-and-remarried Davies to the Catholic court of Belgium is doubtful.

Once again, however, Gibson received no advance notification. Instead, Gibson simply received a letter informing him that his resignation—which he had not tendered—had been accepted. In November 1937, Roosevelt had offered Gibson the Berlin post. Gibson had declined—either because of his distaste for the Nazis or because of the Nazis' distaste for him. In any case, the Nazi government evidently informed the State Department in 1937 that Gibson was unacceptable.

Charles Thayer relates the story of the forced retirement of a career diplomat in the 1930s, a diplomat replaced by a New York lawyer. Although Thayer does not identify the career diplomat or the New York lawyer, one very logical suspect as the subject of his story is Hugh Gibson. Diplomat, 260. Gibson officially resigned on June 30, 1938, and Joe Davies, a New York lawyer, prepared to depart for the Brussels embassy on July 5, 1938. State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 201; Davies, Mission to Moscow, 374.

Hull wrote to Dodd in Berlin on November 20, 1937: "The President has requested me to inform you that he desires to appoint Hugh Gibson, at present, Ambassador to Belgium, to succeed you as Ambassador to Germany." Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937, II, 383. However, Gibson's appointment did not materialize. Ambassador Dodd speculated upon the reason why: "While evidence is wanting, I believe the German Foreign Office refused to receive Gibson. He had been an official in Belgium during the World War and had also written a valuable book about German and certain German leaders." Diary entry, November 23, 1937, Dodd's Diary, 435. Dodd probably was referring to Gibson's
Secretary of State Hull was powerless to prevent Gibson's forced retirement.

Hugh Gibson was another Republican whom I kept as long as I could, because of his outstanding ability. But eventually the President wanted him out—Gibson was a close friend of Herbert Hoover, and there were bitter feelings between Hoover and the President.126

Gibson was fifty-five years old in June 1938 when Joe Davies succeeded him in Belgium.

In contrast to the tragic-comic drama that enveloped the Berlin assignment, light farce characterized FDR's efforts to fill the Netherlands legation at The Hague. Roosevelt promised the Netherlands' post to two people—both of whom believed that they would begin serving in 1933, and neither of whom knew anything about the other's claim. Filling the post took an inordinately long time, although Roosevelt decided at the outset to employ a direct approach in resolving his dilemma.

Roosevelt determined to ask one of the claimants to The Hague to serve for only one year. On April 20, 1933, he wrote to William G. Rice, an old friend and former member of A Journal From Our Legation in Belgium (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1917).

126 Memoirs, I, 183.
the New York State Civil Service Commission:

I would have written you before this in regard to Holland but for the fact that I have been trying to smooth out a somewhat difficult situation, which I want you to know of with perfect frankness. I do not need to tell you that I wanted you to go as Minister to The Hague, but it has developed that there is another friend of mine who is most anxious to go and who, I must tell you quite candidly, has at least an equal claim. May I, therefore, ask you to serve as Minister to the Netherlands with the understanding that you come home after a year? 127

Rice replied to the President three days later. He insisted on receiving the appointment with no conditions attached to it. Born prior to the American Civil War, Rice was then a fiesty seventy-seven years old. 128

Roosevelt repeated his offer to Rice on June 16.

I know you will understand this is written in the spirit of an old friend, and also in regard to the exigencies of many matters in Washington. The number of thoroughly competent men who are available for diplomatic service, including those who are members of the career service, far exceeds the number of embassies and legations. In the case of everyone of these men there is some very definite reason for appointment....

May I also say that in going over these

128 Ibid., 59 ftn. 1.
lists I have eliminated the names of three or four people who are actually a good deal younger than you are, on account of their age, and...I have told a number of those already appointed to foreign posts that I might possibly or even probably ask them to relinquish their post after one year.... I can therefore only invite you to go to Holland as our minister on the same understanding which I have with many other appointees. 129

Once again, thirteen days later, Rice refused to accept the President’s stipulations. At the same time, Rice insisted upon his right to the post. 130

FDR decided upon one last plea. On July 28, he informed Rice:

I was somewhat surprised and much concerned at your letter of June twenty-ninth....I fear you have not understood that an ambassador or a minister holds an appointment wholly and solely at the pleasure of the President.... It was only as a matter of courtesy and convenience to you and to a number of other gentlemen that, in asking them to go to a foreign post, I have told them it was entirely possible that at the end of a year or later, I might ask them to return home....You were the only one, apparently, who failed to understand that diplomatic appointments are wholly personal with,..., the President.

I think that I have made the situation wholly clear. If you care to go to The

129 Ibid., 242.
130 Ibid., ftn. 1.
Hague as Minister..., I shall be very glad to make the appointment immediately, but I must ask for an immediate decision.\footnote{Ibid., 333.}

Rice resolved FDR's dilemma a week later. He declined the appointment. He could not, he conveyed to the President, see his way clear to agreeing in advance to leaving a diplomatic post at the end of a year.\footnote{Ibid., 334 ftn. 2.}

Roosevelt finally settled upon the selection of a minister to the Netherlands with the appointment of Grenville T. Emmet nearly a year after his first plea to Rice. A former law partner of FDR's, Emmet had hoped for the embassy in Rome. Failing that, he had asked for Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, or Constantinople. Emmet remained in Holland until the summer of 1937 when he transferred to Vienna.\footnote{Ibid., 59 ftn. 2; II, 52 ftn. 1. See also Roosevelt and Brough, \textit{An Untold Story}, 113, 217.} George A. Gordon, a career diplomat then serving as minister to Haiti, replaced Emmet.\footnote{State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 109.} In selecting Gordon, perhaps FDR recalled his earlier troubles in trying to satisfy the desires of his friends.
The appointment of an ambassador to Rome also presented Roosevelt with some problems. Several deserving Democrats laid claim to the embassy in Mussolini's Italy in stark contrast to the situation FDR confronted in finding a representative to Hitler's Germany. Before Roosevelt settled upon Breckinridge Long for Italy in April 1933, much maneuvering occurred among the participants. In the end, a temporary meeting of minds between Moley and Phillips resolved the issue.

Three Democrats initially vied for the Italian post. Farley early championed the cause of James W. Gerard, a faithful Democrat and former ambassador to Germany under Woodrow Wilson. Colonel Edward M. House urged the appointment of James Michael Curley, the colorful mayor of Boston who, in Moley's words, "presented unimpeachable claims to the job in the shape of a record of early, energetic, and powerful support of the Roosevelt candidacy." The third candidate, Clark Howell, publisher of the Atlanta Constitution, had long supported FDR. Breck Long was not among the list of contenders.

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135Farley, Farley's Story, 56.

136First New Deal, 243. See also After Seven Years, 132. Curley contributed $10,000 to FDR's 1932 campaign. Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 778.

137Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 361.
Roosevelt never seriously considered Gerard. The President held a grudge against Gerard that dated from the 1914 New York senatorial primary campaign. Supported by Tammany Hall, Gerard had opposed Roosevelt and had won, despite spending most of the campaign in the ambassador's chair in Berlin. That Gerard had performed his diplomatic duties without distinction probably did not influence Roosevelt's decision to ignore him. Nor is it likely that Gerard received no offer from FDR simply because a friend of the President's suggested, in attempting to undercut the former Ambassador, that Gerard wanted the post for only one year so that he could add the experience to his memoirs. Others had been selected on equally flimsy grounds. The best Farley ever was able to produce for Gerard--after also pressing FDR to appoint him to Paris--was a temporary assignment representing the United States at the coronation of King George VI in 1937.

Roosevelt also held grievances against Curley. Although the Boston Mayor had performed yeoman work in FDR's campaign, he had led FDR into an early defeat. Curley had convinced FDR, who was then the Democratic frontrunner, that he could beat Al Smith in the 1932 Massachusetts presidential primary.

138 Farley, Farley's Story, 56; Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect, 64, 213, 263.
139 Farley, Farley's Story, 56.
Despite the commitment of considerable resources, Roosevelt lost by a 3 to 1 margin, a major setback at the time.  

Curley, nevertheless, was the leading contender for the Rome embassy. In 1932 he had visions of becoming the secretary of the navy. By early 1933 he had lowered his sights to Rome, an ambassadorial post that he believed would increase his popularity among Boston's Irish Catholics and enhance future political opportunities. Evidently he had received assurances from Jimmy Roosevelt that the President would honor him with an appointment to either France or Italy. With Gerard's candidacy no longer a reality, Curley also commanded Farley's support.  

Breckinridge Long now entered the Rome ambassadorial sweepstakes. A life-long Democrat with ancestors whose political involvements stretched back to the era of Thomas Jefferson, Long was another member of the RBC group who had found Washington, D.C., an uninviting place since the Republican takeover in 1920. Under Woodrow Wilson, Long had served as an assistant secretary of state, during which he had undertaken the task of eradicating all Republicans from the Diplomatic Service—a role that had not endeared him to William

140 Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 19.
Phillips, who also had served in the State Department at
that time. With the end of the Democratic hiatus in 1933,
Long anticipated a return to government.

Few Democrats were more deserving than Long. A graduate
of Princeton and a lawyer, he possessed great wealth and a
favorable social and professional position. In 1916 he had
loaned the Wilson presidential reelection committee
$100,000. In 1932 he repeated his performance, contributing
more than $1,000 a month to FDR's preconvention Victory Fund,
and lending the Democratic National Committee $10,000 three
days prior to the November election. With justification,
Long expected to serve in FDR's cabinet.142

Roosevelt had other plans for Long. In February 1933
the President offered Long his old berth in the State Depart­
ment. Long refused. He would not serve under William
Phillips, his old antagonist, then the choice for under­
secretary of state.143 For a moment Long appeared headed for
a life of private pursuits. Then, FDR, having offered Howell
both Brazil and Argentina, which the newsman rejected, penned

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142 James Francis Watts, Jr., "The Public Life of
Breckinridge Long, 1916-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Missouri, 1964), 1-20, 37, 68-78; Fred L. Israel,
ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the
Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966),
xi-xxv.

143 Watts, "Public Life of Long," 72; diary entry,
April 22, 1942, Israel, War Diary of Long, 260.
a note to Hull and Moley: "Why not cut the Gordian knot in regard to the Argentinian Ambassador by asking Breck Long if he will take it?" 144

Long determined to hold firm in hope of a more prestigious post. Along with Curley, he became a major contender for Rome. Howell, in the meantime, had declined offers to serve in Turkey or Poland. Eventually, Howell, like Gerard, accepted a position of representing the United States to the coronation of George VI—the only official overseas journey he made under the New Deal. 145

Phillips and Moley eventually agreed upon Long. Between Curley and Long, Phillips regarded Long as the lesser of the evils. Long possessed at least a solid social background, whereas Curley, a fellow Bostonian, was tainted by the Irish tarbrush. Certain that Roosevelt would not consider a career diplomat, Phillips approached Moley. He asked Moley to intercede with Farley to see that Curley was not offered Rome. Moley consented. He would ask Farley to offer Poland to Curley if Phillips would agree to support Long for Rome. 146

144 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 361.
145 Ibid.
146 Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years, 132-133.
The deal was consummated, Farley concurred, and Long became the Ambassador to Italy.

Curley became incensed. Not privy to the negotiations, he reacted with characteristic outrage and Irish aplomb when FDR offered him Poland. He replied that "since Roosevelt considered this ministry [Poland] the most important in the world," the President should resign and "take the post himself." Poland, Curley told FDR, was more fit for a Republican than a Democrat.\footnote{Curley, I'd Do It Again, 251-252. Prior to that talk, FDR submitted Curley's name to the U.S. Senate as his nominee for the Polish post on April 12, 1933. On April 15, FDR withdrew Curley's nomination. Whether FDR had informed Curley prior to submitting his nomination to the Senate is not readily known. Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 51 ftn. 3.}

Long lasted three years in Rome. Upon his arrival, he immediately began to forward to FDR and the State Department enthusiastic dispatches about Mussolini and the Italian fascists. Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, Long urged the New Deal to recognize formally Mussolini's triumph.\footnote{For example, see Long to FDR, June 27, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 255-259; Louis M. Howe to FDR, October 18, 1935, and Long to FDR, June 23, 1936, ibid., III, 28, 333-334.} Aware that Long suffered from a
stomach ulcer and dearly missed the excitement of domestic politics, FDR—who opposed recognition of the Italian victory—persuaded Long to resign in 1936. FDR later appointed Long as an assistant secretary of state. 149

Roosevelt replaced Long in Italy with William Phillips. Phillips had long coveted the Rome embassy. His career had not yet included a prestigious ambassadorship. 150 Moreover, Roosevelt knew he could depend upon Phillips to preserve the delicate line between United States recognition and non-recognition of the Italian escapade in Ethiopia, whatever the career diplomat's personal preference. 151 Phillips survived in Rome until the United States declared war on the

149 Long to FDR, March 13, 1936, Long to FDR, June 15, 1936, and FDR to Long, June 18, 1936, ibid., III, 254-255. 324-325, 330-331. Long returned to the State Department in September 1939 as a special assistant to the secretary. From 1940 through 1944, he was an assistant secretary of state. Israel, War Diary of Long, xxiv.


Axis powers in 1941.

Next to Rome the embassy in Madrid ranked as the most important European post along the Mediterranean. Revolution had punctured Spain's three-hundred year history on countless occasions. In 1931 the Spanish people overthrew the monarchy of King Alfonso XIII and installed a liberal, republican government. Although the Spanish experiment in democracy began without bloodshed, class discontent, conflict, and factionalism loomed near the surface. In selecting an American representative to the infant republic, Roosevelt paid more attention to party patronage than to Spanish history.

Spoils politics and high irony marked the selection of Claude Bowers as ambassador to Spain. A native of Indiana, a popular historian, and a practicing journalist, Bowers also was a staunch Democrat with a national reputation. For years Bowers had wielded a devastating pen in support of Democratic causes. In 1932 he unleashed his talents upon the Hoover administration. "There was," Bowers confessed, "an embarrassing richness of material" that Depression

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year. Roosevelt considered Bowers' newspaper columns "a bulwark of strength." Hoover's staff concurred: Bowers' editorials, one of them commented, "were the most damaging of the campaign." In addition to his credits as a purveyor of purple prose, Bowers enjoyed a friendship with the President-elect.

Bowers wanted a reward for his years of Democratic service. Fifty-nine years old in 1933, he hoped to obtain a leisurely diplomatic post where he could continue to write history. Like William E. Dodd, Bowers was a Jeffersonian-Democrat. The author of two works on southern history, Bowers intended to turn his attention to a study of Jefferson.

Roosevelt and his advisers early agreed to place Bowers on the Preferred List. In a meeting late in February, FDR, Moley, and Farley discussed where to send Bowers to reward him with "his heart's desire"—a serene diplomatic mission. They decided upon Belgium.

Undersecretary Phillips was horrified. Bowers combined an intensely partisan ideology with an extremely sloppy manner of dress. He would cast disparagement upon the diplomatic profession in any post, but especially in Belgium.

154Bowers, My Life, 249-250.
Phillips expressed his objections to the President.

Roosevelt hesitated for a moment. He then decided that Bowers should be sent to Spain. "Claude is a funny-looking fellow," he told Moley and Farley. "The Belgium court is very fastidious. So let's send him to Spain, where there won't be much to do." As an afterthought, FDR recalled that Brand Whitlock "had once sought urbanity, leisure, and quiet," and "had wound up in an invaded and devastated" land as ambassador to Belgium in 1914. Yes, the President declared, Bowers definitely should journey to Spain instead of Belgium. 155

Three years after Bowers arrived in Madrid, Spain erupted into a bloody and cancerous civil war that soon engulfed Europe. From 1936 to 1939, Bowers watched and reported upon the civil war from an outpost in San Sebastian on the northern coast of Spain. He also managed to complete one monograph on Jefferson in 1936 and to begin work on

155 Moley, First New Deal, 243, and After Seven Years, 132. Note also, FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21.

According to Bowers, FDR, in phoning him about his nomination, said he was embarrassed by all the people from New York he had appointed to posts in the administration. FDR then asked Bowers, an Indiana native residing in New York, to claim residence from some state other than New York for the record. My Life, 262.
Roosevelt's three appointees to the Irish Free State resembled many other New Deal diplomats in at least two respects. All were amateurs whose careers had failed to touch even the periphery of diplomatic experience. All had supported FDR's campaigns. In many other respects, they formed a motley group of no great distinction.

The first appointee, however, appeared to be a particularly inappropriate choice. William W. McDowell was a Baptist of Scotch ancestry. His father, one generation removed from Scotland, had served in the Tennessee Senate where he had authored that state's first prohibition law. A wealthy and loyal Democrat, William McDowell migrated to Montana near the turn of the century, amassed a considerable fortune as a shareholder in the Anaconda Copper Company and other mining ventures, and found time to serve two terms as speaker of the Montana House of Representatives and seven years as lieutenant governor. His service from 1930 to 1933 as chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee undoubtedly enhanced his opportunity to acquire a diplomatic post, along with, perhaps, the aid

of U.S. Senator Burton K. Wheeler. Then sixty-six years old, McDowell was in the twilight of his public career.

That Scotchmen were never popular in Ireland appears to have escaped Roosevelt. In any event, McDowell's tour ended abruptly. One month after his arrival in Dublin, he collapsed, dead from a cardiac arrest, while responding to a toast offered in his honor at a banquet held by the president of the Irish Republic. 157

A contender for the Irish post appeared almost immediately. On April 11, 1934, two days after McDowell's death, Richard Wasburn Child offered himself as a successor. In a letter to Roosevelt, Child stated that he was qualified to deal with the Irish "on something more than a fox-hunting basis."158

Roosevelt had asked Child after the 1932 campaign "if there was anything" he "wanted." An amateur ambassador to Rome under Harding and Coolidge and a member of the establishment-oriented Council on Foreign Relations, Child had directed the Republicans For Roosevelt National League in 1932. Following his victory, FDR had queried Child about his

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157 National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXIX (1941), 152-153; State Department Biographic Register, 1934, 284.

158 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 650-651 ftn. 1.
interest in a diplomatic post, mentioning Russia as a possibility. Then, Child had declined to specify a position. However, at Roosevelt's suggestion, he had consented to investigate economic conditions in Europe as a special adviser to Hull, a task he commenced on March 5, 1934. 159 Now, one month later, he named Ireland as his just reward.

Roosevelt evidently thought well of Child's offer to head the Irish legation. In a note to Hull accompanying Child's letter of April 11, FDR wrote: "What do you think of this rather happy thought?" 160 What the Secretary of State thought is unclear.

The President's casual enthusiasm for Child quickly waned. FDR never acknowledged the prospect of Child serving in Ireland, a slight that clearly miffed Child. On August 30, 1934, he wrote Roosevelt of his displeasure:

When I returned from Europe on the mission [you] inspired I was told by your secretaries that you would not be able to talk with me. This was an unusual decision....I did not ask for that assignment.

When after the campaign I had conscientiously as a Republican enlisted for the purpose of urging Republicans to elect you, you asked me if there was anything I

159 Ibid.; Child to FDR, August 30, 1934, ibid., II, 192-193.
160 Ibid., I, 651 ftn. 1.
wanted....
You spoke of Russia. Thank God that you did not ask me to serve you there. Your appointment of another without notification to me caused me embarrassment, which loyalty in me would never have caused you.
To-day [sic] any spirit of loyalty I may have is certainly connected with no more request for favor than I have ever made, except when I suggested that I might serve you in Ireland after the death of McDowell--that loyalty is somewhat put into confusion.\(^{161}\)

Unfailingly pompous and arrogant, Child proceeded to pontificate on his disapproval of many of FDR's advisers and New Deal programs. Nevertheless, he was prepared to serve Roosevelt, if only the President would but respond to his many letters.

FDR replied five days later, perhaps with a view to the 1936 campaign. In a letter that began "Dear Dick,"
Roosevelt expressed his surprise at Child's letter. "I did not know that you had asked to see me." He then congratulated him on his "very excellent trip" to Europe. He assured Child that he could arrange with "Mr. [Marvin H.] McIntyre," his personal secretary, a date to talk with him anytime.\(^{162}\)

\(^{161}\)Ibid., II, 192-193.

\(^{162}\)September 4, 1934, ibid., II, 205. Since Child filed no written report about his trip, and since he did not talk with FDR, it must have been difficult for FDR to decipher that Child's trip had been an "excellent" one. Ibid., II, 193 ftn. 2.
Roosevelt ignored the subject of Ireland. Instead, he noted his own heavy schedule with the Congress. Support for FDR's candidacy, after all, did not qualify everyone for an automatic reward, especially one so liberally disparaging of the New Deal as Richard Wasburn Child.

Roosevelt next considered appointing a man to Ireland who was almost as illogical a choice as McDowell. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., was a Democrat who richly deserved a reward. He reportedly contributed a healthy $33,700 to FDR's 1936 campaign. He was also an Episcopalian, and a divorced and remarried man.

FDR never announced Biddle's appointment to Ireland. Headed by the revolutionary leader Eamon de Valera, the Irish government refused to accept Biddle. Ambassador Bullitt

163 Bendiner, Riddle of the State Department, 133; Kiplinger, Washington Is Like That, 260.

In 1932, Biddle contributed heavily in many ways "to the Pennsylvania Democratic Party...and in 1934 campaigned extensively for George H. Earle, the first Democratic governor of Pennsylvania elected in more than one hundred years." Perhaps Earle, FDR's minister to Austria in 1933, suggested Biddle to the President. Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward Wynot, Jr., and Theodore P. Kovaleff, eds., Poland and the Coming of the Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland, 1937-1939 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 4.

164 Cannistraro, et. al., Diplomatic Papers of Biddle, 2-4; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, LIII (1961), 14.
surmised as much in a letter to the President on April 12, 1935:

As the appointment of Tony Biddle to Dublin has not been announced, I assume that the difficulty of obtaining the agreement of the Irish Government to the appointment of a divorced and remarried man proved to be insuperable.

Bullitt then suggested that the President consider transferring John Cudahy, his minister to Poland, to Ireland. 165

Cudahy, at least, was of Irish-Catholic descent. A second generation Irishman—his father emigrated from Callan County—John Cudahy also presented impressive political credentials for the Irish post. Nominally a Republican, the millionaire playboy and heir to the Cudahy Meat Packing Company had become convinced, during a fit of prescience, that the Grand Old Party had no chance in 1932. His conversion to the Democratic Party and his subsequent donation to the Roosevelt cause—more than $3,000—earned him the Polish embassy in 1933, a post several other candidates had rejected. 166

165 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 478; Bullitt, For The President, Ill. Transferring chiefs willy-nilly was common. Biddle became the minister to Norway on July 22, 1935, replacing Hoffman Phillip, a career officer appointed by Hoover to Oslo in 1930. On the same day, Phillip became ambassador to Chile, a post he held until his retirement in 1937. State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.

Cudahy soon pined for his ancestral homeland. He had found the atmosphere in Warsaw drab and dreary. He "had only one wish in life," he told Bullitt in April 1935, and that was "to be appointed Minister to Ireland." Bullitt believed, as he wrote the President, that Cudahy "would make an admirable Minister to Dublin. He loves to hunt and is a very attractive fellow of the type that the Irish like and his private life is as blameless as the Pope himself could desire."\textsuperscript{167}

Roosevelt finally granted Cudahy his "one wish" in May 1937. When Bullitt related to Cudahy in February 1936 that the Irish post would be his after the fall election, the Irishman "was in Paradise [sic]." He is eager to return to the United States "to campaign and promises 3,000,000 Polish votes!" Bullitt wrote the President.\textsuperscript{168}

In the interim between McDowell's death and Cudahy's

\textsuperscript{167} April 12, 1935, Nixon, \textit{FDR and Foreign Affairs}, II, 478.

\textsuperscript{168} February 22, 1936, \textit{ibid.}, III, 206, and Bullitt, \textit{For The President}, 145.

appointment, Roosevelt bestowed upon Alvin M. Owsley his desire to serve anywhere but Bucharest by transferring him to Ireland. A Texas Democrat, attorney, and friend of Vice President John Nance Garner, Owsley had complained of profound unhappiness since his arrival in the Rumanian capital in June 1933. Bereft of diplomatic experience, Owsley had accepted FDR's offer of a ministership in 1933, although he initially believed that he was being offered a position in a church. He served in Ireland from May 1935 until July 1937.169

Several of FDR's other amateur appointees to Western Europe were similarly without bold distinction. Herbert Claibourne Pell, for example, headed the mission in Portugal from 1937 to 1941. An old next door neighbor of the President's, his friendship with FDR dated to their days together at Harvard and spanned nearly twenty years of active participation in New York politics. Pell's service as a congressman, state Democratic party chief, and vice chairman of the Democratic campaign committee to reelect Roosevelt in 1936 added to his claim on a diplomatic post.170

169 FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The President, 114. Thayer tells the story of an appointee, who fits Owsley's description, who thought he was being offered the ministry of a church. Diplomat, 250.

170 Roosevelt and Brough, Untold Story, 150; Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, III, 92; State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 66.
Expediency appeared to dictate FDR's third selection to Canada. Two professional diplomats—Warren Delano Robbins and Norman Armour—had held the Canadian post. Since the latter's transfer to Chile in January 1938, however, no chief-of-mission represented the United States in Ottawa until the arrival of Daniel C. Roper in May 1939. The delay in nominating a successor to Armour is inexplicable. However, when FDR learned in April 1939 that the King and Queen of England would visit Canada shortly, he hastily began looking for an envoy.

Roper's appointment surprised him. He recently had retired as secretary of commerce, in part because of the President's executive reorganization plan, which took some responsibilities away from his department. He was available, however.

After leaving the President's official family [Roper recalled], I had no idea that I would ever again hold an official position. Then, on April 26, 1939, came one of the great surprises in my life. It began with a telephone call from the State Department. 'The Secretary wishes to see you,' I was told. Within an hour I was in conversation with Secretary Hull, my friend of many years. 'I've just had a long-distance conversation with the President at Hyde Park.' He informed me that he would

Robbins was a first cousin to FDR. He died in 1936. Moley, First New Deal, 27, 433. On Armour, see State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 56.
like for you to accept the position of Minister to Canada for a period of about two months—the period, in other words, of the visit of the King and Queen of England."

He went on to say that their Britannis Majesties would arrive in about ten days. Would I accept, and would Mrs. Roper and I proceed to the post immediately upon confirmation so that we might reach Canada in advance of the royal couple?....

Without hesitation, I told the Secretary...that we would accept and proceed to Ottawa immediately.

Roper thought that Roosevelt had chosen him because, as the President informed him, he possessed a fine sense of propriety.172

Roosevelt was not particularly fond of Roper, however. Roper's appointment as secretary of commerce in 1933 had caused the President considerable embarrassment—he had promised that cabinet post to Jesse Straus. Moreover, FDR had suggested earlier to Farley that Roper might be persuaded to resign his cabinet seat—to which Roosevelt eventually appointed Harry Hopkins—in return for a diplomatic mission.173

Furthermore, Roper confessed that he lacked ceremonial acumen, and that he received invaluable instruction in pro-

172 Roper, Fifty Years, 351. Roper contributed $1,000 to FDR's 1932 campaign. Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 781.

173 Farley, Farley's Story, 114. See also 126, 134-135, 157.
Perhaps FDR experienced a spell of guilt over his earlier treatment of Roper. Or perhaps he required Roper's support, if not silence, for the 1940 presidential campaign. In any case, Roper was a sound politician with a distinguished record of public service, and he was available immediately.

The mission at Berne, Switzerland, was the only diplomatic post in Western Europe commanded by career officers for the entire period of FDR's first two terms. A pleasant, serene place, surrounded by majestic scenery, Berne also was the headquarters of the League of Nations. The role of the U.S. chief-of-mission at Berne as an observer and unofficial participant in the deliberations of the Council of the League required the presence of a proper and delicate diplomatist who would not embarrass or commit the United States to any European entanglements.

That Roosevelt selected Hugh Wilson and Leland Harrison, both distinguished and sober diplomats, to occupy the Swiss legation, respectively, was thus unextraordinary.  

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174Roper, Fifty Years, 353.

175Of Wilson, Hull stated: "I formed a high opinion of him then and in later years as an experienced and capable, though not necessarily a model, diplomat." Memoirs, I, 182. On Harrison, see Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 38, 119-120; Villard, Affairs at State, 199.
Nor did it presage a change in FDR's view of professional diplomats. From 1920, when the League of Nations established its headquarters in Berne, until 1951, when the United Nations headquarters in New York was completed, no amateur headed the Swiss mission. Since 1951, only one professional diplomat has held the post, and then for only four years. 176

II

The selection of chiefs-of-mission to Scandinavia differed little from the appointment of envoys to Western Europe. Political loyalties and presidential whimsy were the dominant criteria. Diplomatic qualifications and experience in foreign affairs were secondary considerations, when they intruded into the selection process at all.

The first minister appointed to the attractive legation in Stockholm, Sweden, possessed solid political and social credentials. Born into a prominent New York Jewish family with a long tradition of membership in the state Democratic organization, Laurence A. Steinhardt moved comfortably in the highest social circles. 177 Wealthy and cultured, a


Steinhardt expected his financial largesse to secure him a diplomatic assignment. Prior to the November election, Roosevelt had not allowed Steinhardt any indication that he contemplated a position for him in the administration. However, Steinhardt had overheard FDR remark that, if he won, he would count each dollar contributed toward his nomination tenfold. From his uncle, Samuel Untermyer, who wielded considerable influence in Democratic circles, and from administration insiders, Steinhardt also knew that he ranked high on the President's Preferred List.179

In February 1933 Steinhardt learned that he might receive the legation in Switzerland or Sweden. Roosevelt's intimates, Steinhardt wrote his uncle, "agreed that Switzerland was by far the more important post, but this was held by a career diplomat, Hugh Wilson. And" the President, Steinhardt noted, "had not yet decided how to handle the career situation."

Steinhardt requested that his uncle refrain from apply-


179 Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 33. See also Pearson and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 344-345.
ing pressure to accelerate his entry into the administration. The President-elect, Steinhardt informed his uncle, hated being coerced into making an appointment, and besides, Raymond Moley, who had expressed bitter opposition to the career boys, might prove influential.¹⁸⁰

Roosevelt evidently considered Steinhardt for the Swiss post. The New York lawyer heard that he might be asked to serve one year as an assistant secretary of state before transferring to Berne. At one point FDR penned a longhand note to Hull concerning Steinhardt: "I have the man for you for Assit. Scry in charge of legal work—...excellent lawyer—knows a lot about world affairs—I think this is the best choice."¹⁸¹ Instead, Steinhardt became the Minister to Sweden.

His appointment to Stockholm delighted Steinhardt. The Swedish assignment, he wrote his sister, would provide an opportunity to relax and to regain the health lost in the past years of constant travel and difficult work. United States relations with Sweden were excellent. Moreover, his tour would be short—no longer than two years—and he anticipated that a diplomatic tour would enhance his corporate

¹⁸¹Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 362.
law practice. He had no intention of making diplomacy a career. 182

Steinhardt, however, soon adopted the Foreign Service as a career. Although not ordained by training or experience, Steinhardt immersed himself in the challenge of diplomacy and quickly earned the respect of his colleagues. 183 He became a well-traveled chief-of-mission, the only political appointee to serve in that capacity throughout the entire Roosevelt presidency. 184

Prior to disembarking at Stockholm in the summer of 1933, Steinhardt attended the World Economic Conference in London at Roosevelt's request. There he noted that the President's policy was one of constantly shifting and changing his representatives. This policy, Steinhardt thought, was "borrowed more or less from the football field," an apt commentary that Steinhardt could later apply to his own New

182 Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 38.


184 Steinhardt served in Sweden (1933-1937), Peru (1937-1939), the Soviet Union (1939-1941), and Turkey (1942-1945). In addition, he served in Czechoslovakia (1945-1948) and Canada (1948-1950) under Truman.
Deal career, which included four assignments in twelve years. 185

Three years proved long enough for Steinhardt in Sweden. Bored and seeking more responsibility, he told FDR in 1936 that he might resign from the diplomatic service unless granted a more important post. 186 Looking around, Roosevelt eyed Peru, the stage for an upcoming Pan American Conference, as an assignment likely to satisfy Steinhardt's ambitions. Without much fanfare, FDR sent Steinhardt to Peru and Fred Dearing, a career diplomat then serving in that post, to Stockholm.

The simple switching of two diplomatic quarterbacks reflected more FDR's desire to accommodate Steinhardt than his wish to assign a professional diplomat to Sweden. A member of the first generation of professional diplomats, as well as of the old-boy network, Dearing had spent twenty-three of his twenty-six years in diplomacy in Spanish-speaking countries. Appointed to Peru by Hoover in 1930, Dearing's transfer to Sweden represented a demotion of sorts. While Peru was an embassy, Sweden held only the status of a legation. In 1938, a year after his arrival in Stockholm, Dearing

185 Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 46.
186 Ibid., 93-95. Steinhardt enhanced his credentials with FDR by returning to the U.S. in 1936 and campaigning for the President's reelection.
retired from the Foreign Service. 187

Another career officer, Frederick A. Sterling, replaced Dearing in Sweden. Prior to entering the Diplomatic Service in 1911, Sterling earned an A.B. at Harvard, attended law school, and managed a cattle ranch. His diplomatic experience included a five-year tour as FDR's minister to Bulgaria. Initially slated to head the mission in Latvia in 1938, Sterling proceeded instead to Stockholm upon Dearing's retirement. 188

Sterling held high marks as a solid diplomat from professionals and amateurs alike. Florence "Daisy" Jaffrey Harriman, one of two women chiefs-of-mission appointed by FDR, wrote that Sterling knew the "intricacies of professional diplomacy," kept an open mind, maintained an "amazing" patience, and commanded the complete devotion of his staff. Herself an amateur, she constantly called upon Sterling for advice. She knew "no better example of a career diplomat." 189

Few better examples of FDR's often haphazard method of selecting envoys exist than his appointment of "Daisy"

187 Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 96-105, 111; State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 208.

188 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 188-189.

Harriman either. The announcement of her appointment as minister to Norway in 1937 completely stunned her. A wealthy Washington socialite, born into the high society of New York's Fifth Avenue, and husband to J. Borden Harriman, a first cousin to the Harriman of railroad empire fame, Mrs. Harriman counted among her friends the very rich and the very famous. Known as "the godmother" of the Democratic party, she had campaigned for Roosevelt in 1936 and had hosted a celebrated "denounce-the-Republican" dinner.\(^{190}\) Although she was knowledgeable in foreign affairs, her diplomatic experience hardly extended past the entertaining of diplomats in Washington. Nor was she a particularly avid supporter of FDR's domestic policies.\(^{191}\)

How and why she received a diplomatic appointment mystified her. "My Mission to the North, my appointment as United States Minister to Norway," she wrote, "was utterly unexpected. I read of it in the newspapers and only found

\(^{190}\) Florence Jaffray Harriman, From Pinafores to Politics (N.Y.: Henry Holt, 1932), 1, 8, 10-16, 22, 34, 61, 72-97, 112-116, 123, 159-161, 288-301, 342; "Women," Time (July 12, 1937), 21; Washington Merry-Go-Round, 27; Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 184-188.

\(^{191}\) In 1932, Harriman informed FDR that she intended to be neutral at the Democratic convention in her capacity as the Democratic national committeewoman from the District of Columbia. At the convention, she held out for Newton D. Baker or Melvin Traylor, two of FDR's rivals. Harriman, Mission to the North, 28; "Women," 21.
out that it was true by investigating the rumors.\textsuperscript{192}

A visit to the State Department confirmed the newspaper reports.

I was immensely heartened to think the President had considered me for such a responsible position. That is, if he had...[sic]. The next morning I went to the State Department, and laid my dilemma before an old friend, Sumner Welles. I couldn't, could I, go on considering myself a prospective Minister when no such job had ever been offered to me, I said. At which he laughed, 'That is funny. Do you mean to tell me all the news you've had of this has been through the papers?' Then he assured me that all the preliminary steps were over. I had only to say 'yes' or 'no.'

Hesitant and uncertain about her qualifications, Mrs. Harriman visited with several State Department officials "to find out what I could about the Norwegian post" before finally consenting to serve.\textsuperscript{193}

Harriman suspected that her appointment was related to her availability and her sex. She noted that she was not "a 'first' in the Department's experience for, after all, Ruth Bryan Owen had broken the ice, four years before."\textsuperscript{194} Mrs. Harriman, Mission to the North, 14. See also Patterson, Duty and Diversion, 220.

\textsuperscript{193} Harriman, Mission to the North, 37.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid. Harriman's influential friends and acquaintances, which included Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins and Eleanor Roosevelt, probably also eased her appointment. More-
Harriman, a member of the women's suffrage movement since the turn of the century, might have been correct.

No woman had held the position of chief-of-mission in the American Foreign Service before Ruth Bryan Owen reached Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1933. Like most male-dominated organizations of its day, the Foreign Service was a bastion of male chauvinism. No friend of the Foreign Service, FDR may well have taken great delight in placing a woman into the top ranks of the old-boys club. He was not immune, either, to the symbolism inherent in establishing an historic precedent.

Happenstance also played a large role in Owen's appointment. The daughter of William Jennings Bryan, himself a three-time Democratic presidential candidate and a secretary of state under Woodrow Wilson, Ruth Owen grew up in the middle west and attended the University of Nebraska. In 1925 she joined the faculty of the University of Miami, where she also served on the board of regents. Three years later the fourth district in Florida elected Owen to Congress. She

over, she apparently had served creditably as the only woman appointee to the Federal Industrial Relations Commission under Woodrow Wilson.

Contrary to E. Wilder Spaulding, it is unlikely that "the friendly support of...Senator Tom Walsh of Montana... sufficed for the [Harriman] appointment to Norway." Although Walsh was influential with FDR--the President slated him for the cabinet slot of attorney general--he died prior to the inauguration in 1933. Harriman was appointed in 1937. Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 186. On Walsh's death, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 158.
served two terms in the U.S. House before suffering defeat at the polls in the 1932 primary race, after which she campaigned vigorously for her fellow Democrat and family friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt.\(^{195}\)

Owen became a prime candidate for a position in the New Deal administration following FDR's victory in November. The President-elect first mentioned Owen to his advisers as a possibility for his cabinet early in 1933. He wanted to be the first U.S. chief-of-state to appoint a member of the female sex to a cabinet post.\(^{196}\) Moreover, his wife Eleanor and Mary W. Dewson, both stalwarts in the Democratic party, exerted pressure upon the President to appoint more women to important positions.\(^{197}\) However, the selection of Francis Perkins, FDR's commissioner of labor in New York, to head the Department of Labor satisfied Roosevelt's quota of women cabinet members. When Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes, the "old curmudgeon," objected to appointing Owen, or any other woman, as his assistant, the diplomatic corps became a not unlikely refuge for the great orator's daughter.\(^{198}\)

\(^{195}\)Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 180-184; Washington Merry-Go-Round, 21-29.

\(^{196}\)Moley, After Seven Years, 111, and First New Deal, 73.

\(^{197}\)Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 387-390.

\(^{198}\)Diary entries, March 11 and 13, 1933, Ickes, Secret Diary, I, 5-6.
Owen approached Raymond Moley for assistance in procuring a State Department position in March 1933. She informed Moley, possibly with FDR's blessing, that she entertained the ambition of becoming an assistant secretary of state. She impressed Moley: He described her as "an extraordinarily attractive woman," noted his idolization of her father, and pledged to assist her. Like Ickes, however, Secretary Hull was less than receptive to the idea of a woman assistant, particularly one whose reputed oratorical talents equalled those of her father's. 199

Soon thereafter she received the appointment to Denmark. Besides being the first of the female species to attain the diplomatic status of minister, she possessed solid political credentials. She was the daughter of a famous Democratic politician, a firm supporter of the New Deal, and a defeated congresswoman seeking government employment. In appointing Owen to the Danish legation, FDR established a precedent, but more by accident than by design. Owen resigned from her post in 1936 following her marriage to a Danish military officer and subsequent acquisition of Danish citizenship. 200

Roosevelt seemed to choose equally and haphazardly be-

199 Moley, First New Deal, 73.
200 Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 183-184.
tween amateurs and professionals in selecting envoys to the other Scandinavian posts. Alvin Owsley, a Texas Democrat who had served earlier in Rumania and Ireland, succeeded Owen in Copenhagen in 1936. When he resigned on the eve of World War II, Ray Atherton, a career diplomat of twenty-four years, replaced him. As consul general to the London embassy, Atherton had earned the pique of Ambassador Bullitt who described him to FDR as an "imitation Englishman." Whatever Roosevelt's thoughts, Atherton enjoyed the respect of William Phillips and other Foreign Service insiders. Sandwiched between his appointment to Denmark were tours as chief-of-mission to Bulgaria and Canada.

Roosevelt retained another career diplomat, Hoffman Phillip, in Oslo, Norway, until July 1936, when he transferred him to Chile. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., succeeded Phillip in Norway.

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201 FDR to Bullitt, April 26, 1935, Bullitt, For The President, 114; State Department Biographic Register, 1939, 224.

202 Bullitt to FDR, March 4, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 233. See also R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 25, 1936, ibid., 507.

203 Weil, Pretty Good Club, 203; State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 56.

204 State Department Biographic Register, 1938, 210.
FDR initially encountered difficulty in finding a suitable diplomatic mission for Tony Biddle. Few political appointees were more deserving than Tony. A descendant of the wealthy Biddle banking-house family of Philadelphia, Tony Biddle presented a charming, athletic, and socially prominent appearance. He also was an eager, intelligent, and active Democrat. However, in addition, he was divorced, a fact that disturbed his family and caused the Irish government to refuse to accept him as FDR's choice for the Dublin legation in 1934. With the transfer of Hoffman Phillip to Chile in 1935, a move made possible by the resignation of Hal H. Sevier, a political protégé of Vice President Garner and then ambassador to Chile, Roosevelt sent Biddle to Norway. Eighteen months later, FDR shifted Biddle to Poland. 205

To Helsinki, Finland, FDR first sent an amateur and later a professional diplomat. Edward Albright, a former U.S. marshal and Tennessee newspaper owner, devoid of diplomatic experience, received the Finnish post in 1933. He died one month after his transfer to Costa Rica in 1937. 206

H.F. Arthur Schoenfeld replaced Albright in Helsinki. A diplomatist for twenty years, Schoenfeld had resigned from the

205 FDR to Bullitt, April 21, 1936, Bullitt, For The President, 113.

206 State Department Biographic Register, 1937, 311.
Service in 1930 after Hoover had canceled two of his ministerial appointments. Reinstated in 1931 as minister to the Dominican Republic, he remained there until the New Deal administration shifted him to Finland in 1937.\footnote{Ibid., 1940, 179.}

III

The twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe included some of the most politically sensitive and significant diplomatic missions in the world. Marked historically by a mélange of antagonistic ethnic and racial groups, Central and Eastern Europe had proven a staging ground for events leading to World War I.\footnote{Two superbly written accounts of the events leading to World War I are Laurence LaFore, The Long Fuse, An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1965), and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1962).} They came to reoccupy that ground during the 1930s as the Nazis sought advantage for their militaristic aims by encouraging divisiveness among the diverse nationalistic elements that comprised many of the Central and Eastern European nations.

Roosevelt filled more Central and Eastern European posts from the ranks of the Foreign Service than he had in Western Europe and Scandinavia. That professionals outnumbered amateurs reflected less FDR's sensitivity to the importance of
these missions than the unattractiveness of most Central and Eastern European capitals to amateurs.

Central and Eastern Europe often have appeared too drab, too desolate, and too unglamorous to amateurs. For instance, neither Bucharest, Rumania—located near the Black Sea—nor Prague, Czechoslovakia—an industrial hub city on the banks of the Ultava River—have excited the campaign contributor seeking a diplomatic post as a just reward. Between 1915 and 1971, only eight amateurs accepted appointments to these cities. During the same period, by comparison, thirteen amateurs and three career officers served in Paris, France, while seventeen amateurs and no career diplomats headed the London embassy.209

One of the most important missions in Eastern Europe during the 1930s was Moscow. Following United States recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, Roosevelt dispatched two amateurs—first, William C. Bullitt and, then, Joseph E. Davies—to represent the United States with the Soviets. Davies departed for the Belgian court in June 1938. Not until March 23, 1939, did Roosevelt select his third ambassador to Russia, who was also an amateur.

Neither the President nor the State Department displayed

209 The statistics are from materials supplied to the author in a letter from Frederick Aandahl, Director, Operations Staff, Office of the Historian, Department of State, March 2, 1979. See also United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, passim.
any urgency in seeking a successor to Joseph Davies. Upon departing for his new assignment in Belgium, Davies suggested that Roosevelt appoint Sidney Weinberg, a New York lawyer and colleague, to Moscow. Roosevelt apparently concurred, and offered the post to Weinberg, who declined for personal reasons.  

In the meantime, the State Department worked to discourage other amateur applicants for the embassy. One aspiring candidate, Pierrepont B. Noyes, president of Oneida, Ltd., wrote the Department to inquire about the expenses of an ambassador to Moscow. Not content to rely upon a written response alone, a Department official undertook to dissuade Noyes over lunch. Noyes evinced no further interest in the post.

The President and the State Department likely had different reasons for moving slowly to fill the Moscow embassy. The President's motivations probably reflected domestic considerations; the State Department's a desire to control foreign policy with the Soviets. Increasingly cognizant and wary of an isolationist Congress, Roosevelt may have reasoned that it was best not to arouse Congress, that it was best not to risk the immediate appointment of someone like a Bullitt or a Davies who might too eagerly espouse

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211 Ibid., 285 ftn. 58.
internationalist sentiments and who would have to pass U.S. Senate scrutiny in confirmation hearings. Or Roosevelt may simply not have thought about it at all, preferring to allow events to dictate an outcome. On the other hand, officers within the State Department, especially the "old" Russian hands who held a deep and abiding distrust of the Soviet leadership, were content to leave the Moscow embassy to Loy Henderson, the chargé d'affaires, until they could exert influence in appointing the next ambassador. Henderson, a professional diplomat, shared the State Department's suspicions of the Soviet regime; his reports reflected that perspective in marked contrast to those Davies had propagated.\textsuperscript{212}

The President and the State Department eventually agreed upon Laurence Steinhardt. As ambassador to Peru, Steinhardt had concluded early in 1939 that he deserved a more important diplomatic assignment. The physical conditions of the Peruvian embassy were deplorable, and he was bored.\textsuperscript{213} Certainly Roosevelt would not want Steinhardt, a member of a prominent New York Democratic family, to become disenchanted. At the same


\textsuperscript{213}Stackman, "New Deal Diplomat," 156.
time, Steinhardt had become a highly respectable diplomat by State Department standards. Speaking for his colleagues, Hull noted that he had "always found Steinhardt to be alert and very efficient as a diplomatic reporter, especially during perilous times." Besides, it may have been apparent that Steinhardt, unlike Davies, shared the hard-line views of the Soviet specialists in the State Department.

The President and the State Department welcomed Steinhardt's appointment. Hull recalled that he "suggested to the President that" Steinhardt "be transferred" from Peru "to the higher and more responsible post at Moscow, to which Mr. Roosevelt agreed." Departing for Moscow in August 1939, Steinhardt arrived in time to witness the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the commencement of World War II.

Prior to the establishment of United States diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, the legation in Riga, Latvia, served as an important western window on the Soviet border. After 1933 its importance diminished. Even though the minister to Latvia also held accreditation to

214 Hull, Memoirs, I, 603-604.
215 Ibid., 603.
Estonia and Lithuania, the legation's activities were limited: Few Americans whose interests required government protection lived in the area, and the passage of the Johnson Act by Congress in 1934 all but ended the meager commercial relations that existed.\textsuperscript{216} Moreover, as the wife of one Foreign Service officer said, Riga was a cold, dreary, and lonely place "where amusements were scarce."\textsuperscript{217} Riga provoked little excitement among campaign contributors seeking their entitlements. Between 1922 and the absorption of Latvia into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic in 1940, only one noncareer diplomat received the honor of representing the United States at Riga.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{216} Named after Senator Hiram Johnson of California, the Johnson Act provided prohibitions against loans to countries that were in debt to the U.S. government. The act was aimed at punishing those nations that had defaulted on loans made by the U.S. during World War I. See Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 74.

\textsuperscript{217} Irena Wiley, Around the Globe in Twenty Years, (N.Y.: David McKay, 1962), 92-93. See also Kennan, Memoirs, 28-31; Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 84.

\textsuperscript{218} Frederick W.B. Coleman of Minnesota, a noncareer diplomat, served at Riga from 1922 to 1931. From 1931 to 1933, he headed the mission in Denmark. United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973, 41, 91.
Three professional diplomats served successively in Latvia under FDR. All three possessed solid diplomatic backgrounds. All had followed well-worn paths to careers in diplomacy.

The first, John V.A. MacMurray, held degrees from Princeton and Columbia. He was a scholar and a veteran of twenty-five years experience in Far Eastern Affairs, including tours as chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs Division and as minister to China. Dissatisfied with the direction of U.S. Far Eastern policy under Secretary of State Henry Stimson, MacMurray resigned from the Service in 1929 to direct the new Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins' University.219 Prompted by friends in the Department, who hoped to arrange his appointment as the first United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, MacMurray reentered the Service in 1933 to accept the assignment to Latvia, presumably the first leg on the journey to Moscow. He never saw service in Moscow, although he held the ambassadorship to Turkey from 1936 to 1942.220


220 The importance of the Far East in Soviet foreign policy calculations and MacMurray's experience in the Far East also made him a logical candidate for the Moscow embassy. See Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50-51., and The New Dealers, 386.
Arthur Bliss Lane succeeded MacMurray in Latvia. Prior to entering the Diplomatic Service in 1917, Lane was graduated from Yale and studied abroad at the Ecole de L'Ile de France. During the New Deal, he became one of FDR's most-widely traveled diplomats. Bright, active, and sometimes impetuous, Lane was in 1933, at the age of thirty-nine, the youngest chief-of-mission in the Service. Sandwiched around his stint in Latvia were tours as minister to Nicaragua and Yugoslavia, all engineered by the State Department. 221

John C. Wiley followed Lane in Latvia in 1938. Born in France of American parents, he attended Georgetown University Law School prior to enrolling in the Service in 1915. As a young diplomat, Wiley received high praise for his work as consul to the embassies in Moscow and Vienna. His appointment to Riga represented a just promotion in the eyes of his colleagues. 222

One amateur diplomat did serve a tour as minister to Lithuania under FDR. He achieved the distinction of being the only American envoy ever to serve solely as the minister to that country, his predecessors having been accredited also to Estonia and Latvia while residing at Riga.

221 Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 1-10, 83-85, 97. Lane resigned from the Foreign Service in 1947.

222 For instance, see R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 25, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 508.
Owen J.C. Norem, a Lutheran pastor and resident of Montana, proceeded to Kaunas, Lithuania, as minister in 1937. He remained there until the U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in 1940. Although the reason for his appointment is obscure, Senator James E. Murray of Montana may have been instrumental in securing his nomination. A Democrat and avid supporter of the New Deal, Murray later penned a brief forward to a book authored by Norem, *Timeless Lithuania*, in which he lauded the Montanan's accomplishments.\(^{223}\)

No mystery enshrines FDR's appointment of two amateurs to the embassy in Warsaw, Poland. John Cudahy, who served in Poland from 1933 to 1937 prior to obtaining the Irish post, and Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., who served from 1937 to 1939 following a tour in Norway, were generous campaign contributors. Cudahy's donations totaled more than $10,000, while Biddle's reached $33,700, both sums worthy of especial notoriety.\(^{224}\)

Little sense can be gleaned from FDR's selection of envoys to the legation in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The first two men to head the post in Czechoslovakia—a highly industrialized nation located strategically in East-Central Europe—

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\(^{223}\) *Timeless Lithuania* (Chicago: Amerlith Press, 1943).

possessed extensive diplomatic experience in Latin American affairs. The third, while also a career officer, had never held a diplomatic post outside of Washington, D.C.

Francis White occupied the Czech legation from June to November 1933, when he resigned from the Service. A Yale Ph.D., White entered the Service in 1915. Twelve of his seventeen years in the Service, prior to Roosevelt's election, were spent in dealing with Latin American relations.225 White was highly regarded as a Latin American specialist. As harsh a critic of the Foreign Service as Robert S. Allen described White as "a peacemaker in Latin American disputes." 226 As minister to Czechoslovakia, White also impressed William E. Dodd, the ambassador to Germany, who usually found little to like about career officers. Dodd wrote that White was "a loyal, industrious official" who, however, was "not well-informed about Europe in any way." 227

White initially balked at the prospect of an appointment to Czechoslovakia. Although the State Department regarded Prague as one of the more important posts in Europe, White

225 State Department Biographic Register, 1934, 274; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 95; Pearson and Brown, Diplomatic Game, 288-290.
226 Washington Merry-Go-Round, 155.
227 Diary entry, September 22, 1933, Dodd, Dodd's Diary, 40.
feared for the health of his children, he told Undersecretary Phillips, "on account of the climatic conditions and the apparent impossibility of living in the legation, which is in an almost impossible condition." To no avail, Phillips suggested that FDR consider sending White to Hungary, which presumably offered better living accommodations.

Why the New Deal administration failed to slate White for a post in Latin America is uncertain. Perhaps Sumner Welles, intent upon sidetracking a potential rival for supremacy in U.S.-Latin American relations, engineered White's exile to Eastern Europe. The careers of Welles and White contained elements that hint at rivalry. Welles was graduated from Harvard, and White from Yale. Both entered the Service together in 1915. Both quickly attained solid reputations in Latin American affairs. Both were only forty-one years old in 1933. At the time of his commission to Czechoslovakia, White was the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. When Welles assumed that responsibility in April 1933, another position had to be found for White. That Welles could have employed his considerable influence with the President to find White a suitable post in Latin America, instead of Eastern Europe, appears plausible enough. That he did not

228 Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50. See also Weil, Pretty Good Club, 83.
suggests that Welles may have played a role in White's transfer to Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the White House regarded White as a Republican. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, then chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, wrote to Hugh Wilson on April 19, 1933, that White, as well as Hugh Gibson, probably would be transferred because, as a prominent Democrat revealed to him, "they have both been too intimately tied up as exponents of the previous administration in their particular fields."229 Soon thereafter, White, a Latin American expert, sailed for Prague, while Gibson, a European specialist, went to Rio de Janeiro.

Joshua Butler Wright succeeded White in Prague in 1934. Then minister to Uruguay, Wright entered the diplomatic corps in 1909 following graduation from Princeton and brief careers in banking and cattle ranching.230 A diplomat of the old school, described by a colleague as "handsome, charming, debonair...a model of manly elegance," who "talked to all classes of people," Wright's expertise was principally in

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230 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 228; Washington Merry-Go-Round, 145.
Latin American affairs. In 1937 he became FDR's ambassador to Cuba, a post he held until his death two years later.

Wright's transfer from Czechoslovakia to Cuba occurred amidst a major shifting of United States envoys abroad. Between April and August 1937, 30 of the 55 American embassies and legations opened their doors to new chiefs-of-mission, ten on July 13 alone. With the exception of the early months of FDR's first administration, when the President made 31 changes in the missions overseas, this period saw the largest single turnover of posts abroad prior to World War II. Not surprisingly, this period also coincided with the advent of Roosevelt's second term.

Somewhat surprising, however, was the announcement on July 13, 1937, that Wilbur J. Carr would succeed Wright in Czechoslovakia. Carr had labored for forty-five years in the bureaucratic labyrinth of the State Department. As the chief architect of the professional Foreign Service, he was legendary in the consciousness of every career officer. Carr was also sixty-seven years old in 1937, planned to retire shortly,
and possessed no overseas diplomatic experience.

The volatile confrontation brewing between Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1937, moreover, appeared to dictate the need for a first-rate, experienced diplomat in Prague. From France, Ambassador Bullitt advised Roosevelt on May 5 that "Czechoslovakia will be a post of the most vital importance during the next twelve months." The United States, Bullitt stated, "shall need at Prague a man who knows Germany and Czechoslovakia intimately and has guts." 234

The administration evidently paid little heed to Bullitt's warning. In June Roosevelt directed Hull to inform Carr that "the President wants you to go to Prague." 235 Once before, in November 1933, FDR had suggested the Prague post for Carr, if Carr wanted it. Then, Carr, who did not want the appointment, asked Phillips whether the President definitely wanted him to go. Phillips replied, "no," and informed Roosevelt that Carr "could not be spared" from the Department. 236

Once again Carr hesitated to accept the Czech assignment.

234 Bullitt, For The President, 212.
235 Crane, Mr. Carr, 329.
236 Ibid., 325.
He had no desire to be a chief-of-mission at this late date in his career. Concerned about his own lack of qualifications for the job, Carr confided to his diary that "I do not know the language and have little knowledge of world affairs." Many of his friends, moreover, urged him to decline the appointment, arguing that it represented no promotion for a man who had led the Foreign Service establishment.

Carr eventually accepted, however. He always had placed loyalty to his government ahead of personal considerations. Besides, Carr assumed that Roosevelt, in appointing him, believed that the Germans would arrive in Prague before he did, thus forcing him into a belated and well-deserved retirement. However, Carr was to serve in the explosive Prague environment for nearly twenty months, until the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, at which time he retired from the Service.

State Department officials may have directed Carr's appointment. According to George F. Kennan, then a secretary at the Prague post, the staff at the legation strongly suspected that Carr's superiors had engineered his appointment to Czechoslovakia "as a well-deserved tribute to a long life

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237 Ibid., 329.
of unassuming service, and as a suitable way of rounding it off." Less than enthusiastic about having to reconcile the demands of contributors and professionals for chief-of-mission assignments, Roosevelt simply may have acceded to the wishes of the Department in Carr's case.

Less laudatory motivations also may have played a part in the Department's "tribute" to Carr. During the mid-1930s, the organization of the Foreign Service began to evolve along lines incompatible with Carr's methodical bureaucratic administration. The younger, post-Rogers Act officers complained that Carr's administrative methods were too rigid, too unimaginative, and too unresponsive. They actively urged a restructuring of the Service that would be more responsive to professional abilities and less reliant upon compliance with bureaucratic rules. The movement for change and the often thinly-veiled criticisms of his out-dated methods hurt Carr's feelings and may have compelled him to intensify his "bureaucrathic behavior." 240

Compounding Carr's difficulties was Roosevelt's penchant

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239 Memoirs, 89. As the situation in Prague became more acute in September 1938, Moffat recorded in his diary that "poor old Mr. Carr who was supposed to be having a quiet post in which to pass his declining years certainly seems to have been forced into the thick of it." Hooker, Moffat Papers, 201.

240 Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy," 185.
for encouraging loose and even chaotic administrative habits among his subordinates. For Carr, guiding the Foreign Service under FDR was unpleasant at best and humiliating at worst. The "tribute" thus conferred upon the old man by his colleagues may have been recognition of his right to chief-of-mission distinction as well as recognition of the end of his usefulness as the venerable Father of the Foreign Service.

In any event, the precise reasons for Carr's appointment remain entombed with President Roosevelt. Unlike many a political appointee, however, Carr could be expected to rely upon the counsel of his subordinates in the legation—all career officers—in reporting upon events and in advising his government.

The same could not be said for FDR's first appointment to the important post in Vienna, Austria. George H. Earle, III, had little to commend him to diplomacy. Scion of a wealthy Main Line Pennsylvania Republican clan with large holdings in the sugar business, Earle joined the Democratic party in 1932 and contributed substantially to Roosevelt's campaign coffers.²⁴¹ Rewarded with the legation in Austria, he soon earned the reputation among State Department officials

²⁴¹ State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 95; "Milestones," *Time* (January 13, 1975), 76.
as "a master of indiscretion and inaccurate statements." In March 1934 Earle solved the problem of how to ease his retirement from diplomacy by resigning to run successfully for governor of Pennsylvania.

Earle's resignation coincided well with the aspirations of George S. Messersmith. Following fourteen years as an instructor and administrator in the Delaware public school system, Messersmith had entered the Consular Service in 1914. Newly-wed in 1913 he had feared that his career in education would not satisfy his financial needs or the interests of his bride. By the mid-1920s he had attained the rank of consul general and was recognized by his colleagues as the dean of the consular branch of the Foreign Service. By late 1933 Messersmith longed for an appointment as a chief-of-mission. Such an appointment would secure his transfer to the diplomatic wing of the Service and ease his advance to

242 Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 102. Others found Earle similarly unimpressive. Dodd, for instance, described Earle as "one of the rich men appointed to foreign posts who know little history of their own or any other country." Diary entry, January 16, 1934, Dodd's Diary, 71-72.

243 When, in 1939, Earle was once again looking for employment, Bullitt urged FDR to find a position for him. FDR to Bullitt, May 16, 1939, Bullitt, For The President, 353. Earle subsequently served as minister to Bulgaria (1940-1941), and as U.S. naval attache' in Istanbul where he reportedly romanced a woman in the employ of the Nazi intelligence services. Petrov, Study in Diplomacy, 141.
higher posts in the State Department.\footnote{Kenneth Moss, "George S. Messersmith: An American Diplomat and Nazi Germany," Delaware History, 27 (Fall-Winter 1977), 236-237, and Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 1-99, 101. See also Dallek, "Beyond Tradition," 233-244.}

Messersmith held impressive credentials that supported his ambitions for promotion. Often described by contemporaries as a diplomat who demonstrated a cool temper, grasp of details, logical exposition, and analytical insight, he commanded respect from Foreign Service insiders and outsiders.\footnote{Traina, Diplomacy and Civil War, 124. See also Beaulac, \textit{Career Ambassador}, 148-149.} As consul general in Berlin in 1933, Messersmith was the first officer to warn the State Department, with prophetic lenses, that Hitler had no desire for peace unless it was a peace that would be at the expense of complete compliance with German demands. A trusted reporter from his vantage point in Berlin, he believed his record made him an eligible candidate for a ministership. He also encouraged his colleagues and friends to lobby the State Department and the President on his behalf.\footnote{Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 55-120.}

His promotion to head the Austrian legation in 1934 was largely the work of State Department officials. On March 9 Roosevelt nominated Messersmith for the position of minister...
to Uruguay. Although Messersmith would have preferred a mission closer to events in Europe, he had spent most of his consular career in Latin America and the prospective promotion pleased him.\textsuperscript{247} With the resignation of Earle on March 25, another opportunity presented itself. Among others, Undersecretary Phillips persuaded the President that Messersmith's intimate knowledge of Nazi psychology could better be employed from the helm in Vienna. FDR readily concurred.\textsuperscript{248}

Whether Roosevelt fully appreciated Messersmith's qualifications is uncertain. The idea of Messersmith as a minister delighted Roosevelt—but less it seemed from a recognition of Messersmith's abilities than from the President's own disdain of professional diplomats. As John Gunther, then a European correspondent for the Chicago \textit{Daily News}, recalled from an interview with the President in 1934, Roosevelt had asked him whether he knew Messersmith. Gunther had replied, "yes." Roosevelt broke out laughing. "That was a good joke on the State Department, wasn't it! Just think what the career boys will say! I've put a lonely consul into a diplomatic post."\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{247} Diary entry, March 10, 1934, Dodd, \textit{Dodd's Diary}, 92.
\textsuperscript{248} Moss, \textit{Bureaucrat as Diplomat}," 102-103.
\textsuperscript{249} Gunther, \textit{Roosevelt in Retrospect}, 23.
A few members of the old-boys club evidently believed that it was unjust of FDR to bypass diplomatic personnel in favor of a consul. Most State Department officials, however, agreed that Messersmith's appointment was wise. Moffat, for instance, thought that Messersmith was the right man for a "frightfully complicated situation." Indeed, so highly were Messersmith's talents regarded that the Department recalled him in 1937 because it believed his great knowledge of Central European affairs would be of more value in Washington. He subsequently became the Assistant Secretary of State for departmental administration, replacing Carr, while also retaining a strong voice in policy matters. 251

In Messersmith's stead to Vienna Roosevelt sent Grenville Emmet. A former law partner of the President's, then fifty-six years old and minister to the Netherlands, Emmet evidently desired a change. An amateur, he possessed little or no expertise in Central European affairs. Perhaps FDR determined that nothing could be accomplished in Vienna to turn the tide against war. In any event, Emmet died three months after his arrival and was not replaced. 252

250 Moss, "Bureaucrat as Diplomat," 103.
251 Ibid., 155-158; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 21.
252 See Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 59 ftn. 2, and II, 52 ftn. 1.
The least important country in Eastern Europe was Albania. Prior to 1922 the United States had no formal diplomatic relations with Albania. A country of mild summers and harsh winters, isolated from the main currents of European affairs, and industrially primitive, Albania forbode an unpleasant tour of duty for any appointee. Albania was an ideal place for exiling a disliked colleague or a troublesome politico. Since no campaign contributor stepped forward to claim Albania, Roosevelt allowed the State Department to exercise the perogative in selecting a minister.

The State Department chose to send Post Wheeler, one of its own, to Albania. 253 A career officer, Wheeler was then minister to Paraguay, a post he had held since late 1929.

Mutual disesteem and hostility characterized the relationship between Wheeler and his superiors in the Department. In 1955 Wheeler and his wife publicly revealed their animosity toward the Department and the Foreign Service in a then controversial memoir:

Much of our thought [Mrs. Wheeler stated] since he retired from the Foreign Service at the statutory age limit [in 1934] had been given to the story of that Service. Not as we had once in our ignorance imagined it, nor as its apologists have described, but as we ourselves had found it in three

decades of unbroken experience. That story needed telling. It should be written in cold blood.... And over-weighing all other considerations was the belief that the story must bring both the State Department and Foreign Service into disrepute....we told ourselves that a Hercules must appear to cleanse the Augean stables.

The failure of their friend, Senator Joseph McCarthy, to substantiate his charges against the Department and the Foreign Service in the early 1950s had convinced the Wheelers to publish their "expose."254

The antagonism between Wheeler and the Department evolved over many years. Prior to entering the Diplomatic Service in 1906, Wheeler received an A.B. at Princeton and taught briefly as an English instructor. By inclination and profession, he considered himself a poet, but had an "itch," his wife recalled, "for seeing what made government wheels go round." In embarking upon a diplomatic career, Wheeler was the first candidate to ever take an entrance examination. He subsequently described himself as "the first 'career diplomat' of the American Foreign Service." Wheeler was "satisfied that no Princeton, Yale, or Harvard senior could have passed it with a grade over 65."255 In fact, only two of 25 who took the


255 Ibid., 200-205.
exam between 1906 and 1909 received less than 70.  

The examination, however, failed to gain Wheeler admission to the Diplomatic Service. As Mrs. Wheeler candidly revealed, she approached her cousin, the powerful Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Joseph Cannon, who succeeded in persuading President Theodore Roosevelt to arrange a diplomatic appointment for her husband.  

By 1916 Post Wheeler had come to regard the State Department and those who controlled its upper reaches with profound disfavor. Blessed with an abundance of arrogance and paranoia, Wheeler had not attained the high rank in the Service that he believed his talents warranted.  

Mrs. Wheeler recalled her husband's transfer to the Albanian legation in 1933 with much bitterness. A phone call came from Undersecretary Phillips in the spring of 1933:  

I came from the bedroom as Wheeler took up the receiver....He beckoned me close so that cheek to cheek I got the whole message: 'This is to advise you that your transfer to another legation has been decided upon.' 'Not an Embassy?' [Wheeler replied.]  

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256 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 91-92.  
257 Ibid., 89; Wheeler, Dome of Glass, 203.  
258 Wheeler, Dome of Glass, 573.
'I offer you the ministership to Albania.' Phillips stated.
'The smallest and least important country in Europe,' mused Wheeler, 'the world's only country without a rod of railroad....'
'Will you take it?'
'A famous Latin line comes to mind,' said Wheeler. 'But perhaps, Mr. Phillips, your studies at Harvard did not embrace that language of culture?....I will transliterate it for you. My mountainous labors of twenty-five years bring forth a ludicrous mouse.'
'Do you take it?' The voice at the other end had a sudden edge.
'While I remain in the Service I carry out my orders.'

A year later Wheeler retired from the Service at the mandatory retirement age of sixty-five.

The State Department also may have arranged the appointment of Wheeler's successor to Albania. Hugh G. Grant served there from 1935 until the fall of 1939 when Italian forces invaded and annexed that nation. A native of Birmingham, Alabama, a graduate of Harvard and George Washington, Grant was a veteran political journalist for southern newspapers as well as an instructor of history. From 1927 to 1933, he worked as a private secretary for a U.S. senator, who may have helped secure him, with Moley's assistance, a position as a divisional assistant in the State Department during FDR's first year in office. As a "tribute" to

259 Ibid., 807.

260 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 110; Moley, After Seven Years, 134-135.
Moley, who had left the Department in August 1933, Department officials, many of whom held Moley in low repute, may have determined to exile Grant. In any event, the Albanian post attracted few eager adherents.

Two amateur political appointees, on the other hand, elected to make Greece and Hungary their permanent homes from 1933 to 1941. Both were friends of and contributors to FDR's campaigns. Among the political friends FDR conferred ambassadorial status upon, Lincoln MacVeagh, who served in Athens, was unusual. Besides graduating magna cum laude from Harvard in 1913, he was proficient in six languages, including Greek. 261 John Flournoy Montgomery, who went to Budapest, was more typical. Chairman of the International Milk Company, he had been promised the post in Switzerland for his campaign efforts by William Gibbs McAdoo, then a New Deal U.S. senator from California. When the Foreign Service managed to retain a hold on the Berne post for professionals, Montgomery settled for Hungary. 262

Six professionals and one amateur split tours to the


262 Roosevelt Press Conference, June 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 219, 220 ftn. 2. See also Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, IV, 138.
missions in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Five of the six career officers had served as chiefs-of-mission during the 1920s; four saw duty in more than one country during FDR's first two administrations. The amateur, Alvin Owsley, also headed the missions in Ireland and Denmark. Of the seven appointees, the case of Ray Atherton reveals the most about the give-and-take between the White House and the State Department over appointments.

Atherton was a solid and polished diplomat typical of his generation. A native of Brookline, Massachusetts, and a Harvard graduate, he entered the diplomatic ranks in 1917 following ten years in the banking and architectural businesses. As consul of the embassy in London in 1936, Atherton incurred Roosevelt's ire when Ambassador Bullitt related to the President a remark by the King of England "(appropos of Atherton) about his wish to see America represented in London by Americans, not imitation Englishmen." FDR subsequently informed Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore that he wanted Atherton transferred from London.

263 See Appendices infra.
264 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 56.
265 Bullitt to FDR, March 14, 1936, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, III, 234.
266 Moore to FDR, November 25, 1936, ibid., 507.
A member of the old-boys club and a friend of Undersecretary Phillips, Atherton found himself minister to Bulgaria ten months later. Roosevelt succeeded in removing Atherton from London, but the consul's friends in the Department also succeeded in seeing that he received a promotion in the process. Two years later, Atherton became the Minister to Denmark.

IV

Nearly another world removed from Europe were two diplomatic missions of immense importance and concern to Washington officials. Although American statesmen traditionally have viewed an Atlantic-first strategy as the key to national security, events simmering across the Pacific would precipitate United States entry into World War II. When FDR assumed office in 1933, the diplomatic crisis spawned by Japan's invasion of the northeastern Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931 commanded world-wide attention.

The delicate and potentially explosive situation in the

267 On America's historical Atlantic-first strategy, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1949), 149-173.

Far East dictated the appointment of experienced and knowledgeable individuals to Peking and Tokyo. Forced to confront the economic depression at home, Roosevelt, not entirely unexpectedly, elected to recommission two highly-regarded career diplomats and Hoover appointees—Nelson T. Johnson to China and Joseph C. Grew to Japan.

That few, if any, deserving Democrats rushed forward to claim either post only made FDR's decision easier. In addition, FDR respected Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of state, under whom Johnson and Grew first served as envoys to China and Japan, and who encouraged the President to retain them. Roosevelt also retained several other Stimson subordinates in the State Department, including Stanley K. Hornbeck as chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Finally, both Johnson and Grew held superb diplomatic qualifications.

By 1933 Johnson had behind him over twenty years of experience in Chinese affairs. Born of parents who pioneered in Indiana and Oklahoma, Johnson was graduated from high school in 1905. He aspired to attend Yale, but insufficient finances forced him to enter George Washington University. While in his first year, he passed the entrance examination to the Consular Service and never returned to school. He began

269See Richard Dean Burns, "Stanley K. Hornbeck: The Diplomacy of the Open Door," in Burns and Bennett, Diplomats in Crisis, 91-117.
his diplomatic career in 1907 as a student interpreter in the Chinese capital of Peking. Assigned as consul in cities from Hankow to Chungking, Johnson rose to become chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1925.

During his years as divisional chief Johnson played a large role in the formulation of United States Far Eastern policy. His conciliatory attitude toward China's demands for greater national sovereignty accorded well with the views of Secretaries of State Frank Kellogg and Henry Stimson. In November 1929, President Hoover appointed Johnson to succeed John V.A. MacMurray as minister to China.

Johnson possessed impressive qualifications for the Chinese post. Widely read in history, the classics, and geography, he knew China well, and he spoke the language fluently. He combined a friendly manner and quick wit, with the patience necessary to conduct diplomacy in China. The Chinese who had known Johnson during his days as a consular officer respected him.270

Johnson viewed his appointment within the context of the complex difficulties facing the Chinese. He did not exaggerate his own self-importance in solving their problems. "I feel confident," he wrote a friend before departing for China, "that when my tour of duty is ended I shall leave my successor as many problems as I shall find when I reach my desk in Peiping."271

President Roosevelt never seriously considered replacing Johnson in 1933.272 In May 1935, the legation in Peking was raised to embassy status, and Johnson assumed the rank of ambassador. In 1937, however, FDR urged John V.A. MacMurray to return to China as ambassador. MacMurray preferred to remain in Turkey; he informed the President that he would scarcely be persona grata to Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers. Roosevelt quickly dropped the idea.

Only FDR, if even he, knew why he contemplated a shift in envoys to China. That he considered a radical change in United States China policy is doubtful, and he never informed Secretary Hull of any intention to replace Johnson.273

271 Johnson to Nicholas Roosevelt, November 15, 1929, Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 146.
272 See FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21.
273 Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 590 ftn. 112.
More than any other man of his era, Joseph C. Grew exemplified and symbolized the best qualities of the American diplomat who attained professional status during the formative years of the Foreign Service. Besides possessing the social requisites for a career in diplomacy--economic substance, New England ancestry, a Groton and Harvard education--Grew entered the old Diplomatic Service in 1904 "without examination, one of the last of the amateurs." Advancing steadily through the diplomatic ranks, he grasped every opportunity to learn the craft of diplomacy. In 1920 he achieved chief-of-mission status. By 1924 he was among those who were "chiefly responsible for inaugurating the nation's first fully professionalized Foreign Service." Symbolic of his involvement in the development of the career Service was his marriage to Alice Perry, a direct descendant of Benjamin Franklin and Commodore Oliver Perry: Their union produced four daughters, three of whom married Foreign Service officers.

Grew's diplomatic career spanned nearly five decades. He had the distinction to superintend the closing of the embassies in Vienna and Berlin when the United States entered World War I in 1917, just as he later would supervise the closing of the embassy in Tokyo when the United States entered World War II. Following tours as head of the missions in Denmark and Switzerland, Grew returned to Washington in
1924 to serve as undersecretary of state, a position he held until 1927 and through which he exercised special care in implementing the reforms outlined in the Rogers Act. From 1927 to 1932, Grew held sway as the Ambassador to Turkey.

Grew firmly cemented his reputation as a diplomatist while in Turkey. Popular with the Turks, he formed a lasting friendship with Mustapha Kemal, Turkey's reformist president, and he negotiated two treaties of historical significance in United States-Turkish relations. By 1932 Grew possessed a wide range of experiences in nearly every facet of diplomacy. Unabashedly, he considered diplomacy the "most splendid, the most exhilarating, the most stimulating, the most satisfying and withal the most useful form of service."

Nevertheless, Grew required more than experience and ability to survive the "quadrennial roulette of diplomatic assignments through eight administrations and forty years." He worked hard to avoid displacement. He lobbied in the right places. He also was a charter member of the old-boys club, and the club always exerted special care in taking care of its own.

Grew's appointment to Japan in 1931 was a case in point. In November 1931, Assistant Secretary of State William R. Castle—a close friend of Grew's, a former ambassador himself to Japan, and a man of considerable influence in the Republi-
can administrations of the 1920s—asked Grew whether he would like to be considered for the ambassadorship to Japan. The present Ambassador, W. Cameron Forbes, a good-natured but absent-minded appointee, would soon be leaving. With his work in Turkey completed, Grew jumped at this "chance of a lifetime." Three months later Castle arranged for Grew's nomination to Tokyo.

Fortune had smiled upon Grew. When the Democrats assumed power in 1933, Grew was the new Ambassador to Japan instead of the old Ambassador to Turkey. He also had the fortuitous luck to have as President a man who shared with him Groton, Fly Club, and Harvard Crimson experiences. Moreover, Grew's old friend Billy Phillips was Undersecretary of State.274

Following Roosevelt's victory, Grew waged a campaign to hold his post in Japan. He reminded the President-elect of their common social and educational background, and subtly

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but clearly conveyed his qualifications, wishes and loyalty to the new administration. He also advised Billy Phillips and several prominent Democrats of his desires. He did not want to retire in his early fifties. He believed that he needed time in Tokyo to develop friendships and acquaintances in order to be able to interpret Japan to the United States and the United States to Japan.  

Grew had little cause for concern. Moffat judged Grew the "safest" of all the career officers. Phillips, who had recommended Grew for undersecretary of state in 1924, again mentioned his esteem and confidence in the Ambassador's ability. And former Secretary of State Henry Stimson added his praise.

Tokyo was never an open mission. Late in March 1933, Grew received a telegram from Secretary Hull informing him that the President was satisfied with his work in Japan and wanted him to continue. Grew confided to his diary that he had not "expected such a message....This is really tantamount to a definite appointment under the new administration and it

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276 Diary entry, March 6, 1933, Hooker, Moffat Papers, 90. About Grew, Hugh Wilson remarked that "I have never heard the rightness of one of his appointments questioned." *Education of a Diplomat*, 165.
makes us very happy to know definitely that we are to carry on." 277

Like his colleague in China, Grew was eminently qualified. Although almost totally deaf, and unfamiliar with the Japanese language, Grew knew several languages fluently. He had acquired a complete command of diplomatic protocol. He regarded patience and integrity as the essential ingredients of sound diplomacy. As important, Grew understood that a diplomat might be operating under intelligent instructions and favorable conditions, but unless he could inspire confidence and respect, his success was in doubt.

Only time could demonstrate the value of Grew's diplomacy. Grew had spent much of his career in posts where stability and order were the norms of experience. 278 All indications were that he would perform splendidly in the increasingly volatile world of Far Eastern diplomacy.

The other six missions in the Far East and Africa paled in significance alongside Peking and Tokyo. To them, Roose-

277 Diary entry, March 23, 1933, Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942 (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 83. See also Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 189-190; FDR to Hull, March 9, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 21.

278 Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 147, 155-157, 161, 165.
velt dispatched six Foreign Service officers and four amateurs. 279

Typical of the amateur appointees was Bert Fish. A native of Indiana who taught in public schools prior to obtaining a law degree, Fish served without distinction as a Florida county criminal court judge from 1910 to 1917 and from 1931 to 1933. In between he traveled extensively and invested heavily and successfully in the citrus grove business. Besides contributing to FDR's election, Fish's greatest qualification was his service as the financial director of the Democratic National Committee. As his reward, he received the post in Cairo, Egypt. 280

Typical of the career appointees was Leo J. Keena who served as minister to the Union of South Africa from 1937 to 1942. A native of the midwest, he attended the University of Michigan prior to joining the old Consular Service in 1909. Still mired in the consular wing of the Foreign Service in 1934, then as consul general in Paris, Keena impressed Ambassador Straus, who recommended him to FDR for promotion. 281

279 See Appendices infra.

280 Childs, Foreign Service Farewell, 67; Kennan, Memoirs, 143-145; State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 100.

281 State Department Biographic Register, 1940, 131; Straus to FDR, April 9, 1935, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 465-467.
In 1935 Roosevelt responded by appointing Keena as minister to Honduras, the latter's first chief-of-mission post.

The Roosevelt administration appointed substantially more career diplomats than political appointees to missions in Latin America. Within the administration, Secretary of State Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Welles were particularly active in shaping United States Pan American policy. Although cool cordiality characterized the Hull-Welles relationship, they agreed upon the necessity of installing competent professionals in Latin American posts, and they played a large role in the placement of chiefs-of-mission to the Southern Hemisphere. Even then, however, the apparent haphazardness with which FDR chose amateurs to some posts more than matched the relatively routine selection of career officers.

The manner in which FDR selected an ambassador to Mexico City, for instance, more than equaled the impulsive and unpredictable manner in which he chose Jesse Straus to head the embassy in Paris. After promising the Mexican post to one political supporter, Roosevelt abruptly chose another. In selecting Josephus Daniels, Roosevelt also ignored the sensi-

abilities of the Mexican populus and the attendant apprehension of the Mexican government. As much as any other factor, a multiple lapse of memory by FDR determined the appointment of America's representative to Mexico.

Josephus Daniels and Franklin Roosevelt formed a strong friendship dating to their days together in the Wilson administration. Few men who became close friends, however, were as different as Daniels and Roosevelt.

Daniels was seventy-one years old in 1933 and FDR's senior by twenty-one years. He had spent much of his life in rural North Carolina as owner and publisher of the Raleigh News and Observer, consistently attacking corporate interests—especially northern, Yankee capitalism—in his editorials. As a feisty populist crusader, Daniels supported the left-wing of the Democratic party and vigorously campaigned for Woodrow Wilson in 1912. Wilson rewarded Daniels by appointing him secretary of the navy. As his assistant, Daniels chose a young man, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he had met only a few months earlier. During their eight years together in the Navy Department, the patrician Roosevelt came to regard Daniels, whom he had first described as "the funniest looking hillbilly I had ever seen," with great affection. Then, and later as President, FDR always referred to Daniels as "Chief," and Daniels was one of the few who called Roosevelt "Franklin"
with the latter's blessing. Naturally, Daniels was among FDR's earliest and staunchest supporters in 1932. 283

Daniels anticipated an opportunity to return to his old berth as secretary of the navy under the New Deal administration. His friendship with the President-elect, his previous experience in the Wilson administration, and his support of FDR's candidacy made him a logical choice for the navy post.

Roosevelt had other plans, however. A naval enthusiast, himself, he considered Daniels too independent for the navy job. Their relationship, moreover, was too paternalistic--FDR being the patronizer--for the President to allow Daniels a seat in the cabinet. Instead, Roosevelt slated Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia for the navy secretaryship. A reliable, non-reform-minded party wheelhorse, Swanson had staunchly supported the Navy Department in Congress. 284

To Daniels the President offered the minor position of chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board. Without hesitation, Daniels declined that post. Skeptical of independent agencies

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284 New Dealers, 295-300.
and opposed to government subsidies to big business, Daniels characteristically responded to FDR’s offer by recommending that the shipping board be abolished. 285

Roosevelt then assured his old boss that another position would be found. In the meantime, Daniels—realizing that a cabinet slot was unavailable—advised his friend and Secretary of Commerce, Daniel C. Roper, that he preferred Mexico to any other diplomatic mission. Roper dutifully carried that message to Roosevelt. Soon thereafter, and without advance warning, FDR announced from the White House his nomination of Daniels to the Mexican embassy. 286

The announcement of Daniels’ appointment startled and bewildered Vice President Garner and Jim Farley. 287 At Garner’s urging and with the President’s concurrence, Farley had promised the Mexican post to Ralph W. Morrison. A wealthy San Antonio Democrat, utility magnate, and retired banker, Morrison held sterling credentials. He had bank-rolled Garner’s unsuccessful bid for the presidential nomination in 1932, and later had contributed $25,000 to FDR’s

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285 Kilpatrick, Roosevelt and Daniels, 129-130; Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 6-7.

286 Morrison, Small-d Democrat, 168-169; Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 8; Moley, After Seven Years, 110.

287 Farley, Farley’s Story, 97-98.
election.\footnote{Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brain Trust, 263; Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 9; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 778.}

No one had bothered to inform Garner or Farley of the switch in FDR's intentions. No one had known but the President, and he had decided upon Daniels only suddenly.

Roosevelt had completely forgotten the promise to Morrison. He apologized to Garner and Farley. He had determined, he said, that Mexico would be a fine tribute to Daniels, who wanted the post and whose work for the country and the party they all knew about.\footnote{Farley, Farley's Story, 97-98.} Later, Roosevelt wrote a friend that he had selected Daniels because he wished to place in Mexico a man "who would personify those qualities of neighborliness on which I have placed such emphasis."\footnote{FDR to Clark Howell, May 14, 1934, Wilfred Callcott Hardy, The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States Policies to the End of World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), 332.}

FDR's qualities of neighborliness, however, failed to include courtesy and a sensitivity to history. In appointing Daniels, FDR had neglected, contrary to diplomatic protocol, to first ask the Mexican government for its reaction to his choice. With a view to history, Mexico, predictably, regarded
the appointment of Daniels as an incredible insult, if not as one more example of myopic Yanqui arrogance. As secretary of the navy in 1914, Daniels had ordered the U.S. Marines to invade Vera Cruz, resulting in 126 Mexicans killed and 195 wounded.  

Daniels presented other attributes that appeared to make him an inappropriate selection. He spoke nary a word of Spanish, and his knowledge of Mexico was scarcely encyclopedic. Whereas Mexico was predominantly Catholic and reportedly flowing with pulque and tequila, Daniels was a devout Southern Methodist and a teetotaler.

The Mexican government, nevertheless, assented to Daniels appointment. To its credit and with some risk to its credibility with the Mexican public, the government decided not to return the insult to the newly-elected United States president. It hoped, instead, for continued improvements in Mexican-U.S. relations, and it was not disappointed. Daniels' sympathy for the goals of the Mexican revolution, his passionate interest in Mexico, and his informal manner and unassuming personality soon overrode whatever deficiencies he may have possessed for the post.

291 Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 15-16.
293 Cronon, Daniels in Mexico, 13; Morrison, Small-d Democrat, 169-170.
Ralph Morrison, on the other hand, soon proved that he would have been a disastrous choice for the post to Mexico or to any other nation. To assuage Morrison's pique, Roosevelt dispatched him as a last-minute delegate to the London Economic Conference in the summer of 1933. In naming Morrison, as well as the several other delegates, FDR failed to consult with Hull. Poignantly ignorant of foreign affairs, Morrison asked newspapermen at a press conference in London, "Who is Benes?" Conference participants later could only describe Morrison charitably as a "boob."

Another protegé of Vice President Garner--Hal H. Sevier--fared slightly better. He became the Ambassador to Chile. A former Texas legislator, Sevier and his wife, who was known as the "Mother of the Alamo," were solid Democrats and knew Garner well. Although Sevier had served on the Creel Committee on Public Information to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay during World War I, and thus possessed some experience in Latin American affairs, his appointment under FDR was clearly political.

Roosevelt hardly knew Sevier. When Garner insisted that Sevier receive the Chilean embassy, FDR readily complied.

294 Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Depression, 263.
295 Moley, First New Deal, 407-408. See also Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 51.
Two years later, in 1935, Sevier resigned his commission following his second recall by the State Department for behavior incongruent with the dignity of his office. \textsuperscript{296}

Roosevelt evidently had intended to appoint Spruille Braden to Chile. Of all the amateurs FDR singled out for diplomatic assignments, Braden, with whom he was barely acquainted, was perhaps his most enigmatic choice.

Spruille Braden held almost none of the standard qualifications for diplomatic appointment. He was neither a professional diplomat nor a New Dealer. By his own account, he was a conservative Republican; he never contributed financially to FDR's campaigns; he was an isolationist. By 1938, at the time of his appointment as FDR's minister to Columbia, he regarded the President's domestic New Deal policies as "irresponsible." \textsuperscript{297} Seldom was one so ill-suited, politically or professionally, rewarded with a diplomatic post.

Braden commanded influential friends, however. He also could have, had he desired, contributed handsomely to any

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{296} State Department Biographic Register, 1935, 294; Stuart, Department of State, 316; Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971), 97, 135.
\textsuperscript{297} Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 92, 96, 100, 115.
\end{quote}
political campaign.

A wealthy copper magnate, born in the Montana mining camp of Elk Horn, Braden followed his father into the mining business after his graduation in 1914 from Yale's Sheffield Scientific School. Moving rapidly through the world of corporate finance, he acted as the principal representative of his father's and Anaconda Copper's interests in Chile until 1922. Residing in New York during the 1920s, he served on the boards of several corporations, including American Ship and Commerce, W.A. Harriman Securities, Pennsylvania Coke and Coal, Monmouth Rug Mills, and the Capital Theatre Corporation.

Despite his Republican allegiances Braden cast his ballot for Al Smith in the 1928 presidential election. Prohibition, he stated, had cooled his "Republican ardor." He also saw much of his sizeable and easily made fortune swept away in the crash of 1929. In 1932 he voted for Roosevelt.  

Braden approached several influential figures in the Democratic party following FDR's victory. He was, he said, "more or less footloose and wondering what to do next."

Two of his friends were members of Roosevelt's cabi-

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299 Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 86-95.
They suggested that he consider diplomacy. Braden "liked the idea of" a diplomatic post. Whether or not someone had offered him Chile, he anticipated receiving that assignment:

Things were completely dead in the business world. It might be pleasant to go to Chile as Ambassador for a couple of years. The Chilean exchange had gone off badly, and living there would be extraordinarily cheap for Americans. While there in 1931 we had given a couple of extravagant parties and found the cost absurdly low. The United States Ambassador to Chile, I knew, could maintain his embassy very creditably without using up his entire salary and bank account.

Along with his friends, Braden believed that his marriage to a Chilean and his many Chilean mining contacts "especially qualified" him for the appointment. When his nomination appeared imminent, he sold most of his Chilean copper stock.

Chile went to Sevier, however. As with Morrison, FDR evidently sought to soothe Braden's disappointment with another appointment. He named him as a United States delegate to the Seventh Pan American Conference to be held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933, the only delegate, perhaps, that Secretary Hull, who chaired the delegation, did not

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300 Ibid., 96. Braden's friends are unidentified.
301 Ibid., 97-98.
Two years later Roosevelt again considered Braden for an embassy. Peru was mentioned. Instead, FDR appointed Braden to replace Hugh Gibson as chairman of the United States delegation to the Chaco Peace Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Stalled in directing U.S. efforts to mediate a settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay over Chaco, Gibson had requested that he be relieved so that he could return to Brazil to supervise a Brazilian-American trade agreement. Braden later complained that his "years"—actually twenty-eight months—as chairman "cost me the millions I would have made on the real estate development of my Stonehurst property."  

Braden finally landed a legation in April 1938. For reasons best known to FDR, Braden became the Minister to Columbia, a post he held until 1942. As a New Deal diplomat, Braden—a large, heavyset, profane, and outspoken enemy of Latin American dictators—earned high praise from Henry 

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302 Ibid., 98. See also Beck, "Hull and Latin America," 74.  
304 Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 146.  
305 Braden also served as ambassador to Cuba (1941-1945), as ambassador to Argentina (1945), and as an assistant secretary of state (1945-1947).
Luce, the owner of *Time* magazine, and from other corporate friends of freedom. Perhaps FDR needed Braden's presence to mollify the American right-wing.

A variety of other amateur envoys filled posts in Latin America. For example, an Indiana novelist and friend of Claude Bowers, Meredith Nicholson, sixty-seven years old in 1933, found life in the embassies in Paraguay, Venezuela, and Nicaragua comfortably retiring. Leo R. Sack, a Washington correspondent for the Scripps-Howard chain and a Roosevelt admirer, who contributed $2,500 to FDR's first campaign, landed the Costa Rica post in 1933. Fay A. Des Portes, a three-term member of the South Carolina legislature and a wealthy businessman, received appointments to Bolivia and Guatemala. A few other amateurs, such as Boaz Long, who had served as deputy administrator of the Puerto Rican National Recovery Administration prior to his appointment to Nicaragua in 1936, had some previous experience in Latin American affairs. Most also were loyal Democrats.

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309 *State Department Biographic Register*, 1940, 89.
310 Ibid., 141; Crane, *Mr. Carr*, 210; Werking, *Master Architects*, 246.
Professional diplomats appointed to Latin American nations also reflected a generous cross-section of career types. Veterans of the pre-Rogers Act era, as well as younger officers, received assignments to Latin America. Nine of the fourteen officers who attained their first chief-of-mission post under FDR served their first ministerial tour in the Southern Hemisphere. Five later moved on to posts in other geographical regions. Of the 42 individual career chiefs-of-mission, 21—or 50 percent—held a Latin American post at one time or another from 1933 to 1939.

Professionals monopolized the appointments to the Caribbean countries. Strategically located at the entrance to the Caribbean Sea, the nations of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had concerned nearly every administration. When, in May 1933, another revolution appeared imminent in Cuba, Roosevelt dispatched his trusted adviser, Sumner Welles, to Havana as his ambassador and trouble-shooter. Compared to any number of amateurs FDR might have selected, Welles was a known and respected commodity. Eight months later, upon the conclusion

Does not count Wilbur Carr or Francis White, both of whom held high-level State Department positions prior to receiving first-time chief-of-mission posts under FDR.
of a mission of mixed success, Welles returned to Washing-

His successor, Jefferson Caffrey, ranked high as a diplo-
matist in the eyes of his colleagues. A minister to El Sal-
vador and Columbia under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover,
respectively, Caffrey had twenty-two years of diplomatic
experience. In July 1933, Roosevelt appointed him assistant
secretary of state with the intention of sending him to Cuba
upon the completion of Welles' mission.

Earlier Undersecretary Phillips had suggested to the
President that Caffrey "might appropriately be promoted" to
the ambassadorship to Brazil. "Such a promotion will be well
received throughout the entire Service." Phillips rated
Caffrey as "one of the best men in the Service in the mini-
sterial rank."314

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312 Several works evaluate the Welles mission to Cuba.
Two of the most recent and most critical are Luis E. Aguilar,
Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Universi-
ty Press, 1972), and Irwin F. Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista:
Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1973).

313 Roosevelt Press Conference, November 8, 1933, Nixon,
FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 468.

314 Phillips to FDR, April 8, 1933, ibid., 50. Hull described Caffrey as "one of our outstandingly capable
representatives." Memoirs, I, 341. See also Spaulding,
Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary, 261-265.
From 1937 until 1944, when he became the first career officer ever chosen to head the prestigious Paris embassy, Caffrey held the Brazilian post.\footnote{Childs, \textit{American Foreign Service}, 103, 147-148.}

The recommendation by Phillips to promote Caffrey to Brazil was also part of the Undersecretary's efforts to protect and accommodate the interests of another career officer, Hugh Gibson. A highly regarded diplomat, Gibson confronted the prospect of an early retirement from the Service in 1933. Because of his close friendship with Hoover, Gibson ranked high on FDR's purge list. Then the ambassador to Belgium, Gibson asked Phillips to engineer his transfer to Istanbul in the likely event that he would be ousted from Brussels. In the meantime, Roosevelt, unable to overcome the objections of Hull and Phillips to Gibson's removal from the Service altogether, had discussed sending him to Brazil.

Phillips moved directly to fashion Gibson's transfer to Turkey. On April 8, in a letter replete with subtle suggestions for maneuvering prospective diplomatic appointments, Phillips suggested to FDR that he consider Gibson for Istanbul instead of Brazil. "Inasmuch as Mr. [Mayor James] Curley [of Boston] is slated for Poland, I suggest that we send Caffrey, whom we discussed for that post, to Brazil in the event that
Gibson goes to Turkey."316 In effect, Phillips was treating Gibson's appointment to Istanbul as a fact.

Another candidate for the Brazilian post also appeared on a list that accompanied Phillips' letter to FDR. Based upon earlier discussions with the President, Phillips included a memorandum listing potential diplomatic appointees alongside various countries. The Undersecretary asked Roosevelt if he would write "the word 'approved' after each country or indicate such other wishes as you desire." Much too canny to commit himself to diplomatic appointments before necessity dictated that he do so, Roosevelt made only one notation on the memorandum. Under Brazil he wrote: "Weddell--of Va Pollard's man?"317

Alexander Weddell was a career diplomat with strong ties to his native Virginia. John Pollard, an active Democrat, was then governor of Virginia. The families of both men shared common backgrounds—aristocratic Virginia wealth, clergymen fathers, Democratic political involvements. 318

Whether the Pollard connection cemented a chief-of-mission

316 Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 50.
317 Ibid., 51 fttn. 1.
318 Who Was Who In America, I (Chicago: A.N. Marquis, 1942), 979.
post for Weddell is uncertain.\(^{319}\) He held solid qualifications for a mission to Latin America. A student of literature and history, fond of Spain and fluent in Spanish, he had acquired a broad background in Latin American affairs since entering the diplomatic corps in 1908. On June 3, 1933, Weddell became the Ambassador to Argentina, not Brazil.

What is certain is that Phillips' efforts to protect Gibson met with only partial success. Under Roosevelt's orders, Gibson was transferred to Brazil rather than Turkey on May 11. However, he was not then dismissed from the Foreign Service.

Among the other career chiefs to Latin America worthy of special mention was Norman Armour. A graduate of Princeton and Harvard, and two generations removed from the founders of the Armour Chicago meat-packing fortune, he joined the Diplomatic Service in 1915 and quickly moved from one responsible position to another.\(^{320}\) Hull rated Armour as "one of the most capable, yet unpretentious diplomats" in the entire

\(^{319}\) Beaulac states that Weddell's appointments to Argentina (1933-1938) and Spain (1939-1942) were the result of "political considerations." *Career Ambassador*, 184.

Service. His colleagues echoed those sentiments. A highly successful negotiator, Armour became FDR's most widely traveled chief-of-mission. Besides Haiti, he also headed the missions in Canada, Chile, and Argentina.

Other career officers received well-deserved, first-time chief-of-mission promotions to Latin American countries. For instance, Douglas Jenkins, at the age of fifty-nine, became minister to Bolivia in 1939. As a diplomatic secretary and consul general in London and Berlin during the 1930s, he had impressed his immediate superiors. State Department officials also had marked him for promotion.

Still other career chiefs-of-mission were less fortunate. Sometimes they contributed to their own demise. Sheldon Whitehouse, for example, balked at being transferred from Columbia to the malaria-infested environs of Panama in 1934.

A veteran of twenty-four years in the diplomatic ranks, Whitehouse evidently also had complained about his assignment.

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321 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1377-1378.
323 On Armour's negotiating ability, see Phillips to FDR, August 3, 1933, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 343-345.
324 R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 21, 1936, Ibid., III, 498. Leo J. Keena was another. Straus to FDR, Ibid., II, 465, 467.
as minister to Columbia. Having spent most of his career in the more comfortable posts of Europe, he expected better treatment. He may have been among that group of officers about whom Moffat wrote in his diary on February 5, 1934: "All together, the impression is gaining ground, in quarters where it ought not to, that our people are childish and all together above themselves." In the case of Whitehouse, Roosevelt responded to his complaints by placing him on the "waiting list." Soon thereafter, Whitehouse, then fifty-one years old, resigned from the Service.

VI

To discern FDR's precise motivation for any diplomatic appointment is difficult, if not impossible. In reflecting upon the criteria—geographical balance, personal and philosophical affinity—that presidents normally appear to employ in selecting their cabinet officers, Raymond Moley concluded in 1937 that the criteria used by FDR were elusive:

So far as I could see, there was neither a well-defined purpose nor

325State Department Biographic Register, 1935, 277.
326Weil, Pretty Good Club, 82.
327FDR to Hull, October 29, 1934, Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, II, 248.
underlying principle in the selection of the Roosevelt Cabinet. It was shaped by a score of unrelated factors. And in some cases it almost seemed as though happenstance played [as large a role as any other]....

Perhaps the historians of the future will be able to discover in the Roosevelt Cabinet some delicate pattern overlooked by me. If so, I wish them well.328

To a large extent, the same could be said of Roosevelt's diplomatic appointments.

The selection of Roosevelt's chiefs-of-mission--particularly the amateurs--derived more from politics and improvisation than from any system with its connotations of method and regularity. Political pressures and priorities, informal human interactions, traditions, and unforeseen events characterized the landscape of the Roosevelt appointive process. Rarely, moreover, did any single factor operate exclusively to compel a selection. Although some factors clearly dominated others, more often than not a constellation of influences combined to secure a prospective candidate an appointment.

Partisan political considerations largely dominated the appointment of amateur chiefs-of-mission. Although chance occurrence sometimes determined who served where, a nearly endless list of amateurs--Tony Biddle, Robert Bingham, Moley, After Seven Years, 110-111.
Claude Bowers, John Cudahy, Josephus Daniels, Joseph Davies, George Earle, Bert Fish, Joe Kennedy, Breckinridge Long, David Morris, Leo Sack, Hal Seiver, Jesse Straus, and Laurence Steinhardt, to name but the most prominent—owed their appointments to their participation, financial and otherwise, in Roosevelt's campaigns.

Their participation in Democratic politics and FDR's fortunes bought them access to the nomination process largely denied to others. In some appointments—such as those of Joe Kennedy and Ruth Bryan Owen—the sponsorship of a powerful political ally—such as Raymond Moley—proved vital. Where partisan political acceptability and powerful connections coincided, the absence of any expertise or special diplomatic qualifications generally formed no barricade to appointment.

Other influences also surfaced and prevailed from time-to-time. Roosevelt's offer of the Netherlands to seventy-seven year old William Rice, his subsequent appointment of Grenville Emmet to The Hague and later to Vienna, and his willingness to accommodate Josephus Daniels with the Mexican mission riveted upon genuine friendship.

Still other appointments were enigmatic, resting upon neither politics, loyalty, or friendship. Among many seemingly inappropriate and untraditional selections—incud-
ing the dispatching of an Irish Catholic to England and a Scotchman to Ireland—Spruille Braden was perhaps the strangest. He was not particularly loyal to the New Deal, although he evidently possessed well-placed friends in the President's cabinet, and he never contributed to FDR's campaigns. Perhaps Braden's appointment reflected FDR's way of placating big business interests. 329 That Roosevelt simply sought to exile Braden, as is sometimes the motivation behind an appointment, is doubtful.

The appointment of Daisy Harriman was also unique. Although a loyal Democrat, she was not fond of FDR or his New Deal policies. More significantly, she neither sought nor campaigned for a diplomatic post. Given the large number of active and deserving political contenders for appointments, Harriman's unsolicited "windfall" selection to Norway was a rarity. Perhaps her appointment merely satisfied FDR's quota—self-imposed or otherwise—for a woman chief-of-mission.

By comparison, the appointment of career officers to chief-of-mission positions followed more established, if unwritten, rules and routines. To the extent that choice posts

329 Perhaps Shirley N. Rawls, "Spruille Braden: A Political Biography," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1977), which this writer has not read, sheds some light on Braden's appointment.
were available to career officers, they went to those who commanded respect within the old-boy network and who could count well-placed colleagues in the State Department as their friends. Hugh Wilson's appointments to Berne and to Berlin were perhaps the best examples.

Partisan political considerations also entered into the appointment equation with regard to career officers. The possession of strong ties to the White House—as William Phillips, Joseph Grew, and Alexander Weddell might have attested—improved a Foreign Service officer's opportunities for promotion to chief-of-mission status. As often as not, however, career officers were the victims, not the beneficiaries, of partisan political winds. Where an amateur coveted a post held by a professional, the professional often found himself demoted or transferred to a less desirable mission. If a professional were too closely identified with a political rival of the President's, as Hugh Gibson was, the result might be ouster from the Service altogether.

In many respects Roosevelt's manner of choosing United States envoys represented no precedent shattering departure from tradition. Nearly all presidents have displayed suspicion toward Foreign Service officers whose politics and loyalties they are uncertain of; have installed indivi-
iduals loyal to their policies in ambassadorships; have succumbed to the pressures of party patronage; have rewarded political supporters and friends; and occasionally have appointed political malcontents to posts abroad for no other reason than to be rid of them.

Where Roosevelt largely differed from his predecessors and successors was in the breadth and depth of his willingness to allow circumstance and happenstance to direct the selection of envoys. With seeming imperiousness, he dispatched amateurs to important posts without thought of their aptitude for diplomacy, concocted after-the-fact rationales to explain away haphazard and inappropriate choices, offered minor administrative positions to some appointees before sending them abroad to head prestigious embassies, and flippantly suggested to intimates that he did not expect some of his selections to last long in their posts. In the end, FDR's diplomatic appointments reflected his ad hoc, disorganized approach to the affairs of government, as well as his scant regard for the Foreign Service as an instrument of United States foreign policy.
One of his most exasperating idiosyncrasies was his almost invariable unwillingness to dictate any memoranda of his conversations with foreign statesmen or foreign diplomatic representatives...as a record to inform and guide those who were running the Department of State.

Sumner Welles

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EPILOGUE: FDR's LEGACY TO PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY

Temperamentally ambiguous, consistent only in his inconsistency, disdainful of career diplomats, yet supremely confident of his own diplomatic abilities, FDR never provided any clear guidance to the experiment in professional diplomacy inaugurated with the Rogers Act in 1924. In the years prior to World War II, he displayed little concern for the future of the Foreign Service, and he failed to nurture it as an instrument of United States foreign policy.

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1Seven Decisions, 215-216.
With the advent of war, he securely grasped the politi-
cal-military machinery of the United States in his own
hands and shunted the diplomatic establishment aside,
isolating it from all but the most esoteric of tasks.\(^2\)
During the war, he excluded the State Department from any
systematic role in the planning, determination, and exe-
cution of wartime policy.\(^3\)

When Roosevelt died the position of professional
diplomacy in the United States was no more certain than
when he became President. In some respects, it was more
uncertain, more insecure. Although no one seriously pro-
posed that the Foreign Service be abolished, the role of professional

\(^2\)One observer described the isolation of the State
Department thusly: "The State Department, which should
have been the vital instrument of our most important
national policy, had been relegated to the status of the
querulous maiden aunt whose sole function is to do all the
worrying for the prosperous family over the endless impor-
tunities of the numerous poor relations living on the
other side of the tracks." Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*,
757.

\(^3\)David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: *The State Depart-
ment Years* (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead, 1976), 45. See also
Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 87, 88; John Paton Davies,
Jr., *Dragon By The Tail: American, British, Japanese, and
Russian Encounters With China and One Another* (N.Y.: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1972), 212; Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of
diplomats in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy was left ill-defined and confused. The question of whether the United States would have a sound professional diplomatic arm, capable of serving as a catalyst for American power, FDR left to his successors to ponder and grapple with anew.

Nearly every administration since the end of World War II has probed the question of organizing the government for the purposes of formulating and conducting foreign policy. At least a dozen major studies or proposals have been advanced, most with some official sanction. Many of them have called for, among other things, the further "democratization" of the foreign affairs community, and for extending recruitment to include a greater cross-section of "mainstream" Americans.

Inexorably, too, or so it appears, the responsibility for foreign affairs has become increasingly fragmented, subject to the endeavors of nonprofessional diplomats. Never the dominant authority for foreign policy under FDR, the

Stein, "Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Public Administration, 663, 666. See also Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 421; McLellan, Dean Acheson, 44-45; Steiner, The Wriston Report, 5; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 88.

Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, 16. Destler, who produced his study in 1972, cites 13 major studies in his note 2 to chapter one, 323-324.

Perhaps the most noteworthy study is the so-called Wriston Report, a study commissioned by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles under Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown University, in 1954. See Steiner, The Wriston Report, and Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy.
State Department watched the actual conduct of diplomacy pass from its hands in 1940 to White House staffers, the military services, and other special agencies. Today, in the 1980s, less than 17 percent of all government employees representing the interests of the United States abroad are professional diplomats under the direction of the State Department. The remainder work for a host of agencies, including the Defense Department, which operate independently of formal diplomatic channels. Frustrated and bitter, if not confused and bewildered, America's professional diplomats complain about being mistrusted, ignored, and placed far from center stage in the nation's foreign relations activity.

If FDR cannot be faulted for the lack of status of professional diplomats in today's labyrinthine diplomatic organization, neither can he be credited with advancing the cause of professional diplomacy during his presidency. The extraordinary turmoil, uncertainty, and diplomatic paralysis wrought by the Great Depression, followed by the profound change in the responsibility of the United States in international relations brought about by World War II, would have severely taxed any normal evolution of professional diplomacy under any administration. Yet, FDR's prejudice against

7Wilson and McKinzie, "Masks of Power," in Makers of American Diplomacy, 475; Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 67.
8Harr, Professional Diplomat, 12, 55-66; Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, 10-11.
9Etzold, Conduct of Policy, 125.
career diplomats, combined with his frightfully loose style of administration, seriously inhibited, if it did not preclude, a constructive approach to the advance of a sound professional diplomatic structure.

In many respects, FDR blindly embraced the "chronic distaste" of American democratic opinion for "the image" of the professional diplomat. He liked the consuls, whom he judged to be toiling in the best tradition of democratic-capitalism in their discharge of commercial tasks. The consuls engaged in concrete, productive endeavors. Toward their diplomatic brethren, Roosevelt evinced little more than scorn. He regarded the professional diplomats as frivolous socialites and undemocratic elitists, prone to foreign mannerisms and modes of thought, with little to recommend them beyond good educations, social breeding and manners.

Roosevelt tended, moreover, to credit the amateur over the expert. "He was quite willing to appoint qualified and experienced Foreign Service officers as Ambassadors and Ministers," Sumner Welles recounted. "But it was very rare indeed, that" the President "could be persuaded to bring into" discussions "on foreign policy any of those State Department specialists who had devoted a lifetime to the study of some particular" area "and who could have given him the detailed information and authoritative viewpoint that he very frequently lacked." 10

10 Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 216.
Disdaining the expertise of foreign relations professionals, FDR came to rely for advice on major diplomatic issues on diplomatically inexperienced men in the White House, and on a succession of amateur "special emissaries" whom he superimposed on his regularly accredited chiefs-of-mission. About one of the latter, General Patrick J. Hurley, Roosevelt concluded that the United States needed "more men like him." Hurley, the President told his son Elliot, spoke in plain language, unlike "the men in the State Department, those career diplomats...half the time I can't tell whether to believe them or not."

At the heart of any final evaluation of FDR's legacy to professional diplomacy is the question of whether "those career diplomats" were better diplomatists than the amateurs. The founders of the Foreign Service advanced the presumption, which they shared with other diplomatic theoreticians and practitioners, that professionals are better diplomats than amateurs by virtue of their training and experience in the

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11Loewenheim, *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 73. Many observers and students have remarked upon FDR's use of special representatives, a practice that while dating to the early years of the American republic, FDR is said to have institutionalized. For example, see Briggs, *Farewell To Foggy Bottom*, 295-296; Barnes and Morgan, *Foreign Service*, 227.

art of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{13} It is not an unreasonable presumption. However, to fully test it against FDR's diplomats—to evaluate the performance of his career and amateur chiefs-of-mission, for instance—requires another undertaking, one that would beget additional questions, one that could wind and weave along any number of different paths.

By what criteria, for example, should FDR's diplomats be judged? By some set of "ideal" characteristics?\textsuperscript{14} By their handling of the major diplomatic functions—reporting and analyzing events, negotiating agreements, representing United States interests abroad, and protecting the lives and property of American nationals? Alternately, should the diplomats be judged by the expectations they may have set for themselves? Concurrently, how are the diplomats to be evaluated alongside the context within which they had to operate—at home and

\textsuperscript{13}For example, see Villard, \textit{Affairs at State}, 226; Briggs, \textit{Farewell To Foggy Bottom}, 38, 46.

\textsuperscript{14}Nicolson, for instance, postulates a set of "immutable qualities"—moral and intellectual—that the "ideal diplomatist" should possess. He also describes some "diplomatic faults"—personal vanity "being the most common and disadvantageous," and the fear of expressing judgments—which suggest another avenue for evaluating the performance of amateur and professional diplomats. \textit{Diplomacy}, 55-67. Gibson offers yet another approach, at least with regard to amateurs, whom he classifies as crusaders, reformers, spenders, and exhibitionists. \textit{Road To Foreign Policy}, 157. Still, Etzold provides an incisive comment on the difficulty Americans have faced—given the brevity of their diplomatic experience, rejection of European traditions, and the effects of egalitarian reform in striking down the once durable standards of education, breeding, and manners—indefining what, or who, is a good diplomat. \textit{Conduct of Foreign Policy}, 123.
abroad? How did Foreign Service officers receive prior to FDR's presidency? How did it prepare them for the events of the 1930s? How did it differ from the experiences FDR's amateur diplomats brought.

The 1930s presented politicians and diplomats worldwide with enormous challenges. In the words of Ferrell: "Statesmen doubted, as they never had before, the advantage of political solutions to international problems....The Great Depression had, therefore, a catastrophic effect upon the maintenance of world peace." American Diplomacy in the Depression, 3. As war approached, politicians and diplomats, amateurs and professionals alike, seemed paralyzed. Old standards of international concord or ethics seemed unworkable; certainly, Hitler, the world's principal protagonist, abided by none. As Heinrichs states: "Diplomacy in the early thirties lacked any clearcut character. International relations were atomized and featureless. Such faith as existed in the old formulas and arrangements drained away. The world drifted as the weather changed." "1931-1937," in Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds. American-East Asian Relations: A Survey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 244. Nowhere, perhaps, was the featureless drifting more evident than in the United States. Disillusioned, turned inward, self-absorbed, and bound by the traditions of a passive and incoherent foreign policy born of geographic isolation and messianic ideals, the United States stood unwilling—though not necessarily complacent—to take immediate risks to reduce the threats to peace. While pouring forth calls for cooperation against international lawlessness, the U.S. drew the line at foreign entanglements. How, thus, to assess the performance of American diplomats—amateurs and professionals—within the currents of their time poses some special moral and intellectual problems. "So far as diplomacy served the ideal of accommodating differences between nations," Heinrichs stated, "the postwar years of nonentanglement were a discouraging time to advertise that service [in the U.S.]." "Bureaucracy," 171.

The best single work on the pre-1930 traditions, mores, and thoughts of the career diplomats is Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind. See also De Santis, Diplomacy of Silence, 76, 202, wherein he concludes that "the tendency to passivity and intellectual conformity" by career diplomats was exacerbated in the 1930s by the government's policy of noninvolvement, the cutbacks in appropriations, and "the public's view of diplomats as anachronistic survivors from some mythological world" of frivolity.
to their tasks? Finally, what difference did it all make in
the development and execution of United States foreign
relations--then, in the years prior to World War II, and
later?

That FDR harbored deep prejudices toward the career
diplomats, prejudices reflected in American democratic
society at large, is clear. Equally clear is that under
FDR the question of whether the United States would develop
a sound diplomatic corps was left unresolved, if not untested.
Much less certain is what it meant for the conduct of United
States foreign policy. At best, perhaps, FDR's legacy to
professional diplomacy will be judged to be of dubious
distinction.
Appendix 1

Career Vs. Noncareer Appointments\(^1\)

1908-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Noncareer</th>
<th>Percentage Career</th>
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<td>1912</td>
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<td>1924</td>
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<td>34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>1932</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Career chiefs-of-mission include those who entered the service by examination, and those who entered prior to 1906 with ten or more years experience in grades below minister. Chiefs-of-mission accredited to more than one country.
Appendix 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Noncareer</th>
<th>Percentage Career</th>
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<td>71</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are counted but once for each year for the years 1908-1940. For the years 1944 to 1960, chiefs-of-mission with dual accreditation are counted twice.

## Appendix 2

### Chiefs-of-Mission By Country

1933–1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Chief-of-Mission</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Termination</th>
<th>Career/Non-Career</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan²</td>
<td>(See Persia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Post Wheeler</td>
<td>8/26/33</td>
<td>11/1/34</td>
<td>C (1906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugh G. Grant</td>
<td>8/9/35</td>
<td>9/27/39</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Alexander W. Weddell</td>
<td>7/31/33</td>
<td>10/29/38</td>
<td>C (1908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norman Armour</td>
<td>5/18/39</td>
<td>6/29/44</td>
<td>C (1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>George H. Earle, III</td>
<td>7/14/33</td>
<td>3/25/34</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George S. Messersmith</td>
<td>4/7/34</td>
<td>7/11/37</td>
<td>C (1914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenville T. Emmet</td>
<td>7/13/37</td>
<td>9/26/37 (d.)</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium³</td>
<td>David H. Morris</td>
<td>5/18/33</td>
<td>5/5/37</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugh S. Gibson</td>
<td>7/13/37</td>
<td>5/15/38</td>
<td>C (1908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Davies</td>
<td>5/14/38</td>
<td>11/30/39</td>
<td>NC</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Fay A. des Portes</td>
<td>8/19/33</td>
<td>5/1/36</td>
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<td>Douglas Jenkins</td>
<td>6/22/39</td>
<td>10/3/41</td>
<td>C (1908)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Hugh S. Gibson</td>
<td>5/11/33</td>
<td>12/3/36</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jefferson Caffrey</td>
<td>7/13/37</td>
<td>9/17/44</td>
<td>C (1911)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Chief-of-Mission</td>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>Career/Non-Career</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Frederick A. Sterling</td>
<td>9/1/33</td>
<td>6/30/36</td>
<td>C (1911)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6/22/39</td>
<td>3/5/41</td>
<td>C (1920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>George T. Summerlin&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9/11/29</td>
<td>1/15/35</td>
<td>C (1909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meredith Nicholson</td>
<td>1/22/35</td>
<td>4/14/38</td>
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<td>Antonio C. Gonzales</td>
<td>3/22/38</td>
<td>2/8/39</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Frank P. Corrigan</td>
<td>1/20/39</td>
<td>9/5/47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Charles S. Wilson</td>
<td>8/3/33</td>
<td>7/28/37</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arthur Bliss Lane</td>
<td>8/9/37</td>
<td>4/14/41</td>
<td>C (1916)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. If the chief-of-mission is a career officer, the date he entered the Foreign Service is in parenthesis. For definition of career chief-of-mission, see (*) to Appendix 1.
2. Ministers to Afganistan were also accredited to Persia. They resided at Teheran.
3. Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels.
4. Chiefs-of-mission appointed by President Herbert Hoover and initially recommissioned to the same post by FDR.
5. Accredited also to Saudi Arabia. Resided at Cairo.
6. Ministers to Estonia were also accredited to Latvia. They resided at Riga.
Appendix 2 (continued)

7 Ministers to Latvia were also accredited to Estonia. They resided at Riga.
8 Also accredited to Lithuania. Resided at Riga.
9 Commissioned, but did not proceed to post.
10 Ministers accredited to Luxembourg were also accredited to Belgium. They resided at Brussels.
11 Ministers to Persia were also accredited to Afghanistan. They resided at Teheran.

### Characteristics of Career Chiefs-of-Mission 1933-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Entered F.S.</th>
<th>Education</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Norman Armour</td>
<td>Haiti, Canada, Chile, Argentina</td>
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<td>Ray Atherton</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1908 (25)</td>
<td>U. Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred M. Dearing</td>
<td>Peru, Sweden</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1904 (26)</td>
<td>U. Missouri</td>
</tr>
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<td>Countries</td>
<td>As C-of-M</td>
<td>Year of Birth</td>
<td>Entered F.S.</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>1908 (26)</td>
<td>L'Ecole des Sciences Politiques</td>
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<td>1906 (27)</td>
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<td>1916 (17)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Van A. MacMurray 5</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Year of Birth</td>
<td>Entered F.S.</td>
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<td>1915 (15)</td>
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<td>Post Wheeler</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1869</td>
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<td>Princeton</td>
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<td>1915 (18)</td>
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### Appendix 3 (continued)

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Countries As C-of-M</th>
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<th>Education</th>
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<td>Georgetown U.</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>1901 (32)</td>
<td>Harvard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin C. Wilson</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>1920 (13)</td>
<td>U. Michigan</td>
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<td>Hugh R. Wilson</td>
<td>Switzerland, Germany</td>
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<td>1911 (22)</td>
<td>Yale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Butler Wright</td>
<td>Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, Cuba</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1909 (24)</td>
<td>Princeton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Indicates countries commissioned to as a chief-of-mission under FDR.
2 Number in parenthesis refers to years of diplomatic experience prior to appointment as chief-of-mission under FDR.
3 Refers, in most cases, to place of undergraduate education. Several officers attended two or more universities, and several received advance degrees. Nelson T. Johnson and George S. Messersmith attended the universities noted but did not graduate. The primary purpose of this column is to indicate whether the officer attended a public or private institution of higher education.
4 Indicates that officer was a chief-of-mission under President Hoover at time of FDR's Inauguration and was retained in a similar capacity by FDR, though not necessarily in the same country.
Appendix 3 (continued)

5MacMurray and Robbins were serving in the State Department at time of FDR's inauguration. Phillips and Welles were temporarily resigned from the Foreign Service. All four had prior experience as chiefs-of-mission.

6Indicates officers who received first appointment as a chief-of-mission under FDR. Two of them—Carr and White—held high positions within the State Department prior to their appointments.

### Appendix 4

**Characteristics of Non-Career Chiefs-of-Mission 1933-1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Countries As C-of-M</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Edward Albright</td>
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<td>1873(66)</td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Cumberland U.</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James M. Baker</td>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>1861(72)</td>
<td>S.C.</td>
<td>Wofford College</td>
<td>Librarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.</td>
<td>Norway, Poland</td>
<td>1897(38)</td>
<td>Pa.</td>
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<td>Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert W. Bingham</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1871(62)</td>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>U. Louisville</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude G. Bowers</td>
<td>Spain, Chile</td>
<td>1878(59)</td>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Journalist; Historian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spruille Braden</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1894(44)</td>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
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<td>Princeton</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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### Appendix 4 (continued)

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<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Frank P. Corrigan</td>
<td>El Salvador, Panama, Venezuela</td>
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<td>Oh.</td>
<td>Western Reserve U.</td>
<td>M.D.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Journalist</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Countries As C-of-M</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Harvard</td>
<td>Publisher; Business</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Year of Birth</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Mining; Ranching</td>
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<td>Lawyer</td>
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<td>Journalist; Novelist</td>
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<td>Mont.</td>
<td>St. Olaf</td>
<td>Lutheran Pastor</td>
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<td>Ruth Bryan Owen</td>
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<td>Fla.</td>
<td>U. Nebraska</td>
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<td>Alvin M. Owsley</td>
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<td>N. Texas State Teachers C.</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herbert Clairborne Pell</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1884(56)</td>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel C. Roper</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1867(72)</td>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>Duke U.</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo R. Sack</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1889(44)</td>
<td>Pa.</td>
<td>U. Missouri</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Countries As C-of-M</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hal H. Sevier</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1978(55)</td>
<td>Tex.</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesse I. Straus</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1872(61)</td>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence A. Steinhardt</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1892(41)</td>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurits S. Swenson</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1865(68)</td>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>Luther College</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lester A. Walton</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1882(53)</td>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Indicates countries commissioned to as chief-of-mission under FDR.
2 Number in parenthesis refers to the age of the chief-of-mission at the time of his or her appointment under FDR.
3 Did not graduate.

### Appendix 5

**Countries With Embassies and Legations**

*By Geographical Region*

1933–1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Scandinavia</th>
<th>Central and Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Africa and The East</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium(^1)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Persia(^3)</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Free State</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia(^2)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Union of South Africa</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5 (continued)

1 Ministers to Belgium were also accredited to Luxembourg. They resided at Brussels.
2 Ministers to Latvia were also accredited to Estonia. They resided at Riga.
3 The Minister to Persia in 1935 was also accredited to Afganistan for that year only. He resided at Teheran.
### Appendix 6

Chief-of-Mission Appointments by Geographical Region
1933-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Posts</th>
<th>Appointments</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non-Career</th>
<th>Percentage Career</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandanavia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa and the East</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Afghanistan-Persia, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Estonia-Latvia are counted as one post each. The Ministers to these posts held dual accreditation.
I. Primary Materials

A. Printed Public Documents


Focuses on personnel administration. Contains an interesting observation by Charles Bohlen on the instructions given to Foreign Service officers in the late 1920s and early 1930s.


A condensed version of Senate Committee hearings marked by reasonableness in explaining a chief-of-mission's duties.


No printed record of hearings on FDR's chief-of-mission nominations from 1933 to 1939 exist. However, the hearing records are a source for studying the appointments of other administrations.

Generally, the Congressional Record is not revealing of information on FDR's diplomatic appointments prior to World War II.


Sources on congressional sentiment on need to broaden membership in the Foreign Service to include "main street" Americans.

A valuable source. Contains insights and generalizations applicable to political appointments of all kinds.


The voluminous volumes in this series are essential for evaluating the abilities of the diplomats.


Provides valuable biographical sketches, especially of many of the lesser known diplomats. Unfortunately, the State Department recently abandoned this publication.


Highly valuable compilation, by country, of American ambassadors, ministers, and high-ranking State Department officials. Solid source for comparing the tenure of career and noncareer appointees under all administrations.
B. Printed Private Documents

1. Journals and Letters


Useful volumes, especially on FDR's relationship with Kennedy, the Munich crisis, and on the diplomacy of Hull and Daniels.


A valuable source on a wide-range of Bullitt's interests accompanied by an incisive assessment of Bullitt in the introduction by George Kennan. The letters enhance neither FDR's nor Bullitt's reputations.


Contains some useful, previously unpublished reports of one of the better amateur envoys whom the editors lavishly praise in a biographical introduction.


Reveals the author's incredible naivete.


An important and authentic source for all aspects of Dodd's diplomacy.

Suggests that Truman was much less hostile toward career diplomats than FDR.


Notes the high intelligence of individual Foreign Service officers, while voicing now familiar criticisms of the cumbersome and unwieldy foreign affairs bureaucracy.


Witty and delightful book containing some incisive observations on diplomacy by a career officer who served as a chief-of-mission under several presidents.


Provides only a partial glimpse of Grew's diplomacy, as Waldo Heinrichs notes in his biography of Grew.


Valuable "inside" account of the Foreign Service from a respected and perceptive member of the "club."


Hoover indicates his preference for professionals over amateurs as chiefs-of-mission, although he--like presidents before and since--managed to reward political supporters with plum posts.


Fascinating comments on FDR's choice of diplomats and on the State Department by the President's highly-opinionated secretary of the interior.


Valuable biographical introduction by Israel, who notes that most of Long's diary for the 1930s has been lost.


Useful for the development of the career Foreign Service and on Grew's ambassadorship to Japan.


Extremely perceptive reporting by one of America's premier diplomatists. Useful, too, in placing the reports signed by Wilbur J. Carr, the minister to Czechoslovakia, into perspective alongside those of his staff and the events they faced.


An important source for studying Josephus Daniels.


Valuable in pointing, once again, to FDR's distrust of professional diplomats.


Useful for asides on Truman's view of the State Department and diplomats.


Contains TR's disparaging comments on diplomats, which were not altogether inaccurate in the early years of the twentieth century.


No mention of Foreign Service or professional diplomacy in these volumes.


Contains a smattering of useful information on some of FDR's diplomatic appointees.


A master of acerbic wit, "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell held professional diplomats in high regard, while acutely noting the general public's distaste for them.


Letters and diary entries of Hugh Wilson revealing a great deal about his views of the Foreign Service, Nazi Germany, and the events of the 1930s.

2. Memoirs

A superb source, whatever one's views of this participant in the early days of the Cold War. Valuable here for the author's comments on the relationship of presidents to the State Department.


Representative of many memoirs by former career officers who feel compelled to indict those, like FDR, who are unappreciative and ignorant of professional diplomacy.


A delightful, wholly irreverent account by a deceased, modern-era Foreign Service Officer. Critical of FDR, reflecting, perhaps, an oral tradition passed down through generations of officers.


Reveals a tone of bitterness that is absent in the author's earlier history of the Foreign Service published in 1948. Contains some useful information on some of the lesser known diplomats of the 1930s.


________. *The Case for the King of Belgium.* New York: no publisher, 1940.

Accounts by FDR's "playboy" ambassador to Poland which apologize for the behavior of the King of Belgium upon the invasion of his nation by Hitler and reveal the author's inclination towards isolationism.


Contains material on Curley's abortive appointment to the embassy in Rome.


Reaffirms Secretary of State Hughes' known support of the career Foreign Service.


Informative memoir of the author's ambassadorship to Mexico. Mined thoroughly by Daniels' biographers.


Biting memoir-history of a diplomat purged from the Foreign Service during the McCarthy era.
Contains some useful and often satirically incisive observations of America's China policy and diplomats.


An astute memoir that compliments Ambassador Dodd's diary.


Interesting comments about consular work, but does not mention the various chiefs-of-mission under whom the author served.


Of the many memoirs on diplomatic life prior to 1930, this is perhaps the best.


By FDR's dispenser of patronage. Useful on only a few diplomatic appointments.


Excellent sketches of some of the more important diplomats by a well-known court-historian.


Superficial comments on many diplomats by a foreign correspondent for the New York Post.


Useful on the maneuvering that preceeded the appointment of Dodd to Berlin.


Provides biographical information on the author's patrician life and appointment as minister to Norway. Also indicates both the author's willingness to delegate responsibility to her subordinates, all career officers, and their cordial relations with her.

Beyond the time frame of this thesis, but contains perceptive comments on FDR and the State Department.


Of chief importance here are Hull's recollections of how envoys were selected. Hull's role in appointments was limited but his loyalty to his subordinates is obvious.


Contains shrewd and discerning sketches of various diplomats by the well-known diplomat-scholar as well as incisive commentary on American diplomacy.


Contains some information on Kennedy's appointment to London.


Provides good information on many of FDR's diplomatic appointments and Moley's battles with the career officers.


By a career officer and personal emissary for FDR. Notes the lack of coordination between the State Department and the President, as well as FDR's distrust of career diplomats.


A useful memoir by a career officer, who, among other assignments, served in the Foreign Service Division of Protocol during the 1930s.


A decidedly discreet yet revealing account befitting a professional diplomat. Nostalgia for the early Foreign Service is apparent.


_______. *Hands Across the Caviar.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952. Lively and witty accounts of only marginal value by a career officer who served under Ambassador Bullitt, among others.

The New Dealers. [John F. Carter] New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1934. Remarkably accurate portraits of FDR and many of his entourage, including diplomats and State Department staffers, by a contemporary listed only as the "Unofficial Observer."


A marginally useful account by a relatively minor confidant of FDR's. Indicates that FDR made many appointments without much consultation with his advisors.


Generally self-effacing accounts by FDR's closest foreign-policy advisor. The first account contains Welles' self-laudatory but inaccurate evaluation of his ambassadorship to Cuba. The second notes FDR's distaste for career diplomats.


A curiosity. A schizophrenic account by a career officer who came to detest the Foreign Service.


A gay account of life abroad by the wife of John Wiley, a career officer.


Valuable in discerning the nostalgia felt by one career diplomat for a serene and elitist Foreign Service that existed prior to 1930.

II. Secondary Materials—Published

A. General, Topical, and Monographic Works


A general work that lends some perspective to the conduct of diplomacy during the 1930s.


What is lacking in writing style is more than compensated for by superb research.


An excellent collection of essays. Useful to generalist and specialist alike.


Two books Ambassador Bowers completed in Madrid, indicating that he, in part, successfully accomplished that which he originally intended to do as an ambassador.

Braeman, John; Bremner, Robert H.; and Brady, David, eds. Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971.

Contains an excellent article by Waldo Heinrichs, "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy."


An indictment of the amateurism that prevails in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.


A credible but thin and uninspiring biography, leading one to suspect that the Johnson papers may be meager.


An anti-Soviet polemic revealing of Bullitt's transformation since 1917.
Still the best biography of Hitler.
Important for an understanding of Nazi foreign policy.


Justifiably acclaimed as one of the best of the Roosevelt biographies.

Contains solid essays on American and Far Eastern diplomats. Useful for evaluating Grew and Johnson.

A fine survey of U.S.-Latin American relations.

Shrewd commentary on the art of diplomacy by a well-known French diplomat and scholar.

Notes the generally negative public attitude toward diplomats and contends that the traditional view of the qualities of the ideal diplomat are still applicable to the sound conduct of diplomacy.

Provides useful bibliographical essays on industrialization and trade expansionism, the
progressive reformers, the Great Depression, and
the diplomacy of the 1930s.

Recites the case for the conduct of diplomacy by professionals.

A columnist's view of the Washington scene, which includes information on Joe Davies and his relationship with FDR.

A general, yet thorough survey of American-Mexican relations.

A sound introductory history containing useful information relating to Ambassador Johnson.

Cursory account with only brief comments on Dodd and Hugh Wilson.

A generally excellent work, containing solid essays on Dodd, Bullitt, and Kennedy.

A poorly written biography, which nevertheless contains much useful information about Carr and the development of the Foreign Service from Carr's private papers.

Well-written, sympathetic treatment of FDR's ambassador to Mexico.

Provides useful biographical information on some of the diplomats of the 1930s.

   A well-researched, adequately-written, and sympathetic treatment of Dodd.

   A balanced treatment. Focuses upon the domestic and foreign constraints FDR faced.
   Contains little on FDR and the Foreign Service.

   A work of propaganda by a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

   Biography by a popular biographer of many subjects. Not particularly revealing.

   A few interesting sidelights about a couple of FDR's diplomats appear in this volume.

   Contains only scanty information on American diplomats to Middle Eastern countries.


   A decent study, highlighting bureaucratic politics and past failures at organizational reform of the foreign affairs machinery.

Misguided fascination with Mussolini was not confined to diplomats.


Solid work on American neutrality. Contains little on individual diplomats.


An excellent, short introduction to FDR's foreign policy.


An example of Dodd's fervent Jeffersonianism.


A thought-provoking, sweeping and ably-written volume that concentrates upon European and Ethiopian figures.


A good synthesis of published materials foreshadowing the New Deal era.


Brief but sound survey with a good annotated bibliography. A good place to begin a study of the Foreign Service.


Covers Bullitt's career from 1933-1936. Not uncritical but perhaps more sympathetic to Bullitt than future accounts might be.


A reasonable though not dispassionate account. As in other accounts on the same subject, Breckinridge Long is portrayed as a principal villain.


Gardner, Lloyd B. Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Sketches the diplomacy of several diplomats from a New Left perspective. Contends, for example, that Bullitt's romanticism is symbolic of the American tradition in foreign policy and that his post-1935 anti-communism stemmed from his view of the Bolshevik menace to capitalism.
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Praises the work of Josephus Daniels. Finds economic motives guiding the actions of such disparate diplomats as Grew and Bullitt.


Contains an excellent article by Gordon Craig describing why politicians after 1919 believed that diplomatic negotiations were too important to be left to professional diplomats.


A critical view of New Deal diplomacy from a New Left perspective.

Gibson, Hugh. The Road to Foreign Policy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1944.

Provides a useful view of amateur versus professional diplomacy.


Contains a brief but solid analysis of FDR's administration.


Herbert J. Storing's essay, "American Statesmanship: Old and New," offers some brilliant insights on American political leadership, from the Founding Fathers to modern leaders.

The solid essay on Hull by David Drummond notes the Secretary's inclination to protect the status quo upon entering the State Department.


A sound, if undistinguished, biography showing Page's anglophilia, which Joe Kennedy was destined to repeat. Both Page and Kennedy are examples of amateur envoys who "lost" touch with their home country.


Interesting views by a contemporary with useful information on some of FDR's appointments. Perhaps Gunther's best book.


Compilation of conference papers. One by Elmer Plischke on the administrative history of the State Department is a fine place to begin one's research on the topic.


A collection of some of Isaiah Berlin's essays, including one on the meaning of Machiavelli, which is fascinating in light of the damning association of diplomats with Machiavellianism.


The data collected is for 1954, 1958 and 1962.


Focuses upon the modern diplomat from a sophisticated public administration viewpoint. Places too much faith in "management systems" as the key to a successful foreign affairs machinery.


One of the better treatments of American diplomacy during the Ethiopian crisis.

A generally fine and provocative work. Introduction superbly places American diplomacy within a cultural context and notes the marginal value attached by Americans to diplomacy as an occupation.


A superb biography and an excellent study of the development of the Foreign Service.


A good primer on the actors in the foreign affairs establishment.


A general, illustrated history of little value.


A Republican view of foreign policy by two men whom Roosevelt distrusted. Not as directly critical of FDR as one might have expected, perhaps reflecting Gibson's sense of diplomatic ethics.


By a veteran journalist assigned to the State Department. Equally critical of wealthy, professional and political appointees as chiefs-of-missions. Not particularly revealing.


A solid, full-scale study of the development of the Foreign Service, with special focus on the administrative machinery of diplomacy. Should
be read in conjunction with more recent works by Schulzinger, Werking, Etzold, and Harr.

Contains some biographical information on one of FDR's amateur envoys to Latin America, Meredith Nicholson.

**Israel, Fred L. Nevada's Key Pittman.** Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963.
Documents Kennedy's indiscretions with diplomatic information via the chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

One article in this volume in the *American Heritage Series* provides material on Joseph Davies, most of which is culled from popular periodicals.

This popular account by a journalist of one group of Foreign Service officers provided some information on the bureaucratic process of how officers are recommended for and transferred to certain posts by their colleagues in the State Department.

Notes that no American legislative body houses a cross-section of the population it serves. Most legislators (like most Foreign Service Officers) are drawn from a narrow middle-to-upper class social base. Indirectly raises the question of diplomat-politician mutual distrust. What factors dominate this hostile relationship?

Valuable here in reporting the campaign contributions of some of FDR's diplomats.
One of the more daring New Left accounts. Contains a few passages on the class background of careerists in the State Department.

A reasonably sound biography by a writer without access to Kennedy's private papers and whose sympathetic treatment of the father may have emanated from the writer's fondness for the father's son, John.

Useful in delineating American trade expansionism during the late nineteenth century.

A stimulating work, covering in broad strokes the events of the 1930s.

Still a standard work for the student of U.S. foreign policy on the late 1930s by two authors with early access to official documents.

A fine work, but of little value on FDR's diplomats.

A solid work. Notes the now well-known prejudice of FDR against the diplomatic experts.

Democratic pressures, in part, forced reform
of the century-old European foreign offices at the same time that the U.S. began to build a professional foreign service. Useful in delineating the pressures of "democratization" upon professional diplomacy.


Popular novel critical of American diplomatic establishment.


A good summary of the New Deal but of little value for studying FDR's diplomats.


Broad, sweeping essays from a predominantly New Left, economic deterministic perspective.


Contains a plethora of details, some important and some trite. Useful in providing a flavor for the 1930s as well as a comparison of the 1930s with the present.


Typically perceptive and stimulating volume by May, providing some interesting observations on American diplomats during World War II.


An important work for indicating that the United States did not seriously consider matching, by building, a professional diplomatic capability with its enormous economic resources. Other nations regarded the U.S. as a world power long before the U.S. did.

Focuses upon World War II. Essay by William Emerson demonstrates how consistently inconsistent FDR was in matters of foreign policy.


A broad survey. No attempt made to evaluate Hugh Wilson's ministership to Bern in the 1930s.


Includes three essays by contemporary career Foreign Service officers who depict "in-house" views of Service needs.


A solid biography, useful here for how FDR and Truman differed in their handling of the State Department.


A classical primer on American diplomacy, containing sound comments on the need for building an institutional diplomatic capacity rather than relying on the sporadic appearance of brilliant individuals.


The source for Nixon's view of career diplomats.
An adequate biography that, like Cronon's, evaluates Daniels' diplomacy favorably.

A fascinating story containing some information on Kennedy's actions at the time the British stumbled in their efforts to negotiate with the Russians just prior to the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Like Schlesinger, Neustadt comments favorably upon FDR's methods of haphazard administration. Leadership is equated with the acquisition of personal power.


Nothing specific on the author's appointment or performance as minister to Lithuania.

A solidly researched monograph, which treats Dodd sympathetically and FDR critically. Useful on other diplomats as well.

A fine introduction to the inter-war period based on the author's own research and on the more than thirty years of scholarly efforts by others.

Pungent and not always reliable observations on Washington life, including that of career diplomats, by the capital city's most famous muckracker.


A brief survey of the New Deal by a diplomatic historian who does not focus upon diplomacy.


Contains a brief evaluation of Spruille Braden taken largely from contemporary journalistic sources.


A highly sympathetic and largely undocumented account of a career diplomat under FDR.


Based, admittedly, on the State Department compilation, *U.S. Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973*. A curious manipulation of the data; few comparisons of amateur and career appointments are noted.


A provocative work. How the idea of egalitarianism and economic abundance shaped the national character. Has application for public's distrust of professional diplomats.

A fine biography of Hull by a thorough researcher and solid writer of diplomatic history.

Contains a few details on appointments.

A useful introduction, lending some details to early diplomatic practice and tradition.

Contains a few interesting and obscure details relative to some of FDR's appointees.

Contains marginally useful descriptive essays on Grew and Messersmith.


Deals only cursorily with foreign affairs, but has worthwhile analysis of FDR's personality and administrative methods.

Critical of the Foreign Service and State Department.

An important source for the views of JFK and his White House staff on the Foreign Service.

Provides an example of an unwanted employee being appointed as ambassador abroad in order to be rid of him, as well as information on JFK's views on the Foreign Service.


An excellent study, adding much to the knowledge of the formative years of the Foreign Service.


A solid work on the dimensions of governmental politics in reorganizational efforts.


Demonstrates how civil service procedures are circumvented through politics, bureaucratic and other. A fine study.


One of the best accounts by a New Deal insider. Notes that Hopkins and Roosevelt shared a distrust of the State Department.


A study in the New Left genre. Critical of Welles' mission to Cuba in 1933.


A worthy and lucidly written addition to the Rise of Modern Europe Series.


A valuable work on early, pre-1815 European diplomatic mores and practices.


Intended for the generalist. Includes useful sketches of some diplomats.

Critical of Wriston committee's recommendations regarding the Foreign Service. The committee recommended further "democratization."


Contains some biographical information on Dodd.


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By a former career officer. Describes favorably the evolution of the State Department and the Foreign Service. Solidly researched and informative.


Interesting and witty account of professional and amateur diplomacy.


Provides useful sketches on some of the lesser known and written about diplomats.


Authoritative work on the Civil War, but does not attempt to evaluate Bowers.


Relies heavily on Ilchman in a section surveying the Foreign Service. Includes a brief argument in support of noncareer diplomats.


An incisive and penetrating analysis of U.S. diplomacy. Provides a solid evaluation of Bowers.

A fine biography containing an excellent description of Ambassador Johnson.

_____.  The Proud Tower.  New York: Macmillan, 1966.  Useful in comparing late 19th century European and American class consciousness, and thus suggestive of their different approaches to what a diplomatic service should be.

Villard, Henry Serrano. Affairs at State.  New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1965.  Presents a case for the greater use of professional diplomats. Contends that the Service has deteriorated since the administration of FDR. Amusing accounts of episodes in the lives of many diplomats.

Warwick, Donald P.  A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.  One of the better studies of bureaucracy generally and of the State Department bureaucracy particularly.


   A credible work, which contributed to Welles' reputation as an expert on Latin America.

   A solid and thorough study of the early institutional reform of the U.S. foreign affairs machinery.

   First given as a lecture to budding Foreign Service officers. Useful in capturing the qualities imbued in young officers for conducting diplomacy.

   Contains a few details on the friendship of Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson.

   Provides excellent analyses of FDR, Welles and Hull.

   A fine, brief historiographical survey of the crises of the 1930s.

   A fine work on the subject, but slim in its treatment of individual diplomats.

   An often trite and unanalytical discussion.

   A useful work, similar to Feingold's.

B. Articles

Includes statistics on department appropriations and the number of overseas missions and staff.


"Ambassador Davies." Fortune, 16 (October, 1937), pp. 94-98. Reflects the kind of favorable publicity Davies assiduously sought while ambassador to the U.S.S.R.


Bailey, Thomas A. "America's Emergence as a World Power: The Myth and the Verity." Pacific Historical Review, 30 (February, 1961), pp. 1-16. Outlines the debate over when the United States "thought" it became a world power and when it began to act like one, and concludes that both occurred during and after World War II.


A survey of the literature on FDR, with special emphasis on the historiography of the President's methods of administration.


Esthus, Raymond A. "Isolationism and World Power." Diplomatic History, 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 117-129. Cogently argues that U.S. did not become a participating, active world power until World War II.

Etheredge, Lloyd S. "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory." American Political Science Review, 72 (June, 1978), pp. 434-451. Concludes with the "startling" revelation that personality characteristics of leaders influence foreign policy decisions. Difficult to see the merit of publishing this article.

An attempt to refute critics who contend that the diplomatic service is a social club by one of the club's less wealthy members.

Points again to FDR's penchant for personal diplomacy.

General, unoriginal recommendations spiced with entertaining sketches of the top officials and chiefs-of-mission in the diplomatic service. An article with the look of "inside," though not necessarily unbiased, sources.

An unexceptional and thin analysis by one who obviously favors career officers.

Appears to be a slightly rewritten account of a State Department news release on departmental appointments under the guise of reorganization.

Useful, suggestive study focusing on early attempts at structural reform especially in the Consular Service.

A brilliant but somewhat arrogant rendition of the subtleties that affect the relationship of the professional diplomat with a democratic public.
Reiteration of many of the themes in the author's 1955 article above.

Like other presidents, Hoover used the spoils system to employ diplomats.

Provides a fair profile of Bowers distilled primarily from his memoirs.

A first-rate article by a college senior. One of the early, sympathetic accounts of Dodd's personal struggle with the Nazis.

Luce, Clare Booth. "The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?" The Foreign Affairs Quarterly, 36 (October, 1957), pp. 105-121.
Argues a "best man" thesis, whether professional or amateur.

Marginally useful on Davies' ambassadorship.

Some interesting material here. Indicates Dodd's Wilsonianism and his hatred of urbanization.

Skillfully examines U.S. diplomats suspicions of Stalin and its effect on U.S. policy.


Cites several examples of the traditional mistreatment of American diplomats by the American people and their elected representatives.


Suggests that factors other than outside criticism influenced the reorganization of the State Department from 1937-1939.

Moley, Raymond. "Shake-Up." Newsweek, 10 (July 17, 1937), p. 44.

Gives credit to FDR for reorganizing an inept Foreign Service in 1937.


Discusses President Carter's campaign promises, his diplomatic appointments, and bureaucratic patronage within the Foreign Service.


Notes the dozen futile attempts at reform since the end of World War II, and questions the "closed career principle" and its applicability to today.


A fine, analytical sketch of Messersmith's career based largely on the diplomat's private papers.
Myers, Dennis P., and Ransom, Charles F. "Reorganization of the State Department." American Journal of International Law, 31 (October, 1937), pp. 713-720. Argues that the reorganization of the State Department and Foreign Service reflected an adjustment to new needs in foreign affairs.


Ninkovich, Franklin. "Ideology, the Open Door, and Foreign Policy." Diplomatic History, 6 (Spring, 1982), pp. 185-208. A solid essay, depicting the importance of national character--as opposed to diplomatic tradition--on American Foreign Policy.


Overacker, Louise. "Campaign Funds in a Depression Year." American Political Science Review, 27 (October, 1933), pp. 769-783. Presents useful information on the campaign contributions of some of FDR's political appointees to embassies and legations.
Of only marginal value.

Concludes that presidents have wide latitude in shaping and using "public opinion."


The Senate hearings on Bohlen's 1952 appointment as ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Were examples needed of how career officers could be disgusted by partisan politics, the finagling over Bohlen's nomination would be one.

Argues that foreign affairs negotiating is not a political process, that the 'amateur' with special technical expertise should replace the professional generalist in the Foreign Service.

Sympathetic of FDR and critical of the State Department. An uncritical reading of FDR's diplomatic correspondence.

A thinly veiled and unwitting effort to extricate the Kennedy administration from any responsibility for the Vietnam War.

An early, generally favorable account of one of FDR's worst amateur, political appointees.

An effort to counter the perceived negative public image of career diplomats and to spark internal adjustments in Foreign Service operations.

A contemporary historian's critical account of the Welles mission to Cuba.

Describes criticisms of U.S. diplomats by their British counterparts based upon documents released by the British Foreign Office.

Attempts to demonstrate the beneficial effect of the Rogers Act on the Foreign Service.

Provides demographic information on the members of the Service by rank and class.

Skillful discourse on the misconception of politicians and diplomats over the objectives that one can realistically expect diplomacy to achieve.

Demonstrates that FDR maintained carefully constructed channels to the "public mind," especially through polls and the monitoring of the nation's press. Interesting in conjunction with the fact that 29 percent of FDR's amateur envoys were journalists or publishers.
FDR viewed foreign policy dissent as subversion and acted accordingly, to his discredit. Suggests petty behavior by FDR.


Focuses upon the post-World War II Foreign Service, but provides some information on the pre-war Service.


Discusses a rule that reflects a nationalistic fear that diplomats often "go native."


A good, critical evaluation of Davies as a diplomat-lawyer.

"U.S. Diplomats Assigned to America." Independent Record (Helena, Montana), March 11, 1976.

Describes a congressional program to place U.S. diplomats in domestic schools and local government offices for various periods to keep in touch with the American public pulse.


Unsuccessful and inconsistent effort to shed insight on Kennedy. Based largely on printed sources.


A brief, elegant, and quaint comparison of diplomatic life then and now.


A good, early account of Bullitt's ambassadorship to France.

The answer is yes—women have been diplomats. Notes prevailing prejudices against women diplomats.


Contends that the career public servant is one of the least studied phenomena of modern American government. Civil servants should sigh in relief, although this study does not fill the "void."

III. Secondary Materials--Unpublished


Contends from reports on economic matters that Dodd relied a great deal on the views of his subordinates in the embassy. They, too, early recognized Hitler's intentions.


Does not deal with the appointment of diplomats to Latin America.


Attempts to show the better side of Kennedy's diplomacy--a tough task.


Solidly researched account depicting a sterile and impotent U.S. foreign policy.


A useful, though sympathetic account.
Useful only for biographical information. The research and analysis match one another in thinness.

A thorough and well-researched study critical of American diplomats. Extends anti-Soviet views of diplomats to its effect on overall U.S. policy.

The format of this thesis inspired the format for mine.

A balanced treatment of Messersmith with emphasis on the consular-diplomat's organizational work in the State Department as well as his anti-Nazi crusade. Messersmith, like his colleagues, did not advocate armed U.S. intervention in European affairs.

A better than adequate study of a successful amateur diplomat.

A sympathetic but critical biography of one of FDR's emissaries to Mussolini.