American amateur diplomats during the administrations of Woodrow Wilson: An evaluation

Martin V. Melosi

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AMERICAN AMATEUR DIPLOMATS

DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS

OF WOODROW WILSON: AN EVALUATION

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Because of the historically important responsibilities of diplomats, historians and former emissaries have attempted to ascertain what qualifications were requisite for the "ideal" envoy. Many of their accounts stressed abilities which were necessary during a particular period of history, while others emphasized those characteristics that are timeless. The noted English historian and diplomat, Harold Nicolson, capably discussed both the particular and general qualities. His emphasis upon the universal characteristics essential for any diplomat was worthy of attention. Nicolson asserted that the function of diplomacy is the management of the relations between independent states through the process of negotiation. The ideal diplomat, he added, should possess "moral influence" or strict honor, which is the basis of good negotiation. This "moral influence" is derived from special virtues which the envoy must have or acquire. First among these virtues is truthfulness, which Nicolson defined as "scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the false or the suppression of the true." Truthfulness will increase the credibility of the diplomat, and fortify future confidence in him. Precision compliments truthfulness and is imperative, because diplomacy is a written rather than a verbal act.
Nicolson suggested "...the great high-roads of history are strewn with little shrines of peace which have either been left unfinished, or have collapsed when completed, for the sole reason that their foundations were built on the sands of some verbal misconception." Calm is also important. He explained, "Not only must the negotiator avoid displaying irritation when confronted by the stupidity, dishonesty, brutality or conceit of those with whom it is his unpleasant duty to negotiate; but he must eschew all personal animosities, all personal predilections, all enthusiasms, prejudices, vanities, exaggerations, dramatizations, and moral indignations." However, a diplomat is not ideal unless he is modest, since the dangers of vanity are great. And finally, the envoy should be loyal to several different and, at times, conflicting sources, such as his own government, his staff, and his diplomatic colleagues. Nicolson concluded: "'But, the reader may object, 'you have forgotten intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and even tact.' I have not forgotten them. I have taken them for granted.'"¹

Graham H. Stuart outlined the basic duties of the diplomat. He asserted that the first and most important of these

is the maintenance of friendly relations with the country to which the envoy is accredited. Of course, he must not lose sight of the policies of his own government, and he must make every effort to justify them, even if they are not pleasing to the host country. Among the diplomat's other major functions should be: 1) the protection of nationals; 2) a degree of assistance to "legitimate" commercial interest; and 3) the perpetuation of cordial relations with his diplomatic colleagues, the foreign office, and all government officials. However, Stuart warned, the envoy should avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the foreign country or making public expressions against its government. In terms of reporting, Stuart continued, a diplomat must observe "with an intelligent and unprejudiced viewpoint" everything that takes place about him, and despatch whatever information he thinks might interest his government, in order that policy can be shaped and proper instructions furnished to the diplomatic officers. Stuart further insisted that social functions are also a very important aspect of diplomatic life, and an envoy's success or failure can sometimes depend upon his ability to utilize his social contacts effectively and astutely.

Charles W. Thayer, a former United States Foreign Service officer, brought the discussion of the role of the diplomat a step further. Like Stuart, he believed political sense is necessary for an effective diplomatist. In addition to natural qualifications and an understanding of his duties, the would-be diplomat, Thayer argued, needs a long and arduous training before he can qualify for a mission. He stated, "Most authorities insist that no government should employ a diplomat until he has served an adequate apprenticeship." 3

Thayer's last observation alluded to a major problem of the diplomatic practice of the United States—the use of the amateur to represent his government's interests in a foreign country. Overwhelmingly, historians, former diplomats, and journalists have criticized this practice. Clare Boothe Luce queried: "...who should represent America abroad: the professional, the amateur, or the 'best qualified man who can be found'? Obviously the latter. And just as obviously, the reasonable presumption must be that the professional is most likely to be the man." 4 And E. Wilder Spaulding said,


4Clare Boothe Luce, "The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVI (October, 1957), 114. See also 116.
"Diplomacy is, and seems destined to remain, the only vital profession in the world where key members without experience or special aptitude are thought to be adequate." He speculated that the non-professional diplomat might bring some advantages to his position, such as infusing the service with "fresh blood" from many walks of life, having compatible political views with the current administration, representing varying geographic areas, and contributing private incomes. However, the amateur often has serious limitations—inexperience, inability to work as a member of a team, unfamiliarity with foreigners and their country, and the likelihood of being overtly partisan for or against the country to which he is accredited.5

Hugh Gibson, a widely experienced career diplomat, was even more critical than Spaulding, and emphasized the many problems inherent in amateur diplomacy. He stated:

But as regards what should be the most highly specialized profession in the world we do a right about-face. In fact, we deny that a specialized need exists. We as a people are convinced we should be better served if the career diplomats were turned out and their places taken by plain Americans from private life. They alone will

stand for no nonsense from foreigners and know how to talk to them.  

He further claimed that discussion about the failure of diplomacy was hardly credible, since diplomacy has not been given a chance to fail. The "politicians, amateurs, and adventurers" usurped the diplomatic functions of the United States, and were sent abroad with new, untried methods and "publicity stunts," resulting in "a world wide mess of unprecedented proportions." Besides, the man appointed solely because he was an active party worker could not be held accountable no matter how outrageously he behaved, and must be handled "with gloves." Gibson also discounted certain criticisms which had been leveled against the professional envoy. For instance, he argued that the belief that the career diplomat succumbed to flattery and social attention was unwarranted. In reality, it was the political appointee who most often submitted to this, leading him to become an active propagandist for the country to which he was accredited. Gibson summarized: "It is impossible to escape the conviction that we have the worst system that could be devised for appointment to high office."  

The "amateurism" which Luce, Spaulding, Thayer, Gibson, and many others have criticized was an obstacle to the development of a capable American Foreign Service, especially

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6Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy, 33.
7Ibid., 49-50, 63, 156, 167, 169-70.
from the rise of the United States as a world power in the 1890's until the beginning of World War II. With the election of William McKinley a substantial turn toward a professional Foreign Service seemed imminent. The President was not opposed to continuing, on good behavior, diplomatic secretaries from the previous administration, and about sixty percent retained their positions. However, this is not to argue that McKinley was above partisan appointments. Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson clearly exemplified the mood of the day:

March 4, 1897, found me in Washington, standing on the curb near the Treasury Department watching the parade in honor of President McKinley's inauguration. I was one of the countless office-seekers that turned the place into a mad-house, making the hotel lobbies swarm with people, hum with excited talk, and stink with the odor of bad cigars. Uncouth men, with Foreign Service Lists in their hands, would run down the salary column, stop at an attractive figure, and ask me "where the hell"

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9See Thayer, Diplomat, 64, 255; Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 45, 238; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 128-29.

the place was. It was the Spoils System working with a vengeance. One heard nothing of Civil Service or paltry questions of qualification. The thing to do seemed to be to get as many letters of recommendation as possible from one's state delegation in Congress and from powerful politicians of the Republican party. So I set about doing this quite shamelessly.

About his own appointment, he added:

After a little talk at the State Department with Mr. Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Sidney Y. Smith, Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau, and others, I was given a copy of the Diplomatic Regulations and speeded on my way, a diplomat de jure, if hardly de facto. Knowing nothing of international law, diplomatic procedure, or commerce, and little of history, I had as qualifications only a fair command of French and whatever natural ability my inheritance may have given me....There were no examinations; no attempt to determine qualifications. Appointments were made simply under pressure of political influence or favoritism. I was thrown into diplomacy, indeed thrown into life, without due preparation or advice, just as I had earlier been thrown into the water to learn to swim.11

Especially because of the effects of the commercial, political, and missionary expansion after the Spanish-American War, subtle changes began to occur in the size, existing hierarchy, and standards of compensation for the Foreign Service. McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt, had gone on record as early as 1894 as favoring a career Foreign Service. In December, 1901, he recommended the reorganization of the consular service, but gave it little

11F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), 46, 48.
practical support at that time. By 1905, he was being pressured for tangible reform of the Foreign Service, especially in the consular branch, by businessmen involved in international commerce, imperialists, missionary groups, and the National Civil Service Reform League. Many members of the Department of State approved of the career principle, and both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root, like most of their predecessors after 1888, approved and supported its application. However, most congressmen and a large segment of public opinion were unenthusiastic. Nevertheless, Roosevelt acted. He issued two executive orders in November, 1905, to make lower diplomatic and consular positions more professional through an examination process and increased compensation. But these orders fell short of what the President had advocated earlier, possibly because he believed the service had too much "bad timber" in it, and did not want to perpetuate them in office. In 1906, a statute was enacted reorganizing the consular service, followed closely by another executive order. The diplomatic corps was not

12 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177-78. See also Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 81-82.
13 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 83-84.
14 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177-78.
15 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 87.
16 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 179-80.
included in the provisions of that particular statute but, in terms of practical advances, there were substantial gains. Twenty-five percent of the ministers and diplomatic secretaries under the Roosevelt administration had entered the service between 1888 and 1895; the remainder entered prior to 1904. Another 61.4 percent had succeeded in serving under two parties, and forty percent had received appointments to two or more posts or promotions within their own post. The number of secretaries reaching ministerial rank also increased to 31.9 percent in 1906, although the rates of promotion were very uneven.\textsuperscript{17} Notwithstanding the increased attention to "professionalizing" the diplomatic and consular services, the ministerial and ambassadorial positions overwhelmingly remained in the hands of political appointees and amateurs.

During the administration of William Howard Taft, some further steps were taken to continue the merit system for the lower offices in the Foreign Service. By an executive order in 1909, all diplomatic officers below the rank of minister were granted civil service status.\textsuperscript{18} Also, of the twelve career ministers Taft had retained from the previous administration, eight remained in 1912; of the eight

\textsuperscript{17}Ilchman, \textit{Professional Diplomacy}, 79.

\textsuperscript{18}Stuart, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, 179-80; Ilchman, \textit{Professional Diplomacy}, 111.
original appointments made from the service under Taft, six remained in 1912. However, 85.7 percent of the career ministers were posted in Latin America.\textsuperscript{19}

The election of 1912 gave control of the Executive and Congress to the Democratic party, which had been in the "patronage wilderness" for sixteen years. Members of the Foreign Service were naturally apprehensive of their fate, since the merit system rested on executive orders, which were not binding on succeeding presidents. And, unlike the consular service, the diplomatic corps had yet to establish a nonpartisan reputation in the public mind.\textsuperscript{20} Nonetheless, security of tenure and promotion by merit, on the secretarial level, were fully accepted by the new administration. But its blatant use of the spoils system all but eliminated the prospect of promotions to ministerial positions.\textsuperscript{21}

The First World War, however, had a positive influence on the diplomatic service. There was a 38.5 percent increase in the number of secretaries, compared to 45.6 percent in the whole previous decade.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, pressure was coming from a number of organizations for increased reform of the diplomatic service, and in 1915 a law was passed essen-

\textsuperscript{19}Ilchman, \textit{Professional Diplomacy}, 111.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 118-19.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 118-19, 130-31. See also Stuart, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, 181-83; Barnes and Morgan, \textit{Foreign Service}, 183-84.

\textsuperscript{22}Ilchman, \textit{Professional Diplomacy}, 132-33. See also Barnes and Morgan, \textit{Foreign Service}, 155.
tially affirming the executive order of 1909. This placed all diplomatic officers, below the rank of minister, on the merit system.23

When the war ended, one of the necessities was reorganizing the machinery for the conduct of foreign relations to meet the fundamental changes in the world's system of states and the new position of power and wealth of the United States.24 With preparation for the peace conference, recognition of new states and governments, and the re-establishment of missions to the Central Powers, the existing burdens of the Department of State increased. All this made a reexamination of the Foreign Service imperative, and immediately twenty-five new secretaries were added to the diplomatic corps. Further legislative activity ensued. Representative John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts introduced a bill providing for a system of promotion of efficient secretaries to ministerial vacancies, which was heartily approved by the career officers of the Department. Although the bill received favorable reaction in Congress, the session closed without action on it.25 About the same time, there was considerable talk of combining the consular and diplomatic

23Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 183.
24Ibid., 184. See also Thayer, Diplomat, 68-69.
25Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 142-44.
services, although members of the diplomatic corps were initially opposed. Some changes were soon to take place, however.

In the election of 1920, the victorious Republican party committed itself to government aid in the expansion of trade, and the diplomatic service would be an important tool in fulfilling this promise. Moreover, the Republicans had traditionally favored a career Foreign Service. The time seemed at hand for a major step toward a further professionalization of the diplomatic corps. Warren G. Harding, who had won the presidency by a margin large enough to free him from many political debts, went on record early in 1921 in support of such a venture. By 1922, thirty-five percent of the upper positions in the diplomatic corps were held by career men—the highest percentage since the Taft administration.26

A major reform of the Foreign Service came in 1924 with the Rogers Act, which combined the diplomatic and consular branches into one group. It allowed for entrance by examination for all who could qualify, and secured tenure and promotion by merit. Furthermore, the principle of interchangeability from one branch of the service to the other increased the possibility that a candidate would get the correct type

26 Ibid., 157.
of assignment. Implementing the Rogers Act was more
difficult than drafting it, since many inequities occurred.
Eventually, under practical conditions, the most critical
issues were worked out.

With all its practical benefits, the Rogers Act did not
cope with the persistent problem of the political appointment
of ministers and ambassadors. However, there were some prac­
tical advances during the 1930's. In 1932, Herbert Hoover's
administration had fifty-one percent of its upper diplomatic
posts, including half of the ambassadorships, filled with
career officers. This percentage did not change radically
under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, even though
the new president has been frequently accused of a deep dis­
trust of the Foreign Service. Early in his administration,
Roosevelt and his advisers decided on a rough balance between
career and non-career appointments. By 1937, fifty-two per­
cent of the ministers and ambassadors were professionals,
and, by 1939, more than sixty percent of the ambassadors were
career men, including holders of some of the most important
posts, such as Tokyo, Rome, and Berlin. Yet, Paris, London,
and Moscow remained in the hands of amateurs.

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27 Ibid., 177. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 185-86.
28 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 190-91.
29 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 211-17. See also
Thayer, Diplomat, 73-75.
The diplomatic service made encouraging, if uneven progress toward professionalism from the 1890's to World War II. However, the upper posts—ministers and ambassadors—were the last to be involved in this process. Of the whole period, the most pointed example of the use of amateurs as chiefs-of-mission occurred during the administrations of Woodrow Wilson. It is the purpose of this thesis to:

1) examine the appointments to all the major ambassadorial and ministerial posts during this period; and
2) evaluate the diplomatic performance of thirteen non-professional ambassadors and ministers through their published memoirs and letters and through the analyses of historians. Hopefully, this case study will demonstrate the nature of "amateurism" in the American diplomatic corps.
CHAPTER II

APPOINTMENTS OF CHIEFS-OF-MISSION

It has been said that Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan were, like most of their predecessors, relatively ignorant of and indifferent to foreign affairs. They also shared, to a remarkable degree, certain assumptions and ideals, which provided the impetus for their foreign policy. They were both moralists, who thought in terms of "eternal verities;" they were both dedicated, at least theoretically, to the democratic ideal, and obsessed with the concept of America's mission in the world; they were both fundamentally missionaries and evangelists, confident that they understood what was best for other countries more clearly than the leaders of those countries. And even though this "missionary diplomacy" did not explain the politics of Wilson and Bryan in full, it demonstrated their desire to act justly, advance the cause of international peace, and give the peoples of the world "the blessings of democracy and Christianity."¹

However, the idealism that the President and his Secretary of State brought to the new Democratic administration was not always expressed in their actions. The pervasive use of the spoils system to fill diplomatic posts was a prime example.

The accession to power of the Democrats after sixteen years of Republican domination has been cited frequently as the justification for the blatant use of spoils politics by the Wilson administration. Stuart added, that since nominations to diplomatic posts had regularly been of a political nature, the Wilson administration was merely following Republican precedents. But Warren F. Ilchman believed that the increasing professionalization of the Foreign Service under Roosevelt and Taft was threatened by the unfettered use of patronage during the Wilson administration. However, neither Stuart nor Ilchman clearly demonstrated why the new Democratic administration resorted to spoils politics.

Virtually all students of Wilson would agree that upon his election, he tried to place the best possible men in the

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3 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 182-83. See also Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 85. (Herein-after referred to as Mamatey, Central Europe.)

4 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 118-19.
ambassadorial and ministerial posts. The possibility that the President would appoint merely personal and political favorites seemed highly unlikely, given his idealism and former position as vice-president of the National Civil Service Reform League. As Ilchman stated, Wilson was an educator who "appreciated the need for career specialization." However, Link noted that the President distrusted the professionals in the Department of State and thought many of them were "...either aristocrats, the products of exclusive schools and a snobbish society, or else sycophantic imitators of the wealthy classes."

However, within the first few months of his presidency, Wilson encountered some serious setbacks in seeking new chiefs-of-mission. Prospective appointees for the embassies in London, Berlin, Paris, and the legation in Peking, declined his offers. In general, the excuses given were lack of funds, personal matters, and corporate interests. It is widely


6Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 118-19.

accepted that inadequate finances was the foremost problem. The government provided the chiefs-of-mission with minimal salaries and only limited expense budgets with which to maintain the embassies and legations, especially in Europe. Hence, they would often need to utilize personal savings or money provided by a benefactor or by a political group. The question of wealth complicated the selection of the "best men," and obviously frustrated Wilson.

The inability of the President to persuade his initial candidates to accept the most important diplomatic posts was, in part, responsible for his selection of many Democratic party favorites. According to Charles Seymour, Wilson was acutely aware of the dangers that menaced American interests abroad when a change in administrations occurred. Thus, Seymour continued, the President fought against the "threat­ened intrusion of the spoils system." However, the problem was not simple, in view of the difficulty in finding Americans with a combination of intellectual backgrounds and material resources, and also in view of the purely partisan influences which regarded the Foreign Service as primarily

*University Press, 1956*, 98. (Hereinafter referred to as Link, *Wilson, II.*)


designed to furnish jobs for political supporters.\textsuperscript{10} Although Link and Paolo Coletta believed that the difficulty in acquiring the "best men" compelled Wilson to yield to party pressure in naming ministers and ambassadors, they also declared that Wilson always considered diplomatic appointments on the upper level to be political in nature.\textsuperscript{11} Acknowledging a certain degree of inevitability, James Kerney, a journalist and Wilsonian from New Jersey, said, "In the first two years of the Presidency, Wilson played considerably at organization politics. It was not to his liking. But every President finds he must be a politician in one sense or another."\textsuperscript{12}

Since Wilson, quite universally made patronage appointments, it seems probable that he was never ideologically opposed to selecting friends and party favorites. Also, when he declined to nominate many professional diplomats to the highest posts in favor of "best men" outside of the

\textsuperscript{10}Charles Seymour, Behind the Political Curtain 1912-1915, Vol. I of The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1926), 177-78. (Hereinafter referred to as Seymour, House, I.)

\textsuperscript{11}Link, Wilson, II, 101, 103; Link, Wilson The Diplomatist, 25-26; Coletta, "Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and 'Deserving Democrats,'" Mid-America, XLVIII (April, 1966), 83. See also Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 48-49.

\textsuperscript{12}James Kerney, The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson (New York: The Century Co., 1926), 308. (Hereinafter referred to as Kerney, Political Education.)
profession, he left himself susceptible to party influences. Certainly, Wilson's use of spoils system was hardly a transition from his original intentions. Nevertheless it should be noted, that Wilson, with the advice of Colonel Edward M. House, his confidant and personal adviser, kept the consular service and most subordinate officials in the diplomatic corps on the merit system.13

Bryan's attitude concerning diplomatic appointments increased the likelihood that the Wilson administration would employ the spoils system profusely. In fact, spoils politics during the Wilson administration have often been equated with the "Great Commoner." He was even more of a novice in foreign affairs than the President, and certainly unfamiliar with the functions of the Department of State. Although the Secretary came to office with an idealistic notion of the foreign affairs of the United States, he was equally dedicated to the value of party politics.14 He simplistically assumed that by "turning the rascals out" and replacing them with loyal Democrats, the new administration would be strengthened. Also, Bryan's opinion of

13Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183; Spaulding, Ambassadors, 9; Seymour, House, I, 178; Tichman, Professional Diplomacy, 120-21.

14Link, Progressive Era, 26, 27.
professional diplomats paralleled the President's. Thus, because of his strong convictions in favor of the spoils system, the inordinate number of demands on him for political appointments, and his powerful position in the Democratic party, Bryan was continually seeking sinecures for "deserving Democrats." Coletta described one of Bryan's most nefarious practices—making a series of temporary appointments for the sake of the honor attached to them. For instance, he had reserved El Salvador "for Nebraskans only." He wrote to his brother Charles: "I think it would be well to give one year to four of our friends and would suggest Doc Brown for the first year. Can make the appointment at once. Suppose you talk to Doc and see if he would like it. It is $10,000 a year." But ex-mayor F. W. "Doc" Brown feared that accepting the post would jeopardize his chances for postmaster of Lincoln. Charles Bryan became so angry with Brown that he suggested that the Secretary of State have the prospective minister's resignation written out, dated a year in advance, and signed before the commission.

15Link, Wilson, II, 103. See also Coletta, Mid-America XLVIII, 85-86; Baker, Wilson, IV, 38-39; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183; Spaulding, Ambassadors, 9; Kerney, Political Education, 316-17.

16Katherine Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years in the Department of State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 146-49. (Hereinafter referred to as Crane, Carr.) See also Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 85; Link, Wilson, II, 103; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 119.
was given. However, Doc Brown never accepted this type of offer, but other candidates did. Fortunately, Bryan's patronage activities were primarily limited to ministers. 17

The nature of the use of spoils politics by the Wilson administration can graphically be seen in viewing the various appointments themselves. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a mission-by-mission analysis of the selections and the qualifications of the chiefs-of-mission for these positions. Hopefully, this will provide evidence of the character of the diplomatic corps during World War I.

WESTERN EUROPE

Since many of the more important and prestigious embassies and legations were located in Western Europe, Wilson made a majority of these appointments himself. The prominent London post went to Walter Hines Page. Born into a substantial family in North Carolina, he attended Randolph-Macon College and Johns Hopkins University, and eventually sought his fortune in the North as a journalist. He became successful in this field, editing such periodicals as The Forum, The Atlantic Monthly, and World's Work. He helped establish the latter with Frank Doubleday, who became his partner, in 1889, in the Doubleday, Page and Company pub-

17Link, Progressive Era, 27; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 120, 126; Seymour, House, I, 177-78; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183.
lishing house. On an assignment from the New York World to cover the Atlanta Exposition of 1882, Page had met a young lawyer, Woodrow Wilson, with whom he established an immediate rapport. Ross Gregory dramatically summarized the relationship between the two men: "If Page and Wilson had not met in 1882 it would have been another time, for circumstances destined that their paths frequently would cross. Both were southerners; both went to Johns Hopkins, attained success in the North, and looked back on the old area with hopeful objectivity." Their paths did cross repeatedly after the first meeting. By 1885, Page had a New York editorial position, and in searching for good manuscripts oftentimes relied upon Wilson, who was then a college professor. It was not surprising that Page became an early


20Ibid., 17.

21Ibid. Gregory also asserted that Page's position as a New York editor laid the foundation for a stronger relationship between the two men.
supporter of Wilson for the presidency in 1912.^{22}

After Wilson had been elected, it could be assumed that he would seriously consider his long-time friend for a place in his administration. Many of Page's associates urged his appointment to the Cabinet. House felt that Page should be considered, but only after "a few qualified men" could be placed, and the political spoils had been dispensed. It was no secret that Page had wanted to be named Secretary of Agriculture. Ironically, the position went to a man he himself had recommended.^{23} He was considered for Secretary of Interior, but some of the President's advisers believed that a southerner would be an inappropriate choice to manage the Civil War veterans' pension system, which the Department of Interior controlled.^{24} By early March, Page was visibly upset by all the political maneuvering. In a letter to "Uncle Henry" Wallace, he said:

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^{23}Gregory, Page, 22-23.

^{24}Hendrick stated that Page was an "outspoken enemy" of the pension program. See his Page, I, 118-19. See also Baker, Governor 1910-1913, Vol. III of Wilson, 454; Gregory, Page, 23-24.
God pity our new masters! The President is all right. He's sound, earnest, courageous. But his party! I still have some muscular strength. In certain remote regions they still break stones in the road by hand. Now I'll break stones before I'd have a job at Washington now. I spent four days with them last week—the new crowd. They'll try their best. I think they'll succeed. But, if they do succeed and survive, they'll come out of the scrimmage bleeding and torn. We've got to stand off and run 'em, Uncle Henry. That's the only hope I see for the country....

Although the opportunity for a Cabinet position diminished, Page was offered the ambassadorship to London through some fortunate circumstances. Originally, Wilson had asked the former president of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, but he refused primarily for financial reasons. The President then turned to Richard Olney, the elderly former Secretary of State during the administration of Grover Cleveland. Once again his offer was rebuffed. With the advice of House and the new Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, the President offered the post to Page. After allowing himself a few days to consider, Page eagerly accepted. However, he had had some problems to resolve before he made his decision, such as the education of his daughter, Katherine,

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26 Baker, Wilson, IV, 26-27. Baker stated that Olney later wrote to Wilson expressing regret for not taking the post. See 311. See also Link, Wilson, II, 99; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Gregory, Page, 24; Coletta, Bryan, I13; Notter, Wilson, 234-35.

27 Link, Wilson, II, 99.
Page's financial problems were eventually solved when Wilson persuaded his friend, Cleveland H. Dodge, a New York millionaire and Princeton trustee, to subsidize the new ambassador with $25,000 a year over and above his salary, to help operate the American embassy in London. In his published letters, Page made no pertinent references to his appointment. However, historians have provided most of the details—he was a southerner, a respected journalist, a close friend of the President, and a third choice for the ambassadorship to London.

The Brussels post, although not ranking in prestige with London, was considered an idyllic assignment in 1913. The reform mayor of Toledo, Brand Whitlock, became the new minister to Belgium. A novelist, he had experience in journalism, government work, and law. Beginning in 1905, he served four two-year terms as mayor of Toledo, after having been legal adviser to Progressive mayor Samuel "Golden Rule" Jones.

28Gregory, Page, 22-25.


Whitlock's biographers summarized the reasons for his selection as minister to Belgium. Robert M. Crunden stated that Newton D. Baker, an adviser to Wilson and later his Secretary of War, gained eminence with the President-elect after the victory of 1912. And Baker wanted nothing more than to place his dear friend, Whitlock, in a diplomatic post where he could meet interesting people and have plenty of time to write. Whitlock, Crunden added, did not want to assume the "attitude of an office seeker," but he knew that Baker would try to get him a position, and that Governor James M. Cox was also favorable. However, he also realized that Ohio Democrats were reluctant to recommend an "Independent" for a diplomatic post, and some of the "less cerebral" Southern senators were opposed in principle to intellectuals in high office. Therefore, Whitlock did not place all his trust in others to secure him a nomination, and asked Rutger B. Jewett, the editor of D. Appleton Company, to obtain an endorsement from William D. Howells, the literateur and former ambassador to Italy. Crunden concluded that Wilson confirmed the appointment either because of the endorsement of Howells or Baker.


32 Ibid., 233-34.
Jack Tager also believed that Baker was vital in acquiring a diplomatic post for Whitlock, although he intimated that Whitlock, on his own volition, initially sought it. During his last years as mayor of Toledo, Whitlock considered his future plans. Higher public offices, such as the senatorship, had been denied him, and he concluded that it was time to commit himself fully to a writing career. Since authorship usually provided only a minimal income, a diplomatic post became his goal. Although Cox told Whitlock to file an official application for the diplomatic corps, he refused on the grounds that by actively seeking patronage he would tarnish his reputation as a "devoted public servant." Thus, he tried to induce his influential friends and associates to acquire a position for him. Finally, through his profession of fidelity to the Democrats and the persuasion of Baker, Cox, Jewett and Howells, he was sent to Belgium.

Allan Nevins added still another perspective to Whitlock's appointment. He asserted that Republicans as well as Democrats attempted to secure a diplomatic assignment for the Toledo mayor. However, the possibility was not promising, since Whitlock had not taken an active part in the Wilson campaign. In fact, he had hesitated whether to vote the Democrat or Socialist ticket. Fortunately, the

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efforts of Whitlock's friends produced results, probably because Wilson was familiar with the writings of Whitlock and admired his "progressive temper."\textsuperscript{34} Thus, Whitlock secured an appointment to Belgium, since the combination of influential friends and a progressive background seemed to outweigh the fact that the Toledo mayor was not a "regular" Democrat.

The selection of James W. Gerard as ambassador to Germany was clearly political. The opulent New Yorker began his career as a lawyer in 1892, and by 1907 he was an associate justice of the New York Supreme Court. In the family tradition, he became a successful financier, with holdings in New York and Montana, among others.\textsuperscript{35} Active in politics, he served as chairman of the New York Democratic campaign committee, and reportedly contributed approximately $120,000 in 1912 to various local and national Democratic candidates.\textsuperscript{36} In 1913, he was appointed ambassador to Germany, after Dean

\begin{enumerate}
\item[35]In 1901, he married Mary A. Daly, daughter of Marcus Daly, a powerful "Copper King" and ranch-owner in Montana during the late nineteenth century.
\end{enumerate}
Henry B. Fine, a friend and Princeton associate of Wilson, declined the offer for personal and financial reasons.  

Completely unabashed, Gerard explained the nature of his appointment in his memoirs:  

It had always been my ambition to be an ambassador and after the election of President Wilson, in 1912, my desire was realized. President Wilson's decision to appoint me Ambassador to Germany was brought about, I think, by the friendly intervention of a combination of Tammany, Senator James A. O'Gorman of New York, William G. McAdoo, William F. McCombs, and William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, in particular, helped me because my father-in-law had so lavishly supported him in his '96 campaign. For a while Colonel E. M. House, the Harry Hopkins of the Wilson administration, very cleverly succeeded in persuading me that he had been the principal factor in my appointment, but this conviction wore off....  

He went on to say that he was initially offered Spain, but demurred, although O'Gorman advised him to take it or he might get nothing. However, Gerard wanted an ambassadorship, and when O'Gorman convinced him that Madrid was to be made an embassy, he was ready to accept. Shortly after this, he received an offer to go to Germany. He said:  

37Baker, Wilson, IV, 28. See also Kerney, Political Education, 310-11; Notter, Wilson, 234-35. According to Link, Dodge also offered Fine a subsidy of $25,000 a year. See his Wilson, II, 101.  

38James W. Gerard, My First Eighty-Three Years in America: The Memoirs of James W. Gerard (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1951), 168. (Hereinafter referred to as Gerard, Eighty-Three Years.) There is no mention of this in his My Four Years in Germany (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1917).
I have heard that a number of gentlemen whom Wilson proposed to send to Germany were in each instance turned down by the Kaiser. It is the custom, of course, to appoint a man who is persona grata to the country to which he is to be sent. Finally someone close to the President said, "Well, let Gerard go to Germany and try his luck with that hoodoo job!" 39

He sardonically concluded:

When an ambassador is appointed, the White House announcements are unctuously flattering and give no hint of the pulling and hauling, the promises and maneuvering, and the blasted hopes that have preceded the appointment. It is frequently more difficult to become a diplomat than it is to be one. 40

Gerard's explanation of his appointment has generally been accepted, 41 but Kerney and Stuart have drawn different conclusions. Kerney believed that Senator William Hughes of New Jersey, the spokesman of the administration in the Senate, had some responsibility for the selection of Gerard. Since Gerard had contributed "on a lavish scale" to the Wilson election fund, he no doubt had wanted a place in the Cabinet. Thus, Kerney continued, an elaborate publicity campaign was operated through his friends in New York to obtain a Cabinet post for him. However, Wilson would not accept him in this capacity. Finally at the urging of Hughes,

39 Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 168.
40 Ibid., 167.
41 See Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Spaulding, Ambassadors, 9-10; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 185-86; Baker, Wilson, IV, 35; Link, Wilson The Diplomatist, 24.
Gerard was assigned to Germany. Stuart maintained that Gerard had also been considered for Mexico City, but he was regarded as persona non grata because of the reputed ill-treatment accorded the peons on his mining properties in Mexico. No matter who urged his selection or for what post, Gerard was purely a patronage appointment.

The embassy in Paris took inordinately long to fill. Myron T. Herrick, a Taft appointee, was retained until the spring of 1914, and hence represented the Wilson administration for more than a year. Like many of the President's own choices for European posts, Herrick was a non-professional diplomat. A former Ohio lawyer, president of a successful banking organization and director of several railroads and trust companies, he became active in politics in 1885. An important Republican, he was a close associate of Marcus A. Hanna, and was an important figure in the election of McKinley in 1896, after which he was offered positions as ambassador to Italy and Secretary of the Treasury. He declined both. In 1903, Herrick was elected governor of Ohio, but failed to be re-elected in 1905. He remained an active Republican, however, and in 1912 accepted Taft's offer to

43 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 211.
become ambassador to France. 44

About his selection, Herrick stated in his autobiography:

When I was running for governor in 1905, Taft came to Akron and made a speech. He intended to help me, but it had just the opposite effect... My friends all thought that without meaning to do so, he contributed a certain amount to my defeat. I have always had an idea that his regret over this occurrence, as much as anything else, led him to offer me a place in his cabinet when he became President. There was also some talk of my taking a mission abroad. 45

With the election of Wilson, Herrick realized that his continuation at Paris was merely a convenience for the White House. 46 And while Herrick waited in Paris, the selection process continued in Washington. William F. McCombs, Wilson's campaign manager, was considered, but he declined. He was more interested in a Cabinet assignment, which was never offered him, and he believed the Paris post would be too expensive for a man of his means. 47 Kerney and


45 Colonel T. Bentley Mott, Myron T. Herrick, Friend of France: An Autobiographical Biography (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1929), 94. (Hereinafter referred to as Mott, Herrick.)


47 See Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 323; Mott, Herrick, 218-21.
Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson's private secretary, then suggested George Harvey, an early Wilson supporter and editor of the North American Review. However, a few days before Harvey's nomination was to go to the Senate, the disgruntled editor wrote an untimely "swift blast" against the President. This terminated Harvey's opportunity for a mission.\footnote{Kerney, Political Education, 315-16. Harvey believed that his work in the campaign deserved some reward. When it did not seem forthcoming, he became a critic of Wilson's policies, especially the selection of diplomatic chiefs-of-mission.}

The search for an ambassador to France ended with the designation of William Graves Sharp in 1914. An Ohio lawyer turned manufacturer of pig-iron, chemicals, and charcoal, Sharp became involved in national politics in 1892, when he served as a Cleveland elector. In 1896, he had opposed Bryan and free silver, but remained a staunch Democrat. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1908, and soon became a ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.\footnote{Spaulding, "William Graves Sharp," D.A.B., XVII, 25. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 238-39.}

In his memoirs, Sharp made only passing reference to his appointment: "My colleagues from Ohio, [Senator Atlee Pomerene and Newton D. Baker] without my knowledge, had also recommended my selection to the President, and the Senate had paid me the compliment of confirming my nomination without
the customary referral to a committee." But some historians have given more detail. According to Link, Sharp had been originally considered for the Petrograd mission, but the Russian ambassador in Washington hinted that Sharp would not be welcomed because he had denounced the 1832 Russian-American commercial treaty in 1911. It is also widely accepted that Sharp was considered for France because he had contributed liberally to the 1912 campaign fund, and was an ardent supporter of the administration.

More political favorites and former associates of Wilson and Bryan filled the other Western European embassies and legations. For the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Wilson chose a Pennsylvania Dutchman, Dr. Henry Van Dyke, who was a prolific writer and poet teaching at Princeton University.

Prior to his appointment, a rumor circulated that the New York Sun was about to publish a letter written by Cleveland


51 Link, Wilson, II, 102. Dawson stated that Sharp was also considered for Argentina, but it was scarcely important enough for him. See Dawson, Sharp, xvii.

52 Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, II, 102; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 185-86; Kerney, Political Education, 315-16.

to Van Dyke severely castigating Wilson. However, Van Dyke refused to give a copy to the New York editor. This incident might have had some bearing upon Van Dyke's nomination, as it certainly would have helped sustain the friendship between the former Princeton colleagues. Van Dyke was appointed in 1913 and remained until 1917. He was succeeded by John Work Garrett, a career diplomat who had been minister to Venezuela and Argentina.

Another friend of Wilson, Pleasant A. Stovall, was appointed to Switzerland in 1913. He and the President were boyhood friends, who had attended a private boys' school together in Georgia. Stovall was a journalist, and, in 1891, with David Robinson, established the Savannah Evening Press, of which he served as editor. An active Democrat, he had been chairman of the Georgia Democratic Convention, aide-de-camp to two Georgia governors, and a representative to his state's General Assembly from 1902 to 1906. Like many of Wilson's friends, he had been a...

54 Link, Wilson, II, 358; Kerney, Political Education, 310-11.
55 Kerney said that Ellen A. Wilson originally suggested to her husband that he send Van Dyke to the Netherlands. See his Political Education, 310-11.
56 Register of the Department of State 1917 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), 96. (Hereinafter referred to as Register 1917.)
57 Irving L. Thompson, "Pleasant Alexander Stovall," D.A.B., XXI, 675-76; Link, Wilson, I, 4. Stovall wrote a book analyzing the political conditions in Switzerland and Europe during the war. See his Switzerland and the World
devoted supporter in the 1912 campaign.

Two Virginians, Thomas Nelson Page and Joseph Edward Willard, were appointed to Rome and Madrid, respectively. Page was a romantic Southern novelist and essayist. A social acquaintance of Wilson, he had been chairman of the reception committee at the inauguration in 1913. Page was selected primarily to appease Virginia's two powerful senators, Claude A. Swanson and Thomas S. Martin. The Virginia senators also supported the nomination of Willard, a wealthy lawyer, a former member of the Virginia House of Delegates, and lieutenant governor. Neither Page nor Willard had any prior experience in foreign affairs.

In another strictly political maneuver, Thomas H. Birch was commissioned as minister to Portugal. It was at his home that Wilson and Bryan were first introduced. Furthermore, Bryan and the New Jersey carriage manufacturer had been friends ever since Birch and his father supported the Secretary of State in the 1896 presidential campaign.

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58 Thomas Nelson Page also wrote a book assessing European political conditions during the war. See his Italy and the World War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920).


60 Link, Wilson, II, 102. See also Spaulding, "Joseph Edward Willard," D.A.B., XX, 236; Register 1916 (1917), 142.

61 Baker, Wilson, III, 209; Link, Wilson, II, 102. See also Register 1916, 74.
stranger to the President either, since Wilson, before he retired from Trenton in 1912, named Birch as an aide on the governor's staff. After the campaign, Birch made known his desire to be named minister to Belgium, and Bryan urged his selection. But the President balked, and offered him Russia instead. When he declined, a compromise was reached on Portugal. The new minister quickly gained the attention of the Department of State by ordering stationery embossed with "American Embassy, Lisbon," instead of "American Legation, Lisbon."

SCANDINAVIA

Of the three key ministers to Scandinavia, two had some diplomatic experience. Wilson personally selected Ira Nelson Morris for Sweden. He had been a businessman for many years before Bryan sent him on a special diplomatic mission to Italy early in 1913. He was appointed minister to Sweden little more than a year later. In his memoirs, he gave minimal attention to the reasons for his designation, yet he complained how ludicrous it seemed to use

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62 Kerney, Political Education, 163, 315-16.


64 Register 1916, 117.
personal funds for diplomatic expenses. He added, "Throughout Europe certain men are, as it were, born to diplomacy...In America, however, diplomats like Topsy, just grow." 66

Maurice Francis Egan, originally a Roosevelt appointee, remained at his post in Denmark during the Wilson administration. A Philadelphia connoisseur of "the good life" and a prominent Catholic, he had been a teacher and journalist with a desultory interest in law. He had taught at Georgetown University, Notre Dame, and the Catholic University of America, and, in 1888, he became part-owner and editor of the Freeman's Journal. Since he was familiar with Europe, he had been an unofficial adviser to McKinley and Roosevelt. The latter appointed him minister to Denmark in 1907 to purchase the Danish West Indies and to keep the administration informed on European affairs. 67

In his memoirs, Egan discussed his appointments in detail. Cleveland had offered him a post, but as he said: "I had very little respect for our foreign service. The


66 Ibid., 3-4. However, he believed a beginning was being made toward professionalism in the corps, which he heartily approved.

tenure was so unstable and the expense for the pleasure of enjoying a little brief authority so crushing, that I was ungrateful enough to refuse."\(^{68}\) He eventually accepted a post from Roosevelt. As he stated:

...Mr. Roosevelt one day gently suggested that I should go to Japan. I was horrified. I knew nothing of the Eastern situation. While I was no novice, I had always felt that if a man was unfortunate enough to be an Ambassador from the United States to any other country, he ought to have served as a Minister Plenipotentiary for a time at least....Besides this, Mr. O'Brien had been spoken of in connection with Tokio. I considered myself well out of the diplomatic service. President Roosevelt said to me, combating one of my objections--"Oh, you can manage very well on $10,000 a year. You and Mrs. Egan will always make a house so agreeable that everybody will come to you." But I knew better than that. I agreed with him that Copenhagen offered many attractions. It was what our State Department has never quite found out, the whispering gallery of Europe, and President Roosevelt knew this very well. He said: "Perhaps Portugal, a Catholic country, would suit you better." "No, not at all," I answered. "I shall probably meet too many Catholics in the next world and I do not always find them so very amusing here." I declined to take any post. Then several members of the Cabinet spoke to me about it;...One day the President sent for me and said:

"I am going down to my little house in Virginia for about a week. When I return I expect you to say yes, and I will send you to Copenhagen."\(^{69}\)

He accepted.

When the Wilson administration took office, Egad paid a visit to the President. He said:

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\(^{68}\)Egan, Recollections of a Happy Life (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924), 181-82. (Hereinafter referred to as Egan, Recollections.)

\(^{69}\)Ibid., 217.
The President was amiable enough to give me five minutes one day. I dared not, under the circumstances, go further than to thank him for keeping me at my post. "I never make merely political appointments," he said. "If I find a man 'in,' who is not of my party and is better than the man who is 'out' and who wants to get 'in,' I retain the better man."... 

Egan later met with Bryan:

...I found that he was more interested in filling the diplomatic places with worthy politicians than with the expert or experienced. He told me he was glad there was a Catholic in the diplomatic service, to which I replied that neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Taft nor Mr. Wilson had appointed me because I was a Catholic;...I seemed to be looked on as a political appointee, who had dropped from somewhere into a circle of white-souled charity and religious beauty.

Egan's perception of the appointment process in Washington during Wilson's administration, and his disdain for being considered "just another political appointee," were quite revealing. He was one of the few chiefs-of-mission with some experience, and Wilson seemed to retain him for merit rather than convenience, unlike Herrick. This was likely since Wilson asked Egan to accept the Vienna embassy. However, Egan declined for financial reasons, and remained in Copenhagen.  

In contrast to the more experienced Egan, Albert George Schmedeman of Wisconsin, an obscure son of German immigrants,

70Ibid., 295.  
71Ibid., 295-96.  
72Baker, Wilson, IV, 32; Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 322.
obtained the post in Norway. Prior to his nomination, he had been a partner in Winden, Grinde and Schmedeman, a prominent clothing firm in Madison. He also had served as treasurer of the Guardian Life Insurance Company and the Bank of Wisconsin. Active in Madison civic affairs, he had been a member of the Common Council of Madison from 1903 to 1907. From his early years, he was an ardent Democrat, at one time serving as treasurer of the Wisconsin Democrat central committee. The reasons for his appointment as an envoy are unclear.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The major appointments to Central and Eastern Europe were as politically oriented as any made by the Wilson administration. The selection of an ambassador to Russia was an excellent example, especially since the administration had such difficulty filling the post. Sharp had refused, as has already been stated, and Charles R. Crane, a Chicago industrialist and Wilson supporter, had also declined. With the support of Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois; Henry M. Pindell, an editor in Peoria and a

73 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, XXXIII, 440; Register 1916, 128; New York Times, November 27, 1946, 25. After eight years as minister to Norway he returned to Madison and became mayor. Later he was elected governor of Wisconsin.

74 Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 84; Link, Wilson, II, 102.
strong Wilson supporter, was appointed. This proved to be a fiasco, since a dissatisfied clerk in Lewis's office stole letters relating to Pindell's selection and sold them to some newspapermen. In an article which soon appeared, Wilson and Bryan were said to have agreed to select Pindell on the condition that he resign by October, 1914. When the Russian Foreign Minister learned of this, he immediately informed the secretary of the American Embassy that his government would refuse publicly to accept Pindell. This situation forced the Peoria editor to rescind his acceptance, and seriously embarrassed the Wilson administration.\(^75\) George T. Marye, a Democratic leader of California and a friend of Bryan, was then selected to replace Pindell.\(^76\)

Two years later, Marye resigned and was replaced by David Rowland Francis, a prosperous former grain merchant from Missouri. He had a long record as a loyal Democrat, first service as delegate-at-large to the National Democratic Convention of 1884. He then had been a reform mayor of St. Louis, governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the Interior under Cleveland. Francis's opposition to Bryan and free silver had damaged his political career and, it was

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\(^75\)Link, Wilson, II, 102. See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 83-84; Kerney, Political Education, 312.

\(^76\)Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 84; Link, Wilson, II, 102.
not until 1908, when he sought peace with Bryan and advocated his nomination in the Democratic National Convention, that he returned to politics. After an unsuccessful campaign for the Senate in 1910, he went behind the scenes and managed Champ Clark's campaign in Missouri in 1912. Four years later he was appointed to Russia.

Francis's memoirs tell nothing of his nomination, but there is a passage which characterized his attitude when he arrived in Russia:

At two o'clock in the morning on the 28th of April, 1916, with the grinding of brakes and the pushing of people toward the doors, the Stockholm Express came to a stop in the Finland Station of Petrograd, and I realized that my duties as Ambassador from the greatest Republic of the New World to the Court of the mightiest Autocracy of the Old had virtually begun. It was dark and cold. I was alone except for my loyal colored valet, Philip Jordan. I had never been to Russia before. My knowledge of Russia up to the time of my appointment had been that of the average intelligent American citizen--unhappily slight and vague....

Many historians agree that Francis's business exper-

77 Walter B. Stevens, "David Rowland Francis," D.A.B., VI, 577-78. See also Stevens, "David R. Francis, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia," Missouri Historical Review, XIII (April, 1919), 195-225; Charles Daniel DeYoung, "David Rowland Francis--American in Russia" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1949), 9-11, 14-18. (Hereinafter referred to as DeYoung, "Francis.")


79 David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy April 1916-November, 1918 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), 3. (Hereinafter referred to as Francis, Russia.)
ience was the principal reason for his appointment. For many years, the United States government had been desirous of negotiating a new commercial treaty with Russia, and in 1916, the Russian Foreign Office had finally shown interest. When Marye tendered his resignation that year, the Wilson administration naturally sought a man with business experience, and Francis's name was familiar to the President. In 1913, Edward F. Goltra, a national Democratic committeeman from Missouri, had recommended Francis for a diplomatic post, but nothing had been available. In 1914, Francis was offered Argentina, but declined because of the uncertainty of business conditions. When the Petrograd embassy became available, Wilson immediately turned to Francis. Certainly, Francis's wealth and his loyalty to the Democratic party were further grounds for his selection.


81 DeYoung, "Francis," 11; Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, I, 35; Bailey, America Faces Russia, 22; Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 197.
Charles Joseph Vopicka was chosen as minister to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. A Czech, born in Dolní Hbitz, Bohemia, Vopicka emigrated to America in 1880 and became a bookkeeper for a truck factory. In 1881, he helped organize a real estate and banking concern in Chicago, and then in 1891, he became a partner in the Bohemian Brewing Company (later called the Atlas Brewing Company). He was a prominent member of the large Bohemian community in Chicago and was active in many civic and political organizations. Victor S. Mamatey said about Vopicka's nomination as minister: "In 1912 he wished to crown his success in the world of business by the dignity of public office and ran for Congress as a Democratic candidate. He was not elected, but the grateful Democratic party 'compensated' his services by securing for him the appointment..." Undoubtedly, Vopicka's nationality as well as his Democratic affiliation was instrumental in his selection.

The appointment of Frederick C. Penfield to Austria-Hungary came after Egan's refusal to transfer from Copenhagen to Vienna. Penfield had some diplomatic experience during the Cleveland administration as a vice-consul general in London and a diplomatic agent and consul general in

83Mamatey, Central Europe, 122.
Cairo. The sixteen years that followed were devoted to travel and writing. About Penfield's qualifications, Joseph V. Fuller wrote: "His service under the previous Democratic administration, his wealth, and his Catholic faith qualified him for appointment by President Wilson as ambassador to Austria-Hungary." It was his wealth which Kerney and Link have emphasized. Kerney stated that Penfield had made a ten thousand dollar contribution to McCombs for the 1912 campaign. In Link's account, Penfield with $120,000 was one of Wilson's heaviest contributors.

The post at Athens went to Garret Droppers, a professor of political economy and a former president of the University of South Dakota. Besides his academic career, he had also been active in Massachusetts civic organizations. After Wilson had appointed him in 1913, it was learned that he could not serve until June, 1914. Bryan viewed this as an opportunity to place his personal friend, George F. Williams,


\[85\]Kerney, Political Education, 151. See also Baker, Wilson, III, 290.

\[86\]Link, Wilson, II, 102; I, 403.

\[87\]Register 1916, 87.

\[88\]Link, Wilson, I, 380.
at the post until Droppers could assume it. This decision demonstrated a most flagrant use of the spoils system.

AFRICA AND THE EAST

Liberia was one of the few major American missions in Africa during the Wilson administration. Fred R. Moore of New York was appointed in March, 1913, but did not go to the post. He was replaced by George Washington Buckner, a former public school teacher and doctor from Indiana, who served for two years in Liberia. In 1915, James Curtis was appointed. He was a lawyer and the only negro to receive an upper level diplomatic post during the Wilson administration. The Liberian mission had been offered previously to the prominent Alexander Walters, head of the National Colored Democratic League and bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. When he declined, he recommended Curtis, who was then actively working with negro Democrats. Hence, negro support for the Democrats in 1912 was a major factor in the appointment of a negro as a chief-of-mission.

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89Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 86; Baker, Wilson, IV, 40-41.

90Register 1916, 116.

91Register 1914, 62.

In succession, two notable contributors to the Democratic coffers were selected as ambassador to Turkey. In the autumn of 1913, Wilson nominated the eminent Jewish New York financier, Henry Morgenthau. He had donated four thousand dollars a month to Wilson's pre-primary campaign. During the latter days of the campaign, Wilson asked him to head the national Democratic finance committee. In that position he was able to acquire sizable contributions, and he dispensed the money wisely. It is generally accepted that his financial support in the 1912 campaign was the primary reason for his selection as ambassador to Turkey.

Morgenthau's Jewish heritage was also a consideration in his appointment, since Wilson believed a Jew was needed in Constantinople in the interest of American Jews in Palestine. However, Morgenthau wanted a cabinet position.

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93 Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People, 70-71. Link said Morgenthau contributed $5,000 a month for four months. See his Wilson, I, 338, 403; II, 102.

94 Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Link, Wilson, I, 338; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 184-85.

95 Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, I, 328, 403; II, 102; Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People, 70-71; Coletta, Bryan, II, 114.

96 Coletta, Bryan, II, 114; Kerney, Political Education, 313; Laurence Evans, United States and the Partition of Turkey 1914-1924 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 29. Evans stated that House originally suggested Morgenthau for Turkey. (Hereinafter referred to as Evans, Partition of Turkey.)
as a reward for his campaign labors, and he was supported by McCombs. When he was offered Turkey instead, he hesitated, stating a preference for a Western European post. But Wilson argued that a Jew was indispensable for the Turkish embassy. Morgenthau contended that many of his coreligionists urged him to decline the nomination because they felt it was the only mission open to Jews in the diplomatic service. Wilson was finally able to convince Morgenthau to accept. When he eventually resigned in 1916, he was replaced by Abram I. Elkus, a lawyer and another wealthy Jew from New York. Elkus had also actively campaigned for Wilson and made substantial contributions to the Democratic party.

Bryan was most influential in the selection of his friend, John L. Caldwell, a Kansas lawyer, for the Persian mission. Caldwell had no experience in foreign affairs, and his only public service was three years as a Kansas state senator.

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97 Kerney, Political Education, 313.
98 Register 1916, 89. He had also been president of the Hebrew Technical School for Girls, and a regent of the University of the State of New York.
100 Register 1916, 78.
The search for a minister to China was an arduous task. The Peking legation was of considerable importance in Asian and world affairs, requiring a man of superior ability. Paul Samuel Reinsch, the eventual choice, was one of the most highly praised appointments Wilson made. Like Page, Gerard, and others, he was not the first nominee. The President once again had turned to Eliot, who declined for a second time. Wilson's next choice was John R. Mott, a leading official in the International Y.M.C.A., who also declined. Wilson also considered Edward A. Ross, a noted and controversial professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, who was endorsed by Crane. While Wilson was considering Ross, Joseph E. Davies, the newly appointed Commissioner of Corporations, wrote the President advising him to read Reinsch's *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*. Davies also praised Reinsch's qualifications and attacked Ross's. Wilson had met Reinsch through

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101 Bryan was pleased by this, since he believed an orthodox Christian should go to China, and Eliot was a Unitarian. See Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East. The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), 13-14. (Hereinafter referred to as *Fifield, Far East*). See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 114; Link, Wilson, II, 98.

the American Political Science Association, which both had helped organize. The President had also been made aware that the ideas of the Wisconsin professor paralleled his own thinking. Finally, Wilson recommended Reinsch for the Peking mission, after clearing him with Senator Robert M. LaFollette, who gave his hearty approval.103

Although not a professional diplomat, Reinsch had a wide variety of experiences. A son of a Wisconsin Lutheran minister, he practiced law for a short time, but upon receiving his doctorate in political science, began an academic career. By 1901, he was a full professor at the University of Wisconsin. In 1904, as has been stated, he helped organize the American Political Science Association; he served as vice-president the first year and later was one of the editors of the American Political Science Review. He was considered one of the few American authorities on the Far East, and a productive scholar in the areas of world

organizations and politics. Reinsch also became active in civic and political affairs, especially as a major figure in Governor LaFollette's "brain trust" in Madison. Roosevelt and Taft both included Reinsch in the delegations to the third and fourth Pan-American Conferences and the first American Science Conference. Furthermore, Reinsch planned studies for the Carnegie Endowment, and joined Elihu Root, Robert Lansing and others in sponsoring a code of international law. In the field of business, he was a consultant and confidential adviser to businessmen and bankers in Milwaukee and Chicago, and aided in the organization of the National Chapter of the American Institute of Banking. From his scholarly, political and business background, he became a forceful advocate of the Open Door policy, and appreciated the need for modern financial techniques in national and world affairs. It seems clear that Reinsch came close to fulfilling Wilson's "ideal" diplomat: an intellectual familiar with world affairs, a devoted


Democrat who favored progressive politics, and a man of integrity. But as Alan E. Kent suggested: "Reinsch possessed decided knowledge of the Far East as a whole...Of course his information was gleaned in the scholar's ivory tower, not in the rough and tumble diplomatic service." It will remain to be seen if Reinsch persevered under the rigors of day-to-day diplomacy.

Two Pennsylvania politicians were successively appointed to the important Tokyo mission during the Wilson administration. The first was George W. Guthrie, a powerful Pittsburgh lawyer and devoted Democrat, who, like his father, had served as mayor of Pittsburgh. He also had been secretary for the National Democratic Convention of 1884, a delegate from 1904 to 1912, and chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic Committee. In 1912, Guthrie and other progressives were prominent in the campaign which culminated in the nomination of Wilson for President. With the choice of Guthrie for Japan, one more political debt was paid. On his death, Guthrie was succeeded by an old associate, Roland Morris, who had practiced law in Philadelphia, was a director of several educational and philanthropic institutions in Pennsylvania,

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106 Kent, Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV, 114.
and also had served as chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic Committee. Like Guthrie, he had actively supported Wilson's nomination for President.

The Siamese post changed hands three times by 1917. Fred W. Carpenter, a Taft appointee, was retained until 1915. A Minnesota lawyer and former confidential secretary to Taft before he was President, Carpenter had been minister to Morocco before being assigned to Siam in 1912. Wilson finally replaced him with William Harrison Hornibrook, who had been a newspaper editor and publisher in Idaho and Oregon, and an Idaho state senator from 1910 to 1912. Hornibrook served two years in Siam, and was followed by George Pratt Ingersoll, a lawyer in Connecticut and New York. Both of the ministers appointed under Wilson were novices in international affairs.

LATIN AMERICA

George Harvey has called Wilson's diplomatic appointments to Latin America a "political debauchery," and many historians have continued this theme. While there.

108 Register 1917, 122.
111 Register 1915, 90.
112 Register 1917, 107.
113 Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXIX, 169.
were some dramatic examples of this "debauchery," the types of nominees for the Latin American missions varied little from their counterparts assigned to Europe, Asia and Africa.

Mexico City was one of the most important posts in Latin America, not only for its proximity to the United States, but on account of the years of internal strife it was passing through. The Wilson administration retained Henry Lane Wilson, a Taft appointee, until the autumn of 1913. Coming from a family of "public servants," Wilson had studied law in the office of Benjamin Harrison. From 1882 to 1885, he was editor and owner of the Lafayette Journal, an Indiana newspaper. He moved to Washington Territory, and for the next eleven years acquired a small fortune there in real estate, banking, and law. The panic of 1893 bankrupted him, and two years later he became active in the political career of his brother, John L., a senator from Washington. As early as 1889, Harrison offered him a position as minister to Venezuela, but he declined. Later, he accepted McKinley's offer to become minister to Chile. After Roosevelt was elected in 1904, Wilson was transferred to Belgium. In 1909, Taft sent him to Mexico.114

114Spaulding, "Henry Lane Wilson," D.A.B., XX, 325; Eugene Frank Masingill, "The Diplomatic Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1957), 6-9. (Hereinafter referred to as Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson."). For further information about the appointments of Wilson to Chile and Belgium, see Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (New York: Doubleday,
Since Wilson was ambassador to Mexico during the first few months of 1913, it should be worthwhile to examine his appointment there in more detail. In his memoirs, Wilson intimated that his transfer from Belgium to Mexico in 1909 was somewhat routine. He further asserted that Taft considered sending him to Russia. But the expense of maintaining the embassy in Petrograd was excessive for Wilson, which he made known to the President. As a result, Taft offered him the ambassadorship to Mexico, especially because Root and Henry Cabot Lodge had told the President that a man who understood "Latin American psychology" and the Spanish language should be sent there. 115

The appointment of Wilson to Mexico has inspired a minor historical controversy. Peter Calvert stated that Wilson's transfer from Belgium to Mexico was said to have been due to the Guggenheim copper interests as well as his brother's political connections and the support of the Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger Jr. Calvert added that if this influence meant much to Wilson, he was not likely to be predisposed to favor the Mexican President, Francisco


115Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 158-59.
Madero, since the Guggenheim interests had been in direct collusion with those of the Madero family in the area of Torrón. 116

Eugene Frank Masingill, in a dissertation, defended the ambassador's own interpretation, and was critical of the accusations made by other historians that the transfer entailed some sort of political maneuvering. Masingill declared that Wilson's reasons for desiring a transfer were obvious: 1) to obtain a promotion from minister to ambassador, and 2) to be nearer the United States, because his mother was sick and his brother was dying. 117

Wilfrid Hardy Callcott compromised between the interpretations of Calvert and Masingill. He asserted that although Wilson had wanted to be sent to Mexico, he was not informed of his selection until October, 1909. Callcott also insisted that Taft had sent Wilson to Mexico at the urging of Root and Lodge, because the situation in Mexico required a man with some knowledge of the problems. Concurrently, he stated that Wilson certainly had intimate connections with wealthy United States corporations doing business in Mexico, and surrounded himself with their agents


"in a most indiscreet fashion."118

The controversy concerning Wilson's appointment to Mexico seems best resolved by Callcott's assessment. However, there also has been considerable speculation about the decision of President Wilson to retain Ambassador Wilson until August, 1913. In February, 1913, rebels led by generals Victoriano Huerta and Felix Díaz overthrew the Madero government, which resulted in the accession to power of Huerta and the execution of Madero. Soon thereafter, many American and Mexican journalists accused Ambassador Wilson of being in collusion with the rebels. President Wilson became greatly disturbed by these accusations, and, as historian Kenneth J. Grieb argued, the President would gladly have dismissed the ambassador, but for the fact that sending an official replacement would have constituted recognition of the de facto Huerta government, which the American president detested.119 Also, as Baker suggested, the President most likely believed that the ambassador might cooperate with his administration, and he further realized that a change of personnel would be a serious detriment to

118Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 293-294. (Hereinafter referred to as Callcott, Caribbean Policy.)

119Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 75. (Hereinafter referred to as Grieb, Huerta.)
a quick solution of the Mexican problem. However, President Wilson sent a series of confidential agents to Mexico to keep him informed of the ambassador's activities. Finally, after it seemed that Ambassador Wilson would not cooperate with the administration, the President called him to Washington "for consultation," and subsequently dispatched John Lind to Mexico as a special representative of the administration. Thus, the retention of Ambassador Wilson was much more complex than that of Herrick or Egan.

Two Taft appointees, Edwin Vernon Morgan and Henry P. Fletcher, were also retained by the Wilson administration. Morgan had traveled widely, studied in Berlin, and eventually taught history at Harvard and Western Reserve University. In 1899, he began a diplomatic career, and by 1905, he was minister to Korea. He later served as minister to Cuba, Uruguay, Portugal, and finally Brazil under Taft and Wilson. Fletcher became a career diplomat after serving in the Spanish-American War. His first important assignment was as second secretary to the Havana legation. He was eventually selected minister to Chile in 1909. According to Ilchman, it was only through the intervention of House that Fletcher

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120 Baker, Wilson, IV, 262-263.


122 In 1914, the Chile post became an embassy, and thus Fletcher was promoted to ambassador.
was retained. When Fletcher was promoted to the Mexico City embassy in 1916, he was replaced by Joseph H. Shea, a former lawyer, circuit and appellate court judge, and a Democratic member of the Indiana Senate.

The choice of James M. Sullivan for the Dominican Republic post has been criticized severely. Sullivan was a former prize-fight promoter and a New York "police court" lawyer, who had intimate ties to the underworld and gambling interests. He also had been active in Irish ward politics in the northeast. Sullivan had supported Wilson in 1912, and was endorsed for a diplomatic post by Tumulty, O'Gorman, Governor Simeon E. Baldwin of Connecticut and other "reputable Democrats." With some hesitation, Bryan brought Sullivan's name to Wilson, and he was subsequently nominated. Not only did the new minister prove to be an inept diplomat, but his questionable dealings brought public attention to his activities. Link stated that the man who was actually responsible for Sullivan's appointment was Willian C. Beer, a New York lobbyist and agent for Samuel M. Jarvis and his Banco Nacional of the Dominican Republic. Jarvis sought control of the deposits held by the American receiver-general of the Dominican customs, and he asked Sullivan to help transfer the funds. Not only was Sullivan in collusion with

123Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121. See also Register 1916, 91.
124Register 1916, 130.
Jarvis, but he also had a clandestine financial relationship with the President of the Dominican Republic, José Bordas Valdés, as well as with many corrupt concessionaires. If that were not enough, his cousin Timothy Sullivan received a large share of government construction contracts. Finally, the receiver-general, Walter W. Vick, wrote to Wilson, Bryan, House and Tumulty about Sullivan's activities, but the President and Secretary of State refused to investigate him. Vick then resigned and told his story to the New York World, which severely criticized Bryan. Wilson finally instructed Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison to investigate Vick! Sullivan was "permitted to resign" in July, 1915. 125 Robert Lansing, the new Secretary of State, suggested that William W. Russell, a professional diplomat who was Sullivan's immediate predecessor, be sent back to the Dominican Republic to avoid more scandal. 126

A career man, Arthur Bailly-Blanchard, was selected for Haiti in 1914, after Madison R. Smith, a lawyer, an editor, a former state senator and United States congressman, and a


126 Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 184-85. See also Register 1916, 127; Link, Wilson, III, 541-42; Link, Professional Era, 26-27, 98; Coletta, Bryan, 116-17.
Bryan man, resigned after only a year's service. Before joining the Foreign Service Bailly-Blanchard had been an associate editor of Le Courier de la Louisiana and Le Petit Journal and an aide-de-camp to the Louisiana governor. In 1885, he became active in the diplomatic corps, and by 1914 he was made minister to Haiti. Ilchman believed that Bailly-Blanchard's appointment was made because of the increasing pressure on the administration to nominate more career diplomats for the upper positions in the diplomatic service.

The selection of Boaz Walton Long as minister to El Salvador could be called an appointment of a professional only in the broadest sense. He had managed a commission company in San Francisco and finally became the proprietor of one with offices in San Francisco, Chicago, and Mexico City. In 1913, Bryan chose him as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs and, in 1914, as minister to El Salvador.

An experienced diplomat was appointed to Columbia, but:

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127 See James A. Padgett, "Diplomats to Haiti and Their Diplomacy," The Journal of Negro History, XXV (July, 1940), 307-08. Smith's appointment broke a long tradition of having negroes serve as ministers to Haiti.


129 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 126.

130 Register 1916, 110-111; Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 226; Link, Wilson, III, 498-99.)
not until Wilson's second term. The original selection was Thaddeus A. Thomson, a rancher from Austin, Texas, and a friend of House.\textsuperscript{131} He was replaced in 1917 by Hoffman Philip, a law graduate, who joined the diplomatic corps in 1901. In 1908, he became minister resident and consul general to Abyssinia; in 1909, secretary to the legation in Rio; in 1910, secretary in Constantinople; in 1912, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs; and finally minister to Colombia.\textsuperscript{132} He was as experienced as any of the selections of the Wilson administration.

A North Carolinian and ex-Confederate, Edward Joseph Hale, was editor of the Fayetteville Observer until his selection as minister to Costa Rica in 1913. He had had some consular experience in Manchester, England, in 1885. After his term as consul, the North of England Trust Company commissioned him to deal with problems connected with the indigo crop in India. He was offered a permanent position with the company, but refused in order to retain his American citizenship. In 1890, he was vice-president of the International Congress on Navigation and, in the same year, declined a nomination as American envoy to


\textsuperscript{132}Register 1917, 128; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 185-86.
Turkey. He was very interested in shipping and navigation, and was the founder of the National Rivers and Harbors Congress. He also took a vital interest in politics as a delegate to the Democratic Conventions of 1884, 1896, and 1912. In the pre-nomination campaign, Hale was an active supporter of Wilson. This partisanship and Hale's international commercial experience appear to have been factors in his appointment. However, as one contemporary observer noted, the new minister's experience "...belongs to the last generation and was acquired practically everywhere except in Latin America."

The remaining major appointments to Latin America were strictly political in nature. Frederic Jesup Stimson, a Massachusetts lawyer, businessman, and professor of political science at Harvard, was the new ambassador to Argentina in 1914. He had also served on the United States Industrial Commission and various Massachusetts legal committees. Stimson was almost alone in discussing his nomination to the Argentine post. He said in his memoirs:


134Link, Wilson, II, 107; Link, Progressive Era, 26-27.

135"The Last Refuge of the Spoilsman," Atlantic Monthly, CXIII (April, 1914), 441.

136Register 1916, 134.
...he [Walter Hines Page] told me that they had fixed on me to go to Argentina as the 1st ambassador, but that it was a month that the State Department had been trying vainly to find where I was; I was still reputed as being "lost in Germany."

But I was absorbed in the war; and felt that Buenos Aires was too far to go. Moreover, a South American post had hitherto been regarded as the pis aller of a diplomatic career, and I had no disposition to abandon for it my work in teaching the United States Constitution to our future leading citizens at Harvard. Mr. Page told me that I was quite wrong, and earnestly urged me to accept....137

Page was able to convince Stimson to accept.

Other appointments to Latin America included an assortment of novices. William Hayne Leavell of Texas, an ordained minister with a law degree, was sent to Guatemala. He was a friend of House.138 John Ewing of Alabama went to Honduras. He had been, at various times, a lawyer, a newspaperman, a customs clerk, a land agent, and a road observer. He was also an ardent Wilson supporter in New Orleans.139 For Nicaragua, Benjamin Lafayette Jefferson was chosen. He had been a doctor turned politician and a Bryan elector.140 Charles S. Hartman was appointed to Ecuador. He had been a probate judge in Gallatin County, Montana, a delegate to the

139 Register 1916, 89.
140 Ibid., 104; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXIX, 171.
Montana Constitutional Convention of 1888, and a former United States congressman. He also had been a free silver man and a supporter of Bryan for President. Benton McMillin was commissioned to Peru. The Tennessean had been a lawyer, a circuit judge, a member of the Tennessee House, a United States congressman, and governor of his state. Harvey characterized him as the "Democratic War Horse of Tennessee." At the time of his appointment, he was selling insurance in Nashville. Preston B. McGoodwin, an Oklahoma journalist, was selected for Venezuela. William Jennings Price was sent to Panama. He had practiced law, and had been a member of the law faculty of Central University in Kentucky. John O'Rear, a former school teacher, a lawyer, and a city councilman of Mexico, Missouri, was nominated for the Bolivian post. William Elliott Gonzales, a moderate Democrat and editor of the Columbia State (a South Carolina newspaper) went to Cuba. He had introduced Wilson to all the leading editors and prominent

141 Register 1916, 98; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXIX, 170.


143 Register 1917, 117.


politicians of South Carolina. Daniel F. Mooney, a lawyer, an Ohio state senator, and a former city solicitor of St. Marys, Ohio, was appointed to the Paraguay legation. John L. De Saules of Pennsylvania served in Uruguay. He was replaced in 1915 by Robert E. Jeffery, a lawyer, a circuit judge, and a state legislator from Arkansas.

From the previous lengthy discussion of the various diplomatic appointments, it is not difficult to understand why historians, former diplomats, and journalists differed in their evaluation of the diplomatic service during the Wilson administration. Those who approved of Wilson's chiefs-of-mission, with the prevalent exception of the Latin American group, usually claimed that many of the nominees were eminently qualified, and while they lacked practical experience, they proved their abilities after they assumed their missions. For instance, William E. Dodd, a former ambassador to Germany and a historian, stated apologetically:

A great deal has been said, both in bitter anger and in friendly remonstrance, about the character of the men whom Wilson sent abroad to carry out his new policy. But men have forgotten in the presence of a great world war that the diplomats of the Wilson Administration were appointed when there was no thought of war or the complications that followed. Still, one

146 Register 1916, 94; Link, Wilson, I, 327.
147 Register 1916, 116.
148 Ibid., 104.
might read much American history without finding better men in foreign courts than Walter Hines Page...James W. Gerard...and Henry Morgenthau...These were new men, to be sure. Wilson would not retain the older diplomats and expect a satisfactory execution of his plans. But new or old, these men have never been accused of want of ability or devotion to the cause of their country....149

On the other extreme, those who censured the choice of the new ministers and ambassadors frequently cited their inexperience in foreign affairs as the major shortcoming of the diplomatic service under Wilson. An excellent example was the criticism by Walter Millis—here referring to Walter Hines Page: "Unfortunately, Mr. Page, like the other representatives whom Mr. Wilson had scattered through Europe—like most American diplomats, indeed, in the opening years of the twentieth century--knew almost nothing about European diplomacy."150

A larger group of historians, who presented more moderate interpretations of the diplomats, were often excessive in their praise of Wilson and severe in their criticism of Bryan. Most prominent here is Link. He supported the statement of one editor who said that many of Wilson's own appointments in the ministerial category were

149 Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, 129-30. See also Notter, Wilson, 234-35.

150 Millis, Road to War, 20. See also Walworth, I, 348; Mamatey, Central Europe, 85.
'the peers, if not the superiors, of their predecessors.' Link had a different opinion of Bryan: "Because of his tenderness for 'deserving Democrats,' especially for veterans of the campaign of 1896, Bryan made many unfortunate appointments on the ministerial level. Most of them were mere incompetents, not scoundrels." Link also stated that in the "greatest debauchery of the Foreign Service in the twentieth century," Bryan dismissed all the ministers who had earned their posts by merit and training and installed "an aggregation of friends and party hacks." 

A few evaluations emphasized the effect of World War I upon the appointment of diplomats from late 1914 to the end of the war. For example, Ilchman believed that the nation's view of the "causes, conduct, and consequences" of the war required a re-evaluation of professional diplomacy as well. The Department of State, particularly under Lansing, increasingly recognized the value of professional diplomacy. Ilchman added that pressure for change in the process of selecting diplomats was developing even under Bryan.

151 Link, Wilson, II, 106.
152 Link, Progressive Era, 97-98.
153 Link, Wilson, II, 106. See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 112-13; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Spaulding, Ambassadors, 9-11.
154 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 126, 132-37. See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 185.
A number of pertinent questions arise from these various assessments of the diplomatic service under Wilson. The ability of the new chiefs-of-mission to perform well is the salient issue, but it requires further scrutiny, and shall be examined in the following chapters. However, there are three points that should be considered here: 1) was Link correct in assuming that Wilson's appointments were superior to Bryan's? 2) was there a substantial disparity in the type of envoy selected for the various posts, i.e., was Latin America the scene of "political debauchery?" and 3) did World War I have some positive effects upon professionalizing the upper positions of the diplomatic service, as Ilchman suggested? Based on the material presented, it would be impossible to make many qualitative judgments about these questions. Hence, this evaluation will emphasize some statistical observations about the selections.

The indictment of Bryan as primarily responsible for the rampant use of spoils politics in the diplomatic service is unfounded. As has previously been stated, Wilson was skeptical of career diplomats, and was inclined to favor non-professionals for the ministerial and ambassadorial positions. Also, the President was immediately responsible for the appointment of ambassadors, and rarely left this task to the Department of State. In 1913, there were twelve ambassadorships, with an additional embassy created in Argentina in
Wilson retained four of Taft's ambassadors, one of whom, Herrick, remained only until a suitable replacement could be found. Of the remainder, only Penfield had any diplomatic experience, and there was a gap of sixteen years before his nomination to the Vienna post. The men Wilson selected were heavy campaign contributors, political associates, and friends. It cannot be denied that Bryan certainly had influence in some of these selections, especially in the case of Birch, but Wilson was directly responsible for these top appointments.

In the ministerial choices, Wilson's influence could also be recognized. Of twelve ministers appointed to European posts, including two replacements, Van Dyke and Stovall were his personal friends, Birch was a former associate in New Jersey, Egan was retained at the President's request, and Whitlock was personally designated. Wilson was also directly responsible for Reinsch and Curtis, two of the five ministers selected for Asian and African posts. The President seemed to have the least direct influence in the nominations for Latin American missions. However, he had had political associations with Hale, Ewing, and Gonzales. Of the remaining eighteen Latin American nominees, four were career men, and two were the choices of House. Thus, while it is justified by all evidence to criticize the appointment...

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155By the end of the war, Brussels was raised to an embassy, but Wilson merely promoted Whitlock from minister to ambassador.
policy of Bryan, the role of Wilson in the issuance of spoils was marked. Furthermore, even if the President was not directly responsible for every selection, he was officially responsible for all of them.

The criticism of the appointments to Latin America as the most wanton application of the spoils system is also unjustified. Twenty new chiefs-of-mission were sent to Latin America early in the Wilson administration. Of these, five had some diplomatic experience in the broadest sense. Five replacements later were selected, three of whom were career men. Only one of the initial seven appointments to Africa and Asia had any diplomatic background, and he was replaced by a novice in 1915. Five replacements had to be made during the war; none of these was taken from the ranks of the diplomatic corps. In Europe, the situation was similar, since only four of eighteen envoys had some diplomatic experience. Of these, Herrick and Egan were holdovers. Morris had had one special assignment, and Penfield had been out of the diplomatic service for sixteen years. Two appointments were made during the war; one was a professional. As a whole, the European, Asian, African, and Latin American ministers and ambassadors were overwhelmingly inexperienced. Also, and quite interestingly, the type of selections did not seriously vary from one location to the other.
The contention that the war professionalized the diplomatic corps did not apply to the chiefs-of-mission in any great degree. Of the two appointments made to Europe during the war, one was a career man; of the five made in Latin America, three were professional; of the five made in Asia and Africa, none were career men. Therefore, only four of twelve replacements were experienced diplomats. Although even this intimates a minor re-direction for the diplomatic service, some further qualifications must be made. One of the four professionals, Russell, was chosen to save face, not appointed as a result of the war. And Bailly-Blanchard's nomination came early in 1914, before the exact nature of the war became evident. Therefore, with some speculation, the remaining two career men, Garrett and Philip, might be considered products of the changing attitude about the diplomatic service. However, this is hardly a trend.

Unquestionably, the appointment of the chiefs-of-mission during the Wilson administration demonstrated the blatant use of the spoils system. The resulting ministers and ambassadors were a conglomeration, lacking experience in international affairs and often unfamiliar with the intricacies of American domestic matters. It was no wonder that they were ill-prepared to face the trials of a major war.
CHAPTER III

PERFORMANCE: NEGOTIATING, REPORTING, AND CEREMONIAL DUTIES

A majority of the chiefs-of-mission of the Wilson administration were confronted with the responsibilities of the diplomat in the field for the first time when they arrived at their posts. A few of the ministers and ambassadors retained from the administration of Taft had also begun their service without professional diplomatic training. How these amateurs performed is the subject of this chapter.

Thirteen chiefs-of-mission have been selected as examples, since they have written (and published) memoirs or abundant letters describing their experiences as American envoys, and since they have been, for the most part, studied by historians. All of these men were non-professionals, i.e., they did not rise from the ranks of the Foreign Service; and all but four had no previous diplomatic experience.

Since the duties of the diplomat in the field are diverse and complex, each envoy will be evaluated in terms of: 1) negotiating--the execution of business at the foreign post; 2) reporting--informing his government of his activities and foreign developments; and 3) ceremonial duty--attendance at social or ritualistic functions in the host country.
WALTER HINES PAGE

Page was well-known for his Anglophilism, and his negotiations and reports demonstrated his penchant of favoring British policy over American. In 1913, he was optimistic over the prospect of strengthening Anglo-American bonds. Attempting to convince Wilson, he argued:

We are in the international game—not in its Old World intrigues and burdens and sorrows and melancholy, but in the inevitable way to leadership and to cheerful mastery in the future; and everybody knows that we are in it but us. It is sheer blind habit that causes us to continue to try to think of ourselves as aloof.¹

Page had also urged House to persuade Wilson to come to England as a gesture of the solid relationship between the two countries. Page hoped that this might initiate what he later called a "real world-alliance."²

Before the summer of 1914, Page usually discharged his instructions as the Wilson administration prescribed. In his first diplomatic task, Page was able to persuade Great Britain to withdraw its recognition of Huerta in Mexico, and this aided the United States in bringing about the downfall of that Mexican President. In a letter to Wilson, Page reported:

¹Page to Wilson, October 25, 1913, in Hendrick, Page, I, 150-51.
²Page to House, August 25, 1913, in ibid., 275-76. See also 282-83.
I have been trying to find a way to help this Government to wake up to the effect of its pro-Huerta position and to give them a chance to refrain from repeating that mistake—and to save their faces; and I have telegraphed one plan to Mr. Bryan to-day. I think they ought now to be forced to show their hand without the possibility of evasion. They will not risk losing our goodwill—if it seem wise to you to put them to a square test.

After the British acceptance of the American position, Page wrote to Doubleday and others:

As I look back over these six or seven months, from the pause that has come this week, I'm bound to say (being frank, not to say vain) that I had the good fortune to do one piece of work that was worth the effort and worth coming to do—about the infernal Mexican situation. An abler man would have done it better; but, as it was, I did it, and I have the most appreciative letter about it from the President.

Gregory attributed little significance to this negotiation. He asserted that the Mexican situation was never a critical issue between the United States and Great Britain, since it did not threaten England's influence in European affairs. And, although Page explained "Wilsonian diplomacy" to the Foreign Office, it was the desire of Foreign Minister Edward Grey to maintain amicable American-British relations that was most instrumental in effecting a solution.
The advent of war created difficult and complex problems for Page. Increasingly, he saw the need for strong ties between Great Britain and the United States, and this became the ultimate goal of his performance as ambassador. Late in 1914, he wrote to House:

Sir Edward [Grey] values American friendship more than anything else of that kind. He is not going to endanger it. To this day, he hasn't confiscated a single American cargo, tho' there are many that he might have confiscated within his rights. Our continued good relations[hip] is the only thing that now holds the world together. That's the big fact. A cargo of copper, I grant you, may be important; but it can't be as important as our friendship of the Kingdom and our Republic will be the most important political fact in the world.--Have stiff controversies? Yes; I'm for them whole-heartedly, when we have a good reason. But there's no reason now; and, if there were, this is the time to be patient. They'll be plenty of time left to quarrel when this dire period is past....

The controversy over the Declaration of London clearly demonstrated Page's pro-British sentiments. Drafted by the British in 1909, the Declaration of London was an unratified code for maritime warfare. When war erupted, the Wilson administration was anxious to have it validated, because it included a lenient neutral rights clause. But the British refused to adhere to it. Convinced that the Declaration would only be an obstacle to the British war effort, Page urged the President and the Department of State to refrain from forcing England into the restrictive situation the code

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demanded. In a letter to Wilson, he argued:

Let us take a little farther view into the future. If Germany win, will it make any difference what position Great Britain took on the Declaration of London? The Monroe Doctrine will be shot through. We will have to have a great army and a great navy. But suppose that England win. We shall then have an ugly academic dispute with her because of this controversy. Moreover, we shall not hold a good position for helping to compose the quarrel or for any other service.

He continued:

So far as our neutrality obligations are concerned, I do not believe that they require us to demand that Great Britain should adopt for our benefit the Declaration of London. Great Britain has never ratified it, nor have any other nations except the United States. In its applications to the situation presented by this war it is altogether to the advantage of Germany.

I have delayed to write you this way too long. I have feared that I might possibly seem to be influenced by sympathy with England and by the atmosphere here. But I write of course solely with reference to our own country's interest and its position after the reorganization of Europe.

Hendrick stated that this letter plainly demonstrated Page's "larger view" of the war, which prescribed standards to guide American policy in Europe. He also asserted that Page was able to arrange a compromise on the controversy over the Declaration of London, which permitted the British to issue a proclamation expressing a more liberal view of maritime rights to which the United States would not offer

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7Page to Wilson, October, 15, 1914, in Hendrick, Page, I, 371-73. See also Page to House, October 22, 1914, in Seymour, House, I, 380-84.
any objection. Page subsequently informed the Department of State that if he was instructed to reopen negotiations on this issue, he would resign. After this ultimatum, the Department withdrew its demands and accepted Page's proposal. Hendrick believed that Page's action, with the cooperation of Grey, averted a crisis between the United States and Great Britain, and was a defeat for Lansing and the Department of State.®

Richard W. Van Alstyne discounted Hendrick's interpretation. He insisted that the "naive ambassador" was unable to comprehend the value of the American plan proposed by Lansing, and failed to take the opportunity to provide both governments with a way to escape embarrassment over the issue.® Agreeing, Daniel M. Smith claimed that Page did more harm than good, since he either presented the American case ineffectively or never presented it at all. Smith speculated that Page would have been dismissed for his actions if he had not been a personal friend of the President and if the recall would not have encouraged the Germans.®

®Hendrick, Page, I, 370-85.


Gregory added that Page's threat to resign was not only an unlikely reason for the American acceptance of the compromise, but probably of minor significance, since he had tried to resign before. In any case, the compromise was inconclusive and ambiguous.\textsuperscript{11}

By 1915, Page had become adamant that the American government totally support the Allied cause. He reminded House that the British were losing respect for the United States, and were apprehensive of the President's inaction. By 1916, he told Wilson that the United States should break relations with Germany.\textsuperscript{12} He wrote to House:

\ldots The English do not see how there can be any mediation, nor (I confess) do I see. German militarism must be put down. I don't mean that the German people should be thrashed to a frazzle nor thrashed at all. I find no spirit of revenge in the English. But this German military caste caused all the trouble and there can be no security in Europe as long as it lives in authority. That's the English view. It raped nuns in Belgium, it took food from the people, it even now levies indemnities on all towns, it planned the destruction of the "Lusitania," and it now coos like a sucking dove in the United States. It'll do anything. Now, since it has become evident that it is going to be beaten, it wants peace--on terms which will give it a continued lease on life...\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11}Gregory, \textit{Page}, 63-74.


The "Dacia" affair, in early 1915, was another conspicuous example of Page's negotiations on behalf of British interests. The "Dacia," a Hamburg-America liner, was sold to an American firm which planned to use it to deliver cotton to Rotterdam. The British had announced their unwillingness to recognize any transfer of German vessels. Yet the American government upheld the legality of the sale, and asked that the ship be allowed to pass through the British blockade. The situation was tense; if the British seized the ship, American-British relations would certainly suffer. According to Hendrick, Page recommended to Grey that the French seize the "Dacia," thus relieving England of any responsibility.

Hendrick's conclusion was accepted by historians for many years, but new evidence uncovered by Gregory has allowed for reevaluation. He demonstrated that Page was not the only person, and perhaps not even the first, to suggest that the French seize the "Dacia." As the records of the British Foreign Office show, at least ten others suggested


15Hendrick, Page, I, 392-95. See also III, 222-28.

the same plan. Accordingly, the affair would have ended as it did if Page had never made the suggestion. Furthermore, Grey did not conspire with the French, because he surmised American protests were not serious enough to warrant it. He decided to let the matter take its natural course, and thus the British were fully prepared to stop the vessel and escort it to Liverpool. This eventually did not occur, since the "Dacia" sailed into the French patrol zone. Thus, in the cases of the Declaration of London and the "Dacia," Page's attempts at supporting British policy seemed ineffective.

Gregory clearly summarized Page's role as a reporter and a negotiator. He stated that the tragedy of the war overwhelmed Page. Thus his earliest despatches reflected his relief that the United States was not involved. But eventually he saw the war as a remarkable opportunity which could make America an international leader. Prior to American intervention, he tried to maintain the policy of neutrality of his country, and was under an obligation to at least manifest impartiality. But he certainly was not unbiased. In his correspondence, he sought to portray Great Britain as a peace-loving "defender of democracy and decency," and Germany as a nation determined to use any measure, however

inhumane, to conquer the world. Gregory recognized Page's disregard for the Department of State and the special relationship he enjoyed with the President, which at times allowed him to bypass the Department. He stated that Wilson, at first, seemed understanding and helpful, writing to Page as often as he found time, and expressing in every letter delight with the work of the ambassador. As the war developed, Page continued to write often, but the President almost never replied and, like House, he became increasingly skeptical of the reports and ideas of the ambassador.18

Gregory was also dubious of Page's correspondence as an influence on the Wilson administration. It was astounding, he asserted, that Page expected to sway the President with messages that did little more than paraphrase British sentiments. And although Page said he was giving British opinion, there was little doubt that these attitudes guided his own thoughts.19 Similarly, other historians have tried to assess the effects of Page's reports on the administration. Hendrick stated that during the war Page wrote frank letters revealing British displeasure with American inaction, and


German confidence that the United States government would do little more than talk. These letters, he said, brought the most perfunctory acknowledgement from the White House. But Page continued to warn Washington of the British and German opinions of America, suggesting that severance of diplomatic relations with Germany in 1915 or 1916 would, in itself, bring the European war to a conclusion. With time, Page became convinced that American intervention was necessary because German atrocities were a menace to world peace, and that the United States owed it to democracy to take up arms against the imperialistic leaders of Germany, who were the enemies of freedom. Hendrick pointed out that it was Page's rationale for war with Germany that Wilson employed in his war message to Congress. Thus, Page's correspondence, irritating in its later phases as it might have been, strongly influenced Wilson in his determination to declare war.20

Page's captivation with England, his amiable relations with Grey, and his commitment to an Anglo-American rapprochement, influenced his performance in formal circles as much as it did in his negotiations and reporting. The ceremonial aspects of his position intrigued him. In a letter to Wilson in the spring of 1914 (during the "Season")

20Hendrick, Page, II, 41-44, 50, 195-96. See also Baker, Wilson, V, 282, 370; Tansill, America Goes to War, 133; Seymour, World War, 82ff.
he claimed, "I hear more gossip, get more points of view, see more people, get closer to my colleagues, than at any other time of year. I dine with everybody from the king down--this whole Babylon goes on a tear!" 21 Hendrick insisted that Page had little inclination for "society." 22 Gregory generally agreed with this conclusion, but indicated that Page had some happy moments traveling in England before the war, and that he entertained in the manner of most ambassadors in London. When he met royalty, he took it in stride, although he found the protocol and the ritual "amazing sights." He did have some trying moments while learning the social and diplomatic ritual. On one occasion, he became absorbed in a discussion, unaware that the other guests could not leave until the ambassador had left. At another gathering, he overlooked a member of royalty, moved too quickly, and left the royal person "without an ambassadorial conversation." 23 Page's difficulty in adapting to the formality of the London post was minimal, however, since his social graces and vibrant personality usually allowed him to fare well. His social experiences certainly must have been an influence in his Anglophilism.

21 Page to Wilson, May 21, 1914, in Hendrick, Page, III, 47.

22 Ibid., II, 312. But Spaulding said that Page did like the ambassadorial uniform. See his Ambassadors, 18-19.

In contrast to the embassy in London, the American legation in Brussels in 1913 and early in 1914 was tranquil. Whitlock's diplomatic duties in Belgium during this period were few, and only the continual social events interrupted his writing schedule. A letter to Rutger B. Jewett exemplified his attitude prior to the outbreak of war:

Thus far I haven't had much chance to do any work; the social duties here have been very onerous, but luckily the season will be over shortly, and we hope to go to the seaside...I hope that I shall be all the richer for this experience, for it is a very interesting one, full of all sorts of life and color, and perhaps all this will show in my work in due time.24

The eruption of hostilities among the major European powers especially surprised Whitlock. Neil Alfred Thorburn stated, in a doctoral dissertation, that Whitlock admitted a lack of knowledge about international events since his Toledo years had not required attention to world problems. He had never heard of Sarajevo, but read the newspapers more carefully after the assassination. He confidently expected the problem would be "smothered by diplomatic notes," because war seemed impossible in "beautiful and placid Belgium."25

24Whitlock to Jewett, April 9, 1914, in Nevins, Whitlock The Letters, 179.

25Thorburn, "Whitlock," 126. See also Whitlock, Belgium Under the German Occupation, A Personal Narrative (London: William Heinemann, 1919), Vol. 1, 27-29. (Hereinafter referred to as Whitlock, Belgium.)
However, Belgium was soon to be engulfed by Germany. On the eve of the German advance, he notified the Department of State that there was great uncertainty and timidity in financial circles in Brussels, but he was not sure what it meant. The next day he reported the German invasion. At that time Whitlock decided to remain in Brussels and not leave with the Belgian court. As Millis stated, this decision left a minister in occupied territory who was wholly in sympathy with the Belgian government, and who inevitably became a "representative of Belgian and Allied interests behind the German lines."28

His obvious anti-German sentiments, although not expressed publicly, were duly recorded in his memoirs and journal. For example, he said:

Somehow, I do not know exactly how, the very air is poisoned with militarism, one has a constant sense of personal discomfort, one is everywhere ill at ease, one cannot voice one's own thoughts. There is a menace everywhere, and in this poisoned atmosphere one suffocates. Oh! for a breath of free air again.29

But in a different context, he stated:

Cable from Department asking for a full report on the German atrocities in Belgium...

26 *Foreign Relations Supplement* 1914, 30.
27 Ibid., 35.
28 Millis, *Road to War*, 54.
Gerard has his book out and going strong, divulging state secrets right and left, astounding and appalling the world and paralyzing mankind. I've been hanging back, from a feeling, outworn in these times, that a diplomatist should not go about like a peddler of sensations, nor make any money by patriotic officiousness—and now, the Department wants my story, and will give it to the newspapers, and maybe kill it for me. But no, that is gratuitous bitterness; that is best which wears best in the long run, after all. So let Gerard record the secrets the Kaiser told him, and prove the Kaiser a liar, and so on; which he is, of course, for his empire is founded on a lie. But the persistent, morbid interest in America in the German atrocities is saddening, because it shows how pitifully small and feable imagination is, and how little conception there is of principles. As though the justice of our cause depended on whether Germans killed babies in Belgium, or not. 30

Not only was the war perplexing for Whitlock, but it radically altered his role as minister to Belgium. 31 Sympathetically, Nevins asserted that the minister became a "tower of refuge" and a "pillar of support" to the Belgians. 32 More realistically, Crunden argued that Whitlock was as confused about the war as anyone else, and he felt helpless to do a little more than aid the people supposedly under his protection. 33 For example, on the eve of the German occupation—

31 See Tager, Whitlock, 150-51.
33 Crunden, Whitlock, 249, 261, 346.
tion, large numbers of Americans began pouring into the legation. And with each day, Whitlock became increasingly fatigued, if not irritated:

The fleeing Americans continued to crowd the Legation all day, and we were busy trying to reassure and comfort them—a terrible task. They all think that I have some supernatural power, that I can evoke ships, money, care, comfort for them: predict the cause of the war, tell them where they will be safe, and how long the war will last, and so on. It is maddening, but as Carlyle used to say, "Courage and shuffle the cards."34

Other duties involved the protection of Belgian citizens. He strove to acquire the release of officials and others who had been wrongly imprisoned. When the Germans began the deportation of Belgian citizens to work camps, he attempted to do what he could to stop it. However, Whitlock was powerless, since the Wilson administration only issued formal protests. In a futile effort, he did try to organize a bureau of repatriations.35 In a few instances, Whitlock was associated with successful negotiations to save the lives of certain individuals. For example, he and Persian minister Mahmoud Khan, through a requête en grâce signed by all the diplomats in Belgium, were able to get the death sentence of Belgian senator Halôt commuted.36

35Whitlock, Belgium, II, 261-367. Ironically, the Department of State had communicated a request to Whitlock to save monuments from destruction in Antwerp. See ibid., I, 213.
36Ibid., II, 181-82.
In the much-publicized case of Edith Cavell, an alleged British spy, the protests of Whitlock and other diplomats were in vain, and she was executed.\textsuperscript{37}

After the occupation, most of Whitlock's time was spent with the Commission for the Relief in Belgium, an organization established predominantly by Americans to feed the starving Belgians cut off by the British blockade. The spearhead of the group was Herbert Hoover, who administered the operation from England. Whitlock and Marquis de Villalobars, the Spanish minister, helped coordinate it in Belgium. Whitlock's memoirs, journal and letters were filled with discussions of the relief project. He habitually complained of German pressure to subvert the commission's activities and the immeasurable negotiations to maintain it.\textsuperscript{38} He considered himself an integral part of the work of the commission, and was fearful for its fate if he left Belgium.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}Nevins, Whitlock. The Journal, 217-18; Whitlock, Belgium, II, 49-51. Thorburn has demonstrated that Whitlock's account of the execution of Cavell was largely secondhand. The minister had been ill during the tragedy, and Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the legation, had done most of the investigating and made most of the protests. See his "Whitlock," 126.


\textsuperscript{39}For example, see Nevins, Whitlock. The Letters, 217-18. The group was formally abandoned by the Americans when they entered the war. See Whitlock, Belgium, I, 396-457.
Historians have presented various interpretations of Whitlock's performance with the relief commission. Nevins lauded the minister's activities: "With the C.R.B. officials, with his legation staff, Whitlock spent two and a half years of toil, anxiety, and ever-haunting apprehensions; years in which the character of the Middle Western idealist was not so much deepened as utterly transformed." Tager remarked that the necessity for Whitlock to use skillful diplomacy was acute because of the continued clash of personalities in the relief organization. Besides the problems inherent in relief work, he was continually confronted with petty jealousies, especially from Villalobar and the German bureaucrats. Also, his relationship with Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the legation, was cool. Whitlock considered Gibson "swashbuckling," and the secretary believed his superior weak. Crunden also believed that discord among the commission members was rampant, and questioned why Whitlock did not include these events in his memoirs. Thorburn added that while the American minister could be tactful, he gave his associates the impression that he lacked the strength to deal with critical problems. Hoover, specif-

\[40\text{Nevins, Whitlock, } \text{The Letters}, \text{ lix. See also Millis, Road to War, 74.}\]

\[41\text{Tager, Whitlock, 151-53.}\]

\[42\text{Crunden, Whitlock, 274.}\]
ically, believed Whitlock acted only when shown the way, but nonetheless placed tremendous responsibility on him. Whitlock had little difficulty with his ceremonial responsibilities. Before the war, there had been considerable opportunity for protocol and ceremony in Belgium. As Whitlock stated in the letter to Jewett, the social duties, abundant as they were, became trying. But, in general, he found pleasure in them. Tager stated that the minister's fluency in French and his "gentle refinement" made him compatible with the atmosphere of the Belgian court. He took full advantage of his ability in French to please the Belgians. At one banquet in his honor, Whitlock not only responded in French, but slipped into Belgian vernacular and a few words of Brussels slang, and received a tremendous ovation. Thorburn emphasized the transition Whitlock needed to make in order to become comfortable in Belgian society. He explained that the minister lived simply, but admired graciousness. He had impeccable taste, a love for elegance and beauty, and preferred the company of wealthy and sophisticated people. Whitlock found this kind

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43 Thorburn, "Whitlock," 120-21. He further stated that Whitlock gave substantial credit for the success of the relief commission to Hoover, which seemed fair because the minister's performance did not match Hoover's. Also, Whitlock's account of the relief work often was too general, and emphasized the failures and not the strengths of the program. See ibid., 120-21, 126.


of life in Belgium, but brought with him little savoir faire. Protocol and the conventions of social life in a European capital were strange. He adapted well, however, because of his personality and taste, and delighted in the congenial atmosphere of Belgium. It would have been unfortunate for Whitlock if he had been minister to Belgium at a more tranquil time in Europe. Social graces alone were not sufficient to prepare him for the European war.

JAMES W. GERARD

Gerard was in the most volatile post in Europe. Before the war, Gerard was equivocal about the European situation. On July 27, 1914, he optimistically reported, "I have reason to believe matters will be arranged without general European war." Approximately at this time, he believed one of his "delicate diplomatic duties" was to persuade the German government to sign Bryan's peace treaties. These negotiations failed, and by July 30 he wrote: "Think Germany's efforts toward peace fruitless and general European war.

46Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 112. See also Crunden, Whitlock, 239.

47Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 16.

48In case of a major dispute, they provided for a negotiating period of a year before resorting to war. See Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 187.
When the war broke out, Gerard was immediately faced with the protection of the rights of American neutral shipping. In his memoirs and despatches, he stated that the German government resented American shipments of arms to the Allies. He repeatedly cited the Hague Convention of 1907 to the Germans, arguing that the unilateral alteration of international law was unthinkable. In a letter to House he expressed the belief that the Germans would never be satisfied unless the United States actually joined them in war. However, Gerard remained hopeful that an early peace could be attained, and he sent numerous requests to House, the President, and the Department of State to encourage the United States and Britain to initiate some positive action. In one of his despatches of February, 1915, he said:

...It is my belief that if you seize the present opportunity you will be the instrument of bringing about the greatest peace which has ever been signed, but it will be fatal to hesitate or wait a moment; success is dependent upon immediate action.

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49 Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 21. See also Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 131-32.
50 See Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 226-27.
52 Ibid. See also Foreign Relations Supplement 1915 (1928), 453.
53 Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 9-10.
Ironically, he sent many reports to the Department of State describing what he called the German "hate campaigns" against American shipment of arms to the Allies. 54

With the sinking of the "Lusitania" the relations between the United States and Germany were sorely strained, and the ambassador and the German government leveled threats and counterthreats. 55 Gerard's anti-Germanism was becoming more evident. On June 1, 1915, he asserted, "It is the German hope to keep the "Lusitania" matter 'jollied along' until the American people get excited about baseball or a new scandal and forget. Meantime the hate of America grows daily." 56 And while he tried to pacify the Kaiser and the German government in Berlin concerning the munitions shipments, he was still smoldering. In a letter to House, he said:

...Perhaps it is worth a war to have it decided that the United States of America is not to be run from Berlin. The people here are firmly convinced that we can be slapped, insulted, and murdered with absolute impunity, and refer to our notes as things worse than waste paper. I hear this is said by persons in very exalted stations. They feel that our 'New Freedom' is against their ideas and ideals, and they hate President Wilson because he embodies peace and learning rather than caste and war...

54 Ibid., 103, 104, 138, 402.

55 See Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 227-36.

56 Gerard to House, June 1, 1915, in Seymour, House, I, 454-55.
I hope the President never gives in on the arms [export] question; if he ever gives in on that we might as well hoist the German Eagle on the capital. 57

The submarine issue most provoked the American ambassador. From 1915 to 1917 the issue of the unrestricted use of submarines raged. For a time, Gerard believed Germany would hold to its various pledges to refrain from torpedoing neutral ships. By early 1916, he was convinced that "ruthless" submarine warfare would commence if peace was not quickly secured. Realizing that the military was responsible for much of the policy being made in Germany, he suggested to Chancellor Theobold Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg that a meeting be arranged for him with generals Erich von Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg. This request was denied. When unrestricted submarine warfare commenced, Gerard's forebodings about German sincerity for peace were confirmed. After the United States declared war, he concluded, "The choice lies with the German people. And how admirably has our great President shown that people that we war not with them but with the autocracy which has led them into the shambles of dishonor." 58

Gerard's ability as a diplomat has garnered praise from some historians. Armin Rappaport, for one, suggested

57 Gerard to House, July 20, 1915, in ibid., II, 23.

58 Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 346-55, 358-59, 368-73, 402.
that the ambassador had a reputation as a shrewd observer.\(^{59}\) Seymour believed that Gerard was "...excelled by none in the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the most trying diplomatic situation of the war zone." He added that the ambassador's letters to House were "pungent and prophetic," and that through them the President was kept informed of the complicated forces that governed Germany.\(^{60}\)

These favorable evaluations have been challenged. Link argued that in early 1915, when the issue of the submarine was vital, the President and his advisers were not aware of the division of opinion in the German government or its outcome. All that they knew came from Gerard, who was so highly excitable and gullible that he did not and could not distinguish between gossip and truth. He missed what any envoy with the right connections would have discovered—the impact of the policy of his government upon the men who were making the crucial decisions in the country to which he was accredited. Instead of reporting what was necessary for his superiors to know, he "bombarded" the Department of State with telegrams describing the "hate campaign."\(^{61}\)

\(^{59}\)Rappaport, British Press, 38.

\(^{60}\)Seymour, House, I, 185.

\(^{61}\)Link, Wilson, III, 331-32. See also May, American Isolation, 396. Tansill stated that although Gerard sent some alarming and anti-German despatches, House had great confidence in Gerard's remarks because he had little patience with the Germans himself. See his America Goes to War, 358, 366, 394.
Walworth characterized Gerard as Wilson's "bumptious am­bassador at Berlin." 62

Probably Karl E. Birnbaum has presented the best treat­ment of Gerard's activities, especially with respect to neutral rights. He stated that in 1916, Bethmann Hollweg was preparing the way in neutral countries for unrestricted submarine warfare, and the German Foreign Office actively tried to prevent the American government from taking any "radical steps" in case Germany initiated such actions. They first endeavored to persuade the American Congress and public opinion that Britain's illegal methods of warfare, i.e., the blockade, had placed Germany in a critical position. This failed because it came too late to influence Wilson's debate with Congress on the issue of warning American citizens against traveling on armed merchantmen. Gerard, under the presumption that the German propaganda campaign in America was an effort to maintain peace between the two countries, assured the Chancellor that the campaign had exerted a posi­tive effect. Birnbaum argued that Gerard's evaluation was certainly not true in respect to Wilson and Lansing. 63

62 Walworth, Wilson, II, 22.

Later, Birnbaum continued, Gerard indirectly invited the Chancellor to make use of his services to bring about peace negotiations between the belligerents. The manager of the German-American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin learned of this offer and asked Hans Krämer, a German financier, to relay it to the German authorities. In his report, Krämer had stated that Gerard believed Germany could not be defeated and that October, 1916, seemed an appropriate time for mediation. Krämer said Gerard emphasized that he and President Wilson would act as the arbitrators, since no official American authorities would offer their services on account of the rejection of previous American peace notes by the German parliament. This proposal was likewise rejected.

By early 1917 Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office believed that the United States was still interested in its efforts for peace. Nevertheless, they were evasive, due in part to their previous unpleasant experiences with Gerard, who had been indiscreet in presenting confidential messages to Washington. A case in point occurred in October, 1916. The American ambassador was to return to America for a brief visit. The Chancellor had a peace message to present to Wilson, but he did not trust Gerard to deliver it. The Kaiser thought this was too cautious, but Bethmann Hollweg insisted and gave it to Johann H. von Bernstorff, German ambassador to the United States, for transmittal. Meanwhile, on the ship to America, Gerard gave an impolitic
interview to Herbert G. Swope of the New York World. He stated that he was bringing no peace message, and would tell the President that Germany would begin unrestricted submarine warfare after the 1916 election unless the unexpected happened and peace occurred. When Gerard met with Wilson, he related what he had told Swope, and possibly more. Birnbaum concluded that the causes of the eventual collapse of American-German relations involved a lack of viable communications as well as actions by both sides not conducive to peace. He said about Gerard's performance:

...These shortcomings were not compensated by American diplomacy. The United States Ambassador in Berlin was a rather incompetent diplomatist, and neither the German Government nor President Wilson had any real confidence in him. His indiscretions during the autumn of 1916 apparently deprived the officials at Wilhelmstrasse of all inclination to employ him as a confidential channel between Berlin and Washington. On the other hand, Gerard was, owing to the absence of fundamental, general instructions in American diplomatic practice, and on account of Wilson's critical opinion of him, insufficiently informed of the President's intentions and plans during decisive periods.

In his ceremonial role Gerard, although obligated to

64 But in keeping with his personal pledge, the President would not make peace overtures until after the election. See Birnbaum, U-Boat, 153-65, 293-94. See also Link, Wilson, V, 173-75; Tansill, America Goes to War, 597; Notter, Wilson, 557.

attend many social functions, did not thrive on protocol. Upon his introduction to the Kaiser he decided to abandon the "fancy diplomatic uniform" and return to the "democratic, if unattractive and uncomfortable, dress suit," because American newspapers and certain congressmen had a most extraordinary prejudice against American diplomats wearing diplomatic uniforms. He characterized the court life as "frivolous" and "far away." Stuart acknowledged Gerard's contention that court life was pretentious. But Millis, who disliked the ambassador, believed that Gerard actually enjoyed himself at ceremonial functions in the "heavy brillance" of the Potsdam court, and began to realize the complexity and difference of European society.

Gerard came to realize that an ambassador was compelled to become part of this system and that he could gather the most useful information at social functions. He also discovered that these occasions could be exploited for what he considered American advantage:

I was informed through various channels...of the imminence of a return to merciless submarine warfare. I knew of this on the night of a great banquet given to me in Berlin at which I said in a speech that the relations between Germany and the United States had never been better. Both the

66 Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 22-23.
67 Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 228, 337.
68 Millis, Road to War, 21.
69 Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 31.
President and Colonel House had urged me to show myself exceptionally friendly to the Germans. Knowing that the break would soon come, I was delighted to follow these orders. I knew that if I showed myself excessively friendly, criticism of the Wilson administration by the great mass of German-Americans would be blunted when relations were finally broken.

Tuchman stated that Arthur von Zimmermann, foreign minister of Germany, and Gerard each engaged in lulling the other, and "outdid each other in purring." These social engagements, to Gerard as well as the German officials, seemed to be extensions of the cat-and-mouse negotiations between Germany and the United States.

MYRON T. HERRICK

Herrick's performance as a negotiator and reporter in 1913 to early 1914 was quite limited. In his autobiography, he asserted that he made concerted efforts to protect American citizens stranded in France during the early stages of the war. To do this he organized a committee to develop gold credits, established a fund to aid destitute Americans, obtained rail and ship passage for those desiring to return home, and employed other means to protect American life and property. He also helped establish an American hospital in France.

70 Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 244-45.
71 Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 144.
72 Mott, Herrick, 127-35. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 270-71.
His despatches during 1913 and 1914 were not enlightening or numerous until the weeks preceding the war. He was best noted for his July 28, 1914, telegram in which he predicted the coming of hostilities:

Situation in Europe is regarded here as the gravest in history. It is apprehended that civilization is threatened by demoralization which would follow a general conflagration. Demonstrations made against war here last night by laboring classes; it is said to be the first instance of its kind in France. It is felt that if Germany once mobilizes no backward step will be taken. France has strong reliance on her army but it is not giving away to undue excitement....

Herrick asserted that Bryan did not answer or acknowledge this message, and that it was not shown to the President. Thus, the ambassador was perturbed that his forewarnings were not heeded.

Herrick's activities in France during the early days of the Wilson administration have not been carefully analyzed. However, the telegram of July 28 interested a few historians. For example, Millis recognized the note as the earliest official suggestion of the war arriving at the Department of State. He further contended that even during those first days, mediation in Herrick's "excited mind" was being altered into a proposal for American intervention to

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73 Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 18-19. See also Mott, Herrick, 118-19.

74 Mott, Herrick, 199-200.
halt Germany. 75

Although Herrick's diplomatic activities were limited in 1913 and 1914, he flourished in the social and ceremonial environment of Paris. During his tenure in France he attended innumerable gatherings, and became widely known for the July 4 celebrations he gave. As a result, he became popular with many of the French dignitaries. 76 His ceremonial activity also seemed to contribute to the ambassador's assiduous Francophilism.

WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP

Little of significance is known about Sharp's negotiating ability. In his memoirs, Sharp discussed his assistance with relief programs and his special interest in the treatment of Allied prisoners of war. 77 Sharp also maintained that he kept abreast of all Allied armistice and peace proposals, because he desired "...the promptest possible cessation to this prolonged slaughter of the world's best young manhood," and wanted "...a peaceful future safeguarded against further unprovoked onslaughts of militaristic imperialism." 78 However, he never referred to his involvement, if any, in

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75Millis, Road to War, 49. See also Grattan, Why We Fought, 30; Link, Wilson, III, 5.
76See Mott, Herrick, 94-115. Of course ceremonial occasions were more infrequent during the war. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 276.
77Dawson, Sharp, 68.
78Ibid., 347-49.
negotiations to bring the war to an end. Spaulding argued that since the French ambassador to the United States, Jules Jusserand, was of such an impressive stature that many diplomatic problems were often settled in Washington rather than through Sharp.79

As a reporter, Sharp was more business-like than Herrick and less prone to dramatics. Most of his despatches concerned neutral shipping rights and violations, giving full accounts of such cases as the "Dacia," "Lusitania," and "Sussex."80 Sharp gave little attention to the continental aspects of the war, although when America intervened he sent Wilson a list of observations. These gave some insight into his attitude during this period. He believed that French morale was better than expected, although German advances were steady. He conjectured that the internal problems of the French government, especially Socialist agitation, could disturb the military confidence of France and retard its prosecution of the war. In association with this, he further believed a radical change in the upper echelon of the government was imminent. The war in Europe, he argued, was being prolonged by: 1) the equality of men and resources on both sides, 2) trench fighting, and 3) the airplane. He saw an

79Spaulding, D.A.B., XVII, 25.

80See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 340, 508; 1916, 107-23, 218.
indication of change since American troops were beginning to redress the balance, and German supplies were rapidly diminishing. All in all his reports were informative, if a little clinical.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN

Egan had been in Denmark seven years when Wilson took office. In this time he came to consider Copenhagen a strategic post. He was sympathetic: "For myself, when I had studied the history of Denmark, I could imagine no people with a more glorious past or a more pathetic present, except Ireland or Poland." He also feared the aggression of Germany and was concerned about the preservation of an independent Denmark. And he became disgruntled when he felt the United States would not give Denmark the attention he thought it deserved.

As World War I developed, Egan found it difficult to remain neutral, but he earnestly attempted to perform his duties without a hint of his partiality. Concurrently, he was occupied with attempts to purchase the Danish West Indies for the United States, a project to which he had been

81 Sharp to Wilson, August 24, 1917, in Dawson, Sharp, 195-201.
82 Egan, Recollections, 218.
83 See Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier, A Retrospect and a Warning (New York: George H. Doran, 1919), 231. (Hereinafter referred to as Egan, Ten Years.)
84 Egan, Recollections, 225.
devoted since 1907. It was not until 1916 that this transaction was completed.

In his memoirs, Egan stated that the purchase was one of Wilson's dreams and, although he had a carte blanche on the timing of the negotiations, he proceeded carefully:

I knew very well that if I could strike President Wilson at the psychological moment with precision and directness, he would trust me to do the job. I must say the chance, until 1916, seemed rather remote. The state of political parties in Denmark was what may be called "incoherent" and confused....I knew very well that for the Minister of a great country like the United States to hint at any bargain for the islands that might irritate the national pride of the Danes would be fatal.

In his despatches to the Department of State, at that time, he sought encouragement to begin negotiations, and simultaneously warned of the possibility of the subjugation of Denmark and its possessions by Germany. Subsequent despatches revealed Lansing's acknowledgement to begin negotiations and the specific nature of the American proposal. Egan credited Lansing with taking the steps necessary to complete the transaction, while noting his own role in the

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85The American interest in these islands was derived from their strategic importance to the Panama Canal.

86Egan, Recollections, 285-86.

87For example, see Foreign Relations 1917, (1926), 557, 564, 588-90.

88Ibid., 592-706.

89Egan, Recollections, 286.
negotiations.

By the time the United States declared war on Germany, Egan had completed his major objective as minister to Denmark. His active period as a negotiator was nearly ended. He then focused attention upon the prosecution of the war. American intervention relieved him:

The wretched days of neutrality were over; the voice of the eagle was heard in the land, and there was no more need of feeling apologetic, even when one put on a bold front and pretended to be too "proud to fight." But the day had gone by when anybody who could watch the course of government intelligently, really believed that we were fighting to make the world safe for democracy. England and France were fighting for their lives and we were fighting because the American sense of honor had not yet perished.90

Tansill was one of the few historians who analyzed the diplomatic performance of Egan, especially those activities concerning the purchase of the islands.91 He stated that while Egan's attempts to secure the islands were persistent, the Danes' impression of the United States as a violent, imperialistic nation which hanged negroes, made his chore difficult. Egan finally was able to convince the Danes that he was far different from what they imagined his country-

90Egan, Recollections, 335.

91Both Link and Notter mentioned Egan in their studies of Wilson, but they only emphasized that the minister utilized the threat of German encroachment in Denmark as a major reason to negotiate for the islands during the Wilson administration. See Link, Wilson, II, 81; Notter, Wilson, 421.
men to be, and thus gained their confidence. In June, 1915, Lansing authorized Egan to negotiate formally for the islands. But, Tansill asserted, Egan delayed for two months, probably because the governor of the Danish West Indies, Christen Helweg-Larsen, opposed the transaction. Surprisingly, Egan made no reference to this delay in his memoirs. Also the instructions from Lansing to begin negotiations referred to a "plan" to be presented to the Danes. This "plan" was not the direct purchase of the Danish West Indies, as Egan intimated in his memoirs, but a proposal he suggested as early as September, 1910, for the exchange of Mindanao for Greenland. Tansill further alleged that Egan was never aware of the pressures which Lansing placed on the Danish government, and thus inadvertently his reports and memoirs usually made his own negotiations seem more important. 92

In spite of Egan's concern for the purchase of the Danish West Indies and the prosecution of the war, he was quite active in endless ceremonial duties. 93 His long service in Denmark certainly made him familiar with many of the important personages, and this was a great advantage to a diplomat who was trying to persuade his host country to sell a piece of property.

92 Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish West Indies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), 456-57, 470-73, 508. (Hereinafter referred to as Tansill, Danish West Indies.)
93 See ibid., 289ff.
IRA NELSON MORRIS

Before the American intervention in World War I, Morris felt overwhelmed by his duties as a neutral minister in Sweden. He not only was responsible for German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, but negotiated diplomatic matters which the Central Powers wished to transact with Russia.  

The geographic position of Sweden made Morris's post an important location from which to view German and Russian activities. An especially significant task was keeping the Wilson administration informed of all trade going through the Kattegat and Skagerrak. However, in a report to the Department of State in 1915, Morris told the Secretary of State that compelling Sweden to discontinue all exports to Germany would incite Germany to retaliate in kind.  As 1917 approached, he took heed of all aliens going to America and the increasing German espionage in Sweden.  

American intervention prompted new activity for the minister. Aside from some commercial negotiations between Sweden and the United States, he gave full attention to

94 Morris, From an American Legation, 33.
95 Ibid., 76. See also Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 156. (Hereinafter referred to as Bailey, Neutrals.)
96 Morris, From an American Legation, 122-23.
97 See Bailey, Neutrals, 151-53.
aiding in the defeat of Germany. Since the ambassador to Russia, Francis, was often incommunicado, Morris provided a vital service by reporting activities in Russia to the Department of State, especially during 1917 and 1918. Morris believed that the events during the summer of 1917 indicated the eventual withdrawal of Russia from the war. Upon the Bolshevik rise to power, he recommended that the Allies cooperate, in some way, with Lenin's government to prevent the utter disintegration of the Russian participation in the war. To compliment this, he advocated a counter-propaganda campaign against Germany. Of course, he was disappointed that his suggestion was not employed. In order to further improve his understanding of the activities in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, he established a "Russian Bureau" with men of various political persuasions, who would keep him informed of the intricate problems there.\textsuperscript{98}

In other legation business, Morris aided in a propaganda campaign against Germany. He concluded, "I claim for our propaganda work some share in bringing about what was, in effect, a veiled offer of peace from Germany early in 1918."\textsuperscript{99} However, this "veiled offer" had come from a Socialist member of the Reichstag, who had no authority or

\textsuperscript{98}Morris, From an American Legation, 73, 156-67. See also Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, (1931), 96.

\textsuperscript{99}Ibid., 132-33.
power to negotiate peace and, under proper diplomatic procedures, should not have been received by Morris. In this case, the minister clearly overestimated his responsibilities as a diplomat.100

CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA

What is known about Vopicka's performance as minister to Bulgaria, Rumania and Serbia was derived primarily from his memoirs and correspondence. And although his diplomatic duties were varied and often conflicting, his anti-Central Power sentiments and his paternalistic attitude toward the Balkan countries were always evident. In the forward to his memoirs, he wrote:

A blow struck in the Balkans, as of steel upon flint; a spark, a flame—and then, the holocaust of the world!

But the blow came from without; the hand of tyranny was raised against a people whose freedom had been bought with their own blood.

The World War began in the Balkans, yet its origin was in the hearts of the unscrupulous autocrats whose ruthless ambition knew neither justice nor limit; who counted the subjections of a people merely as the first move in the game to win commercial and political supremacy, and in the end, to dominate the world. Serbia was only a power to be swept aside as the first obstacle in the path of world conquest.101

100 Morris's ceremonial performance was difficult to determine.

101 Charles Joseph Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans: Seven Years of a Diplomatist's Life in the Storm Centre of Europe (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921), v. (Hereinafter referred to as Vopicka, Balkans.)
However, Vopicka considered his activities in the Balkans during the period of American neutrality in keeping with the principles and policies of the Wilson administration. For example, an American, who had been doing business in Austria and Hungary, tried to make a lucrative deal with the minister. Vopicka was to convince the Rumanian government to allow Germany to send trainloads of food, secretly hiding ammunition, to Constantinople. The American minister refused, stating he was from a neutral country and would not aid belligerents in any way. In another episode, he had asked for the resignation of an American consular agent in Bulgaria, who had written a book which asserted that Bulgaria should side against Russia in the developing conflict.

Much of Vopicka's work prior to 1917 was typical of many ministers from neutral countries. He was responsible for various groups of prisoners of war, and was asked to head an international committee to investigate the treatment of prisoners in Serbia.\(^\text{102}\) He also took charge of the interests of eight countries, including Germany. However, his suspicion of the Central Powers made him dubious of their activities in the Balkan countries. Vopicka was fearful of espionage and propaganda, believing that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments employed spies in Bucharest to observe the American legation. In one case, he said, a

\(^{102}\)Ibid., 35-40, 42-43, 50, 270.
beautiful woman spy was assigned to obtain information from him. He was able to expose her because she had begun a discussion with him without being properly introduced, which was contrary to diplomatic protocol. He later discovered she was a prominent Austrian agent.103

While Vopicka's despatches during the period of American neutrality clearly reflected his biases, they also were a primary source of information about the Balkan situation. His war correspondence was most abundant from mid-1914 to late 1915, because of the crucial nature of Bulgarian and Rumanian neutrality. He reported the Bulgarian decision in October, 1915, to ally with the Central Powers, which he considered surprising not only to the Entente, Rumania, and Serbia, but also to the Bulgarian people.104 In this report he referred to his previous statement of November 30, 1914, which had predicted this event.105 His anti-Germanism especially can be seen in his skepticism of Rumania's political intentions before they joined the Allies: "From my despatches the Department will see that I never placed much confidence in Roumania because the king is a member of the Hohenzollern family and the present administration under Mr. [Ionel] Bratianu always acts according to his wishes."106

103 Ibid., 82-83.
104 Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 70-71.
105 Ibid., 1914, 155.
106 Ibid., 1915, 71.
Also, his paternalistic attitude toward the Balkan countries was evident in his despatches. For instance, in support of Serbia he exhorted the Department of State to persuade Britain to withdraw its opposition to the Red Cross shipment of flour to that country.\textsuperscript{107}

The culmination of his distrust of the Germans occurred in January, 1917. General August von Mackensen, the occupation governor in Bucharest, forced Vopicka and his staff to leave. On their way through Berlin, the American minister talked with an official in the German Foreign Office, who told him the affair had been a mistake, and that he had not been recalled. Vopicka answered, "I am sorry, but you must settle the matter with my government. This is nothing less than kidnapping and a \textit{casus belli}."\textsuperscript{108}

When he finally returned to Rumania and set up the legation in Jassy, its temporary capital, he continued business as usual. When the United States finally entered the war, his bias against the Central Powers continued relentlessly. In fact, he had recommended a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary as well as Germany, although his suggestion was discounted by the administration.\textsuperscript{109} He also continually

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 1916, 921. See also 40, 46.

\textsuperscript{108}Vopicka, Balkans, 125.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 128, 246; Foreign Relations Supplement 1918, I; Mamatey, Central Europe, 122.
expressed his hatred of Bolshevism. He believed it had to be eradicated, since, among other things, it forced Russia out of the war.\textsuperscript{110}

Vopicka's biases even found expression in his ceremonial duties. For example:

In Sofia I was received by Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, being presented by Prime Minister Genadieff....On the following day, the newspaper "Mir" printed an interview with me in which I expressed a favorable impression of the czar, stating truthfully my belief that he was a good monarch as he had labored twenty-seven years for the education of the Bulgarians. This evidently pleased the czar, as thereafter he was very friendly, and always gave me prompt audience whenever I came to Sofia, an honor not granted to all my colleagues, some of whom, I understood, being unable to see him even once a year.\textsuperscript{111}

Mamatey was extremely critical of Vopicka's prejudice against the Central Powers. For example, he said that the American minister gave the Rumanian prime minister the mistaken impression that his prejudice against Germany and Austria-Hungary were felt by many Americans. Mamatey further stated that Vopicka demonstrated open hostility to his Austrian counterpart in Bucharest, and created such rancor against the Central Powers that they often attempted to recall him. However, even though he became a minor legend for his "hilarious social gaffes" in the "gossipy and tight little

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{See Vopicka, Balkans, 143-45.}

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid., 22-23.}
world of international diplomats," his activities endeared him to the Rumanians and provided some valuable services to the Allied cause.112

DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS

Although Francis was sent to Russia to improve commercial relations between that country and the United States, World War I made the task of the ambassador difficult, and broadened his responsibilities. On his arrival, he was immediately given the duty of representing German and Austro-Hungarian interests. According to Francis, there were approximately one and one-quarter million Austrian prisoners, one-quarter million German prisoners, two hundred thousand interned German civilians, and fifty thousand interned Austrian civilians.113 In spite of this newly acquired responsibility, he was still determined to attain a commercial treaty with Russia. In his first meeting with Foreign Minister Serge Sazonoff, he was told that no treaty was possible until all the Allies developed some definite economic policies. Francis was disappointed.114

The various interpretations of Francis's commercial negotiations are scarcely in harmony. Charles Daniel

112Mamatey, Central Europe, 121-23. For a more sympathetic view, see Thomson, "Charles Joseph Vopicka," D.A.B., XXI, 695.
113Francis, Russia, 4.
114See Francis's letter to his son, Perry, in ibid., 8.
DeYoung asserted that Sazanoff was willing to negotiate a commercial treaty in the spring of 1916, but unknown to the Department of State, the Czarist government had inaugurated a policy of refusing to enact trade agreements until the commercial programs of the Allies were clarified. Francis then turned to advancing trade without a treaty, although that was hardly his responsibility. Lansing attempted to restrain the ambassador's vigor, but Francis persisted. However, DeYoung added, the relations of Francis with the Czarist government were not close, and he was eternally suspicious of its activities.\textsuperscript{115} Williams argued that, in the ambassador's view, his failure to establish more favorable commercial relations with Russia occurred, in large part, because of the decision of J.P. Morgan to handle Russian loans through his British office. This policy made it difficult for American exporters to arrange satisfactory American credits for Russia, and increased England's influence at Petrograd.\textsuperscript{116} Kohlenberg added that Francis also realized the necessity of placating American Jewry in order to conduct commercial negotiations compatible with their political interests. Soon Francis was aware that the Russian government had no intention of altering its discriminatory policies against Jews, and this was a detriment

\textsuperscript{115}DeYoung, "Francis," 23-24, 27.

\textsuperscript{116}Williams, American-Russian Relations, 84.
to his negotiations.\textsuperscript{117}

Although Francis was wary of the political unrest in Russia in 1916 and early 1917, he had new hope for a commercial treaty with the coming to power of the Provisional Government.\textsuperscript{118} In the absence of instructions from Washington, he quickly tried to associate himself with the new government, and was soon able to acquire United States recognition of it.\textsuperscript{119} Unfamiliar with Russia, Francis characterized the rise of the Provisional Government in terms of American political goals. For example, in May, 1917 he observed:

> An immense crowd of enthusiastic Russians have just left Embassy where they came to extend salutation from free Russia to free America and at their earnest and repeated request, I am now expressing their greetings to their brother freemen in the United States....\textsuperscript{120}

But Francis also began to discern that the Russians desired a separate peace with Germany, and he continually exhorted the new government to continue the war in order to keep pressure on the German east flank. He stated:

> This situation, in my opinion, not only justified but demanded activities on my part to assist the Russian Government to keep the Russian armies fighting which under ordinary circumstances would have been not only unusual but improper for an Ambassador to undertake.

\textsuperscript{117} Kohlenberg, \textit{Mid-America}, XL, 204-12.

\textsuperscript{118} Francis, \textit{Russia}, 22-23; Kohlenberg, \textit{Mid-America}, XL, 213.

\textsuperscript{119} See Francis, \textit{Russia}, 82; Kennan, \textit{Russia}, I, 17.

\textsuperscript{120} See \textit{Foreign Relations Russia, 1918}, I, 1-12.
He evaluated this step as helping to determine the future of the United States, Russia, all international relations, and society itself. As a result, he regularly sought American financial support for the new government.

Before the accession to power of the Bolsheviks, Francis held firmly to the conviction that the Russian people should support the Provisional Government, and he decried "...the anarchistic dictums which had been preached from every street corner by an extreme Socialist named Lenin and his followers," who he believed were in the pay of Germany. With the Bolshevik revolution, Francis's anticipation of improved commercial relations between the United States and Russia, and the continuation of Russia in the war faded. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the ambassador made no recommendation for recognition, nor did he receive instructions to do so. At first he did establish what he called a "quasi-business" relation with them. However, after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, he became an enemy of Bolshevism, and raised the ire of the German government as well for inciting the Russian people to continue the pros-

121 Francis, Russia, 125.

122 For example, see Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 1-12, 90-94, 150.

123 Francis, Russia, 112-13; Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 40.
ecution of the war. Francis was undaunted. More than ever he harangued the Bolsheviks and the Germans. And although he had been initially opposed to it, he finally advocated Allied military intervention in Russia to extirpate German influence, and ultimately to topple the Bolshevik government. He stated, "I advocated the eradication of Bolshevism in Russia because it is a blot on the civilization of the Twentieth Century, and for the additional reason that it is our interest to exterminate it in the land of its birth."

Historians have given substantial attention to Francis's activities in Russia during the revolutionary period. Kohlenberg commented that Washington was pleased to do all it could to aid any individual or group whose aim was the destruction of the Bolshevik regime, and Francis, in agreement, was unwilling to pursue his plans for a commercial treaty or any other intercourse. Conversely, Williams

124 Francis, Russia, 132, 173-77, 189-212, 231-37. See also Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 521. He eventually moved his staff to Vologda.

125 Francis, Russia, 288-309; Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 387, 519; II, 55, 126, 178-80, 519-20, 526-27.

126 Francis, Russia, 307. See also 340.

viewed Francis's actions as "open threats" to reactivate the Russian Army, and silence Lenin and Trotsky. He added that Francis did not seem to understand that the Russian people had little inclination to continue the war.128

Historians have generally agreed that Francis's reports gave little insight into the problem facing Russia in 1917. Kennan stated that the events in Petrograd seriously confused Francis, and his despatches gave Washington only a dim and "not wholly intelligible" impression of what was happening. On the other hand, the Wilson administration did not keep its ambassador well-informed either.129 Foster Rhea Dulles concurred, and added that although despatches from the American consuls in Petrograd and Moscow gave some idea of the growing influence of Bolshevism, the Department of State built its policy on the interpretation of Francis, who had continually dismissed the threat of Bolshevism to the stability of the Provisional Government. Also, the ambassador failed to realize that while Lenin and Trotsky received aid from Germany to get to Russia, they were not paid agents.130

128Williams, American-Russian Relations, 92.
130Dulles, Road to Teheran, 104. See also DeYoung, "Francis," 35-41; John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 73.
An example of Francis's distrust of Bolshevism was his acceptance of the validity of the Sisson documents. Kennan explained: "In the winter of 1917-18 the Committee on Public Information, which was the official American propaganda agency of World War I, stationed in Petrograd a special representative, Edgar Sisson, formerly an editor of *Cosmopolitan Magazine*. In February and March 1918, Sisson purchased and removed from Russia a number of documents and photographs of documents purporting to prove that the leaders of the Bolshevik government were paid agents of the German General Staff." Eventually Sisson showed these documents to Francis. Dulles stated that Francis utilized these as conclusive proof of his conviction that Lenin and Trotsky were in the pay of Germany. In time the documents would be discredited, and Francis's basic assumptions would prove to be unwarranted. But his opinion was almost universally accepted in those decisive days.

Betty Miller Unterberger presented a clear evaluation of Francis's activities concerning intervention in Russia. She stated that there was a growing unanimity among American representatives in Europe and Asia in favor of intervention. The consuls in Russia urged it, and Reinsch in China


believed that the Russians would welcome Allied intervention, if Japan was not allowed to enter unilaterally. Francis became more vehement, and advocated immediate occupation of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel. And, like Reinsch, he was opposed to the unilateral intervention of Japan.133

Since the political unrest in Russia was almost continuous during his time in Russia, Francis's ceremonial activities were limited. Before the Provisional Government came to power, the Russian court was considered the most lavish and ritualistic in Europe. Francis's association with the Czar was cordial, but not intimate.134 According to Kennan, Francis lived quietly in his embassy apartment, confining his social life largely to the American colony, and taking little part in the gatherings in high Petrograd society. Kennan further asserted that Francis seemed to find no easy approach to his colleagues; he was ignored or was the subject of amusement and condescension. His rare diplomatic dinners, which were "...marked by a squeaky gramophone playing behind a screen in the dining room, and Philip [Jordan] interrupting the service at the table from


134For example, see Francis, Russia, 12-16.
time to time to crank it," were not up to the standard of Russian society. He attended some social gatherings with members of the Provisional Government, including Alexander Kerensky, and his relations with them were friendly. But he never lost his apprehension of the Bolsheviks, and imperial protocol was certainly not part of Russian society then.

HENRY MORGENTHAU

Morgenthau's reluctance to accept the Turkish assignment was not evident in his performance as ambassador. On his arrival to Constantinople, he quickly determined to take charge of his embassy:

Soon after my arrival I observed a curious phenomenon concerning the position of an ambassador. The instinctive ambition of the attaches led them to try to keep the Ambassador from taking an active hand in the work of the Chancery. It was explained to me with great solemnity, that the business office of the Embassy was not like other business offices; that its operations were so involved in delicacies of diplomatic usage that none but old hands, trained in all their niceties were competent to handle the transaction of its intricate affairs...I made short work of this mysterious nonsense...Therefore, I promptly acquainted myself with the records of the Embassy for several years preceding, and took absolute charge of its functions, as I was duty bound to do. The mysteries faded instantly. Common sense, judgment, and energy are the desiderata of all business relationships, and I found no barrier in these affairs, because of their so-called diplomatic nature.136

135Kennan, Russia, I, 38.

However, he also viewed his post in more ideal terms: "America's true mission in Turkey, I felt, was to foster the permanent civilizing work of the Christian missions, which so gloriously exemplified the American spirit at its best."\(^{137}\) This was quite a remark for a Jew, but Morgenthau disapproved of Zionism in association with Judaism, believing it was the "most stupendous fallacy of Jewish history." Instead, America was his Zion.\(^{138}\)

His diplomatic tasks soon became more immediate and concrete with the war. Turkish neutrality was vital. He employed loans to Turkey as an expression of American friendship and as an inducement to remain aloof from the conflict. In his reports, he strongly urged increased Allied demonstrations of friendship for the Turks in order to counteract the mounting German influence.\(^{139}\) Finally, Turkey demonstrated its partisanship towards the Central Powers, and closed the Dardanelles, cutting off the Allies from Russia. Morgenthau recalled:

The Grand Vizier came out in answer to my request. He presented a pitiable sight. He was in title at least, the most important official of the Turkish Government, the mouthpiece of the Sultan himself, yet now he presented a picture of abject

\(^{137}\)Ibid., 203.

\(^{138}\)See ibid., 348, 401.

\(^{139}\)Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1929), 37-41, 43-46. (Hereinafter referred to as Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story.) See also Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 980, 982-83.
helplessness and fear. His face was blanched and he was trembling from head to foot. He was so overcome by his emotions that he could hardly speak; when I asked him whether the news was true that the Dardanelles had been closed, he finally stammered out that it was. "You know this means war," I said, and I protested as strongly as I could in the name of the United States.\textsuperscript{140}

Historians have been especially interested in Morgenthau's negotiations concerning Turkish neutrality, and the strong presentation of his position. Grattan stated that it was not surprising that Turkey joined the Central Powers, since they had every reason to doubt the sincerity of the proposal of the Entente to observe the integrity of Turkey if she remained neutral. Although a treaty of alliance between Turkey and Germany had been signed on August 2, 1914, the Turks continued negotiations with the Entente as simply a smoke screen to hide their preparation for war. Morgenthau was as much in the dark, Grattan argued, as the Entente statesmen during the period between the signing of the treaty and the Turkish declaration of war.\textsuperscript{141} But as Laurence Evans and John A. DeNovo asserted, Morgenthau was anxious to make a strong presentation to the Turks to demonstrate the illogic of their defying the Entente. His plan was discouraged by the Secretary of State, who instructed him that under no circumstances was he to offer suggestions, officially or unofficially. Only if the Turks asked, was he to inform

\textsuperscript{140}\textit{Ibid.}, 106.

\textsuperscript{141}Grattan, \textit{Why We Fought}, 249-50.
them that the United States preferred them to remain neutral. However, Grattan, unlike Evans and DeNovo, noted that Morgenthau recorded in his memoirs that he had approval from the Department of State to act unofficially.

Morgenthau's desire to keep Turkey neutral can be attributed, in part, to his suspicion of the Central Powers. He was certain that they had premeditated the war, waiting for an opportune casus belli. After his attempts to persuade Turkey to remain neutral failed, he turned much of his energy to relief work. He contended that there was nothing between the foreign nationals under his protection and destruction except the American flag. From the beginning, he realized that his task would be a difficult one. His memoirs abound with examples of his relief efforts. One curious example involved the white slave trade in Constantinople. Morgenthau had told Bedir Bey, Prefect of Police, that he would some day write a book on his stay in Turkey, and thought Bey's performance of his duties should improve so he would not be cast as a villain. According to the

142 Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914-1924 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 26. (Hereinafter referred to as Evans, Partition of Turkey.); John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 90. (Hereinafter referred to as DeNovo, Middle East.)

143 Grattan, Why We Fought, 150-51.

144 For example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 89.
ambassador, Bey then made a concerted effort to curtail the slave trade. During the Allied bombardment of the Turkish capital, Morgenthau remained in the city to "forestall massacres and the destruction of the city," and was able to establish safety zones with the approval of the Department of State. At that time, he also had "a most significant meeting" with Enver Pasha, Minister of War. The Turkish government had been incensed by the Allied bombardment of civilian targets, and decided to take hostages from the ranks of the foreign nationals. After considerable discussion, Morgenthau convinced the Turks to take only fifty hostages, and soon thereafter obtained their release.145

Morgenthau was not as fortunate with his protests against the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey. He was greatly disturbed by the annihilation, but felt helpless to interfere in Turkish internal matters. Therefore, he began a widespread propaganda campaign in Europe and America. He even proposed a large-scale evacuation of Armenians to America, but the project was considered impractical.146 His various activities produced no substantial results. Consequently, he became frustrated with his failure to stop "the

145Ibid., 54-56, 130, 200, 244-47.

146See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 988. A committee, proposed by Morgenthau, was formed to raise funds and provide means to save the Armenians. Some of the prominent members were Cleveland Dodge, Charles Crane, John R. Mott and Stephen Wise. This group believed the large-scale emigration of Armenians to America was impractical.
destruction of the Armenians," which made Turkey "a place of horror" for him. The ambassador left Turkey in 1916, believing there was nothing more he could do, and he decided to return to his former business and political activities. He felt he could best serve his country by helping to reelect Wilson.

Historians have generally recognized Morgenthau's efforts on behalf of foreign nationals, and especially Armenians. Grattan argued that while Morgenthau could hardly be reproached for his publicity campaign to save the Armenians, he played into the hands of Allied propagandists who used the massacres to prepare the public for any measures of severity toward Turkey they might institute after the war, i.e., the division of spoils as established in their secret treaties. Robert L. Daniel supported his thesis, stating that although Morgenthau helped organize relief committees for the Armenians, he too exploited latent animosity toward the Turks and resorted to name-calling. The ruthless Turk, Morgenthau said, was "psychologically primitive" and a "bully and a coward."

147 Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 385.
148 Ibid.
149 For example, see DeNovo, Middle East, 79, 101.
150 Grattan, Why We Fought, 251.
151 Robert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927" Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (September, 1959), 253-54. See also Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 236, 275.
The ambassador's ceremonial role was more difficult to discern than his performance as a negotiator and a reporter. He was friendly with many Turkish officials, often socializing with them, but maintaining a condescending air. In his associations with his diplomatic colleagues, he was superficially cordial and always imperious. For instance, on his arrival to Turkey, instead of the customary visitation required of an ambassador, he remained at the American Embassy and waited for the other envoys to come to him. He told Dr. Paul Weitz, an unofficial attaché and a "secret German agent," that he never made the first advances. The other diplomats should decide whether they wished a relationship based on formal diplomatic exchange or a frank informal friendship. If they preferred the latter, he would be delighted to meet them halfway, but they must cover the first half. In addition, he was often on guard at social events for hints of important diplomatic secrets. At a dinner at which he was host, the American ambassador noted that the special emissary of the Kaiser was offended by his table placement. He said, "I reported this dinner incident to my government as indicating Germany's growing ascendancy in Turkey...," and presumed all other envoys at the affair did the same. His flair for the dramatic was

152 For example, see Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime, 202.
153 Ibid., 180-81. Morgenthau said that the German and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors were delighted.
154 Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 43-46.
The duties at the Peking legation were complex and varied in 1913, but Reinsch chose to interpret most of them in terms of economic activities. As he said:

I had long discarded any narrow interpretation of diplomacy, but even if I had adhered to the principle that the diplomat must busy himself only with political matters, I should have had to admit that in China political matters included commerce, finance, and industry. I did not, of course, intend that the Legation should enter into a scramble for concessions, but it was my purpose that it shall maintain sympathetic contact with Americans active in the economic life of China, and should see to it that the desire of the Chinese to give them fair treatment should not be defeated from any other source. 155

Reinsch did become involved in maintaining and securing concessions for American businessmen, as in the case of the Hwai River conservancy project: "I thought it essential to propose only such relationships as would help develop some American interests already established in China. I was attracted by this plan, sound, useful, and meritorious, to redeem the Hwai River region." 156 In another case, Japan disputed some oil rights in northern China which the Standard Oil Company had developed. Reinsch quickly informed Standard Oil's headquarters that its interests were endangered,

155Paul Samuel Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), 64. (Hereinafter referred to as Reinsch, China.)

156Ibid., 80-81. See also Foreign Relations 1914, 107, 111, 113, 114; also 1917.
and coaxed the Chinese into re-affirming the American claim. But in his plan for economic development in China, he received little cooperation from the uninterested financiers in the United States. He was frustrated by their lack of concern for China and their overt attention to Europe. Japanese aid to China also vexed him, since he assumed that it would reduce active American business activity in China. The Lansing-Ishii notes were the coup de grâce, because, among other things, the United States officially recognized Japan's economic interests in China.157

Those historians who evaluated Reinsch's ability to negotiate economic issues generally applauded his efforts, but indicated his failures. Pugach stated that Reinsch believed Wilson wished to assist in the development of China, strengthen the independent position of the United States in the Orient, and protect its national interest, as opposed to "facilitating the marketing of portfolio investments." The minister of China, Pugach continued, felt he was executing the foreign policy of the President, even when he exceeded "the letter of his instructions." Pugach also suggested that Reinsch had a modicum of success, especially when he visited the United States in 1918 to stir American business interest in China. By the next year, however, the Japanese-American rapprochement made it impossible for him

157Reinsch, China, 82-88, 304-07, 328, 353-58, 382.
to continue his work. Gage was in basic agreement, but emphasized the practical political motives of Reinsch's economic policy. The Sino-Japanese negotiations in early 1915, having shifted the balance of power in the Far East, forced Reinsch to conclude that American capital interests in China should be strengthened to stave off Japanese economic advances, and eventually political incursions. The minister also saw the necessity of weaning Britain away from Japan, and influencing its diplomats to follow an American lead which would include a new interpretation of special interests in the Orient. Internally, Reinsch wanted to manipulate Chinese policy to bring about a closer relationship between his country and China by keeping in office an amenable group of Chinese statesmen. Unfortunately, Gage asserted, Reinsch's program failed for a number of reasons, including: 1) European countries, even with the war in progress, were unwilling to abandon their spheres of influence and special interests; 2) the Japanese were able to discourage American capital investments in China; 3) Reinsch's attempts to manipulate Chinese officialdom split it into factions relying on outside support to gain power; and 4) the Lansing-Ishii notes. After the failure of his program, Gage concluded, Reinsch just marked time.

159Gage, "Reinsch," 97-98, 101-02, 135, 189-92, 427-29. See also Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest
The problems of the war and Japanese political and military encroachment in China were issues of major significance with which Reinsch was compelled to deal. The Chinese government asked for his advice when Japan presented the ignominious Twenty-One Demands to them. Realizing the devastating effect of such ultimatums, he recommended that detailed negotiations on each demand be carried out in order to stall for time and arouse the interest of other nations. Beyond this, Reinsch felt helpless, and believed he could only watch the course of events and give sympathetic hearings to the Chinese officials. 160

As the war intensified, Reinsch flooded Washington with despatches urging close association with China to keep her neutral. He stated in his memoirs:

We built up our solution of unity for China. In carefully weighed dispatches I sent it to the American Government, and cabled the President a statement of China's vital relation to future peace. I was constrained to condemn Japan's policy, quite deliberately, summing up the evidence accumulated in the course of five years. I had come to the Far East admiring the Japanese, friendly to them—my published writings show this abundantly. I did not lose my earnest goodwill toward the Japanese people but I could not shut my eyes to Japanese imperialist politics with its unconscionably ruthless and underhanded actions and its fundamental lack of every idea of fair play. The continuance of such methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment

An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Co., 1934), 186-91. (Hereinafter referred to as Beard, National Interest.); Li, China Policy, 164; Notter, Wilson, 275-76.

160Reinsch, China, 125-28, 130-37, 143-44, 149. See also Foreign Relations 1914, 182-205; Supplement 1915, 83.
is a condition of peace and real welfare....\textsuperscript{161}

But although Reinsch tried to persuade the tenacious Chinese officials to keep their country neutral, they were bent on belligerency. Reinsch stated:

In their ignorance of these secret arrangements [between France, Britain, Italy, and Japan, assuring non-interference with Japan's China aims] the Chinese thought that association with the war powers would put them on the footing of an ally. ...For my part, I allowed the Chinese to feel that the American government, desiring them to decide this question according to their own best judgment, hoped that a way might be found to bring the war situation into harmony with justice to China.\textsuperscript{162}

Reinsch believed that if China became a belligerent she should be entitled to assurances from the powers guaranteeing her political and administrative integrity in terms not easily avoided in the future. But China became involved in long discussions with the Allies instead, and her financial situation constantly weakened. Throughout these negotiations Reinsch desired to give "the best form of American assistance." Above all, he had in mind "steering China beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were luring her upon the Japanese rocks."\textsuperscript{163}

A number of historians recognized Reinsch's awareness of Japanese encroachment in China as a fundamental problem

\textsuperscript{161}Reinsch, China, 334-35. See also Foreign Relations Supplement 1917, I, 402, 412.

\textsuperscript{162}Reinsch, China, 286-87. See also 241-54.

\textsuperscript{163}Ibid., 296.
with or without war. The Twenty-One Demands were the most graphic example of Japanese incursion. Pugach asserted that the American minister realized that the United States could and would do little to stop Japan at that time, since not even the British would act. Reinsch thus concentrated on achieving three things: 1) to focus attention on the duplicity of Japan—to arouse American public opinion and awaken the administration to Japan's intentions; 2) to disassociate the United States from acquiescence to the demands; and 3) to "hammer away" at those sections which proved the greatest menace to American interests. In these areas Reinsch had some success. According to Gage, as the war developed, the American minister advocated stronger political and international measures to discourage Japanese advances in the Far East. When he resigned, Reinsch recommended direct action against the Japanese to "call her bluff," since he realized diplomatic representations were no longer efficacious. Bailey added that Reinsch's increasing militancy towards Japan somewhat embarrassed the Department of State. He had made certain informal commitments to the Chinese on his own responsibility in 1917, which were partially the cause for Chinese protests.

against Germany. As a result, Lansing reprimanded Reinsch and ordered him to make no further unauthorized promises.166

Thus, Reinsch had difficulty enacting his program for China. And when he attempted to make firm recriminations against Japan, his own government had to make sure he did not overstep his authority.

Reinsch's awareness of the importance of the Far East in the foreign policy of the United States was exemplified in his ceremonial performance. An educated, well-informed scholar of Asian affairs, he realized the necessity for cordial relations with the Chinese.167 Besides, he had a strong affection for them. He was able to maintain his favorable relationship with the Chinese government even in the most critical periods of the continual internal turmoil. It was no wonder that he was asked to become a personal adviser to that government after his resignation from the diplomatic corps.

HENRY LANE WILSON

The interference in the internal affairs of Mexico by the contentious ambassador Wilson best illustrated why he was so controversial. It was well known that Wilson detested

166Bailey, Neutrals, 23-24. For a more sympathetic view, see Li, China Policy, 106; Fifield, Far East, 69.

167For example, see Reinsch, China, 188.
the Francisco Madero regime. On its inception, he said:

The revolution of Madero sprang unarmed and motley from the national discontent with the system and administration of the Diaz regime. This discontent it neither represented nor organized. Madero was a comparatively unknown person who appeared at a psychological moment and reaped a harvest which might have gone to stronger and abler men had any such been then prominent in the public eye....Nevertheless, the character of the revolution inaugurated by him was from its inception formidable neither in numbers nor organization....168

Throughout Madero's rule, the ambassador decried the Mexican President and predicted his ultimate failure.169 Eventually, the threat of revolution arose against Madero. Wilson was deeply concerned about the safety of American and other foreign nationals in Mexico, and he protested to the Mexican President and the rebels. He even advocated that the United States use forceful action if protection was not extended to American life and property.170 In the interest of peace, he said, the whole diplomatic corps tried to persuade Madero to relinquish his position to the Mexican Congress. Madero was incensed by this demand and sent a note to Washington blaming Wilson for inciting action against him.171

As the revolution persisted, Wilson felt impelled to

168Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 205.
169Ibid., 226; Foreign Relations 1913, (1920), 935.
170Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 234-35, 255-60; Foreign Relations 1913, 704.
171Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 263. Wilson stated that Madero later apologized for his accusation.
restore order to Mexico, and decided to ask generals Victoriano Huerta and Felix Díaz, the leaders of the rebellion, to come to the American Embassy for consultation. His object, Wilson asserted, was to have the two generals enter into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for joint submission to the Federal congress. Madero's overthrow followed, and Huerta was installed as provisional President. Within a short time Madero was killed. Huerta claimed that assassins had murdered him while he was being escorted to prison. Wilson said he was shocked, having received assurances from the general that Madero would not be harmed. However, the ambassador did not blame the new government for the deed.

Wilson spent the remaining days of the Taft administration and the first year of the Woodrow Wilson administration attempting to obtain American recognition of the Huerta government. During the Democratic administration, Ambassador Wilson believed his despatches were being ignored since he disagreed with the President's policy of de jure recognition. The ambassador was also aware that the President believed he had been in collusion with Huerta and Díaz during the revolt. In a lengthy telegram, Ambassador Wilson

172 Ibid., 279. Wilson claimed to have no prior meeting with Huerta. See 274-75.

173 Ibid., 283-88.

174 For example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 725.
had explained the situation during the revolution, as he viewed it, and exonerated himself of all blame.\textsuperscript{175} This had little effect, and his frustration was clearly demonstrated in his memoirs. He stated:

The anomalous situation, resulting from the attitude of the government in Washington I was obliged to endure in silence as there seemed to be no cure for it. The reports and recommendations which it was my duty to make I made and then waited patiently, trusting that a certain amount of experience would teach the administration the course which it ought to pursue in the interest of the welfare of the Mexican nation and for the good of our people living in Mexico.\textsuperscript{176}

The ambassador's version of his performance during the revolutionary period has been severely criticized and sympathetically defended. Callcott asserted that Wilson had indeed taken an active part in the overthrow of Madero. He had given substantial advice to the rebels, and arranged the meeting at the embassy to unite them. When Huerta was securely in office, Wilson sought his recognition so Mexico could return to the "...good old conservative days of Diaz when property rights were secured, the classes were supreme and only the people were suffering." Callcott concluded that Wilson's activities were hopelessly out of step with Washington and he knew it. Thus, his recall by President Wilson was no surprise.\textsuperscript{177} Blaisdell, while critical of

\textsuperscript{175}Ibid., 768-776.
\textsuperscript{176}Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 300-01. See also 308.
\textsuperscript{177}Callcott, Caribbean Policy, 301ff. See also Grieb, The United States and Huerta, 16-17; P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and
the ambassador's interference in internal Mexican affairs, argued that his actions were not necessarily "out of step" with Washington. Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox were willing to give Madero a chance, but when the revolution broke out they were reluctant to take definite steps. Blaisdell asserted that their caution rose from their preeminent concern with the three-sided American presidential election of 1912. Thus Ambassador Wilson, and his conservative ally in the Department of State, F.M. Huntington Wilson, were able to harass the Madero regime which they both disliked. Wilson, Blaisdell said, gave way to his "penchant for meddling," and accepted the cause of the rebels as a way to restore order in Mexico. Blaisdell contended that although the ambassador had no direct part in the murder of Madero, "...the world awakened on the morning of February 23 [1913] to find that the climax to the ambassador's statesmanship had been the assassination of Madero, [and] Wilson's diminishing reputation sank to the vanishing point." The event prompted an investigation of the ambassador's conduct by the new Democratic administration, and led to his eventual dismissal.178


178Blaisdell, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XL, 118-25.
Link outlined the ambassador's antagonism to the Wilson administration in more detail. Because the Taft administration was reaching the conclusion of its tenure when Huerta rose to power, the President and his advisers decided to leave the question of recognition to the new administration. The ambassador's despatches had become increasingly dramatic by then, and this made President Wilson dubious of the credibility of the ambassador's reports. By March, 1913, when the New York World began a fierce campaign to discredit the ambassador, the confidence of the Wilson administration in its envoy had faded. The President was prepared to recall him, but if he did, a new envoy would have to be appointed, and this would constitute a recognition of Huerta's regime. In an evasive move, the ambassador was called to Washington for "consultation." He was never returned to his post. Grieb went a step further and argued that Ambassador Wilson's despatches did not only pique the Wilson administration, but strengthened its resolve to depose Huerta.

Masingill contradicted the critical interpretations of Wilson, and defended his actions. Masingill insisted that, in general, the ambassador did not stray from his instructions, since in 1911 Knox had authorized him to use his own discre-

179 Link, Wilson, II, 348-56; Link, Progressive Era, 111-12. See also Calvert, Mexican Revolution, 135.

180 Grieb, The United States and Huerta, 70, 85. For a less critical account, see Baker, Wilson, IV, 238-39.
tion in cases of emergency. By 1912, the Taft administration was increasingly leaving the Mexican question in Wilson's hands, although the ambassador did not initiate a policy anathema to the American government. Masingill accepted the ambassador's own conclusions about the overthrow of Madero. And while the death of the ex-President of Mexico shocked Ambassador Wilson, it had hardly been possible for him to have prevented it. Besides, the ambassador, with the support of the Department of State, accepted the Presidency of Huerta as a fait accompli, and he became more concerned with the new regime than with the fate of the deposed officials. The failure to accept Huerta's explanation of the death of Madero, Masingill argued, would have been an admission that the new Mexican government had acted in a criminal manner. The recall of Wilson, he went on, was based on political reasons. A campaign of persecution was waged against the ambassador, because his policy of recognition differed from the President's. A stream of "amateur sleuths" constantly embarrassed Ambassador Wilson and finally, in a "humiliating public way," he was dismissed.181

FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON

Historians have overlooked the performance of Stimson as ambassador to Argentina. Of course, the relative unimportance of Latin American countries during World War I and the priority given the war policy by the Wilson administration justified this. But, even in his memoirs, Stimson discussed few substantive issues. He asserted that it was indiscreet to record details of confidential negotiations between the United States and Argentina. And, he warned, quite facetiously it is hoped, that his memoirs might include fictitious elements to mask state secrets.\textsuperscript{182}

On account of his attitude, only a few examples of the performance of Stimson are available. He attended a considerable number of conferences in Latin America, including the Pan-American Conference of 1915 and the Tacna-Arica arbitration. In both instances, he blamed the Department of State, in part, for their failure. He credited himself, however, with salvaging hope for a resolution of the Argentine-Chile border dispute in 1917, by convincing the contending parties to accept mediation by the United States and Uruguay. He later stated that the Department never sent him any reply to this suggestion.\textsuperscript{183} In other activities, he sought a marine telegraph cable between the eastern United States and Argen-

\textsuperscript{182}Stimson, \textit{My United States}, 278-79.

\textsuperscript{183}Ibid., 350-56.
tina, which was accomplished after settling a conflict with the British monopoly.  

In one of his few contacts with the problems created by the war, he was instrumental in bringing about a wheat convention between the Allies and Argentina. According to the subsequent treaty, Argentina would extend credit to England and France to buy wheat. However, Stimson was slightly disturbed that he had taken part in such an unneutral act.

The ambassador's despatches were scarce, mostly concerned with local conditions and commercial relations. However, his attitude toward the Department of State was blunt and critical:

The first thing a diplomatic secretary is taught to do is never, in his dispatches, "to put the department in the wrong." But the difference between an undersecretary in the department and the minister at the post is as an assistant secretary of state more lucidly explained to me, that "The department thinks the fellow on the job is a d----d fool but the fellow on the job knows the department is." He added that he was inclined to think the Department was right about half the time, which was a liberal concession. It (and he called the Department "it") was a "singularly bad" correspondent, published the most confidential despatches in the newspapers, and lacked manners--his most

184Ibid., 401.
185Ibid., 415-17.
186Ibid., 294.
serious charge of all. He would have liked reasons for
the Department's instructions, believing he could then act
more intelligently. He also criticized the Department for
never acknowledging which of his suggestions were carried
out, since "it" alone could give instructions. His solution
to these problems was to give all important despatches to
the Associated Press. He insisted that, if nothing else,
he caught the attention of the Department of State and got
results. 187  Stimson, in a radical way, suggested a common
problem that many American diplomats complained about--poor
communications with Washington. It was questionable, however,
if his solution was in the best interests of the United States.

The analyses in this chapter illustrated some of the
basic characteristics of the performances of these diplo­
mats. However, such studies are of little value unless they
are accompanied by synthesis and reflection. In the next
chapter, an attempt will be made to develop some overall
evaluations of these envoys.

187 Ibid., 294-99. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Prac­
tice, 77-78.
CHAPTER IV

PERFORMANCE: EVALUATIONS

A diplomat not only can be evaluated by comparing his performance to some ideal standards, but by analyzing the manner in which he executes his duties and the results he attains. In the case of the chiefs-of-mission under Wilson, the complexity and variety of the tasks they performed must be taken into account. Therefore, in order to have the broadest possible perspective of these diplomats, self-appraisals as well as scholarly interpretations will be presented. These evaluations should then provide the basis for an overview of the performance of each diplomat.

WALTER HINES PAGE

Pervading almost every letter and despatch Page wrote was his conviction that an Anglo-American detente was necessary. In 1914, he wrote to Wilson:

...Of course, what some of the American newspapers said is true—that I am too free and too untrained to be a great Ambassador. But the conventional type of Ambassador would not be worth his salt to represent the United States here now, when they [Britain] were eager to work with us for the peace of the world, if they are convinced of our honour and right-mindedness and the genuineness of our friendship.¹

¹Page to Wilson, March 18, 1914, in Hendrick, Page, I, 261.
In a more general sense, he reflected: "Is an Ambassador a man sent to keep another Government friendly and in good humor with your Government so that you can get and give all sorts of friendly services and make the world better? Or, is his business to snap and snarl and play 'smart' and keep 'em irritated—damn 'em!--get and give nothing?" Because of his pro-British sentiments, Page revealed which type he considered himself to be.

Historians have used Page's Anglophilism as the basis of their analyses of the ambassador's performance. Hendrick believed that Page's pro-British sentiments and his anti-Germanism aided in explaining his performance as ambassador. However, Hendrick often defended Page's actions instead of evaluating them. For example, he said:

And so for five busy and devastating years Page did his work. The stupidities of Washington might drive him to desperation, ill-health might increase his periods of despondency, the misunderstandings that he occasionally had with the British Government might add to his discouragements, but a naturally optimistic and humorous temperament overcame all obstacles, and did its part in bringing about that united effort which ended in victory. And that it was a great part, the story of his Ambassadorship abundantly proves....But history will indeed be ungrateful if it ever forget the gaunt and pensive figure, clad in a dressing gown, sitting long into the morning before the smoldering fire at 6 Grosvenor Square, seeking to find some way to persuade a reluctant and hesitating President to lead his country in the defense of liberty and determined that, so far as he could accomplish it, the nation

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2Seymour, House, I, 312.

3Hendrick, Page, I, 325.
should play a part in the great assize that was in keeping with its traditions and its instincts.4

Countering Hendrick's contentions, historians critical of Page asserted that the ambassador's pro-British sentiments were so extreme that he acted at the expense of his own country.5

Gregory examined the character of the ambassador and evaluated his performance with better perspective than either Hendrick or the severe critics. Page, he argued, proved to be a more enthusiastic exponent of "idealistic missionary nationalism" than Wilson.6 And, like many nationalists and expansionists, Page believed American greatness was linked to kinship with Britain, as a racial as well as a political union.7 Therefore, Page did not hesitate to invite Britain to join in his scheme for remaking the world. But he was extremely idealistic, partly because the United States had not been involved in the arma-

4Ibid., II, 319-20. See also I, 360; II, 20, 229. For other favorable, yet not as sympathetic views, see Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People, 145-46; Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 26; Walworth, Wilson, II, 4; H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 638, 640-42.


6Gregory, Page, 35.

7Gregory insisted that this was not an extreme sort of racism, but a virtual Social Darwinism expressed as the Anglo-Saxon example for the world in terms of individual liberty and democracy. See ibid., 127-28.
ments race or the balance of power of Europe. Coming from a prosperous country, he did not believe Europe could solve its own problems without American assistance in the form of an Anglo-American alliance. Gregory added that Page, like other men cast into new positions of prestige and importance, had boundless enthusiasm to do a great deal in a short time and to simplify solutions to complicated problems. 8

The outbreak of war in Europe and the declaration of American neutrality most conspicuously demonstrated Page's Anglophilism, Gregory asserted. For example, in 1915, Page "...favored nothing that would force Britain to alter its policy and show respect for American neutral rights—little less than placing American commerce under British control." Unfortunately, the ambassador's activities were often contrary to the policies of his government. 9 Consequently, by 1917, Anglo-American relations were not what Page desired.

The impact of Page upon American-British relations, Gregory continued, was not as notable as the ambassador and some historians have assumed. If he had any influence in Washington, it was only during the first few months of the war. By 1915, he was so hopelessly Anglophile that the

8 Ibid., 35-36, 44, 48.

9 Gregory speculated that if the American government had been as clearly in favor of the Allies as its ambassador to England, it would be difficult to imagine Germany exercising the restraint it showed prior to 1917. See ibid., 130-31. See also Tansill, America Goes to War, 138.
administration usually treated his messages with indifference or apprehension. And, in London, his influence with the Foreign Office was not significant, as demonstrated by the "Dacia" affair and the controversy over the Declaration of London. Furthermore, Grey, often neglecting Page, listened to and received information from House, Lansing, and Cecil Spring-Rice, British ambassador to the United States. In fact, when House was in London, Page faded into the background.\textsuperscript{10}

Gregory also surmised that not only Page's Anglophilism, but his inexperience reduced his effectiveness as an ambassador. His freshness and willingness to explore new ideas were commendable, but as an amateur diplomat, he was unable to understand typical diplomatic frustrations. Also, he did not realize that his proximity to the diplomatic activities of London and Europe could be deceiving as well as enlightening. While he knew that he was sent to his post to manipulate the foreign government, he did not realize that the foreign government would try to manipulate him.\textsuperscript{11}

Although Gregory's analysis of Page was the most thorough since Hendrick's, and surely the best balanced, a further observation about the performance of Page should be made--Page's pro-British sentiments went through a metamorphosis.

\textsuperscript{10}Gregory, Page, 197-98, 211, 214.

At the beginning of his service in England, they were, in large measure, a means to an end, since he was looking toward the emergence of the United States as a potent world power. He then deemed it necessary to ally with the other great Anglo-Saxon nation. However, the longer Page remained in England, the more his pro-British sentiments became an end in themselves, and he began to defend British policy at every turn. Page's outlook at this stage directed his energies to the prosecution of the war, which he viewed as a struggle between freedom and tyranny. This, of course, reaffirmed his desire for an Anglo-American alliance, but also inspired him to enter upon a dramatic crusade against "the Teuton lords." Whatever idealistic plans Page had for the world, they were put further out of reach by the broadening of his pro-British sentiments into Anglophilism and anti-Germanism.

BRAND WHITLOCK

The war overwhelmed Whitlock. His memoirs and letters demonstrated how frustrated he became and how helpless he felt to cope with the German occupation of Belgium. He said:

It was a constant source of poignant and unavailing regret with me that I could not perform the prodigies that those poor harried folk so touchingly expected; such as the unlimited confidence in the great Republic across the sea. Sometimes I had the uncomfortable feeling of being a kind of impostor, the pitifully little I could accomplish being so very small in comparison with all that I should have liked to do.
to help them in their sorrow and their pain.\textsuperscript{12}

Of course, he insinuated that he had done his best. He wrote Newton D. Baker in 1917:

"My experience in Belgium—perhaps I have told you this before—took something out of me that can never be replaced, did something to me that can never be repaired. I seem to have given all my youth, all my energy, all my freshness to the task, and it has left me limp with the pale constitution of the valetudinarian. Ah me!\textsuperscript{13}"

However, he took solace in his popularity with the Belgian people, asserting that he had received unimaginable gratitude when he left, which had been somewhat embarrassing. He even noted that Baron von der Lancken, head of the Political Section in Brussels, had told him at their farewell meeting, "Peut-être au congrès de la paix," as if to imply "when we meet again."\textsuperscript{14}

The biographers of Whitlock have generally acknowledged the predicament in which the war had placed the minister, but they gave minimal attention to an evaluation of his performance in light of it. Tager's assessment of Whitlock was superficial, and virtually ignored his diplomatic duties. He described Whitlock as a champion of virtue and justice, who probably felt a renewed sense of mission in his association with the Belgian relief program because of its humani-

\textsuperscript{12}Whitlock, Belgium, II, 189.

\textsuperscript{13}Whitlock to Newton D. Baker, December 12, 1917, in Nevins, Whitlock The Letters, 250.

\textsuperscript{14}Whitlock, Belgium, II, 455.
tarian aspects, and who further believed he was doing everything in his power to destroy the authoritarian German state. Tager added that the conflict against German domination was apparently a resumption of the minister's old battle against corrupt forces in domestic politics. And although Whitlock had considered himself a pacifist, his experience in Belgium changed him. In fact, his activities as a war minister purportedly increased his stature in America, which he relished. However, by the end of his service in Belgium, he had lost all sense of mission. The war and political and social developments in America, i.e., the passage of Prohibition and the rejection of the Versailles treaty, disenchanted him. He became bitter and "turned his back on the world."15

Thorburn's analysis was similar to that of Tager, but it emphasized the character of the minister in more detail. He considered Whitlock's major attributes to be his alert intelligence, his eagerness to learn, and his peculiar willingness to accept new ideas. Never an original thinker, the minister gleaned his ideas from others, and then expressed them in his own way. Thorburn added that, as a diplomat, Whitlock freely admitted his lack of knowledge about international events, but he rose "splendidly" to the occasion when war broke out. Like Tager, Thorburn noted Whitlock's

15Tager, Whitlock, 153-64.
disillusionment. He argued that the minister had been beset throughout his public career by an inability to learn what bothered him. Hence, Whitlock never really knew what his goals in life were.\textsuperscript{16}

Crunden evaluated Whitlock in much the same manner as Tager and Thorburn. He stated that the minister arrived in Belgium as a "sensitive libertarian" and artist. Having experienced little horror in his life, the war shocked him, especially after his tour of the front. As the occupation progressed, Crunden asserted, Whitlock's nerves all but disabled him. He was not physically or emotionally strong, quite out of his element in the war zone, and it was surprising he did his job as well as he did. As the war persisted, his initially buoyant and optimistic nature became increasingly pessimistic. Crunden concluded that although Whitlock died "overwhelmed by a sense of failure," he actually deserved to be a hero.\textsuperscript{17}

Essentially, all three interpretations were identical. They avoided, however, the obvious conclusions about Whitlock's performance. Given his background and personality, the minister was unfit for his position. He had been sent to the idyllic Belgian post as a personal favor to some Wilson supporters, especially Newton D. Baker, in order to

\textsuperscript{16}Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 113, 127, 133, 174-76.

\textsuperscript{17}Crunden, \textit{Whitlock}, 302, 343, 387, 399, 427.
allow him time to write novels—hardly a sound reason for an appointment to a diplomatic post. The war not only shocked Whitlock, but destroyed the tranquil environment he had desired. Therefore, his inexperience was compounded by his unusual unpreparedness for the war. Contrary to Tager, Thorburn and Crunden, it must be argued that Whitlock failed as a war diplomat. His reports lacked analysis of the events he observed and most often emphasized the Belgian relief work, something he could comprehend through his humanitarian instincts. But although the relief program was his major concern, most of his colleagues did not credit him with doing an equitable portion of the work. Thus, Whitlock appeared to be a man of words not action, frustrated and shocked out of his ideals by the realities of war and its aftermath. One can sympathize with his predicament, but one can hardly ignore his inability to cope with it. He was a classic example of a political appointee placed in a situation that even an experienced diplomat would have found difficult.

JAMES W. GERARD

In his memoirs, Gerard declared that he left Germany with a "clear conscience" and the knowledge that he had done everything possible to keep the peace. Concerning his relations with the Germans, he said:

I was credited by the Germans with having hood-winked and jollied the Foreign Office and the Government into refraining for two years from using illegally their most effective weapon.
This, of course, is not so. I always told the Foreign Office the plain simple truth and the event showed that I correctly predicted the attitude of America.

Our American national game, poker, has given us abroad an unfair reputation. We are always supposed to be bluffing....

I only regret that those high in authority in Germany should have preferred to listen to pro-German correspondents who posed as amateur super-Ambassadors rather than to the authorized representatives of America....

Gerard's self-appraisal was more of a vindication than an assessment of his performance as ambassador to Germany. Similarly, many historians who lauded Gerard neglected to examine his ability as a diplomat. For example, Seymour applauded Gerard's "dignity" and the skill with which he maintained cordial relations with Germany in the most trying post in the war zone. However, he said little more.

Some critics of Gerard did attempt to determine the nature of the ambassador's performance, but their discussions often degenerated into denunciations. For instance, Link characterized Gerard as a "former dilettante in Tammany politics" who was an "authentic international catastrophe." He added that at a time when circumstances demanded tact, understanding, and wisdom, Gerard could offer only ineptitude, ignorance and folly. Thus, both American and German authorities began to rely on Joseph C. Grew, a young career diplomat at the

18Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 429. See also 430.

19Seymour, House, I, 185. For another favorable, but less sympathetic account, see Arnett, Kitchin, 123.
embassy. Link further stated that "...during a period of extreme tension in German-American relations Wilson had as his spokesman in Berlin a man for whom he had no respect and not a little contempt." The President's opinion of Gerard was pungently revealed in comments that he penciled on copies of despatches from the ambassador. On September 10, 1915, Wilson wrote: "Ordinarily an Ambassador ought to be backed up as of course, but--this ass? It is hard to take it seriously." On the next day, he added: "Who can fathom this? I wish they would hand this idiot his passport!" 20

Although Birnbaum echoes many of Link's contentions, he was a more objective critic, realizing that Washington had not given Gerard adequate instructions. However, it must be recognized that since Gerard felt duped by the Germans and deluded about German peace offers, he became increasingly anti-German, and was a detriment to his government in a period of tenuous relations with Germany. Obviously, more diplomatic experience and a keener awareness of European conditions would have made him a more valuable representative, but additional experience might not have been able to counter his natural impetuousness.

20Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 25-26. See also Link, Wilson, III, 311; Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 121.
Herrick made it evident in his autobiography that he deemed his amicable relationship with the French the outstanding achievement of his service as ambassador. He said:

I am told that I have really won the love of France. If that be true, I am blessed beyond the measure of good fortune, for the things I have done which have brought me this sentiment are also the very things that have won the confidence and approval of the people of my own country, whose love for France was never stronger than it is to-day....

However, Herrick not only neglected to evaluate his performance of diplomatic duties, but dismissed his tenure under Wilson as an anticlimatic period of his service. He stated:

As I look back on it, I realize that I never had such a carefree time in my life as during those first seventeen months as Ambassador under the Wilson Administration. I had no responsibility other than carrying out my instructions; I was staying on at the President's request, yet realizing it was only temporary; and I knew that any time I wanted to leave I could say so and start home....

Mott's evaluation of Herrick was hardly more enlightening than the ambassador's own account. He praised him as a "pioneer in diplomacy" who was willing to take chances rather than to be stagnated by convention. Furthermore, Mott re-emphasized the admiration of the French for Herrick,

21Mott, Herrick, 261.
22Ibid., 117.
and insisted that although the ambassador had to his credit no peace confirmed or war avoided, he left a legacy to his countrymen chiefly in the example of his character.23

Some critics of Herrick condemned his Francophilism. Millis, in a severe attack, asserted that the ambassador demonstrated his sympathy in many "grossly indiscreet ways." For example, Herrick's decision to remain in Paris after the French government retreated to Bordeaux was reckless. Millis contended that the event made a hero of Herrick in France and the United States, but impaired American neutrality. In another instance, a group of young American men came to the American Embassy in Paris, early in the war, to inquire about enlisting in the French army. The "foolish old man," Millis said, explained the laws of neutrality to the group, but then encouraged them to enlist. Many of these young men died in combat.24

Without question, the ambassador's diplomatic activities were limited and his reports infrequent during this period. His only significant accomplishment after the commencement of hostilities in 1914 was relief work. Aside from this, his major concern was maintaining amicable relations with the French. This overemphasis, however, crippled Herrick's efficiency as an American representative. The equally potent

23Ibid., vi, 221-22, 258, 375-76.
24Millis, Road to War, 74. For a less severe criticism, see Grattan, Why We Fought, 73-76.
anti-Germanism that his pro-French sentiments produced made him an unreliable source of information for the Wilson administration. Of course, his clear support of the French cause in the war made him even more popular in France, but further detached him from his responsibility as an envoy from a neutral country. In addition, he did not realize that popularity is a superficial way to build good relations between countries. Thus, having "won the love of France" was a minor diplomatic achievement for Herrick. It represented a personal accomplishment, not a substantial improvement of Franco-American relations.

WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP

It is difficult to determine exactly how Sharp analyzed his performance in France, since he made few pertinent comments in his memoirs. However, he continually emphasized his attempts to keep his diplomatic activities in alignment with the foreign policy of the Wilson administration. Historians have added little of significance to Sharp's remarks. The sympathetic Beckles Willson lauded the ambassador without measure, but introduced nothing of critical value. Seymour, one of the few historians to evaluate Sharp at all, claimed that the ambassador was a reliable source of information whom House admired for his exemplary conduct throughout the war. Seymour concluded that House often turned to Sharp
for advice.  

The few statements of Sharp and Seymour are hardly adequate to judge the ambassador's ability as a diplomat. However, a few observations can be made. Since Sharp, a political appointee with no diplomatic experience, genuinely accepted Wilson's "New Freedom" and "New Diplomacy," he allowed the administration to guide his actions, and possibly his thoughts. Good examples were his reports and despatches, which were informative, but rarely critical of his instructions or American policy. Viewed from the extremes, Sharp might be considered a blind follower, on the one hand, or an effective instrument of the Wilson administration, on the other. However, given the colorless nature of his reports, the limitations of his negotiations, and the lack of attention from historians, he was most likely only a faithful servant of the Wilson administration.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN

Egan considered the purchase of the Danish West Indies his crowning achievement, believing he had a major part in the negotiations. In his memoirs he asserted that Wilson and Lansing highly praised him, as did the Danes, who had never before given such accolades to an American. However, Tansill stressed that Egan's participation in the negotiations for the purchase of the islands was important, but

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25 Seymour, House, II, 226.
not as significant as the minister intimated. Nonetheless, Tansill was quite sympathetic to the minister, who he believed was an "eminent American man of letters" and an able diplomat.26

Tansill's analysis of Egan's performance concerning the purchase appears to be quite accurate. However, Egan's activities as minister after this transaction were un uninspiring. He had completed the task for which he had been sent to Denmark, and became more interested in maintaining his long-time pleasant relationship with the Danes. He had found a comfortable niche in the world, and was content to pursue a life uncluttered by superfluous diplomatic activities.

IRA NELSON MORRIS

Morris believed his immediate goals as minister to Sweden were to improve Swedish-American political and economic relations and, when war broke out, to keep his government well-informed of the activities of Germany and Russia. He never clearly stated whether he felt he had accomplished the former, but he intimated his reports were important aids to his government. Morris said, "What I was trying to get at all these years, and what, I hope, I shall always be trying to get at, is the truth."27 His observations of

26 Tansill, Danish West Indies, 450.
27 Morris, From an American Legation, 167.
prison camps, his role as liaison between the Central Powers and Russia, his few economic negotiations with Sweden, and his propaganda campaigns against Germany, were all discussed in his memoirs, and he considered them important. And although the Wilson administration frequently neglected Morris's advice in his despatches as substance for policy, his reporting appeared to be his most significant function, especially because he displayed a clear understanding of the influence of German militarism and the Russian revolution on Europe during the war. Yet, his effectiveness as a reporter was somewhat limited by his anti-German sentiments which often colored his conclusions.

CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA

Unquestionably, Vopicka regarded his performance as minister to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, as successful and righteous. His conspicuous mention, in his memoirs, of a number of medals conferred upon him by the Balkan countries exemplified this feeling. He increasingly had become convinced that he not only represented American interests, but Balkan interests as well. Hence, he could justify his potent anti-Central Powers sentiments as a legitimate reaction to the crucial situation in East Central Europe.

Since the minister was certainly self-deluded, naive, and excitable, Mamatey's criticism of him seemed justifiable.
Vopicka's bias against Germany and Austria-Hungary was obvious from the beginning of his service—not only as a response to the hostilities in Europe, but most likely as a deep sympathy for his former countrymen and a hatred of foreign imperialism. Therefore, his actions in the Balkans could almost be predicted. His lack of diplomatic experience and his frequent disregard for the practicalities of foreign relations were evident in his interference in Bulgarian, Rumanian and Serbian affairs, in his prejudiced despatches, and in his continual antagonizing and suspicion of the envoys of the Central Powers in the Balkan countries. Since Vopicka was one of the few chiefs-of-mission near the hostilities in Europe, he especially needed prudence and objectivity. Unfortunately, these characteristics were non-existent in him. It must be admitted that the complexity of the situation in the Balkans would have been difficult for any diplomat to comprehend. Nonetheless, a more unsuitable choice for the ministerial post in the Balkans could not have been appointed.

**DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS**

Francis found little in his own performance to criticize, sincerely believing he had done what was correct. He remained an idealist to the end of his service. And although he admitted his inexperience and lack of know-

[^28]: For example, see Francis, *Russia*, 349.
ledge about Russia, he never questioned the quality of his negotiations or his ability to report.

Most historians understood the shortcomings of Francis, but some apologized for them. Kennan argued that it was easy for the members of the American community and the diplomatic corps in Russia to ridicule Francis and deprecate his ability, but in sending him to the Petrograd post, Wilson had done an undeserved injustice to him. While Francis, at his age and with his experience and temperament, had not been well-equipped for the post, he made do with the qualities he possessed, and performed with "courage and enthusiasm." 29

Kohlenberg evaluated Francis's commercial and economic activities in Russia, emphasizing the strengths and limitations of the ambassador's performance. He stated that although Francis failed to satisfy his insatiable desire to promote closer economic ties between Russia and the United States, any lesser man would have yielded long before Francis. Kohlenberg concluded that Francis was primarily a charming old gentleman, who had proved himself in the business world and, as Lansing aptly appraised, the ambassador was a man with too keen a scent for trade to be an ideal diplomat. 30

29 Kennan, *Russia*, I, 40-41.

Many historians were severely critical of Francis's inexperience as a diplomat. Walworth contended that Francis naively pictured the revolution in Petrograd as a practical realization of American principles of government. But more than that, the appointment of Francis demonstrated that Wilson was to pay dearly for his tendency (and House's) to give attention to political expediency in choosing envoys for Russia. Unfortunately, Walworth added, American policy towards Russia, after the downfall of the Czar, was based on Francis's unwarranted faith in the Provisional Government and his disdain for the Bolsheviks.31 Philip C. Jessup was even more explicit than Walworth. He argued that Francis was unable to perceive the events in Russia as they unfolded during the revolutionary period. To the ambassador, the great issue was whether the Russian people would adopt a constitutional monarchy or a representative form of government, not envisioning that a social revolution would follow the political revolution. For example, he had called Lenin an "extreme socialist or anarchist" who was stirring up a little minor trouble, and later Francis accepted the rumor that Lenin was a German agent.32 Jessup further stated that Francis also did not realize that the Provisional Government

31Walworth, Wilson, II, 93, 137. See also Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure The United States and World War I 1914-1920 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), 137-38.

32See Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, 27.
was wholly dependent for its actual power upon the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who exercised what little control anyone had over the army. Max M. Laserson was similarly critical of the ambassador. He asserted that Francis's utterly irresponsible evaluation of Lenin was an example of the ambassador's total ignorance of the political map of Russia. He did not know the difference between "radical socialists," "anarchists," "maximalists," and "bolsheviks," and he did not really know who was fighting whom during the revolutionary period. The ambassador's description of events in Russia was a model of "illiterate political reporting." Laserson did concede that, despite the ambassador's ineptness, he took certain practical steps on his own initiative or on instruction from Washington that were sound, such as requesting that a railroad commission be sent to Russia and that credit be extended to the Provisional Government.

Most historians, whether sympathetic or critical of Francis's performance, agreed that the ambassador lacked the qualifications and experience to deal with the diplomatic problems imposed by the revolution in Russia. Thus, it was


no surprise that he was unable to comprehend and report clearly the events that occurred from 1916 to the end of the war. That he also interfered in internal affairs in Russia made it clear that the United States could not afford to have such a novice in Russia during a crucial period of history.

HENRY MORGENTHAU

When Morgenthau acknowledged his inability to impede the Armenian genocide, it appeared that he was admitting failure as a diplomat. This is unlikely. In his memoirs, the ambassador constantly referred to his relief work and his relationship with the Turkish government, intimating he was an energetic envoy who tried his best. Although Morgenthau's assessment of his performance lacked substance, his memoirs demonstrated many aspects of his personality and character which were of vital significance in determining his prowess as a diplomat. And these aspects have been generally neglected by historians.

Morgenthau was a fascinating combination of business practicality and Wilsonian idealism. He could be imperious, haughty, and condescending towards the Turkish ministers; blunt and earthy with his diplomatic colleagues; strong-willed within his own embassy; and emphatic and persuasive

35For example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 82-86, 401-02.
with the Department of State. Concurrently, he was altruistic about the work of the Christian missionaries in Turkey, and empathetic about the plight of destitute foreign nationals and Armenians. He also foresaw an "Americanization" of the Turkish economy as workable and proper, trying to impress the Turkish ministers with the benefits of American business practices. And he interfered in internal Turkish affairs when he believed the Turks were forsaking the Allies for the cause of the Central Powers. Unable to change the decision of the Turkish government, he devoted himself exclusively to relief work, which inevitably resulted in his disillusionment with his post.

PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH

In the broadest sense, Reinsch regarded American relations with China as dependent upon "spontaneous cooperation" between the two peoples in matters of education, commerce, and industry. During his service in China he had tried to impress upon America a "new vision" of a modernized China. Reinsch believed he was unsuccessful because of the provincialism of the financiers of the United States, and outside influences working in America to halt business enterprise in China. Reinsch also believed that Wilson had misjudged the importance of China, and did not heed his warnings about what could happen if Japanese incursions continued. However, at the end of his service, the minister
was unwilling to advertise the difference in their attitudes, believing it would produce no practical results. But he never disclaimed his ideals for China, and his sole consolation seemed to be the lasting friendships he developed with many Chinese. 36

Historians gave considerable attention to the appointment of Reinseh to China and, in most cases, praised the selection. However, analyses of his performance as a diplomat have varied. Fifield believed Reinseh was unquestionably one of the most capable American diplomats ever sent to China. The minister was able, Fifield contended, to understand the fundamental forces in the Orient, although he was a strong partisan of the Chinese people and a steady critic of Japan's Far East policies. 37

Pugach was sympathetic towards Reinseh. More detailed than Fifield, he emphasized the minister's economic programs for China. He argued that Reinseh was an expansionist, whose ideology resembled the ideas of Dollar Diplomacy. 38 However, Reinseh wanted expansion to be gradual, based on the practical needs and the actual power of the United States. In the Far East, the minister desired his country to forge

36 See Reinseh, China, x-xi, 298, 384.
37 Fifield, Far East, 14. See also Curry, Far Eastern Policy, 39.
38 Pugach, "Reinsch," 59. See also Beard, National Interest, 183-95.
a partnership with China built on mutual trust and advantage, which included international cooperation as well. Pugach further stated that Reinsch had a sense of mission--a feeling of responsibility to the United States, China, and the world, and "threw himself" into the implementation of his program when he became minister to China. This program had been practical as well as idealistic. The overseas expansion of American enterprise became his major emphasis, and the primacy he attached to American investments in China helped to explain the inconsistencies between the principles which he advocated and the actions he pursued. The apparent failure of American enterprise in China, however, forced him to search for the causes and seek a solution. A major concern became Japanese threats to American interests, which he fought with increasing resolve. He also began criticizing Washington and Wall Street for not supporting his program for China. However, he won a few limited and fleeting victories, i.e., he helped prevent the most dangerous and obnoxious objectives of the Twenty-One Demands from being implemented until approximately 1917, and he made possible a few loans and enterprises for China. By 1918, he finally became tired, angry and disappointed, since the growing ambitions of Japan, the World War, and the lack of American business interest in China were too overwhelming to counteract. Pugach continued that although the minister did not fulfill the objectives of his program, he had a "noble
vision" of a "good society" which began with the unobstructed application of science, technology, and the principles of the Open Door. And it was ridiculous to assert that Reinsch should have accepted the reality of the world situation and revised his programs, since the question of his success or failure, which some historians have belabored, was inconsequential in assessing the minister's ideas and policies or the events of his day. Pugach argued that it was more fruitful to examine Reinsch's major ideas, their validity, and his faithfulness to them, since the minister was a leading interpreter and a commentator as well as a participant involved in the major ideas and policies of his day.39

Kent took a harsher view of the failure of Reinsch's mission. He argued that since the minister always saw the best in men, it was a logical consequence that he would attempt to secure a better understanding between the United States and China. However, he developed an enduring partisanship towards the Chinese and, without regard to consequence, promised more than his instructions warranted. When the Chinese did not get results, they lost faith in the ability of the American government to fulfill its pledges. Also, Reinsch's attempts to fashion his own foreign policy in the field demonstrated his unfamiliarity with an environ-

ment which emphasized intrigue and deception, rather than friendship and fair play. Kent considered the lack of American political and economic interest in the Orient and the role of Japan only secondary reasons for Reinsch's failure as a diplomat. He concluded that the minister actually fared well as a prophet, accurately predicting that increased Japanese encroachment in China would contribute to a major war. But it was tragic that an intelligence capable of pointing out the menace of Japan and the importance of China in the international community should have failed in the diplomatic arena in practical affairs.40

Although Gage concluded that world political and economic conditions played a part in defeating Reinsch's programs for China, he, like Kent, placed considerable blame on the minister himself. He claimed Reinsch was the principal protagonist of American political, financial, and cultural imperialism, which he pursued with great enthusiasm. The minister brought to his post many distinctive qualities and ideas compatible with Wilson's ideology, expressing them as a sense of mission in China. His genuine sympathy for ancient Chinese culture, in all its aspects, encouraged him to consider it America's duty to assist in developing her resources and culture. But this led him to become almost a jealous guardian, with the right to influence China left to

the United States. However, on his arrival to China, he did not realize that the scene in China was prearranged by the balance of power already in existence, and the internal Chinese political and social unrest. Gage continued that much of the minister's activities in China involved American business interests, but he and the American financiers approached commercial affairs from entirely different perspectives. Reinseh modified or ignored details that would be insisted upon in regular business transactions. Profit-making and strict financial practices were, for him, secondary to American national interests and policy. He also considered the war as an opportunity for the United States to increase its economic and political influence in China. But Japan also regarded the war as an opportunity, and Reinseh found himself in a clash of major consequence, in which Japan was more successful than the American minister. Like Kent, Gage realized that Reinseh's diplomatic activities illustrated his determination to construct policy and define procedures without instructions. While the minister's programs demonstrated good historical insight, legal acumen, and his ability to envisage ultimates, they were not always practical in view of the problems of the moment. And although Reinseh's idealism and energy were laudable, he fell into many contradictions. For instance, he repeatedly asserted that business and economic enterprise were sufficient for the execution of American policy in China, but he often
resorted to political action of extreme sorts. The minister further contended that public opinion would be adequate to control Japanese activity in China, while recommending to Washington that military action be taken against Japan. In addition, he disclaimed the race for concessions, but engaged in such activities for the United States.41

Gage and the other historians were able to elucidate many pertinent characteristics of the performance of Reinseh in China. There are, however, a few additional points that might be considered. The minister had the intellectual potential to become a good diplomat. Yet, he lacked a certain degree of pragmatism and experience. This was manifest in the program he developed for China. His economic plan to develop China's industrial and agricultural potential, increase American business interests, and reduce European spheres of influence, was essentially positive and optimistic, since he envisaged a modernized China of the future, prominent in international affairs and closely allied to the United States. However, this dream did not take into consideration the existing problems of internal strife in China, the World War, lingering European interests in Asia, and the lack of enthusiasm of American financiers for business ventures in China. Also, he unrealistically believed

that unilateral aid to China from the United States was essential. On the other hand, his political goal was immediate and negative—to dispel the steady encroachment of Japan in China, which not only endangered Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, but threatened the increase of American influence in Asia. Realizing, as he did, the increasing importance of the Orient, his antagonizing and baiting of the Japanese could create many problems for future American relations there. Thus, Reinsch's program became a weak compromise between long-term economic goals and immediate political interests, which were inconsistent and impractical in light of the realities of his diplomatic environment.

HENRY LANE WILSON

Wilson's despatches and memoirs substantiate that he believed he had made a correct appraisal of conditions in Mexico, and had acted accordingly. The ambassador also flatly denied that he had interfered imprudently in Mexican affairs or acted in collusion with Huerta and Díaz to overthrow Madero.42

Many of the historians who have studied Wilson's service in Mexico have endeavored to determine why he interfered in Mexico's internal affairs. The conclusions of Charles Curtis Cumberland were typical of many critics of

42For example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 768-76.
the ambassador. Cumberland claimed that Wilson believed Mexicans were fit only for dictatorship, and that direction by a great power, namely the United States, was necessary. In his ardent desire to return to the Díaz system, the ambassador failed to comprehend that conditions in Mexico had changed with the rise of Huerta. It was ironic, Cumberland averred, that Wilson's desire for the restoration of a government subservient to the American Embassy was almost completely lost, since Madero's overthrow, which the ambassador had deliberately or accidentally encouraged, led to the death and destruction following the Huerta coup and the violent anti-Americanism in Mexican policy for many years thereafter.43

While critical of Wilson's performance during the revolution, Calvert admitted that the ambassador's actions were not entirely his own fault. The simultaneous death of his brother and the election of Woodrow Wilson as President placed the ambassador's career in the balance. Calvert speculated that Ambassador Wilson believed that only a great diplomatic victory could save his career, and when fate presented the revolt against Madero, he took the chance, but unjustifiably earned an infamous reputation. Moreover, the Department of State was largely responsible for his predicament, since

the Mexican policy of the Democratic administration was incoherent and would have been difficult for the most gifted diplomat to convey. However, Calvert added, the ambassador became increasingly unfit for his post, because of his unpredictable and arbitrary behavior, attributable to his intemperance, poor health, habitual drinking, and moodiness. He also became plagued by rumors and got caught up in the intrigues of Mexico, increasingly detaching him from the Wilson administration.44

Grieb and Blaisdell also evaluated Wilson in terms of character. Grieb believed the ambassador's moods were the major hindrance to his performance, his short temper his primary weakness. Grieb added that Wilson's inflated ego, enhanced by his position as dean of the diplomatic corps in Mexico City, was also a detriment. These characteristics came to the fore as he attempted to promote American business interests and assure adequate protection for Americans and their property in Mexico.45 Blaisdell added that Wilson had an active intelligence, a willingness to work hard, a desire to represent American interests to the fullest, and a knack of acquiring information not ordinarily available. However, he was too ambitious and contentious, clashing with many, if not all, of his superiors. In addition, the ambassador had


a meddlesome nature and a pessimistic attitude, which also influenced his actions.\textsuperscript{46}

Masingill's evaluation of Wilson was a defense rather than an indictment. He argued that it was not a singular interest in American business which directed the ambassador's activity in Mexico; it was his conviction that a country where chaos was so prevalent, like Mexico, needed the rule of a strong government. However, the ambassador's attitude was not an aberration, since he more often spoke for his superiors than for himself. And not until early 1913, when the Taft administration decided to leave the Mexican problem to the Wilson administration, was the ambassador warned against meddling. Masingill further insisted that the ambassador would have been able to contribute his experience and talents as a diplomat to the Democratic administration. However, he was never consulted, since his recommendation to recognize Huerta was contrary to the President's Mexican policy. Also, Masingill argued, the ambassador was not necessarily responsible for the events that occurred in Mexico during the revolution, but given his impulsive nature, his tendency to arouse controversy gave him a notorious reputation.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46} Blaisdell, \textit{Southwestern Social Science Quarterly}, XL, 127-35.

The various assessments of Wilson's character were useful in understanding why the ambassador decided to interfere in internal Mexican affairs. However, he cannot simply be criticized for his intentions. The fact that he felt compelled to interfere not only demonstrated what he thought the Mexican government should be, but what authority he believed an American ambassador in Mexico had at his disposal. His interference, in some measure, jeopardized the ability of his country to develop a working relationship with Mexico. Trying to solve Mexico's problems by overstepping his authority alienated him from Washington, made a compromise solution difficult, and set a precedent for future unwarranted American intervention in Mexican affairs. Wilson's interference itself was the cardinal error of his service in Mexico, and all other criticisms or accolades are secondary.

FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON

Stimson's self-appraisal was mildly sarcastic and, while favorable, was not laudatory. His memoirs were not extremely revealing, but attested to his outspoken nature, as exemplified in his censure of the Department of State.48 His attacks seemed to have arisen from his distrust of the professional diplomat, who he believed was unfit in emergency situations. He argued that the career man was often

48For example, see Stimson, My United States, 455.
out of touch with his home country and acted only by instruction, employing little personal initiative or discretion. Accordingly, his criticism was a defense of amateur diplomacy and, consequently, his own position.

There were few treatments of Stimson's performance as ambassador to Argentina, and none which considered his complex character. Harold F. Peterson's sympathetic account went little beyond the exterior of the man. He characterized the Harvard professor as a neophyte diplomat, with extensive public service, who had charm and a "puckish humor." Stimson's erect carriage, grey hair, and pointed beard got him the nickname "Jesus in a dress suit." Peterson further asserted that no American visualized the weaknesses of the Department of State more effectively than Stimson and, at the end of his service in Argentina, the ambassador set forth some workable recommendations for the improvement of the Department and the diplomatic corps. For example, he recommended a closer relationship between commerce and diplomacy in Latin America, believing that the chiefs-of-mission should coordinate all the reports of commercial attachés and consuls to assure a reliable flow of information upon which to base policy.50

49 Ibid., 374-75.

Peterson did not seem to realize that, although Stimson was a perceptive critic, he was also a victim of his own criticisms. He blamed the Department of State for having little confidence in the ability of its envoys, while he demonstrated a similar lack of trust in the Department, even denying the authority it represented. He argued that the Department was imperious and discourteous, corresponded inadequately, and publicized confidential despatches imprudently. However, besides arrogantly holding himself aloof from the Department of State and its activities, Stimson assumed that his conclusions and evaluations were preferable to those of his superiors, and indiscriminately gave important despatches to the Associated Press for publication. Furthermore, he accused professional diplomats of lacking innovation and adaptability, as if amateurs, like himself, innately possessed such qualities and were able to utilize them without any diplomatic experience. Thus, when Stimson's actions as well as his words are considered, he presents quite a paradox as a diplomat.

While historians differed in their evaluations of the chiefs-of-mission under Wilson, the self-appraisals of the diplomats were quite similar. And although the diplomats did not assert that they had brought every task to a successful conclusion, they firmly avowed that they had tried their best.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Although the diplomats under discussion intended to serve their country well, and often exhibited humanitarian concern for the foreign nationals and actively supported relief programs, they generally performed poorly. There were three major shortcomings, intricately woven together, which hampered them: 1) lack of ability and preparedness for their posts; 2) problems concerning relations with the foreign government; 3) problems concerning relations with the home government.

Of the various inadequacies of these diplomats, inexperience in foreign affairs was the salient characteristic. With the exception of Egan, Herrick, Wilson, and to a minor degree, Morris, the conglomeration of businessmen, politicians, college professors, and lawyers lacked practical exposure to the intricacies of diplomatic life prior to their appointments. Abundant examples have been presented which demonstrated many of the problems created by placing inexperienced men in unfamiliar positions of responsibility. Gerard was an excellent example. He had difficulty even determining which officials in Germany represented authority. He also, for a time, placed excessive faith in German peace offers, and could not clearly distinguish between genuine
offers and diplomatic maneuvers. In addition, his reports often neglected substantive issues, and emphasized such manifestations as the German "hate campaigns." Similarly, Whitlock was not a shrewd observer, more concerned with the details of the work of the Belgian relief program than the German activity in Western Europe and especially Belgium.

It is difficult to determine when inexperience ends and naiveté begins, since, in many cases, they are closely allied. Some of the diplomats were gullible, and accepted almost everything they observed at face value. Francis was possibly the most glaring example. He was not only unfamiliar with Russia, but he drew many superficial conclusions about the revolution and its participants. He equated the rise to power of the Provisional Government with American political ideals; he neglected the war-weariness of the Russian people, while advocating that they continue the war against Germany; and he labeled Lenin as an anarchist, damning the Bolsheviks because he thought they were under German influence. Whitlock, Gerard, Vopicka, Morgenthau, and Page were similarly unfamiliar with the political problems of Europe and the rest of the world. Even Reinsch, who was purported to be a competent reporter, often accepted the statements of Chinese officials without question.

Some of the chiefs-of-mission of the Wilson administration were also self-deluded. For instance, Page actually assumed that his threat to resign influenced the Department
of State to accept his proposal for the resolution of the controversy over the Declaration of London. In similar situations, Egan credited himself with a preeminent role in the purchase of the Danish West Indies, and Whitlock believed himself an indispensable part of the Belgian relief program. These illusions, unfortunately lacking the benefit of perspective, often resulted in exaggerating the role of the envoy.

Possibly the most serious self-delusion is unrestrained idealism. It goes without saying that idealism is not inherently destructive for the diplomat, but when it becomes an obsession, it can hinder if not obstruct his day-to-day activities. The concept of "world order" which Page and Reinsch held bordered upon obsession. Both were dedicated to the rise of the United States as a great international power. In the mind of Page, the United States especially needed to become an active agent in European affairs through an alliance with Great Britain. With the war, the United States assumed a more dramatic role in his mind—to save the world from the "Hun," and preserve "democracy." Reinsch believed the United States needed to increase its influence in Asia through a close association with China, since he felt the Orient had the potential for significance in international affairs. Also, both Page and Reinsch attempted to execute their goals without due regard for the practicalities of their day or the wishes and desires of their own government,
the host government, and other nations of the world. Their quest became personal. Their partisanship for their host country increased, almost at the sacrifice of their duty to the United States. They distrusted individuals and governments which opposed their ends, i.e., Germany for Page, Japan for Reinsch. These envoys sometimes promised more to the host country than they could deliver, often exaggerating the power and wealth of the United States. Page and Reinsch became almost self-righteous and inflexible.

Partisanship and its counterpart, disdain and distrust, are the most obvious problems concerning the diplomat's relations with the foreign government. Biases, of course, are natural for all human beings, but when they contribute to an envoy's errors in judgment, prejudiced reports, and unwarranted conflicts, they are detrimental. Vopicka's hatred for the Central Powers was demonstrated in many injudicious ways while he was still a neutral minister. The pro-British sentiments of Page often led him to support English policy over American. Herrick's love of France was excessive. The overtly dramatic despatches of Francis, which decried the Bolsheviks, were misleading. And some of Whitlock's reports almost bled. The examples are endless.

Interference in the internal affairs of the foreign country is possibly the most serious charge that can be leveled against the diplomats of the Wilson administration, especially because of the numerous instances of such inter-
ference. Not only was relations of the envoy with the host country jeopardized, but he was telling the foreign government--"I know what is best for you." Henry Lane Wilson most clearly exemplified a diplomat who overstepped his authority, and complicated the relations between his government and the foreign government. However, other diplomats during the Wilson administration were equally guilty of impolitic interference, including Francis, Vopicka, and Morgenthau.

Poor relations with the home government was not a problem for most of the envoys who have been discussed. Of course, difficulties in communications between the Department of State and the chiefs-of-mission were recurrent, most dramatically in the case of Stimson. Page and Henry Lane Wilson had the most serious conflicts with the administration; Gerard and Reinsch had conflicts to a lesser degree. Most of these problems concerned disputes over policy or were personality clashes. However, the administration reacted differently in each case--Henry Lane Wilson was dismissed, Page was ignored, Gerard was neglected, and Reinsch was pacified. In all these instances, the envoy was as uncompromising as the administration, and thus must be equally criticized.

All of the shortcomings discussed restricted the effectiveness of the diplomats during the Wilson administration. Yet, the question that needs to be answered is to what degree these inadequacies can be attributed to amateurism, since most of the problems could be exhibited by the professional
as well. Inexperience in foreign affairs impeded the amateur diplomats, and it was aggravated by the coming of World War I. The unfamiliarity of the amateurs with the day-to-day routine of diplomatic life, with the foreign governments and their leaders, and with the variety and complexity of diplomatic duties, was compounded by the increased responsibilities which the war imposed. As neutral ministers and ambassadors, these men (with the exception of Henry Lane Wilson and Stimson) acquired such tasks as assuming the interests of a number of other countries, inspecting prison camps, and developing and executing relief programs. The expanded duties of the envoy during this period would have been difficult for the most seasoned diplomat. Thus many of the amateurs faltered and were often overwhelmed by their duties. Also, they frequently acted intemperately—interfering in internal affairs, exhibiting profound biases, and reporting with a dramatic flare. Similarly, it was not difficult to understand why men such as Morgenthau, Page, Whitlock, and Reinsch became frustrated and disillusioned when their ideals were dashed.

The chiefs-of-mission under discussion were almost universally unprepared by their backgrounds and experiences to become diplomats. Unlike the professionals, they began their service without the benefit of diplomatic training or apprenticeship. Therefore, through hindsight, it must be
concluded that many of the amateurs should never have been appointed. The use of spoils politics by the Wilson administration might have paid many political debts, but it produced a number of envoys who were, in large measure, unfit to serve.

However, the Wilson administration was not unique in appointing amateurs as chiefs-of-mission. As has been demonstrated, this practice was common during the period of the rise of the United States as a world power. It would seem that a strong trend toward professionalizing the ambassadorial and ministerial posts should have occurred during this period, since the consular service and the subordinate positions in the diplomatic corps had been placed on the merit system. Yet, it was ironic indeed that a government which demanded training and experience of its consular officials and diplomatic secretaries, would simultaneously allow political favorites, heavy campaign contributors, and businessmen to lead these subordinates and represent American interests abroad.
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I. Primary Materials

A. Printed Public Documents


Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1913-18. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920-33. The despatches were a necessary source of information about the reporting ability of the diplomats, but often they were unrevealing.

B. Printed Private Documents

1. Journals and Letters


Nevins, Allan, ed. The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock. Two volumes. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936. The journal was much more revealing about Whitlock’s activities in Belgium than the letters. Nevins’s comments about the minister were extremely laudatory.
Seymour, Charles. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Four volumes. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1926, 1928. The first two volumes contained some informative letters from Page and Gerard to House. Seymour also made some pertinent observations about these two envoys. The last two volumes contained little of value.

2. Memoirs


Egan, Maurice Francis. Ten Years Near the German Frontier, A Retrospect and a Warning. New York: George H. Doran, 1919. In this work Egan concentrated on the day-to-day activities of his mission, although he overemphasized his role in the negotiations for the Danish West Indies.

Egan, Maurice Francis. Recollections of a Happy Life. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924. Egan was more specific in this work, and gave substantial details about his appointment and his prescribed duties.

Francis, David R. Russia from the American Embassy April, 1916-November, 1918. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. The largest part of these memoirs was taken from extracts of Francis's confidential letters and despatches. This work revealed clearly his naïveté.

Gerard, James W. Face to Face With Kaiserism. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1918. This work was of little value in determining the quality of Gerard's performance in Germany. The ambassador characterized this work as a continuation of his My Four Years in Germany.
Gerard's discussion of his appointment was the only significant information in this work not contained in the other memoirs.

Possibly the best known of Gerard's memoirs, this book contained substantial information about the relation of the ambassador with the German Foreign Office and the Chancellor. Like all of his memoirs, this work was dramatic, reflecting Gerard's growing anti-Germanism.

Gibson seemed more aware of the diplomatic and political events in Belgium than his superior, Brand Whitlock.

Anecdotes were frequent in this work. Morgenthau discussed his relations with the Turkish government in some detail.

Morgenthau's imperiousness was very apparent in this work.

Morris did not give a very full account of his performance as minister to Sweden, and often he seemed quite naive.

Most of the events in this work were dictated to Mott, who was with Herrick in France. This book was saccharine.
Reinsch, Paul Samuel. *An American Diplomat in China.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922. These memoirs had been carefully culled before publication. Consequently, they were not extremely revealing.


Vopicka, Charles J. *Secrets of the Balkans: Seven Years of a Diplomatist's Life in the Storm Centre of Europe.* Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921. Vopicka hardly concealed his hatred of Germany and Austria and his partiality to the Balkan countries in this book.

Wheeler, Post and Rives, Hallie Erminie (Mrs. Post Wheeler). *Dome of Many-Colored Glass.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955. This voluminous work contained personal observations of some of the diplomats of the World War I period by one of their colleagues. Wheeler was hardly moderate in his evaluations—either severely critical or laudatory.

Whitlock, Brand, *Forty Years of It.* New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1913. This volume was of little value concerning Whitlock's diplomatic experiences. However, it was useful in demonstrating his reaction to domestic American political and social events prior to 1913.

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Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927. Wilson discussed his diplomatic career in some depth, although his discussion of his Mexican mission was a vindication of his performance rather than a candid evaluation.

II. Secondary Materials—Published

A. General, Topical, and Monographic Works

Allen, H.C. Great Britain and the United States A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1955. Since Allen's work was such a broad treatment of Anglo-American relations, one could not expect much depth on the World War I period. However, his favorable evaluation of Page supported other more extensive sympathetic accounts.

Arnett, Alex Mathew. Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1937. Arnett's few comments concerning the diplomatic corps during World War I were generally critical.

Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950. Bailey's comments about Francis were critical, but were useful concerning his appointment to Russia.

.... The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. Bailey's remarks about Morris's commercial negotiations in Sweden were helpful, since almost every historian has neglected this minister. However, they were explanatory rather than evaluatory comments.

Since this work was an official history of the Foreign Service, it was moderately critical of the slow evolution of the diplomatic corps to a more professional status. There was some good information about the appointments, however.


Beard's discussion of economic activities of Reisch in China was a useful supplement to the works of Gage and Pugach.


Bell gave some attention to Page's performance as ambassador, but the work was not intended to analyze the diplomatic corps during the Wilson administration.


The sections concerning Bryan and Lansing were informative, but were of little use for the study of the diplomats during the administrations of Wilson.

This book was of very little value for the study of Wilson's diplomatic appointments to Latin America.


This was a worthwhile introduction to the rise of the United States as an imperial and colonial power.

A balanced assessment of Gerard was conspicuous in this monograph, as was Birnbaum's abundant use of German sources.


This work has been replaced by a number of more comprehensive books. Callahan's interpretation of the role of Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico was sketchy. He did not implicate the ambassador in the plot to kill Madero or overthrow his government.


Callcott's evaluation of Ambassador Wilson was brief, but his criticism seemed pertinent and well-taken.


Calvert gave a great deal of attention to the American ambassador to Mexico—criticizing his actions, while sympathizing with his predicament. He was too speculative about Wilson's motivations, however.


The account was brief and to the point, but it should have included a few more examples.


This work contributed some helpful information about Bryan's role in the appointment of chiefs-of-mission, although the interpretations were not new.
There were no useful comments about the appointment of Whitlock in this work. However, Cramer made some criticisms of Walter Hines Page.

Crane, Katherine. Mr. Carr of State Forty-Seven Years in the Department of State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960.
Carr's long career in the Department of State made him an important subject in the study of the professionalization of the Foreign Service. However, there were few comments about the appointments during the administration of Wilson, or Bryan's role in the selection process.

This was possibly the best-balanced account of Whitlock's performance in Belgium. It was still somewhat superficial, however, since Crunden did not give sufficient attention to the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the minister.

Cumberland's analysis of Henry Lane Wilson was brief, but lucid.

The comments about Reinsch were not abundant, but this work is a standard study of Wilson's policy toward China and Japan.

The broad nature of the work did not allow for a comprehensive analysis of Morgenthau. The few comments about him emphasized his concern for the Armenians, but did not go much farther.
Dodd was almost defensive about Wilson's appointments to the major diplomatic posts.

Dulles recognized Francis's naivety as ambassador to Russia, and its effects on his despatches to Washington.

This study was of little value in explaining the role of Morgenthau in Turkey.

This was a useful supplement to Curry, for an understanding of Wilson's Asian policy. However, Fifield's evaluation of Reinsch was too brief and too laudatory.

Gibson's strongly critical account of the diplomatic corps demonstrated some of the serious weaknesses of non-professionals as envoys.

Grattan was critical of almost all phases of American foreign policy during World War I. Thus, his book should be used with care.

Gregory's objective and informative study was a lucid reevaluation of a complex ambassador.
Grieb attempted to present a balanced view of Henry Lane Wilson, but his prejudice against the Mexican policy of President Wilson was too obvious.

Although dated, this is a necessary overview for the study of United States Asian policy.

This new study of the revolutionary period in Mexico presented nothing new concerning the performance of Henry Lane Wilson. There was too much reliance upon United States sources.

This was a well-researched study, especially useful for its analysis of the effects of professionalism upon the consular and diplomatic services. However, Ilchman did not give sufficient attention to the use of spoils politics in the appointment of ministers and ambassadors.

Jessup provided some useful comments about Francis.

The biographical data was useful, but the interpretations were often poorly supported.

Kerney, James. The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson. New York: The Century Co., 1926. The editor and publisher of the Trenton Evening Times had a close association with the Wilson administration. For this reason, he was able to provide some valuable information about various diplomatic appointments. However, since he relied primarily upon his personal experiences during the Wilson administrations to write his book, his comments should be scrutinized carefully.

LaFargue, Thomas Edward. China and the World War. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1937. There were relatively few comments about the role of Reinsch in China.


Law, Frederick H. Modern Great Americans. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969. Originally published in 1926. This was only useful insofar as it gave some biographical information about Van Dyke.


Link's biography of Wilson was indispensable for this study. The discussion of various appointments was especially important. However, Link's evaluations of the diplomats were somewhat uneven—he could be overly critical or too sympathetic.


This was helpful for an understanding of Wilson's motivations for his foreign policy.


Many of the segments in this work relating to the diplomatic corps can be found in Link's Wilson.


This dated and poorly researched work was of little value in the study of Bryan's role in the selection of diplomats.


Mamatey included one of the few accounts of Vopicka's role as minister, although it was highly critical and condemning.


May's interpretation of the ascendency of the United States as a world power after the Spanish-American War was worthy of consideration, and a good background for an understanding of American diplomacy during the early twentieth century.
There was little discussion of the American diplomats during the World War I period, although this work provided a good background for an understanding of American neutrality.


One of the first works to attempt to synthesize the foreign policy of Wilson, Notter's work included some general comments about many of the newly appointed diplomats, but little detail.


Brother Rosewell's discussion of the appointment of Thomas Nelson Page to Italy was possibly the most thorough.


Palmer included a few pertinent comments about the performance of Walter Hines Page in London. The association between Baker and Whitlock was not clearly made, however.


Perkins gave little attention to Page's first two years in England.


The discussion of Stimson was not very fruitful.


Rappaport was not seriously concerned with Page's activities in London.


Ross presented a well-balanced and well-written account of Henry Lane Wilson's performance in Mexico, especially his relations with the Madero government.

Selle asserted that William Henry Donald, an Australian journalist, who worked in the inner political circles of the Manchus, was almost a legendary figure. Donald had acted as an intermediary between Reinsch and the Chinese government, and many episodes in this work revealed the complex internal difficulties in China with which the minister had to cope.


This is a standard study of the period, like Notter's, but it is quite dated. He gave minimal attention to the American chiefs-of-mission in Europe.


Smith's selective bibliography of secondary works was impressive.

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Smith gave a brief account of the relations between Lansing and Page.


Spaulding's evaluations of the major diplomats during the Wilson administration were not original. This seemed to be a popularization of the diplomatic corps, rather than a genuine research study.


This study had disappointingly little about Henry Lane Wilson.
This work was necessary for an understanding of the functions and duties of the American envoy. However, Stuart's discussion of the history of the Foreign Service was sketchy, and his evaluations of the diplomats under Wilson were superficial.

There were some brief discussions of the diplomatic appointments under Wilson.

This work was of no value for an assessment of the diplomatic posts in Latin America during the administrations of Wilson.

The emphasis of this study was not foreign relations of the United States or Whitlock's role as minister to Belgium. Consequently, Tager's comments on these subjects were superficial and unauthoritative.

There were a number of comments about Gerard and some of the other chiefs-of-mission in Europe, but Tansill never presented a lucid evaluation of the diplomatic corps during World War I.

Tansill not only provided the most comprehensive assessment of Egan's role in the negotiations for the islands, but indicated some of the inconsistencies in the minister's memoirs. His general evaluation of Egan's performance was quite limited, however.
Tarulis, Albert N. American-Baltic Relations 1918-1922: The Struggle Over Recognition. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965. This work was of little value in discussing the role of Francis, Egan and Morris. In fact, Tarulis did not use the memoirs of Morris.

Tassier, Suzanne. La Belgique et L'Entrée en Guerre des États-Unis (1914-1917). Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1951. Tassier was sympathetic to Whitlock, although she mentioned him infrequently.

Thayer, Charles W. Diplomat. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959. Thayer was a useful supplement to Ilchman and Stuart. His discussion of the qualities needed by an ambassador was especially worthwhile.


Welles, Sumner. Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic 1844-1924. New York: Payson and Clarke Ltd., 1928. Welles was critical of Bryan's role in the appointment of Sullivan.
Unterberger's work is more thorough than his study.

Willert's treatment of Page was sketchy.

This was an interesting contrast to Kennan, since Williams was critical of Francis. However, his discussion was too brief.

These two works were disappointing. Willson's research was inadequate, and his interpretations were shallow.

B. Articles

This was useful background for an understanding of Wilsonian policy in Latin America, but little was mentioned about the various diplomatic appointments to Latin America.

This article clarified many misconceptions about the sinking of the Cunard liner.

Blaisdell presented a moderate criticism of Ambassador Wilson's activities in Mexico, but did not introduce much new evidence.

Coletta, Paolo E. "Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and 'Deserving Democrats.'" *Mid-America*, XLVIII (April, 1966), 75-98.

Coletta gave more pertinent information about Bryan's use of spoils politics in this article than in his biography.


Daniel did not give much attention to Morgenthau's concern for the Armenian genocide, but the article was useful background.


Dodge's offers of financial support to Page and other diplomatic nominees were made clear.


This short article presented an excellent clarification of the case of the "Dacia." It also demonstrated that the effectiveness of Page as a diplomat was not necessarily what it seemed.

Gregory demonstrated how Page had fallen out of favor with the Wilson administration.
Harvey, George. "The Diplomats of Democracy." North American Review, February, 1914, 161-74. Harvey's frustration at not being offered a diplomatic sinecure was apparent in this article. Probably most noteworthy was his characterization of the appointments to Latin America as a "political debauchery." His indictment of Bryan was severe.

Kennan, George F. "The Sisson Documents." Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (March, 1956), 130-54. This article clarified the nature of the documents and why they were exploited as evidence that Lenin and possibly Trotsky were in the pay of the Germans. Kennan did not give substantial attention to the attitude of Francis.

Kent, Alan E. "Down From the Ivory Tower: Paul Samuel Reinsch, Minister to China." Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV (Winter, 1951), 114-18. Kent was severely critical of Reinsch's qualifications for the post in Peking, and concluded that he failed as a diplomat as a result. His comment that Reinsch's educational background was not compensation for his lack of practical experience as a diplomat was quite enlightening.

Kohlenberg, Gilbert C. "David Rowland Francis: American Businessman in Russia." Mid-America, XL (October, 1958), 195-217. Kohlenberg's concentration upon Francis's commercial negotiations was warranted, since it has been established that the improvement of commercial relations with Russia was one of the ambassador's primary duties.

Lasch, Christopher. "American Intervention in Siberia: A Reinterpretation." Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (June, 1962), 205-223. Lasch believed Francis was no less confused about the situation in Russia than anyone else.

Luce, Clare Boothe. "The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (October, 1957), 105-21. Most of Luce's examples were from the period after World War I, but her discussion of the role of the diplomat could easily be applied to the appointments during any administration.

Padgett, James A. "Diplomats to Haiti and Their Diplomacy." The Journal of Negro History, XXV (July, 1940), 265-330. The biographical information about Wilson's ministers to Haiti was useful.


Shelton, Brenda Kurtz. "President Wilson and the Russian Revolution." University of Buffalo Studies, XXII (March, 1957), 111-55. Shelton was mildly critical of Francis and made only passing references to him.

Stevens, Walter B. "David R. Francis, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia." The Missouri Historical Review, XIII (April, 1919), 195-225. This article was a laudatory account rather than a research study. It included little of value concerning the ambassador's performance in Russia.

Unterberger, Betty Miller. "President Wilson and the Decision to Send American Troops to Siberia." Pacific Historical Review, XXIV (February, 1955), 63-74. The information in this article was included in her book, America's Siberian Expedition.
Van Alstyne was quite critical of Page's role in the negotiations over the Declaration and Hendrick's interpretation of Page's role.

This article is dated, but still valuable.

Wolgemuth's article was useful for its description of the appointment of Curtis to Liberia. It also made clear that few negroes were appointed to prominent positions in the Wilson administration.

III. Secondary Materials--Unpublished

This was one of the few works dealing with the ambassador to Russia. However, DeYoung's conclusions were too speculative, and he relied upon United States sources exclusively.

Gage's treatment of Reinsch was balanced, although his style was uninspired.

Lowry was critical of the President and sympathetic towards the ambassador. However, his evaluation of the latter was neither original nor detailed.

Pugach, Noel Harvey. "Progress, Prosperity and the Open Door: The Ideas and Career of Paul S. Reinsch." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967. This former student of William Appleman Williams emphasized Reinsch's writings, which was noteworthy. And his discussion of the minister's activities in China was substantive. However, Pugach's conclusions were weak—almost defensive rather than analytical.

Thorburn, Neil Alfred. "Brand Whitlock: An Intellectual Biography." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965. Thorburn examined the influence upon Whitlock's intellectual development. Consequently there was not much information on the minister's diplomatic experience, and what was included was very general and speculative.