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Autonomy and achievement in the American culture

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AUTONOMY AND ACHIEVEMENT
IN THE AMERICAN CULTURE

By
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M.A., University of California, 1959
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American modal ways and values are subjects of worldwide interest. The cultural pattern of the United States' mainstream, the numerically-dominant and nationally-pervasive middle class, is herein treated and studied as the (majority) American ethnic. This mainstream pattern is often used by anthropologists, sociologists and others for their benchmark of comparison, against which are measured other ethnic cultures' patterns and component characteristics—the nature of Japanese or Hopi success drives versus the American, or old-time Italian extended familialism compared with American nuclear family autonomy. In probing and clarifying one sector of the American culture's most distinctive or salient traits and values, this paper cites evidence and interpretations to give insight into our widely held national image, indicating the nature of one area of discrepancy between the overt ideal American conception and the covert majority pattern.

Two major trait-values found to be potently linked and powerfully decisive in the American pattern are autonomy and achievement. They are so strong as to be imperatives in most people's lives. Minority groups that do not share these (or other first-rank, equally significant trait-values such as the nature of family ties, or deferred gratification pattern), to the same general extent, intensity, or mode may thereby differ sufficiently to be classified as subcultures, deviant or pluralistic sub-ethnics, such as the Ghetto-poor,
the Japanese-Americans, and other 'ethnics' like Jewish-Americans, Hutterites, and even Mormons or communal 'Hippies.'

In this study I am indebted especially to Clyde Kluckhohn's pioneering approaches and comprehensive evaluations of dominant American values (1958a:147). After review of the works on American values in many disciplines, saturation reading in American History, and then intensive study of empirical investigations, Kluckhohn came to the carefully considered conclusion that there is a marked and widely dominant set of values, shared extensively, geographically and class-wise, although in varying degrees, by the bulk of the United States population. He found that there is as much consistency and continuity of values and patterns in the American culture as there is in the dominant patterns of traits identified for the mainstream of England, or Germany, or Japan, or any other large-scale ethnic grouping.

While Kluckhohn's treatment was holistic, and he thus identified and dealt with at least a score of American trait-values considered preeminent, this paper must necessarily focus on a manageable section of our cultural components. Autonomy and achievement were therefore selected for study as two of the most important. However, for wider understanding and in search of materials related to the thematic traits, this writer has read the full coverage material by Kluckhohn and others (listed in the C part of the Bibliography) dealing with the major aspects or holistic treatment of the American culture.
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Chapter 1

CRYSTALLIZING AND DEFINING THE TRAIT-VALUES INITIALLY--RIMROCK

This initial chapter tentatively affixes and clarifies the two key trait-values denominated. In it the contrasting and varying patterns of the five subcultures found by Vogt and Albert (1966) in their study of Rimrock-Homestead, New Mexico, in the 1950's is used to identify and define the autonomy and achievement complex traits.

Trait—a distinguishing feature or quality; characteristic—is used herein roughly synonymously with value—elements in social life (ideals, customs, institutions) towards which the people of a group have an affective regard (American College Dictionary). Clyde Kluckhohn's definition (Vogt and Albert 1966:6) is:

A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.

Vogt and Albert in part further define their concept of value:

Values...have persistency over time, and manifest directionality, an observable consistency of response to recurrent situations; and are inter-related as elements in distinctive patterns or systems; i.e., as differentiated but interdependent parts of the whole.

Value orientations of selected samples of social groups can be identified and compared, as was done in this Rimrock study, by interviews, field observations of individuals and groups, formal questionnaires (to elicit value choices),
Rorschach Tests, Magic Man Tests, color charts, tachistopic images, tape recordings of small group discussions, or by studies of oral literature—all subject to the anthropologists' educated interpretations. Most pioneer studies in social anthropology, as Boas et al., used mainly or exclusively the first two methods.

The Rimrock-Homestead study was conducted by a team of several anthropologists working in the arid Rimrock area, a 7000-foot plateau of western New Mexico, near the hamlet of Homestead. Five distinct social groupings, comprising two main culture variations and two or three distinct subcultures, of or in acculturation with the American ethnic, co-existed and were studied side by side. They were: 2486 Zuni Indians (in their ancestral homeland); 625 Navajos (in-migrants since 1868); 89 Spanish-Americans, called "Mexicans" (dating from 1865); 241 Mormons (dating from 1882); and 232 Panhandle Tex-Oklahomans (some dating from 1865 but mostly forced migrants from the 1930's dust bowl), hereinafter referred to as Pantexes. For this paper the contrasts and comparisons among all five groups are informative, but in particular the divergences between those two groups fully enculturated as inheritors and carriers of the American ethnic culture—the Mormons and the Pantexes. The authors deemed the Pantexes as relatively representative in expressing the dominant American cultural norms (though a somewhat distinctive Southwest-cum-Ozarks version), at least in dealing with autonomy and achievement, and the Mormons as definitely
somewhat more deviant from mainstream values as intensified in their locally-spatially separate subgroup residence and association patterns (Vogt 1955:1167). Due to the remoteness of the area and isolation from the parent Salt Lake body, this group was ultraconservative Mormon in its values and therefore in its practices (Vogt & Albert 1966:46-48, 13, 214).

The study showed that each of the five groups occupied a somewhat different ecological niche in the same area; that their choices, or resort under pressure, depended on their group's patterned solutions based upon values—conceptions of the desirable—and that up to the study time each tended to hold to its distinctive cultural patterns and differing response to the environment. Each group's pattern of living and values was consciously a reflection of the group's identity. An example of this was illustrated in a comparison between dwelling patterns of the Mormons and the Pantexes. Although both shared the bulk of their common American values, such as the importance of rational mastery over nature, of achievement, success, progress, optimism (Vogt & O'Dea 1953:648), they diverged when it came to individualness (autonomy) versus groupness in coping with similar problems.

Illustrative of this divergence were the contrasting settlement and dwelling patterns. The Mormons originally laid out their settlement somewhat like an early New England Puritan town, with homes grouped regularly within hailing
proximity. This facilitated cooperative irrigation systems and other group endeavors. They have continued to live thus in newer settlements despite the shift to non-water-demanding dry farming. By contrast, the Pantexes settled individualistically, each nuclear family on its own ranch and homestead, dispersed some distance from each other with no effort to form a settlement pattern facilitating mutual assistance and group demands (Vogt & Albert 1966:171-2). Thus the Pantexes, carrying more nearly the central stream of American culture, put a high value on being "on their own," not closely associated with their neighbors or any community (pressure) organization. They prized their autonomy, whereas group discipline of the Mormons, reinforced by religious conviction, impelled them to partially submerge their individual "freedom" (autonomy) for the greater good of the group and, incidentally, greater support of the component families. This is not a central majority American value practice.

**Individualism Versus Autonomy**

The Rimrock authors strongly stressed that "individualism" and adherence to "independence" are values held very highly in the dominant American culture. They noted, through systematic observation of conversation and patterns of behavior, and through value indicative tests, that the Pantexes constituted an archetypical personification of these traits. Like classic frontiersmen, they could not tolerate living "bunched up" like the Mormons (Vogt & Albert
Although the three terms individualism, independence, and autonomy can be used to cover the same or overlapping areas of values and consequent behavior, this paper will employ the term autonomy to denote that aspect of individualism and independence that has as its foremost goal self-steering--freedom from being steered by any group or person, freedom from detailed prescriptions enjoined by perceived social institutions. This distinction is necessary because of widespread value illusions or confusions between the "overt" ideal and the "covert", held for and by the American ethnic; this is illustrated in the Pantex's overt conviction that, by dwelling physically and organizationally isolated from his kind, he was a "free man." In the sense of daily decision making, in steering his own and nuclear family life, this would be immediately true. But in the sense that each carried the same cultural pattern and values that dictated this behavior and did not countenance marked individual variations from it, each was thereby unknowingly constrained. Thus the Pantexes were really not culturally free; they could not deviate much from their cultural norms as, for example, to create and submit to the discipline of cooperative organizations, as did the Mormons. Although "free" to choose among them, he was enjoined to participate in one of the range of ten fundamentalist-inclined Protestant churches. A man was free to choose his own brand, or even fragment a new one (quasi-individualism) but within the avowed Protestant limits
Hence, autonomy is herein employed to characterize that aspect of individuality and independence that cherishes and emphasizes one's own career, own life decision-making and living, apart from others' overt suasion, and without reference to the compulsion of an organized monitoring social group—as the religio-social Mormon organization. This autonomy necessarily involves isolation from fellows; the degree and kind denotes some of the principal characteristics of American life. It is latently a reference value embodied in the old American expression, "Every man for himself, and God take the hindmost."\(^1\)

The reader may question whether such an autonomy-oriented group could have accomplished as much nationally and individually as the Americans have; this problem is considered in the concluding chapter.

Of marked significance was the finding that the Rimrock Mormons, by virtue of collective plus individual efforts, achieved more community benefits and community activities, and enjoyed a higher collective and individual economic standard, than did the Pantexes. The Pantex farm and business

\(^1\)The cousins and offspring of these Pantexes "bunched up" in heavily urbanized California would seem to have to operate from a drastically different ethic, yet in each suburban subdivision these same autonomous values, recast in urban form, still strongly operate. (See Chapter 3.)
enterprises were operated according to classic individualistic free enterprise principles with only the nuclear family cooperating, rarely modified by a limited amount of work exchange between kinsmen and neighbors; each nuclear family was on its own.

With the Mormons the concept of individual private property was strongly modified to include several extended family enterprises and several cooperatives for irrigation, for town water, and for cattle raising, all encouraged and cultivated by an elaborate church-run communal system. The Mormons had, in their development under Joseph Smith's tutelage, modified the dominant American pattern by raising cooperative institutions to a level equal with individual enterprise. The church provided capital and loans to launch communal enterprises. Hence, among the Mormons, the American ethnic's pervasive autonomy trait was strongly ameliorated to the point where each family was not on its own. In this respect, the Mormons resembled the Zuni and Navahos (and Japanese, and Israelis, and many other cultures) (Vogt & Albert 1966:187-190, 58).²

² These Pantexes derived from the Southwest Ozark variant of the American culture and therefore in their extreme "independence" were an exaggerated version of the modal American ethnic ("bigger than life"—in other words, beyond the norm). In contrast, the Mormons probably derived from the mainstream majority Northern culture, hence a comparison between Mormons and the mainstream north and west culture would not be so sharp. Nonetheless there would be (and is) clear enough distinction, as witnessed in Northern California by the author—despite the fact that most of the Northern California mainstreamers and Mormons alike stem from the Middle West.
The negative results of the Pantexes' autonomous orientation versus the constructive results of the Mormons' collective orientation were perhaps magnified in Rimrock to an unusual degree. The contrasts were highlighted in several similar issues with which each group had to deal. One instance occurred in 1934 when the Pantexes had opportunity, through the United States Government, to band together and buy a large chunk of land suitable for settlement by their youth. They failed to organize. The result was that the excess population had to drain itself off to the Rio Grande Valley and further west to California. When confronted with a similar situation in 1945 to find a place for thirty-two returning war veterans, the Mormons successfully negotiated a large church loan and bought thirty-eight sections to operate as a cooperative in terms of land ownership, but with individual ownership of cattle. In so doing they mated cooperative and individual values, thus paralleling to some degree the system of the Navajo.

Another value-charged situation occurred in 1950 when a construction company offered to gravel the Rimrock streets for $800.00. The Mormons contracted mutually for this improvement for Rimrock. But the Pantexes in nearby Homestead were unable to agree on the operation; the upshot was that only the individual store owners paid for graveling in front of their own places. Another contrast was the response to a State offer to contribute toward the building of a high school gym if the citizens would provide the labor. In Rimrock,
under the leadership of the principal, a Mormon leader, arrangements were made whereby each able-bodied man either worked or contributed $50.00. Although some crayfished, the group pressure ultimately told, and the building was completed in 1953. In Homestead, however, the Pantexes complained of overwhelming burdens in their individual families and ranches; they worked only as long as State wages were offered, but would contribute no free labor. The gym was only partly built; the adobe bricks disintegrated in the rain.

For community dances the Mormons organized a budget of $15.00 per year per family. The dances were well-attended and served as a significant social outlet fostering intra-group cohesion. With the Pantexes in Homestead, dances were "ad hoc," there was no organization to sponsor, attendance was fitful, and festering tensions between families, incidental to heavy drinking, often erupted into fist-fights (Vogt & O'Dea 1953:648-651). 3

Socialization - Autonomous Independence Versus Subordinated Interdependence

Vogt and Albert found (1966:91-102) that the socialization process established these differential values in

3These comparisons seem perhaps unrepresentative, putting the carriers of the dominant American culture in a position of invidious performance inferiority to the well-organized Mormons—in this thinly populated backwater setting. In other settings the differential gap closes to a degree, usually by the tax compulsions of myriad local governments enjoining communal measures and so counter-acting autonomy in serving community needs. (See in this regard Chapter 4).
children very early. A comparison of child-raising practices among the Pantexes, Mormons and Zunis makes this clear.

In their push for independence, the Pantexes ended breast feeding earliest of the three groups, at a median age of nine months (the range for the Pantexes was six to thirteen months, which is close to mainstream American practice and hence evidence of the normativeness of the Pantexes). The Mormons ended breastfeeding at a middling median of twelve months (range, eight to seventeen) and the Zunis the latest (median twenty-four months, range twelve to sixty). Toilet training followed similar curves: the Pantexes were the earliest, starting at a median nine months and ending at thirteen and one-half months; the Mormons starting at a median twelve months, ending at twenty-one months; Zunis again the longest, starting at a median eighteen months and ending at two and one-half years. The Zunis heavily stressed respect and discipline; the Mormons put a fairly strong stress on respect and discipline, and demanded especially getting along with the group. Fighting among children was highly discouraged by Zunis and actively discouraged by Mormons. In contrast, the Pantexes thought fighting not necessarily a bad, and possibly a good, thing; it was good training. Above all, in the Pantex value system, each child must be trained to (individually) pull his weight in the world. "Sassing" parents was not condemned by the Pantexes, but was abhorred by the Mormons and heavily suppressed by the Zunis, with the aid of witches.
The autonomous cultural drive of the Pantexes tended to stress competition, and begat factionalism and feuding; inter-family cooperation was exceptional. In religion, for instance, they fractionated into the following: Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, Nazarene, Campellite, Holiness, Seventh Day Adventist, Present Day Disciples, and even Catholic (though these members were considered "lost," conversion having stemmed from marriage to a "Mexican").

The Mormons, secure at the top of the Rimrock area cultural-status system, considered the Pantexes rough, immoral, and disorganized. However, the Mormons acknowledged the Pantexes' more open friendliness. They admired and pitied especially the Pantex courage in pitting themselves one by one (autonomously) against the harsh, arid, Southwest climate and adverse farming conditions. From a Mormon view, they pitied the Pantexes in their coping with such adversity without real divine sustenance, fraternal communion, or effective earthly organization (Vogt & O'Dea 1953:651-2).

Achievement - Individual Versus Collective

The mainstream American culture's overlapping association and close identification of independence with success is perhaps unconsciously illustrated by the authors (Vogt & Albert 1966:119) in their statement:

That the Texans are extreme with respect to childrearing practices that promote a strong drive for success is indicated by the age at which they wean their children, assuming this is the first step in training for independence. (Italics supplied)
As analytic observers of the Pantex culture and as members themselves of the dominant American ethnic, the writers took it for granted that independence and success are to be equated or at least are inescapably linked. Numerous other cultures do not assume this equation, notably the Japanese, where success perforce must normatively be in the context of group accomplishments (Goodman 1957; Caudill & de Vos 1956). As noted above, the typical Pantex mother viewed independence in the context of her child being a self-starter, being directed toward and equipped for achieving and doing things on his own. Most American readers will recognize this orientation as so normal, so pervasive, as hardly worth mentioning. Here is found reaffirmation that this cultural norm, this close identity of autonomy and achievement, is a pervasive value tandem operating as a basic component unit of those elements which are distinctive to the American ethnic's value system. This close identity provides a cogent argument for studying these trait-values as a joint pair in this paper; to study one without the other would be to miss a key relationship.

The Magic Man Test is used to measure the force and direction of the achievement drive in children. In it the children are asked to make choices as to what they would like to be. It has been used cross-culturally by different anthropologists, and it has been found to yield results that correlate positively with the results of the Thematic Apperception Tests (TAT) following McClelland (see 1961)
and Whiting and Child (1953). The test is a measure of a
culture's values, indicating those goals and statuses
towards which the society, the adults, have socialized their
children.

In comparative Magic Man scoring, Pantex children came
out with an orientation toward achievement score of 57%,
Mormon 38%, and Zuni 20%. To the query "What kind of person
would you like to be?" the Mormon children tended to respond
with ".../be/ good, honest, kind...or fish, run, go swimming,"
whereas the Pantexes aspired to ".../be/ a great doctor in
the Mayo Clinic...to be a rancher and raise beef cattle so
I can get some money...a great Yankee baseball player."
In greatest contrast, the Zuni typically responded "...to be
a man (or woman)," i.e., to be a Zuni. It is notable that a
high proportion of the Pantex childrens' aspiration dreams
were to excel, to be a success, an individual success, in
far off places divorced from the fostering community. By the
same token, Pantex children were most eager to grow up (so
they could achieve these higher statuses), whereas Zuni
children were quite satisfied as they were (Vogt & Albert
1966:107-8).

The testers then offered the children, under the heading
"What is the nicest thing that could happen to you?" the
choices of Goods, or Status (rich, famous, powerful), or
Fun, or Security (not being sick, or punished, or separated
from the family.) Whereas Zuni children were most tempted
by Goods--candy, clothes or money--the Mormon girls preferred

The authors concluded that for Pantexes, early weaning, early and strong pressure for self-reliance and individual achievement, were the child-rearing determinatives of the ongoing value system, and that success individually attained in some high status position was the ultimate goal. Their study noted that perhaps one-third of the Mormons were indistinguishable from Pantexes in patterns of early weaning, and stress on independence. They predicted that in another generation the Mormon patterns would be indistinguishable from the general American pattern, as represented by the Pantexes (Vogt & Albert 1966:122).

Summary

This chapter has introduced the thesis that autonomy and achievement are linked twin trait values of fundamental significance in the imperative patterns of the American

4 This observation and prediction is included herein to afford faithful reporting—that Mormons and Pantexes did overlap to varying extents, depending on the values in question. However, the prediction was probably rash. From the author's local (San Francisco Bay area and immediate hinterland) observation there is convergence, but there is still significant distinctive Mormon-type variation in value patterns.

Recent studies indicate that Catholics in the United States now hold the same value patterns as the mainstream, which is historically WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). Thus the Mormons have managed to maintain distinctive values whereas the Catholics have not. It may be significant that the Mormons are growing in numbers whereas the Catholics are diminishing.
(United States) dominant mainstream culture. The distinction has been made between the autonomy characteristic and other aspects of individualism and independence. It was stressed that American culture distinctively inculcates and operates on the expectation that each person is quite separate from others. Each is emancipated from binding lineal or collateral groups that would directly inhibit the most free exercise of individual, egocentric, will—as would obligatory ties and duties to kinfolk, cooperative enterprises, and churches with strong social demands. It was noted that achievement in the American culture is highly correlated with autonomy. Each person is expected to achieve high or higher status, independently. He does not advance as a symbiotic participant in a kin or other reference group or cohesive ethnic phalanx aiming to reflect pride on, and mutually advance, the family or group, as with Levantine Armenians or Japanese. Rather, the normative American scrambles through life mostly as a lone achiever, divorced from permanent group allegiances or identities except for the minimum of his fleeting nuclear family.

The micro-society sample findings of the Rimrock study indicated and illustrated these points, with the settlers from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle identified as archetypically representative of the dominant American values. The more group-oriented and constrained Mormons were found to be in partial contrast as to life styles, but in marked contrast in the trait-values in question. For, though the Mormon
culture and Pantex culture generally carried the same American values on the whole, the Mormons deviated significantly in consciously and successfully raising collective values and constraints and resultant behaviors to a level approaching equal status with individual achievement. Thus the contrast highlighted the subject values. The Zuni's values served as an opposite pole of contrast, being highly anti-autonomy, and pervasively group-obligations-oriented.

The Rimrock study was based not only on interviews, participant observation, and questionnaires, but also on Rorschach and Magic Man testing.

In the subsequent chapter possible historical roots of this autonomy-achievement trait complex will be offered. Then an array of more detailed and wider-ranging international cross-cultural studies, containing comparisons with data, will be analyzed. Finally, recent manifestations of these trait-values and their configuration in contemporary urbanized American society will be delved into and assessed.
Chapter 2

HISTORICAL CLUES AND POSSIBLE ANTECEDENTS: AUTONOMY AND ACHIEVEMENT

Purpose

This Chapter seeks possible and likely antecedents marking the origins and development of Autonomy and Achievement in the American culture. The findings and interpretations of modern scholars as Seymour Lipset, Jules Henry, Cora Dubois and Bernard Bailyn—respectively a Sociologist, two Anthropologists, and a Social Historian—are presented. These and other contemporary specialists studied early historical records, and firsthand (1750-1840) observer accounts such as those of Alexis De Tocqueville, Harriet Martineau and others. They weighed and compared the findings of these early observers, seeking regularities in behavior that persisted through generations. At length, after rigorous examination and evaluation, they came to similar conclusions. They found distinctive American trait-values that operated pervasively, regularly and consistently as manifest in the ways and aspirations of several successive generations. They found a cultural pattern.

Nuclear Conjugal Units - Self Determination

The authors of the Rimrock study attached considerable significance to the normative American rural dwelling pattern

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as typified by the Pantexes' mode of homesteading and maintenance of separate dwellings, through many generations. Each lived on his own farm, an average of one mile from each other. A study of American history indicates that, apart from the early Puritan settlements and the protective stockade of certain other early settlers, individual voluntary isolation was the typical American pattern. In Rimrock the Pantexes thought that such isolation produced independent, resourceful, autonomous people, since the family, and especially the children, lived their daily lives somewhat sequestered from, and independent of, one another. This was in complete contrast to the nearby Mexican or Spanish village, Atrisco, where homes were grouped closely into a village pattern, and the workers made daily work trips into the surrounding fields (Vogt & Albert 1966:166), following the millenial patterns of Spain and Italy, and southern Europe in general.

Conrad Arensberg (1955:1143-61) dubbed this pattern of individual dispersed farms and farmsteads Einzelhof. He stated that the pattern antedated the birth of American culture. It had been established historically all along the Atlantic "seawall" from Berber Africa north through Atlantic Spain and the Celtic lands (but not England?) to northwest Europe. Thus, he believed, the pattern was brought to America by Dutch, Rhinelanders and Scots-Irish. It was later confirmed by such acts as the post-Revolutionary War western land grants to ex-soldiers, and by the Homestead
Acts of the 1860s, which further facilitated the trend toward continuing dispersal. He noted that pioneers went west as lone individuals or as minimal nuclear families, loosely associated in groups without ordered clustering or fixed membership.¹

The interpretation is thus that the major non-English immigrant cultures brought to America this pattern of dispersed settlement coupled with its associated livelihood values, and that the unique opportunities of a rich and wide-open frontier afforded optimum opportunity to this trend toward individualized sequestered farmsteads. From this evidence it would appear that the village-bound English traits could, in a few generations, shift to the Einzelhof pattern. Such a pattern would be likely to favor individualistic traits over patterns and institutions of collective mutual help and constraint. Factors such as virtually free land, great geographic mobility, and the economic ease of setting up independent households seem to have favored rapid growth of, and shift toward, this mode of living and its attendant values (Vogt & Albert 1966:114–116, citing Bailyn 1960:23).

Vogt and Albert attributed part of this atomistic or individualization development to the abrupt break-up of the Elizabethan extended family, incidental to relocation in the New World, but it is more likely that such extended kinship ties had been weakened or terminated long before

¹The Donner-Reed overland party, whose membership almost entirely succumbed to starvation in the California Sierras in 1846, illustrated this loose transitory affiliation pattern.
the American settlement. This breakup of ties plus the peculiarly American factors cited might help explain why
the settlement of the South African frontier by the Dutch
Boers and the Siberian frontier by the Russians did not
produce the same individualistic patterns of nuclear family
dwelling and livelihood, nor any approximate degree of
autonomous individualistic values (Hofstadter & Lipset
1968:9-13, 165-167). It could be that the relative safety
and possibility of individual emigration from England and
Northwest Europe to America fostered an unbounded individual­
ness in the migration. Also, the "escape" to the New World
may have selectively attracted a significant proportion of
anti-authority, anti-compulsion types of personalities that
deviated somewhat from their normative home-cultures in
being anti-authority, anti-constraint in orientation. England
in Elizabethan and later times had a significant share of
anti-authority, rebellious, and major and minor criminal
types of people.

It seems logical to say that, whereas a large extended
family dwelling unit perforce needed to suppress intra-group
aggression, as with the Zunis and pre-Elizabethan English,
a family reduced to the United States dominant nuclear
conjugal unit had fewer such pressures and could give vent
to or even encourage aggressiveness, individual-oriented
effort, and, ultimately, individual careers. The historic
18th century pattern was for each excess child in growing
up to forsake his parental home and settled neighborhood for
the frontier to make his own way. Such pattern would also foster the bent of "This new man, this American" to oppose overt authority constraint and collective institutions, since this new American modal personality was at least shaped by such institutional pressures—in comparison to most societies.

**Independent Self-Starting Bent Nurtured**

Studies of Elizabethan English precepts to parents disclosed that these ancestral patterns stressed obedience and the dampening of aggressiveness. Following this value pattern English colonies in the 1600's and 1700's in Massachusetts passed numerous laws designed to reinforce family, and especially patriarchal family, authority. Schools were set up in considerable part to attempt reinforcement of these old values. Although the town fathers struggled for community retention of their European-based value ideals of deference to father and obedience to authority and community constraint values, these values and their practices were, in the 1600's and 1700's, eroded rapidly. Young parents moved away from the traditional influences of grandparents and away from the mores reinforcement of surrounding close-in public opinion (Bailyn 1960:25-26).

First the confines of the 1000-year-old village in England were escaped; then the 50-year-old township in Massachusetts

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Note that from the beginning American schools were conceived not just for skills teaching but for socialization along the lines and values targeted by the representative school boards.
was forsaken. New settlements were made and new authority established, but there was a slippage, an erosion of authority all along the way. In typical continuation of these American patterns that had evolved, the 1950's Pantexes stressed individual initiative and independence as much higher values than obedience (Chapter 1). In contrast, the Mormons, in accord with their preceptor Joseph Smith, consciously sought to return to the early New England and English Puritan family values. The Mormons deviated from the American mainstream in several ways, some dating to their beginnings in the 1830's and 1840's. Not the least divergence was apparent in their adherence to close community ties, family and group discipline, subordination of the individual to the group.¹

Murray G. Murphey (1965:144-163) reviewed accounts of America written about 1800. He found that foreign observers noted extreme permissiveness of parents, absence of deference to authority, lack of parental authority, but at the same time they also observed ability of the

¹"Go West": This contrast was graphically illustrated in the 1846-49 Western prairie and mountain crossing where the disciplined, prudent, group-oriented Mormons lost not a single man nor suffered much hardship on their trek to Utah, whereas the individualistic trekkers to California and Oregon suffered and died extensively.

However, under institutional discipline select volunteers of this self-reliant dominant culture were able to defeat the individualistic, rather disorganized and fractioned Mexican armies--perhaps showing a latent American capacity to selectively accept, and be subordinate to, constraint institutions of government, at least sporadically (Potter 1962). However, the later brigades of the 1856 Mormon "handcart" migration lost trekkers due to a late August start and poor provision.
children to take care of themselves, precocity and early maturity. Harriet Martineau (English writer, 1802-1876) likewise observed that American children were left to a considerable extent to their own development, that their early training was to maximize activity and independence (Lipset 1963:120 citing Martineau 1837:14-15). Lipset also noted that Max Berger, quoting Marryat (1943) and Dixon Wecter (1937), had found corroborative evidence in the evaluations of several other European observers that American children were seen to be undisciplined, aggressive, independently capable, self-willed, and spoiled. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., affirmed roughly the same views, citing J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, 1783, and James Bryce, 1888 (1943:225-244). De Tocqueville (French nobleman writer, 1805-1859) found mistrust of authority even in schools where the children made up their own rules in games (Lipset 1963:122).

Observations of Autonomous Independence

Jules Henry cited that portion of Alexis De Tocqueville's 1831 evaluation of American society wherein the latter admired the courage of each man, each conjugal family, fighting life alone, but mourned that nobody was compelled to help his neighbor nor could expect much help. Equality of opportunity was thought to offer a fair chance to all. De Tocqueville felt that such value practices produced much self-reliance. Henry adduced that the origins of this individual drive for achievement, for acquiring mastery
over the environment and over one's own life, came from the circumstances of the suppressed peoples of (Northwest) Europe being suddenly released (1936:5-6). With 140 years of hindsight, historians feel that De Tocqueville's observations and analysis of American character are a startlingly accurate appraisal of the on-going American character. Moreover, recent studies of American value patterns tend to show a great deal of continuity in values from De Tocqueville's time to the near present. Lipset holds that the basic core values of the American character are unchanging, that the character may take new forms, but the basic value imperatives tend to continue through generations (1963:110).

Factors such as the salient aspect of the autonomous personality noted—the extreme self-reliance imperative and the unwillingness to submit to institutions of community obligation as policing, the lack of help from others—paints a picture somewhat at odds with the conventional, nostalgic American folk image of cooperative group barn raisings, exchange of farm work and equipment. Though there is evidence of some practice of and value in informal mutual help and ad hoc neighborliness, there is also evidence

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4 In Henry's view this independent drive to mastery and urge for individual self-advancement became so plausible and possible with the richness of the continent to exploit, that it inculcated a permanent, greedy acquisitiveness, a vice—consumerism—that lies at the root of many of our ills. The notion is not central to this thesis, though it may or may not have merit.
presented below of counter traits. Marion Pearsall stated that the typical American frontier model developed all along the Appalachian Mountain edge. Then it flowed westward from the Middle Atlantic Fringe through the Southern Appalachians into the Ohio Valley, northwestward into the Middle West, and southwestward between 1820-1860 into the Ozarkian regions of Missouri and Arkansas and East Oklahoma and Texas. In so doing it carried along the ancestral culture of the Pantexes. In the more open country locations, wider communication and later urbanization influences modified the ancestral patterns somewhat toward more constraint and volunteer fire department type of cooperation. But, Pearsall stated, in the Appalachian coves the folk retained the old unchanged patterns of culture, unrefined, for a longer period of time.

From his studies of sources contemporary with 1820-1860, Pearsall found that his adjudged archetypical segment of the American culture, the trans-Appalachian society in its "purest" state, was composed of autonomous neighborhoods, consisting of small, shifting, diffuse, atomistic groups. These were subject to frequent disintegration as communities, especially as the soil was exhausted and folk moved on. He found that each frontiersman was supposed to take care of himself and expected others to do the same; that relations between households were frequently hostile. The cooperation that did occur tended to follow kinship lines. Families would sometimes band together to set up schools and churches,
but tended to break apart easily (1966:128-141). "Independent" was the ideal value, the Leitmotiv. Pastors and schoolmasters historically lived very insecure existences—as did their independent employers.

Converse Aspects of Independence: Isolation, Cultural and Peer Pressure

Although these aforesaid American trait values of autonomous achievement helped to produce some of the most capable-seeming, enterprising, energetic and achieving people on earth, paradoxically these traits produced also serious weaknesses. Though the resultant or associated American political culture became outstanding in the world for wealth, accomplishments, individual freedoms, and swiftly evolved national image of idealistic humanity coupled with pragmatic opportunism, still these penetrating observers of the national character noted an unexpected set of inhibitions and impediments. They found associated factors engendering a debilitating insecurity that in some personalities amounted to a crushing burden.

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5This is reminiscent of a 1971 fission of a Livermore (northern California) Baptist church, where a fraction disliking the Pastor's views (and behavior) split off and set up an "independent" church. This fractionization of congregation-run churches has been typical of American social patterns. It continues to go on here in this ultimate manifestation of American culture, California—especially from the more frontier-traditioned or southern value-carrying churches.

6The term "independent" has great value significance in the American culture and is frequently employed in situations like the above to signify breaking off and opposition to something rejected.
According to Bailyn those cultural forces which continually pressed the normative American toward individual autonomy and achievement tended to heighten the individual's sense of separateness, causing him to look upon society from without, as a non-member, rather than from within. The community and its embodiment, the State, seemed external, artificial. The institutions of government and religion did not belong to or embrace the individual. Therefore he was isolated and alone (1960:25-26). Thus if he suffered any setback—"bad luck," accident, disease, or failure to achieve—the American was quite alone. He had few family or group ties to sustain him (Henry 1966:6 citing De Tocqueville).

Despite this feeling of exclusion (or perhaps because of it), despite this stress on "independence," the American pattern produced a paradoxical strong need to conform to the values of the group. These normative group values were not devolved from those of the respected elites, as in De Tocqueville's France or in most prior societies, but arose from the mass, the awesome tyranny of peer-group pressure. Martineau claimed in 1837 that Americans were very

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7In Himrock "bad luck", adverse nature, was advanced by the Pantexes as understandable reason for failure, whereas any acknowledgement of human failing, or lack of either competence or "gumption", would have been an intolerable burden to the self-image shaped from childhood and through many generations toward success (Vogt & Albert 1966:124).
fearful of the opinions of others, especially of being
considered singular (unusual, nonconformist, "oddball" in
the current lexicon). She held that they "wore chains of
repression" imposed by intolerant collective standards of
behavior. A German traveler, Francis J. Grund, stated in
the 1830's that Americans operated in the fear and appre­
hension that their actions, opinions, and beliefs might be
condemned by their fellows. James Bryce (British writer,
1838-1922) likewise encountered in America a strong tendency
to accept and fall in line with the dominant opinion—much
more so than in Britain (Lipset 1936:108--Martineau /1833:

Clyde Kluckhohn also agreed with De Toqueville's
estimate, citing his conclusion that even though in America
"the will of a man was not shattered," nevertheless his
fate was shaped and guided. The popular will forced
conformity. "Mavericks" were free to think differently
and still retain life and property, but they henceforth
became strangers to their own people, subject to social
scorn and ostracization. Kluckhohn accepted this judgment
to a degree, but not fully. He affirmed the anti-higher
"establishment" value but also the parochial subordination
of Americans to standards that were strongly defined and
enjoined by public approval; that

while Americans do not easily accept authority from
above, they have ever been highly vulnerable to the
impersonal and unorganized authority of their
social environment (1958a:186).
Thus the need for social approval, based on approval of one's peers, even in semi-isolated settings, appears to have been a factor negating and corrosive of the mythological, complete, "mountain man" independence. Even in the carving out of autonomous careers there had to be validation from the approval of others—the society. Hence the basic form of independence always bore its flawed contrary side producing a vulnerability to public opinion that eroded and countered deeper self-direction and weakened self-respect.

Wider Historical Hindsights

In comparing American culture with that culture most closely related, the English Canadian, Lipset (1964:173-192) found significant differences, rooted originally in the American "independent" (anti-authority) values growing out of the aforementioned early (pre-1800) transoceanic and value-shaping frontier influences. Unlike the Canadian, these values were reinforced by the successful anti-government, anti-authority ideology of the American Revolution. These established cultural patterns were then further reinforced in the 19th and 20th centuries by the American romanticization of the aggressively independent, capable frontiersman, followed by the gun-wielding lone cowboy, imposing his own concept of law. In contrast, the later-settled, more evolutionary Canadian society was more willing to accept official authority, characterized by the institution-backed, community-approved, romantic but institutional authority figure, the Canadian Mountie.
Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the whole body of literature on American values, consisting of scores of observations and evaluations by many different authors, disclosed to his satisfaction that "in broad outline there is remarkable agreement upon their stability through more than one hundred and fifty years" (1958a:149). Carefully he questioned whether the early observers might have been contaminated in their objectivity by one another, and particularly whether they had all derived from De Tocqueville. He concluded that most had not heard of one another, and some had never even encountered De Tocqueville's writings; yet they arrived at generally approximate or overlapping conclusions.

While this paper can handle only one segment of the significant American values—autonomy and achievement—a brief review of the compass of significant values found by Kluckhohn and affirmed by other scholars will give the reader a clearer idea of the relationship of autonomy and achievement to the whole. The values most commonly listed as especially characteristic of the American set were: individualism, pragmatism (especially mechanical ingenuity), hard continuous work, optimism, change-as-desirable, generosity (compassion), idealism, deference to women, wasteful living, pursuit of pleasure, social and geographic mobility (change-is-good syndrome?). Equally important were: the acquisitive spirit, grasp on possessions-property, perfectability (limitless improvement, hope and expectation),
high moralism, a paradoxical mixture of lawlessness (anti-
authority) with ostensible respect for law and order
(Kluckhohn 1958a:150).

**Summary**

This chapter has sought historical clues and scholarly
assessments as to the derivation of the Pantex culture
and in particular of the traits of Autonomy and Achievement.
The assumption was that the main thread of American culture
had stemmed from England, since 60% of the 1776 colonial
population were English, and since British institutions and
values dominated every one of the thirteen original states.
Historical authorities such as Bailyn were therefore examined
to recognize the American transformation. These sources
showed how the thematic trait-values developed apace with
the transformation of the semi-group-constrained English
villagers of 1600 into the 1750 Appalachian-breaching,
independently operating individuals and nuclear family units,
who were each carving a westward destiny. The possibility
was suggested that the mother country's patterns were already
well along the road to individualistic capitalism and
autonomous careers torn loose from family ties. Also,
the possibility was indicated that selective emigration
plus the New World's individualistic economic opportunities
and lack of group controls greatly accelerated these inci-
pient trends.

In order to test these ideas, a comparison was made
between the Pantexes' values and patterns of behavior and
those patterns observed in America during the 19th century by foreign travelers. The findings of these observers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau, after "jelling" for 50 to 100 years, were critically sifted by modern scholars such as Seymour Lipset and Clyde Kluckhohn, whose analyses were used in this chapter. The values and behavior patterns found in Rimrock were already largely recognizable 150 years earlier, in the eastern United States, though some of them in Rimrock were found to be exaggerated or in inbred-backwater form. Corroborative characteristics confirmed in both places included early weaning, encouragement of independent child development, precocity, comparative "disrespect" for elders and authority, weak family ties, great store on self-reliance.

These observers also uncovered an authority factor that American society itself did not fully appreciate: the pervasive "tyranny of the majority"--the internal need and social necessity for conforming in values and behavior to the will of the society expressed by public approval/disapproval under the dire penalty of social ostracization. It would appear that despite the Americans' vaunted and cherished independence in decision-making and career orientation, few persons could withstand that pressure. This is a pan-anthropological phenomenon; that is, powerful group pressure for conformity is intrinsic to most, if not all, societies. It is worthy of note here because observers found that American society believed its members to be
freer of constraint than those of any other society.

This chapter restressed a subordinate point of Chapter 1, that the autonomy of the individual bordered in many cases on isolation of the individual, alienation from institutions and fellowship, and put on him the unrelieved burden of coping alone.

For breadth, the Americans were contrasted with English-speaking Canada to show how the varying historical experience of Revolution and unpoliced frontiers greatly fostered the development of the autonomous values of the Americans, but lack of revolution and the more controlled development kept, or turned, the Canadians toward more respect for constituted authority patterns. For further breadth, an excerpt of Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the American culture's value history was set forth (1) to reinforce the above findings, and (2) to let the reader see some of the scope of the wide and distinctive set of characteristic American values that are recognized, of which autonomy and achievement are basic determinative elements.

At the conclusion of this historical chapter it is possible to project these trait trends into the national future. How well do these traits/values serve, these cultural determinants of individual success or debilitating insecurity, when added up into a national society of aggregate achievement or composite vulnerability? How well do they equip the United States, with its version of competition versus cooperation, to compete with the collaterally reinforced, highly cooperative Japanese society, and with the
fully collateralized, totalitarian Asian Communist societies?
VALUES VALIDATED--THE INVERSE RECIPROCAL

Overview and Cross-Cultural

Purpose and Methods. This chapter provides a variety of supporting material amplifying the thematic Rimrock findings as to the extent, nature, and significance of autonomy and achievement trait-values. In it the historical findings and judgements of Chapter 2 are checked against 20th century findings for long-run validity using the interpretations of numerous contemporary anthropologists and sociologists. Herein are presented the findings of Walter Goldschmidt, Margaret Mead, David McClelland, Yehudi Cohen, George de Vos, Francis L. K. Hsu, Margaret Clark, and others in their subject areas.

Some findings, like those of Goldschmidt, Florence Kluckhohn, and Mead, are based mainly on the trained anthropologists' participant observations, in effect the fruition of many earlier supporting studies. Other interpretations like those of Alex Inkeles, are based on an intensive clinical psychological cross-cultural study program employing long written questionnaires, detailed life history interviews, a battery of tests: Rorschach, TAT, sentence completion, projective question, and problems-situations (e.g., Russians versus Americans).

The concomitant purpose of this chapter is to denominate, sharpen and affirm those corollary trait-values that, in this
American pattern, seem to be the flawed side—a negative reciprocal product of the much admired autonomy (independence) and achievement. These consist of the interlocked inverse traits of conformity (need and practice), isolation, frustration, weakened self-esteem, and need for approval and recognition—found especially by contrast with societies that put less value on autonomous achievement. In Chapter 2 some of these reciprocals were stressed historically—as in Bailyn and De Tocqueville. Each inverse reciprocal trait-value herein has been adduced by more than one expert, hence is set forth here as a likely hypothesis. Other more controversial, anti-social, personality-corrosive findings, as Jules Henry's on excessive greed and Kluckhohn's (1941) on weaknesses in internalized social control,¹ are reserved for Chapter 4.

Mobility and Impermanence were always core characteristics of the Americans, according to Walter Goldschmidt (1955:1209-1217). He held that American culture was built on mobility—historical, geographical, and social. The normative individual had the urge and, more often than in most societies, the possibility of moving out from an oppressive or "intolerable" situation (1955:1213). (What is deemed intolerable might be a function of the values—such as built-in resignation as opposed to a socially approved value of non-acceptance of "fate", the expectation that anyone with

¹These early Kluckhohn writings were more harshly critical, more in the vein of a "sick society", than those of his mature years. He wrote first at the end of the Great Depression, in the late 1930s—a time of doubting, as were the 1960's and early 1970's.
"gumption" should be capable of breaking out of unpalatable situations. The effect of this mobility was to undermine group identity, sense of community, allegiance to the hometown. In the United States a hometown was the place to come from; in traditional China the place to return to (Thomas Wolfe, You Can't Go Home Again). So individual mobility tends to undermine group ties and belonging. It fosters autonomy.

Achieved Status—Ultimate Worth were, according to Goldschmidt (1955:1215), determined in American society's standards largely by the individual himself, with the possible exception of those starting their careers, their "race of life" at the very top—possibly a Nelson Rockefeller or a Jack Kennedy?—and those at the very bottom—types like Arthur Bremer (Wallace assassin). Consequently, if a man by middle age had not achieved much status, he obviously had not much worth, since achievement equals both social and self worth ("He never amounted to anything.") By middle age and retirement this apparent or relative failure begot grave psychic disorder and depression (see later discussion of the relative position of the aged in American society, in this chapter). This

2 Unlike more static cultures, Americans have rated resignation low on the value scale; it is deemed by the majority as suitable only for the aged and infirm and the sequestered religious (but very hard even for this last group to accept).

Spurning one's apparent lot and reshaping one's destiny, creating one's own lifepath, has been a keystone of the American experience. One shall win mastery over nature and adversity.
system, where the individual's evaluation of his own self-worth is based on his personal relative achievements, produces much achievement but also much personal and family tension and anxiety, and ultimate disappointment.

Margaret Mead in 1941 (Kluckhohn et al. 1967:663-670) set forth two significant peculiarities of American character structure:

(1) its emphasis on moral choice, and
(2) its dependence upon achievement measured against the achievement of near equals (1967:665).

She held that achievement was measured comparatively, not against the father, because his achievement would be already outmoded, but against the achievements of one's siblings and peer group. She held that peer group standards were the meaningful ones by which Americans measured themselves and their "progress". All were expected to progress. Her explanation was that change was so rapid in the United States that parental standards, and those of prior generations, were inadequate. Here we have a rephrasal of De Tocqueville's "tyranny of the majority", and an affirmation of his observation that the peer group sets the standards; by implication said group is the reference point from which to win approval and regard. Mead's stress that this occurred because of the rapidity of change is somewhat circular. Perhaps, as suggested in Chapter 2, in the two factors--the historic rejection of authority plus the concomitant optimistic belief in change for change's sake, change as progress--are found key elements in the unremitting thrust to aspire higher to win regard, if
not renown. Thus in the dominant pattern a lifespan is looked upon as a long competitive race with one's peers. The race is rendered more uncertain by the constant necessity for side-long checks with the field to see in which direction the race is currently veering—in technology, in shifts of popular approval—for fear that, as front runner, one will be marooned in a suddenly obsolete direction or position.

Mead also stated, as a second reason, that this peer-set standard arises due to the diversity of American national backgrounds ("The old man is stupid, he doesn't even speak good English or know his way around.") However, the historic evidence presented in Chapter 2, and that of the Anglo-antecedent ed Pantexes in Chapter 1 tends to discount this aspect; even with the same English (or fully WASP-assimilated) background these patterns of autonomous achievement and peer reference were well established in the American ethnic during the colonial period.\footnote{In considering comparative legal systems Yehudi Cohen (1966:239-241) stated that:}

\textit{...a central theme in interpersonal relationships is the individual's need in the United States for independence and autonomy, a fear of too close association with other individuals and groups.}

\footnote{Lately in television programs and popular magazines Margaret Mead has carried her youth-patronizing theme to the extreme—that (American) culture is continually obsolete, the young must make up culture (the values) as they go. She appears to be unduly minimizing the psychic and value continuities in even American culture, and the potential psychic crack-ups, social disorganization and anomie if discontinuities multiply and feverish rejection of social values becomes widespread.}
Where an individual assumes responsibility for other members he throws his emotional lot in with the rest of the group. Where he does not assume such responsibilities, he plays a lone emotional game (1966:241).

Cohen stated that unlike the situation in traditional or collective-oriented societies, an American man and wife are not responsible for each other's criminal actions, siblings have no legal liability or responsibility for each other's actions at any time in their lives. Children are not responsible for their parents (except for some "antiquated" laws, no longer effectively enforced, that insist that destitute, aged parents are supposed to be partially supported. This constitutes a lingering pro-forma survival, a relic of an obsolete social obligation).

Cohen's "lone emotional game" is echoed or pre-figured in Jules Henry's specific restatement of De Tocqueville: that Americans feared holding unpopular opinions, had little involvement with persons outside their immediate family, had sustaining relations only with a narrow coterie of friends. De Tocqueville said that, in extremis, the American had the feeling that one stands alone, no one really cared whether one lived or died (Henry 1966:105-106).

Russian comparison: Alex Inkeles, et al., (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964:577-592) employed elaborate diagnostic test methods--questionnaires, life history interviews, Rorschach, 

4 An American reader might react that, isn't this the human condition?--which reaction only tends to affirm that there is a dominant American pattern of values. For other cultures in the world do not so feel, at least feel it less strongly.
TAT, sentence completion test, and problems situation tests—to ascertain values of a group of Russians who incidental to World War II had fled west. His study group compared these tests results with those of a representative and matched group of Americans. They found that Americans had a much greater need for achievement, that they had a much greater need for approval and recognition, but paradoxically they feared involvement ("don't get involved"). The Russians felt the need to belong to groups and have close interpersonal contacts with people. In contrast, the Americans feared too close or intimate relationships as potentially freedom-inhibiting, a burden of obligation, a personality threat. The Russians welcomed such contacts. Yet Americans needed to be liked as "all right guys" and they greatly feared isolation from the group.

Paradox: Modal folk in both cultures had need for sustaining contact with their fellow man beyond the nuclear family. Whereas the Russian culture recognized this need and people had institutionalized and participated in group contacts to fill it, the American culture's dominant value of independence overtly scorned the need for such contacts. sub- or semi-consciously, however, the American need was apparently powerful and expressed itself in the need for approval by peers, and fear of rejection. 5

5"A Nation of Joiners" is often a characterization of the Americans, but in this writer's view this is greatly exaggerated or is pro-forma. The average man is not active in a volunteer organization /Footnote cont'd on following page./
Couched another way: In the American culture there existed (and probably continues to exist) a dependent corollary to auto-achievement, namely an unseen, generally unnoted but blindly felt, almost lemming-like compulsion toward surrogate collaterality—a substitute social group meeting a possibly innate need for group ties—and toward value conformity. This compulsion exists despite the overt condemnation of more openly practiced patterns of conformity when Americans adjudge other cultures—as can be seen in statements like, "Japanese businesses or government can’t reach a decision until all hands have hashed it over forever and a consensus is reached," or "When you meet a Filipino he seems to have cousins upon cousins to the 'nth degree, each of which has some claim on him," or "Those Japanese tourists in Hawaii all go about in disciplined groups, each pointing his camera on the suggestion of the leader." Here seems to be an ambivalence or discordance to be examined in the exploration and evaluation section, Chapter 4. It would appear that few Americans are strong enough to stand on their own autonomy. Eccentricity, or going against the group values and expectations, is hazardous to the psyche and to the career.

German comparison: This unique American culture emerged 300 years ago from predominant English patterns which in turn stemmed 1400 years ago from the value systems of Anglo-

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ and club. True, that minority of our society who are members of the Elks, Rotary, Masons, Legion, Barbershop Quartets, do get some group rapport, but not to any significantly sustaining degree. Only the minorities of highly member-involved religious groups---Mormons, Hutterites, Black Moslems—approach this sustaining degree, and thereby approach deviant sub-cultural status.
Saxon, Germanic tribesmen of A.D. 400. The reader, therefore, would expect the American and English, and to a slightly greater degree, the German, to have a closer congruence of values than the American and Russian, or American and Japanese. McClelland (1964:65-74, and 1961:197-198) cited a study by McClelland, Sturr, Knapp and Wendt (1958), where investigators matched two sets of high school boys aged 16-19 (both pre-selected elites--private school in the United States and Gymnasium in Germany) using open ended fantasy tests such as "What are the three things you would most like to teach your children?" This was supplemented by a direct answer questionnaire. They found that the Americans had a much greater need for, or interest in, achievement, in the ratio of 4.7 to 2.7; said drive was ego-centered, anti-group. However, McClelland thought this feature, which he deemed "selfish, self-seeking," was ameliorated and counteracted by a correspondingly high degree of group-centered activities like team sports and clubs, school publications and religious associations, drama, and service organizations. In this comparison the ratio was 5 times as much American adolescent participation as German, whose extra-curricular activities tended to be reported as more individual--pursuits such as hiking or reading. The American data indicated that the imperative was to develop oneself unilaterally--to achieve--was rendered more social, was checked and channeled by the necessity of conforming to the opinions of other participants. In McClelland's (too neat) aphorism:
...So while the German engages in more individualistic activities he has a greater sense of his obligations to others, whereas the American has a greater sense of obligation to himself, which is held in check by participation in many group activities (1961:198).

The paradox here is that the American in his ethos, self-image, puts a premium on exercising his free choice while the German, in making choices, admittedly tends to defer to authority—elders, experts. Ironically, the American "freely chooses" what others expect him to choose, he accedes to majority standards although by a round-about, somewhat self-deluding route. So, while an American will tend to resist overt pressure to do thus and so, the cumulative or subtle group pressure tends to make him conform "voluntarily." To do otherwise would be to risk being "oddballed", excluded, not well-liked. Most Americans accede to majority standards. They feel they should bring up their children pretty much as the neighbors do. British and Austrians differed markedly on this, stating more willingness to maintain child-raising standards of some difference from those of their neighbors. Americans were even more influenced by the opinions of others than Germans as to which movie to see, or which book to read (McClelland 1961:197). As noted above, with Mead (Kluckhohn et al.1967: 663-670) and in Chapter 2, whereas the German's standard tends to be set by respected authorities, the American's tends to be set by the amorphous "others"—neighbors, acquaintances, fellow workers, the "peers"—De Tocqueville's majority.
From personal observation as a teacher, this writer doubts that the listed group activities are typical of American teen-agers, though the leaders, a small minority, do participate to considerable degree, as in Scouts, teams, bands. Likewise this writer questions that this type of participation has the great ameliorating effect attributed to it by McClelland. Rather, it is the other half of his explanation, the sheer pressures of numbers, of peers, applied to folk personalities (the normative American) vulnerable for approval, that pressures the conformity. In some situations this may indeed serve non-egocentric social ends as, for example, when the Scouts cooperatively clean up a littered river bed, or when individual Chamber of Commerce members depart from their competition long enough to provide the community with a dog pound, a beauty contest, or a polio fund-raising drive. But these activities are ancillary to each person's egocentric drive, his imperative need to carve out his own individual mark, attain a bettered status.

Japanese Comparisons: Mary Ellen Goodman's study (1957:979-999) measured the values involved in occupational

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6 The Junior College is admittedly (and hopefully) somewhat different from high school, since 60% are earning all or part of their keep, yet of the remaining 40% (and even the busy 60%) scant few participate in group activities, other than occasional church activities. McClelland's sample of American high school students was possibly skewed (elite group) and/or they were answering the questionnaire according to what was expected. Our culture also carries a socially cultivated piety of supporting the ideal of superimposing cooperative efforts, values, on top of the deep ego-centric drives. Smart respondents may be apt to give lip-service for the institutionally urged goal of cooperation.
aspirations of 1250 Japanese children in central Honshu. These were compared with 3750 American children in the Northeastern United States. She analyzed their essays on "What I want to be when I grow up." Contrasts were significant. In the upper grades the gap between Japanese and Americans steadily widened in that the Japanese children expressed more concern for others, the Americans progressively less concern (Goodman 1957:988). In selection of future occupation the Americans chose for themselves (self-determination), whereas the Japanese choices were family-directed or oriented. The Japanese responses were strong for duty, obligation; the Americans stressed that aspect very little. With maturity the Japanese tended to subordinate personal desires, the Americans tended to focus on them all the more. Japanese aspirations were expressed within the framework of being good team workers. The American expression was typified by the desire to be outstanding, to be a star in baseball big leagues, to be somebody like a President, to have grandiose schemes of running things.

These aspirations of urban northeast United States children were relatively parallel to those that the Rimrock authors found in the same (1950's) period for the rural, isolated Pantex children in New Mexico (Chapter 1). This indicated a fairly broad and congruent distribution of values even before the subsequent trend toward homogenization from television; so confirming a dominant trait-value. Individualism, "self-orientation," was found to be much
higher for Americans than Japanese. American children were markedly more self-centered and egocentric than the Japanese (Goodman 1957:998). According to Goodman the modal American was enculturated to think of himself as a "private person" (autonomous), wherein private personal gain and advancement, individual rights and freedom of self-expression and self-fulfillment were to be sought and exercised uninhibited by the demands or needs of others, whereas the Japanese was oriented to not think of self as autonomous. Japanese culture stressed uppermost duties and obligations rather than individual rights. With the onset of adulthood the Japanese individual's attention tended to be turned away from self toward family, community, and wider society. (Goodman 1957:997-998).

Between 1947 and 1950 William Caudill and George de Vos (1956:1102-1126) studied 342 Japanese-American families, a sample of the 20,000 individuals who chose, under duress, to relocate themselves in Chicago during World War II. One-third of the sample were Issei, first generation immigrants, and two-thirds were Nisei, second-generation American born. They found that even in the highly acculturated Nisei certain differentials in cultural patterns still held, as reflected in their relatively greater success with employers and high regard by neighbors when compared to white Americans in general, and Negroes in particular. TAT and Rorschach tests were administered mainly for purposes unrelated to this paper, but the Japanese drive for achievement emerged
outstandingly, even stronger than that of the normative American.

What was especially significant was that the context of achievement differed. Like Americans, the Japanese placed high value on deferred long range goals, including higher education and professional success, but to a high degree (by American standards) they held that a spotless reputation earned on the way was equally important. Likewise the way that money and power was used was important; its most desirable use was for the wider family and community. Powerful group social sanctions would be risked if the achievements were not so used. In contrast to Americans, where the method of attainment and ultimate use of money and prestige was considered a private, individual matter (as long as you did not get caught at something illegal), the Japanese value stressed the family and community responsibility (see collaterality—group bonds—below). With the Japanese as with, to some extent, the Rimrock Mormons (Chapter 1), the individual felt that he did not stand alone for support and therefore conversely he did not stand alone and free in making his choices of career and methods of achievement. It was always felt that the community was hovering close about, those "white-eyes" watching, weighing, criticizing, exerting a powerful force for constraint and inhibition. Hence the Japanese culture was more effective in enjoining group or community responsibility and duty, and thereby restricting individual freedom.
William Caudill and Henry Scarr (1962:53-91) interviewed and tested Japanese children, comparing them with American children. They classified them under the headings of three types of orientation in values: Individual—ego-centric, Collateral—strong orientation toward family and wider groups of orientation, and Lineal—orienting backward through perceived ancestors and forward through the children, a sense of family (or class or caste) continuity. In ranking the social relationships of Family and of Work Relations, they found that Americans put the greatest value on Individual as #1, Collateral as #2, and Lineal as #3. The Japanese put Collateral as #1, Lineal as #2, and Individual as #3.

The point was stressed that these were dominant values of each society. Some deviates in each culture had a different sense of priorities, as when some modern adult Japanese set Individual as their #1 (thereby paying the psychic penalty of considerable internal guilt or anxiety for violating the norms in which they were socialized). Some minority-traditioned Americans such as the genteel Cavaliers of "old Virginny" would put Lineal as #1, as for them lineage, ancestral and extended "family", with its concomitant values and high status furnished a bulwark to their most important set of values, a sense of elite pride. American society has usually scorned such attitudes, as to the majority they have appeared to reflect a distorted sense of values.?

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This is demonstrated over and over among students observed by the author /Footnote cont'd on following page./
Caudill and Scarr (1962:90) made the further point that a shift in environmental conditions could favor those individuals holding minority values, elevating them to leadership and holding up their values for emulation. This appears to be a possibility for Americans if the Ecology-minded "No Growl.n" group should gradually win public approval and ascendency. But for such a group to become constituted as the new "tyranny of the majority"--the prevailing norm--changes in deep-seated values would be necessary (see Chapter 4).

Florence Kluckhohn (1950:376-393) antedated and affirmed the findings of the above American-Japanese comparison in so far as dominant American values. She held that American core culture is in orientation individualistic, achieving. Status is determined by individual accomplishments and productivity (1950:382-83) and is future time oriented. She stated that American society is not lineal, does not relate life toward ancestors. However in some subcultures, as for example in the Old South, or in a growth-bypassed town such as Warner's Jonesville (1949) or Yankee City.

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ over a 15-year period whenever, in effect, lineality is brought up--pride of ancestry and family values handed down, as characteristic of the upper and upper-middle classes of the Old South. With California students this invariably evokes strident condemnation as being un-American; each generation is to be on its own. At least half the students never knew their grandparents or what they did in life. The Mormons are the Western deviate exception in cultivating a sense of lineality.

(There is allied a strong, built-in deprecation by the mainstream of Southern subculture.)
(currently 1963), this normally weak subordinate value can have somewhat greater weight. Nor are American values collateral in stress, as there are little or no alliances nor enduring bonds with kinsmen or wider family, as there are with the Japanese (thus her findings tie in with Caudill and Scarr above) (1962:53-91). The American orientation is individual, each person almost entirely "on his own," picking his way through the vicissitudes of life (as "programmed" by the culture). In analysis it appears that there may be a latent receptivity for collaterality that is universal. It could be a latent but potent American trait since Americans have functioned effectively in highly collateral situations, though at unusual times and places, preferably under special duress, as when forced into crises where the situation is highly structured. An extreme case was the desperate induced group loyalty of the 1951 Marine Corps in North Korea, surrounded at the Choson Reservoir but passionately carrying their wounded back, fighting mile by mile. Another example was the one-season, continent-crossing Charlestown, Virginia Company, a volunteer military-type overlander troop trekking to California in 1849 (Potter 1962).

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8Typically, ex-Marines express ambivalence: great resentment at their egos having been crushed and free will restricted, with an equally great admiration for the esprit and a nostalgia about their lost sense of belonging. In combat, most would do more for each other than they ever would in subsequent individualistic life for any person, including nuclear family loved ones.
Subordinate or minority-held values may be more central to a minority group; e.g., those Negroes who are slum-dwelling, poorly socialized toward success. McClelland held that in the past, the dominant culture had a relatively low opinion of civil service jobs as being too limiting of daily freedom of action, while black people, confronted with a lack of other jobs, accepted the "low status" of a civil service job in order to gain security (1964:77). In evaluation: the blacks might feel deprived that they could not exercise their freedom to refuse such jobs. So it might not be so much a question of different values as the compromise of values in order to get ahead or compete.

Another, related view is that Negro lower class subculture operates with a "value stretch"; that is, the minority also holds the dominant majority values, but stretches them to include an alternate set, and uses one or the other as the situation warrants (Robert Bell 1969: 223-4, citing Hyman Rodman 1963:209).

English Comparison: Devereux, et al. (1969:257-270) compared 700 sixth graders in Surrey, England, with 900 comparable pupils in Onondaga, New York (half the American sample came from public, half from parochial schools). As the English sample was all native-born, the authors culled the New York sample likewise; to eliminate subcultural variation, they removed Negroes also. They administered a 30-item questionnaire concerning parent-practices as seen from the child's viewpoint. There was no direct or
participant observation such as an anthropologist would find minimal to validate or check the questionnaire. Nevertheless, the authors thought the results valid since they converged with another study where there was direct observation of parent-child relationships. They found that the American child was encouraged to be independent and vocal in his views, was more vocal, outgoing, flexible, less respectful of authority. In comparison, the English pupils—in some ways cultural cousins—were more inhibited in behavior, quieter, harder studying and more stoic.

Another study by Maurice L. Farber (in McClelland 1955:323-330), compared by questionnaire the views of 32 insurance clerks in England with those of 81 Americans, on the ranking of desirable qualities to be cultivated in their children. Farber found that in Britain, repression of aggression was important, but not in America (so validating Rimrock, Chapter 1). For the Britons, the concept of getting along with others was not cited, while for the Americans it was strongly noted (therefore differing from Rimrock's Pantexes, and more like its Mormons). This seemed to relate to the American responses which stressed love-getting and giving—possibly a modern development?

These findings tended to reinforce Inkeles' findings (above) (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964:577-592) that in comparison with the Russians, Americans were greatly fearful of being isolated from the group; that they had need for approval and recognition, need to be liked. Another finding was
that the American responses stressed adjustment to other children whereas the British adjustment was toward adults (McClelland 1955:327). Thus these findings supported Mead's and McClelland's views that standards tend to be set by peers; approval must come from peers, more so than in Germany or England. And, of course, much more so than Japan, where peers and family standards tended to be one anyhow.

Adamson Hoebel and Francis Hsu are, in effect, current pioneers among recognized contemporary major anthropologists in insisting that the study of the American character is a desirable and potentially fruitful field. In his overview of anthropological studies of the American ethnic ("national character"), Adamson Hoebel (1967:1-7) stated that since Margaret Mead's (1965/1942/) war-inspired work on the Americans, there has been a great reluctance on the part of American anthropologists to tackle their own American culture.

This has occurred despite the great success and critically-acclaimed validity of Ruth Benedict's 1946 non-participant-observer analysis of Japanese culture, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. If a complex culture of 100 million people could be analyzed and captured in a study, by a non-participant observer, why could not one of 150 million (now 200 million)—the American? One objection was that American culture was held to be not as homogeneous as Japan's. However, Clyde Kluckhohn has been cited in Chapter 2 of this study (1958a: 149) as saying that in his judgment, based on a lifetime of study, the American culture is as regular and pervasive in
its dominant value-traits as that of any other major country. And one of the by-products of this paper in examining autonomy and achievement and considering the evaluations of many anthropologists and sociologists, is the evidence of regularity of these traits and their negative corollaries.

Hoeber (1967:1-7) lauds Jules Henry and Francis L. K. Hsu as the only two scholars to tackle the American ethnic in this last decade. One, Henry, offered a very subjective, angry, reform tract; the other, Hsu, presented an objective comparison of his traditional Chinese culture with his adopted American culture.

Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American anthropologist of Northwestern University, a specialist on national character, modal personality types, and core values, has been drawing American-Chinese comparisons over a period of twenty years, seeking to characterize and explain the American character (1951a, 1951b, 1953, 1961, 1963). He cited ego-centricity (completely or dominantly self-oriented determination) as being a core trait that generates numerous corrosive social and personal traits (1951a:243-250 and 1951b: 57-66). Compared with traditional Chinese values, the American norm of choosing a mate for oneself, for love (which Hsu regarded as chance), is a manifestation of ego-centric individualism that tends to produce incompatibility, broken homes and unstable background for socializing the next generation. Traditional Chinese deference to family wishes and social suasion, on the other hand, made marriage and its
(constricted) sex activity socially constructive. With the Chinese culture's stress on loyalty to the lineage and the larger, extended family, generational gap conflicts were minimized and the young people grew up fitting the social mold without the destructiveness of American (and, in his opinion, pan-Western, Euro-American) individualism. Hsu advanced his view that the extremely high American crime rate was the product of emotion—runaway self-gratification (1951b:62-65). He stated further that this crime level was the product of intense pressure for individual achievement, which has run amuck, lacking the balancing influence of family constraints and loyalties (1963:202). Compare also the Japanese (above) (Goodman 1957:998, Caudill & Scarr 1962: 53-91).

Hsu held that the dominant element in American kinship values was "self reliance" (autonomousness). Each person functioned as an independent unit and was enculturated to think foremost of his own rights, pleasures, privacy, status, advancement, and to try to achieve these wants through self-

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9 Hsu's comparisons are based, of course, on the patterns of pre-Communist China prior to 1948. Such society no longer exists on the mainland. Although diluted, these values still persist, and are still significant, in American-Chinese, where overall, despite the publicity of San Francisco's Chinatown gangsterism, the delinquency and crime rate is only a small fraction of that of the American mainstream. However, various other students of Chinese and Chinese-American culture have noted that this system also involved much internal conflict and stress, and occasional suicide, although the American seems to involve much more internal and external stress, pyramided.
reliance. Furthermore, an American was culturally compelled to so strive since he had no set niche or longrun family (no lineality sense) or larger extended family and lineage ties of reference. Each person had to carve out his own destiny. Since the parental family could afford no protection for the child as an adult, the child sought the security of his peer group. The peer groups of his school, playground and job would be his mentors, judges, and measures of success. By contrast, in traditional China the children were oriented vertically toward their elders, rather than peers (1963:202).

In evaluation: Hsu has held very strongly to this theme over twenty years of writing and studying the American character. In it he independently affirms Mead (Kluckhohn, et al 1967:663-670), Inkeles (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964:557-592), McClelland (1964:65-74), and Devereux (1969:257-270) on peer-power and the paradox of the American concept of free-willed independence actually circumscribed by the non-institutional, irrational, ineluctable peer-power (democratic power?) or "tyranny of the majority." 10

Success-Failure Conformity: Likewise, Hsu affirmed the view that the stress on independent achievement continually spurs the self-reliant man to outdo his peers, to seek visible symbols of relative achievement. An example would be changing homes frequently in an "upgrading" progression,

10A "democratic" folk opinion, but actually suppressive of minority or independent values.
moving to ever better homes outward in the suburban ring, or changing friends to match, or shifting from club to club (as from the Elks to the Country Club, or from the smaller college to the greater university, or from the four-square Fundamentalists to the Episcopalians) (Hsu 1963:213). A deep psychic injury rests when the striver has attained successive higher levels but then "stagnates"—hits his ceiling on a job plateau, or otherwise falls short of his ultimate status. This shortfall tends to be interpreted as a shortcoming, a failure, even though the modal American has, in fact, heretofore climbed a fair piece upwards in his job status and real wages from where he started—his father's level. This was largely made possible by the constant population and geographic expansion and exploitation of new resources, catalyzed by technological and managerial transformations.

Said status striving and resultant apprehension of mediocrity, with increasing sense of failure, tends ultimately to block much of the striver's avenues of satisfaction, sociability, status, and security. The self-reliant man has no retreat—not back to where he started from, nor back to his family of origin (it no longer exists) (Hsu 1963:228). Feelings of inferiority, low self-worth, and frustration develop all along the way, from grade school to middle age.\[11\]

\[11\] In De Tocqueville's assessment, "in a democracy" most men will end up being frustrated since only a few can win the choicest plums. He assumed that the American democracy would serve as the prototype for all. In that, he may have been the prisoner of insufficient data—of European, Western civilization blinders.
and worsen with old age (see below). These phrases parallel those of Goldschmidt and Clyde Kluckhohn (above, 1955:1209-1217, and 1967:663-670, respectively). Hsu holds that

the more a culture stresses self-reliance, the more it will generate fear of inferiority... and the more it will compel him to conformity (1963:217)

So he comes to agreement with Inkeles (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964:557-592), Devereux (1969:257-270), with the historic observations of De Tocqueville and Martineau (Chapter 2) in the seeming non-sequitur (from Western philosophic rationale) that this most individualistic culture, in self-determination, operates to prescribe restricted patterns of performance and values on its members. In Hsu's reasoning it is not so odd, this constriction or channeling of the free will by peer power, but is a cause and effect.

Intra-Cultural

Oldsters: Hoebel (1967:1-7) erred in listing only Jules Henry and Hsu as interpreters of the American culture during the last decade. Two contemporary northern California anthropologists, Margaret Clark and Barbara Gallatin Anderson, in their study of Culture and Aging (1967), have probed deeply into the post-65, or terminating, stage of the life cycle. Most Americans prefer to close their minds to this aging segment of society and its characteristics. Clark and Anderson's method was largely that of in-depth, long-term interviewing (buttressed by questionnaires), and thorough acquaintance with their subjects and with the milieu, in this case representative aged from both mainstream and
minority subcultures in San Francisco (most of the sample were born and raised elsewhere). These authors affirmed the basic values of autonomy and achievement as set forth from the many approaches mentioned above. And they found their aging subject sample subscribing to these values to which they had been socialized from childhood. They held that an American is expected to:

...be independent, responsible, and self-respecting, and thereby to be worthy of respect in one's own right (1967:428).

As stated in connection with Hsu's views, in the development of a typical American career, frustration and feelings of failure may become overpowering by middle age. Finally in old age and after forced retirement these feelings tend to become an obsession. The authors hold that in America success-achievement has a "sacred character", that most of the oldsters can no longer "produce" (that is, they are not allowed to produce). Retirement ends the principal prop to their self-esteem. It erodes their self-image, their self-value. They perceive themselves as finished, of little value in terms of their social worth. Curiously, or logically, the peer value standard does not shift with circumstances; it is still the lifetime value of producing, of being a success. One aspect of the achievement imperative is the need to feel superior to other people. It is so enculturated that the authors claim that American mental health demands it. This too is a product of autonomous achievement; one must achieve to have self-worth. Remove
this ego-support and the personality edifice has a tendency to come apart and deteriorate (Clark & Anderson 1967:182).

The other half of these twin imperatives, culturally induced need for independence, is equally difficult for the aged to continue to fulfill. All their lives they have been taught and expected to pilot their own lives and support themselves (see Pantexes, Chapter 1) and now in the socially-enforced twilight of diminished self support—even a healthy person is often forced to yield up his job at age 65—these socially degraded people find it harder and harder to live up to their norm of self-respect. As their money fails, circumstances, in many cases, force them to turn reluctantly to social agencies for help. Most of the "mainstream"people interviewed, those of the dominant middle-class-values majority, abhorred this prospect, feeling such "charity" to be a final confession of defeat. For their values, unchanging through life, included

...the ability to keep on managing oneself, to go it alone, to reaffirm that one is still a self-governing adult (Clark & Anderson 1967:380).

The authors noted that the personality effects of accumulating years arise only partially, or not at all, from biological factors; that the culture powerfully prefigures the effects of aging on personality and even on health. For the culture decrees that the great majority of aged people can never again achieve in the real world, the competitive, wage-earning
world; they can no longer maintain their economic independence; they tend to become "sick", eventually developing real physical illness. So this apparent biological problem actually stems from mainstream American cultural values. In comparison, the subject Latin-Americans and Chinese-Americans, to the degree that they were not fully acculturated, tended to keep their health and self-respect. A Chinese or Latino deemed it right and proper for his middle-aged children to support him with no lessening of his self respect, whereas the mainstream American detested this "admission of failure" --"never be dependent on your children--or anyone else" (Clark & Anderson 1967:177-180, 222, 381, 390).

As the aged were unable to measure up to these tests of manhood, of self-worth, they would increasingly develop mental and physical problems. "Death is preferable to becoming a burden" was frequently voiced. Institutionalization for a modal American, who has normatively been anti-institutional all his life, is slow death--as the last vestiges of one's autonomy, independence, is torn away. In an egalitarian ward of a nursing home or County Hospital, it is very difficult to feel superior to anybody. Women lived somewhat longer than men, since their achievement and independence drive had not been inculcated personally to the same degree. In evaluation: as women are now being stimulated

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12 To the "Senior Citizen", even programs of card-playing, folk dancing, and making unsalable handicrafts seem as "useless" (nonproductive) as they would to Americans still in the mainstream if this were their main activity.
to compete for higher achievement on a ladder equal with men, we can expect to approach equal problems of failing self reliance and ego-erosion thirty to fifty years from now. In effect, the aged now have no real place in the American value system based on autonomous achievement. For their own self-image and mental health, the aged need to reconstitute themselves as a new subculture with value standards significantly different from those of the dominant culture.

Another dismal product of autonomous living, with its associated geographic and social mobility and the resultant condition of having few friends and scant or rejected family, was that most aged people had lost all or nearly all of their social alliances. The initial reason was that most, as normative Americans, throughout life never had many endearing, enduring relationships, family and friends. Compounding this was that early death, or retreat, of those relationships one had had, combined with the act of retirement, cut one off from the "actives"—those still gainfully employed, who shun and abhor the physical evidence of what lies in wait for them, too. Also, the authors found a tendency for these typically defeated, inadequate-feeling aged, who loathed the physical and social evidences of their "failure," to avoid each other. All told, these factors produced mental changes that worsened any personal relationships.  

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13 A few escape this by being deemed not aged, by taking high office at 65 as did President Eisenhower, or being an independent savant like Hyman Rickover and Albert Einstein, or a recognized independent productive artist as cellist Pablo Casals, age 94, conductor /footnote cont'd following page/
The average American past 65 years of age is deprived, anxious, depressed, idle, and unhappy. In part, this results from the cultural patterns which stress autonomy and achievement (and which favor youth and beauty, fragile family ties and anti-authority), and in part from the catastrophic interaction of the destructive effects of being deemed old—unwanted, non-productive. This is in contrast to an aged Korean or aged member of other traditional East Asian cultures, where such individuals are accorded an honorific status. They usually retain control of the family wealth, and continue in respected daily social relations with others of kin and community who are of different generations (Clark & Anderson 1967:13).

The reader may suspect that Clark and Anderson have magnified the negative aspects of the aged's situation, that they shared the (alleged) bias typical of psychological anthropologists—"wherever he looks he finds pathology." In fairness, it should be noted that these authors did find that a small minority of their senior subjects were making a reasonably good adjustment to their social security years. One category consisted of those who were able to continue along their lifetime "independent" (self-supporting) ways, as for example the self-employed watchmaker or

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Leopold Stowkowski, age 89, or Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, the Pope, and most U.S. Senators. But most people cannot do this. Even those economically well off and healthy feel the purposelessness and alienation faced by the gabby, vigorous, purposeless, unwanted hero of the movie Kotch.
carpenter. These, in effect, were able to continue comfortably with their value system past the age of 65. A different sort of category were those who had always been deprived of significant achievement and/or of minimal affective ties; the dislocations of age were minimal for the spinster or bachelor who had long ago become resigned and adjusted to lone living and for those persons who had also learned throughout life to accept relatively low achievement levels and standards of consumption.

In these latter cases the lifetime relative deprivation of either family ties and/or notable achievement and its economic rewards had rendered these types of people marginal in terms of the dominant culture. But when they passed 65 their heretofore deviate or substandard patterns suddenly became those patterns most suitable for survival, because such deprivation became the majority norm. Therefore these longtime-disadvantaged people experienced only a lesser "come-down" of deprivation and so suffered the least injury to their mental health. Other minorities who also deviated from the dominant autonomous achievement norms made excellent adjustments--those of Oriental or Latin cultures who had lived and continued to live in some measure avowedly reinforced and supported by family and collective ties.14

14 Cases have occurred of lonely old women of the mainstream culture putting ads in the paper for people to phone them. Organizations of volunteers have tried to perform such contacts. The Mormons have a regular function of calling isolated souls (and also "jack", fallen-away brethren). No Mormon is supposed to be isolated, or ever "lost" for good.
This would tend to indicate that two of the values that have contributed mightily to the American reshaping of a continent and leading of the world in wealth and technology, were two of the most undesirable values to carry on into normative (typical) retirement (no useful function or place). These findings could even indicate that in the end true "independence" might--though not necessarily--derive from a lifetime of non-achievement, non-autonomousness.

Jules Henry, through his work in geriatric hospitals (1963), tended to confirm the findings of Clark and Anderson (1967:182, 380). He held that humans in America tend toward obsolescence all through life, which begets great insecurity. (This paralleled Margaret Mead's affirmation of American built-in human obsolescence (1967:663-67) though she asserted that the remedy was to keep changing toward youth values).

Henry observed in the geriatric hospitals "the bitter fruits" of the culture being fought out to the end, as when two old ladies in their fight for autonomousness quarreled over the use of the room, fighting for privacy (or dominance?) (Henry 1963:9-29, 450-1). In evaluation: Perhaps in another culture where privacy (autonomousness) is not considered as high a "good", they might still fight--if they were very poor, like low-caste Indians who might fight with their families or others for food, or if they were feeling a loss of position, as in modern urban Japan, whose people struggle increasingly for attention and a role of relevance.
Like most Americans, who feel that man should be in control of his destiny, Henry apparently felt that there should be a good ending to all stories, and that human relation problems are, or should be, solvable. This aspect of his values makes Henry very American. Henry observed in the hospital that:

...culture outlasts body and mind...body barely alive...but the mind of an American upper-middle class woman is concerned with appearance and status, and her capacity to hate and hurt, as determined by the channels of her culture (1963:473).

In evaluation: This reflection in the aged of personal conflicts aged cultural value patterns is possibly just human, although it does illustrate the persistence of value-laden behavior to the end. Henry found, in the end, no love. Is this lovelessness in old age an American trait-value, too?

Summary

In this chapter the findings of many anthropologists and sociologists have been marshalled as to the nature, extent, and significance of the value-trait autonomy-achievement in the (dominant) American ethnic pattern. Some, like Inkeles, based their findings on a battery of methods—Rorschach, TAT tests, life history. Others, such as Goldschmidt and Mead, based their findings on a lifetime spent as participant-observers of the American culture with comparative studies with other cultures—their methodology was similar to Ruth Benedict's analysis of the Japanese culture (1946).
Although Benedict used interviews and studies, she was not a participant observer. Significantly, the findings of those who used ethnographic observation and those who used the battery of tests and observations were in general agreement. Agreement in findings as to the nature and extent of the autonomous— independent, own self-oriented, decision making— and achievement— the awesome lemming-like drive for autonomously attaining high job status regardless of ties of family, friends, home base— occurred so regularly as to be somewhat repetitious. There was consistent explication as to the gap between the American culture's conscious advocacy of cooperation, veneration of the aged, strong belief in the family ties, and the actual contravening reality of dominant egocentricity.

For soundness of support, a dozen or more authorities of repute in anthropology-sociology, as well as lesser known researchers, were discussed. There was no serious disagreement among the experts on the essential, central trends toward more autonomy and achievement, manifest over the 200 or more years that the American ethnic and its cultural patterns have been in existence.

There was, however, some disagreement as to the nature of this self-reliance, and the nature of the socialization for adulthood, as between classic Rimrock development of youth's competency and Jules Henry's modern findings of youth dependency. The studies also revealed a claimed weakness in internalized self-discipline, as seen both by Kluckhohn
and in the Danish comparison. These more controversial, or unreconciled, items may in part represent shifts over time, and shifts from the rural frontier to the urban setting; in part they may represent intrinsic paradoxes and self-delusional myths which the radical intellectuals rediscover each generation and use to dub America a "sick society."
The following chapter will discuss how these critics' efforts may in time serve as catalysts for socially self-directed changes in values, to reconcile some of these discontinuities and apparently inappropriate sets of values.

Comparison with various other cultures—British, German, Japanese, Chinese—highlighted differences in values held by the Americans, as being more independent and seemingly individually outspoken and "free-thinking." However, the purely individual striving was seen as masking the unconscious workings of an imperative social control. Most members of the dominant "mainstreamers" had been socialized to strive along socially dictated patterns of conformity. The concomitant ego-sapping by-products of the imperative for autonomous achievement, in striving to "be better" (than someone else), winning higher status, that De Tocqueville noted already in the 1830's, were found also by the modern authorities. Whether studied in comparison with Chinese, Russian, English, or other cultures, these negative reciprocals stood out: the conformity (above), isolation and loneliness, frustration, especially in middle years and most strongly past 65 years of age, and need for approval and recognition
at all ages coupled with the deep-seated fear of too close involvement with others.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15}Given all these factors, most of which drive people apart rather than together, it's a wonder that any American marriages last a lifetime. Even though as would be expected the American culture has the highest break-up rate of any Western nation, it is a tribute to other values--loyalty, traditional ideals, minority religions--that the majority of marriages still hold (70\% of first, 50\% of second marriages).

As the reader knows, there is no basic hominid guarantee of such holding, since in some cultures, notably the Hopi, the modal situation is no marriage lasting for a lifetime. In the Hopi society, however, the extensive collaterality takes up much of the affective need.

The Mormons hold that the selection of a mate--for eternity--is the most important choice in life; that no career achievement can be valued in comparison to the loss of family. The Mormons have doubled their American membership these past 20 years--only half of which growth was due to excess of births over deaths.
Chapter 4

THE MORE TENTATIVE APPRAISALS

Purpose

In Chapter 3 were set forth those basic characteristics and interwoven products of the autonomy and achievement trait-values that are widely affirmed and are largely agreed upon by scholars. At the present writing these seem to be accepted by the serious students of American culture, and, in this writer's view, are acceptable as relatively sound judgments even though at some points they are at variance with the common American self-image. Hence, the first three chapters of this paper brings together data and sources usable in revisionist efforts to clarify the American view of ourselves--self-knowledge.

In this chapter the paper seeks to go further and explore the uncertain. The first part presents an overlapping collection—in effect, a web, of interpretations and inferences about these traits, in contemporary American society. These trait-values' modern manifestations, and possible shifts or transformations over time, and the resultant effects, are set forth as worthy of note because the various writers' interpretations of these phenomena seem to have, at least in part, some truth to them (though they are not proven, nor are they disproven).

These interpretations are offered for thought, as tentative clues and insight into the complexity of a national
culture—particularly the paradoxes of the American culture. These interpretations are also, of course, the product of the diverse individuality, the selective biases, of the different observers.

The second part of the chapter offers a final cautious assessment of "where we seem to be" lately relative to these traits, especially in reference to the momentous value-practices changes that have occurred since 1965. What now are the salient cultural values related to autonomy and achievement, and in what possible direction (or directions) is the trend?

Inferences Problematic; Time Shifts in Values

Was old time "rugged individualism" sabotaged by modern urban industrial society? Du Bois (1955:1236) and Henry (1966:105-6) followed the logic that this prized rugged individualism must have been eroded and weakened progressively since the advent of industrialization, about De Tocqueville's time, 1831. This gradual industrialization of American society during the 19th century was accompanied by a shift in occupation from the "independent" self-employed frontiersman and farmer to the work-dependent industrial employee, and from isolated farmstead life to close-in urban living. Therefore, they held that the transformation of the average American type into a subordinated, somewhat regimented employee was a transformation to normative conformist. However, there is much evidence to indicate that the conformist trait was endemic from the beginning,
as touched upon in Chapter 2.

The clue perhaps lies in the natural tendency of the observers of colonial or frontier child-raising to emphasize the obvious, the strikingly American, traits: independence, precocity, rejection of authority and the seeming sturdy competence of the children. Yet the observers may have missed, or given insufficient weight to, the less patent but in effect repressive or "neurosis"-inducing manner of child-socialization by parents and peers.

Noting examples of "survival" of earliest American ways, researchers pointed to Rimrock's (Chapter 1) weaning and toilet training as being forced at the earliest possible time, far ahead of the world average (Whiting & Child 1953:74, and in Barnouw 1963:124-5). While the foreign observers of the 1800's did not specifically mention this "diaper anthropology," they did note great parental disgust at soilage and heavy stress on cleanliness (Murphey 1965:151). These latter values have a familiar ring, for Americans do have a great--"neurotic", from a world view--loathing of dirt, especially fecal dirt. Cleanliness is such a compulsion in the American culture that other peoples are often judged civilized or not by the standard of cleanliness alone, and "dirty" is the most common pejorative term.

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1The reader can recognize "dirty"'s extensive cultural role: "dirty S.O.B.", "to play dirty", "dirty jokes" (sexually prurient episodes). In the Oakland police usage, any suspect or wanted person is "dirty." Or the phrase that became household from its popularization on a television program--"dirty old man" --the pejorative of dirt, and of age (both deeply negative values in the culture). Or, in America "Godliness is next to cleanliness."
Authorities state that both in Rimrock and modern urban America oral indulgence is much more restricted than in most other societies: the nursing period is short, the anal training is more severe than all other societies studied except the Tanala and Chagga (Barnouw 1963:350-351, and Whiting & Child 1953:74).

Therefore possibly the Americans developed a pattern of child raising that produced seemingly self-reliant, self-sufficient, precociously mature children who, at the same time, had been imprinted with an anxious, compulsive drive for success, a concomitant fear of failure, and an allied deep-seated insecurity that left them constantly craving approval and recognition. Both sets of traits would tend to be interlocked in the same persons, though perhaps in varying proportions. Frontier farming conditions did equip the person with practical skills to cope with his environment and so may have immediately masked these insecurity-motivated needs, which then emerged in adulthood. For these widespread pressures for conformity were noted long before the shift to urban living and wage-employment (See Chapter 2.) However, the said urbanization/industrialization shift seemed to concerned critics to be also a shift in values, since the locale change made both the drive for success and the autonomy-achievement related insecurities more apparent. Factors such as the chanciness of job security and self support, the vulnerability to the effects of "boom-and-bust" economics, the relative individual success and failure roles, were played out in the urbanized theater with large proximal
audiences. When so grouped together, people's vulnerabilities were more apparent.

Thus it may be that the esteemed American folk trait of "rugged individualism" would be a more apt designation for the thematic guiding principle and value of autonomous self-orientation, and its fulfillment in carving out an autonomous enterprising career successfully, as, say, with an Andrew Carnegie. It is less valid in reality in its representation of a theoretical, idealized concept of a man of independent integrity, the rare non-approval-seeking independent-minded individualist, like Edmund Ross. Our folk lore, our national myths, put high lip service value on the latter qualities, but our true deeper values usually worked to consign such an individualist to status failure and nonemulation by the members of his society. There is a tendency to judge such ambivalence of values to be the product of modernity, but it appears to have always been there—this massive ground-swell unconsciously socialized

Edmund Ross's (1826-1907) career is an embodiment of an ideal, but not the dominant norm. Elected as an abolitionist type radical Republican Senator from Kansas, he refused in 1868, on the principle of justice and for the good of the presidency, to accede to the overwhelming public and peer (nearly 2/3 of his fellow Senators) pressure to impeach President Andrew Johnson. For voting his conscience and independent judgment, he was outrageously vilified and ostracized and denied election the rest of his life. For 20 years thereafter he worked mostly as a newspaper printer, usually bucking the dominant norm—and usually losing.

Earl Warren's career had significant elements closer to the norm of conformity to the popular will. Despite his later liberalism and seeming independence as Chief Justice of the United States (1953-1968), in 1942 as California Attorney General he strongly supported the widely popular Californian demand for relocation of the Japanese-Americans. He was elected Governor the next year.
in the infant and childhood need to conform to achieve approval and security, versus the ostensible American ideal of (seemingly) being a truly independent man. Some such approval need is probably as old as man, a "social animal," but its power appears to be at noteworthy variance with conventional American mythology.

Pursuing the problem a step further, have the shifts in socialization patterns of the American child tended to make him and his adult self more vulnerable to the power of his peers? Has the erstwhile training for independence—taking care of oneself—been delayed to post-adolescence by indulgent and protective child-raising? Is there discontinuity in the raising of American children for the life with which they must cope?—and succeed?

Lipset (Chapter 2) quoted the 19th century observers, Martineau, Berger, Wecter (1963:168-177, 119) to the effect that not only were the American children making their decisions apart from their parents, but they were trained for activity and self-dependence, they were equipped to strike out on their own, to make their living "on their own hook." Some of the observers, like Anthony Trollope in 1860 and James Muirhead in 1900, felt that the child's desires and views were unduly indulged, that they were never punished, that America was a child-centered culture (Lipset 1963:120).

3 From New England fishermen, "on your own hook" was to fish self-employed, independent—an early ideal.
The Rimrock authors (Chapter 1) judged that the Pantex children were being trained for independent coping with life. American history witnessed repeatedly the pattern of sons and daughters growing up, cutting the family connection, and moving westward on their own. The relative success and survival of these offspring must have indicated that they had good socialization to get along on their own, for the tendency was for one to get scant help from one's neighbors (Chapter 2).

But in modern times this "paddle-your-own-canoe" type of independence has been called into question. In the Farber study (McClelland 1955:323-330), the values British parents preferred their children to learn in contrast to the American preferences indicated that the British (said they) put greater stress on self-reliance, whereas the Americans stressed instead getting along, smoothly functioning with the group, getting and giving love. This would be at considerable variance with the stated and observed overt values of the Rimrock Pantexes, and would be more akin to the Mormons.

In evaluation: such study carries the suspicion of methodological flaw—in accepting what people say as fact, rather than combining the questionnaire with anthropological studies of relationships. Yet the findings may indicate a shift toward recognizing the power of the peers and more realistically discounting the shibboleth of independence. Perhaps independence has simply been subordinated to concern over "getting along."
Kandel and Lesser's (1969:348-358) study used questionnaires to compare the student-stated values of American and Danish high school students (2327 American vs. 1552 Danish). There were no validating field observations. They found that the reported typical Danish parent-child relationship was more like the impression of American families recorded in the 19th century by De Tocqueville and others, that the modern Danish family relations were the more democratic and equalitarian. In contrast, the American students reported constrained, autocratic, parent-controlled relationships (surprisingly!). The authors suggested that the American adolescents operated under external constrains whereas the Danes had internalized norms instilled through the greater infant discipline practiced by the Danes compared to the permissiveness of the American infant discipline. They reported that the average American adolescent was much more dissatisfied than his Danish counterpart with the amount of curtailment of his independence (he was, of course, still dependent on the parents for economic support).

In conclusion: This is a hard study to fit in. The findings seem to conflict with those of most authorities, who state that peer power was and is of paramount importance in American society, especially for developing adolescents. Possibly the Danish comparison could be partly right. In America, attempted parental control during the schooling period, extended to age 18, does play a longer role than in Denmark and most other countries where school is on the
average terminated two or more years earlier. There have been sizable changes, diminutions, in responsibility put upon American children since the Rimrock type of life, including the lengthening of economic dependence since most American high school students lack significant chores or role in the earning of the family income. Along with higher and higher education, interrelated with the shift to urban living, has come prolonged economic dependence.

Another interpretation is that it could be the rivalry, the tension, between peer power, egging the juveniles on to "independence" and defiance of parental control, versus the continued concern and control efforts of the parents, that caused the respondents to paint a picture of parental despotism. Perhaps the respondents had no real comparison of what really authoritarian parents would be like—see Jules Henry below (1963:260-261). However obliquely, these authors may have stumbled onto something possibly valid, though lacking supporting and clarifying evidence. Kluckhohn, in his earlier, less mature criticisms of American society (1941:175) held that, "The United States is, then, weak in internalized social control from the educative process." But he did not clarify what he meant. More telling evidence of such lack of internal controls might be the performance of the American prisoners of war in Korea, discussed later.

The Danish comparison touched only part of the depths of the adolescent value conflicts, which Hsu cited as highly
significant (1963:200-201). Therein he portrayed the inconsistency, the discontinuity of the American child-raising process wherein the child is encouraged to be autonomous, independent, to think for himself and be self-reliant, while perversely (from Hsu's view) parents sought to shield the child from the real world of adults, of adversity, competition, cruelty, evil, sickness and death. The Americans sought to impart to their children an idealized picture of the world, man, and American society. Hsu held that such raising was defective in that it delayed maturity and produced great stress due to gaps in socialization. He held that this shielded child raising resulted in lack of adequate experience training, lack of the tempering needed to cope with life. He contended that it could give rise to serious disillusionment with the real world when the post-18-year-old person must suddenly seek success in a highly competitive, autonomous role in a society demanding competent, unremitting performance.

A generation ago, in 1938, Ruth Benedict (in Kluckhohn & Murray, 1967:522-531) characterized the American culture as one of great discontinuity between what children were allowed and socialized to do, and the great weight of full competition with adults they had suddenly to cope with upon adulthood. In America, the stress attending the onset of

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adulthood is great. The psychic "breakage" is thus great, developing in those who cannot adequately cope with society's demands, or who flounder through life deemed arrested in some pre-adult stage of "perpetual adolescence". Most cultures enculturate the young in a consistent, gradual system of developing greater and greater responsibilities, awareness and capacities to cope.

As noted, the shift from Rimrock-type living to modern urban has accelerated these discontinuities. However, this factor need not be totally decisive as witnessed with the partly-assimilated California Chinese and Japanese and the 95% mainstream-cultured Mormons. All three groups are still relatively successful in their raising of children in such a manner as to develop patterns of responsibility; they all experience lower rates of delinquency and family disorganization, and achieve significantly higher scholastic attainments.

It is noteworthy that in all these studies of American values, those values of duties and obligations were rarely cited (compare with the Japanese in Chapter 3--Goodman 1957: 979-999). Ultimately the mainstream American culture is highly demanding that its adult members take on heavy duties

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Instead, perhaps all should graduate equally from high school, and then college? Yet competition for entrance, and then within the graduate and professional schools intensifies. Again is posed the inherent difficulty of reconciling Lipset's characterization of the basic American conflict between "equality versus achievement."
and responsibilities. To many recently-matured persons these demands seem to "be sprung" suddenly and unmercifully just at adulthood. Many persons are inadequately equipped to cope at that time, and some are never able to measure up. In contrast to the scant, or very mild duty and obligations of age 16 or 17, come harsh and severe demands such as being drafted for war at age 18, or being a pregnant bride at 20.

The "independence" of modern teen-agers, Jules Henry (1963:260-261) claimed, had nothing to do with the old 1760 American frontier. Rather, the self-reliance of American teen-agers, as he studied them close-up through continued contact and observation, was "but a hollow shell." Henry held that this "independence" was the product of many weaknesses, "a mindless infantile egoism," the fruit of parental permissiveness. It meant simply: "doing what one pleases." He found a "war" going on between the teen-agers and their parents, the "kids" struggling to get out from under any control. But, he judged, the "kids" were very unsure of themselves. He also found a "war" going on between the teen-agers themselves, fearful of showing too

5Where the Kandel and Lesser Danish comparison found the American parents exerted autocratic control, Jules Henry found these same type of parents unduly permissive. Kandel and Lesser operated via questionnaires furnished by students, Henry mainly by personal observation, close involvement, and questionnaires. Possibly the same questionnaire, as administered by Kandel or Lesser, if given to Henry's subjects, might have evoked the same "authoritarian" claims.
much interest or affection for others lest they be deemed weak and dependent, and be belittled in the pecking order. Here can be noted a cultural consistency, a longrun consistency in the American culture. Lately, as well as back in 1760 and in the Rimrock frontier of 1950 or the aged frontier in San Francisco of 1960, to be dependent was and is one of the worst value pitfalls that can happen to an American. Sometimes "independence" meant and means economic self-support independence—that stern imperative that takes over at adulthood—but also throughout American life and history it seems to have applied equally to emotional independence. Even being emotionally dependent on another, according to Henry, involves high risk of rejection as being unworthy, or being deemed cheap, easy, or weak (Henry, 1963:258-260). By the folk patterns of values, an American was, and apparently is, supposed to walk alone (see Cohen 1966:239-241, Chapter 3).

Critique: Henry is difficult to reconcile with the rest of anthropological writings on the American culture—other than Clark and Anderson—since his tone is that of a revivalist reformer, righteously condemning the evils of American society. His work lacks perspective in that he makes no comparisons with any other society. Yet his probings of the teen-agers and later the geriatric hospital inmates furnishes useful insights, even though he scants the strength of the culture and focuses on what he deems its overriding pathological aspects. One cannot be certain
that this fear of emotional involvement is as singularly American as Henry says—though Cohen remarked that "the (American) plays a lone emotional game" (Chapter 3, and Cohen, 1966:241)—or if it is Anglo-North European, or merely human. However, we should at least offer as a possibility that this "lone emotional game" is an outgrowth of the Anglo-American culture of 1760 developing its autonomous orientation, its pride of economic independence, its pride and myth of stubbornly individual discrete character strength. The explanation is suggested that this autonomous culture where the normative person was bereft of extended emotional and fraternal bonds has been able to survive, and in its perverse way flourish, because of the uniquely-American, relatively-easy economic possibilities and because of the driving cultural imperative of carving out a job and life alone, or nearly so. This culture is somewhat unique in that most men in other times were heavily dependent on and sustained by their web of bonds to each other.

Has old-time rugged individualism become "insatiable greed"? Back in 1941 Clyde Kluckhohn (1941:169-171) stated that the individualism of the frontier spirit that had won the West had, in modern urban industrial society, become the social ill of egoistic individualism. He held that the venerated pioneer individual enterprise was now a cancerous cultural "dysteleology." Jules Henry stated that this American drive to achieve, acquire, master—which sprang
from the circumstances of the suppressed of Europe being released to take advantage of the great opportunity for self advancement in exploiting and building up a rich continent--became at length a vice of insatiable greed. It was now manifest especially as consumerism, materialism, a major sickness of the American society (Henry 1963:6).

Kindredly, he affirmed (1966:101) that historic individual achieving had been perverted to the endless consumerism of "egoistic consumption." In evaluation: This decried process was all of a piece, one continuous evolution. The evolution from the frontier-farming achievement drive to get more land, buy more livestock, acquire a good looking buggy, a coal-oil lamp and then a gasoline lamp, a water-pumping windmill, became today's drive to get more consumer goods, private cars, color televisions, air-conditioners, better suburban living, private swimming pools. This is a logical continuum of sequential growth and achievement. It is part of our deep seated values of acquisitive "conspicuous consumption" as the reward and hallmark of success. The ecology-oriented minority face a monumental task if they are to argue out, or render subordinate, this achievement-consumer satisfaction value. But when this trait is carried

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It is noteworthy that the large 7-store Berkeley Co-op, founded 40 years ago primarily for consumers to consume more thriftily and with better quality, has these last 10 years shifted in ideology, becoming a political crusade group to attempt to downplay the consumption value and emphasize redistribution of wealth, ecological controls, racial equality, agricultural workers' power. The frequent recent conflicts within the Board of Directors reflect the clash between the old dominant /Footnote cont'd on following page/
to extreme its socially adverse effects are clear.

Is the American driven intolerably by the demands of "the system," the culture? Related to the above consumerism, Henry (1963:13-30) held that American culture was forced on by its

...achievement, profit, mobility drives, and by the drives for security and a higher standard of living. Above all it is driven by expansiveness (1963:13).

He maintained that this achievement-success need had become transformed into the Frankenstein of imperative consumerism and dynamic obsolescence. He indignantly noted that in America everything--cars, homes, people--aged and became undesirable quickly, including the working person beset by uncertainty and technological "drivenness." He claimed that a large segment of the population worked in fear of their jobs being cancelled or automated out from under them--railway station masters, shipwrights, auto assemblers, (space engineers?). Moreover he maintained that most people--those in the 61% of the population comprised of factory hands, mechanics, laborers, truck drivers, clerical and sales persons engaged in routine work requiring little education or initiative--found little satisfaction in their work.

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ values of the 1930-1940's established by Finnish immigrants with the liberal university-oriented middle class of that time, now transformed into the ultra-liberalized-radicalized national minority (but co-op majority) advancement of this new set of values. The Co-op now loses money for the first time, but the new majority feels this is a minor concern. A trend?
Their type of work provided little gratification; it reduced the self to a cog. He held that people cared little for one another on the job since each was inherently replaceable.

Howard Becker (1968:215) was in general agreement with Henry although he noted that the career elite seemed, to an extent, to find rewarding work in the American system. One-third of the sample of successful middle-aged males felt they were in control of their lives. They felt that autonomy, self-directed skill, and responsible social interaction were satisfactory. However, the majority of the sample, even the successful functioners, felt that they were in effect putting in time, merely earning a living without much personal choice or the joy of a sense of identity.

In evaluation: It is too early to say, and not appropriate in this paper, whether the above findings or inferences are true—there is some indication that intellectualized researchers project their own feelings into evaluation of how blue collar or repetitive clerical workers feel about their jobs and lives. Nor can it be certain, if the findings turn out to be "true," that job dissatisfaction is the fruition of long-term American trends—the heightened expectation of a "better life" here and now, in a society that has been socialized to expect too much, including job satisfaction. Also, some critics would contend that a person's sense of identity should not hinge on the quality of his job. However, given the American identification of self-
worth with job success, this equation is inescapable for the normative individual. And, though some thus find the American job system wanting, the rest of the world appears to be striving hard to approach these high material standards of the American worker and the interesting highly paid jobs of its professionals—20% of our doctors are immigrants. However, other societies may have the advantage of cultural compensations and psychic bulwark in affilial emotional values, beliefs and the security of group-tied social cohesiveness—as the Japanese, and likely both the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists.

Kluckhohn's Five Value Shifts - Evaluated

In noting value shifts, Kluckhohn (1958a:145-217) adjudged the cultural trends as he found and projected them forward nearly 15 years ago. Now in retrospect we can judge whether he seemed to have really captured a valid trend or denominated an abortive or elusive one, or was just the prisoner of wish-fulfillment. Not all of his inferences are closely related to the themes autonomy and achievement. (An example is the valuation and participation in institutionalized religion. Kluckhohn saw it as going up, and actually since 1965 it has been going down overall in numbers and in relative life-cycle significance, especially with the Catholic Church. The exceptions that have enjoyed numerical growth and unshaken conviction were the most traditional, participatory and member-committed institutions with clear-cut standards, like the Mormons,
The recent workings of the conformity trait, which in the American culture is the reciprocal, the reverse side of autonomy (Chapter 3), Kluckhohn saw as emerging in a new, somewhat compromise form, which he characterized as "collective individualism." He discerned that the operation of the longstanding imperative of the conformity trait—the need for public approval, the dire psychic necessity of being liked and approved by one's peers—had, with the growth of social consciousness, started to take a socially constructive form. The cumulative effects of the late 19th and 20th centuries' historic revelations and criticisms of the harsh, inhumane components of the American social system had begun to bring about a shift in values. As propounded in the writings and revelations of Steffens, Norris, Dreiser, Upton Sinclair (especially with the national acceptance of Lewis' searching value criticisms contained in the national-character embodiment of Babbitt) these concerns began to take hold of the opinion-makers conscious value system. The dominant norm began to shift. Kluckhohn foresaw that this norm would henceforth become ever more involved in working toward a "collective individualism" more humane and socially constructive.

He held that it was becoming fashionable and widespread in professional and business circles to be supportive of group values in community organizations, social class, profession, and various agencies for community uplift and
healing. This was reflected in movements and organizations that were more social minded, more esthetic, and in support of more communal controls (Kluckhohn 1958a:185-7, 204).

In evaluation: One can see Kluckhohn's trends advancing and widening to capture more support: as acceptance of laws banning discrimination in hiring and promotion, for instance, or executive programs for "affirmative action" whereby the disadvantaged minorities sometimes get preferences over equally or better qualified whites, or court orders for busing for integration, or laws for ecological controls, or the ban on filling in any more of San Francisco Bay. This social consciousness backs laws raising the level and accessibility of welfare so that about 10% of the mainly urban population is on welfare, compared to only 20% in the depths of the Great Depression when 25% of the whole population was jobless. These value shifts are reflected in the capture of the Berkeley Co-op by the militant crusaders (see footnote #6), the growing reluctance of judges and juries to convict and punish accused criminals and the attendant stress on reform rather than punishment.

It would appear that the old, high value placed by Americans upon morality, moralism, and righteousness, has been drifting from the success ethic of the ruthless, socially-irresponsible, self-made man toward an ethic of more social responsibility. This is accompanied by a feeling of unapproving tolerance activated by a somewhat uneasy but vulnerable guilt toward those who "haven't made it." However, the
The autonomousness of the individual achievement is only lightly relieved for most folk in their acquiescing to these laws and attendant value shifts. In total, the above does indicate change toward group-beneficial values. Yet so far this trend appears to have cut very little into the essential autonomousness of individual living. One perhaps unsympathetic observer with some contact with numerous local "communes" where groups of nonrelated people live together—usually to seek some ties of surrogate family or fraternity—claims they are but "shifting way stations of lonely people."  

A second significant shift advanced by Kluckhohn was that toward tolerance of heterogeneity (1958a:197-198) which would, if actual, be a significant break with the conformist patterns noted above. He cited the fact that protesters and deviates in American history were suppressed not by the police or government but largely by public opinion—in extreme cases by vigilantes. He noted that Americans were now more aware of other cultures, due to several circumstances of the mid-20th century: the presence of millions of American servicemen abroad in World War II, the ease of foreign travel, growth of education, wider knowledge of the world and tolerance for differences, and the decline of authoritarian

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7 Estimates for Berkeley and adjacent Oakland range from 500 to 1000 of these group living arrangements; some are a structured fraternity with mutual obligations and responsibilities, others operate with fluid arrangements and deteriorating home environment. A local real estate dealer put the average commune life at two years.
child raising. In evaluation: since Kluckhohn wrote, particularly since 1965, this trend has mushroomed—homosexuals publicly sue for equal rights, athletes and working males wear hair that is not only shaggy but of a length and style considered in this century to be "female", the movies show explicit sexual intercourse and various forms of what has been deemed "depravity". In fulfillment of greater rights for diverse peoples, the films show blacks in superior sympathetic roles, voting requirements eliminate the necessity for reading English (ballots locally—San Leander and Hayward, California—are printed also in Spanish and Portuguese), abortions are furnished on demand, war protesters are sanctioned, the voting age in 1972 was lowered to 18. In terms of alternatives to the family, an increasing minority, say 5% or more, of men and women now dwelling together are doing so in trial marriages, coeducational dormitories, or shifting promiscuous colonies. Also, in the direction of wider rights, the Ralph Nader-led consumer-oriented attacks on business and on the quality, safety, and security of its products have been energetic.

It has, on the whole and despite occasional use of left-wing fascism—as in "trashings", forcible breakage and entry, and disruption of free speech—been a period of feverish liberalization on many fronts. Among the factors

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8 This continually noted "decline in authoritarian child-raising" is a curiously-recurring anomaly. Nearly every generation of observers since 1700 has sagely noticed the same decline (Chapter 2). At that rate most or all authority should have disappeared long ago.
helping to erode American national conceits have been the repercussions of the "no-win" (containment) Korean and Vietnam wars, and our failure to convert many subsidized countries like Korea or Ghana to our democratic values (despite unexpected success in West Germany and Japan). These 'failures', or qualified successes, have generated a great deal of American self-criticism and even cultural self-hatred, as expressed in intellectual "liberal" circles and made public in the Saturday Review, New York Review, and New York Times. There has thus occurred, despite the fact that the past war revived half of the world's economy, an erosion of American confidence in its historic mission of carrying the banner of righteous democracy and justice. We seem suddenly to be mortal and flawed and uncertain of our values.

Perhaps Kluckhohn was correct in seeing that this tolerance of heterogeneity was already building up in the 1950's. It has occurred as a product of the questioning of and loss of faith in old norms and values. Also, the liberalization movements are worldwide in all of the more affluent industrial nations; even the Swiss males voted for women's suffrage in 1971. What is its effect on our American thematic values? This reluctant acceptance of more deviation in life styles has been accompanied by growth of a small minority who have perhaps temporarily rejected the achievement "syndrome" and live very modestly, or beggarly, on part-time jobs, welfare food stamps or by "rip-offs"
(light stealing from the affluent, morally unprerehensible from this group's viewpoint). These latter values, should they grow in numbers and repute, could influence the built-in dedication of the American culture to autonomous achievement of jobs, status, money and other symbols. So far these unorthodox "dropouts" are too peripheral to be significant. Some small percent of middle class youth "drop out" of the career work track or treadmill, but their places are speedily taken over by achievement-oriented "mainstreamers" or minorities, just admitted into the mainstream--as for example Pacific Gas & Electric's Black repairmen. The net result is downward social mobility for a few, a little more opportunity for upward mobility for others in a currently-tightening, reduced-opportunity career pyramid. The impact of the widespread liberalization may erode other values such as fealty, self-restraint, racial inequality, and heterosexuality, long before those trends have much effect on this basic American deep seated drive and need for personal achievement.

In a politico-cultural sense, the 1972 Presidential election was partly a contest between paragons of the old individual (autonomous) achievement values--"self-made", one-generation-up-from-working-poverty but middle class valued successes, as Nixon and Agnew--versus the more radical McGovern supporters who, as zealous social minded reformers, questioned the "materialistic" orientation of the mainstream of American society. These ultra liberals tended to reflect and support and urge ever more of the above liberalization
trends and attempted to put the onus of immorality on their "establishment" and property-cherishing opponents. These ultra liberals held that the lauded differential achievement represented by a Henry Ford, Henry Kaiser, Howard Hughes or J. Pierpont Morgan was in great measure the product of influence, connections, tax loopholes, and of immoral, ruthless corporate and political wheeling and dealing. Though a sizable portion of the mainstream middle class, which since 1933 was nominally Democrat but as ever was also strong in its allegiance to the traditional acquisitive achievement values, eventually and reluctantly swung toward McGovern, still he lost the majority. The fatal tone of his campaign was set in the primaries where his closest supporters (42% with Master's Degrees) weakened their credentials for liberal tolerance of variation by spurning the old Democratic Party politicos, the organized labor hardhats ("Archie Bunkers"), and the lower middle class. In so doing they seemingly also rejected the normative American values of striving to get ahead and acquire property and material possessions--the symbols of achievement and bulwark for security. Tolerance of diversity, of political compromise, had not yet claimed 1972's most "liberal", or intolerantly radical, major political wing.

These new movements do not really seem to have breached the wall of autonomy of each person--the fear, or bother, or obligation of person-to-person involvement--although some have this as a major aim.\footnote{A not exceptional example is found in the neighbor, the chic, well-educated, /footnote cont'd on following page/}
A third trend seen by Kluckhohn was toward hedonism—that is, present time orientation, less acceptance of delayed gratification patterns, more self-indulgence (1958a:192). He felt that the old-time Protestant Ethic value of putting off rewards until one had earned them through long struggle—had in fact attained them as hallmarks of achievement—had been eroded by the values of "enjoying it now," buying on time: appliances, cars, foreign travel trips, private swimming pools. This was reminiscent of Henry's consumerism imperative (above and 1936:6). Traditionally, these comforts and indulgences were expected to be earned and enjoyed in part as the symbols marking achievement, success-crowned. But now as they became more widely diffused because of advertising, rising expectations and affluence, greater circles of people came to want them soon, to enjoy them now.

In evaluation: this expectation of current gratification could also be a contributor to the United States' unparalleled modern nation crime rate. Even though the trend was predicted correctly—there has been a pronounced shift toward current consumption—still the evaluation should

/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ autonomously striving "Mrs. Jones," divorced, her children largely with a housekeeper, active in a range of establishment-attacking causes, marcher in protest parades, outraged contributor to the defense of those deemed wrongly accused by the "system.

She finally asked if her immediate neighbor to the west, Mrs. Wilson, an aged but pleasant lady, "was away?" The answer was that Mrs. Wilson had died 10 days ago. The cause-oriented Mrs. Jones had never bothered to socialize with her aged neighbor. Her compassion was for causes, not individual people, especially not the aged who most need personal interest and neighborly compassion. This orientation is common among both Liberals and Conservatives.
be seen against the mainstream drive still operating to
"save some, invest some, borrow some." The normative aspir­
ants to higher professional status still devote years to
higher education in hopes of attaining the admired and
rewarded job status. Though there has been some slackening
in the demand for college the last two years, there is no
likelihood of ever returning to college enrollment levels
of even ten years ago. Competition to enter medical and
law, nursing and other professional-vocational schools has
intensified in the 1970's.

Like most social changes, this one is more of a modifi­
cation than a reversal. One could say that the deferred
gratification pattern has been modified, moderated, and
somewhat transformed. Consider, as an example, the old
Portuguese immigrant to Alameda County of 1900-1920, who
was already imbued with the "Protestant" ("Portegee?")
ethic, although unlike "WASPs" was supported by strong
family affinity ties. He worked as a laborer six or seven
days a week his entire life, never took his wife out to
dinner, bought a car only with cash, and never "enjoyed
himself" with frivolous expenditure. He finally died owning
two or three houses or an apartment house. His pattern has
now elided into the pattern of his largely mainstream value­
patterned son, "Franklin Delano Souza". Printer or painter
or contractor, Souza now typically works only 40 hours per
week including overtime. He takes in shows, expensive Big
League Football and Baseball games, takes his wife to Tahoe
and on trips, buys his children bikes, and owns only his own $27,000 suburban home. Yet he still manages to pay off his car and his house, and still saves some money—relative affluence allows a compromise. Notwithstanding, he more than ever wants his children to achieve, to "be somebody—not a no-good hippie." He has scant tolerance for those taking welfare, and doesn't want public housing, or the kind of people that live in public housing, in his neighborhood or even in his largely middle class suburban city—San Leandro, parts of Hayward, Castro Valley, Pleasanton, Livermore, Dublin.

Kluckhohn's fourth significant point (1958a:194) was that the American culture has, since 1933, undergone a great change in acceptance of government and other organizational control, and concomitantly demands, and is habituated to, a great amount of services and government support. Hence, many see this as an indication of erosion of self-reliant individualism. Before Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, 1933-45, scarcely anyone received a government check. Now huge sectors, if not the majority, of the population receive such checks, directly or indirectly—Welfare, Social Security, Veterans, FHA-backed loans, Model Cities, Agricultural Price Supports, Soil Bank, grants for academic research or for highways or local schools, revenue sharing.

In evaluation: although Americans have, since the 1700's, cherished a built-in antipathy toward authority and much government, there has been a nearly complete reversal
since 1933. Unlike most social change this one has embraced a wholesale acceptance of enormous government socialization programs, which have grown much larger in the national scheme even since Kluckhohn's writing, and are now embraced even by a Republican President, Richard Nixon. Possibly this may eventually erode the basic notion that persons should take care of themselves all their lives. So far, however, the erosion is very slight, since many feel that these checks either represent a form of deferred earnings, such as Veterans' Benefits or Social Security, or are "guilt payments", an equity or sharing with the less able or less fortunate. Others consider that their knowledge and work preparing acceptable applications for grants for Model Cities or research or archeological rescue is a new but now legitimate way to pay one's way. One way or another, the stigma of welfare is escaped. "You're entitled" may insidiously erode this value of self-support reliance, and we have swung a considerable distance from the non-protected and non-supported situation of the Pantexes. Yet within this reshaped economic system of a high percent government largess and stipulations, the concept of autonomous achievement is still paramount even though adapted to the large bureaucracies of government and business and academia.

William H. Whyte's The Organization Man (1956) suggested along the postulate of Riesman that the normative American was, in the 20th century, shifting from an inner-directed man of conscience and integrity to an outer-directed organi-
zation man, constantly adjusting his behavior and values in order to be successful; thus he had no central integrity. However, as Lipset and Lowenthal (1961) showed, while this characterization fulfilled the prophecy of those believing in the deleterious effects of the loss of old-time rugged individualism—for instance, Frederick Jackson Turner (1958)—it was not well founded, considering the evidence available on American character. As this paper has indicated, contrary to Whyte and Riesman, the normative American was other-directed, conformist, in values from the beginning. It is conceded that the earlier American might have had much greater freedom in his daily decision making or in his mode of dress, and greater latitude for little eccentricities of behavior, when he dwelt on a remote frontier farmstead, compared to his modern counterpart, the office worker of a big urban bureaucracy. The continuing theme of this paper is that, in either case, frontier farm or metropolitan insurance hive, he was directed by the dominant values of autonomy and achievement. Mainly, it was the externals that changed. The way of making one's own climb shifted from cattle raising to car peddling or memo writing or gas station operating, but the individual drive to make more, get more, climb upwards, is undiminished. The number of attempts to found new businesses has not lowered.

Kluckhohn's fifth inferred value shift—The Equalization of the Roles of Men and Women (1958a:199)—was quite correctly discerned as an ever-growing trend, and has recently broken
through strongly "on the coattails" of the ethnic/racial minority rights tidal wave. Suddenly, since 1965, it has exploded into "Women's Liberation" and (anti) "Male Chauvinism" movements. The Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution has already passed Congress with the two-thirds vote of each house. The United States' Government is taking widespread action against employers, clubs, against differential hiring and promotion, or admittance, by sex, or race, or ethnic; encouraging reverse preferential hiring in the near future to redress the balance. (Some laws also state equal rights for the aged and aging, but the society's values and its government do not really support these at all—"They have had their chance." Life is still very much regarded as a race, not a process of evolving.)

In these last two years the California State Supreme Court has found unconstitutional laws prohibiting women from working as bar maids or racetrack stable hands, or newsgirls, or limiting their maximum and nighttime hours of work. Thus laws designed to keep women out of what were considered degrading or dangerous or heavy work situations have been killed. Practices barring women from higher business or professional or blue-collar skilled jobs are under successful attack. The concept of woman as "a lady" is rarely heard, but so too is the "gentleman" concept. To be "feminine" and to be a "feminist" now have divergent meanings. It is too soon to prognosticate whether this is fad or folk trend, whether it will level off or continue.
Kluckhohn’s views, written 15 years ago, were that American women were already the envy of the world for their relatively high status—higher percentage of higher paid female wage earners than any other Western society (though still much lower than men). This was coupled with the deeply engrained, pioneer, chivalric, and New-England-schoolmarm status values of the society that elevated women to a moral, esthetic pedestal higher than men. They were considered the custodians of American culture and preceptors of moral values, pushers for educational, cultural, aesthetic and social betterment standards, the centers of family life and the basic teachers of values, a folk virtue embodiment in skirts to be looked up to. Kluckhohn noted that these shifts in values toward women’s "equality" seemed to many men to be shifts toward women’s dominance. To others today, the changes appear degrading to women and to the society. Kluckhohn stated that the chance was fraught with domestic tensions and disruptions of heretofore accepted social relationships.

Now the pedestal is shaken: virginity, modesty, and deference are, in dominant values, down-graded somewhat. Some local entertainments presenting bestiality feature participant women. Rape along with other violent crime has increased several fold. 10

10 From August 15 to 24, 1972, nine days, New York City experienced 64 homicides; none were gangland, just an increasing part of the current American culture trend. For all of England (50 million people) the entire 1970 homicide figure was 145; Norway, 4; San Francisco, 145.
At the same time, women are, in small numbers, becoming telephone linemen and truck drivers, and gardeners. They are also seeking, with government sponsorship, to become professors, a trend pioneered especially in anthropology. Abortions in urban states now exceed birth; the birth rate has dropped lower than it was in the depths of the 1930's depression. The divorce rate has accelerated as women increasingly seek their individual fulfillment; more children thereby will grow up likely to experience divorce themselves. Small children are put into day care, trending toward the well-nigh universal practice of Russia and China. There is an ever-increasing demand by women's groups for more day care centers and also for men to stay home part or full time and take care of the children. All this is a drastic, confused and violent shake-up of values, with great repercussions across the social board, the cultural patterns. Especially the family seems to be shaken, reduced in a significant percentage of cases to a divorced woman and her one or two children. Yet deeper values don't change so drastically en masse; it is likely that a counter movement will arise, as Life-right has arisen to battle the victory of easy abortion.

What are the effects of these changes, for the purpose of this paper? Totally unanticipated by Kluckhohn, whose most significant value trend change noted under autonomy and achievement was increasing socially constructive "collective individualism" ("wish fulfillment?") (above and 1958a:
185-7, 204), is this current intensification of competition
to achieve.

The effect of this thrust of women, blacks, Mexicans
and the other official minorities (as designated and supported
and favored by the United States government\textsuperscript{11}) is to intensify
and worsen competition to achieve. More and more women,
blacks, and others are, by peer pressure from organized
pressure groups, induced to partake of the American imperative
to achieve. They are being stimulated and driven in their
assimilation of the dominant folk values to aspire to take
on the roles and high status heretofore achieved by white
males. It can be foreseen that the pressures may escalate
well-nigh intolerably. Competition and ultimate frustration
for the normative achievers, especially for white males who
for all the American generations have been socialized to
expect that they should attain success in high status positions,
may become dreadful. It could pit person against person,
woman against man, in the most egocentric self-seeking way.
It could accelerate the divorce rate as men fail to measure
up to the expectations and/or job status of their wives.

Despite marginal rejections of the "system" by a few,
scores of highly and newly ambitious "newmen" or "new persons"
press forward, working, striving to exploit for their personal

\textsuperscript{11} In 1972 a street paving firm, Souza Brothers,
entirely of Portuguese descent, was ruled ineligible and
had its longtime contract cancelled by the City of Oakland
by ruling of the dispensers of Federal Funds that the Souzas
were not an approved minority group.
autonomous ascent this newly opened up equality of opportunity. This old American ideal, heretofore only fractionally realized, is now being pushed to the hilt. No other country has attempted so radical an equalization of opportunity, and perhaps ultimately of status. But within this potential lie the seeds of great possible disillusionment when the frustration De Tocqueville identified becomes manifest—"most are doomed to relative disappointment in a democracy."

Compounding the potential for social disruption is the coincidence that this accelerated trend of intensifying competition has occurred at a juncture when the reformist movements have been successful in leveling off population growth. Thus, a sudden oversupply of qualified status-seekers in many fields, notably in academia from Ph.D.'s on down, is coincidental with an intensification of competition to achieve. A shift threatens in the American society's cultural expectations from a norm of constant expansion with its accompanying multiplication of opportunities for achieving higher status, to a society of little or no growth. This could, and seems likely to, gradually throw the United States back into the mentality of the post-medieval Europe that it sought to escape, as it is faced with a static no-growth structure.

In such a society opportunities are much more limited for personal status achievement—akin to Foster's peasant culture (1965) of limited good—where more for one means
less for others. There would likely be an increasing economic reward of more affluence for all, but with rising expectations based on dominant American values, that is a minor consideration. The values of the culture place the goal according to relative achievement, toiling to high status, getting something "better than" (somebody else). This "crunch" would likely result in a high percentage of frustrated people, and increase political and social instability, threatening the practice of American democracy itself.

The question arises: could other replacement values take over? At this writing, present social movements for ever greater individual achievement, and for accelerating achievement catch-up for those newly admitted to full competition, seem to be growing in strength. Since these achievement drives are rooted more deeply in the basic drives of the culture than the newly launched counter movements to "cool" the drive, they would appear to be most likely to continue ascendant. The new ethic would urge fulfillment in a limited vocational handicraft or some "non-productive" or "genuinely creative" activity or group sharing instead of own-ownership. Though there is this incipient latter trend, it appears miniscule and highly unattractive so far.

It is noteworthy that militant leftwing or other collective movement groups are consciously aware of the evils of American individualism. Most have made conscious efforts to lessen the typical atomistic American autonomy and gain collective reinforcement by cultivating group identity ties
as Women's Liberation and Lesbians' "sisterhood", black "soul brothers", La Raza Unida, all somewhat akin to an earlier generation's "Brotherhood" of Train Men. Yet despite this stress on collaterality—on brotherhood or sisterhood—the result has been, with rare exceptions like the Black Muslims, that these are now hotly aspiring people are basically and deeply socialized in the main American value patterns. They therefore operate along the autonomous achievement paths of the mainstream values. As Americans they are probably unable to operate otherwise—barring the exceptional value changes that rarely forge new cohesive patterns of group identities—as with the Muslims and Mormons and Hutterites. It seems to require a religion, a supernatural sustenance, a commitment to make such groupness work in the United States.

Those from the subcultures, say of the ghetto or barrio, heretofore not fully socialized in the mainstream, must in order to compete already have or speedily must integrate these individual achievement values and drive for success. For "liberation" and "equality" means in large measure, in the context of American culture, higher job successes and definite measurable growth in relative incomes. "What percent are at Grade level 15? What percent are tenured?" For the bulk of the newly activated achievement race-runners, like the blacks and the white women, the autonomy is cored in already. No change is necessary. They already come from an egocentric individualistic, non-collateral orientation.
Latinos from a folk-culture sometimes must, along with other adaptations to modern industrial society, make some conversion to this orientation. As in the case of Romano Banuelos, Treasurer of the United States, any lingering collaterality tends to be yielded in order to make the lone climb up the individual ladder of success.

Creativity and Crack-ups. Hsu suggested the possibility of the conformity trait generating a constructive as well as the stated negative corollary. Hsu's concept is that of "creative conflict": he held (1963:222-227) that some Americans react positively against the conformist norm, and in so reacting come up with reformatory and creative movements. In some sectors these alterations receive favorable reception since in the value system creativity is deemed good (change is good, change is progress). So individuals may escape psychologically the constraints of the system, its imperative value patterns, through individual variations amounting to escapes from conformity and cathexes (the investment of emotional significance in an activity, object or idea). In evaluation: since Hsu did not offer specific

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12 In her climb from 17-year-old penniless immigrant of 1944, with two infants back in Juarez and no husband, up to Treasurer of the United States in 1972, she allegedly victimized fellow Mexican-Americans by paying substandard wages in her Los Angeles tortilla factory. This she denies. She is known as a hard-driving person; she was the founder of a successful bank, the first Mexican-immigrant-oriented bank in Los Angeles. She seems well integrated into the mainstream American culture with the requisite autonomous achievement success values. She contends that you have to be "hard boiled", reject demands of compatriots for indulgence, in order to get ahead.
illustration, one can only indicate tentatively that the idea may have merit. It is not clear whether Hsu's "mavericks" were tilting against the more superficial conformity that suppresses eccentricity, beards, or proper dress, or whether they were successful protestants against the deeper conformity of needing group approval for their work achievement and betokening life styles. It was not stated how these creative nonconformists would handle the dire imperative of going along with the crowd in values. Moreover, in some areas, ostensible nonconformity might in reality be a form of conformity since there are long-standing American values sanctioning and approving newness, innovation, change for its own sake. In current lower educational circles professional reputations seem to be built by School Superintendents launching new systems—like ungraded classes, open classrooms, heterogeneous groupings and the like. Some try a new system yearly. In most fields, however, he who would start a real alteration, like criticising operation of a bureau or trying in higher education to transcend the departmental subject matter jurisdictions, generally fail.

Yet creative alteration as a reaction to conformist pressure is one explanation of how this conformist-in-value society is so technologically innovative. Changes in technology are much more easily accepted than shifts in deeper values, as in forgoing the lifetime achievement competition or accepting a more intensive degree of local policing and individual public responsibility.
Korea Misgivings: The experiences of the Americans taken prisoner by the Communist Chinese during the Korean War (Dahrendorf 1961:193-4), 1950-1953, brings into question the absolute value of autonomous achievement. These experiences raise the question of whether values that were so pragmatically effective in the building of America are as effective in sustaining a society, or sustaining even individual life, when put to a cruel test under suppressive conditions. These prisoners were put to the utter test of actual survival. They were subjected by their captors to intensive value pressure. These "brain-washing" clinics cleverly exploited the basic American autonomousness and latent or potential distrust of each man for the next. They acted on the supposition that each person conceived the other from infancy more as a competitor than as a cooperating ally or friend. From all evidence the captors were able to reduce several thousands of young Americans to a non-relating collection of egocentric individuals, each blindly oriented only to his own welfare, and callous to others' survival. Sick men were thrown out of the hutches by their colleagues to die; many put blankets over their heads and died, their will to live gone. Of the total, 38% died, though they had sufficient rations. In contrast, the Turkish prisoners, who came from an authoritarian, group-oriented (and harsh economic) background, all survived, maintaining their discipline and coherence, caring for their sick, maintaining their integrity.
In evaluation: These facts above have, in some interpreters' hands, been deemed not so damning to our culture, in that perhaps the Chinese manipulators made much greater and more skillful efforts to break down the Americans than on the obdurate Turks, and perhaps these American soldiers, being largely less-educated draftees, were unrepresentative of the dominant middle class and its values. Still, the debacle raises the spectre that possibly these values may, in fact, have serious internal defects that become apparent when the society or the individual is put to great adverse stress. These men needed to cooperate and sustain one another, but they were unable to. The Chinese manipulators had studied the American culture and unerringly struck at its weak, non-supportive, aspects (perhaps they had read Hsu? (1951)).

One explanation of the normal organizational effectiveness of Americans in contrast to this breakdown under extreme pressure could be that institutional channels and sanctions of school, job, and government as superimposed on the basic autonomous urge to achieve, keep the American "programmed" and oriented to functioning effectively. In response to immediate institutional and socially approved rewards and penalties, he works cooperatively and effectively with his fellow workers or fellow tax-payers, though he always has deep in his mind the competitive insecurity that he could be laid off or fired—unlike the Japanese culture. But remove these institutional channels, their rewards, sanctions, and supports, and a basic alienated, fearful-of-others personality
takes over. It is possible that there is lacking a sufficiently strong internal "gyroscope" to keep the individual steadfastness viable when the external social framework is removed. When said institutions are eliminated or their control weakened the intrinsic volunteer patterns are too weak to overcome the culture's autonomousness and get men to cooperate—even when the alternative might be collapse and death, one by one, individualistically. Despite protestations to the contrary, it is held that group sacrifice and commitment are alien to the culture. These latter can be developed under special conditions (Chapter 3) but the collateral background is not there to evoke. This is a harsh judgment.

This breakdown in American behavior and sustaining values is reminiscent of the possible effects of autonomous values expressed in Cohen's "Lone Emotional Game" (Chapter 3, and 1966:241), and in Henry's quote of De Tocqueville (Chapter 3, and 1966:105-6): "The American had the feeling that one stands alone, no one really cared whether one lived or died." This breakdown could also be related to Kandel and Lesser's (1968:348-58, and Chapter 4) suggestion that Americans operated more in response to external constraints (than Danes), and had but weak internalized norms of behavior.

A reading of eye-witness accounts of some epochal crisis situations in American history, such as the crossing of the plains and mountains in the California Gold Rush, with its hardships, social organization and disorganization, yields some antecedents or forerunners of the later American
behavior under duress in Korea. The prized "winning-of-the-West" individualism also revealed a large component of egocentric, socially irresponsible, every-man-for-himself behavior. In their eagerness or greed to cover miles, win land, grasp treasure, some Argonauts did cooperate loosely and fleetingly, but many died, too, for lack of commitment to a cohesive organization. Of those who succeeded in crossing the continent, many, if not the majority, ended up in the 1870's and 1880's California as destitute derelicts, without family. Each had carved out his own career. This sector of the American character is worth more investigation— as a potential national fault that could contribute to national collapse under sufficient duress.

Sub-Summary to Inferences Problematical. In the section above was presented a variety of authorities' inferences on the nature, development and effects of American cultural trait-values associated with the thematic autonomy and achievement. Some inferences seemed to fit well, although based on theories still in dispute, as that of very stringent, very early toilet training producing compulsively anxious personalities, e.g. the modal American (Murphey above). Some challenged the fairly widespread historical view that the modal American personality shifted from an 1800 model of sturdy, self-reliant, self-directed personality to a modern peer-directed conformist pattern. Jules Henry's companion view that the pioneer virtues were transformed into modern vices was presented and then disputed, as not
recognizing elements of continuity and internal (but paradoxical) consistency in cultural values evinced all the way, 1760 to 1960. Counter views in support of some transformation in socialization of the young during these historic two American developmental centuries were presented. Authorities like Benedict and i. su were cited for their ideas on discontinuities in American socialization. The theme of a "lone emotional game" of both Cohen and, in his rather singular social-critic way, Henry, was offered as an apparent intrinsic trait stemming from the thematic pair. Kluckhohn's 1950's appraisal items of noted and predicted value shifts were explored and discussed to see how valid they seemed in their manifestations 15 years later, and whether anything fundamental in a shift in values was transpiring. It turned out that he predicted some value trends correctly and on others he misprojected. The questions posed by the social and personality disorganization of the American captives of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War were raised as possibly an exposure of inherent weakness of the American value system.

Overall, this section was meant to be left open-ended and exploratory. The explanations for unreconciled findings were meant to be tentative and provide ideas for future considerations. In social science and in the study of American culture there is much that is fluid, and there is much we do not know, much data yet to be found, much paradoxical phenomena still to be related. However, where there was seeming evidence of regularities, logical or possible cause
and effect, it was so indicated. Potential areas to be delved deeper were suggested, such as the implications and possible recurrence of the breakdown of the American prisoners of the Chinese in Korea in the 1950's.

Summary Assessments and Considerations

In this latter part of the chapter an overall, balanced perspective will be sought. The authorities cited throughout this paper have been fairly well balanced. One group consisted of those relatively critical of American society and culture, such as Jules Henry, Margaret Clark and Barbara Anderson, and Francis L. K. Hsu. These were countervailed with authorities largely approving, such as Clyde Kluckhohn, Seymour Lipset. A middle group were the considerable number who called the traits as they saw them, neither pro nor con. They found dynamic thrust in the balance of tensions, as in the constructiveness of competition and the fear of forsakenness in failure. This group, from De Tocqueville to Goldschmidt, meted out both approbation and social criticism. However, since the negative effects of autonomy and achievement and its reciprocals of conformity and insecurity have constituted a considerable bulk of this paper's presentation, it is pertinent to remark here for the sake of perspective, that the American society and its culture has been one of the most successful of all. In terms of economic well-being for most of its people, and of opportunity to rise, political freedom of expression, individual career freedom, it has been unequalled. It has also been strong in pursuit of
idealistic as well as material goals. Of all large nations the American has been the pioneer in lowering the barriers of political participation to include successively poorer or lower orders of people. Especially lately, both through idealism and guilty liberalism it has initiated programs to compensate and afford greater achievement opportunity for those from groups or ethnics adjudged rendered unfairly weak by "the system" in the competitive race. Through government taxing and therefore partial wealth redistribution, it seeks to provide low achievers a greater share in the ever-rising minimum standards of living, including medical care, education and job satisfaction.

Several cultural historical treatments of the 1950's reaffirmed not only the continuities of American socio-political values but also the continuous thread of high idealism, even if short-fallen in execution, of American values and social practices--Daniel Boorstin (1953), Louis M. Hartz (1955), Ralph Gabriel (1956) (in Lipset and Lowenthal, 1961).

How then did these autonomous achievers, these insecure conformists, these historic every-man-for-himself land grabbers, achieve and build together such a nation of worldwide prominence, envy, and hope for the oppressed peoples and nations? Why has it continued to be the refuge for the persecuted (whites), ranging from the Eastern European Jews of the 1900's to the Cubans and the daughter of a Russian dictator, Svetlana Stalin, in the 1960's? Why is it that,
for many, if not most of the world's peoples, this American society is still, even with its sum of individual insecurity, considered the most desirable prototype society to emulate? The national achievement answer seems to lie in the paradox, the thesis-antithesis, that the "independent" anti-authority individualist American also carries a culturally indigenous trait of willingness to submit and cooperate effectively with and in and under the direction of a formal government operation. However, for an American so to submit and cooperate, the circumstances of time and situation must indicate such subordination as a generally acceptable proposition. The "peers" must be convinced--public opinion must so indicate. The waging of World War II represented full public support and peer pressure. The necessity of recalling all American ground troops in Viet Nam after 1968 represented the withdrawal of public support--and peer pressure.

In this government, the beneficiary of a thousand years of English trial and error and gradually crafted democracy, the American political culture contained also the elements of working to compromise. The normative person would submit to compulsion of taxing, and ultimately even the historically rejected "Old World" bodily draft ("conscription") providing that in public opinion (peer standards) it was considered really justified. This could be considered the essence of democracy, though possibly not by those resisting conscription. Perhaps the covert conformity trait, the need for public approval, facilitated this acceptance of the compulsory hand
of government, even though this government control was historically resented and on lesser issues was often stymied. Emerson said that a good citizen should not obey the laws too well. The residual feeling of 200 years of anti-authority still flows in the ambivalent public attitude toward the police and law enforcement.  

So through American history we have had the conflict of authority versus freedom. Youth would grow up, reject parental and township authority, and yet settle further west in their maturity and establish new authority. In the new settlements a community consensus would grudgingly tax themselves as the need became manifest. Through the ideological objections of Old Time Liberalism these transplanted posts of American society would be slower to tax, slower to control

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13 This antithesis emerges strikingly in the Berkeley scene. This atypical, but possibly bellwether forerunner-type community has recently generated surprising grass roots volunteer social efforts, as when the "people" took by force State (University of California) property for a "Peoples Park." They leveled the fence twice, in 1969 and 1971. In a paradoxical way, it has become a conservator or reinstigator of old frontier, anti-government populist values, at least in terms of public control of people's persons.

Yet the Council majority like Populists of old (or Socialists of the future) have been eager to use the taxing power of their government to "soak the rich" and affluent, and even small holders, by levying of rent control laws and greatly increased business license fees.

The City Council's avowed "radicals" torn between responsibility as the people's representatives and this latent populism--"government is bad"--reflect this old American ambiguity. In 1971 Oakland took advantage of a Federal grant for a police helicopter; Berkeley rejected the same, fearing "Big Brother's" surveillance. Physically, the cities merge into one another, but the values differ, showing variations, or possibly stages in development.
the freedom of property and the individual self-determination of disposal of his income than in the old European or Japanese cultures. In America, in attaining collective community betterment, there was considerable time lag compared to older more historic societies. There was much resistance to instituting programs and taxing and getting acceptance of the loss of some individual freedom. Surprisingly, these anti-government individualists generally, in time, paid their taxes, though the arch, old-time typical Appalachian mountaineers enjoyed defying the Revenue Man, avoiding the payment of "moonshine" taxes. Even today a 100-year-old American town such as Missoula is apt to have much less community-enhancing development and controls as central square malls, community-sponsored cafe-gathering centers, elimination of wrecked auto hulks and debris about town, preservation of old landmarks, in comparison to a German, Swiss, Scandinavian, or even old New England town.

So a national government emerged that could do a minimal job, a regular Army was created that was allowed barely enough strength to cope with Indian uprisings. A dual, complicated system of courts, State and Federal, was instituted in fear of concentrated, monolithic power. These court systems grew enormously, accruing great and decisive power as they carried out law in an especially complex, litigation-rife fashion. This reflected a need for government control or umpire institutions, after all. Time after time the trait for legal security coped with the illegal
frontier avarice in occupation of land. "Squatter Sovereignty" was frequently legitimized as a fait accompli, as with the "Sooners", who slipped into Oklahoma prior to 1889, and with the Pre-emption Acts. The juxtaposition of the hunger for property and the need for order was recognized in laws legitimizing much frontier individual jungle law. So a web of commerce developed, basically privately owned, and profit- (individual achievement)-motivated, yet under a governmental protective web, that of late has grown so that its branches encompass most Americans in one way or another. The old-time tacitly accepted minimal government has become enormously large and powerful, therefore strongly decisive, yet the tension between private and public continues into housing, into use of resources. The United States' society's culture, a daughter of England's, carries a unique interplay, an interweaving or jousting of these twain antithetical values. The accumulative effects of egocentricities have been, nationally speaking, mitigated by the acceptance of governmental controls and services.

The process has, in fact, not been so different from the trend perceived in 1958 by Kluckhohn, toward "collective individualism", except that it is much more vested in agencies of government control with much subordination of the individual, than he expected. This system of democratic government compulsion as a substitute for voluntary collateral cohesion was working all the while. It worked poorly with the Pantexes (Chapter 1), more effectively in a modern
California town, with its myriad codes, where unpaved streets or unplumbed houses are generally no longer permitted. Lately, governmental "collectivism" has taken in much more terrain, from the early, simple township government services of schools and constables to the modern massive system of federally backed loans, state pollution standards, aid to dependent children and tax money spent for the hungry of India or for bombs in the Vietnam War. Kluckhohn favored the type of "collective individualism" that operated in volunteer social uplift sectors—working for more art, civic improvement, libraries, educational facilities. These volunteer-supported groups have burgeoned, also, but relatively much less than the constraint management of government—Federal, State, City, County, School, Special Districts—tax upon tax, public services and control upon control and management. Thus the affluent incomes won from differential achievement have been redistributed somewhat—not enough for Socialists but far too much from a 1900 American view.

Thus the normative autonomous American operated successively from the frontier into settled communities of ever-increasing community life, using some few volunteer organizations such as fire departments. Most significantly, the normative American's life career was fulfilled in a web of business and government organizations. From the 1880's giant corporation, through the giant government of 1900 and especially since 1933, the web has grown, the percent of people working for someone else has increased, to become the norm. Though the normative American continued personally
autonomous, his necessary acceptance of direction, discipline, and labor-coordinating control of, say, the Northern Pacific Railroad, made this autonomous achiever in fact a collateral achiever in his work-day, work-life organization. But this collaterality had no deep kinship or permanently enduring affilial ties. It was more a loose confraternity of, say, mobile railroad telegraphers like Chet Huntley's father Pat (Huntley 1968:155). Initially the small company, then the giant corporation, and latterly the giant government has supplied the American society the necessary organization, productive efficiency facilities and the work-a-day social cohesion. These institutional surrogates have operated somewhat in place of the ties and supports of lineality and collaterality (See Chapter 3, Caudill and Scarr 1962:53-91, and Florence Kluckhohn 1950:382-3) that had been largely eliminated from American culture prior to, during, and shortly subsequent to, the ocean crossing from Mother England. Motivating achievement factors included pride in achievement, hope of climbing to higher status, some satisfaction either in developing one's own "spread" (ranch) or farmstead, store, or, increasingly, in attaining a responsible role in a business, corporation, or in times of stress for the nation, in the military, and lately in government organization. These were the gears, the machinery furnishing billets, work opportunities, that enabled the autonomous achiever to, in effect, work cooperatively and build up his wealth and status, and that of the United States.
Kluckhohn's last word (1958a:165-7) was that the autonomy, the orientation to individual achievement, was still the core motivating force, and a dedicated grasping privatism went along concomitantly (though he hopefully discerned trends toward amelioration). Thus the normative American who was forced (in the case of Pat Huntley) by his failure in pioneering and by industrialization, to work for the big corporation, still adhered to his goals of making his way independently of help or hindrance from kinfolk, and regardless of his town or class or origin. As ever in American history the dominant values held him responsible for supporting his nuclear family (only). He jealously guarded what wealth or home he could acquire. He was ignorant of the extent to which his values were molded into a conformist pattern of lone achievement, since he was socialized to believe that there was no acceptable alternative—even a military career in 1920 was very suspect. Kluckhohn, moreover (1958a:187), argued somewhat contrarily and perhaps idealistically that Americans might conform exteriorly in order to husband their psychic energy inwardly to develop their unique personal potential (See Hsu's oathexes, Chapter 4 and 1963:223-227). This the writer would deem a goal achieved perhaps by a small minority, but not by the dominant majority socialized to be dependent on public approval.

14 Most of those attempting to homestead in Northern Montana, 1910-1924, were so doomed.
As noted, the achievement-bound normative American has no compunctions about forsaking his roots, his hometown, his homeclass, his old friends. The conformity comes in molding his career along expected lines of promotion and advancement, which leads to the judgment that the striver is an "operator", the classic Dick-Nixon-like opportunist who allegedly lacks integrity (Whyte 1956:5, 6, 11, 135). However, it could equally be said that this constant "trimming" and adjusting of the normative American shows great social acuity and consideration of others (peers and bosses) in adapting to new situations, new demands, new sets of people,\(^{15}\) (Lipset 1963:132). Only a few can go the whole route, "to the top," zigzagging their way upward. The Huntley father, born in Wisconsin as one of seven children, moved west at adulthood, was bested in his Montana homestead attempt, 1913-1920, and ended up as a lifetime railroad telegrapher. He was closer to average than an Andrew Carnegie. But he and Carnegie shared those same achievement values. Pat Huntley would unquestionably have made the climbing zigzag had his opportunity opened up. His son did. Historically, we would never have heard of these normative men, Pat Huntley and John Anderson Truman, except for the chance of their sons' exceptional achievements.

\(^{15}\)Studies indicate that those who move about geographically and those who move up status-wise, tend to have significantly greater chance of heart attack than those who stay put. The latter achieve less and live longer—Harry Truman excepted.
The working out of autonomy and achievement has also been in the context of a fuzzily-held but pervasive value of equality. According to the frontier and Declaration of Independence ethos Americans were supposed to be equal in that one man was as good as another, until he proved he was better. Each man was entitled to equal treatment before the law, unless he could pull strings for preferential treatment. Each man should have the same opportunity to rise, though it helped to marry the boss's or richest man's daughter, as did Abraham Lincoln. Each man should be addressed by a common equalitarian term, unless he could get elected and be referred to as the "Honorable." These somewhat conflicting values have continued in uneasy association. Their on-going manifestations are presented in the paradoxes between adherence to equality and (differential) achievement—the basic American need to feel superior to someone (Henry above, and 1966). Sometimes these values reinforced or moderated one another (Lipset, 1963:123); for instance, the feeling that the effect of the special favoritism and "pull" (examples above) should be minimized.

And the highly individually competitive United States' society

16 Hofstadter felt that at the time the Declaration of Independence was written, the phrase about equality actually meant only that an American was equal to an Englishman of the same class, but as later interpreted has come to mean that every man is (potentially) as good as another. Children start the race of life with equal opportunity to succeed.
has minimized these greatly with its merit system and meritocracy, as compared to more traditional collaterally-oriented societies as in Latin America, Africa, Asia, though the latter have decried the American system as cold, heartless, devoid of sustaining ties.

Individually, achievement has been the cultural tyrant. If a man proved he was "better" he attained power and position. Then he was entitled to enjoy the benefits. Those who proved themselves to be less good or to be "losers" should "take their medicine", sometimes attributed to "luck." This value pattern also produced those ill effects of the "loser" or even middle achievers, who, feeling themselves mediocrity failures, succumbed to the corrosive effects of normlessness, especially in the middle and later years (Clark & Anderson 1967:11-18, 325). Goldschmidt held that though it produced much achievement, this American system also produced much seeming failure—failure to achieve as much as the better of one's peers. He held that the system resulted in much family and personal tension, whether the individual was deemed a failure or a success (1955:1216). From these writers' studies and from Henry's, and from participant observation, this writer's opinion is that these losses, these frustrations and self-doubts of those who have hit their status ceiling, is probably much more widespread and debilitating than has so far been revealed. Other reports by psychologists and psychiatrists, and contacts with people, indicate a widespread incidence of this malaise. However, most men would tend to
keep it unexpressed, as public confession of failure would be
damning for an American of the dominant cultural pattern. De
Tocqueville said that if a man fails in self-reliance, if he
falters, is a "loser", then he feels forsaken, impotent, his
peers are unsympathetic and tend to abandon him (Henry 1963:6). 17

Loneliness: Another penalty paid for this autonomy-
achievement orientation, in the opinion of several authorities,
is that the normative American experiences a great sense of
loneliness, not just when aged but all along the life line.
Cohen (Chapter 3 and 1966:241) stressed the "lone emotional
game." Brodbeck (1961:43) especially found this theme of
loneliness all through American history, from the obvious
lonely plains on through to teeming but impersonal cities
and the autonomy of suburbia. In the American patterns this
loneliness may arise from the aforesaid lack of collaterality,
extended family or group ties, lack of lineality, lack of roots
as mobility and status-climbing shuttles the individual about--
often more than a thousand miles from his home source, roots. 18

17 The Japanese view the American system of laying off
people from their jobs as barbaric. Recently, in 1970-1971,
American scientists and engineers, as well as blue collar
workers, experienced overnight the collapse of their status-
supported world, as their jobs disappeared without warning.

18 In American epic cowboy films, the lone rider, seemingly
without background or family connections, without roots,
courageously and often singlehandedly coping with adverse
nature and malevolent humans, is a recurring theme—as in
Shane and Will Penny. In the end, the hero generally rides
off toward more anonymity, if not oblivion. Herein may be
found a symbol of many lives.
Also, the aforementioned fear of involvement, the widespread distaste of getting too close to others, the fear of emotional demands, all tend to isolate. Nevertheless, human need for close contact continues unabated. Hence, as Henry indicated (1963:145), extreme emotional demands are put upon the only outlet left for viable close human contacts, the nuclear family. Sometimes the strain on two (or one) frail parents, beset with job and outside concerns, is too much. Emotions and frustrations boil over in violence, and/or the socialization and personality of the children suffer—the result is a new generation that is even more isolated. Some, parent and child, maintain emotional barriers even within this minimal family, avoid closeness, retreat into their protective autonomy, yet are highly conscious that one should strive to be "well liked" outside the family—by the peers (Henry 1963:323,149).

Unchanging Values; Peer Approval. Peer approval, as a major determinant of the normative man's status and therefore self worth rather than self approval, the "inner-directed" personality—if it ever really existed—appears as imperative now as was noted in Chapter 2 in the various historical observations and evaluations. Greater democrati-

zation of government bodies and advisory boards enhance this power, as 18-year-olds are put on Planning Commissions, workers get more say in management, colleges share part of their governance with faculty senates, and college committees allow students to participate in decision-making. A kind
of nascent work-stead collaterality system is thus cultivated. It differs from the unique Japanese workstead-as-family, boss-as-father setup, in that the American individual is competing without security (unlike the Japanese) in a "driven" way with the same peers who are also judging him. As Lipset quoted Riesman:

We can contrast the small grocer who must please his individual patrons, perhaps by a "counter-side" manner with the chain store employee who must please both the patrons and his co-workers.

The colleague, like the peer-group, is the very person with whom one engages in competition for the scarce commodity of approval and the very person to whom one looks for guidance as to what is desirable (Lipset 1963:131).

Of course there is still the boss insisting on high standards of performance and meticulous conformity in work patterns and associated values. Yet the peers are powerfully influential, too. For instance, though most metropolitan newspapers are owned and directed at the highest levels by political conservatives, the pressure of the working newsmen, reporters, and editing staff has since 1960 become so prevailingly, and overwhelmingly, liberal-socialist that the news and syndicated columns tend to have a "liberal slant." Often the content of the newspaper is at variance with the editorials (see The Missoulian, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle). Note the above italicized scarce commodity of approval. Approval, akin to status, or along with status, is always in short supply. There is not enough to go around, so powerful cultural pressures for conformity continue.
When they slacken in one way, say for social acceptance of homosexuals, or of couples living together out of wedlock, or of avoidance of the draft, they usually tighten in another, as the peer group pressure gets more levers.

The Protestant Ethic "Engine." Equally powerful and equally influential on the achievement value ("syndrome", some would say) is the embodiment, the characterization of the work-is-virtuous value, that the historians inaccurately label the Protestant Ethic. Periodically avant garde social observers adjudge the trait obsolete, dying or dead. Originally this value was religiously conceived by the 1600's Calvinistic Puritans as allied to salvation. In time, by the 1800's, it was modified secularly to equate goodness and morality with success. Through American history this moral value of the drive to achieve, the worship of success has, especially in the American modal character, consciously or unconsciously been a mighty ideological and folk value reinforcement of the autonomous achievement ethic. A man deemed good succeeds careerwise and financially, and gains status and respect. A man who does not succeed is of questionable worth. His status is relatively undesirable; his character is suspect.

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20"Puritan Ethic" would have been a more apt rubric recognizing the English and American Calvinistic origins of the concept. Actually, Catholic peasants from Europe in the 1900's carried this value into the U.S. just as strongly as Protestants. The 70 years' experience of the local (Alameda County, northern California) Catholic Portuguese reflected hard work and belief in hard work, saving, and delayed gratification, as much as any Northern European Protestant...like the old Puritans they judged a man partly on how hard he worked, and partly on how much success he made with it.
Ralf Dahrendorf (1961:205), a German observer of American values, held that the alleged decline of the Protestant Ethic was highly premature; that the actual decline of the work-success ethic in the dominant majority was nil. It continued to be almost the most dominant value of the mainstream culture, where a man to be respected must work hard and well to achieve, attaining heights publicly approved. Ten years after Dahrendorf, despite the "counter culture", the growth of "street people", of a few mainstream "drop-outs" who do not compete, there has been no mainstream lessening of this drive to success. If anything it has intensified as it has broadened to include not only financial success as businessmen but acceptable alternates for the liberals who reject direct profit-making success. It has included ever more strongly aspirations to achieve as self-employed or semi-independent professionals--doctors, lawyers, scientists, planning consultants, marriage counselors, educational specialists, university professors, journalistic pundits. Most of these have come to constitute a new status elite initiated through the competitive rites of threshold achievement in postgraduate studies, a system roughly parallel to the classic Chinese scholar-gentry system.

As noted above, the "able operator", if he is in a position to do so, avoids retirement and consequent loss of status to the end. Multi-millionaire Kennedys and Rockefellers continue to work all their lives, well past 65. Roger M. Blough, who "retired" as Chairman of the United
States Steel Corporation in 1969, and who is financially well off with a $70,000 annual pension, continues to work full time practicing law in his old firm. James Roche, who "retired" in 1971 as Chairman of General Motors, works steadily on many boards and directorships. Activity and achievement are still the main prizes, preoccupations, and sources of status, the "greening of America" notwithstanding.

To counterbalance somewhat the unfavorable picture of American culture produced by the reiteration of the negative reciprocals of the thematic pair of traits, like conformity and insecurity, it should be stated that the culture carries also strong positive traits and values. A major counterbalancing trait in the national ethos and in the cultural patterns has been the deep-seated American optimism (briefly listed in the enumeration at the end of Chapter 2). The normative American was idealistic and/or optimistic in his faith in the expected growth and role of his country, and of the future world development with the United States as leader and exemplar. This was the outgrowth, the national sum of his optimistic outlook on his own career development and success. For the United States "had never lost a war," had always been a success. American economic and social progress on the whole was ever upward, and most individuals, if they worked hard, prospered. Interestingly, when the individual reached his ceiling, or suffered a setback, he might become disillusioned as far as his own fate went, but his generalized notion was that his children and other people
would "make it." When the Big Depression (1929-1933) jolted 25% of the people out of their jobs, and 50% were done out of their savings, there occurred the first period of uncertain questioning, but by the 1940's with the great American accomplishments in World War II, and subsequent prosperity, the general optimistic outlook returned. This feeling prevailed in the 1950's, deemed by critics to be smugness. Yet the vicissitudes of the 1930's permanently modified this optimism toward the normative American's grasping at government-guaranteed social security.

Due to the national confidence crisis of the disillusioned Vietnam Era, 1965-1972, and due to the slowing down of growth opportunities, a dark mood of pessimism lately permeates the writings of many intellectuals, akin to the expatriates of the 1920's such as Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway, and similar to the critical expressions of the 1930's. America has thus frequently been categorized by its own critics as a "sick society, a racist, exploitive, consumption-mad society." Yet the modal American remains on the whole guardedly optimistic. He still seems to remain convinced that things will turn out all right. This steady optimism is not easily reconciled with the stress of the earlier part of this chapter on insecurity, tension, feelings of frustration at middle-aged mediocrity, and the oldsters' overwhelming feelings of failure and alienation.

This may be due to the American norm of values being set by the highly successful people and buoyant, indulged,
"you-can-be-anything-you-want-to-be" youth. And the majority in middle age can look back to moderately good achievement in terms of possessions--cars, home, suburban location. Those who, despite their possessions, suffer from relative lesser or non-achievement, and who suffer the damaging effects of autonomous alienation, possibly may condemn themselves as deviate, at fault. However, to avoid further isolation, they may dutifully express optimism to the outside world, and especially to their children--to give them the proper start in life. For youth, vigor, optimism, and achievement are fundamentals in the American way.  

Possibly this American paradox of achievement and insecurity is an inherent, viable part of a constructive, workable value system--with some modifications. If this system could be adjusted to bring into full participation these multitudes of collections of lone individuals who, in their own or peer opinion (peer meaning successful and/or youthful people) are not "making it", and who are but "tenuously connected with the 'living'," the successful producers. Some incorporation of features of the excellent Mormon system of everybody participating, everybody being of some consequence,  

21Political figures like Jack Kennedy, even with the handicaps of a bad back and chronic sickness, carefully cultivate their youthful, vigorous image. While seeking and fighting to hold status, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Hubert Humphrey all dyed their gray hair black. George Miller, Democratic representative in Congress, was, despite a 30-year liberal record in Congress, defeated in the 1972 primary, largely because "he was too old--80-odd--and not up with the times."
might be the direction in which to move (O'Dea 1957:184).

Proto-European. This paper's stress on those aspects special to the American cultural pattern should not be taken in distorted degree in comparison with European developments. Most of this American divergent stress and singular development sprang from the parent British cultural matrix. Thus these main American developments have been extended and magnified projections of already budding West European trends—as for example the trend toward individualism, curtailment of the family to the conjugal unit, and the like. Once American society took the lead it became the forerunner of parallel, though laggard, Western European developments. In the aspiration for individual fulfillment the American pattern has developed as the accelerated pilot-project, the prototype of the eventual paths that the Western World, if not the whole globe, has taken or will likely take. These value-trait paths include the trends toward autonomous individual achievement, toward social and geographic mobility, toward overall group conformity in behavior and values and toward increasing stress on the attaining of relatively higher status. Especially the notion of non-resignation, the refusal to accept one's fate, appears in the 20th century to have become a world-wide value. Some of these so-called "Americanization" movements, as toward individual autonomous

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22A non-Mormon critic in 1903, Richard T. Ely, held the Mormon social system to be one of the most perfect participatory systems found anywhere (O'Dea 1957:185). It is notable that Mormons needing help, even in old age, are required to do some work within their capacities. This is in accord with folk societies where every member participates according to his ability.
living made possible by affluence can be seen in developments of the last twenty years in Western Europe, and even in Japan where the aged are beginning to feel unwanted and useless.

Crossroads: Exterior Controls—Participation Need. As seen by Lowenthal (1;61:34-36) these American trends were the outgrowths of nascent European trends. In contemporary Europe growth was slower in comparison to the outburst of property accretion marking successful achievements of the "driven" egoistic normative Americans, characteristic of the epoch 1700 to 1900. In America this explosion of achievement was made possible by the exploitation of the resources of a new continent, but the catalytic agent was the cultural pattern—the vigor of her youth-oriented, driving, "driven" people. This American explosion occurred so quickly and, in terms of prior slow labors, relatively facilely, that this growth outran checks and constraints desirable for the good of the community. Eventually a day of public reckoning had to come. As an example, to combat the wastage of natural resources, conservation and ecology movements are inaugurating more constraints on the cherished individual economic freedoms. In the interest of air purity and conservation of fuels, the private auto operator will submit to more and more restraints. These conservation oriented public-spirited "Liberals" will become ever more the constrainers and controllers of society. Europe may escape some of this historic American sequence of unbridled egocentrism—
"individualism". It may cope better, making gradual adjustments apace with the slower growth of its countries, adapting their continuously-evolved control institutions and supporting values, as has England. Asian Communist societies are taking an apparently effective approach that is fully collective, anti-individualistic, totally controlled.

Perhaps the human wastage of spirit cited above in Henry and in Clark and Anderson should indicate some such conservation of people, too. This would entail a drastic restructuring of values and priorities, a consciously directed social shift, a break with the past. Yet England in 1820-1850 managed a considerable turn-about in popular values in winning respect for authority, inculcating civility among its people, achieving a reduction in crime and an enhancement of civic feeling. Through conscious effort the British developed and won popular support for these values as the dominant norm. Possibly some such application of the renowned American skills in operating big organizations could be made to rearrange the work system to utilize the autonomous achieving individual's skill effectively, but more humanely than at present. The goal would be to give the individual a sense of belonging, a feeling of consequence in his vast society. Kindredly, the whole social mechanism might stand some tinkering into, with the aim of making each person more a permanent interacting part, with at least a little stake and participation in the same, of mattering so long as he lives. Henry deemed this widespread feeling of inconse-
quentialness amounting to worthlessness as our greatest American social defect. Henry himself did not reach an earthly stage of obsolescence, nor one of being "entombed" in the abhorred aged care home.\textsuperscript{23}

The question is still posed whether America's great enterprising accomplishments, this historic carving out of the 20th century's preeminent national position in wealth and power as well as the highest standard of living per capita, is worth the stress price. Is this foremost position not only in technological attainments but, since the 1930's, in art, music, literature, television, and university learning, worth the anxieties, insecurities, and failure feelings endemic under the surface of the mainstream? Need the one be contingent upon the other? Clyde Kluckhohn (1958a:206) quoted Eugene Burdick's 1949 posing of the question:

\begin{quote}
In England there is none of the rise and fall, the massive brooding anxiety, the creative stabbing of self doubt, the tortures of ethnic inadequacy that one finds to a marked degree in America...
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
It is impossible that England today could produce a Shakespeare while the United States or Asia might.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
In this man-eating neurotic America there are enormous creative currents.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Those English who see only our chrome plating...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23}Jules Henry, 1904-1969, Professor of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis, died "in the saddle" September 23, 1969, without having to undergo the old age he found our society dreading, disguising and rejecting. He was of a generation that got its professional start with and at the end of Franz Boas' career, aided by the tutelage of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict (Gould 1971:788-792).
and roaring vulgarity are, understandably, not attuned to something vaster that turns and weaves just below the surface of American life like some raging caged and almost invisible beast.

This beast may destroy us while England is still competent and serene.

Burdick went on to become a popular professor of Political Science at Berkeley, well-liked by his colleagues; then the creator of two best sellers, The Ninth Wave and the Ugly American. He achieved doubly high status as a millionaire and full Professor, suffered estrangement from wife and family, allegedly carried heavy psychic burdens, and keeled over dead on the tennis court in his 40's.

Autonomous Achievement.
Chapter 5

SUMMARY

Chapter 1 introduced the concept of the associated trait values of autonomy and achievement. Their significance in American society and its hierarchy of values was illustrated by the findings of the Rimrock, New Mexico, study in the 1950's, wherein settlers from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle areas were identified as archetypical representatives and therefore cultural carriers of old-time American values. These characteristic patterns as measured in intensity by various tests and as corroborated and illustrated in the nature of community activities critically observed by the anthropologists, were contrasted with the significantly deviate patterns of the adjacent Mormons. The latter, though also largely mainstream in culture, were deemed distinctive in consciously raising "volunteer" collective values and institutionalized group restraints and resultant behaviors to a level approaching equal status with the normatively more dominant individual achievement.

It was found that both Mormons and "Pantexes" shared to a high degree the American values of thrift, hard work, and optimism. However, they differed significantly in that the Pantexes put greater value on individual autonomous achievement—if need be, divorced from the parent community and kindred ties—whereas the Mormons tended to aspire and
achieve within a more collateral framework, within and for the group. The Pantexes were more egocentric in orientation; the Mormons' individual aspiration was more subordinated to group pressures, needs, and approvals. It was noted that the characteristic Pantexes' individualistic orientation was a product of their culture, a conforming to the group expectations, to which they had been socialized since childhood. Hence, the freedom of this most representative group from routine collective constraint actually embodied the directional constraints of impelling the individuals to strive mightily for individual success, but especially in ways winning public approval and, hopefully, renown. Within the Pantex value system public approval of its reference group--its neighborhood embodiment of American culture and social values as a whole--was just as significant and decisive as was the Mormon need to win approval of fellow Mormons, in the village and at the national headquarters in Utah.

In Chapter 2 the early American experience as it originated in the culture of England of the 1500's, then was transposed and transformed somewhat in New England and the East Coast in the 1600's and 1700's, was studied through the eyes of contemporary observers, including Alexis De Tocqueville. The comments of these observers were interpreted by later social scientists, who concluded that the roots and manifestations of autonomous achievement were already present in the 1700's and 1800's. They stemmed largely
from British traits, but blossomed more rapidly and pervasively in the lesser restrictions and greater opportunities of the American setting. Autonomous achievement flourished along with associated traits of anti-authority and belief in individualism—self determination of career, aspiration, milieu, and family choices.

Other basic American traits included pragmatism, optimism, change-is-desirable, wasteful living, generosity, idealism, deference to women, pursuit of pleasure, social and geographic mobility. Equally significant was the acquisitive spirit, as property acquisition was always a high goal. The ideal of perfectability went along with a self-righteous moralism. Most paradoxical in incompatibility of values was the ostensible respect for law and order and lawfulness that operated in continual tension with a deep egocentric bent toward taking the law into one's own hands. This contradiction was associated with a kind of perverse admiration for defiance of authority.

Over a period of 200 years from the 1650's to the 1840's, it was found that these observers were, in broad outline, in remarkable agreement as to the dominant value patterns as expressed in the socialization of children and subsequent behavior of adults. Americans generally were much less respectful of the authority of the state, of community leaders, of their family and parents, than were people in Western Europe. They were trained to operate independently, to "think for themselves." Generation after generation
struck out on their own, moving west or away-to-town. Each successive generation tended to feel that it existed somewhat by itself, unobeholden to past generations, free to "do its own thing." But each was subject to the ironclad law that it must take care of itself. Each individual had to carve out his own career, to succeed or fail on his own. Success won resounding approval; failure was considered a defect of the character, mitigated perhaps by the understanding that it was due to bad luck, though "real successful people don't have bad luck."

The observers confirmed De Tocqueville's concept of "tyranny of the majority," that the real authority was peer power. This dominant American concern with outside approval produced individuals fearful of and vulnerable to public approval or disapproval. Therefore the American's individualism had to be expressed in a conformist pattern of doing what the peers expected. This was significant in that the average American did not, and probably does not now, understand and appreciate how his "individualism" was and is so highly conditioned by conformity to the culture's norms of expectation of success and concomitant fear of failure. Associated with this individualism, these observers determined, was a great isolation of the individual; therefore loneliness and alienation constituted pervasive norms.

Hence this chapter developed the historical roots of the unique American complex or paradox. Normatively, this counterbalance of traits produced a tension whereby the
autonomous achievement imperative caused dominant individuals to strike out alone and accomplish much in the economic and professional spheres. But they paid the price of being cut off from their roots, and walled off from their fellow men, except for transitory, insecure, shallow work relationships. Another part of the price was the lack of inner security since the norm of worth depended on one's attainments relative to the best of one's peers—in ways approved by the society of peers. Peer approval therefore could be easily lost. Peer approval depended on how much one had accomplished lately, as seen and weighed publicly.

In Chapter 3 the historical findings of Chapter 2 were validated by the researches of 20th century anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Through their own studies of the American culture, and through cross-cultural studies of American values compared with Russian, German, Japanese, English and Chinese, a generally consistent agreement was reached. These scholars' findings were in accord as to the character and dominance of autonomousness—independent self oriented decision-making—and achievement—the awesome drive for attaining high job status regardless of ties of family, friends, home base.

Their findings as to the paramountcy, pervasiveness and general nature of these traits were so consistent as to be repetitious. They validated the historical chapter and much of the initial determinations of Chapter 1. They agreed that the seeming independence and individuality of
the American, the purely individual striving of the modal personality, in reality masked an unconscious pervasive social control impelling the modal American to strive along mainstream patterns of conformity.

As expected, there were great discrepancies between the conclusions of the researchers and the idealized American maxims of cooperation, overt veneration of the aged, and devotion of family ties. These controversial items were therefore further re-examined in the fourth Chapter.

These authorities tended also to confirm the negative reciprocals associated with the stress on autonomous achievement. This included the strong pressures to conformity, the individual isolation and loneliness. The frequent ego-frustration (especially in middle years) and resultant weakened self esteem, the sense of failure in middle and post-65 years were also cited. They felt that all age groups had a strong need for outside (peer) approval and recognition, paradoxically coupled with deep-seated fear of too close involvement with others. Clark and Anderson's study of the aged in San Francisco was cited, giving their conclusions that the values of the society were very hard on the aged. They found that American society's stress on autonomy and achievement left the aged entirely autonomous—alone, isolated, and convinced of their complete failure since they could no longer achieve.

The most certain, the most cut-and-dried, validation of the themes of the thesis were therefore embodied at this point. However, in an attempt to disclose more factors,
this study went further: it explored those aspects of the theme traits that are not so clearly in congruence with the enviable record of the American nation, and its monumental accomplishments in achieving national and individual wealth, personal freedom of action and self-determination. The question was: how, considering the defects suggested by observers and researchers, did this society realize such a high fraction of the founding political ideals of democracy and equality of opportunity?

Chapter 4 considered these more tentative, less validated or even uncertain appraisals. The first part of the chapter re-analyzed the historical reports to see whether there had been a shift over generations, from the inner-directed "rugged individualist" to the contemporary organization-abiding man. Evidence showed that child-raising practices of the 1700's and 1800's, as continued in part by the Pantexes of the 1950's, could have produced fearful, anxious, driven, peer-pressured personalities in the early period as well as the later. But in the earlier times, these characteristics could have been masked by the seeming precocity, competence, and resistance to overt adult direction and norms.

Hsu's Chinese comparison, first advanced in Chapter 3, suggested that the special American weaknesses of high crime rate, extremely high divorce rate, family and personal disorganization, could have had their roots in this peculiar American combination of traits. The chapter followed Ruth
Benedict's conclusion that there had been a continual growth or conversion to a dominant norm of considerable discontinuity, as between the character of the socialization of the child to cope with life, and the actual process of coping.

Several authorities noted the modern American tendency to shield and protect the child and delay true independence. This was acknowledged as perhaps not an original trait but one developed over 200 years of affluence and urbanization. Therefore, it is possible that this defect has added another element of stress to the individual; he is suddenly, at adulthood, pitched fully into the autonomous competitive battle where his self esteem depends upon success relative to that of his peers.

Jules Henry was an iconoclastic anthropologist who strongly contended, on the basis of his participant observation researches, that contemporary adolescents were not independent emotionally or economically. His findings tended to validate the findings of this author in that his subjects felt they were supposed to be, or at least supposed to appear to be independent, and not indicate need for others. Possibly, then, there has been some lessening of work-competence independence training in child raising. Perhaps there is some validity to Henry's contention that the manifestations of successful achievement had become, as in various critics' eyes, "an insatiable consumerism" destructive not only of natural resources but of human values, of sense of purpose and worth, of collateral feelings for others; hence alienation.
It is possible that these demoralization effects are masked by an overt individuality and are worsened by fear of others.

The middle section of Chapter 4 assessed, from the hindsight of 20 years, Clyde Kluckhohn's delineation of five areas of Value Trends and Possible Shifts as related to autonomy and achievement. He foresaw no lessening in the drive for achievement; despite the "Greening of America" type of observation, this author agrees. However, Kluckhohn predicted that the autonomy would yield somewhat through the workings of group pressure and transform itself into a "collective individualism", wherein groups of individuals would voluntarily work for community uplift in terms of esthetics and community betterment controls. There is some realization of this trend in campaigns such as those of the Sierra Club, particularly in that the Club is pushing for publicly-approved but government-mandated tax and spending programs to achieve their ends.

In support of Kluckhohn's prognosis of greater tolerance for heterogeneity and hence a lessening of the conformity patterns, there are numerous current social developments; for example, the recent granting of full civil rights to homosexuals. However, there is also a tendency for new orthodoxies in attitudes to become fixed--like the liberal article of faith that increased government spending will solve social problems. There seems to be no lessening in the main avenue of conformity--that is, in the imperative
to succeed along paths approved by peers. The predicted trend toward hedonism—immediate self-gratification—has not occurred to any full extent, since the deferred gratification pattern is still paramount for the mainstream strivers as the pattern for success. One evidence is the tremendous pressure on students to get into law and medical schools.

Kluckhohn’s fourth prognosis, acceptance of government controls and services, has become by far the overwhelming social development of the times. In forty years, 1933 to 1973, the United States has become a semi-socialistic society under the banner of “Liberalism.” Yet here again, the deep-seated twin traits of the culture, autonomy and achievement, have not been rendered obsolete in this government-managed and insured society. Rather, these traits have been adapted to the enlarged government-overseen and government-supported arena of achievement. Although avant garde educators decry the stress on competition, for every individual “dropping out” of the competition a dozen or more new aspirants to higher status shoulder their way into the race. In particular, the erstwhile disadvantaged minorities, racial and sexual, are now actively spurred to seek their rights and psychic fulfillment in pursuit of higher job status. Kluckhohn’s predicted equalization of roles for women and men suddenly appeared to be happening about 1968. This development tended to intensify the main trend: competition to achieve has become ever more acute with women now bona fide competitors.
The latter part of Chapter 4 enumerated the major loose ends needing resolution, making an effort to regain perspective whereby the selected study traits would not appear out of proportion to other, equally-significant American traits. There is a possibility that some of the creativity of American society comes from individuals seeking individual expression and relief from the cultural confines of conformity. Hsu and Burdick held that a minority of achievers found individual fulfillment in "offbeat" but potentially innovative and useful "pioneering." Such idiosyncratic pioneering may become more acceptable and win recognition, probably first in the sciences, technology, and academia, and finally in the main social stream of society.

The disorganization, degradation, and high percentage of deaths among the American prisoners in the Korean War gave rise to misgivings as to whether the traits of the culture are socially as well as individually constructive. Though it is possible to relate this behavior to the effects of the autonomous achievement trait-patterns traced in this thesis, it is not within the scope of the thesis to attempt to resolve the problems of American society and its cultural paradoxes.

Chapter 4, then, attempted a reconciliation of the great achievements of the American people with the social and anti-social manifestations of the thematic traits and their negative reciprocals. The latter part of the chapter
discussed our society's inability to fulfill its national ideals of universal equality and universal achievement. Of particular concern was the fact that American acceptance of public and community responsibility has been slower than Western Europe's. This can be traced to historic stress on individualism, privatism, and the resultant lag in controls and amenities such as environmental protection, street policing, or any form of voluntary public self-policing.

The chapter also traced the massive growth of surrogate collaterality—the legally created substitutes for original family and community ties and supports, those great institutions, the businesses and corporations and the continually-swelling government bureaucracy. That "rugged individual", the normative American, shows a willingness and indeed enthusiasm to work in these "surrogate kindreds," under bosses and in a state of temporary, workaday, enforced cooperation. Here he has obviously found a new "El Dorado," a means to achieve an individualized livelihood, a channel for his aspirations to success.

In toto, this American system resulted in enormous achievements—the settlement of a continent, winning of several wars, and landing of a rocket on the moon—in company with great individual standards of affluence and considerable political freedom. Possibly, this autonomous achiever, this American, is able to accomplish so much groupwise for two reasons: first, because group cooperation is the main avenue available for achievement in 20th-century
America, but also because he probably has a latent deep-seated need for approval, and even a genetic or historical cultural-social predisposition to work with others. Therefore, under the direction and enforced cooperation of an institutional setting, he works well and achieves, though with some productive loss and lack of allegiance and sense of belonging due to the omnipresent intense competitive rivalries and insecurities. However, if at any time the institutional framework is removed, serious difficulties arise within the individual; Korean War prisoners and the aged in American society are divergent but clear examples. Within the system also are the probably-widespread hidden "failures" and "mediocrities," the so-called "alienated" from job and society.

The final conclusion of this thesis is that the continuing inhumanity, the isolation, the frustration of the many, the personal devastation of the aged, might not be a necessary corollary for future national achievement. Revamping the values and social system to provide more worth-accruing participatory roles, more recognition of each person, more interaction of people—somewhat along the lines of the Mormons or of those simple societies as in the Caucasus where all have a useful and respected role—would be a desirable avenue for American development. There would, however, have to be a vast shift in values to accomplish this.
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