Intersubjectivity: From mute eidos to verbose world being

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Intersubjectivity: From Mute Eidos to Verbose World Being

by

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Intersubjectivity is concerned with how meaning is derived from inter-subjective communication, or human community. Intersubjectivity is the context for the formation of values, morals, knowledge and institutions.

This broad topic includes "unconscious" intersubjectivity which deals with false consciousness. This describes a duality of consciousness and distorted consciousness, the latter being values to which persons ascribe but do not question because the values have become unconscious habits issuing from prevailing norms; i.e., consumerism, individualism. This consciousness which lacks reflection is false because the person is not aware of repressive economic forces (capitalist exploitation) which mold and maintain the values of a society, namely ruling class values.

Further research on this "unconscious consensus of values" led to the discovery of intersubjectivity as a problem in philosophy. This is the problem of constituting an objectively shared world between subjects, or persons. Intersubjectivity (in this paper) takes two forms: one, transcendental idealism, and two, historical hermeneutics. The first focuses on transcendental reason and the discernment of objective truth thru a scientific, thematic methodology. It establishes a position of ahistorical objectivity from which to identify distortion and validate truth.

Historical hermeneutics (interpretation) recognizes the historical origin of all knowledge and value formation, and the inherent distortion of all human interaction. Here distortion is viewed as prejudice; not pejoratively, but as the text of an individual's life history which cannot be escaped and which orients all action. Hermeneutics as such does not arrive at meaning thru scientific method which eradicates distortion. Meaning is created intersubjectively in language and dialogue with distortion as a dynamic component for the expansion of experience and knowledge. This latter view of meaning as a creation of human intersubjectivity subverts Cartesian subjectivity and questions the rule of the techno-scientific structure in society. It leaves authority open to question and change, and offers hope as a medium for preserving and realizing human freedom in a world of plurality.
This project of intersubjectivity arose from a Marxist concern with false consciousness. False consciousness is the identification of a schism in social reality where prevailing values and norms are seen as the legitimation structures of a repressive ruling class. These values require the acquiescence of the masses in order to maintain their authority, which is the authority of the elite. This smokescreen of oppression is perpetuated by individualist philosophy or Cartesian egology, utilitarianism, consumerism and scientistic-technological instrumental reason which objectifies the world and persons into means for pregiven ends. Individualist doctrine centers knowledge and meaning on the individual and not on the individual's social relationships. Thus, the goals of a society remain goals of the individual, not goals of a society as a whole nor as global goals.

In that each individual ascribes to these individualist values, there becomes an unconscious consensus which legitimates these values. Thus, there is an unconscious intersubjectivity sustaining social institutions. This is called systematic distortion in the work of Jürgen Habermas. It is his project to develop a theory which
emancipates social participants from distorted meaning in communication in order to restore individual autonomy and responsibility free from repression.

Further research revealed intersubjectivity as a problem in phenomenological-idealistic philosophy, addressed in this paper through the writing of Edmund Husserl. This is the problem of establishing an objectively shared world between persons when I can never have the experiences of another ego, but can know only my own original experience. Husserl attempts to resolve this problem by an empathic bridge in transcendental intersubjectivity.

This collapse into transcendentalism led to a further excursion into phenomenology and hermeneutics via Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger. Historical hermeneutics situates the individual as always already in the world without recourse to a transcendental position separate from history. This is historical being that is always within tradition and as such always prejudiced. Tradition is the context of pre-judgments that orient the subject's action in the world. A subject or individual cannot reach an objective point from which to discern distortions in communication or institutions, but must recognize that he/she is always applying his/her own tradition.

Here then, distortion takes a turn from something to be cleansed from communication as in Habermas, to something inherent to all human activity and meaning, because human
Being is always distorted, or rather, prejudiced by the tradition in which it finds itself.

Thus, intersubjectivity becomes a realm of risk, where individual prejudices and claims to possible truths can be tested in dialogic communication. The quasi-transcendental standards of Habermas which seek to ensure truth are replaced by an active hope in the contingency of conversation.

This is not only an incorporation of distortion into human activity, but it is also a shift in the locus of understanding away from a fixed knowing subject to understanding realized in dialogue with others, or decentered subjectivity. This grounds the subject in relationships and recognizes freedom as an activity that is bound up with others as well as nature. Autonomy and responsibility become defined in terms of the relationships a person has with the world, and not in terms of his/her isolated goals. As such, individuality becomes realized in the larger intersubjective totality.

I wish to acknowledge the support and critical convictions of Ron Perrin, which aided me in beginning this project. I owe the depth of my research to James Buchanan, who has not only been an incredible source of intellectual information, but who has also brought this project alive in our many conversations.
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INTRODUCTION

The following presentation will be devoted to intersubjectivity, or human community. Intersubjectivity will first be addressed as a problematic outgrowth of Cartesian egology. We will then follow Edmund Husserl's analysis of transcendental subjectivity which he formulates in response to this problem. We will then see Husserl's genetic constitution of the "ego as a substrate of habitualities" contrasted with the ego as historical understanding in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. With Gadamer, we will see understanding unfold as linguistic in character and as an historical event. Human beings participating in the event of dialogue are thus intersubjective beings.

Part two of this presentation will consist of the historical perspective of intersubjectivity as it is examined in the work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas develops a theory of undistorted communication for the realization of human freedom and autonomy. Habermas sees authority as a repressive force in society and a source of distortion. This will take us to the work of Gadamer once more as he characterizes authority and belief in terms of human finitude. Finally we will turn to Paul Ricoeur's analysis of ideology and utopia with distortion inherent to the
cultural imagination. This will lead us to the replacement of meaning determined by transcendental rules to meaning created by active hope.
A) Cartesian Subjectivity

Cartesian egology, or subjectivity, finds its origins in the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental reflection. In *Twilight of Subjectivity*, Fred Dallmayr gives a survey of the idea of subjectivity. The idea of subjectivity finds its pronouncement in the Cartesian legacy of the "thinking substance."¹ Descartes strove to ascertain a point of departure from which to arrive at objective knowledge. This emphasis on subjectivity elicited "a division between 'thinking substance' and 'extended matter' or between 'subject' and 'object' of knowledge—a division which in due course formed the backbone of both rationalist and empiricist perspectives."² Modern philosophy holds subjectivity to be synonymous with theoretical consciousness, "construed as a premise for cognition."³ But in the modern social and political theory, the "cognitive-epistemological ego" is accompanied by the "practical, or acting, human subject."⁴ Thus the "practical ego" is elucidated in the traditional notion of
individualism. Dallmayr cites the following passage by Elie Halevy regarding the practical ego in individualism:

"In the whole of Europe it is a fact that individuals have assumed consciousness of their autonomy, and that every one demands the respect of all the others, whom he considers as his fellows or equals: society appears, and perhaps appears more and more, as issuing from the considered will of the individuals which make it up. The very appearance and success of individualistic doctrines would alone be enough to prove that, in Western society, individualism is the true philosophy."5

Referring to epistemological individualism, Steven Lukes further stresses the notion of the autonomous human agent:

Descartes' thought began from this position, from the individual's certainty of his own existence-cogito ergo sum-from which he derives knowledge of the external world and the past via the transcendental route of assuming God's veracity. . . Kant saw the categories as innate in the (abstract) individual. But the paradigm epistemological individualist is perhaps the empiricist, who holds that (individual) experience is the source of knowledge, that all knowledge arises within the circle of the individual mink and the sensations it receives."6

The stringency of self-determining individualism is characterized by Lukes according to the following principles: "respect for human dignity, autonomy (or self-direction), privacy, and self-development," which Lukes takes to be derivative of the "ideas of equality and liberty."7 Dallmayr explicates these ideas of equality and liberty as the primary concerns of "practical reason or the practical ego, to the extent that they pinpoint the
individual's status and role in relation to other human beings and to society." The "cognitive character" associated with individualism is articulated in the "abstract individual" who embodies "theoretically presupposed 'interests, wants, purposes, and needs.'"

The expeditious method of the Cartesian model, utilizing the concept of "thinking substance" and "extended matter," was alloyed with the sacred sovereignty of Christian monotheism to entrench the schism between man and nature as well as between man and man in Western thought and practice. The individual, with his theoretically presupposed wants, interests, purposes, and needs, acted upon non-cognitive, inert nature, in order to obtain knowledge and derive meaning for his isolated existence.

This individual with the Cartesian theoretical consciousness maintained his subjective autonomy in practice. Lukes' description of individualism as a concern for self-development and self-direction upholds the ideals of equality and liberty. This reflects human community as a system of respected rights tailored to fit each individual cocoon.

Western man's goal of accounting for the absence of reciprocity between subject and object or between human agents for determining a mode of being in the world finds its counterpart in concrete intersubjectivity, as opposed to transcendental intersubjectivity. But it is through this
realm of transcendental intersubjectivity that we must pass, in order to obtain an understanding of the complexity of the problem of coming to human community in the world.

B) Husserl's Eidetic Intentionality

It is when the subject or ego is assumed to be a human being as a social being existing with other human beings, or rather, with Others, that the ontological validity of subjectivity comes into question. Hence, there is the problem of inter-subjectivity, or how there can be an objective world shared with Others, when the world is primarily my world, primarily known to me through "cogito," or "I think." As ego-cogito, I do not have the originary experience of being the cogito of the Other.

Husserl confronts this problem of intersubjectivity by using two approaches, the eidetic and genetic constitution of experience, respectively. He uses the eidetic, or transcendental self-constitution as a basis for establishing a pure realm of experience. This in turn paves the way for a presuppositionless science and a pure realm of intersubjectivity. The eidetic realm provides unprejudiced objective reality and the means to communicate this reality by providing the common transcendental constitution of subjects.

Husserl's later work on genetic constitution, or the genesis of meaning through time, seeks to explain how meanings are constituted within intentionality, or the
perceptual structure bound within the eidetic constitution. Husserl seeks, then, to connect the theoretical consciousness of Descartes with the phenomenological world that has its own significant existence beyond that of being merely an object at the mercy of the subject. But at the same time, he wants to retain the security of pure knowledge by making subjective experience a continual referral to the transcendental realm. It is the inclusiveness of both subject and object for constituting experience that makes the problem of phenomenology one of a self-constituting ego that "includes the whole of actual and potential conscious life" which "must include all constitutional problems without exception. Consequently the phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole."¹⁰

Let us begin our sojourn with Husserl by delving into his work on eidetic constitution. In order to make fast his pure realm of self-constitution, Husserl describes the Ego as a disinterested monad, or being that experiences, in an absolute sphere of egological being unaffected by prejudice. This ahistorical constitution in turn becomes the basis for what we will see later as the constitution of the Other, or alter ego.

The mainstay of Husserl's eidetic constitution of experience is his analysis of intentionality. Intentionality is the relation between consciousness and what consciousness is conscious of. Intentionality is the
essential element for any objective knowledge because it recognizes the difference between the intending subject and the object of intention. Husserl's foremost task is that of splicing objective knowledge content with the subjectivity of knowing. Husserl asks, "how the an sich of objectivity can come to presentation, and thus in a certain extent become subjective; what it means, that the object is an sich and yet 'given' in knowledge;" and further, "how the ideality of the universal (as a concept of Law) can enter into the flow of real psychic experiences and become something possessed in the knowledge of the man who thinks." Husserl accepts that we encounter objectivity, but he questions how it is possible, and how it can be understood.

Husserl investigates this question of the "how?" of objectivity by first examining meaning in objectivity. Meaning is essential to every theoretical act. There is a relationship between meaning and objects such that "every expression not only states something, but it also speaks about something; it not only has its meaning, but it is also referred to certain objects." In terms of sense and reference, this is a double constitution. There is a meaning that is constituted, or sense, and an object that is constituted as meant, or reference, in every objectivating act. The object could be a concrete thing, that is, a cup or a dwelling, or
fictitious characters or events in narratives or mythology, like Anna Karenina or the Sirens in the Odyssey. The reference of Anna Karenina is that of an aristocratic matron in czarist Russia with the beauty and grace to charm every foe. The sense of Anna Karenina could be interpreted as more than a description of a Russian woman; a figure caught in the suicidal binds of Russian morality that ostracized those who sought to break with tradition. Intentional consciousness grasps what is referred to as well as the possible meaning of that object; the Russian woman and the meaning of being that Russian woman.

Intentionality has the characteristic of relating objects to consciousness, of presenting objects to itself. We are aware of a thing in itself through an intentional relationship that constitutes objectivity as present to consciousness. The objects are not mere sense data intuited by our senses as Kant would have it, but rather, objects carry the dual constitution of sense and reference. As Sokolowski observes, "all intentional acts refer to an object, and do so under a certain aspect or sense. This is true of perceiving, remembering, evaluating, imagining, . . . it is true of all acts which Husserl calls 'objectivating' acts." We are aware of the object itself. "I am aware of a single point of reference and a
single sense which endures throughout my subjective changes, aware of an 'objectivity' which transcends my own subjective experiences."\textsuperscript{15}

This objectivating act establishes the structure for the sense-reference of objects that have meaning and objectivity for subjectivity. The objectivating act transcends the initial subjective experience. The objectivating act is the primary act of consciousness that is a purely contemplative act. The object is presented to consciousness. There is no evaluation, no emotional response, no volition added to this fundamental act. As a merely contemplative act, it is free from the influence of history and tradition. This sets up an intentional relationship to an object with a given sense or aspect, and clarifies the object as an object of consciousness. This theoretical objectivating act is the basis for rationality which is then given to any and all acts built upon it. This is Husserl's unveiling of subjectivity as theoretical consciousness with intentionality as the basis for judgment.

It is objectivation that differentiates a rational act from instinct or a stimulus-response reaction. The clarifying power of the theoretical objectivating act enables the subject to "recognize the object of his emotion as a reality apart from himself, with meaning or a sense of its own."\textsuperscript{16} The effort of phenomenology is thus to describe this reality apart from the subject in such a way that the
subject comprehends meaning in its intentional relationship with it. This perspective of rational objectivity depicts a thinking being who constitutes the meaning of objects within an intentional, or objectivating act that transcends subjective experience in the world.

Here we have the difference between theoretical and practical and evaluating acts. Theoretical acts are given priority in importance for discerning knowledge because they are not marred by the diverse influences of culture, history, psychology, etc. The object is presented in itself, not as a means or an end for the varied purposes of human willing, human practice.

In reference to the intentional act itself, Husserl states that "it will be immediately understood that the same thing that, in reference to the intentional object, is called presentation (a perceiving, imagining, or representing intention towards it), is called apprehension, interpretation, or apperception" in regard to the sensations belonging to the act. As far as an object may be presented to consciousness, it is apperceived by consciousness. The act which recognizes the relation of consciousness with the object, or the interpretation of the object; the act which makes consciousness known to itself, is an apperception. It is the transcendent move which makes consciousness aware that it is itself not one object amongst objects, but rather a conscious unity of apperceptions in
relation to an object or world separate from itself. The intentional essence of an act, its quality and material, when joined to the sensory content, forms a complete, concrete intentional act.

This relationship between sensory "matter" and intentional "form" is the explanation for the subjectivity of knowing and the objective content of knowledge. This formulation of eidetic constitution may explain the structure of meanings as located within intentional acts, but not how they are constituted within intentionality.

It is to this question of "how" meanings are wrought within intentionality that we now turn. In order to shear experience of its worldly trappings and deliver it gleaming on the doorstep of transcendental reflection, Husserl performs a universal method of reduction. By "apprehending myself purely; as Ego and with my own pure conscious life," the entirety of the Objective world in all of its spatiotemporality, any thing belonging to the world is accepted by me; it exists for me "in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it."\(^{18}\) This is what Descartes referred to as cogito. The world gets its acceptance as existing from these cogitationes, or many facets of the cogito. "I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me, myself."\(^{19}\) But if I rise above this admixture of experience and keep from
doing any believing about the existence of the world, and rather narrow my perspective to regard only this world-life in itself, "as consciousness of 'the' world - I thereby acquire myself as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my cogitationes."20

This is natural being presupposed by transcendental being.21 The universal method by which we arrive at transcendental being is none other that the transcendental epoché, "the transcendental phenomenological reduction."22 The move from the cogito to pure ego surpasses Descartes' transcendental realism by disclaiming his analysis of ego-cogito as adequate for an absolute science. Husserl maintains that Descartes was on the brink of transcendental subjectivity, but failed to enter it because he substantiated the ego as a separate human "mens sive animus" (mind and spirit) that inferred the rest of the world according to its innate principles.23

Husserl's transcendental subject is devoid of any indication of world existence, its being or non-being. The Ego is untouched by the existence of the world. "The reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego."24 The Ego is the "acceptance-basis of all Objective acceptances and bases, there is no psychological Ego and there are no psychic phenomena (as components of psychophysical men)."25 The Ego is not included in acts
dependent on the world for content; acts of valuing, doing, believing. Rather, the Ego "bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense."26

For Husserl, then, the problem is not one of proving being or non-being, that is, making a judgment about existence as it is put forth in the statement "I think, therefore I am." Husserl moves to screen subjectivity of its practical and evaluative activities to reach a realm where such activities are accepted in the transcendental Ego, and can be constituted in the eidetic structure of intentionality. Once this realm is shown to be accessible to any and every Ego, this universal realm is able to constitute the particularities that drench the canvas of concrete subjective experience.

C) Husserl’s Genetic Constitution: The Move from Transcendental to Temporal Consciousness

In order to constitute the Objective world, Husserl needs now to move from the first sense of the ahistorical Ego as transcendental subject to the ego as temporal I; the second sense of ego. The self-constituting pure Ego is first seen as "the flowing cogito." The ego "grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that cogito, as the same I."29 The intentionality of the pure Ego polarized objects as "synthetic unities" of meaning in
actual and possible consciousness. In contrast to the indifferent pure Ego, the ego as I is suffused in all processes of consciousness, i.e., evaluating, doing, desiring; because it is "the active and affected subject of consciousness" and as such is related through these processes to all "object-poles" constituted in the pure Ego.

These many processes of consciousness are the basic turf for revealing and describing the concrete ego, the I. Husserl purified the Cartesian ego in transcendental subjectivity, and also made the concrete ego as I a descriptive method of discerning objective knowledge. The cogito can no longer spin yarns of knowledge drawn from the bales of sense data to be categorized according to principles innate to the ego. Husserl flips over this Cartesian ego that gives meaning to objects and shows us an ego that accepts the possible meaning of objects for consciousness.

Husserl prepares for the constitution of the concrete ego through two fundamental structures of intentionality; synthesis and temporality. His use of synthesis as identification of an object and temporality as the allowance for the changing appearances of an object signals the shift from eidetic to genetic constitution of experience.

Synthesis is a process by which the many perspectives that describe an object, for instance; the color of an apple, its size, shape, smoothness of surface, the crunch
when one bites into it; all of these multiple perspectives of apprehending the object are the flow of multiplicities which synthesize into an identity, a synthetic unity of the object. The cogito intends the cogitatum (in apperception) which describes to consciousness an identical unity.30

This takes place within the noematic/noetic structure of consciousness.31 Modalities of being, certainly being, possible being, or subjective-temporal modes; being present, past or future are noematic. The noetic concerns the modes of the cogito itself, the modes of consciousness (i.e., perception, recollection, retention). The combination of the noematic with the noetic serve as a basis for the constitution of the concrete ego's objectivating acts. In this respect, an apple is given continuously in the subjective-temporal mode as being present and the multiple ways that the apple is apperceived, or given to consciousness, as texture, color or symbol; are synthesized so that the object, or in this case the apple, as "one and the same" is intended as appearing."32 The noetic is the endless life of pure consciousness, and the noematic is that which is meant, it is the meant world.33 This unity or identification is described in a synthetic structure of intentionality that is "the method for a descriptive transcendental-philosophical theory of consciousness."34

This form of synthesis is first encountered as "an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the
continuous consciousness of internal time." Now Husserl floods intentionality with the element of temporality, bringing the genesis of constitution to the formerly static eidetic structure of consciousness.

Husserl cleaves temporality into objective and internal time. "Objective temporality that appears" i.e., the temporality of this die is distinct from the "internal temporality of the appearing," i.e., that of the die perceiving. The internal temporality of the appearing "'flows away' with its temporal extents and phases," the continually changing appearances of the die. The unity of these multiple appearances is

"a unity of synthesis: not merely as a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (facets of the cogito-judgments, values, desires), i.e., being stuck together externally, but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity as 'the same' objectivity belonging to multiple modes of consciousness becomes constituted." The cohesive character of internal temporality makes possible a synthesis of the fecund life of the cogito, and hence a unified consciousness.

As a result of the transcendental époche, the existence of the die and of the world are bracketed, but "the one identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously 'immanent' in the flowing consciousness, descriptively 'in' it." The object is a being in consciousness not as a part (that would be in relation to a whole), but "ideally," as
possible meaning. The object is disclosed "'ideally' as something intentional, something appearing . . . a being-in-it (consciousness) as its immanent 'objective sense.'"38 The object is included in the subjective process itself as a sense; it does not come from the outside as a closed entity confronting subjectivity. The object is in the subjective process "as an 'intentional effect'" produced by the synthesis of consciousness. The object is involved in many modes of consciousness - in perception, evaluation, recollection. The object as meant, as noematic, becomes constituted in the noetic modes of consciousness as a "unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes,"39 and makes an identifiable meaning possible. The "all-embracing cogito" of reflection, as synthetic conscious life, "is the all-embracing of life itself, with its openly endless unity and wholeness."40 The one constant within all of these life processes of the ego is their temporal ordering "within the constant infinite horizon: immanent time."41

Now that we have scanned Husserl's method of transcendental constitution via intentionality as that of a synthesizing of noema and noeisis in immanent time; i.e., as objects described in the flowing consciousness, we are equipped to hew from the pure Ego the concrete ego as I that is constituted as a "substrate of habitualities."42
Every action of the ego brings a new objective sense and the ego therefore "acquires a new abiding property." As ego, with a certain conviction I decide by an act of judgment in favor of a "being-thus" of an object that cancels a previous conviction. Up until this point, however, the conviction was such that it had been accepted by me. It was that to which I could "return" repeatedly and have it as mine. This habitual state of appropriating the past into the present then determines the ego as ego convinced. This active generation of habitual properties finds the ego participating in "the stream of subjective processes." Through this mode of conviction-cancellation the ego exhibits in these alterations "an abiding style with unity of identity throughout all of them: a personal character." This personal character renders the ego concrete. The ego can only be concrete through the activities of its flowing intentional life with the objects it intends, the objects meant. The intentional constitution of an object finds its "existence and being-thus" correlated to the "habitually constituted in the Ego-pole himself by virtue of his position-taking."

The self-constitution of the ego now occurs in a "surrounding world" which exists for the ego, and in it, objects exist for the ego. Temporality allows the ego to make the distinction between those objects with which it is acquainted and those not yet encountered. The objects I am
acquainted with have been acquired by me through my intentionality and synthetic activity of constituting the object in the noematic/noetic structure. "My activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality of my Ego," where the object, with "its manifold determinations is mine abidingly." These "abiding acquisitions" compose my surrounding world that includes those objects with which I am acquainted as well as the horizons of those with which I am not acquainted, but are anticipated within the framework of habituality.

Thus the historical dimension is woven into Husserl's constitution of experience through the woof and warp of synthesis and temporality that fabricate genetic constitution. The ego is habitually concretized in its surrounding world, or "my world." As Sokolowski observes, "genetic constitution is not simply deductive explication of the content of our concepts; it is the result of a continually repeated encounter between subjectivity and reality." And this is the basis for not only the phenomenology of self-constitution, but for phenomenology as a whole.

Husserl's earlier eidetic structure functioned as the possibilizing ego, the pure realm to which the de facto concrete was reduced by epoché. The perception of objects in concrete subjectivity is bracketed, for concrete subjectivity is not the acceptance-basis for objective
knowledge. The practical ego must give way to the theoretical ego. This abstention from accepting the object as being moves us to the realm of the transcendental ego. Here is the realm of possibilities where the actual perception of the object is cast amongst the "pure 'eidos' perception, whose 'ideal' extension is made up of all ideally possible perceptions, as purely phantasiable processes." The epoché has rid the subject of prejudice and judgment by exposing it to the all-embracing eidos. The object is subject to the principles of the eidos ego; the object's relation to rationality (its pure possibility) and its thus being made scientific (logical). Recall that the object is presented to consciousness in an objectivating act that is solely contemplative. This opens up consciousness to all possible meanings issuing from the sense of the object. Only from this primarily theoretical skeleton of meaning that sets up the object as meant can any other acts be derived, can there be judgments of knowledge made. Husserl's phenomenological reduction or the epoché, and "eidetic intuition" or acceptance-basis for meaning, make up the "fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods," and make science "possible." Husserl's quest for a knowledge basis for self and world has linked the ahistorical eidetic ego with the concrete ego by the temporal constitution of the concrete
ego as an habitualized ego that posits objective acts as an identity, or synthetic unity, in the unified consciousness of the I.

The synthetic structure of the eidos is such that it allows for the identification of meaning, but also for the incompatibilities and contradictions in consciousness seeking to understand itself and the world. This absolution of incongruities in the eidetic constitution is not applicable to the continual change encountered by the subject interacting with reality. Without the genetic constitution of the concrete ego, Husserl would have no way to deal with the alterity of the temporal world. The eidos ego would be a worldless ego, because it would not encounter the world, but absorb the multifarious content of the world into its abstract form. The emptiness of the eidos that Husserl himself admitted amends itself with the inclusion of the habitualized ego that functions in time. But the eidos is never forfeited; it remains a checkpoint for science and self.

This fundamental format of the triad of Husserlian constitution of experience, the natural being that presupposes theoretical being that arrives at genetic being is carried over to Husserl's constitution of intersubjectivity. The method of reduction to the possibilizing sphere of eidos and the descriptive method of determining meaning that characterize Husserl's arrival in
the world as "my world" are also used when Husserl attempts to account for the existence of the Other, or alter-ego.

D) Husserl's Transcendental Intersubjectivity: The Transition from Subjective to Objectively Shared World

As we said earlier, the problem of intersubjectivity is how there can be an objective world shared with Others when the world is primarily my world, primarily known to me through cogito. As ego-cogito I do not have the originary experience of being the cogito of the Other. The syntheses in my intentionality which give rise to my uniquely habituated ego are not the same as the Other's. Husserl attempts to solve this situation of concrete alterity through the transcendental community of egos. Transcendental subjectivity is disengaged from particular being in the concrete world. Therefore, if one were to establish a transcendental realm of intersubjectivity, one would have the starting-point for an objectively shared world, for human community. Thus, Husserl is in keeping with the tradition that upholds theoretical consciousness as the mode of understanding and discerning knowledge. Husserl alleviates the silence forced upon the object world in his analysis of intentionality that recognized the possible meaning of the object for consciousness. His descriptive phenomenology retains the dignity of the object as more than "extended matter" at the service of the "thinking substance" of Descartes. But he is faithful to the idea of human being
as reflective being over and above the seething cauldron of cultural influence and beyond the tentacles of tradition.

How, then, does one establish a community of reflective beings? Husserl begins by working out the problem in terms of the separate existence of ego and alter-ego.

The spatio-temporal separation of each existence is paralleled by the mental separation of each psyche. I cannot physically verify the mental existence of the Other, as I can their bodily presence. I can touch your body, but not your mind. The anticipation of the Other's consciousness can only be made in a realm of transcendence, beyond the physical, in a realm of pure being. It is this abundance of abstract psyches, or transcendental subjectivities, that Husserl wants to agglomerate into a transcendental community of subjects by means of phenomenological reduction, or bracketing of relations with the concrete world. This transcendental realm provides a medium for an empathic bridge from one ego to another, or alter-ego; from subject to Other. Therefore, from our shared absolute presence we can "intuit" the presence of the Other, and establish a basis for an objectively shared world, or community.

Because the mental life of the Other is not an originary experience, as is that of his/her body for me,

"the possibility that any other consciousness posited by me in empathic experience, does not in fact exist cannot be compellingly refuted by any
experience of mine. My own empathic experience, however, is absolutely and originally given in the stream of my immanent perception. Empathic evidence thus excludes, in principle, originary verification.51

Thus, mutual understanding via empathy is at least possible in principle among ego-subjects, without recourse to the arbitrary world of experience. Here we have a conduit for the sharing of "factual separate worlds of experience" that form an intersubjective world. This is the "universal extension of the human community reduced to pure consciousness and the pure I."52 My former inability to grasp the Other in concrete existence becomes possible in transcendental intersubjectivity by means of empathy.

This is accomplished through a reduction to the ownness sphere of the ego. It is the reflection of the I as an I, an ego, which recognizes itself as "me," a "my own" that enables the ego to delineate that which is not my own, but rather that which is alien, or Other. "Thus, I first constitute the sense 'ego,' and then I transfer the sense 'alter-ego' to the Other."53

Now that we have become familiar with the initial concern of the problem of an objectively shared world and the constitution of the Other, let us return to the ego as intentional subjectivity and develop the "factual separate world of experience" of the subject.

As an ego, my separate world of experience is that where "existents have sense for me only by virtue of the
operating intentionality of my conscious life and its constitutive synthesis." This aspect of intentionality is derived from Husserl's genetically constituted "personalistic attitude," or the sensual orientation of the body within the spatio-temporal world.

The naturalistic attitude is fundamental Nature, the reality of material things and the reality of the psyche. Animated bodies, those of animals and human beings, have "localized sensibility; all consciousness is founded upon the body, localized upon it, and co-ordinated with it in time." Bodies are embedded in substantial causal Nature, and with consciousness coming from the sensibility of the body, the "cogito" is then a "fact of nature."

We now make the transition from material subjectivity in Nature to subjectivity as the existence of the psyche as spirit, as active ego. Husserl's spiritual realm is the personalistic attitude, which is: "the everyday life among our fellow-men with whom we are connected in manifold relationships." A person is a subject in an environment, where he/she is actively involved in the world by apperceiving, remembering, believing, etc., this world. The person develops a "theoretical or practical or evaluating attitude" towards this personal environment which exists for him/her. The theoretical, or contemplative act is given primacy over the practical and evaluative because it is the basis for scientific knowledge and rational
decision-making. As you will recall, the practical and evaluative are derived from the theoretical; the universal that gives credence to the particular.

This personal environment becomes the objective reality of the person. It is a world for the person, not a world in itself, and not the world of any arbitrary person, but a personal world for someone who must know of it through actual apperception, or recognition, or at least have it in the horizon ready to be apperceived. In the words of Schutz:

"It is a world experienced by the person in his intentional experiences as having a particular meaning structure which . . . is always changing and subject to modification by cancellation and regrouping of meaning contents . . . the personal environment is always in a state of becoming."57

This is a more historically explicit - because it entails futurity and the implied past - account of Sokolowski's statement that genetic constitution is a repeated encounter between subject and reality. The personal environment is the world as it is originally perceived, but develops and changes as the concrete I is actively involved in continual apperception and the development of theoretical and practical evaluations.

The naturalistic attitude would regard the things of the world as stimulus upon the being as a causal relationship. (Hence, the naturalistic attitude is pre-theoretical, pre-reflective.) In the personalistic attitude, the causal relation gives way to a system of motivations. "The noematic unities called 'things as
apprehended by the personal I' are starting points of more or less strong tendencies attracting the subject to turn to them in practical, cognitive, evaluating, etc. acts."58 The I finds itself motivated by these tendencies in its actions or its passive endurance of them.

Thus we have the intentional relationship of the subject or ego towards the world. This spiritual ego, or active concrete I, is subject to the laws of motivation in which the interconnected experiences of space, time, and causality are dissolved. Consciousness is then a unity of motivations.

"The motivations may be of different types: (1) motivations of reason, that is motivations of act by acts which stand under the jurisdiction of reason, as in the case of logical reasoning where I bestow my doxic thesis (opinion) upon the conclusion 'in consequence of' having bestowed it upon the premises; or (2) motivations by association and habit, that is, relations between earlier and later experiences within the same stream of consciousness, in which case the motivating experiences may be sedimentations of previously performed reasonable acts or even perfectly unreasonable ones, imposed upon us; they may be distinct or hidden, eventually even "unconscious" within the meaning of psychoanalysis."59

The bridge between myself and others, Husserl's empathic leap, presupposes the Other as a spiritual I in a personalistic environment in which the Other acts and reacts by reason and habit. These laws of motivation are the foundation for the comprehension of other human beings who are subject to these laws as I myself am. The body and
bodily movements of the Other, as physical objects and events which articulate a meaning-structure, indicate the expression of "the Other's spiritual I to whose motivational meaning content I am directed. Empathy in other persons is nothing else but that form of apprehension which grasps this meaning."60 Through the apperception of the Other we apprehend the Other's meaning-content. Thus we are able to make an intuitive empathic leap from my ownness sphere to the Other. Empathy becomes the breaking ground for the "We," or community of human beings, or transcendental intersubjectivity.

The abstraction of the ego as ownness is carried out from the naturalistic attitude of a body in the world, my owned body in owned nature, through the personalistic attitude of my own apperception of the world for me in my own theoretical and practical attitudes and evaluations; my own intentional I. The incarnate structure of my ownness is centered in my body, through which I can exercise my powers; my sensibility for seeing, touching, hearing, etc. The embodied I is the "terminus of a purification and the departure point for a constitutional performance."61 The embodied I is a composite of potential and horizons that demand a "coming to awareness of the 'owned' (which penetrates a life whose wealth exceeds reflection."62 The
fully experiencing cogito as a concrete monad reveals the abundance of human being beyond that of a mere "thinking substance."

Now we turn from the constitution of the consciousness of the I to the constitution of the consciousness of the Thou; the other, the alien that is not my own. As has already been indicated, Husserl makes the leap from the ego to the alter-ego by empathy. This is an act of imagining an Other beyond my ownness sphere, or rather, imagining an alter-ego with consciousness thru analogical pairing.

The "analogical grasping of the Other" embraces "the two requirements of phenomenology: respect for the otherness of the Other and the rooting of this experience of transcendence 'in' primordial experience."63 Thru analogy, there is a reach beyond the ownness sphere, beyond solipsism, while preserving the originary experience of the ego.

Because I cannot experience the Other in the original, for then he/she would be an extension of me, the Other is experienced as an appresentation through his/her body. This harks back to Schutz's analysis of the Other whose bodily movements indicate a meaning-structure that can be apprehended by me. The bodily movements and body that are apppresented indicate the spiritual I, or incarnate existence of the Other.
This analogy of body to body makes it possible for the "signification ego" to move "from my body . . . to the body of the Other, which appresents another life to me." The here of "ego" is moved to the there of the Other, as alter-ego. The alter-ego is "seen as" the ego thru an act of the imagination.

The analogy of ego to alter-ego is of a particular breed. It goes from the originary to the non-originary, not merely from object to object in an original sphere of experience. "This 'pairing' brings it about that the sense of the one refers to the sense of the other, is transposed or transferred to the second."65

This first moment of pairing by analogue is followed by the constitution of the Other through my deciphering of the expression of behavior or expressive signs by the Others. We have already discussed this in terms of the apprehension of meaning-structures. This second moment "fills in" the empty analogue of pairing with the possibility of a being that has meaning for me.

This possibility for meaning brings us to the third moment of imagining "if I were over there." Thru this act of the imagination, the Other is a potential experience for me. There is no consciousness of the Other that I can perceive (I can only apperceive the Other's existence), but this potential experience can be filled by my own creations of my imagination. "The fiction is this liberation from my
perspective and this movement into another point of view."®® By imagining another perspective, I establish the Other as an intending alien life, distinct from me but an intentional nexus as I am. I see the Other as I see myself.

But Husserl ends his empathic exposition by recognizing the sphere of the Other as mutually exclusive from my own sphere. The Husserlian project of transcendental intersubjectivity is maintained as a community of monads.

"According to the idealistic requirement of constitution, the Other must be a modification of my ego and according to the realistic character of description, the Other never ceases to exclude himself from the sphere of 'my monad'."®®

As an intending subject, the ego experiences the Other by analogy, signification and imagination. This experience is essentially enigmatic because "my here and the over there of the Other are mutually exclusive."®® There remains a gap in the intersubjective realm, transcendentally and concretely. There is a gap between persons, physically and as separate consciousnesses.

We have been propelled by two thrusts of thought in our study thus far. On the one hand, we have developed the existence of the eidetic ego in relation to the world primarily as an I am, therefore I think,®® or embodied consciousness in the world. We have shown the existence of the Other as an alter-ego by making the empathic move of the imagination thru pairing the ego and alter-ego in a transcendental realm of absolute egos. This provided the
scaffolding for Husserl's community of monads that are mutually exclusive in transcendental subjectivity.

On the other hand, we have substantiated the subject as an intentional nexus, who acts and interacts in the sensual world. This subject forms attitudes, values, desires and beliefs about the world, making consciousness a matter of the events that occur in the world. This genetic, or habituated ego is a motivated subject that apperceives the world through an ongoing "stream of consciousness" of earlier and later experiences that become sedimentations.

But in the transcendental community, the ego and alter-ego remain mutually exclusive. And in the concrete the subject experiences the Other from the edge of the gap that remains between the here and the over there of the other. Not only transcendentally, but concretely, intersubjectivity remains an enigma. Husserl is caught in a catch-22 of egological reflection.
Hans-Georg Gadamer criticizes Husserl's concept of empathy for its unrelenting focus upon the "interiority of self-consciousness" in which empathy "fails to achieve the orientation towards the functional circle of life, which goes far beyond consciousness, to which, however, it claims to return." What Gadamer beckons is not a further analysis of community that is essentially a modification of reflective self-understanding, but a retraction of Husserl's claim that only a pure realm of thought is a legitimate basis for knowledge and understanding. Gadamer is backtracking to the pre-reflective natural world in which the ego exists. Empathy as a transcendental bridge is a necessary conjuration for beings alienated from their natural environment, but an unsuccessful conjuration.

A) Heidegger: Intersubjectivity as Being-in-the-world

Heidegger jars this empathic keystone from the transcendental portal and plops it amidst the "unsociable" "dominant modes of Being-with." Heidegger interprets empathy as a suppression of genuine understanding, such that "Being-with-one-another and Dasein's knowing of itself are
led astray."71 (An example would be the identification of a person with their occupation - someone is regarded only as a manager and not also as a musician or parent.) Dasein's (human there-being) Being-towards Others is "an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being," but also, as Being-with, "is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is."72 Therefore Dasein-with is "a kind of Being which entities encountered within-the-world have as their own. So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being."73 Dasein-with is ontologically prior to empathy, for only because there is already a Being-with is empathy possible. Empathy does not constitute Being-with. It gets its motivation from the "unsociable" dominant modes of Being-with. Heidegger takes care to note that Dasein-with cannot be construed as a summation of subjects. This numerical treatment of Dasein is "inconsiderate" and does not take Others seriously because it does not want "to have anything to do with them."

This description of empathy that suppresses genuine understanding changes the tack of intersubjectivity as a transcendental ideal for concrete being to a mode of Being-in-the-world. Genuine understanding is a realization of this Being-in-the-world. "Understanding is not a last methodological ideal of philosophy over against the naiveté of unreflecting life." It is, on the contrary, the "original form of the realisation of There-being, which is
Before understanding is dispersed into the various directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, it is There-being's mode of Being that is potentiality-for-being and possibility. Possibility is now located in the world, and not the eidos.

Heidegger inverts Husserl's conception of understanding, i.e., understanding as an achievement of the possibilizing eidos. There is not a theoretical understanding, a separate evaluative understanding; an understanding for the many attitudes one could take according to Husserl. Transcendental reflection is not the mother of understanding that eventually confirms or denies the existence, or being of the objective world. Heidegger topples the regal eidos with his own view of understanding as an act which is itself the movement beyond Being. This is Being as projection, or thrownness. The understanding that is potentiality-for-Being is transcendence, "of moving beyond being." 

Heidegger develops Being as historical in its potentiality-for-Being. History is seen not so much as a past, but as something that has effects in the present, or "now." "Anything that has a history stands in the context of a becoming." Anything which has a history shows itself as that which makes a history, and indicates a future in the present. In this sense, "'history' signifies a 'context' of events and 'effects,' which draws on through 'the past,'
the 'Present,' and the 'futures,' On this view, the past has no special priority."

History is the totality of these events and effects which operate in time. Heidegger poses the question whether Dasein is already present, i.e., has absolute, contained being, which can get "into a history," or is it that "Dasein is historical in its Being?" In the latter mode, Dasein must concern itself with the essential nature of projection and thrownness, or becoming; the "now" and the "then." Thus Dasein is concerned with temporality, or "the mode of making-present which retains and awaits." "Then" has a future reference in which something is to happen "then." This implies that something is previous the "then," or that there is a "beforehand." The reference to the past is that which "has failed or eluded us 'on that former occasion'." What occurred "on that former occasion" is "something we must 'now' make up for."80

Heidegger puts these three modes of events in a conception of time focusing on the Present. "Then" is thus an awaiting; "on that former occasion" a retaining, and "now" a making present. The "then" carries within it the not-now-yet. And within the "on that former occasion" is the now-no-longer. These explanations of temporality are described in terms of "now," in relation to the Present, i.e., not-now-yet, now-no-longer. "Temporality ensnares itself in the Present."81 Time is seen from the perspective
of what is "now"; "on that former occasion" is what was "earlier" than now, and "then" is what is "later on." Seen thus, temporality rotates on the axis of now, the Present, as a "unity with awaiting and retaining."\(^{82}\)

However, Heidegger emphasizes the "then" as a "then, when . . .," the "on that former occasion" as a "on that former occasion, when . . .," and the "now" as a "now, that . . ." ("jetzt, da . . ."). This places the "then," "on that former occasion," and "now" in a "relational structure which we call 'datability.'"\(^{83}\) As a datable event, the "now" is given the status of a point in time. "The 'now' is time."\(^{84}\) What this datability shows is the "now" that makes present is the "now, that . . .," the "now, there (da) . . .," the clearing in Being. Something defined as a "now that" is an identification of an event that is time, there-being which is time.

"In the 'now that . . .' lies the ecstatical character of the Present. The datability of the 'now,' the 'then,' and the 'on that former occasion,' reflects the ecstatical constitution of temporality, and is therefore essential for the time itself that has been expressed. The structure of the datability of the 'now,' the 'then,' and the 'on that former occasion,' is evidence that these, stemming from temporality, are themselves time."\(^{85}\)

The "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" are the way of "assigning a time."\(^{86}\)

By assigning a time, there is another mode of viewing time, which is the "until-then," the "meanwhile" and
"awaiting," which leaves a space that is "in-between" the "now" and the "then," or "in-between" the "now" and the "on that former occasion." Thus there is a "span" in which the making-present is "ecstatically stretched along," as historical temporality.87

In this mode of being stretched along, Dasein is "living along" in an everyday manner, but does not understand itself as "running along in a Continuously enduring sequence of pure 'nows.' By reason of this covering up, the time which Dasein allows itself has gaps in it."88 This is not to say that these gaps splinter time into random pieces, but rather that in its continuity, temporality is made up of "nows" that have been disclosed and stretched along ecstatically. This is the historical dimension of temporality as an authentic "constancy of Self."89

What Heidegger has done is "unsnared" temporality from the Present. The "now" is contextualized as a succession of points of time, where the "now" is time. The "now," which is a making present, is the clearing in Being, or the "now, that . . . ."; the identification of an event, of an entity which is "there." Being is thus a succession of "nows," or events, and the gaps between the "nows." Being is that which is making present in relation to that which was and that which is to be. Being is that which is Present and
that which is not-present, or the gaps in Being from which "nows" are disclosed in the "there" of Being.

Thus, Gadamer can say that for Heidegger, Being itself is time. This counters the traditional relegation of Being to the transcendental level which showed Being as what is present. Heidegger released Being from its transcendental constraints by declaring a "there" in Being; "a clearing in being, i.e., a distinction between Being and beings."90 This fundamental distinction in Being brings the question of nothingness to the fore, because now Being may be not-present, and possible, like time.

Thus understanding is the realization of possibility, for it is There-being's mode of Being. The existence of the clearing in Being, or of There-being leads Heidegger to an investigation into Being itself. Husserl was concerned with finding a basis for knowledge in the human sciences whereas Heidegger is concerned with a "hermeneutics of facticity."91

Facticity is the problem of the interrelatedness of Dasein with all that it encounters in its own world. As existing in the world, Dasein defines this existence as a Fact. "Whenever Dasein is, it is a Fact."92 As within-the-world, Dasein has Being-in-the world that is "bound up in its 'destiny'" with the Being of other entities in the world. Thus, a hermeneutics of facticity is a continual interpretation of the relations of Dasein with other entities of Being. It is an interpretation of the
events, or situations which Dasein finds itself and through which it comes to understand itself.

As possibility, understanding moves from the idealist position of synthesizing perceptions that determine what is present objectively and therefore determine that which has being; to the act of understanding as an event of interpreting meaning coming from the object in There-being and meaning brought to this event in the forestructures of understanding belonging to the interpreter. Heideggerian understanding embraces the historical nature of understanding as an event that includes the fore-structures, or prejudices of the interpreter. He provides an opening for the meaning of Being that does not blanch understanding to purify it of subjective experience. Heidegger immerses understanding in the whole of being-in-the-world.

B) Gadamer: Understanding as Historical Event

Understanding that is an event in the world becomes a central element for Gadamer's hermeneutics of experience. He demonstrates understanding as more than a theoretical act in his example of human practice. When someone learns how to use a machine, knows a trade, or has an understanding of artifacts, "it still remains true that . . . (this is) ultimately a self understanding." Understanding requires not only what is presented immediately, but also the disclosure of what is hidden in expression, in human activity. This means that a person "knows one's way in it
... a person who understands, understands himself, projecting himself according to his possibilities."  

Understanding is an ongoing projection of human action, not a product of identification with which to dub reality. Understanding is a movement in history, not an adequation of intellect and reality. According to Graf-York, this historicality depends upon the "generic difference between the ontic and the historical." The knower and the known are not "present-at-hand in an 'ontic' way, but in an 'historical' one," ontic as an emphasis on what is as static present. Our study of history rests on our being "historical." "The historicalness of human There-being in its expectancy and its forgetting is the condition of our being able to represent the past."  

What is brought into perspective here is the difference between a "correspondence" and "similarity" for scientific method. Correspondence characterizes understanding as a reproductive process, where knowledge from the past carries the same meaning when it is reproduced in the present. Correspondence implies the idealist notion of pure concept unattached to contingent subjective influences. Thus, correspondence is inherently ahistorical.

Similarity, on the other hand, bursts this bubble of pure knowledge because it acknowledges the involvement of human There-being as past and possible in the act of understanding. This historical dimension makes knowledge
incapable of being reproduced; it can only be re-presented. The interpretation of what it means in the present can only be a similarity, at best, of what it meant in the past, because understanding always includes the forestructures that influence how we interpret things.

Correspondence is not included as "a condition of the original meaning of historical interest" because only when correspondence admits tradition can it be "as original and essential a part of the historical finiteness of There-being as is its projectedness towards future possibilities of itself. Heidegger was right to insist that what he called 'Thrownness' belongs together with that which is projected." Understanding becomes more of a productive interpretation of things because of its inherent possibilizing structure of There-being.

This historical understanding will be incorporated by Gadamer in his theory of an historical hermeneutics. He applies Heidegger's structure of There-being that is thrown projection to his concept of concrete hermeneutics. There-being realized in understanding is concretized in historical understanding. This occurs because "the commitments of custom and tradition and the corresponding potentialities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself." As such, There-being has always "been," in relation to its potentiality-for-being. This is
the meaning of the existential of "Thrownness," or being
that is continually interpreted.

Gadamer contrasts this hermeneutics of facticity with
Husserl's transcendental constitution:

"no freely chosen relation towards one's own being can go back beyond the facticity of this being. Everything that makes possible and limits the project of There-being precedes it, absolutely." 99

Working from this position of natural historical being that understands without the epoche, Gadamer's project is to develop the existential structure of There-being expressed "in the understanding of historical tradition."

What this does for intersubjectivity is offer a shared objective reality not in terms of an absolutely constituted realm, but in terms of a factical hermeneutics that locates intersubjectivity in-the-world. The ontology of intersubjectivity is not founded in transcendental subjectivity where it is identified in the concept of intuitive empathy. Intersubjectivity is shaken awake by Heidegger's Being-with in the actual historical world. The ontological relevance of Being-with is that

"the 'subject character' of one's own Dasein and that of Others is to be defined existentially - that is, in terms of certain ways in which one may be. In that which we concern ourselves environmentally the Others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do." 100

Here activity defines ontology as relationships in the world, and ontology becomes a matter of the interpretation
of ways of being-in-the-world, or Being-with-Others. What we are developing is intersubjectivity as a hermeneutics of experience, and as we shall see later with Gadamer, a linguistic hermeneutics, or interpretation of experience.

The methodological basis for Gadamer's hermeneutics of experience is the constant interplay of understanding and interpretation as perceived by Heidegger. The task of hermeneutics is "never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions," but to secure a scientific theme by working out said forestructures "in terms of the things themselves."101 This is the Cerberean hermeneutic circle that resists the habits of thought that obliterate the possible meanings of the things-themselves.

By focusing upon the thing, for example, a stanza of poetry, the interpreter ceases to accommodate the distractions arising from his/her own fore-understanding. In trying to understand the text, the interpreter engages in an act of projecting. He/she projects a meaning for the entire text when there is a discovery of some initial meaning. This "initial meaning" occurs only because the interpreter has an expectation of meaning for the text. Thus, working out this projection of fore-understanding with what is really there becomes a task of revision and understanding the text. This is the continual "process of new projection" that is "the movement of understanding and
interpretation."102 Objectivity is then a result of this working-out of meaning that is given to the text by the interpreter and that meaning emerging from the text itself.

Gadamer takes into account the possibility of misunderstanding a text, seen as a contradiction in meanings. "how can misunderstandings of a text be recognized at all if there is nothing else to contradict?"103 Misunderstanding implies meaning that has its source in an other besides the interpreter. He deals with this possibility by taking an attitude of openness towards the meaning of the text or person. This requires putting ourselves in relation to the other within a medium of meanings as possibilities rather than an equation of meanings between the two. Fore-meanings and expectations are submitted to the event of understanding that includes that which the text may be telling the interpreter. What is important is the awareness of one's own bias; of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices "so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings."104

Thus, there is a tension between given and possible; between the past and the possible, between prejudice and the possible. This is what gives historical hermeneutics its significance. The idea of prejudice in Gadamer is not placed in an unfavorable light that reveals superficial scars and bruises inflicted upon the face of knowledge.
This is the light of the enlightenment; the belief in legitimate knowledge as perfect knowledge freed from prejudice by reason, or the "prejudice against prejudice."

C) Gadamer's Concept of Prejudice and Tradition

For Gadamer, it is our history of prejudice that illuminates the worn face of finitude from within our concrete experience. Prejudice is not subject to corrective measures of reason that seek to perfect humanity. But rather, reason and prejudice mesh in an acceptance of the unpredictability of historical being. Reason does an about-face, so to speak. Instead of working to discredit prejudice under the illusion of absolute knowledge, "reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, i.e., it is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates."¹⁰⁵ We belong to history, it does not belong to us. This is why Gadamer observes that to focus upon self-reflecting subjectivity for knowledge of experience is an inadequate approach. Self-understanding is accomplished in a context; in a family, a society, a state in which we live. Individuality is only a parcel of the larger experience of historical life. "The prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being."¹⁰⁶

Reason that is situated in history is important for the idea of prejudice in two respects, that of authority and
that of tradition. The problem of legitimate prejudice initially was, for the enlightenment, a problem of not using one's own reason and bowing before the sovereign old authority which determined knowledge. The dilemma contains more than the prestige of authority replacing individual judgment. It also holds the possibility that authority can be a "source of truth." According to Gadamer, authority is an acquisition of knowledge, of superior knowledge; which indicates not a narrow view, as the enlightenment would have it, but a broader perspective that can be presented by a person as well as substantiated by "solid grounds offered by reason." This formulates objective prejudices, and not solely arbitrary assertions reverberating from a stolid dictatorship of authority.

From this latter notion of authority as acquired knowledge comes the concept of tradition as a form of authority. Gadamer calls tradition a brand of authority that is "nameless." Our finite historical being is characterized by the fact that "the authority of what has been transmitted - and not only what is clearly grounded - has power over our attitudes and behavior." He cites the validity of morals as a case in point. Morals are "freely taken over, but by no means created by a free insight or justified by themselves. This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity."
Gadamer refutes the romanticist bias that sees tradition as equated with nature and opposed to reason. Tradition is not an unquestioned part of our conditioning. Tradition incorporates freedom and history in the act of preservation, the act of reason, because tradition needs to be "affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, such as is active in all historical change . . . preservation is as much a freely-chosen action as revolution and renewal."

In contradistinction to the idealist position that designates self-understanding as a result of reflection, Gadamer states that

"we stand always within tradition, and this is no objectifying process, i.e., we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us, a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our later historical judgment would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as the simplest preservation of tradition."112

Understanding is an opening that allows tradition a voice in determining the meaning of what we are examining. And it is through this continual process of bringing to bear the authority of tradition, or reasoned preservation upon the act of understanding that creates a proving ground for the validity of what is true and hence creates the possibility for historical knowledge.113

With this possibility of understanding something as true comes the hermeneutical project of reaching agreement
concerning the content of what it is we are attempting to understand, of the thing before us. The fusion of past and present in tradition from which meaning can spring is understanding's claim to objective validity, "which is not a mysterious communion of souls, but a sharing of a common meaning." And it is the nature of this "common meaning" that is significant for the hermeneutic project.

Historical understanding does not require, then, a reduction to a transcendent subjectivity in order to constitute meaning. Understanding can achieve objective meaning through agreement of content in historical facticity through the "interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter."

This kind of agreement demands a different orientation of the subject towards the world than that offered by Cartesian egology which places man as the axis of all knowledge. Here the subject is forced to leave the official's post and enter the field of play.

D) Gadamer's Concept of Play

Gadamer's concept of play is critical for historical understanding because of its diminution of the importance of the knowing subject by involving that which is more than the subject. "Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in his play. The mode of being of play does not allow the player to behave towards play as if it were an object." The intention of play is the "to and fro
movement which is not tied to any goal which would bring it to an end."117 The definition of a game is so dependent upon this movement that it does not matter who or what performs this movement. Play is this movement of the game.

The involvement of the player is that of deciding amongst the possibilities realized in the play. The freedom of decision carries with it the element of risk in the game itself that could prove dangerous. "One can only play with serious possibilities. This means that one may become so engrossed in them that they outplay and prevail over one . . . all playing is a being-played."118 Thus the lure of the game is its mastery over the players. In the game, the player is spellbound, being drawn into play and kept there. The enjoyment of play is dependent upon the "freedom of playing himself out," whereby he is "transforming the aims of his behavior into mere tasks of the game."119 Hence, the purpose of the game lies not in the solution of the task, but rather in "the ordering and shaping of the movement of the game itself."120

The movement of play that draws a player into a "reality that surpasses him" characterizes the movement of tradition and interpreter. This is an infinite process of discovering new meaning in the "place between strangeness and familiarity," or the tension that is the "home of hermeneutics."121
We no longer have a gap between monads but a clearing in being where the tension between the meanings of texts or persons is "played out." A hermeneutics of intersubjectivity demonstrates "the effectivity of history within understanding itself," or effective-history, in the story told by each person, in the language that gives rise to meaning. This effective-history bears in it the commitments of tradition that have been preserved by reason in understanding. Thus, authority is manifested in understanding as the "having been" of the person's experience, and by implication supports the "to be" that is the possible meaning that is disclosed in the "playing out" of discourse.

Now that we have moved intersubjectivity into history, let us continue with the task of discerning meaning from the hermeneutic situation. This "situation is one of effective-historical reflection," in that "to exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete." The substantial subject that is historically pre-given simultaneously limits and prescribes the possibility of understanding in tradition.

From this general orientation of limitation, Gadamer develops the limit of possibility of vision in a situation, or a horizon of a situation. "The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." The concept of horizon
includes a dialectic of the finitude and the expansion of thought. A horizon characterizes "the way in which thought is tied to its finite determination, and the nature of the law of the expansion of the range of vision." Horizon is then a constant working-out, or rather playing-out of the limits of tradition that are brought to the hermeneutic experience. This opens into the possibility of broadening and enriching the tradition of the interpreter with what is offered up by what is being examined.

Horizon is the finite flux of experience; a recognition of what is that has been substantiated with what was as well as the possibility of what might be. The experience of the horizon is a testing-ground for our prejudices. Understanding "is always the fusion of these horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves." This fusion is not an assimilation, but a tension between the text and the present. The movement of horizon as simultaneous projection and removal in understanding hence formulates the problem of application.

The hermeneutical triad of understanding, interpretation and application is Gadamer's platform for establishing interpretation as the "explicit form of understanding," that makes understanding always an interpretation, and interpretative language an "inner structural element of understanding."
Before we enter into a discussion of language, let us recall that the significance of prejudice is to be aware of one's own bias. This allows the newness and possible meanings of the text or other person to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings. This provides an openness to the Other, without which there can be no genuine human relationship. A violation of this openness is the false claim to understanding the Other in advance, and thus distancing him. This becomes a means of "mastering the pact," and ultimately the other person. The Other is denied a voice. The splintering of such dogmatic presuppositions comes with "the question."

E) Language and Dialogue as the Realization of Understanding

In a conversation between persons who are open to what the other is saying, questioning becomes a testing, where questions are not suppressed by the dominant opinion. The give and take, or play, of questioning and answering probes the significance of what is being examined not as true, but as meaningful. And faithful to the hermeneutic method, "the possibility of its truth remains unsettled, this is the real and basic nature of a question, namely to make things indeterminate."\textsuperscript{127}

Persons who are engaged in conversation are involved in the hermeneutic situation where communication of meaning is the common goal. It is the purpose of language to perform this exchange of meaning. Language is the common milieu of
persons seeking to understand. "To reach an understanding with one's partner in dialogue is not merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful assertion of one's own point of view, but a transformation into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were."128

Language is the root commonality between any persons seeking to understand each other. Speaking the same language is a presupposition for any authentic conversation. With this common thread of language, each person opens him/herself to the others in order to engage in understanding "not a particular individual, but what he says."129 What is to be grasped in the play of language is the "objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion."130

Language is not "a tool for the purpose of understanding but, rather, coincides with the very act of understanding and reaching agreement."131 Language gives a voice to one's own horizon of understanding. The meaning and possibility that one brings to the conversation is put into play with the other's own horizon. As such common expression, language is "the universal medium in which understanding itself is realized."132

That our capacity and desire to understand is so much greater than any statement we make is not a critique of language. The incongruity of possible knowledge and possible expression in language does not refer to the barrenness of language, but to conventions of meaning that
have been formed in language. Our desire for knowledge looks to release itself from "the socially motivated tendency towards uniformity with which language forces understanding into particular schematic forms which hem us in." Criticisms of the "conventions of linguistic expression" are actually concerned with the conventions of meaning. This has nothing to do with the connection between language and understanding, except that critical thought itself confirms this connection, because it must be expressed in language. Therefore, the universality of language "keeps pace with the universality of reason."

Hermeneutical consciousness is active in the relation between language and reason. If understanding has a "necessary relation of equivalence to its possible interpretation," and there are no limits on understanding, then "the linguistic form which the interpretation of this understanding finds must contain within it an infinite dimension that transcends all bounds. Language is the language of reason itself."

Reason is not encapsulated in any single language. Thru the hermeneutical experience, multiple languages have their own unique ability to name objects. Because any understanding and interpretation is meaningful, the coming to a meaning is the work of reason preserving a tradition while appropriating the meaning issuing from the other. The activity of reason in effective historical understanding is
not confined to a single language, but rather, is an inherent characteristic of any language and is constituted in each language, as is understanding. This gives the opportunity for reason to be involved in the meaning disclosed by the other. In the tension, or play of interpretation, reason springs free of a given language and "is itself constituted linguistically."\(^{137}\)

By adhering to this core unity of language and thought, Gadamer stresses the importance of concept-formation that is the constant labor of understanding. Words and concepts are not tools for the interpreter's task of understanding. Rather, concepts shape understanding through the words in which the object realizes itself and that are simultaneously the language of the interpreter. Thus there is a dynamism to conceptualization that is charged with the movement of historical consciousness. Language is not set apart from understanding to be used as a storage-bin from which to pluck a given sign for an object. Language is a necessary medium for meaning to be realized at all. "Everything that is intelligible must be accessible to understanding and to interpretation... (neither) is ever simply an object, but comprises everything that can ever be an object."\(^{138}\) Thus understanding must be able to recognize the unlimited possibilities of meaning from the object, and as such, cannot be constrained to an unchanging universal concept that binds the object to the intellect.
F) A Comparison of Idealist Understanding and Hermeneutic Understanding

The distinction between the understanding that constitutes the object in ahistorical concepts and understanding saturated with prejudice is important to intersubjectivity in two aspects. Recall Husserl's concerns with intersubjectivity as one, the search for an objectively shared world based on a presuppositionless science, and two, the problem of constituting the Other; or other human beings as I myself am constituted. First, in terms of an objectively shared world, knowledge is what gives coherence to this world and establishes its being a world. As we have seen, the Cartesian ego-cogito arrives at knowledge through the perception of "extended matter." As manipulable matter that is given meaning by a subject, the possible meaning of the object expires in the vacuum of scientific classification and repeated demonstration. Cast in a vat of ahistorical scientific knowledge, objects become signs maneuvered by reason, a "thinking substance" that seeks sovereignty over "extended matter." This is a sovereignty that uses objects as means for its own ends. The world as such is a cornucopia of utility. Human activity is thus not primarily in relation with the world, but a use of the world that is justified and legitimated as knowledge that has transcendental status. Reason becomes streamlined to accommodate the demands of scientific knowledge and
technique thru which man controls and utilizes matter. The one-way street of reason as instrument of science and technique thus distinguishes understanding as anthropocentric comprehension of the world.

Intersubjectivity in-the-world becomes, then, a manifestation of this "instrumental" reason in understanding. Instrumental reason operates on the fundamental distinction between subject and object. The commonality with Others now rests on the commonality of knowledge created by science that tends to include other human beings in its categorization of objects distinct from the subject, and hence objects of instrumental reason. The transcendental realm of a presuppositionless science legitimates the subject/object dichotomy and logically, instrumental reason.

Secondly, the schism between subject and object as other than the subject also indicates a schism between human subjects as Others. This denies the fundamental "we" of human existence. As knowing subjects, each knows only his/her world of experience, but none in commonality with Others.

Husserl modified his idealist conception of reality with his analysis of intentionality. He sought to respect the object's own meaning through a method of pure description that could also serve to constitute the world primarily as "my world, a personal world for me." The only
problem was that with the world as primarily my world, any conception of our world would necessarily be a derivation of my world.

Gadamer is willing to give up the primacy of the subject and submit the meaning of the world to the play of language. In this way we are able to "build up our own world in language" in actual relationships with one another. This "genuine speaking, which has something to say," recognizes the common experience of dialogue and the interconnectedness of persons.139

Inherent to dialogue is a reciprocal relationship between speakers. It is not an "I and Thou," where each is intact as an isolated entity having only its own world. "Thou" may indicate our separateness, but there is a common understanding; a "deep common accord" is presupposed. This situates language not in the realm of "I-Thou" but in the realm of "We." To speak of an object is to present it before someone else in a language we both understand.140

Gadamer frees the meaning of the world from the possessive grip of the constituting ego and allows what is said to have "a claim over one." In this respect, "language ... on it depends the fact that man has a world at all ... this world is linguistic in nature."141 Hence Gadamer's observation that "whoever has language 'has' the world."142
Having language, and hence having the world emanates not from the application of fixated concepts as in scientific rationality, but from language wrestling with our own finitude. It is the event of tradition working in understanding to expand one's horizon through the dialectic of question and possible answer.

This brings us to the relationship of meaning to the "I." For hermeneutics, the meaning of traditions, of prejudice, of what is handed down, "finds its concretion in its relation to the understanding 'I,' - and not in the reconstruction of an 'I' of the original meaning." The "I" is a matter of situating the "I" in-the-world because outside of this historical, linguistic being, the world does not exist.

Despite Husserl's laborious attempt to retrieve the world after carving out the original meaning of the "I" as eidos, intersubjectivity flounders as a way of being-in-the-world. The original "I" does not give itself over to the play of meaning. With Husserl, intersubjectivity becomes a Frankensteinian creation of sorts; a desire for community distorted into a grotesque entity that leaves its creator unfulfilled and alone.

Husserl's empathic grasping of the Other in transcendental egology is subverted by Gadamer's concrete transparent linguistic understanding. The meaning of
objective reality becomes shared in the commonality of language that presupposes the "We" of human being.

Intersubjectivity is now an activity of a linguistic consciousness that is historical. Gadamer has maintained hermeneutics in the event of understanding. Language and interpretation are not tools for understanding, but rather are understanding itself. And as participants in the activity of dialogue Dasein-with, or intersubjectivity becomes ontologically linguistic.

The scientific subject with its tote of tools for language never gives itself over to an authentically shared world. It remains a purveyor of meaning that does little more than anthropomorphize all it perceives. For intersubjectivity, the mode of science and technology that pervades consciousness is reflected as an implicit attitude with which we engage in dialogue. Understanding is revealed in language; reason itself is constituted linguistically. Thus instrumental reason works its way into intersubjectivity and is sedimented in words that become "ossified" terminology. The grip of the scientific mind on reality through instrumental reason and technology is the overriding characteristic of our time and demands further investigation and clarification that will be the thrust of the next section.
PART II. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND DISTORTION

CHAPTER 3

HABERMAS'S THEORY OF UNDISTORTED COMMUNICATION

The following section will deal with the work of Jürgen Habermas. The hub of Habermas's writing is the concern with rationality that is permeated with a backlog of structures of domination. He wants to develop a theory of knowledge and communication that will allow for the emancipation of people from repressive traditions and authority.

The term "repressive" that is used by Habermas to describe tradition and authority is the bone of contention between Habermas and Gadamer. As we have seen, Gadamer's historical-hermeneutic intersubjectivity appropriates tradition and authority as not only inescapable prejudice in which the subject is submerged, but meaningful prejudice that gives the subject an orientation in the world. The individual's prejudices, "far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being." Tradition incorporates freedom and history in the act of preservation, the act of reason, because tradition must be cultivated, affirmed, embraced. "Preservation is as much a freely chosen action as revolution and renewal." Thus it is the preservation of tradition fused with the present that
provides the fermentation of meaning in the play of inter-subjective dialogue and interpretation.

Habermas, in contrast, will contend that tradition is a source of distorted meaning. It is a perpetuation of repressive authority manifested in institutions and ideologies. He will opt for a critical intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity bounded by certain critical ideals for securing truth and severing communication from the authority of tradition imbedded in institutions, and the norms and values of society. Such critical intersubjectivity is the arena for undistorted communication between autonomous, responsible participants, and the basis for social transformation.

A) Critical Theory

This project indicates Habermas's fundamentally Marxist orientation towards a theory of society. However, Habermas's social theory is greatly modified from that of the determinism of orthodox Marxism. Habermas speaks from the chorus of critical theory developed by the Frankfurt School in Germany in the first half of this century. As modified Marxism, critical theory finds the germ of emancipation from domination in consciousness, rather than in class conflict. A theory of motivation replaces a theory of causality. Habermas extends the scope of his writing beyond the criticism of instrumental reason and the administrative techno-scientific power structure that was
the meat of repression for Max Horkeimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and other colleagues at the Frankfurt School. He thus develops a theory of communication founded on motivation.

The failure of revolution by the proletariat in America, the degeneration of Stalinism into technocratic bureaucracy, the absence of the revolutionary class consciousness, and the condensation of Marxist theory into a deterministic and pessimistic critique of culture are the main points of the paralysis of revolution.¹

For Habermas, there have been changes in the structure of capitalism in terms of state intervention in the private market and organizational techniques. Organization and bureaucracy are results of instrumental reason, or "objectifiable and technically instrumental knowledge which controls experience by making it schematically accessible and repeatable."² Reason thus concerns itself with method, not end. The efficient coordination of the social system jeopardizes the public sphere of political life, i.e., democratic institutions where rational discourse may take place. Habermas thus sees a need to rethink social theories, including Marxism, which are no longer valid, or whose goals have been obscured in techno-scientistic societies. He seeks to reconstruct these goals by removing the distortions accrued by instrumental reason, techno-science, capitalism, and other repressive ideologies.
Individual questioning of administrative activities in government dissipates in a labyrinth of faceless authority. Class conflict is abated by regulative techniques of management. It is a rehabilitated reason, a critical reason that is the thread between theory and practice unraveled in language which Habermas will use to rescue human freedom and autonomy from authority. Thus reason is essential for emancipation in the reflective realm of critical theory.

Critical theory for Habermas is a "philosophy of history with political intentions." Its task is to develop a theory of historical understanding distinct from historical explanation as a science, and to articulate the role of interpretive understanding in social practice. In this way, critical theory embraces hermeneutics, as far as hermeneutics offers a mode of historical understanding and describes social practice in the form of practical speech or communicative understanding. These dimensions of hermeneutics are appropriated by Habermas.

However, Habermas utilizes critical theory as a method with which to critique society and history. This is an approach toward "emancipation from our historical past," where history is viewed as "a history of the exercise of domination and repression. Here critical theory joins forces with science against hermeneutics." Science is that which provides us "new means of control over our natural condition." As method, critical theory takes the stance of
an objective observatory overlooking experience. Emancipation which wields critical theory against authority and tradition has the implication of a "shared form of life in which we have come to an understanding with one another which need no longer be revoked." For Habermas, it is the ideal speech situation in communicative action which provides this form of life. And it is in opposition to this point of objectivity that hermeneutics will stand in our concluding section. Now let us whittle into the dense body of Habermas's thought which eventually leads us to a theory of society free from distortive structures of authority.

Habermas, in working from the perspective of critical theory, is resistant to the demands of traditional theory, or rather, the legacy of the Enlightenment and idealist philosophy. We have had a taste of this idealism in our above references to Descartes and Husserl. The demands of traditional theory are more fully articulated by Max Horkheimer in his outline of its logical structure. First, there is the subsumption of facts and events under lawlike or nomological statements. Second, traditional theory is ahistorical, i.e., it abstracts from the historicality of the object and knowing subject. And thirdly, there is the fundamental division between subject and object. This structure of traditional philosophical thought is due to the Cartesian dualism of thought and being as a natural mechanism; a process that is static and discoverable through
reason in the form of laws which in turn establish an objectively shared world. Thus, we have intersubjective meaning defined in terms of transcendental, objective laws.

Critical theory, on the far edge of this search for knowledge, interpolates the role of human activity in the shaping of a shared world. The contribution of German idealism to the significance of human action, specifically Kant, is the reconsideration of the knowing subject in its essential relation to time. Critical theory, as a critique of history, thus maintains itself as simultaneously empirical and practical. It is both a critical theory of society as it is and a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life.8

This historical dimension of critical theory retains the status of reasonable objectivity because it is a relation of the subject to time, and not Heidegger's concept of being as time. Hence, there is a dichotomy between reason and history inherent to critical theory. This is a perpetuation of the split between subject and object in Cartesian subjectivity. It is a problematic that Habermas wants to overcome through his quasi-transcendental structure of language, but also, it is the force of his argument against authority, which can be substituted for history in opposition to reason.

Horkheimer outlines the dual character of contemporary society. First, the economy and culture are products of
human work and organization, as creations of self-conscious will. Secondly, bourgeois society is comparable to non-human natural processes, to pure mechanism. The place between these two aspects of reflection and natural science is significant for Habermas. This is where he positions critical theory as a practical theory of truth that lies between reflective philosophy and empirical science; it is an "empirical philosophy with practical intent."

In order to substantiate the "betweenness" of critical philosophy, i.e., between theory or knowledge and practical intentions, or human interests, Habermas models the structures of human experience according to quasi-transcendental principles. Through his use of Kant, Habermas modifies Kant's a priori structures of knowledge (i.e., pure intuition, understanding) as historical and social a priori principles. The link between theoretical reason and practical reason as one that is fundamentally historical brings the "quasi-" into Habermas's theory. Habermas wants to establish the relation between knowledge and its object. For Kant, "the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs only to the critique of knowledge; it does not concern the relation of that knowledge to its objects." But this relation is essential for Habermas because he is trading a theory of causation (class conflict and the technological overcoming of the fetters of the means of production) for a theory of
motivation which locates emancipation in consciousness. He must link interests derived from material being with ideas without using the base-superstructure deterministic model of Marx, because the base is no longer reliable as a source of social transformation. Ideas, consciousness, in turn, must connect with a social context in order for the light of reason in reflection to have any impact in society. Thus, Habermas needs to show that the transcendental which belongs to the critique of knowledge rests upon unacknowledged presuppositions that are historically generated. As such, there can be a critique of knowledge that is transcendent of a society and yet recognized as within the historical context of that society.

From this modified transcendental perspective Habermas creates a space for critical reflection that can apply to a particular historical situation. Critical philosophy cannot have a concept of knowledge which is elucidated "independently of the subjective conditions of the objectivity of possible knowledge." Objectivity is derived from subjective circumstances which constitute the "highest employment of understanding" shown by the Kantian principle of the synthetic unity of apperception (ego).

This subjective and explicitly historical temper of knowledge as Habermas describes it is contradictory to the onslaught of scientism. The rigidity of scientism, or science that identifies itself with objective knowledge is
strengthened by philosophical positivism, or philosophy of science. Positivism employs both rationalist and empiricist traditions to enforce the hold of science on knowledge. Positive knowledge is knowledge valid after the fact, after it has been demonstrated. This is not reflected knowledge which entertains possible meanings, but knowledge which relies upon the structure of the sciences, or absolute methodology for its validity.13

B) Habermas's Concept of Self-Reflection in Historical Consciousness

Habermas will seek to wrench the possibility of self-reflection from the clench of positivist thought, which identifies knowledge as what is, and not what could or ought to be. Self-reflection nurtures the emancipatory interest of humanity, the freedom from repression and the freedom for expression. This comes to fruition in communicative action, or dialogue that is bounded by quasi-transcendental standards, i.e., the truth of the propositional content, the comprehensibility of the symbolic expression, the truthfulness of the intentional expression, and the rightness of the speech act with respect to existing norms and values.14 This ideal speech situation is the leavening agent for freedom and autonomy, as well as social existence.

The emphasis on language and dialogue funnels what Habermas calls "knowledge-constitutive interests" into
experience. We can begin to see his theory for linking transcendental knowledge with material interests beginning to take shape. Knowledge-constitutive interests posit the possibility for emancipation in consciousness, limit the rule of positive-instrumental knowledge to one area of thought (preventing the eclipse of human freedom by techno-scientism), and ground reason in history through language.

Habermas categorizes knowledge-constitutive interests into three main bodies of thought. First, positive, or scientific-technological knowledge corresponds to the technical interest of man to control the environment. Its interest is in labor or work, the instrumental activity in the material world. Another division of knowledge is the historical-hermeneutic sciences which pertains to language interpretations that provide orientations of action within common traditions. This symbolic activity involves the interest in language. The last division of knowledge is that of the social sciences which constitutes the legitimations that a society accepts or criticizes. This latter division is concerned with the individual in relation to the norms of the group. This is the interest in power.15 Thus, Habermas schematizes knowledge-constitutive interests into work, language and power which secure the existence of the human species.
It is only through the power of self-reflection that knowledge and interest combine. The human interest in autonomy and responsibility "can be apprehended a priori."\textsuperscript{16} What differentiates us from nature is language, for it is "the only thing whose nature we can know."\textsuperscript{17} Through language, autonomy and responsibility are realized for us. Speech expresses "unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus." The a priori truths of autonomy and responsibility arrive at historical significance in intended speech. Moreover, as a priori, autonomy and responsibility parallel the idealist conception of reason as both will and consciousness. "Reason also means the will to reason."\textsuperscript{18} It is through self-reflection that "knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility."\textsuperscript{19}

We can see a curious combination of Husserl, Kant, and Hegel in this synthesis between knowledge and interest. Let us first take up with Husserl's approach to knowledge in his theory of genetic constitution. As a fundamental structure of intentionality, rationality was the basis for knowledge and human action in the world. The eidetic realm was primarily a transcendent realm which allowed rational acts to be differentiated from instinctual acts. It was human activity in the temporal world which necessitated the link between the eidetic realm and the concrete realm. Here the
pure, eidetic ego subsided in significance next to the concrete ego which generated convictions in history; it was an habituated ego.

This juncture between the theoretical eidetic and the practical genetic spheres was described as essentially rational because it allowed the subject to distinguish a reality apart from itself, and to respond to this reality thru reason. The theoretical objectivating act is not influenced by subjective emotions, culture or history. The intentional, theoretical act itself is the apperception, interpretation, or apprehension of the sensation belonging to the act which presents an object to consciousness. But recall that with Husserl, the object remained a diversity of intentionalities, which kept it from being schematized into a closed concept. Meaning is open to possibility in Husserl's phenomenology. Here there is a break with Husserl and a move to Kant.

Habermas appropriates Kant's conception of understanding as the highest principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. Through the mediation of understanding, sense data were synthesized by the transcendental ego and given meaning in concepts. The structure of understanding is given a priori, and as such is ahistorical, a fixed corpus of thematized meaning and knowledge.
Now we can take the transcendent act of rationality in idealism, here illustrated by Husserl, and the thematization, or objectification of meaning in closed concepts of Kant to establish a rational knowing subject. Idealism provides a transcendental understanding of self or ego apart from the world through the act of reflection. But we need to connect this subject to the world as an active subject. For this we turn to Husserl once more.

Husserl modifies the idealist theory of consciousness as transcendental understanding when he inscribes genetic constitution into egological experience. Recall that Husserl's naturalistic attitude regarded things of the world as stimulus upon a being as a causal relationship (hence, the naturalistic attitude is pre-theoretical, pre-reflective). But in the personalistic attitude, where a person is actively involved in the world by apperceiving, remembering, believing, etc., this world, the person develops a theoretical or practical or evaluating attitude toward this personal environment which exists for him/her. In the personalistic attitude, the causal relation gives way to a system of motivations. "Things as apprehended by the personal I are the starting points of strong tendencies attracting the subject to turn to them in practical, cognitive, evaluating, etc., acts." The I finds itself
motivated by these tendencies in its actions or its passive endurance of them.²⁰

The intentional relationship of the subject or ego towards the world, as active concrete I, is now subject to the laws of motivation, which Husserl divides into two areas. First, there are the motivations of reason, i.e. motivations of acts by acts, in the order of logic. Secondly, there are the motivations by association and habit. The latter is a genesis of earlier and later experiences which may be sedimentations or unreasonable acts imposed upon us. These may be distinct or hidden, even "unconscious." Under Husserl's theory of genetic constitution, consciousness is a unity of motivations. The subject is active in the world. The ego does not merely passively apperceive meaning, but generates meaning through convictions derived from temporal experience. Understanding becomes a succession of convictions formulated and replaced by new experiences of the concrete ego. To this motivated ego we add the dialectic of Hegel.

Hegel describes the self-formative process of understanding as the formation of standards which are disintegrated in the dialectical process and replaced by new ones. For Hegel, society was not a composite of individuals, but rather the medium within which self-hood was shaped through the communication of one with another.
Through this dialectical process there is an identity which is sustained through reflection; this is knowledge as reconstructed negation.

In order to keep his materialist, historical context of human beings in society, Habermas devises a cognitive structure to accommodate the objective demands of critical theory. He grasps the rational, transcendental contribution of idealism, and the active generating of convictions or standards of phenomenology to mold a consciousness capable of objective self-reflection upon meaning originating from concrete social existence. Autonomy and responsibility are aligned with social existence through language. The transcendental structures of idealism become quasi-transcendental structures of language operant in the world.

(C) Hegel's Critique of Kant

Habermas must diffuse his quasi-transcendental framework with history to prevent it from becoming the scaffold of one more mode of domination, one more rhetoric of dogmatism. He detours the path to positivism, or pure methodology by rehabilitating self-reflection from the perspective of Hegel; i.e., Hegel's critique of Kant.

Hegel depicts Kantian epistemology as based upon three unacknowledged premises. First, Kant assumes a normative concept of science. By "presupposing that the statements of mathematics and contemporary physics (Newtonian) are valid
as reliable knowledge," these principles can be used to draw conclusions about the "organization of our cognitive faculty."\textsuperscript{21} Hegel's counter to this claim is that "one barren assurance is just as valid as another . . . the critique of knowledge must begin by abstaining from any prejudgment about what is to count as science."\textsuperscript{22} If varied manifestations of knowledge, or everyday life experiences in the world become our focus, then the standards that arise out of this process can be revealed as coming from the self-formative process of consciousness. Through reconstructing this process of self-formation all stages of the formation of standards can be shown as a disintegration of preceding premises and the making of new ones.

This brings us to the second presupposition of Kant, the assumption of a complete, fixed knowing subject. Hegel rebuts this claim with the concept of the genesis of the phenomenological experience. Perspectives are thus produced in a continually renewed process of reflection.

The last presupposition of Kant is that of the distinction between theoretical reason, the ego as the unity of self-consciousness and practical reason, the ego as free will. Hegel asserts the reversal of consciousness against this claim. We learn from negative experiences: the "dissolutions of identifications, the breaking of fixations, the destruction of projections."\textsuperscript{23} Determinate negation of a state of consciousness is not an empty
nothingness but is the nothingness from which it resulted, a result containing that which was true in the previous instance of knowledge. Hence, "a form of life that has become an abstraction cannot be negated without leaving a trace, or overthrown without practical consequences."24

D) Hegel's Concept of Dialectical Self-Formation

The successive relation between states of consciousness of a system brought about through determinate negation is not a logical or a causal relation, but a self-formative process. Knowledge is a genesis of levels of reflections which sustain an identity of mind through the negated identifications of consciousness. As dialectical, identity has within itself the distinction between theoretical and practical reason and cannot be defined in relation to this distinction in reason.

By drawing upon the conception of knowledge as self-formative, as a generating process of reconstructing identifications, Habermas can situate the emancipatory interest in the process of self-reflection. Self-reflection serves to break fixations, shatter distortions while simultaneously preserving an identifiable meaning.

This self-formative process is not the activity of an isolated ego, but rather a social process. Hegel "does not conceive society as a product of contact between already existent individuals, but more fundamentally as a medium within which self-hood is shaped and therefore as the
condition of possibility of the individuals who constitute it.25 Hegel's "Geist," or Spirit, is the medium within which an "I" communicates with another "I," and from which, as an absolute mediation, the two form each other into subjects.

"Geist" has three patterns of mediation; moral relationships, language, and labor. The mediation of the moral relationship is a dialectical process of alienation and reconciliation. Through this process, power and false objectification enable the institution of an objective world. Thus structures of domination are realizable as institutions. This first mode of mediation is an intersubjective relation between individuals-in-difference. Next, labor and language each involve the dialectic of externalization and appropriation which results in an objectivating mediation. What is external and appropriated by labor is the material world, and for language it is the symbolic world.

Habermas identifies the activity of "Geist" in the objective act of labor as technical control, of language as communication, and of moral interaction as emancipation.26 The development of the human species is centered on one of these three acts for Hegel, Marx and Habermas. Hegel collapses language and labor into moral interaction, Marx collapses language and moral interaction into labor, and
Habermas argues that development of society occurs in the medium of symbolically mediated interaction, or linguistic communication.

Recall that Habermas has set before us a critical philosophy which was described as an empirical philosophy of history with practical intent. He wants a theory of knowledge, of truth that is at once empirical, i.e., refers to the natural world of human existence, and reflective, i.e., allows the subject to transcend immediate reality and distinguish oneself from it. The "objectivating" medium of labor and language provides the technical and practical aspects of the empirical world, while the critical medium of reflection on power provides the emancipatory aspect of transcendental philosophy.

Emancipation for Habermas is freedom from the hypostasized constraints of distorted communication. It is Hegel's dialectic of power and alienation which provides the possibility of critical insight into the false objectivity, or legitimacy of institutional and internal subjective forces. The role of self-reflection is to disclose and negate unconsciously motivated compulsive behavior and the limits of perceptions which tend to work as pseudo a priori assumptions, or ideology.

Hegel's rational reconstruction in the self-formative process of determinate negations is applied to social evolution and the structure of distorted, or objectively
false communication. "It has its basis in the logic of undistorted language communication," in the truths that are retained in the succession of negations and formations.

This method of dialectically connecting theory and practice, knowledge and interest divides the emancipatory interest of critical reflection into one, rational reconstruction and two, critical self-reflection. Critical self-reflection differs from rational reconstruction in one, that it reveals false objectivity; paranoia, phobias, not the "objective data" that are conscious creations of the subject from the beginning. Two, it is criticism of something particular; a parental figure, and not an anonymous system of rules; a corporate rank and file system. Three, critical self-reflection reveals unconscious elements to consciousness in a manner that has practical implications, i.e., one can alter habits of action once one has become conscious of the habit; one has a rational choice of action.

Reconstruction shows know-how, the intuitive knowledge we acquire when we possess rule-competence without involving practical consequences. This aspect of reconstruction zeroes directly in on the critique of ideology to which Habermas targets his entire social theory. It is the criticism of concepts of legitimated systems of thought, of individualism, utilitarianism, consumerism, of scientism. We can know the distortions of ideology and reconstruct
their meaning through a process of rational negation and elimination of distorting forces to reveal the truths within these concepts.

E) Habermas's Relocation of Emancipation: From Causal Relations to Motivated Consciousness

By combining self-reflection, which frees the subject from particular unconscious distortions, with rational reconstruction, which frees universalizable concepts from distortion and reconstructs their meaning, Habermas can weld the empirical and theoretical in consciousness through the emancipatory interest. Emancipation need no longer be dependent upon "social processes, the material production and appropriation of products."29 Emancipation can be an act of motivated rational consciousness. The paralysis of the proletariat can be invigorated by critical reflection on symbolic structures in language and institutions.

Habermas makes the distinction between Marx's material conception of synthesis and that of symbolic synthesis in reflection and language in order to identify the technological trap awaiting Marx. General social knowledge that is a force of production implies that the "knowledge that makes possible the control of natural processes turns into knowledge that makes possible the control of the social life process."30 Productive knowledge determines reflective knowledge. Knowledge directing social processes is analogous to natural science as the power of technical
control, and fosters the actualization of technology as an autonomous entity permeating social reality. Habermas tunnels out of this "nature-like" process of social activity through linguistic interaction, and arrives at rational activity.

Marx constituted knowledge at the level of production. This entailed social practice that included work and interaction, labor and language. "The processes of natural history are mediated by the productive activity of individuals and the organization of their interrelations." These relations are regulated by norms and legitimated by institutions, which determine the allocation of rewards, duties, obligations and responsibilities among social members. Institutions distribute the social surplus created by labor. The medium in which these social relations are normatively regulated is cultural tradition, which in turn creates a class structure. Tradition also "forms the linguistic communication structure on the basis of which subjects interpret both nature and themselves in their environment."

Habermas uses this framework of institutions and communicative action to work out his theory of interests. From the Marxist viewpoint, material activity, or labor, directs the way in which natural history moves. The processes of natural history are mediated by individual productive activity and how their interrelations are
organized. Human existence depends upon instrumental action (labor) to constrain external nature through the technical control over nature in the forces of production. "Communicative action (language) stands in correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature."³⁴ It is the institutional matrix which commands the extent of repression by "the unreflected 'natural' force of social dependence and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition."³⁵

A society's emancipation from the external forces of nature (i.e., having a consistent food supply, secure dwellings, geographical mobility) is determined by the labor processes, or the production of technological knowledge. "Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature" (individual desires, emotional needs, wants) is secured when institutions based on force are replaced by democratic institutions whereby the "organization of social relations . . . is bound only to communication free from domination."³⁶

Habermas, like Marx, sees internal human nature squelched by the institutions rising from the past. The realization and fulfillment of changing human needs and wants is relegated to traditional norms that become sedimented and unresponsive to the dialectical self-formative process. Marx brandishes the emancipatory sword at the beast of domination not only in productive
activity, or class conflict, but also in the critical activity of the relations of production, or realm of class consciousness.

Marx equates the consciousness of a society to the level of technically available knowledge. For Marx, the foremost activity of human being is labor, or productive activity that realizes human needs and wants through the engagement in nature for other human beings. Thus for Marx, the self-formative process is the labor process, the Hegelian dialectic materialized.

Habermas objects to this collapse of moral activity and also language into labor (labor determines both) because "as far as the identity of a society takes form via the level of scientific-technical progress, it is the self-consciousness of 'the' social subject," the mass identity with instrumental consciousness.

"The" social subject is not an augmentation of the subject generated in the scientific-technical sphere of knowledge. For Habermas, the "self-generative act" of Marx involved in the material working-up of nature is distinct from but accompanied by "a self-formative process mediated by the interaction of class subjects either under compulsory integration or open rivalry."

That is, compulsory integration by institutions carry the weight of binding tradition. This is Habermas's distinction between a material conception of synthesis of meaning and a symbolic
synthesis of meaning in language and institutions. The self-generation of the subject and the self-formation of the social subject are interdependent, but do not converge.\(^{38}\)

In Marxist theory, self-formation is coincidental with productive activity, critical reflection coincides with production, and is dependent upon technology for emancipation from ideological constraints on social relations. Humanity free from external natural constraints is humanity free from institutional constraints on internal nature. In this framing of reality, repression is doomed to repeat itself through the overcoming of fetters to production in class revolution. Class consciousness implements a new stage of technical knowledge which requires a redistribution of social surplus and the use, then, again, of repressive institutions working between classes in society.

"As long as the constraint of external nature persists in the form of economic scarcity, every revolutionary class is induced, after its victory, to a new 'injustice,' namely the establishment of a new class rule. Therefore the dialectic of the moral life must repeat itself until the materialist spell that is cast upon the reproduction of social life, the Biblical curse of necessary labor, is broken technologically."\(^{39}\)

This determinism of repression impedes the movement of emancipation, and is replaced by a dialectic of the moral life not in labor, but in dialogue. Habermas makes a move from Marx to Hegel for the dialectic of self-formation in intersubjectivity as individual identities-in-difference.
We move from historical production to historical consciousness; from causality to motivation.

Repression becomes a matter of suppression and renewal in the dialogue situation that is "reconstructed as moral relation." Thru this reconstructive activity of dialogue, or "struggle for recognition," the "grammatical relations of communication" that were "once distorted by force, exert force themselves." The movement of the dialectic rids communication of the distorting force of false objectification and generates freedom from constraint in discourse. It is not "unconstrained intersubjectivity itself that we call dialectic, but the history of its repression and re-establishment." Dialogic distortion, or ideology, takes the form of "split-off symbols and reified grammatical relations . . . removed from public communication (and) prevail only behind the backs of subjects, and are thus also empirically coercive." For example, national security is addressed in the language of escalating militarism and a defense from communism, but not in terms of global American corporate hegemony.

F) Meta-Psychology as the Link Between Theory and Practice

The next step is to show how knowledge can "reconstruct underlying experiences of the history of the species" which in turn lead to "a new stage of self-reflection in the self-formative process of the species." Reconstruction is
the setting right of a "mutilated text of tradition" through the elimination of errors contained within the text. The meaning of the text may be mutilated by external conditions. It can be mutilated by limitations placed on conduits of transmission, be they memory or cultural tradition. Unintentional distortions or mutilations can only be comprehended after the meaning of the distortion itself has been analyzed. Psychoanalysis probes meaning structures in terms of the unintentional. But psychoanalysis does not aim at understanding symbolic structures (cultural objectifications), but at self-reflection.

Thus Habermas transposes Hegel's dialectic of transformation from Marx's material alteration to the process of psychoanalysis which occurs in concrete reality in the relation of patient to physician. He is in keeping with his goal of a philosophical theory with practical intent.

In psychoanalysis, the existence of distortions in both the subject's memory and institutions blocks the possibility of meaning being realized or comprehended. The reconstructive method of identifying distortions in the self can be applied to the larger context of culture because self-reflection is a core characteristic of the individual's participation in society where values for the human species
as a whole are generated. By starting from square one, the self-formative process of the individual, Habermas proceeds to build a case for the eventual application of distortion identification to cultural traditions, or ideology, particularly the instrumental rationality of technoscientism. He can only proceed in one manner, and that is through language, for it is within language that the Hegelian dialectic of identity-in-difference, or interaction of individuals becomes a concrete social phenomenon, or intersubjectivity-in-the-world. Thus, consciousness as individual self-formation (consciousness as a unity of motivations) is species consciousness formation. And it is in language that theoretical reason and practical reason are one; reason is a will to reason, critique as the passion for critique. Reason as such is active in the quasi-transcendental structure of the language situation which nurtures the emancipatory interest of humanity.

The methodological move from self-reflection to species-reflection is made through metapsychology which arrives at a "meta"-intersubjectivity, or critical intersubjectivity.

Metapsychology incorporates "conceptual constructions, the assumptions about the functional structures of the psychic apparatus (id, ego, superego) and about mechanisms of both the genesis of symptoms and the dissolution of
pathological compulsions." This is the Freudian scheme of the ego's resistance to a perception and subsequent repression, or refusal to deal with something, which becomes a psychological distortion in the unconscious which can then only be identified thru the process of self-reflection, or the process of making conscious that which is obscure or unconscious, thus bringing about a reintegration of the ego in consciousness thru reconstructing and identifying meaning. This structural model replete with definitions becomes a "rigorous scientific formulation," and therefore a basis for knowledge.

Metapsychology is "a general interpretation of self-formative processes." As such a "metahermeneutics," metapsychology "unfolds the logic of interpretation in the analytic situation of dialogue." The use of reason, or logic, establishes the foundation for possible psychoanalytic knowledge. Metapsychology

"is on the same level as the methodology of the natural and cultural sciences. It, too reflects on the transcendental framework of analytic knowledge as an objective structure of organized processes of inquiry, which here include processes of self knowledge. However, in contrast to the logic of the natural and cultural sciences, methodology cannot exist detached from material content at the level of self-reflection. For here the structure of the cognitive situation is identical with the object of knowledge." This material content keeps metapsychology from taking the status of metatheoretical propositions and lapsing into a pure methodology of idealism or positivism.
The practical intent of metapsychology deals with the link between language and interaction; particularly "language deformation" and "behavioral psychology." With this in mind, ordinary language is confronted with two tasks. First, ordinary language accounts for the validity of symbols determined intersubjectively through dialogue. Second, socialization becomes comprehensible through language, or rather, the grammar of language games. In this way the structure of language defines both language and conduct. "Motives of action are also comprehended as linguistically interpreted needs." Motivations are illuminated in language. They are not impulses functioning behind subjectivity, but rather are "subjectively guiding, symbolically mediated, and reciprocally interrelated intensions." As with Husserl, consciousness is thus a unity of motivations.

This reference to impulses working behind subjectivity is Habermas's definition of authority. He is setting up a refutation of authority that runs counter to Gadamer's retrieval of authority and tradition, both perceived by Habermas as repressive structures.

Through metapsychology, motivations can be uncovered, displayed and dissected in order to ascertain truth. The "split-off symbols" and unconscious motives that distort everyday language games in habitual interactions, i.e., "compulsion, lies, and the inability to correspond
expectations that have been made socially obligatory" turn into a kind of "impulse potential." As instinct that is collective, self-preservation or suppressed drives is rooted in "meaning structures of the life world." These distorted motives operate as a mode of "natural" conditions subject to the causality of fate, not nature, "because it prevails through the symbolic means of the mind. Only for this reason can it be compelled by the power of reflection." Only because conscious motives have been distorted in symbolic communicative action (or linguistic spheres) as authority in traditions and institutions can they be attacked by self-reflection. Distorted meaning in the mind cannot be cured by material labor or technology (without giving over to instrumental reason). Only at the level of cognitive self-reflection can distorted or unconscious motives become conscious. This mutilated text of the individual can be reconstructed in the framework of metapsychology.

However, when we move to a mutilated public text, the framework of a reconstructive meta-sociology is not readily available, but is necessary to shatter authority. The task is not the reconstruction of an individual life history, but a collective history. An individual participating intersubjectively can give meaning to a symbol "through rules resulting from contingent circumstances of the individual's life history." But this is not to say that
the individual perceives the symbol "according to intersubjectively recognized rules." Thus the rules which guide an individual to the meaning of a symbol may differ from another individual with a different life history. Concealed meaning and distorted public interaction cannot be ascertained by the individual or others.

Habermas uses internal intersubjectivity, the dialogue of a person with him/herself, to demonstrate his point. Distorted meanings "can only become understandable at the level of an intersubjectivity that must be created between the subject as ego and the subject as id," i.e., through self-reflection. The identification of false meanings, or split-off symbols resulting from this internal dialogue is the reconstructive work of self-reflection. This analysis of the unconscious ferrets out the connection between critique as knowledge and critique as transformation. Self-reflection explains the origin and eliminates the causality of fate, of the "natural" perpetuation of repressed intentions. Thus, "depth-hermeneutic understanding takes over the function of explanation." Its explanatory power comes from self-reflection "in which an objectivation that is both understood and explained is also overcome." This is the Hegelian critical accomplishment of comprehending.

Self-reflection is emancipatory. The goal now is to take the blueprint of individual self-reflection and derive
a structure for social emancipation. The architecture of this ambition of Habermas is the ideal speech situation. The key to this conversion of individual emancipation to social emancipation is dialogue. The internal intersubjective dialogue of reconstruction through self-reflection pivots to an external intersubjective dialogue of reconstruction through self-reflection. But the methodology or the rules for reconstruction must have an external intersubjective validity. The rules must apply to society as a whole, not an individual with a particular life history, in order to ensure that the reconstructed meaning is comprehensible by social participants. As the method which identifies distortion, and provides for the rational self-reflective emancipation of society, we have arrived at the ideal speech situation as a critical intersubjectivity. The guidelines of metapsychology have been replaced by quasi-transcendental standards, or rules of reconstructing socially situated meaning, i.e., truth, truthfulness, rightness, and comprehensibility.

Critique becomes practical due to the inherent connection between the empirical structure (norms, traditions, institutions) which it pierces and the intentional structure that it reconstructs and makes understood by way of grammatical rules. The generative connection between language and norms and values allows the same kind of dialogue we saw in psychoanalysis to occur at
the level of communication and institutions in society. Individual distorted meanings are now analogous to ideological distortion. As one giant patient, society is held hostage by distortions on the scale of Lilliputian tethers, needing only to carry out a reflective dialogue within itself to shirk its restraints and realize its freedom. The means to perform this feat is "an organization of social relations according to the principle that the validity of social relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination." This organization is the ideal speech situation.

Self-reflection as an interest in knowledge becomes an emancipation from the previously distorted objectification which was not identified by the subject. Self-reflection as dialogue posits the individual as acting in a concrete reality. These materialist presuppositions, of language and labor as creating objectifications in the material world (Hegel), change the relation of reason and interest. The proposition that "interest inheres in reason" found in idealism is altered to the claim of reason inhering in interest, found in the self-constitutive human species in contingent natural conditions.

Habermas has filled out his shift from the causal mode of emancipation to the motivated mode of emancipation with
an inherently rational structure tied to the world through interest, specifically the linguistic interest which garners emancipation through self-reflective dialogue. The dialectical dissolution of previously held convictions through negative reconstruction benefits and combines knowledge and interest, theory and practice. The dialectic uncovers and retains a consistent truth in a concept which establishes identifiable knowledge. And with this knowledge, it frees consciousness from distortion or incompatibilities, and renders the subject liberated from repressive structures and hence capable of autonomous and responsible action.

G) Summary of Habermas's Critical Theory

This brings us full circle to the original intent of Habermas to locate emancipation in consciousness, in cognitive structures, and not the traditional Marxist structures of class conflict and technology. The quasi-transcendental arena for undistorted communication is the "shared form of life in which we have come to an understanding with one another which need no longer be revoked." The ideals of truth, truthfulness, rightness, and comprehensibility guard against the deceptions and repressions brought to language by authority and tradition, the ogres of history. Rational reconstruction (self-reflection) dispels ideology from institutions and
welcomes rehabilitated democratic institutions in which the original meanings of concepts can flourish.

The anticipation of "the realization of the good life" in and through the ideal speech situation is itself tied to tradition, the topic of Habermas's scathing scrutiny. As a shared form of life, ideal speech assumes shared meanings and shared beliefs. These beliefs find their source in the "Enlightenment ideals of rationality (truth as unconstrained consensus), justice (the effective equality of chances to assume dialogue roles), and freedom (responsible, authentic autonomy). (T)he historical origins and ideal character of those beliefs" contextualizes them and "undercuts Habermas's argument for their transcendental necessity." Could this criticism be seen not only as an oversight by Habermas but as a favorable attitude toward tradition as containing elements of freedom? Or any other prejudice from which we see the future?
CHAPTER 4
GADAMER'S RETRIEVAL OF AUTHORITY AND TRADITION

Indeed, we hear vestiges of the voice of Gadamer tampering with Habermas's attempt to formulate a philosophy of history at once ideal and material. This leads us to the next section of this paper in which we will further develop the hermeneutic approach to intersubjectivity as it is clarified against the Enlightenment's insistence upon objective meaning in intersubjectivity. We will begin with a recapitulation of Gadamer's hermeneutic project followed by his rebuttal of dogmatic reflection. This will tie us into Ricoeur's analysis of the interconnectedness of ideology and utopia in the cultural imagination and the subsequent replacement of the use of quasi-transcendental rules with active hope.

Habermas's theory of rational reconstruction is at odds with Gadamer's hermeneutic assessment of reflection and authority in tradition. Gadamer does not square off authority against reason, as implied by Habermas's depiction of tradition and authority as an unreasoned, nature-like process of ruthless repression. This link between authority and reason is essential for the understanding of Gadamer's description of hermeneutics as a universal experience. For
Gadamer, all experience is an interpretation, a fusing of horizons of prejudice. Which means to say that we are what we have experienced and that is what we bring to every possible experience. We are thus "prejudiced" simply because we are beings in history where we encounter otherness. We are beings who have diverse experiences to be expressed, never fully, but proximally, hopefully, in language. It is the authority of our prejudices which gives us an orientation to the world, and a motivation for action, be we war veterans, lovers, mothers, senators, friends or mariners. We speak to the future through our traditions, and through the risking of these traditions in language, or intersubjective dialogue.

Language, then, is "the game of interpretation that we all are engaged in every day." Everyone participates as equals. There are none that are endowed with superior knowledge or hold a position of objectivity separate from the historical process. Rather, all are playing the game of interpreting, of understanding, "especially when we see through prejudices or tear away the pretenses that hide reality." Understanding as "seeing through" something odd or unintelligible is understanding that "solves" a difficulty.

Gadamer questions Habermas: "Does this mean that we 'understand' only when we see through pretexts or unmask false pretensions?" Is this the true "power" of
reflection? To see through ideology's Oz? Gadamer claims that as such a power, reflection is required to "shake the dogmatism of life-praxis." Gadamer identifies this as a prejudice against authority, because "reflection is not always and unavoidably a step towards dissolving prior convictions. Authority is not always wrong." He accuses Habermas of sinking into the prejudice of the Enlightenment that sees making the structures of prejudice transparent as possibly leading to an acknowledgement of authority.

Gadamer is quick to concede the innumerable forms of domination stemming from the dogmatic power of authority. He cites examples from education, to the military and government to political entities and fanatics. He asserts that the outward appearance of obedience to authority cannot indicate why or even if that authority is legitimate. One cannot tell if "the context is true order or the veiled disorder that is created by the arbitrary exercise of power." For Gadamer, acceptance or acknowledgement is the key to relationships of authority. And further, what is the foundation of this acknowledgement? Granted, acceptance can express "a yielding of the powerless to the one holding power rather than true acceptance," but this is not true obedience, because it is not founded upon authority but rather on force. The rise or decline of authority in history shows how it is identified and fostered. "It lives not from dogmatic power but from dogmatic acceptance."
Dogmatic acceptance hinges on the concession to a superior knowledge and insight of the authority, "and for this reason one believes that authority is right." This concession, this belief, is the fulcrum of acceptance or non-acceptance. "Authority can rule only because it is freely recognized and accepted. The obedience that belongs to true authority is neither blind nor slavish." Thus, we can see Habermas's own appeal to authority in his instatement of the quasi-transcendental standards as intersubjectively recognized rules.

A) Gadamer's Concept of Finite Effective Reflection Counter to the Concept of Reflection in Idealist Thought

Turning to the theme of reflection, Gadamer questions whether reflection indeed "always dissolves substantial relationships or is capable of taking them up into consciousness." We have dissolution on the one hand and preservation or acceptance on the other. This is a counter-claim to Habermas's claim that only tradition is fallow ground for the acceptance of authority or prejudices. Gadamer insists that authority can only be rooted in insight as a hermeneutical process. Tradition alone is not a validation of something, not where validity is demanded by reflection. Regarding validity,

"Where does reflection demand it? Everywhere? I would object to such an answer on the grounds of the finitude of human existence and the essential particularity of reflection. The real question is whether one sees the function of reflection as bringing something to awareness in
order to confront what is in fact accepted with other possibilities—so that one can either throw it out or reject the other possibilities and accept what the tradition de facto is presenting—or whether bringing something to awareness always dissolves what one has previously accepted."73

The concept of reflection used by Habermas is, for Gadamer, "a misinterpretation of reflection."74 There is an inherent false objectification in this idealist conception of reflection. The overcoming of this objectification is demonstrated in Husserl's theory of intentionality—which we have seen focuses upon the object's many and diverse intentionalities for meaning—and also in Heidegger's concept of Being and There-being as an opening or clearing in Being which undermines the subject-object demarcation in idealism. Gadamer claims "there is most certainly an inner reversal of intentionality in reflection, which in no way raises the thing meant to a thematic object."75 Hence, there is a distinction between "effective reflection," in which the unfolding of language occurs, and "expressive and thematic reflection" which makes everything an object and sets up the requirements for science.

In order to break through Habermas's scientific requirement of truth standards for the realization of meaning in intersubjective dialogue, we must probe into this distinction in reflection made apparent by Gadamer. It is in Gadamer's finitude of the word that there is allowed a space for meaning to arise in intersubjectivity through the
dialectic of hermeneutics without recourse to thematic objectification.

Recall that for Gadamer, understanding presupposes a deep common accord that situates persons always already in relation to each other in their being-in-the-world, which is disclosed thru language. What is brought into the open, into the clearing in being through language, is the being of the object or person that is disclosed by the word.\textsuperscript{76} The truth of objects is not evident in the individual word, but rather through speech, through the linguistic event. It is the linguistic event of understanding that rebuffs the method of idealism in which the subject tabulates the meaning of objects as thematic judgments.

In this view of linguistic historical understanding, meaning is not a reproduction of judgment. Knowledge is not reconstructed meaning from a previously dissolved judgment in logical categories. Rather, productive historical understanding is involved in the process, the event of concept formation because it recognizes the inherent "imperfection of the human mind" that constitutes the finitude distinct from the omniscience of the divine.\textsuperscript{77}

Gadamer shows three indications of this limit and potential of human knowledge by characterizing the human word, the finite word. First, "the human word is potential before it is actualized."\textsuperscript{78} This depicts the process of thought formation where what is not yet formed is at the
same time capable of being formed, as potential. The word is an expression of the object which seeks expression, and the word is only formed through the process of thought that has limit because it also has the potential for expressing something new, something beyond or outside of the limit of thought.

Second, "no human word can perfectly express our mind." This is not due to a deficiency of the word, but rather of the mind. The word is capable of reproducing "completely what the mind is thinking." The mind "never possesses complete self-presence," because it is continually thinking disparate things. As opposed to the Unity of the Divine Word, the human word in many words. Imperfect presence is the mind not knowing what it knows, because it is "not perfectly present to itself in what it knows."80

Third, in not knowing, the human mind cannot deliver a complete expression of our nature and substance in actuality, as with the Divine. Thoughts we think as well as words are mere accidents. "The word of human thought is directed towards the object, but it cannot contain it as a whole within itself."81 New conceptions are then intrinsic to thought that cannot be fully realized in any particular one conception. Gadamer identifies the positive aspect of this negative quality as the "infinity of the mind" that continually surpasses itself in unprecedented mental processes and realizes the freedom for new conceptions.
The orientation of thought towards the object, which is continually being explored and given expression of meaning in words, is not a reflective act. What a person says or thinks refers to the thing or object that he/she thinks. "His mind is not directed back towards his own thinking when he forms the word."82 The word is a product of the mind thinking a thought through. The word remains in the mental sphere, and thus gives the impression that the mind has an attitude towards itself and that "speaking to oneself is a reflexive thing."83 Gadamer denies this latter claim and states that it is this structure of thought that enables it to "direct itself reflectively towards itself and can thus become an object to itself."84 This "inwardness of the word" allows this false impression to describe thought as a movement from thinking to speaking to oneself. The appearance is created that the formation of the word arises from the movement of the mind towards itself."85 But this is only an appearance because what is expressed is not the mind, but the object. The word is not an adequation of mind with reality, but rather a "similitudo rei," a similar reality, distinct from the object. The unity of the word and object is so proximal that it is here that "knowledge is completed."86

"The unity of the word that is revealed in the multiplicity of words manifests something that is not covered by the structure of logic and brings out the
eventual character of language: the process of concept formation." Thus Gadamer discards the idealist thematicizing approach to understanding and vouches for the dynamics of limit and potentiality in language. Language embodies the multiplicity of human words which reveal what is said as well as harboring as possibility that which is unsaid. In this finitude of word pulses an infinity of meaning.

The task of expressing the "similitudo rei" of the word is the task of metaphor in linguistic consciousness. Without becoming ensnared in the inductive process of universal subsumption of word meanings (one word meaning corresponding to an object), metaphor is the immanent recognition of similarities in dissimilar objects as the transferral of meaning from one thing to another. As such a transferral, meaning hovers in the gap between objects, between words. This dialectic between objects is the dialectical expansion of horizons of meaning, or of concepts in the act of linguistic understanding through metaphor. Metaphor attempts to bridge the gap between word and object.

The difference between this active formulation of concepts and the logical application of universal concepts to objects is the use of language. For the former, productive understanding is language, a language turned outward in a dialectical relationship with the object. In the latter, understanding is reproductive meaning
demonstrated over and over again in language. Here language is reduced to a grammatical instrument, a system of signs. Language is used to designate the meaning of objects through the use of terms that correspond the mind to the object. Here then, the "original connection between speaking and thinking . . . is changed into an instrumental relationship."88 Science has succeeded in immobilizing language by subjugating the object to the "technical term," which ossifies meaning as a consistent theme, and so makes this "terminological use of a word an act of violence against language."89

In the sense of linguistic understanding that we have come to know, this infers a violence against understanding. The correspondence theory of knowledge obliterates the tension that exists between word and object, limit and potential in effective-historical understanding. This tension is the font of new meaning and potential for understanding; it is the recognition of the human mind's finitude.

What is at stake here is not just a theory of language, but the method of science that determines objective knowledge in an attitude of unification, not limitation. Science in this regard assumes an air of omnipotence that runs counter to the very search for objective knowledge, which indicates that science is an incomplete and therefore limited body of knowledge. The rule of science will be
complete with the elimination of the question, of the testing of our finitude in the world.

Having language, and hence "having the world" issues not from the application of fixated concepts as in scientific-instrumental rationality, but from the writhing, twisting movement of the freedom of language engaging in our own finite existence. It is the event of tradition working in the present to expand the limit of one's horizon through the dialectic of question and possible answer.

This mode of hermeneutic "effective-reflection" which does not necessarily "dissolve previous convictions," brings something to consciousness and approximates meaning through metaphor. This "similarity" that recognizes the difference between word and object keeps open the avenue of meaning at limbo in the gap of possibility. Metaphor completes the gap by attempting to capture meaning and make it into objectifiable knowledge. This illusion of certain knowledge is the snag which allows knowledge to be unravelled and exposed as ideology and also revealed as utopia, as certain meaning coexistent with possible meaning.

B) Distortion as Necessary to Reflection and Language

The point is, however, that distortion and deception are inherent to language and to reflection, regardless of the position taken by the theorist; be they idealist, critical, or hermeneutic. It must be contingent and illusory because of the finitude of human being always in
flux. What bridges this finitude to certainty is belief. Belief that there is a meaning of the word in relation to the object, to the other; belief that these many "certain" meanings can be called knowledge; belief that this knowledge carries a certain authority, and that this authority is valid, and hence acceptable and as such, an orientation to action in the world, specifically intersubjective activity.

For Gadamer, authority rests in the relation of finite human being to the Divine; for Habermas, it exists in reason and science as universal bodies of truth. We have seen Habermas's retrieval of the ideals of the Enlightenment in his theory of rational reconstruction. Within this theory Habermas can do three distinct but interconnected things. One, he can rehabilitate the rule of reason thru the emphasis on self-reflection while keeping reason in a material context by being realized in language. Two, he can liberate humanity from the net of the techno-scientific complex, and remain in keeping with the emancipatory goals of Marxism by relegating instrumental reason to its proper category of knowledge constitutive interests. And three, he can establish claims to universal human interests and their corresponding ideals which become ever more apparent through the removal of distorting structures of symbolization, or authority.

The first two points were criticized through Gadamer's refutation of idealist reflection as objectifying and
thematic, which close off the possibility of new meaning, and hence new claims to truth.

The third point will be taken up by referring to the work of Paul Ricoeur on ideology and utopia as necessary features of a living society.
Let us examine the third point from the joint footing of ideology and utopia "as deviant attitudes toward social reality." This is a "criterion of non-congruence," or disparity which assumes "that individuals as well as collective entities may be related to social reality not only in a mode of a participation without distance (congruence), but also in a mode of non-congruence which may assume various forms." This two-sided assumption is the work of a social or cultural imagination which operates in either constructive or destructive tones. It is possible that there is a complementarity to ideology and utopia, that is, that the constructive side of one may enhance the distortive, or deconstructive side of the other, and vice-versa. Thus, the distortions of ideology may complement the aura of possibility in utopia, and the coherent, socially adhesive aspect of ideology may complement utopia as a subversive force in society.

In order to develop the point-counterpoint of ideology and utopia, we shall follow Ricoeur's positing of the dialectic between ideology and utopia as the dynamic of the cultural imagination.
A) Ideology as Conservative and Integrative

Ideology is generally understood as a pejorative concept, as concealment and distortion, as illustrated by Marx in the German Ideology. Ricoeur selects this approach because it is a concept that is related to persons in real material conditions, and also because it is the mark of a new anthropology which concentrates upon reality as praxis, i.e., "the activity of human individuals submitted to circumstances which are felt as compulsory and seen as powers foreign to their will." This overturns the Hegelian anthropology of consciousness and the idea of species-being as the base of social reality.

In this respect ideology is "a sphere of representations, ideas, conceptions" in opposition to the "sphere of actual production." It is the discrepancy between the imaginary and the real; appearance and actuality. Assuredly, this demonstrates a gap between the "unactual representations in general (religious, political, juridical, ethical, aesthetical, etc.) and the actuality of the life-process." However, in Marxist theory, and we can call upon Habermas for this, this gap cripples human action and subjects it to a vicious circle of class conflict dependent upon technology for abatement.

Ricoeur quotes Marx as declaring that "each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled merely in order to carry through its aim, to
represent its interests as the common interest of every member of society." Here Ricoeur identifies the relation of interest to its ideal expression as one not in the context of causation, but rather of motivation. This introduces legitimation as the prime concern of social activity. There needs to be a process of justification in order "to represent a particular interest as general, as the only rational, universally valid one." But Marx's shift from Hegelian reason working in ideas as transformative to material interest "expressed" in ideas is unsatisfactory for Ricoeur on two counts. One, "it presupposes that the notions of rationality and universal validity make sense by themselves, before being captured by interest." And two, this "capture" claims that domination cannot succeed without successful arguments staged to uphold claims to legitimation by the ruling class.

In order to substantiate and probe his objections to Marx's obscure use of interest as validation for legitimation, Ricoeur turns to Max Weber's work on the problem of domination. In reference to the political power upheld by the state, Weber asserts that "it is an induction from experience that no system of authority voluntarily limits itself to the appeal to material or effectual or ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. In addition every system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 'legitimacy'."
Now the ground has been prepared for speaking of legitimacy in terms of human action as having motives that are backed by an enculturated belief. "The belief in the existence of a legitimate order relies on this assumption. The problem of validity cannot be raised in other terms than those of the motivation of meaningful action."

Thus we can flashback to Gadamer's claim that authority rests on its acceptance which is founded on belief. Now we see that the contingency of finite being and meaning in hermeneutic understanding, to which belief is integral, takes on a certain form in the organized functioning of the social realm. Recall that with Habermas this form was identified by the quasi-transcendental rules of the ideal speech situation. But historical hermeneutical understanding rejects such exclusion of other possible forms of life by dogmatic authority. Thus there needs to be a mode of social theory compatible with the dynamics of a hermeneutics of ontology. Ricoeur provides such a mode in the polemic of ideology and utopia which serves to register the meaningful content of the beliefs which orient intersubjective activity.

For Ricoeur, there is a breach between a claim to legitimacy and a belief in legitimacy, or "the claim raised by authority and a belief conceded by individuals." This is the field for the cultivation of beliefs referred to by Weber. This gap, or rather, authority's "unavoidable excess
of claim over against belief," is filled by ideology. Because ideology is intended to reinforce belief so that it alleviates the demand for legitimacy, this "credibility gap" is the well of distortion and deviation between claim and belief. The process which for Marx gives "ideas the form of universality, and presenting them as the only rational, universally valid ones," gains coherence for Ricoeur as the distortion that is required by the claim of authority to legitimacy to fill the credibility gap.

Keep in mind that we are working in a realm not of determinate causality as in class conflict and the inevitable fall of capitalism. We are working in a realm of action determined by a rationally motivated individual in history. As equal partners in social activity, the meaning of any one person's beliefs is as valid as any other's. Each has equal authority in their prejudices. It is when it comes to having a shared belief that there become discrepancies in meaning and authority simply because of the discrepancies in individual experiences, and hence prejudices. In order to accept one belief instead of another, and so share a belief (for the shared beliefs of a society insure the stability and cohesion of institutions which provide for social needs), the authority of this shared belief must be validated in its now unequal status as a social belief rising out of intersubjective activity. This takes us right back to Gadamer's concept of play. It
is in the play of intersubjective dialogue that we allow a meaning, a belief, to "make a claim over one."

Because being is not a static process, but a continual becoming, any claim of meaning is vulnerable to change in the freedom of individuals' activity. But the organism of society is such that it demands a continuity in the form of institutions. Thus, the claim of meaning that was once free and equal becomes instituted in society as authority amidst equal partners. The continuity of this authority depends upon its acceptance by society. Now we can discern a change in character of meaning that makes a claim, or authority, and meaning still operating as possibility. The first is static in its position of continuity in institutions, and the second is dynamic as potential meaning for being that is a becoming.

Meaning that makes a claim needs reinforcement to maintain itself as a shared meaning amongst contending individual meanings. It is always subject to the violence of the historical process of change. Thus authority has a demand for legitimacy and the concession of individuals who share a belief in the meaning of this authority that has claimed them, claimed them through their own rational intersubjective activity. This is where ideology steps in to fill the "credibility gap" of the excess of the claim over against the belief. Ideology functions as a distorting steroid which sustains authority through history.
Ricoeur layers the concept of ideology working from a symbolic base. Beneath the level of distortion we discover systems of legitimation that meet the claim to legitimacy demanded by a system of authority (filling the credibility gap between belief and authority). And beneath this level we find yet another system of symbolization which constitutes action itself. This torte of ideology is a means to pattern, integrate, and consolidate an order of action. It provides stability in society, whether a ruling class, system of authority or stable community. Ideology is the cohesion for human order that is susceptible to splintering by the forces of nature or history, or internal or external disruptions. "All the pathology of ideology proceeds from this 'conservative' role of ideology."¹⁰²

B) Utopia as Otherness and Possibility

The lurking possibility of disruption to a given order is an alternative order to this given order. This is the function of utopia, to present the voice of subversion to ideology. "The utopian mode is to the existence of society what invention is to scientific knowledge."¹⁰³ It excels in imagination. Utopia is the language of "another" - another society, another reality, another world. Inventive imagination shuns integrative functions for a world of "otherness." This "search for 'otherness' has no thematic unity, but instead implies the most diverse and opposed claims. Another family, another sexuality, may mean
monasticism or sexual community. Another way of consuming may mean asceticism or sumptuous consumption."

Ricoeur uses the same method of explicating utopia as he did with ideology by regressing to the idea of utopia as "nowhere." Coined by Thomas More as a literary term for a place with no place, utopia has retained its meaning as a ghost place in the imagination. This holds a significant function for society. As an open possibility, utopia provides a porthole for looking in on our reality. Through the glass of utopia, we are separated from our accustomed ways of living, and they are not so familiar anymore, for nothing is taken for granted, because now there is this possibility beyond actuality, "a field for alternative ways of living." Utopia is the contestation of what is. It counters the integrative function of ideology as utopia itself appears as social subversion.

Utopia interrogates given systems of authority. Ideology reinforces authority by providing legitimation structures for it. This credibility gap is pried open by utopias that indicate "alternative ways of using power, whether in family, political, economic or religious life; in that they call established systems of power into question."106

This apparent opposition between the stabilizing role of ideology and the subversive power of utopia can be seen as corresponding pathologies in the legitimation or
contestation of a system of power. The positive aspects of both can be seen as ideology as conservation and utopia as a schema of perfection.

This latter view of utopia may appear as eccentric or erratic, as a decentering device. But "what decenters ourselves is also what brings us back to ourselves." Such is the paradox of utopian imagination. "On the one hand there is no movement towards full humanity which does not go beyond the given; on the other hand, elsewhere leads back to here and now."\textsuperscript{107}

C) The Dynamic Dialectic of Ideology and Utopia as Distortion

But the "interplay of ideology and utopia" cannot function without each other. The need for ideology to mediate social ties, to reinforce belief; identifies "a gap, a distance and consequently something potentially eccentric," a potential utopia. This interplay is a process of dynamic imagination, not a state of being. This dynamic necessitates the distortions and pathologies of ideology and utopia. This creative dynamic of the imagination can only be ascertained through a relation to the figures of false consciousness; ideology and utopia. "It is as though we have to call upon the 'healthy' function of ideology to cure the madness of utopia and as though the critique of ideologies can only be carried out by a conscience capable of regarding itself from the point of view of 'nowhere.'"\textsuperscript{108}
We have taken a route through Ricoeur for a view of hermeneutics at work in history through ideology and utopia. We have countered the last point of Habermas's objection of hermeneutics, i.e., its failure to remove or critique distorting structures of symbolization, or tradition and authority which would secure the values of human freedom and autonomy.

Ricoeur, through the hermeneutic method retains, through ideology, the structures of symbolization that orient action in the world while providing a critical view of these structures of authority through utopia. The social participant remains historical without recourse to quasi-transcendentals which secure meaning and limit the imagination. There is no getting rid of distortion, because distortion is necessary for the cohesion as well as transformation of society. This dialectic is active and its reconciliation temporary and utopian, yearning for an "otherness" and a coming back to being in the present, to which we might apply this "otherness" from our imagination. Thus, the goals of the ideal speech situation, of reaching autonomy and responsibility, as well as the boundaries themselves (truth, truthfulness, rightness and comprehensibility) need to be viewed as one possibility of utopia. This is one possibility to be worked out in the larger sphere of the hermeneutics of being.
This is not to trivialize the Habermasian project, for its intentions and implications speak to the heart of a concern for humanity in an age of diminishing potency of individual action in mass society.

However, the implications of a hermeneutic of being, or ontology, are not significant only for the "foundations of knowledge," but also as a shift away from the arrogance of the Enlightenment with which human beings have perceived their environment and themselves. My emphasis upon belief in regard to Gadamer's finitude of the word, and its telltale wag in Ricoeur's essay on the cultural imagination is a counter to the idealist certainty of reasoned knowledge, and Habermas's ideal speech situation. The debate may be visibly one concerning the significance of authority in tradition, but moreso it is one concerning authority in being, or the finitude of humans in relation to a larger totality.

Habermas imbibes in a tradition of perhaps not an ideal intersubjectivity, but an intersubjectivity that can claim its future from its position of superior critical knowledge, or dogmatism. Habermas does not give his theory over to the play, the risk, the tension of a sphere of possible meaning. If he did, he would risk losing his position of authority to other historical possibilities.
D) Hope as a Replacement for Rational Reconstruction

The hermeneutic game is one of a decentered subject, thrown into a plethora of "otherness," not just utopian, but the otherness of a text, a person, a beetle or a beach. But freedom is freedom in a context, active in the world. This freedom is garnered by both hope and belief; situated in the dialectic of decentered subjectivity. This is the milieu of the "category of hope, the category of contradiction," where reconciliation is looked for in spite of contingency.\textsuperscript{109} There is a demand for meaning that can be tested in the gap between what is and would be possible.

Bringing hope into play, so to speak, places freedom in a different perspective than that offered by Habermas. Freedom for Habermas is attained through cognitive reasoning, the emancipatory interest in self-reflection that is realized in language. "Reason is the will to reason." For Ricoeur, freedom shows itself in a doing, not a knowing. Freedom can only be constituted in the acts of freedom. It involves the originary action of belief. "I must believe that I am free. I can only begin from the belief that I can (one must believe that it can be). I am what I can do and can do what I am."\textsuperscript{110} As act, freedom attests to works, and in society, these works take the form of institutions. Thus ideology and utopia are at the core of the very constitution of social reality for they provide the possibility for systems of symbolization to create a
social reality as institutional and hence as a realization of human freedom.

It is in the dialectic of contradiction between what is and possibility, which we saw in metaphor, intersubjective dialogue, and the interplay of ideology and utopia, that hope is realized. The "in spite of" contingency or distortion is an active hope that works out possibilities from the imagination, not a set of ideals, i.e., proscribed systems of values and meaning. Hope is taken up with diversity and activity. This is not intersubjectivity with a semi-idealistic pilot hovering on the edge of history. This is an intersubjectivity grappling with finitude, continually testing prejudices and possibilities through experience. Hope becomes a substitute for rational reconstruction in that it recognizes distortion as part of the human condition and a plurality of meaning in spite of it.

Hope finds its counter in dejection, that state of being where one expects nothing from himself, others, or life. It dissolves the relationships with the world into an immobilization of life that has no resemblance to fear. Gabriel Marcel contrasts this immobility with the inner activity of hope as prophetic.

Marcel begins expounding on courageous hope by characterizing courage as facing something. In this instance, courage is a matter of denial, or treating something as nonexistent and of no value. "The soldier who
defies death behaves as though death were of no account. Marcel is careful to note that courage does not mean deluding oneself regarding the given situation. On the contrary, courage is at its peak when the situation is most clearly appreciated. The denial is not only on value, but on existence as well. "The opposition between existence and value cannot be regarded as absolute. Fundamentally it is precisely this opposition which hope transcends, in a sense, it denies." The person who hopes for a world of justice is not stating a preference for a just world over an unjust world. Rather, he/she "proclaims that this world shall come into existence; in this lies the prophetic nature of hope . . . the being who hopes is putting forth a sort of interior activity." But hope is not just for one's own self, but finds its generative power in spreading it to others. Marcel offers the expansive character of hope as intersubjectivity.

In a conversation with Paul Ricoeur, Marcel engages in a discussion of the topic of intersubjectivity. "Intersubjectivity is openness to the other, an openness which is perpetually threatened because at every moment the self may close itself again and become a prisoner of itself, no longer considering the other except in relation to itself. But the possibility of opening to others, that is, through charity (is where) experience undergoes a certain transformation in that it takes on the value of a test."
To which Ricoeur replies that Marcel's work on mystery is not a Platonic escape to an "elsewhere," but rather a meditation on the concrete. "It is the act of recognizing others which ceaselessly leads us to experience and makes experience a test." In agreeing, Marcel answers that, "For me what is essential for man is to recognize but also to admit his faults, to recognize his errors," And Ricoeur, "It is to this act of recognition that we must look for the true sense of hope," And later, Ricoeur, "We have come to see that hope and journeying are not two different things, but that hope is what makes the passage something more than just simple wandering; your expression 'being is being underway.' That's hope . . . the unity of your concrete philosophy is the conjunction of two ideas, the labyrinth of existence and the rays of hope that cross it; your 'I hope in you for us.' Hope is always coming back, but beneath our experience and not above it, if I may put it that way."

The prophetic nature of hope speaks the language of denial of that which is, and casts the expansive, intersubjective nature of hope into the tension, the enigma of being. Could it not be said that the intending will of the subject participating in the event of being is the will of hope? This hope is at once violent and affirmative, and also beyond; transformative becoming, being underway. It denies what is and yet recognizes what was and the potential for experience in a larger totality of being, of meaning.
We have traversed a vast vista of thought concerning intersubjectivity. We have maneuvered our way from Husserl to hope. We have persevered through a transcendental legitimation for intersubjective meaning and have been subjected to the historical tension of intersubjectivity in Heidegger and Gadamer. We have seen the necessity for a critical element to question authority intersubjectively in Habermas, and have allowed for this in the active hope of the decentered subject in Ricoeur.

There are essentially two modes of intersubjectivity running through this paper. On the one hand, there is the idealist concern with a presuppositionless foundation for objectively shared knowledge and meaning. This focuses on the primacy of truth and reason for determining guides to action in the world. On the other hand, there is the historical-hermeneutic concern with the essential relatedness of human being with a world that is a myriad of contingency, tension and distortion. It relies upon the possibilizing imagination and belief to orient action thru a linguistic understanding of being as being underway. The first mode appropriates the values of the Enlightenment, of the subject over and against the world, with reason vicariously assuming the power of the unity of the infinite. The second mode holds no pretense of its limits, and takes the responsibility of its finitude in an openness.
to the other and the promise of being while recognizing human fallibility and the origin of meaning in the dialogue of the vocal and the voiceless.
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13. This is my own example.

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