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
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ATTEMPTS AT PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE GHANA-
TOGO HIGHLANDS

By

John Sheffy

B.S. University of Wisconsin, 2001

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements


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
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Chairperson


Graduate Dean

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Attempts at Participatory Forest Management in the Ghana-Togo Highlands

Chairperson: Mike Patterson *MEP*

Participatory forest management and participatory conservation in general represent a process of traditionally upper level, government forest conservation agencies engaging local populations, and their complex forms of local governance, social institutions, and livelihoods, in the official management of natural resources. In practice participatory conservation entails many different means to this end. Participatory projects include community-based conservation, joint forest management, co-management, protected area outreach, and others. Across these approaches are a diversity of perspectives on elements of participation that are critical to the successfulness of different types of projects. This thesis explores the elements of participation that impede and facilitate the successfulness of participatory conservation initiatives through a case study of three participatory forest management projects in the Ghana-Togo Highlands of West Africa. These three cases represent different organizational strategies, which reflect different underlying assumptions: protected area outreach, co-management, and community conservation. They also involve three primary project activities: reforestation, ecotourism, and alternative income development. Through a combination of interviews, participant observation, and document reviews, this thesis argues that these initiatives presented site specific problems due to conflicts present in three themes: narrow initiation of participation through limited definitions of 'conservation' and 'participation'; low representation of local interests through different forms of local management committees; and non-negotiated values and inequitable benefits of conservation. Rather than viewing any of the specific elements of these themes as barriers to successfulness, I conclude that the contextual problems are due to the similar lack of conflict resolution and adaptation processes present for different reasons in each case. To improve this I recommend that local actors, project leaders, external facilitators, and particularly non-authority level actors, engage in dialogue focused on broadening all participants' knowledge of a continuum of participatory conservation approaches that then can be discussed to negotiate conservation approaches that better fit local conditions.

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Finally, I have to give my greatest appreciation to all the amazing Togolese and Ghanaian counterparts and friends I made during the course of this project. Working for over two years with some of the participants in this study will forever keep me grounded in the people that live with the lands and struggle with conditions that are all too often out of their control.



This thesis is dedicated to Koffi Bassan and Grease.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Research Goals and Objectives

This thesis is concerned with factors of participation that facilitate the successfulness of participatory conservation strategies. Participatory conservation, generally, may be defined as conservation initiatives that in some capacity include resident populations. I address this topic through an assessment of three participatory forest management projects in the Ghana-Togo Highlands of West Africa. The organizers of each of the three initiatives (combinations of central and regional government agencies, non-government organizations, and traditional authorities) aim to achieve particular goals of forest conservation through different types of local participation. The project areas have many geographic and socio-economic similarities; however each is situated in its own web of conservation history, social institutions, interest groups and local politics. The three initiatives attempt to complement these different characteristics with different management structures, objectives, and activities. One of the challenges of this analysis is comparing strategies at different scales to inform broader project contexts beyond the unique, site specific project characteristics. The other main challenge of this study is determining criteria for and analyzing factors of participation relevant to the successfulness of participatory conservation, because participatory conservation has such a broad and malleable definition. As such, the two overall research goals were:

1. Identify factors within participatory conservation strategies that influence their successfulness.

2. Help refine and further the development of a framework for analyzing and critically evaluating participatory conservation initiatives at the local scale.

The first goal identifies factors locally, within the participatory strategy or the setting, while the second goal explores local factors as they relate to differences among the diverse array of participatory conservation models. In this way the two goals allow me to approach the issue from multiple scales. To achieve these overarching goals I created three sub-objectives, which were:

1. Define categories of participation factors that contribute to the successfulness of participatory conservation from varying perspectives in the existing literature and organize the factors along a continuum to serve as a working definition of participatory conservation.
2. Describe the characteristics the three initiatives studied based on detailed information of the initiatives, project areas, populations, and participatory measures obtained from interviews and observations of a diverse group of actors in the study area.
3. Assess the influence of different factors of participation on the successfulness of the initiatives by comparing factors within and between each initiative in the context of the continuum organized in sub-objective number one.

My first objective was to summarize existing literature on participatory conservation, highlighting factors of participation that affect the successfulness of participatory conservation initiatives into what I see as a useful analytical framework. The factors come from multiple perspectives of participatory conservation, including

protected area management, co-managed areas, community conserved areas, decentralization of forest management, and participatory development. From these perspectives I organized what I see as elements of participation contributing to the successfulness of initiatives into the following three themes:

1. Participation initiation: how, by whom, and why
2. Representation, capacity, and empowerment of local actors and institutions
3. Values of forests and the benefits of participation

These themes are used in the subsequent chapters to analyze and compare the influence different factors of participation on the initiatives. The discussion of the factors from the differing perspectives on participatory conservation and the organization of the analytical framework for this thesis are presented in Chapter 2.

My second objective was to uncover the elements of participation most relevant to the successfulness of each specific initiative. To achieve this objective, I created the following general questions to guide my interactions with actors in the study area:

1. What are the backgrounds of the project areas (i.e. historic use, ownership, classification, management, etc...)?
2. What are the management structures of each initiative?
3. What are the goals of the projects and how did they develop?
4. Who are the relevant local actors and how do they view forest conservation?
5. How do local actors participate and what are their benefits?

These initial questions expanded into more specific interview guides and worksheets designed to target different actors. The discussion of the methodological framework, particular methods, sampling, and data analysis occurs in Chapter 3.

The third objective was to assess the relative importance of differences in participation to the successfulness of each project. In chapter 4 I describe the study areas and introduce the three initiatives. In chapters 5, 6, and 7 I discuss the results of the study, which are organized into the three categories defined by the analytical framework. Based on these three chapters, I draw conclusions and make recommendations in Chapter 8 concerning what factors of participation can make participatory conservation initiatives more successful.


Chapter 2 Literature Review and Analytical Framework

This chapter reviews literature on participatory forest management within the larger scheme of conservation. Following this, it highlights five perspectives of conservation and development related to participatory conservation from the literature: protected area management, community conservation, co-management, decentralization, and participatory development (Figure 1). The authors of these perspectives come from a range of disciplinary and practical backgrounds, and identify and describe elements of participation that they perceive as critical for achieving successful participatory conservation. On the surface many of these elements appear similar. However, each perspective on participatory conservation incorporates specific assumptions regarding what the goals of conservation projects should be, how local and external people should participate in conservation, who should participate and when. This review of participatory conservation literature explains that there are diverse definitions of successful participatory conservation and of the elements of participation that are critical to facilitating them, which differ depending on the perspective from which they are defined. Therefore, in the scheme of the research questions underlying this thesis, I emphasize in this literature review that determining the perspective of participatory conservation an initiative is based on is a necessary first step to understanding the elements of participation that facilitate or impede its success.

For this reason, I use this review of elements of participation that different perspectives on participatory conservation consider critical to success, to identify factors and organize them into a framework with which I will analyze the three case studies. The overall framework is represented by Figure 1. To create this framework I will highlight

elements relative to participation that make projects more successful from each different perspective individually (the outer circles in figure 1, also displayed individually in Figures 3-7) by reviewing the literature. Following this I combine the factors from each perspective into a list of factors that I see as ranging across the different perspectives (Figure 8). Finally, I organize the factors from this list into three overarching themes (Figure 9) that correspond with the presentation of the results and analysis chapters in this thesis.

1. Participation Initiation
2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity
3. Values and Benefits



The circles in the core area of Figure 1 represent the three overarching themes of the analytical framework that are made up of factors from each of the five outlying perspectives on participatory conservation. I selected the factors of participation critical

to the successfulness of initiatives based on my review of literature describing each perspective (Figures 3-7) and subsequently determined the organization of the factors across perspectives which I present in Figures 8 and 9 in this chapter. Therefore, I created all figures presented in this chapter, other than Figure 2, based on my review of participatory conservation literature to create this analytical framework (Figure 1).

What is Participatory Forest Management?

Participatory forest management initiatives are a subset of the types of environments, resources, and conservation programs involving local peoples that can be more generally termed 'participatory conservation'. Participatory conservation is a way of approaching conservation issues through building relationships between local peoples and conservation initiatives, which has emerged along with participatory approaches to development since the 1970's (Wells et al. 1992). From the 1890's until the 1970's conservation was promoted throughout the world using exclusionary means to preserve landscapes from human use, like national park or wilderness models from State-led, bureaucratic, technocratic or expert driven approaches (Western and Wright, 1994, Brechin et al 2002). These models remain common, but have lost popularity for numerous reasons, particularly among non-biologists, for their lack of success excluding local residents (often lower class and ethnic minorities) and protecting resources within their boundaries, as well as their inflicting negative social impacts on local populations' dependent on those resources (Brandon and Wells 1992, West and Brechin, 1991). Reconsidering the role of resident peoples in conservation is part of a greater transition toward what theorists call 'new conservation'. These include interdisciplinary


approaches to conservation that incorporate multiple scales of ecological, social, political, and economic concerns (Berkes 2004, Hulme and Murphree 1999, Scoones 1999).

The strategies and activities at work in participatory conservation initiatives are diverse and applied in many conservation approaches, including protected area outreach programs (PAOP), co-management; joint forest management (JFM); community-based conservation (CBC), natural resource management (CBNRM), and wildlife management (CBWM); integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP); biospheres; resource reserves; sacred groves; working landscapes; and various other nuanced titles. Participatory conservation strategies have become so pervasive, particularly among governmental and non-governmental conservation and development organizations (NGOs) in tropical developing countries, that it is wrong to assume that parks are necessarily exclusionary, or that community-based techniques are necessarily participatory because there are examples of both parks that include vast local participation and community areas that exclude all use (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). There can be both shallow (e.g., involvement in a limited set of activities such as revenue sharing) and deep (e.g., involvement in initiative definition, goals setting, and critical program evaluation throughout all stages) participation strategies at work in both cases. Therefore, participatory conservation cannot be understood in terms of a particular strategy, policy, or management activity that can be chosen and implemented. Rather, it is a process of decision making and negotiation required to involve the governance structures and livelihoods of local residents, which are made up of complicated political, social, and economic issues (Infield and Namara 2001, Brechin et al. 2002, Michaelidou et al. 2002). Whether a participation strategy is characterized as shallow or deep depends

on the qualities of decision making and negotiation, particularly in their inclusiveness of multiple parties and interests. Why and how issues related to decision making and negotiation, such as authority, power, and knowledge, are incorporated into conservation initiatives vary according to strategies applied at particular sites in practice, which stem from the project organizers' perspective of the role of resident peoples in conservation. Therefore, this review will now delve further into these different perspectives.

The diverse perspectives and practical approaches that have evolved over the past thirty years in participatory conservation present many design strategies and techniques with different elements of participation, which in turn are focused on achieving different types of success relative to the perspectives and approaches. The literature of participatory conservation from the past ten years is full of multidisciplinary critiques, competing narratives, and backlashes against the range of perspectives and approaches to be presented in this literature review (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Brechin et al. 2002). More recently authors have attempted to categorize elements of success from different perspectives of participatory conservation in various participatory conservation continuums (Adams and Hulme 2001a, Barrow and Murphree 2001). The continuum displayed in Figure 2, adopted from Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004), displays a number of the key factors associated with the decision making and negotiation processes of participatory conservation from across different perspectives.

Figure 2. Role of Participation in Conservation Continuum
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004)



For the purposes of this literature review, the continuum in Figure 2 represents the different depths of participation from perspectives and approaches to participatory conservation. The three categories of management organizations on the top-side of the continuum represent three of the five perspectives highlighted in this review of the literature. In addition to the three listed in Figure 2, I also include decentralization and participatory development in this review as two additional perspectives, which in relation to the continuum could be positioned to the left of government managed protected areas and to the right of community conserved areas respectively. However, the locations and titles of these perspectives, as 'perspectives', 'frameworks', or 'approaches', in relation to each other are not critically important. One should not get the impression, for instance, that decentralization is the polar opposite of participatory development simply because they are being positioned at extreme ends of this continuum.

For example, the perspectives of decentralization and participatory development could theoretically result in two identical projects. The difference between the two is

their process; as decentralization is generally controlled by, and would not occur in the absence of the central government, through a process of devolution of power.

Participatory development, on the other hand, is generally a process that is initiated and dictated entirely by local decision making. As a simple example, through decentralization, the State could decide to vest a large amount of forest management power in locals' hands to decrease management costs and increase efficiency. Likewise, via participatory development, a community could decide to legally classify a portion of communal forest lands with the State in order to gain access to other State benefits. In other words, these could result in similar management strategies, through two different processes. However, from this superficial example nothing can be known about the actual depth of participation between the two perspectives since this lies in the characteristics of the participatory processes, i.e. who is included, decision making and negotiations. What the continuum can shed light on is the importance of understanding the motivation for participation and definitions of successful participation from different perspectives to understand the differences in the depth of their processes.

The top-side of the continuum also labels certain regions as protected or conserved areas distinguishing how the different perspectives relate the goals of participatory conservation initiatives to different values, like biodiversity and local livelihoods. Finally, the upper half of the continuum links different degrees of authority and responsibility with different management bodies, including full authority with a protected area agency or concerned community, versus shared authority between the two. This implies that elements related to authority and responsibility, such as decision making, can be concentrated in one party or shared in any number of ways between vast

interest groups. Again, the terms ‘agency’ and ‘community’ are loaded with assumptions and positioned as opposite extremes by the authors of the continuum. I am merely referring to them to exemplify the breadth of variability of participatory conservation with respect to how a project is designed and implemented by and for external or local interests. On the bottom side of the continuum the authors more explicitly align elements from different perspectives that correspond with different factors of participation, such as the element ‘ignore’ describing one possible interaction between management bodies; ‘agreement’ as a type of decision making; and ‘recognize’ as the extent of power sharing common with the processes of different perspectives.

However, the continuum in Figure 2 is only one possible approach to characterizing different approaches to participatory conservation. For this reason it is an example, but not the product of this literature review and analytical framework. The authors of the continuum (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004) admit that the bottom of the continuum could be reversed to describe whether a community would ignore or recognize the government, like my comparison between decentralization and participatory development processes. This reversibility, the ability to see participation from different perspectives, is a crucial characteristic of the continuum and to the working definition of participatory conservation as a process of decision making and negotiation in this thesis. Therefore, as a working definition, I describe the types of participation throughout this review as shallow or deep in the sense of their inclusiveness of multiple parties and perspectives in their decision making and negotiation processes.

This particular continuum (Figure 2) assumes many linkages of different elements that do not necessarily have clear boundaries, like at what point a protected area outreach

becomes co-management. A more detailed continuum would include a vertical axis to complement the horizontal gradient to illustrate that within each section of the continuum there may be perspectives varying from shallow to deep participation. The most significant factor that the continuum demonstrates is that there are a range of possible organizational and participatory strategies for project actors to choose from, which it illustrates through the interactions of the government, or other external 'experts', and communities.

Despite the appearance of a large middle ground inherent in a continuum Adams and Hulme (2001a) argue that most participatory conservation projects in practice are near the poles of this continuum, either protected areas with primary biodiversity preservation goals and secondary economic benefits for local people, or community-based natural resource management strategies that focus on local economic development with biodiversity as a secondary goal. Following this assertion, the discussion of the five previously stated perspectives presented below begins with the poles of the continuum, protected area management and community conservation, followed by the co-managed middle ground, and then revisits the range of variation through the less grounded perspectives of decentralization and participatory development. By examining the assertions of authors who advocate for each of these perspectives I aim to highlight elements relevant to participation that these authors believe are necessary for achieving successful participatory conservation and then converge elements from the five perspectives into an analytical framework.

Protected Area Management Perspectives

The first element of success relative to participation from the protected area perspective is clear biodiversity goals (Figure 3). Authors from the protected area, or pro-parks, viewpoint define success in terms of the goal of biodiversity conservation (Brandon et al. 1998, Kramer et al. 1997, Oates 1999, Terborgh et al. 2002). They argue that the theory of integrating conservation and local development is flawed because it shifts the goal away from biodiversity conservation (Terborgh et al. 2002, Oates 1999). Therefore, from this perspective, any inclusion of local residents in management goals, activities, benefits, and use, should be done only as a means to achieve better management for biodiversity.

However, Terborgh (2002) argues that one of the main reasons the definition of conservation has broadened to 'integrated conservation and development', has been to harness large development funds. Protected area proponents tend to see local development as a threat to the goal of biodiversity conservation because of links they perceive between development and extraction, and extraction and decreased biodiversity (Oates 2002, Terborgh 2002, Brandon 2002). These authors argue that broadening the goal of conservation has resulted in the majority of conservation efforts shifting from trying to effectively manage protected areas within themselves, to managing rural development projects in surrounding areas, which, collectively result in the degradation of the interior of the protected areas. Rather than alleviate the threats to protected areas, Brandon (2002) says that stimulating the local economy through development initiatives tends to increase migration to frontier areas and increase local capacity to extract more

resources. Therefore, this perspective also considers greater focus within park boundaries a key element (Figure 3).

The second and third elements relevant to successful participation from this perspective are greater monitoring and enforcement of park boundaries to exclude use in conjunction with locally targeted environmental education and awareness programs (Figure 3). Several collaborative pro-parks books - *Making Parks Work* (Terborgh et al. 2002), *Requiem for Nature* (Terborgh 1999), *Myth and Reality in the Rainforest* (Oates 1999), *Parks in Peril* (Brandon et al. 1998), and *Last Stand* (Kramer et al. 1997) - provide protected area outreach perspectives on practical criteria necessary for parks to succeed, under these authors' goals and views. These include measures like strict enforcement of exclusion through higher paid guards, clear biodiversity objectives, monitoring, and scientific research (Brandon et al. 1999, Oates 1999, Terborgh et al. 2002, Kramer et al. 1997). Their objectives to achieve these keys to successful conservation, i.e. exclusion of use by local residents, are different than the goals of how these authors propose to include local participation, which are to convince local residents of the value biodiversity and so they will accept the appropriateness of exclusion and science-based management. For this, Oates (1999) suggests key elements like greater environmental education and awareness activities, training for the next generation of park management, and activities directly related to conservation. This is consistent with this perspective that nature and humans should be separate, that "Parks are simply not the right forum for poverty alleviation" (Terborgh and van Schaik 2002: 7).

The fourth critical element relevant to participation from this perspective is the need for increased investment in protected area management (Figure 3.) Proponents of

the parks model contend that the failures of parks is greatly due to the lack of investment in them and say that to abandon the idea of parks because of this in favor of integrated conservation and development is, “speculation or wishful thinking”, a “defeatist attitude”, and “utopian ideal” (Terborgh and van Schaik. 2002). From this perspective, integrated conservation and development projects are defined as ways to support park management, or “differ in degrees they aim to protect biodiversity” as the main goal (Brandon 2002: 444). This is in contrast to viewing the integration of conservation and development as legitimate means of conservation in its own right within which parks play a role (van Schaik and Rijksen 2002).

Rather than linking investment to development, advocates of this perspective link greater investment to more reliance on scientific research (Figure 3). Perhaps even more than their considerations related to the design and implementation of projects, Brandon (2003) stresses the importance of appropriate site selection, fit between park size and social boundaries, and the timing of park activities. These are more examples of factors aimed at biological success that are analyzed by non-local managers based on biological and socioeconomic criteria used to analyze sites prior to implementation. Protected area outreach proponents accept that parks are but one element of biodiversity conservation in different circumstances, but stress that properly managed parks have the greatest potential for success (Terborgh and van Schaik. 2002).

The final element of success related to participation in protected area outreach is centralized, government agency or NGO, decision making (Figure 3). Since biodiversity conservation is the key goal in this perspective, protected area outreach programs encourage the role of environmental NGOs to take the place of corrupt and ineffective

governments (Brandon 2003). The biodiversity conservation imperative is described by Terborgh (2003) as a “race against time,” thus waiting for governments to develop capacity or capacity building through participatory conservation are not in the best interest of parks. Instead protected area outreach proponents presume that environmental NGOs have greater management capacity. Oates (1999) suggests creating trust funds for parks that will assure support for biodiversity even through political and economic crises in unstable developing countries. The long-term benefits and popular national and international support of biodiversity preservation through parks are championed as being worth the short term costs to local populations and governance (Terborgh 2003).

Collectively, these elements of successful participation from the protected area outreach perspective are limited to shallow participation, such as revenue sharing shown under this category in Figure 2. As previously described, this is primarily because this perspective only intends to be inclusive of residents in substantial decision making and negotiation processes to the extent that it assists in achieving predetermined biodiversity conservation goals. Therefore, only in the exceptional case in which the elements listed in Figure 3 are local desires rather than the results external decisions or methods of coercion would protected area outreach projects qualify as participatory conservation.

Figure 3. Protected Area Outreach Elements Relevant to Participation

- Clear Biodiversity Goals and Indicators of Success
- Greater Enforcement, Exclusion, and Monitoring
- Outreach for Education, Awareness, and Resource Protection Training
- International Funds and Scientific Research
- Higher Management Investments Within Park Boundaries
- Government or NGO Decision Making Power
- Popular Support at the National and International Levels

Community Conservation Perspectives

The opposite end of the continuum is community conserved areas where local populations, which could be defined in many ways, have full authority and management responsibility. The first two elements of success relevant to participation from the community conservation perspective are goals based on livelihood needs and ecological services (Figure 4). The authors of the continuum titled this 'conserved' areas rather than 'protected' because they represent areas where conservation occurs through livelihood activities that are governed by traditional authorities or local institutions (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Unlike the protected area management goal of biodiversity preservation, community conservation goals are more often expressed as community needs like water and ecological services, economic security, preserving cultural traditions, intrinsic values, and sustainable use, which maintain natural processes (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Michaelidou et al. 2002). Pro-community conservation authors believe this makes participation stronger and more effective because is tied to the local way of life, woven into the social institutions, traditions, and economic forces (Berkes 2003).

The third critical elements related to participation (Figure 4) stated by proponents of community conservation is local autonomy and ownership (Campbell and Vainio 2003, Agrawal and Gibson 2001). Ribot (2004) describes these as elements of participation where local actors not only take part in conservation activities, but exercise their authority to decide if and when activities should occur. Proponents of community conservation believe it results in greater personal investment of local participants in project activities (Gibson et al. 2000). However, community conservation authors also

describe lesser types of participation with various terms including: passive, information giving, consultative, and functional depending on how projects are implemented (Barrow and Murphree 2001). Cornwall and Gaverta (2001) encourage interactive and self-motivated participation because they argue these types tend to lead to local actor self-reliance and project ownership rather than greater dependence, the tendency in designs that incorporate lesser extents of participation.

One reason community conservation authors argue for greater inclusion of local participation is based on the assumption that many communities have a long-term history of harvesting renewable resources from the landscape (Figure 4) which they desire to continue, and that their local knowledge is the most appropriate means of maintaining the function of that system (Berkes 2003, Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Such community conserved areas have evolved over centuries of traditional government, migration and settlement, and gradual cultural change (Ghimire and Pimbert 1997). However, other community conservation systems may be recent post-colonial organizations, such as traditional leaders that have been co-opted to play a role in a developing country's budding locally representative government body (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).

Barrow and Murphee (2001) describe the elements necessary for community conservation as: cohesion, demarcation, legitimacy, and resilience listed in Figure 4. Cohesion is the social bonds and boundaries, such as land tenure and use rights, that correspond to the geographic areas of demarcation. In community conservation areas tenure can include State owned lands with use rights, complex individual rights, and communal ownership. For community conserved areas to succeed these forms of tenure must coincide with each other to create shared goals and control access. Legitimacy is

the ability to enforce or have authority. Even if cohesion exists there must be a management body with the capacity to act (Barrow and Murphree 2001). Proponents of community conservation consider this element critical because it affects the extent of local representation and decision making processes:

The entire community may be involved in decision-making, or a smaller set of representatives may be assigned this responsibility; those responsible may be mixed gender groups, or groups consisting only of women or men; they may be mostly youth or mostly elders; there may be religious or spiritual groups, or completely secular ones. (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004: page #)

Finally, authors describe local resilience as a critical element because it is the final test of time to endure social changes (Barrow and Murphree 2001).

Therefore, community conservation demonstrates deeper participation with elements dependent on strong local inclusiveness. However, as the views of different authors described, the wide range of implementation strategies of elements from this perspective result in a wide range of depth of participation. For example, a shallow community conservation initiative where local actors merely go through the motions of participation dictated by an external party would be less participatory than a co-managed initiative (discussed in detail below) where the shared power held by residents represents a decision making and representation process determined and upheld by them.

Figure 4. Community Conserved Areas Elements Relevant to Participation

- Goals Expressed as Community Needs, Ecological Services, Economic Security, Cultural and Intrinsic Values
- Conservation through Livelihood Activities
- Management Based on Local Ownership and Autonomy
- Local Knowledge Based on Long-Term History of Sustainable Use
- Cohesive Social Group Corresponding to Geographic Boundaries
- Locally Legitimate Representation, Decision Making, and Authority

Co-management Viewpoints

The middle section of the upper continuum may involve joint or co-managed protected areas. The first criteria of success in this perspective (Figure 5) is co-managed areas are defined as multiple parties, generally local populations and the States, engaged in negotiation around a management plan that is “part of a broader agreement, including complementary initiatives, by-laws, incentives and compensations” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Typically access to resources that are important for local livelihoods is legally established through the negotiation process, which assigns different management roles to local bodies (Barrow and Murphree 2001). There are examples of many types of parties participating in co-management, like village committees, business groups (tourism, safari hunting), NGOs, government agencies, and private landowners.

Broader goals including joint decision making authority, shared resource management, and conservation of biodiversity as well as livelihood resources are crucial elements related to participation in co-managed initiatives (Figure 5). Authors describe these goals as results of including multiple parties, complementary initiatives, and incentives as defined above. Because co-management rests in the middle section of the continuum, it provides the most variability in the extents of sharing authority and possible combinations of factors of participation. Infield and Adams (1999) differentiate co-management from protected area outreach as the point when park management is not only ‘reaching out’, but neighboring populations are ‘reaching’ in to have a greater say in the process of how resources are managed. From that gray boundary on the left end of co-management, this perspective stretches to the right hand border with community conserved areas. At this point co-management can be defined by what Borrini-

Feyerabend et al. (2004) describe as the reversal of the continuum, where communities seek government involvement in the management, or official government protected area status for communal lands. For this reason it is difficult to identify elements of success that are specific to co-management because they are usually trade-offs between the poles.

Another of the defining critical elements of co-management is the collaboration of government agencies or NGOs with local organizations (Figure 5). Authors describe most co-management arrangements as forming when local peoples gain legitimate access to previously established government managed protected areas (Barrow and Murphree 2001). However, co-management can also be the result of the government agency negotiating their role in communal or private lands, or renegotiating their role in a protected area as is the case in certain forms of decentralization (Ribot 2004). Co-management perspectives say that a key to collaboration among joint authority organizations is including multiple parties with diverse interests (Ribot 2001). Kellert et al. (1999) and Leach et al. (1999) propose building upon pre-existing institutions (Figure 4) as a successful way to bring together multiple interests because their local legitimacy reduces conflict. However, authors warn that it is critical to consider the capacity institutions have to regulate resource use and represent local populations equitably (Ribot 2001, Agrawal and Gibson 1998, Brosious 1999).

Types of power sharing common in co-management arrangements vary between consultations and benefit sharing, to fully shared decision making authority as part of a co-management body. Consultation is defined as soliciting local comments on management proposals but not actual decisions (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Having shared authority means being party to decisions or having meaningful processes to object

to management decisions (Ribot 1999). Methods of joint decision making in co-management can vary from autocratic, hierarchical, majority, and consensus decisions (Ribot 2004). Proponents of co-management advocate consensus decision making (Figure 5) to promote more thoroughly negotiated goals and analysis of management implications (Borrini-Feyerband et al. 2004).

Authors describe the access to management information and knowledge by decision makers in co-managed arrangements as a final key to power sharing and joint decision making (Figure 5). Berkes (2003) says creating accessibility to information by all participants requires the use of situated knowledge, information relevant to the types of knowledge and understanding that local actors have of the environment and conservation. Campbell and Vainio (2003) state that situated knowledge create more flexible and adaptive management processes rather than fixed management plans because of the greater weight given to experience.

Given that a foundational goal of this perspective is negotiating agreements between multiple parties, strict adherence to biodiversity conservation or local livelihoods from the previous two perspectives would be problematic. Therefore, elements that promote flexibility are crucial for co-management success. As such, this perspective, more than the previous two represents the potential for either shallow or deep levels of participation. In general, co-management tends to result in deeper forms of participation than protected area management, but less deep participation than community conservation because of its deliberate goals of shared power between the State and actors at the community level.

Figure 5. Co-management Elements Relevant to Participation

- Multiple Parties Engaged in Negotiation
- Broader Goals and Initiatives for both Biodiversity and Livelihoods
- Management Power and Roles Shared between Government and Local Bodies
- Local Bodies Built on Pre-existing Institutions
- Majority or Consensus, Joint Decision Making
- Situated Management Knowledge Accessible by All Management Parties

Decentralization Perspective

Agrawal and Ribot (1999) define decentralization as the devolution of decision making and rule making powers from the central government to a local level of authority (Figure 6). The particular type of institution that is empowered defines how decentralization relates to the continuum of previous perspectives. For example, Ribot (1999) defines protected area outreach projects as deconcentration, the devolution of powers from central government to lower government branches, which typically increases local participation, but most of the decision making power remains with the State because of low downward accountability. On the other end of the continuum lies what authors from this perspective would define as democratic decentralization that includes, most importantly, high downward accountability through local representation and discretionary powers (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ribot 2004, Shackelton et al. 2002). Ribot (2004) says that elections are the standard indicator of downward accountability, which is flawed because in frequently unstable developing countries elections can indicate both low and high degrees of accountability based on how openly the elections are conducted. Other mechanisms that can also increase downward accountability including: public reporting requirements for management bodies, embeddedness of managers in the community, third party monitoring by NGOs or media, evaluations,

threats of unrest, performance awards and others (Ribot 2004, Wycoff-Baird et al. 1999). Therefore, the level of downward accountability is another critical element of decentralization (Figure 6), which determines the degree to which management bodies that are devolved have the authority to make decisions speak in the interest of local populations.

A third element of decentralization relevant to participation is discretionary power (Figure 6), which describes the authority to choose management options. Ribot (2003) encourages the implementation of minimum standards approaches to decentralized management rather than elaborate management planning because minimum standards facilitate the local use of discretionary powers (by local this could be local government, joint management, or local citizen organization). Proponents of minimum standards argue that central government agencies commonly require excessively detailed, micro-management of resources through scientific management plans for local management to become legally recognized (Gretzinger 1997, Ribot 2003). These exclude local level organizations regardless of their actual ability to sustainably manage the resource. Ribot (2003) suggests a minimum standards approach be applied until local managers choose to engage in activities that require detailed management plans.

Authors from this perspective also mention that the sequence of decentralization activities is important (Figure 6). Ribot (2004) argues that discretionary powers should be transferred to the local level before management responsibilities and capacity building occurs because discretion is a necessary ingredient for local management bodies to be respected and garner participation for the democratic process. Supporters of this perspective state that without discretionary power and responsibilities, local authorities

do not gain experience to build capacity, or have means to demonstrate their capacity has increased (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).

Finally, decentralization proponents describe its process as a means of generating greater participation in the local democratic governance (Larson 2004). Graham et al. (2003) define governance as the process that gives citizens a voice in decisions of public concern. For example, Ribot (1995) argues that non representative and non participatory governing structures conflict with the idea of decentralized governance, which can exist at both the central agency and local traditional government levels. Good governance is a key element to democratic decentralization which supports human rights based principles to conservation including equality, equity, performance, and accountability (Graham et al. 2003). Democratic governance is also an advantage of garnering both local and international support for decentralization.

Similar to co-management, decentralization has the potential to result in many levels of participation. As described in this section, decentralization aims at gradually transferring power from the central government to the local level to increase local control. This may or may not necessarily be an improvement in inclusiveness depending on how the local implementation process occurs, i.e. if local decision makers provide greater representation than distant decision makers. In other words, decentralization of conservation can result in shallow, or non-participation when top-down power relations between the State and local actors are simply moved to the local level, and deep participation similar to community conservation when local actors are empowered, like the latter elements in Figure 6 suggest. However, deep participation is also difficult to

achieve through decentralization because it depends on decisions made and actions taken by the government.

Figure 6. Decentralization Elements Relevant to Participation

- Devolution of Management Power from Central Government to Local Level
- Downward Accountable Representation through Elections of Other Measures
- Local Discretionary Power to Choose Management Options and Processes
- Minimum Standards Management Approach
- Devolution of Power Before Responsibility and Capacity Building
- Increased Public Participation in Democratic Process

Participatory Development Perspectives

In many ways participatory conservation, particularly community conservation approaches, build on over thirty years of participatory development approaches (Western and Wright 1994). However, authors from the participatory development perspective draw a clear line between their perspective of participatory conservation and those that see participation as a means to achieve pre-determined conservation strategies. Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003) define participatory development as a process with participation as an end (Figure 7) that, when achieved, will result in perpetual engagement of local actors in solution finding. This process is linked to conservation by the assumption that conservation will be part of the result of greater local control over decision making because local populations rely on natural resources and environmental services (Brown 2003).

The second key element relevant to participation from the participatory development perspective is the role of praxis (Figure 7). Brechin et al. (2002) describes praxis as the combination of context, experience, and adaptation. While authors from both participatory development and community conservation perspectives strive to be

place based and build upon local institutions, other participatory conservation strategies have a reputation for being blueprint models, which fall short of this with activities such as ecotourism and alternative income strategies (Belsky 1999, Brosious 1999).

Allowing all participants access to knowledge, or situating knowledge, is another tenet highlighted by participatory conservation proponents (Figure 7). Authors from this perspective have advanced participatory techniques such as community mapping, seasonal calendars, and analytical diagramming to collect local knowledge through participatory rural appraisal and participatory action research (Chambers 1994a, Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003, Berkes 2004). A result of practicing these inquiry techniques is the change the relationship between external agents and local peoples. Chambers (1994b) argues that when outside facilitators use such visual participatory methods, they catalyze local empowerment by including local actors in analysis processes. Like building upon pre-existing institutions, these techniques can increase local legitimacy and reduce conflict. However, participatory development proponents emphasize their value of increased equity and giving voice to otherwise marginalized interests (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003).

High local ownership of conservation projects is seen by adherents to this perspective as a final critical element relevant to participation (Figure 7). The concept of local ownership has replaced the idea of stakeholders because critics believe the latter assumes that all interests with a stake in an initiative hold equal power. On the other hand, according to Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003) ownership indicates the relationships among stakeholders with differing power concerning who actually has influence in decision making processes. Ownership is high when there is transparency

and mutual accountability between stakeholders and representatives (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003).

These elements make participatory development the deepest perspective of participation among those I have described. However, unlike the previous perspectives its application is not limited to conservation initiatives, rather it is a process designed at identifying development activities in general. Therefore, the definition of success of participatory development is significantly different from the previous perspectives that relate specifically to conservation.

Figure 7. Participatory Development Elements Relevant to Participation

- Participation as an End Goal
- Perpetual Engagement of Local Actors
- Management Based on Context, Experience, and Adaptation
- Built on Local Knowledge Collected through Participatory Techniques
- Local Ownership based on Accountable Decision Making

Summary of Factors of Participatory Conservation

The previous perspectives on participatory conservation provided specific lists of elements critical to each perspective relevant to participation (Figures 2-7). However, some authors have urged a departure from the cyclically competing perspectives that community conservation has been stuck in (Salafsky and Margoluis 2002, Brechin et al. 2002). Salafsky and Margoluis (2002: 411) state, “We need to stop looking at generalities and instead focus on developing our understanding of the specific conditions under which a protected area strategy works, does not work, and why”. For this reason, I have created a list of factors that cut across previous five perspectives without presupposing advantages or disadvantages particular elements, or combinations of

elements may exhibit in practice (Figure 8). In other words, the purpose of these factors is to guide, but not limit the scope of the place based analyses of the three cases in this thesis. Participatory conservation has been described as a toolbox rather than a tool. Therefore, perhaps the best fits under particular conditions are a number of elements from different perspectives in combination with a number of definitions of success.

Figure 8. Summary of Factors of Participatory Conservation Success

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------|
| ▪ Knowledge | ▪ Actors |
| ▪ Values | ▪ Activities |
| ▪ Representation | ▪ Incentives |
| ▪ Accountability | ▪ Capacity |
| ▪ Ownership | ▪ Governance |
| ▪ Goals | ▪ Legitimacy |
| ▪ Organization | ▪ Cohesiveness |
| ▪ Discretion | ▪ Participation |
| ▪ Tenure | ▪ Site History |
| ▪ Adaptation | ▪ Timing |

Overarching Themes

To make the lengthy previous list of factors more manageable for discussion and analysis, I have regrouped them into three overarching themes (Figure 9):

1. Participation Initiation,
2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity, and
3. Values and Benefits.

As portrayed in Figure 1 these themes overlap, which allowed me to organize the factors according to their relationships to each other in different initiative phases.

The first theme, Participation Initiation, incorporates factors related to the history and instigation of initiatives. These factors answer the questions of who initiated

participation, for what reasons, and with what authority. Building upon this foundation, the theme explores the management structure, positioning of actors and roles, types of knowledge, and means of engaging the local population. The means of engagement transitions from the foundational factors presented by this theme into the more complex and abstract factors in the second and third themes.

The second theme, Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity, collectively describe initiative processes. These factors respond to who and what interests are represented, who implements management activities, how these roles relate to social and geographic boundaries, who monitors activities and with what authority, and how changes are made. Ultimately the successfulness of the combination of these factors reflects on the first theme and determines the third theme.

Finally, the third theme, Competing Values and Benefits, discusses initiative results. These factors describe the diverse ecological, social, economic, and political values held by interest groups. This theme discusses the distribution and types of benefits created by the initiatives vis-à-vis these diverse values. Lastly, these factors explore processes of conflict resolution and the ability to sustain project activities and benefits. Together these themes provide a perspective to analyze success according to different phases of factors in the three participatory initiatives presented in this thesis.

Figure 9. Overarching Themes

1. Participation Initiation:

- History and present conditions
- Goals of conservation and development
- Funding source
- Management organization
- Roles of external agents and local participants
- Types of knowledge and access to information
- Means of engaging local population

2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity:

- Cohesiveness of multiple stakeholders
- Organization of local management bodies
- Goals of local governance
- Legitimacy of actor roles
- Type of decision making
- Measures of accountability
- Discretionary power
- Institution building
- Adaptive management

3. Competing Values and Benefits:

- Use vs. non-use values
- Traditional ecological knowledge
- Activities and incentives
- Adjudication process
- Sustainability

Chapter 3 Methodology

Research Goals and Objectives:

This study has been designed to describe and analyze the elements of participation influencing the success of three participatory forest management initiatives on the West African border between Ghana and Togo. The first objective was to develop categories of participation factors influencing success from numerous perspectives through a review of the literature of participatory conservation to frame my discussion of the initiatives, which was presented in the previous chapter. The second objective was to describe and compare the three initiatives according to these categories. My third objective was to analyze the initiatives in relation to different perspectives of participatory conservation. This chapter describes the methodology I designed to accomplish the latter two objectives. I begin by situating the process of research design and data collection in the context of my service as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Following this, I state my decisions of research design, and describe my sample and data collection techniques. Finally, I describe how data were recorded and analyzed.

Volunteer-Researcher Context:

My role as a Peace Corps Volunteer influenced the different versions of reality I was able to acquire through the type of constructivist-activist interviewing and observation techniques I used in this study. As a Peace Corps Natural Resource Management Volunteer, living in the study area for two years allowed me to build relationships with residents of the study area with diverse interests. The ambiguous, grassroots nature of my natural resource management program created a particularly fruitful environment for this type of engagement.

I arrived at the study area in September 2002 without a clear view of what my role in the community would be. The natural resource management program my training group was recruited for began in 1988 with a small number of environmental volunteers specializing in reforestation. Since then it had readopted many of the activities of past agriculture programs and branched out into agroforestry, environmental education, animal husbandry, food preservation and transformation techniques, and biointensive gardening. Therefore, the title 'Natural Resource Management' was more of a euphemistic catch-all for combining environmentally oriented projects and rural livelihoods.

During an eleven week training period before heading to our posts we participated in classroom and field sessions on a dizzying number of topics from these fields, with our trainers acknowledging that what we would apply during our service would depend greatly on the climate of our site and the desire of the populations we worked with. For this last part we were also trained briefly from a handbook on *Participatory Analysis for Community Action*. Through this we learned a process we could use to determine community resources, problems, needs, and appropriate places to act. These included eliciting information at community meetings, conducting gender analyses, developing village and farm maps, seasonal calendars, and detailing problem analysis 'trees'. Our assignment during the first three months of our service after training was to use these techniques to conduct site studies, *etudes d'mileux*, and hopefully find something to do at our posts reminiscent of something from our grab bag of training activities.

The result of this type of training, and Volunteers from diverse academic and personal backgrounds was a dynamic natural resource management corps. For example,

Volunteers from my program structured an ecotourism project, trained farmers to raise bushrats, taught English and environmental education in middle and high schools, built a urban recreation league, implemented animal traction techniques for mechanized land cultivation, organized garbage collection, demonstrated erosion control farming and many other types of projects; not exactly a cohesive program. This affected all of us at the individual level when we arrived at our sites; to find work many of us became involved in diverse activities with broad members of our communities.

Since I was assigned to one of the remaining forested posts in the country, I sought work by building relationships with residents engaged in forest use activities. These included farmers growing many cash and subsistence crops in secondary forests, such as coffee, cacao, banana, taro, kola, avocado, citrus and other fruits, as well as people that hunted in the forests and collected non-timber forest products, like bamboo, vines, fuel wood, spices, and mat making materials. I learned about the three participatory initiatives and study areas through working with these groups. Hunters and farmers from Kuma villages introduced me to areas they used in and around the Missahoe and Afadjato forests, while a farmer from an agribusiness group thought I would like to see the forest and waterfall at Agumatsa. Unfortunately, in a region dominated by dense forest one generation ago, these three areas are now the only places to find forests. Approximately one year into my service I started making conscious efforts to learn as much as I could about the three projects and develop a research strategy.

Entrance Into Study Areas: As I learned more about the Foret Classee de Missahoe through conversations with farmers, local committee leaders, and employees at the Ministry of Forests, I considered myself as an indirect actor in the participatory

initiative because my work in the project area as a Volunteer overlapped with both project actors and activities. My 'expertise' included beekeeping, coffee roasting business, and agroforestry, which coincided with the other activities functioning in the Missahoe participatory project. The activities I worked on as a volunteer influenced village life in similar ways as the Missahoe project (encouraging alternative income and agroforestry activities to conserve forest by increasing their economic value), but were not formally incorporated within the Missahoe project in any way other than participant and geographic overlap. This informal overlap between private, locally based projects I worked on, and the Missahoe initiative meant there were no additional barriers to gaining access to the project. Since I was already integrated into village life with a role similar to that of the Missahoe initiative, my interest in the initiative was not questioned. People were used to working independently from the Missahoe project to prioritize diverse livelihood activities in their schedule according to what benefited them the most. Individuals felt that it was their decision to participate in whatever interested them and were not bound to one project if something more interesting came along, like the projects I was initiating independently. Therefore, all participants from this project area were open to discuss the Missahoe participatory project with me, as well as their lives and other possible project ideas, because that was my role in the community.

This role in the Missahoe project was quite different from my role in the two Ghanaian initiatives. It took longer for me to establish myself as an insider in the Afadjato and Agumatsa project villages. This was partially because these initiatives deliberately reached out to capture broader interests of their community, creating umbrellas of project activity formally incorporated within the project. For example, the

two Ghanaian projects hired tourism guides within the projects, which excluded other residents from being guides. In the Missahoe case guiding was an independent livelihood activity. Therefore, guides felt free to discuss their role in the Missahoe initiative with me. However, since I was not a volunteer researcher within the official project umbrellas of the two Ghanaian cases, I was an outsider. The perception of my role as an outsider was embellished by the perception that I was not ‘their’ volunteer in Ghana. Both the Ghanaian project areas had hosted Peace Corps volunteers in the past. This made a difference in villager’s perceived benefit of my activity in their projects even though my volunteer-research role included the same techniques in all areas, i.e. farm visits, interviews, observing meetings, facilitating and giving advice. Therefore, I had to spend more time in these villages building trust and formally being accepted into their initiatives. Most farmers, hunters, charcoal makers and tourist guides in these projects accepted me after spending time discussing our projects, eating, speaking Ewe, and socializing together. Village leaders and project managers in both Wli and Gbledi were more skeptical and demanded specific questions and documentation about my research intentions, which I satisfied.

The more I learned about the projects, the more I thought a comparative case study involving all three would be more beneficial. This was particularly because of the different type of organization strategies each displayed and distinct activities they applied to accomplishing similar goals of forest conservation and local benefits. Learning about the three projects and their populations was a serious undertaking. Soon I had to make a division between Peace Corps work and research when I became more intensively involved in site visits because I needed to reserve enough time to continue working with

projects I began earlier. From February through August 2004 I spent a week and a half in Kuma working on Peace Corps projects and Missahoe research, followed by a week in Wli and Gbledi conducting research, before returning to Kuma. Blocking out periods of time in each area helped me develop relationships and living routines in each area as a volunteer-researcher. I gradually became involved in diverse activities in Ghana besides research and my role in all three areas seemed to have no particular purpose, i.e. people became accustomed to me as who I was, not merely what I was officially doing.

Building Trust: Being a Peace Corps volunteer created certain stereotypes that sometimes aided and hindered conducting research. The two most blatant misconceptions were that I was aligned with the Ministry of Forestry, and therefore pro-preservation, anti-hunting and exploitation because I was a natural resource management volunteer (I was technically invited to Togo by the Ministry of Agriculture, Husbandry and Fisheries), or that I had lots of money to fund research and Peace Corps projects. I knew that these perceptions of me were only allowing me to observe certain village realities, meet particular villagers, and discuss only 'conservation' issues. On the other extreme, one hunter initially misunderstood my interest in his hunting as me placing a bounty on a crocodile he told me about. I overcame these stereotypes in many different ways that coincided with becoming integrated into the community, like making deep friendships and working relationships, and living the village lifestyle. On the latter point, I cleared and cultivated my own farm, bought all my food in the village market, ate bushmeat, and gathered forest products.

Although I was well integrated into my working and living community, my amount of contact with different interests within and between villages varied. In general,

I spent more time building trust with hunters, charcoal makers, and tenant farmers within villages because I targeted them for my Peace Corps work. This was partially to compensate for the absence of these actors in project activities that I immediately observed, and also because these groups are the most actively engaged in resource use the projects were trying to restrict. I also spent large amounts of time building trust with village women while shopping and socializing in the markets and learning how to transform produce for sale.

These are in contrast to the smaller amounts of time I spent with traditional authorities, other than during ceremonies or specific meetings I organized to ask for their permission and inform them of my ideas for work. Traditional authorities played a large role in the study, but our relationships were organized by formalities and expectations that were unavoidable, so building trust was less my responsibility. These differences between myself and different participants displays my role as a Peace Corps volunteer-researcher as both powerful and powerless depending on the context just as other participants. This had a positive impact on data collection because of the empathetic relationships I formed with non-actors, which allowed them to play a larger part in the study.

Research Design: I collected data for this study while working with other village-based conservation and development projects through research methodologies grounded in participation. Therefore, my role as “the researcher” in the study of these three participatory forest conservation projects was defined by my role as “the volunteer”. As a Peace Corps Volunteer my work in the project area was as a facilitator and activist for conservation and development activities, assisting farmers to form

cooperatives to assess their problems and resources, and research and apply alternatives in an adaptive management type process. This work revolved around the four tenants of action research: relationships, communication, participation, and inclusion (Stringer 1999) and utilized the methods of participatory rural appraisal such as village mapping, analytical diagramming, seasonal calendars, and feasibility studies (Chambers 1994a). During my research I discussed the existence or absence of the tenets of action research and participatory rural appraisal with study participants regarding the participatory forest management initiatives and local social institutions to “reveal the different truths and realities...develop a context in which individuals with divergent perceptions can formulate a construction of their situation that makes sense to them all” (Stinger 1999). Thus, although this research project would not qualify as action research because the motivation for the inquiry came from me and were carried out by me, my research design was based on action research tenants.

Action research and participatory rural appraisal differ from traditional research in both the methods of data collection as well as the perception of research. They are “based on the assumption that the mere recording of events and formulation of explanations by an uninvolved researcher is inadequate in and of itself” (Stinger 1999). These participatory research techniques engage actors as subjects and participants in the research process, rather than objects of inquiry. They also base research goals on experience and adaptation rather than metatheory, or the means rather than the end (Chambers 1994b). An important idea of action research is researchers and participants alike, seeing individuals as multiple personalities, being both oppressed and oppressors in different levels of their social environment. This creates an empathetic mindset that


allows new forms of knowledge, relationships, and negotiation of social roles to occur. Therefore, as a volunteer-researcher I was not only collecting data on projects' structures, objectives, actors, and activities, I was encouraging the reassessment of them and trying to motivate actors to recreate them by sharing knowledge and empowering local actors to use their local knowledge to shape their conservation initiatives.

To achieve total action research there needs to be a group of participants who agree to pursue an inquiry together, through action and reflection. This is time consuming and goes against the tradition of research in rural areas and developing countries where people are accustomed to research being imported and conducted by 'experts' (Stringer 1999). In my case, many of the actors and interests relevant to the forest initiatives were not willing or able to commit to an action research project. This was mostly because of time constraints, but also due to their historical perceptions that their participation should be decided by experts. Those who could participate freely in participatory action research, such as frequent meetings and discussions, were those in traditional authority or management committee roles, with different pre-existing forms of power that gave them more free time and ability to participate. To compensate for this and gain more broad participation in the study, I used action research methods in small groups, such as tenant farmers or youth groups, or discussions with individuals to collect data and promote the value of fully realizing action research. At the end of the data collection period I coordinated an action research-like conference with actors of differing power levels from each of the projects meeting for two days to discuss their project histories and futures.

Sampling:

My sampling sought to represent the population by capturing the range of actors directly involved and relative to the projects including government managers, local management committees, traditional authorities, guides, landowners and others, as well as non-actors, or those not directly involved in project activities or benefits, like tenant farmers, hunters, charcoal makers and others. To assess the range of actors and non-actors in each project area I collected background information on each project, villages involved, and populations in the project areas for six months. During this stage I accessed information through counterparts from Peace Corps work and snowballed from them to more actors and non-actors until I had built structural frameworks (Figure 10) for the three projects. These outlined the project's management hierarchies, funding sources, local stakeholder or interest groups, and individual actors.

Figure 10: Initial Mapping of Project Actor Groups



From these frameworks, I selected participants of different ethnicity, gender, age, and class to represent as broad a range of viewpoints as possible. However, many positions within the formal institutions like traditional authorities, government employees, and local management committees are homogeneously made up of older males from the middle to upper class of the dominant Ewe ethnic group. To avoid limiting the initiative descriptions to this group of actors, I sampled tenant farmers and hunters from the minority Kabye ethnic group, women charcoal makers, lower class farmers and hunters, male and female small business owners, and male and female tourist guides. The samples from each project are displayed in the figures 11, 12, and 13.

Figure 11. Afadjato Sample

N=23*	Farmers	Non-Project Business*	Project Small Business*	Tourist Guides	Landowners	Project Management Committee*	Village Chiefs*	Ghana Wildlife Society
Gender								
Male	3	1	1	2	4	3	2	2
Female	1	2	1			1		
Ethnicity								
Ewe	4	3	2	2	4	4	2	2
Kabye								
Class								
Low	2							
Middle	2	3	1	2		4		
Upper			1		4		2	2
Age								
<30	1							
30<n>50	1	3	1	2		4		2
>50	2		1		4		2	

Figure 12. Agumatsa Sample

N=18*	Charcoal Makers	Village Youth*	Hunters*	Tourist Guides	District Assembly	Tourism Management Team*	Village Chiefs*	Ghana Wildlife Division
Gender								
Male	1	1	1	3	1	3	4	2
Female	1			1				
Ethnicity								
Ewe	2	1	1	4	1	3	4	1
Other								1
Class								
Low	1	1						
Middle	1		1	4				2
Upper					1	3	4	
Age								
<30				1				
30<n>50	2	1	1	3	1	3		2
>50							4	

Figure 13. Missahoe Sample

N=23*	Charcoal Makers*	Tenant Farmers*	Hunters	Tourist Guides	Landowners	Village Committee Members*	Village Chiefs*	Forester
Gender								
Male		3	3	2	2	3	4	1
Female	4	1						
Ethnicity								
Ewe			2	2	2	3	4	1
Kabye	4	4	1					
Class								
Low	4	3	1					
Middle		1	1	2		1		
Upper			1		2	2	4	1
Age								
<30	2	1	2	2				
30<n>50	2	2	1		2	3		1
>50		1					4	

The asterisks in Figures 11, 12, and 13 represent actor groups where data were collected through group interviews and observations. In these cases the characteristics of the sample (gender, ethnicity, class, and age) represent the characteristics of the majority of the group members the data came from. I stratified the sample according to age, and particularly class based on approximations. Several of the interviewees whose age I did not directly ask did not know how old they were, so I approximated age. I used household and farming characteristics of interviewees as rough indicators of class, such as cooking goods, building materials, and clothing, as well as if the family or individual owned land or tenant farmed, and if they did own land did they hire laborers or tenants.

Data Collection Methods:

I collected qualitative data due to the inherent qualitative nature of the different roles of project actors and non-actors in social institutions such as traditional authority, land tenure, and illegal activities that conflict with conservation initiatives. To collect this data I used multiple techniques including participant and direct observation, informal and structured interviews, group interviews, group workshop activities, photography and document reviews. In most cases, several techniques were employed with each participant. For example, to collect data on hunters I visited hunting sites with individuals to make observations and conduct informal interviews. I also interviewed groups of hunters during shared meals where I often took photographs of hunters, prey, and methods of cooking and eating wild game. Photos often sparked conversation when I gave them copies as well. Finally, hunters were included in the cross project workshop where they collaborated with other actors from their project to respond to worksheets and

presented their project to members of the other two projects. Similarly, I used multiple methods with other non-project actors like charcoal producers, and project actors such as tourism guides, managers, traditional authorities, and small scale enterprise actors.

Through these combinations of methods I sought to understand the following three topics about each participant:

1. Background person information, family, and seasonal and daily livelihood activities.
2. Role in the participatory projects or description of the participatory projects in relation to their resource use activities.
3. Future or possible role in participatory management and their view of where the projects are heading.

Usually informal, open-ended interviews occurred within the context of other conversation in the market, field, other workplace, or home of participants. I purposely avoided leading questions that specifically asked about their initiatives' success or failure. Instead, I used questions such as those in the worksheet used as an interview guide for project managers (Appendix A), which asked questions about how the project started, boundaries, activities, and benefits. I wanted to allow their discussions of experiences from the initiative to guide the conversation and see if they constructed them as successes or failures (Rubin and Rubin 1995). In some cases single questions were used, such as asking a farmer "How did you work with the project?" Subsequent questions would depend on their response and the conversation created by our interaction. Only after several conversations or at the end of a semi-structured interview would I ask what they thought were the problems with the initiative, or how they view it changing in the future.

I collected data on managers, traditional authorities, project management committees, and landowners through more organized, semi-structured interviews. Because of the formal positions and responsibilities of these actors they viewed unstructured interviews without a list of questions as insulting or not worthy of chiefdom, or office meetings. In these cases I created interview guides with questions on a broad number of topics (Appendix A). These barriers limited the amount of personal information I collected during meetings with chiefs and managers. Therefore, data on these actors were also collected from observations of community meetings and interactions among committees, government, and NGO managers. Participant and direct observation with these and other actors involved my emersion in project activities, particularly meetings, followed by time apart from project actors each day to write and reflect on my observations (Taylor and Booden 1998, Marshall and Rossman 1999).

Near the end of data collection I organized a two day conference for participants from each initiative to share information about the organization and activities of each project with the other projects. During the conference each initiative team worked on two worksheets I created to assist them in creating presentations of their initiative. One worksheet was the same list of questions used as a general interview guide with project directors (Appendix A). The second worksheet was specific to positive and negative issues from their initiative that I determined were important from previous data collection. Group presentations and observations made during the conference were recorded as well as written documents and maps created by the participants.

Analysis and Use of Data:

All data collected, besides lengthy documents like management plans and funding proposals, were recorded in notebooks specific to each management initiative in the form of field notes and short quotations. Due to the active nature and rugged locations, such as farm visits, or the personal contexts of sharing meals I always recorded observation and informal interview data after the fact, instead of tape recording. During the semi-structured interviews with traditional authorities and managers I was able to write notes during the conversations. In either case, most of the data collected is in my own words, describing my thoughts and reactions to things participants said and did. The rigor of some qualitative analysis comes from individual quotes as are found in transcribed data. In contrast to this, the strength of my analysis is found in the number and diversity of individuals that relate to the results, which can be seen in Figures 6, 7, and 8 as well as throughout the text of the results chapters.

I used an hermeneutic approach to analyzing this data. The types of data acquired by this project are background information on the participatory initiatives, actors' and non-project actors' livelihood and initiative activities, and conflicts between social institutions and the initiatives. According to Patterson and Williams (1998) the process of organizing this type of data into themes that represent the social issues present between actors and management factors is the analysis, while the final organizational system is the result of the analysis. Because the research question of this thesis deals with the elements of success at the level of the initiative, my analysis of data focused on the across individual theme level. However, in order to organize the data at this level, analysis began at the individual interviewee, or participant level.

The individual level of analysis allowed me to summarize the perspectives of each participant from their livelihood activities, roles in social institutions relevant to the projects, and their relationship to the forest management initiative. This is consistent with what Brydon-Miller (2004) call analyzing participants' 'near environments'. In this phase I analyzed all interviews, observation, and other data from each participant to create biographical sketches for them. Each sketch included a summary of the actor's overall position, a combination of personal information and their relations to project and non-project issues, and approximately a one page bulleted list of main points from their data supporting their position. A summary of these sketches and excerpts of data on individual interviewees are presented in Appendix B, which can be referenced as a check on my interpretation, or organization of the data.


Following the individual level of analysis I organized individual viewpoints from each project into themes at the across individual level. This required me to combine viewpoints from different actors describing similar issues with different causes, as well as actors describing different issues resulting from the same cause. To do this I organized actors with similar overall positions from their biographical sketches and created lists of the main points from their sketches related to their similarity. This involved many steps of reorganization of lists of related viewpoints and figures that represented the relationships of viewpoints to each other. During this phase in particular my committee Chair also analyzed a subset of the individual level data that I had organized into themes to confirm the validity of my organization into themes. Eventually the themes solidified and I returned to the individual biographies to collect data to represent the individual

viewpoints that, in relation to other individual viewpoints, that collectively describe the themes.

Finally, after the across individual, place based analysis of each project according to the three themes, I analyzed each theme in itself across the projects to look deeper at the meanings of the different factors of participation that influenced success. Since success is relative to the perspective of participatory conservation, this analysis was to identify elements of participation common to the projects that influenced success in a general sense. This analysis expanded upon my interpretation of the individual and thematic data of each project and incorporated my review of theories and examples from participatory conservation literature.

Chapter 4 Study Areas and Participatory Forest Management Initiatives

Figure 14. Maps of Ghana, Togo and the study area.



The three participatory forest management initiatives I studied are located in portions of Ghana and Togo (Figure 14):

1. Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area, Ghana
2. Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary, Ghana
3. Foret Classee de Missahoe, Togo

Geography: The darker shaded region in the right hand map from Conservation International ranks the study area as extremely high forest conservation priority (CI website 2002). In vegetative terms, the study area is the eastern most component of the Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem, in the elevated range known as the Ghana-Togo Highlands, Akwapim-Togo Range, Atakora-Togo Range, or Voltaic-Togo Highlands, an area with humid semi-deciduous forests type (Rodel and Agyei 2001). The section of the Highlands in the study area, known locally as the Agumatsa Range and Fetish Range, rises

1000 meters above the drier lowland deciduous forest and savanna woodland vegetations in both countries (Rodel and Agyei 2001). Conservation International hosted a conservation priority setting workshop in 1999, where scientists working in the Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem declared the Ghana-Togo Highlands one of the most important areas for conservation of biodiversity, partially due to how little research has been conducted on the area, mounting political and socioeconomic threats, and rapid rate of conversion to agriculture (CI website 2002).

Political Boundaries: The western peaks of the Highlands that run through the center of the study area has defined the international border between the Anglophone and Francophone colonies since the division of German Togoland in 1914, and countries since independence in 1959 (Ghana) and 1960 (Togo). This divides the study site in numerous social, economic, and political ways including: currency (Cedis and CFA), national languages (English and French), education systems (British and French), infrastructure developments, international alliances and donor investment, to name a few of the larger differences. Two of the projects, Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary and Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area, are found on the eastern border of Ghana's Volta Region, one of Ghana's ten regions, which are divided into various numbers of districts. Each district is governed by a partially elected District Assembly. Both of these projects are located in the Hohoe South District. Below the district level, the projects are within traditional government jurisdictions, called traditional areas. Afadjato lies in the Gbledi and Fodome Traditional Areas, while Agumatsa rests in the Wli Traditional Area.

The third project is on the western border of Togo's Prefecture de Kloto, one of Togo's twenty-one prefectures, the smallest form of national government, each under the

appointed leadership of a Prefet. Below the prefecture level in Togo are Cantons, the equivalent of Traditional Areas in Ghana. The Missahoe project falls in three Cantons: Kuma, Agome, and Hanyiba.

Local Similarities: At the Traditional Area and village level the international boundary is an imaginary line running through a culturally uniform area. Similarities in way of life across the three project areas are numerous including: local language (Ewe), subsistence and cash cropping activities and seasons, division of labor and income within the household, market goods and prices, mixture of traditional and Christian religions, funeral celebrations, and traditional leadership.

From a cultural perspective, this part of West Africa has been settled by the Ewe ethnic group since the 1600s. Every villager in the study area is involved in daily farming and forest product production through cultivation, harvest, transportation, transformation, sale, purchase, or trade. These labor and time intensive activities occupy the daily schedules for most residents in the study areas and create tightly knit seasonal behavior patterns which limit the additional activities they can engage in. These tasks are strongly divided between age and gender within family units composed of multiple immediate families connected by siblings, often sisters, living in one compound.

Men are responsible for clearing parcels of land, planting, and weeding crops of grains, tubers, and vegetables for family consumption and sale, and make the majority of land use decisions including when and where to grow food and cash crops. Men also hunt, fish, trap, and collect building materials from the forest. The profits from men's economies are used to pay for children's school fees and supplies, larger household

expenses like construction materials, and invested in future income sources like cash crops and animals.

Women play a larger role in harvesting, transporting, transforming, cooking and selling crops as well as collecting fuel wood, water, and taking care of the household. Women's forest activities include charcoal making for sale, fuel wood gathering for home use, and collecting certain tree leaves for weaving and wrapping food. Income from produce and goods sold by women are used to buy household items for immediate use, invested in future income generating activities, or saved in women's tontines. The lines of gender division were stronger in the past, but due to economic constraints men have become more involved in harvesting and transformation of crops, while women have also become more involved in planting and weeding. Children represent labor in the study area and work in most aspects of field work, fuel wood collection, transportation, and water collection.


Family units are grouped into clans that are usually a cluster of compounds constructed adjacent to each other in a distinct section of the village. Each clan is represented by a clan head, generally the oldest man descending from the clan founder. A new clan can be created any time a portion of a clan no longer feels represented by their clan head. According to traditional Ewe governance, land ownership occurs at the clan level. All lands used by family units and individuals must have the consent of the clan head. Land use and tenure is quite complicated because clan heads can also sell, trade, and sharecrop their lands. Once use rights have been attained, except for tenant farmers, they are usually indefinite and impose no restrictions on the individual. Tenant farmers are part of specific land use and harvest or profit sharing agreements between

themselves and an individual with previously obtained lands or the clan head directly. All tenant farmers in the study areas are from northern ethnic groups generally lumped together in the study areas as Kabye.

The villages in the study area consist of 3-6 clans depending on the village size and history. Clan heads are village elders, or sub-chiefs to the village and paramount chiefs. Similar to clans, a new village is created when a group of clans no longer feels represented by the village chief and branches off to settle an unoccupied part of the traditional area. The traditional governments in the three study areas are identical; all villages belonging to the Ewe ethnic group whose traditional areas are governed by a paramount chief and elders whose chiefdom includes all the villages and lands in the traditional area. The position of village chief rotates between clans in a village. The village chief and elders are responsible for making judicial and development decisions in the village. These typically occur in village wide meeting where opinions and arguments are publicly voiced. Afterwards the village chief and elders withdraw themselves to decide guilt and punishment.

A group of villages descending from the same founding village make up a traditional area. All the villages in a traditional area have two part names made up of the traditional area followed by the village. Thus within the Kuma Traditional Area, Kuma-Konda is simply called Konda. A traditional area or canton is the highest extent of traditional government system. Several hundred years before the peaks of the highlands in the study area became the French and British colonial boundaries they were recognized as the portions of the limits of the traditional areas where the participants in this study reside.

Figure 15. Participatory Forest Management Protected Areas (shaded), Study Villages (stars), Traditional Area boundaries (dotted), and international boundary (dashed).



Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project, Ghana

This initiative includes four villages from two Traditional Areas in Ghana, Gbledi and Fodome. This study focused on the village of Gbledi-Gbogame where the project office and trailhead are located as well as many of the small-scale enterprise projects. This project was co-managed by the Gbledi Community Project Management Committee and the Ghana Wildlife Society, a national environmental non-government organization. At the beginning of the project in 1998, village landowners donated portions of their forested lands to create a forest reserve of approximately 12km² to preserve wildlife, forest habitat, and environmental services from the mountainside on the East side of their villages. The Ghana Wildlife Society initiated community conducted biological surveys and trap sweeps within the reserve, and tourism for hiking to the summit of Mt. Afadjato, the highest peak in Ghana at 2095 feet. In addition to preservation and tourism, the

initiative designed a revolving fund for small-scale enterprise development to benefit the local community.

Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary, Ghana

This protected area is located entirely in the Wli Traditional Area, including its three main villages of Wli, and a group of outlying homes lumped into a fourth village category. This study focused on the two physically connected villages Amegafe and Agorieve that were closest to the Sanctuary office. Agumatsa was created in 1973 by the predecessor to the Ghana Wildlife Division, a sector of the Ghana Forestry Commission. Its goals were to protect the unique wildlife habitat known for its butterfly and fruit bat populations in the forests surrounding Wli Falls, the largest waterfall in West Africa at approximately 400 meters. It was not originally managed for tourism, but over the past two decades has become one of Ghana's most popular attractions with an estimated 16,000 national and international visitors annually. The Wildlife Division managed the sanctuary without local involvement until 1998 when a group of village representatives formed a Tourism Management Team and demanded local control. Through negotiations legally facilitated by the Hohoe District Assembly a three party co-management strategy was created between the Wildlife Division, Tourism Management Team, and District Assembly including shared tourism revenue and management duties between the three bodies.

Foret Classee de Missahoe, Togo

This protected area covers 11 km² of forest lands belonging to eleven villages from three cantons in Togo: Agome, Hanyiba, and Kuma. Two Kuma villages were focused on by this study. Missahoe was originally classified as a protected area in 1953

during the French colonial rule of Togoland to preserve its sensitive forested slopes from erosion, produce fuel wood, and timber. Before the French colonial period, Missahoe was a German botanical preserve used to experiment with and promote agroforestry systems. Because of this landowners from the three Cantons retained tenure rights and were encouraged to cultivate perennial crops such as coffee and cocoa in the under story and enhance forest stands in Missahoe with other income generating trees like kola, avocado, citrus, mango and other fruits. Since independence in 1960 the area has been under the authority of different divisions of the Ministry of the Environment (Ministere des Forets et Eaux, Direction de la Protection et Control de Exploitation de Flore - Ministry). During political instability surrounding Togo's transition to democratic government in the 1990s, open access and looting of resources in the country's parks, faunal, and forest reserves was common, including Missahoe. In 1999 the Ministry created the participatory initiative reforest and protect degraded areas of Missahoe by engaging the local population in management activities.

Chapter 5 Participation Initiation: How, by whom, and what for?

Initiation of participation in the three initiatives was influenced by pressures originating from villagers and village leaders, local governments, management agencies, national and international NGOs, and international donors. The processes of initiating local participation in these cases represent three different types of models: 1) Creating participation as the basis of a community initiative led by a national NGO (Afadjato); 2) Initiating participation from the top-down to replace an ineffective exclusionary protected area management scheme (Missahoe); and 3) Increasing participation by localizing management roles, while maintaining the original management strategy (Agumatsa).

Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project

Project Initiation: There was no protected area in place when the Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project was initiated. In the past their farming economy was more balanced between cash crops, primarily cocoa and coffee, and food crops than it is today. When this balance existed, they said there was less pressure on the forested mountainside because their food and cash crops grown in the lowlands adjacent to the forest satisfied their needs (Togbega, Sasa). This changed after a bushfire burned most of the village's cash crops in 1983. Landowners said that they did not have the means to replant cash crop fields because of their lack of access to credit (Morrtty, Amiga IV). The Gbledi Paramount Chief said that since then the economy has also been worse for cash crops while the prices of commonly purchased goods have risen (Togbega). Together these changes increased the pressure to cultivate more annual food crops on lands that were previously a border of perennial tree crops between the village and the forest mountainside. Villagers began to rely more heavily on forest products like animals,

charcoal, and lumber as income sources. Elders also said the village lost many youth who migrated to urban areas because of the lack of economic opportunities in Gbledi (Amiga IV, Mancredo). These issues were seen as problems especially by villagers who had spent time away from the village in Ghana's capital and internationally because they had seen alternative development strategies like ecotourism and microfinance projects occurring in other places and wanted to initiate something in the Wli community to help their relatives (Mancredo).

During the 1990s groups of ornithologists, such as Birdlife International, toured Ghana to catalog Globally Important Bird Areas. Groups associated with the Ghana Wildlife Society, an Accra based environmental NGO, visited forests in the Wli traditional area numerous times. Through interactions with the birders and Wildlife Society, the elders and village elites approached the Wildlife Society in 1996 with their desire to help the village develop a revenue generating project focused on their forests, particularly Mt. Afadjato, the highest peak in Ghana. One of the village elders and a guide employed by the project both said that the village targeted Wildlife Society because it was an NGO and they knew, "The government has no money to give to communities without connections (i.e. revenue sharing conditions)" (William). In 1998 the Ghana Wildlife Society wrote a plan for the initiative, Mount Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project, which outlined their objectives, activities, and proposed outputs. The Netherlands embassy to Ghana accepted the project to be funded for five years, until 2003.

The plan proposed a spectrum of outputs including: to identify problems using surveys and participatory assessments, establish the Mt. Afadjato Community Nature

Reserve, prepare and implement a business plan integrating ecological management and socio-economic development, increase awareness of the value of conservation and natural resource management, monitor and evaluate the project. Participation was stated as the key to achieving all of these outputs, particularly the implementation of the integrated business plan:

The business plan will be developed as an overall and integrated development strategy for biodiversity conservation, development of tourism, and development of alternative income sources...It will not be defining isolated investments...(and) cannot be developed in a single effort by a consultant, but will require continued inputs from the entire project team.

A major assumption (of this initiative) is that the management plans will be implemented by local communities and partners. Involvement of stakeholders in the planning process should ensure this. (Ghana Wildlife Society) should be most careful to support and facilitate the existing well developed self-help spirit in the community by playing a catalytic role instead of disrupting it by creating a dependency on the project funds. (Ghana Wildlife Society) should avoid giving even the slightest impression of favouritism and become a cause of conflict among the different village groups and committees, traditional and administrative leadership, men and women, members of the village elite and other villagers. (Ghana Wildlife Society plan)

Local Participation in the Initiative:

Local participation occurred in three main areas, land donation by clans for the nature reserve; representation by the Project Management Committee; and conservation, ecotourism and small scale enterprise activities. During the initial social and ecological assessments the Ghana Wildlife Society managers negotiated the amounts of lands to be donated by each of the village clans for the nature reserve. One of the managers remarked that “landowners bought into the project mostly for the tourism and small business development (benefits)...they would say ‘yes’ to the conservation benefits, but they say, ‘but what am I going to eat today?’” (Edem) The village-project liaison, one of the principal Afadjato project instigators, described his position during this phase as convincing the Ghana Wildlife

Society that the community was willing to donate land, while simultaneously convincing the clan heads to donate lands because the Wildlife Society project would bring the village benefits (Mancredo). Donation of lands and creation of the reserve was a requirement of the Wildlife Society. Land donations for the reserve were a one time contribution or decision made not requiring ongoing active participation.

The second means of local participation in the initiative was through the Project Management Committee. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan required that the Project Management Committee be a representative management body of all interests in the project area, and that the Project Management Committee would make all management decisions. The Project Management Committee formed based on the traditional government system and included chiefs from the involved villages, project-village liaison, Wildlife Society project manager, and representatives for village youth, women, Accra youth, village health and sanitation, the Ahor Steering Committee (a separate development committee from the village Ahor), and the District Assembly. Villagers discussed the importance of the by-laws created for the project by the Project Management Committee, “the by-laws of Afadjato were not implanted by the Wildlife Society” (Isaac). The by-laws were the desires of the Gbledi community, or individuals within the community, formed based on their ideas and supported and enforced by the village traditional system. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan stated that it was essential for the initiative to build the capacity of the Project Management Committee to sustain management activities.

Conservation activities, ecotourism, and small-scale enterprises were the third way villagers participated in the initiative. Villagers fulfilled the labor requirements of

the project for tree planting, cutting fire breaks, and environmental surveys. The project employed eight guides from the villages that lead tourists on hikes through the forest and monitor the forest for illegal activities. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan initiated small-scale enterprise activities, especially targeting women, as alternative income sources, which included beekeeping, animal husbandry, transformation of agriculture products, soap making, and craftwork. Villagers formed small-scale enterprise groups that were trained by the Ghana Wildlife Society on bookkeeping, cost-benefit analysis, group management, and technical skills related to their specific activities. Initially, the initiative funded twenty small-scale enterprise groups with a rotational loan system. One village leader speculated that the eighty percent of village youth are involved in these groups (Marseilles).

Despite the initiatives participation focused priorities, the Ghana Wildlife Society maintained control from the beginning. The Ghana Wildlife Society project plan stated:

The Ghana Wildlife Society will be the managing organization. It will select and recruit staff, procure equipment and manage and monitor the project technically and fiscally.

The project will avoid becoming involved in a too wide range of micro-investments, losing track of its mandate of conservation and deriving benefits from conservation. (Ghana Wildlife Society plan)

Villagers also voiced their awareness of the Ghana Wildlife Society control of the initiative. It was commonly referred to as “Their” project. One landowner said, “The key is obeying their (Ghana Wildlife Society) bylaws or they will pack up and leave us, and we won’t get anything” (Aprepsu). This demonstrates a different view of the ownership of the initiative from the perspective of landowners than that previously stated by the guides. However, Project Management Committee and small-scale enterprise

members also supported the Ghana Wildlife Society control of the project because it decreased their responsibilities.

Foret Classee de Missahoe

Project Initiation: Unlike the Afadjato project, the Missahoe protected area existed prior to the initiation of the participatory management initiative. The previous two decades leading up to the participatory forest management initiative in the Foret Classee de Missahoe (Missahoe) showed significant encroachment of farms within the forest boundaries and forest clearing for different economic activities. A report of the condition of the Missahoe from 2000 stated, “The vast majority of the areas of natural forest cover, in particular the large trees of high commercial value, have disappeared” (Egli 2000). Even before the uncontrolled harvesting of trees for timber and charcoal production and hunting during the political and economic crisis during the 1990s, the Missahoe had changed in character. Landowners had progressively reestablished their use of lands in Missahoe, “(landowners) sent more and more tenants into the forest to cultivate their land... (because) the State did not have the means to properly manage them” (Egli 2000). Forestry managers and villagers alike agreed that this has been due to the lack of fertile lands to cultivate outside Missahoe and economic alternatives. As previously stated, landowners never lost agroforestry use rights when the forest was protected in 1953. However, over-harvesting due to the increased pressure on Missahoe lands has limited the forests’ ability to protect the fragile mountain slopes, and regenerate to provide a timber and fuel wood resource, which were its original goals (Kokou 2003).

When the Department of Protection and Control of Forest Exploitation (Ministry) a branch of the Ministry of the Environment and Forest Resources, began to reestablish

management of Missahoe at the end of the 1990s, they decided that a new management strategy was needed to accomplish the protection and production Missahoe goals.

Planners for the new Missahoe strategy incorporated members of the Ministry national office in Lome, international consultants from the Organisation Internationale de Bois Tropical (OIBT), a Swiss NGO, and professors from the Université de Lome. Under their guidance the Ministry conducted several studies in 1998 to determine the most ecologically appropriate methods of silviculture to apply to restore degraded areas of the forest. However, it did not know how to incorporate the surrounding population into a new reforestation and protection strategy.

Based on these studies, the collaborators decided that the Missahoe case brought together many elements that would facilitate a participatory management approach. (Egli 2000) They sited the creation of a voluntary farm by principal actors from villages surrounding Missahoe for testing proposed management techniques, and the immediate consensus among principal actors of the proposed forest use zones presented by the Ministry as examples of the appropriateness of using a participatory approach (Egli 2000). The principle actors noted in their plans were a small number of traditional authorities (village or traditional area chiefs) or other privileged village members selected by the Ministry to attend planning meetings.

The participatory project plan (*Amenagement Durable et Participatif des Ressources Naturelles de la Foret Classee de Missahoe*) was written by the OIBT consultant and funded by the Bali Partnership Fund, a fund established after the 1983 World Congress on National Parks in Bali, Indonesia for the support of communities surrounding parks. The plan emphasized the values of participatory techniques in forest

management by describing the failures of protected areas whose environmental goals supersede social and economic interests, which have resulted in encroachment, illegal cutting, poaching, and contested use rights (Egli 2000). The project was budgeted for two years and began its two phased approach in 2000. The initial phase was for the OIBT consultant to train the Ministry staff, specifically the Technical Team of Missahoe foresters, about participatory management. The second phase was the implementation of the initiative, to carry out the actual reforestation and enforcement of Missahoe with the surrounding villages. These two phases occurred back and forth; the consultant facilitated the training workshops for the Ministry team who would then implement those parts of the initiative and then return for more training and evaluation; the key being when the consultant did and did not participate. During the training phase four members of initiative, including Ministry and village representatives, were taken to Burkina Faso and Mali to visit numerous protected forests and natural resource management areas. Finally, the plan suggested that, as the first attempt at participatory management in Togo, participatory management of Missahoe could serve as a model of forest management to be replicated throughout the region and nationally. The purpose of the two phase approach was to increase capacity of Ministry to implement participatory methods.

The OIBT consultant facilitated the initial Ministry training workshops. He guided small and large group sessions to discuss the theoretical foundations of participatory forest management using case studies from Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Madagascar. The consultant also presented how the initiative will be organized and financed, and led a field trip to nearby village with an exemplary water pump system managed by a village committee. The OIBT consultant used participatory activities, like

group mapping, worksheets, and presentations, to explain the rationale for the OIBT plan and demonstrate participatory techniques, rather than to gather information from the Ministry team and local representatives to construct the management plan. In reference to questions about how the initiative was designed, the Regional Ministry Chief who was a member of the technical team during the workshops said,

I can't respond to those questions. The coordinator (of the project) is no longer here, the director is in Lome. I can't respond to the budget, creation, planning any better than the villagers. We all had our parts of the project. I was monitoring... the Chief of Kusuntu (president of the Union of village committees), the other villagers, they are the ones who did the work of the project. (Efako)

In addition, less than one third of the participants in the workshop were villagers from the populations surrounding Missahoe. The majority of the participants were the Ministry technical team and representatives of regional NGOs. The six villagers that were in attendance were each sole representatives of their village, leaving five villages (the remaining number out of the eleven) unrepresented during the training and planning phase.

Local Participation in the Initiative: Once the management decisions were discussed in the workshop it was the responsibility of the DCPEF to implement them in the villages. This was primarily an exercise of organizing local management committees (CLGPM, or comites locaux de gestion et protection de Missahoe). Members of the Ministry technical team met with village and traditional area chiefs to create local committees in eleven villages bordering Missahoe to inform them of the reforestation and protection objectives, which would be their responsibilities. The technician for protection and surveillance said that they "installed" committees and "educated" them (Efako). The technical team also held ceremonies in the villages with the regional

governor, *Prefet*, to give the local committees the confidence and authority to guide their village and enforce the initiative's goals.

Each CLGPM wrote a constitution and by-laws governing their organization and participation (Paulin). Like most group documents in development committees, these were vaguely written as a requirement to be officially recognized, rather than a true foundation of the group (observations of group projects). For example, the local committees' constitutions outlined the need to have an executive committee, but not what the roles of the specific committee members are (Adame CLGPM). The by-laws were more precise on how they would manage their funds to organize work groups for the tree nurseries, transplanting and maintenance of trees, trails and firebreaks, and boundary monitoring. Representatives of each local committee regrouped into a seven member Local Committee Union (UCLGPM) that served as a decision making body for all local committees and facilitated communication between Ministry and the local committees (Paulin). The Union members represented the villagers in the initial workshops.

Local participation was limited to roles that achieved predetermined goals, primarily in the form of labor. Local committees participated in the project included producing seedlings in village tree nurseries, site preparation, transplanting, and maintenance of seedlings in Missahoe, border monument building and signage, and road, trail, and firebreak construction. The Ministry also trained the local committees in two non-production or protection activities: mushroom and tooth-pick (cure-dent) tree cultivation as alternative income sources.

Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary

Project Initiation: The Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary was created by the Ghana Game Commission, the predecessor of the Ghana Wildlife Division, in 1975. The current Wildlife Division head officer at the sanctuary said that the sanctuary was seized from the traditional area, “When gazetted in the ‘70s it was not quite real because they (Game Commission) did not have the judicial powers...they did not buy the land” (Anthony). As a wildlife sanctuary, all harvesting of fuel wood, animals, and forest products were prohibited (Anthony). Landowners were not compensated for the lost use rights of the forest lands. Those that had coffee and cocoa farms within the boundaries were allowed to maintain them but no new farms could be established (Alfonse).

In the beginning, the Wildlife Division staff included twelve officers, all non-residents assigned to the sanctuary. There was little if any revenue to speak of during this time and no revenue sharing with the village. However, the boundaries of the sanctuary and its protection were considered by villagers and managers to be secure and effective exclusion. Many rare forest bird and mammal species were present in the sanctuary, including the endangered golden cat, bongo, forest antelope, and species restricted or endemic to the highland forest ecosystem. Over time the sanctuary became a popular research site and tourist attraction, known as West Africa’s largest waterfall with combined drops of 400 meters. Another Wildlife Officer remarked, “Gradually the people (tourists) started coming, money started coming, and the community saw we were making money from under them” (Felix). During the following two decades of its management the number of wildlife officers decreased from the original twelve to three when the current Head Officer arrived in 1999. By this time the Wildlife Division had

begun sharing twenty five percent of tourism revenues with the Wli community as an attempt to increase local support and respect of its protected area regulations. But, from the community leader's standpoint this was not enough due to the decrease in workforce and effectiveness of the Wildlife Division.

Local Participation in the Initiative:

With the help of three Peace Corps

Volunteers from 1996-99 the village organized a Tourism Management Team (TMT) to represent residents of the three Wli villages. The TMT grew out of a tree nursery and reforestation project group initiated by villagers of Wli, Peace Corps Volunteer, a Ghanaian environmental NGO (NCRC), and funded by the Japanese Embassy to Ghana (Emanuel). The nursery was located at the boundary of the sanctuary along the main trail. The nursery project established the capacity and credibility of villagers in environmental protection activities, which created space for the TMT to enter the sanctuary management.

In 1998 the TMT delivered an ultimatum to the Wildlife Division that they would take over control and management of the sanctuary within a matter of months. This prompted a meeting between regional Wildlife Division staff, the TMT, and the District Assembly. The ultimatum, as the TMT proposed to assume full control, would have meant handing over power from a national government agency to village authority. Ghana's central government, including the Forestry Commission, has led African governments in decentralization efforts by moving powers to the district level, primarily to decrease government bureaucracy, spending, and increase international investment from aid donors (Brown). However, the District Assembly was brought into the picture because it is the level of regional government vested with decentralized judicial authority

over village matters. Because of this decentralization effort the District Assembly was required to be a judicial and development sponsoring role for the project. During this meeting the roles of the Wildlife Division and TMT were also negotiated; the Wildlife Division would facilitate the handing over of management responsibilities to the TMT, and the TMT would transition into the prominent management role by writing a formal constitution and by-laws to govern their institution and the sanctuary. Since this decision, revenue from the project has been divided as follows: 57% TMT, 23% Wildlife Division, and 20% District Assembly.

The responsibilities of the TMT written in the constitution included the establishment of guidelines for the operation of the TMT; development of long-term targets that ensure the objectives of the TMT are accomplished; protection of the Sanctuary particularly for the community youth; and management of all financial aspects of tourism and the Sanctuary (Constitution). The preamble to the constitution and bylaws states the following:

We the People of Wli Traditional area have assembled to mobilize our own capacities, to be social actors, rather than passive subjects, to manage, protect and conserve the Sanctuary and resources of the area, to make decisions regarding tourism and the Sanctuary, to control the activities that affect tourism, the Sanctuary and our lives, and above all the Management Team will continue to bring UNITY among the traditional area of Wli to enhance total and enviable development in tourism and Wli traditional area. (Constitution)

The written objectives of the TMT are to “provide Wli with direction in growth of tourism, the Sanctuary and development. We are laying the foundation for conserving our resources and planning for the future” (Constitution). Specifically the objectives listed were: uniting the Wli community as one body towards development, creating sustainable tourism, spreading the benefits of tourism to local communities, providing

affordable natural tourism for domestic tourists, building facilities to enhance the site, and creating employment opportunities.

The constitution stated that TMT members “shall be elected by their community to uphold the views of their community.” (Constitution) Each of the three main villages of the Wli traditional area has three members on the TMT, plus one representative of a smaller outlying village. One of these three members must be a village chief. These members hold a term of office for four years with the opportunity for re-election. In addition to members, the constitution stated that a landowner representative also has a vote in TMT decisions, and numerous technical advisors from the Peace Corps, Wildlife Division, and District Assembly have non-voting status.

The TMT internally elected an executive committee, finance committee, and protection committee. The executive committee includes a Chairperson, Secretary, and Treasurer, each from a different main village. TMT meetings were stipulated in the constitution to be held at least twice a month, plus additional executive committee meetings, and extraordinary meetings as necessary. The finance committee oversees tourism revenues, investments, and project budgeting. The protection committee “shall be responsible for the preservation of the Sanctuary and how to enhance the Sanctuary for generations to come...technical support shall be given by the Wildlife Officers.”

(Constitution) The responsibilities of these committees clearly state the intentions of the TMT to control all aspects of the sanctuary. The authority of decision made by the TMT “shall be respected by the Wli Traditional Area and upheld by the Wli Traditional Leadership and Hohoe District Assembly.” (Constitution)

The Wildlife Division and District Assembly fulfill roles not negotiated for by the TMT. The Wildlife Division officers remain the technical conservation specialists for AWS. They maintain the Sanctuary boundary and patrol to control illegal hunting, cutting, farming and burning. The three officers live in the village and divide their duties between the field and office. One officer is usually at the office assisting with bookkeeping and revenue collection. “Only when the revenue collector is not here, we have to be here (the office)” (Felix).

The District Assembly is a local government development body that assesses the grassroots need for services and decides where to fund projects when development funds are available. Most infrastructure, health, and education projects that are funded by donor aid are directed by the District Assembly to local communities or government agencies to carry out the work where they are needed the most. The District’s role in the co-management is to provide judicial support in two ways. It upholds the Sanctuary laws concerning illegal activities within the sanctuary. It also supports the TMT Constitution by holding both the Wildlife Division and TMT to their co-management decision. Because of this second role, the District exercises revenue distribution authority. At the end of every month a District appointed revenue collector, a resident of Wli, balances the tourism receipt books, with the help of the Wildlife Officers and TMT, and delivers all revenues to the District Assembly in Hohoe. The District deposits the percentages into TMT and Wildlife Division accounts. Previously all revenue collection and distribution was done by the Wildlife Division regional office in Ho.

Summary and Discussion

These cases demonstrate three types of participation initiation. The Afadjato initiative is an example of building a participatory management system where nothing previously existed. It is an NGO created and implemented approach to integrate development and conservation goals by prioritizing local representation, capacity building, and ownership of the project. Missahoe is an example of initiating participation through top-down governmental decision making and training to change an ineffective exclusionary management design through the installation of local management committees. The Agumatsa initiative demonstrates participation initiation from the bottom-up by a village management team that demanded full participation in all management aspects by legally establishing themselves as a co-management body.

The goals, and therefore success, of these projects differs because of their initiation. The success of Afadjato depends on the continuous ability of the Ghana Wildlife Society to share the burdens of activity design and implementation with the other members of the Project Management Committee. It tests if delegating authority to create local participation while simultaneously building capacity will result in effective conservation and development. The success of the Missahoe initiative depends on if its government defined amounts of benefit and goal sharing will result in local management sufficient to change or control forest use activities. The success of the type of participation in Agumatsa hinges on the ability of the TMT to accomplish the same management as the GWD through local control and benefits. It tests if local representation, labor, and use of revenues are more effective than the State agency.

Throughout these cases, the amounts of local control and their effects on the types of participation were not consistent with who initiated them. The Missahoe and Afadjato cases represent initiation of participation defined from above, but for different reasons and with different approaches. The Ministry narrowly defined participation of local committees, while the Ghana Wildlife Society wanted villagers to participate more fully in the Project Management Committee than they were willing. With the opportunity of greater local control, the Project Management Committee in Afadjato decided to give more authority and responsibilities back to the Ghana Wildlife Society. In contrast to this the TMT in the Agumatsa case showed a large increase in local control through the creation of their management team, but then also did not change the goals of the project.

These results show that village groups and external management agencies act in different ways for different reasons in different projects. Therefore, the criteria for success in each case are relative as well. However, participation initiation is linked to other characteristics of each initiative that further evolve during their implementation, such as representation, capacity, and empowerment of different actors, and competing values and benefits among actors. These are presented in the following chapters.

Chapter 6 Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity

The previous chapter described that each of the initiatives formed local management committees to represent the local populations. This chapter explores the combination of representation, empowerment, and capacity that collectively play a significant role in determining the effectiveness of interest groups in the local management committees. In this introductory section, I provide an overview of the framework that I developed to organize and present the analysis. In the subsequent sections, I apply this framework to describe the combined effects of representation, empowerment, and capacity, in each of the three cases.

The first dimension of this framework explores unequal representation of interest groups within the local management committees. In the context of this analysis representation includes two dimensions: the actors that participate in decision making bodies, and the interests that are incorporated by the initiative. The level of this analysis focuses on interest groups, which are defined as actors with shared livelihood or sociocultural roles. Based on whether an interest group is represented on either or both of the two dimensions of representation, they are classified in one of the following three categories in the analysis below:

Figure 16. Categories of Representation

Self Representation	Members of the interest group participate in some forms of decision making, planning, or management and livelihood or sociocultural role are directly incorporated by the initiative.
Non-self Representation	The interest group is recognized by decision makers, but participates only in non-decision making roles not linked to their livelihood or sociocultural role.
Non Representation	The interest is not recognized or considered relevant to the initiative by decision makers and the livelihood or sociocultural role of the interest groups is not incorporated in other ways.

The following is an example of how this framework of representation is used in this chapter. In the Missahoe case, the local management committee structure created by the Ministry of Forestry was designed to serve agroforestry interests. This structure appointed landowners to decision making roles on the management committees. This privileged the landowner interest group whose livelihood and social role centers on agroforestry. Thus landowners were self-represented. In contrast, village youth did not play decision making roles on the Missahoe local management committees. The livelihood and social role of village youth focuses on tourism, but they were incorporated into the initiative as labor to grow and plant trees. Therefore, youth were non-self represented. Finally, hunters and charcoal makers that use Missahoe forest resources illegally were neither included in decision making, nor represented by project activities. Thus, these interest groups were non represented. Figure 17 presents a summary of the classification of interest groups in each of the three cases.

Figure 17. Representation Categories of Interest Groups

<u>Self Represented (*):</u>	<u>Non-self Represented:</u>	<u>Non Represented:</u>
<i>Missahoe:</i>		
Ministry of Forests (c)	Youth (C)	Hunters (c)
Landowners (c)	Tenant Farmers (C)	Charcoal Makers (c)
Chiefs (c)		
<i>Agumatsa:</i>		
GWD (c)	Tourism Guides (c)	Bat Hunters (c)
District Assembly (C!)	Landowners (c)	Charcoal Makers (c)
TMT/Chiefs (C!)		Village Youth (c)
Youth Association (C)		
<i>Afadjato:</i>		
Wildlife Society (C!)	Tourism Guides (c)	Forest Users (c)
Chiefs (C!)	Small Scale Enterprises (c)	Private Business (C)
Liaison (C!)	Landowners (C)	
	Youth (c)	

* By definition only this category can be empowered, (E) Empowered groups, (C) High pre-existing capacity, (c) Low pre-existing capacity, (C!) Empowered and High Capacity.

Unequal representation reflected across the three categories limited the empowerment of certain interest groups. I am defining empowerment as increased control over one's livelihood activities. By using this definition only self-represented interest groups can be empowered. Therefore, since youth representation in the Missahoe case was different from their interest, they could not be empowered. However, self-representation by itself does not guarantee empowerment if decision making and management roles are compromised by higher authority. Landowners on the Missahoe management committees were self represented, but their decisions and activities were limited by the predetermined structure and goals of the committees by the Ministry. Thus landowners were also not empowered. There are also shades of gray between different states of empowerment and representation classes. Therefore, in the analysis, they are discussed in relative terms. For example, in Missahoe landowners and chiefs were both self represented, but because chiefs did not actively participate in the management committees as the landowners did they were relatively less self represented. Therefore, the contribution of the chief's livelihood role was less significant in the project and they were less near empowerment than landowners. This type of difference is important when considering how privileging one interest group can decrease the participation of another.

Representation and empowerment are both factors dependent on how the initiative is designed to achieve its goals. A third significant variable, capacity, on the other hand, depends on other sociocultural factors and relationships that are not directly under the control of initiative designers or project goals. I am defining capacity as the ability to participate in project activities. Within this definition there are two dimensions of capacity: pre-existing capacity, and capacity building. Representation and empowerment

can potentially harness and enhance an interest group's pre-existing capacity. Interest groups with high pre-existing capacity will potentially produce greater results if empowered, while a group with low capacity that is empowered will perhaps still not be effective. Finally, unequal representation and empowerment can also erode the capacity of an interest group because of conflicts with other differentially represented interest groups.

The following sections describe the combined effects of representation, empowerment, and capacity in each of the three cases and are separated into two sections: overview and analysis. The overview sections highlight the main points from each case that cut across their different interest groups; conservation and development project goals; and project and non-project activities, which are summarized in an accompanying figure of each project's web of representation. Following the overview is the analysis of the evidence for each main point. The analysis sections are organized according to the order of the main points. The secondary points and results related to each main point are discussed sequentially before moving on to the next main point.

Foret Classee de Missahoe

The types of representation, empowerment, and capacity in this case conform closely with the protected area outreach framework of success for participatory conservation discussed in the literature review. This framework says that local participation can be an effective means of achieving conservation goals if there are clear biodiversity goals, well financed activities focused within the protected area boundaries, primarily on exclusion of use, with decision making remaining with the government

agency (Figure 3). Therefore, the Missahoe case provides examples of the effectiveness of these elements in designing and implementing participatory forest management.

Overview: Despite the fact that the Missahoe project was designed in a way that conforms to what the literature review suggests is necessary for its type of protected area outreach participation, the project itself was not successful. There are four key elements of the top-down Ministry of Forests project design in the Missahoe case that resulted in ineffective monitoring and enforcement of the project (Figure 18):

1. Local representation in management committees privileged landowners because their agroforestry interests coincided with the agroforestry project goals.
2. The different roles of management committees were based on the spatial distribution of land ownership, either inside or outside the Missahoe boundary.
3. Landowners on the village management committees were given the responsibility of monitoring and enforcing the Missahoe boundary with village chief authority.
4. The Regional Ministry technicians that worked directly with local committees were also upwardly accountable to the national level Ministry and international donor (OIBT).


First, the Ministry defined the management roles of each committee based on land owner's agroforestry interests and held the committees upwardly accountable to the Ministry goals rather than other local interests. This predetermined committee structure and goals result in two related issues, (1) it did not empower landowners to represent other village interests, such as infrastructure that would have benefited the village more broadly. The landowners on the management committees were limited by the Ministry to representing only their agroforestry interests despite their attempts to incorporate other community interests. Because land owners were not empowered to bring in other community interests by the ministry, other interest groups refused to participate in monitoring and enforcement activities. (2) Landowners exercised low capacity because

of their limited financial and planning decision making power and low confidence inherent to external aid projects.

Second, the Ministry defined the roles of village management committees based on the spatial distribution, either inside or outside the Missahoe boundary. This resulted in three problems, (1) classification based on inside or outside did not recognize the different tenure and land use types within the boundary. Specifically, clan based tenure was self represented while tenant farming was non-self represented, which resulted in lower tenant participation in agroforestry. (2) Monitoring and enforcement roles were assigned based on the distribution of Missahoe landowners. However, this did not match up with the distribution across villages of tenant farmers and forest users using their lands. In other words, it was logistically difficult for landowners to monitor tenant and user activities and enforce penalties because they did not live in the same villages. (3) Limited project roles given to village committees with lands bordering but outside the boundary changed the nature of these roles, which resulted in less participation in the activities related to that role.

Third, chiefs did not have the capacity to enforce Missahoe regulations because of lost respect for traditional authority. Therefore, even if the committees worked out the logistical inconsistencies of land ownership and use, chiefs did not have the authority to enforce their rules.

Fourth, Ministry technicians were conscious of the previous three problems to some degree during the project, but could not adapt to them because, like the landowners, they were upwardly accountable and not empowered to make on the ground decisions.



This top-down representation strategy was sufficient in the short-term to get the trees in the ground for the reforestation effort, thus accomplishing the Ministry's primary goal. However, this strategy failed to accomplish the project's monitoring and enforcement goals. In the larger picture, this representation did not create the foundation for long-term participatory management of Missahoe. Instead it created many rifts in the project community: between villages based on management roles, between interest groups within each village, between youth and chiefs regarding enforcement, and villagers and Ministry Technicians.

Analysis:

Representation of landowner Interests on Local Management Committees:

Local committees were generically composed of landowners, traditional authorities (chiefs and elders), and youth across the Missahoe project area. However, landowners had a more self representing role in the village committees than other interest groups (Figure 18) because the Ministry developed the project to coincide with landowner agroforestry, coffee production goals. In general, landowners organized local committee activities as defined by the Ministry technicians, which were designed to be implemented by the village youth with the authority of village chiefs. Therefore youth who did not have a decision making role and whose livelihood interest (tourism) were not part of the project took part in the committees as non-self represented labor and chiefs were self represented, but only as figure heads that did not actively participate in most committees. The following sections explain the consequences of these committee organizations, corresponding with the first two representation issues, that landowners had low capacity and did not represent the interests of others.

Non-Empowered Landowners with Low Capacity: Although self represented, landowners on local committees were not empowered to choose village goals vis-à-vis Ministry interests. The following is an example of low landowner ability to incorporate and represent other village-wide interests due to hierarchical decision making authority that placed the Ministry at the top. As reflected in the example below, the Ministry ultimately decided what interests would be incorporated into the project goals making landowners dependent on Ministry decisions and leadership for project activities.

During interviews the committee President in Konda suggested that the villagers have a strong interest in building an alternative road from Konda to Kpalime on the North side of Missahoe. Currently the only road passing to the South is dangerous because of its steep curves and overuse, and includes several gendarme and bus-taxi syndicate checkpoints where bribes are demanded for transporting goods to and from the regional market (observations of market route). Thus, the President was seeking to represent the broader interests of the community as a whole rather than just landowners' agroforestry interests. As a result of the President's suggestion, the Ministry technical team entertained the road building idea with the local committee during project initiation, perhaps as a way to increase village support, but decided that road building would hinge on the value of possible timber harvests in Missahoe rather than the existing (OIBT) project funding. Thus the committee could contribute the road idea, but had no power to decide how funding was distributed between project activities. The Konda President said the value of timber was estimated to be insufficient for road building by the Ministry, and the road proposal was set aside as a future possibility for organization by the union of local committees. This caused many Konda villagers to lose interest in the initiative. When asked if the committees could possibly manage the road project without the Ministry the Konda President replied:

We (committee members) need the Director (Ministry Chief). We can't write anything (for funding) to OIBT directly. If we have better ideas we will go to the Director. It was him that created the project... We want to construct an office. We are making bricks (as our contribution). (Paulin)

Making bricks is symbolic of the hierarchical power relationship between external experts and local participants in development projects. Typical local participation observed in the project area occurred in the form of locals gathering local or producing

materials and labor with great supply and little value to supplement externally designed projects with expensive and imported advisors and materials (observations of school, health center, and road building projects). In this case the committee had requested an office from the Ministry and had started making bricks as a sign of their efforts.

However, their motivation for doing so was not to build the office themselves, but to convince the Ministry to assist them. This demonstrates that even landowners, privileged in the sense that they were self-represented, were not empowered by the initiative to make decisions to address their interests, particularly financial decisions. The landowner committee members also did not demonstrate the capacity to assume more management responsibility because of their understanding that local participation as labor and low value material supply related to development projects.

Non Representation of Other Interests, Lack of Youth Participation: Since representation on the village management committees privileged landowners and did not represent other interests', such as those of youth, youth did not participate in management activities unless there were direct economic incentives for their participation. This decreased the effectiveness of monitoring and protection activities because, unlike the reforestation activities, these were not paid. Thus, representation of youth as labor did not capitalize on the youth's high capacity to engage in forest monitoring as if they had been motivated to participate through self representation or other means. In the broader village concept there is no clear definition of 'youth'. Practically any male is a youth from the time they are no longer in school to the age or circumstances when they are considered an elder. Therefore, youth incorporates a range of ages, livelihood activities, and interests. In the context of the project, committee members and Ministry technicians

referred to youth as labor, thus, this meant the younger, more active end of the youth spectrum that are less engaged in farm and family responsibilities and have more time to work. This youth sub-population is also more interested in alternative livelihood activities than older youth that are integrated into traditional village way of life. The young youth resist the 'traditional' way of life, which revolves around subsistence agriculture, for many reasons beyond the scope of this discussion (see Chapter 7 for a more comprehensive analysis of youth values). The following sub-section describes the adverse consequences of the project not representing these particular youths' interests in tourism (hereafter youth with such interests are called guides).

Unlike the local committees that were created during the initiative, the Konda Guides Association had pre-existing structure and capacity to manage youth labor and group finances. Konda is the main tourist destination for Missahoe because of its location at the mountaintop at the edge of the forest. The village is also accessible by the paved road and has a large hotel/restaurant and a smaller guesthouse. The Guide Association is a group of young Ewe residents who guide tourists on hikes, collect insects for sale in display cases, carve drums and figures, and organize traditional village *fetes* upon request. A portion of the revenues from all of these activities is saved in a group fund. The fund is used for group celebrations, like *Bonne Anne* or *Noel*, and distributed during lean times as loans to group members. (Dieu Donne) The Ministry plan encouraged tourism to be developed by local committees with their own means, but disenfranchised local guides by not giving them a self represented role by funding tourism development in the project as it did agroforestry. The Ministry initiative only created opportunities for them to participate as laborers, not artists and nature

interpreters. Guides participated in the committee work teams and paid per tree for transporting and transplanting seedlings.

Interviews indicated that guides held ideas for project goals and enforcement that clearly were not incorporated or reflected in the project initiative developed by the existing structure. With respect to goals, they criticized the reforestation and agroforestry goals of the initiative because it subsidized forest use. Guides wanted only natural forests in Missahoe, without coffee, cocoa, or agroforestry (Dieu Donne). With respect to the issue of enforcement, other than tenants living in Missahoe and illegal users, guides spent the most time in the forest, either while guiding tourists or collecting insects, plants, and carving materials to sell to tourists. One guide remarked that employing some of the guides as spies would be more effective than the monitoring of illegal forest use done by the local committees and chiefs (Dieu Donne). In his mind the villager's role in forest monitoring should be to observe illegal activities and inform the Ministry technicians who would arrest and fine violators. He emphasized that the monitoring positions would have to be well funded because of the danger of turning in illegal users (Dieu Donne). On several occasions guides led me through the forest to observe villagers in the process of cutting down trees to harvest wild pepper, making charcoal, and hunting. This demonstrated their capacity to monitor forest use. However, since guides' interests were not represented by the initiative, they were not personally invested in its goals and did not say or do anything to discourage the illegal use they saw and showed me (observations of guides and forest users).

Youth tourism interests were primarily not represented because the narrow reforestation and protection goals defined by the Ministry limited representation to

agroforestry interests. However, landowners also did not resist this limitation because of other social conflicts between them and guides. These conflicts have to do with the guide lifestyle and reputation in Konda and the surrounding villages. Guides are seen by landowners and older, more traditional youth as untrustworthy thieves and not hard working because they do not farm. The following example illustrates the reason that landowners held this perception. The President of a local coffee roasting cooperative stated that his group had tried commissioning the guides to distribute their roasted coffee as a tourist product through the guide association. The guides refused to pay for the coffee up front, but then changed the price of the coffee and were delinquent in paying back the group after they had sold it. When the coffee group broke its relations with the guides and tried selling the coffee through local boutiques and hotels, the guides boycotted the coffee and stole bags from the boutique to sabotage the system (Egan). Guides were also known to spread rumors to undermine other interest groups. For example, one guide told me the local committees were paid in lump sums; that committee leaders embezzled the village funds; and that money distribution was done secretly (Dieu Donne). However, they also said the local committees should have been paid more by the Ministry. This contradiction shows that the previous comments were made to discredit the committees. Thus it illustrates the type of malicious rumors that led landowners to distrust guides.

Guides actively separate themselves from other villagers as well by the way they dress like tourists in western clothes rather than traditional cloth, speak French with a distinctly European accent, and look down on the agriculture way of life. One guide described modern farming as untraditional, “Before there was dense forest all over here

and people still grew enough to eat” (Dieu Donne). He was referring to the decreased cultivation of forest farms with mixed cash and food crops and increased cultivation of food crops for home consumption and sale. Since guides spend most of their time with tourists, they do not manage fields and buy most of their food in the village. These non-project conflicts between landowners and youth, rooted in economic and social change, decreased the desire of landowners to represent youth tourism interests. Therefore, when the Ministry goals did not permit landowners to organize tourism activities, landowners felt like including the youth as labor in reforestation was just as good of an alternative if not better because it required the guides to get their hands dirty. However, the response of youth to this was less participation in project activities that they were not paid for.

Village Committee Roles Based on Spatial Distribution of Landownership:

Representation in the initiative based generically on land ownership did not address the variations in land ownership between different Missahoe areas.

Representation based on spatial distribution of owners also did not coincide with the spatial distribution of tenant farmers and illegal forest users. The following data are examples of how the project’s system of representation did not differentiate between different tenure types, and how monitoring and enforcement management roles were vested in committees where user populations did not reside.

Two Tenure Types With Different Interests, Two Agroforestry Outcomes: The Konda committee President described that historically Konda farmers had no Missahoe in-holdings, but acquired them over time from their distant family members in Tokpli. The village of Konda was founded by a small number of clans from Tokpli who separated from Tokpli to form their own village. As Konda grew, the original lands they

separated with became insufficient and farmers sought permission to farm other Tokpli lands. Tokpli landowners granted lands in Missahoe adjacent to Konda to their relatives in the traditional fashion of clan based land use delegation (Paulin).

Since the Konda farmers are descendants of Tokpli, their use rights are pseudo-tenure rights, which means they do not share land use decisions or harvests with the Tokpli landowners. The result of their pseudo-tenure status is that Konda farmers use their forest farms for long-term income sources, like perennial, tree cash crops that coincide with the agroforestry goals of the Missahoe project (Paulin). Because of these compatible interests the pseudo-landowner Konda farmers were self represented committee members in Konda, and were paid directly by the project for maintaining the trees planted in their farms (Paulin).

In contrast to this traditional clan-based tenure system, other Tokpli lands in Missahoe are under tenant farming agreements. Tenant farmers in Missahoe are migrants from the north of Togo, primarily from the Kabye ethnic group. In general, tenants and landowners form verbal agreements of terms, usually determined by the landowner, regarding what lands will be cultivated with what crops and how the harvests or profits will be divided (observations of tenant farming). However, tenant land use agreements differ outside versus inside Missahoe. Outside FMC the standard is for tenants to share one third of all crops, or the profit there of, with their landowner. This factor makes decisions of crops typically dependent on the market price of different crops. Landowners also place restrictions about where and when crops should be grown and harvested. Tenants outside typically also have to work on other fields owned by their landowner during busy seasons and “gift” their landowners, i.e. obligated to share

personal hunting and husbandry harvests, when landowners visit their farms (Bassan). Therefore, outside of Missahoe the type of land use by tenant farmers is heavily controlled by the interests of their landowner. As a result, tenant agroforestry, particularly coffee production, is successful in many villages surrounding Missahoe in this context.

Land use agreements within Missahoe are significantly more liberal than the agreements made between tenants and landowners outside the protected area, which allows land use to depend on tenant interest. Most importantly, tenants within Missahoe only divide their coffee harvests with their landowners (Koffi 1, Koffi 2, Emanuel). As long as they grow coffee according to the extent specified by their landowner, any other crops they grow are for their personal use and profit. Inside Missahoe, landowners also do not restrict where and when tenants plant crops other than coffee. Tenants stated that these liberal agreements are due to the distance of their forest farms in Missahoe from the villages (Koffi 1, Koffi 2). Because of the distance landowners visit these tenants less frequently than they visit tenants outside of Missahoe that are closer to the village. This decreased the amount of monitoring and control landowners have over their tenants activities. Fewer visits also meant fewer spontaneous demands of tenants, since visits are when “gifts” or “favors” from the tenants are expected. Therefore, landowner agreements inside Missahoe encouraged tenants to produce more food crops to maximize their personal profits, rather than shared agroforestry crops to satisfy their landowners.

Tenant farmers’ were incorporated into the project by landowners as labor, but unlike guides and Konda pseudo-landowners, tenants were not paid. Their tasks included weeding sites in preparation for tree planting and maintaining the reforested areas after

planting by preventing fires and weeding. These project duties were added to the original negotiations between the tenants and landowners by their landowners without discussion (Koffi 1, Koffi 2). The amount paid to each committee per tree produced and transplanted was distributed among committee management and work team members. In addition, maintenance fees for weeding around trees after being planter were distributed to landowners (local committee members) rather than to the tenants who did the work (Koffi 1, 2). To compensate for their additional labor inputs, tenants maximized their land use agreements, i.e. expanded their food crop production. This meant they did little to protect the trees planted in their fields, many of which were cut or burned while preparing fields for increased food crop cultivation (Koffi 1, Emanuel's Son, observations of tenant fields).

By creating committees based generically on land ownership the initiative incorporated two significantly different land use types with the same representation system. As a result of the way in which landowners were selected, however, only one of these land use interests groups were actually represented on the committee. Where Konda pseudo-landowners' could be incorporated directly in the reforestation and monitoring efforts. In this case, the post planting project goals (the protection and growth) were relatively more successful. In contrast, tenant farmers were indirectly incorporated by the initiative through their Tokpli landowner agreements. The tenants that farm Tokpli lands cultivate coffee to meet the requirements of their tenant agreement and share the harvest with their landowners. Therefore, they do not have the direct incentive to grow more coffee in agroforestry systems, like the Konda pseudo-landowners, because they would have to share additional coffee production with their self

represented landowners who were paid by the initiative rather than them. Thus, while planting goals were met, subsequent protection was far less successful with Tokpli tenant farmers than for the Konda farmers with pseudo-landowner status.

Mismatched Spatial Distribution of Landowners and Land Users: The Kabye tenants who work Tokpli lands have farm homes in the forest, but reside more permanently in Adame rather than Tokpli. The implications of this are that they sell their food crops and forest products in the Adame market, and are bound more to the social institutions, like traditional authority, family groups, and communal labor, in Adame than Tokpli. This severely limited the opportunities of Tokpli landowners and committee members, in charge of monitoring their portion of Missahoe, to observe the quantities and types of products tenants brought from their forest lands. Landowners in Konda, on the other hand, can see what other landowners harvest from the forest with minimal additional effort because their harvests are transformed or stored at their Konda homes and sold in the Konda market. Since the tenant farmers using Tokpli lands lived more in association with Adame, it would have been more appropriate to give the monitoring and enforcement responsibilities of those lands to the Adame village committee. This would have required empowerment of committees based on the distribution of forest users, or empowerment across all committees regardless of ownership location.

The spatial distribution of illegal use created a similar problem to the distribution of tenant farmers. Hunting and charcoal making are activities done by many youth and tenants opportunistically or as safety net activities when no other income sources are available (Bassan, Denis). These activities are banned within Missahoe, therefore hunters and charcoal makers were not represented by the project. Village committees with land

ownership in Missahoe were also responsible for enforcing the regulation of these illegal activities. Committees were responsible for clearing and patrolling the border of forests adjacent their village's lands and controlling their village populations' activities.

However, hunting and charcoal making are done by residents of other villages that do not necessarily access the forest where they ultimately harvest resources (Aza, Bassan).

Charcoal making commonly occurs on the forest edge between Adame and Konda lands by Kabye women, including tenants and Adame villagers, who all sell their coal in the Adame market. The Adame lands that border Konda lands are outside Missahoe and less forested. Because of this most of the wood used by the women to make charcoal is cut inside Missahoe on Konda lands and transported to their homes on Adame lands to actually be transformed into coal. Again, since Adame's committee was not incorporated into the surveillance and enforcement roles of the project because of the distribution of their lands, they did not monitor charcoal making on their lands and these activities were not curtailed by the initiative. In other words, the local management committee did not include those who were geographically in the best position to successfully monitor the post planting protection.

Low Participation of Village Committees Without Monitoring Roles: Committee roles based on spatial distribution of land ownership also resulted in low participation in the villages without monitoring roles. Since the Ministry vested monitoring and enforcement roles only to village committees with land ownership inside the Missahoe boundary, village committees with land ownership bordering, but outside the boundary, participated mostly in a tree supplying role. This single, paid supply role changed villager's perception of the committees from communal labor to employment, which for

cultural reasons limited their willingness to participate. The following is a description of how the Adame committee was given a less significant management role than Konda, which resulted in less participation in Adame by non-landowners, and participation based solely on economic incentives.

The Adame local committee was made up of landowners with lands adjacent to, but not within the Missahoe boundaries. For this reason the committee played a role only in tree production the only aspect of the project that occurred outside of the boundaries. The Adame committee was paid a fixed price per seedling. In contrast, additional management duties were only vested in committees with lands inside Missahoe. For example, the Konda local committee organized fire break maintenance, boundary demarcation, and monitoring teams in addition to producing seedlings. Supplies, such as machetes, and cement and paint for erecting boundary pillars were furnished for these additional activities, but no wages. Therefore, the Adame committee was relatively less empowered, if additional monitoring activities are considered empowering. Without these additional management responsibilities the Adame committee considered their role primarily as a short term income generating opportunity, which limited participation and the level of investment made by committee members (Adame local committee).

Since the committees considered themselves an outsourced small business group rather than forest monitors and managers, participation in nursery activities and use of the trees produced were limited to committee members. For example, the Adame committee produced 5,000 seedlings per year, 3,000 of which were paid for by the Ministry for planting within the Missahoe boundaries, while 2,000 seedlings were left over to be used for reforestation in Adame's portion of the lands surrounding Missahoe. Adame's

committee leaders said the left over trees were intended to be used freely by all villagers (Aza). But villagers not involved in the committee nursery felt they could not use the trees because the trees were owned by the committee members (Aza, Bassan, Koffi 2). This was because of the cultural norm that business and wage labor are for individual, rather than public benefit. Thus the trees seemed like private goods to other villagers.

The limited empowerment of the Adame committee also reduced its committee member's management capacity because they were less motivated to work. Each local committee was broken down into a management team and work team, totaling around fifteen members. The Adame committee work and management teams met weekly at the nursery for simultaneous group work and discussion. The Vice President said that these days are frequently skipped by some members or cancelled. For example, even he did not attend the meeting for the week I discussed this with him because he went to a neighboring village to visit a friend. Therefore, most of the committee work was usually done by a few committee members, which is one of the biggest reasons group projects failed in the Missahoe villages (Paulin, Aza, Koffi 2). Normally agribusiness groups are serious about absences, fining members for absences with poor excuses, those not associated with illness or death (observations of agribusiness groups). Thus, committee members took their obligations to the committee less seriously than agribusiness groups. The Adame Vice President also said that his committee holds discussions reactively, only when there is a problem, and discussions occur after the work session when people are anxious to depart. Finally, he commented that since the funds for growing trees have ended, encouraging other committee-based income generating activities, like mushroom cultivation, has not motivated participation. He meant that the current committee did not

have the capacity to conduct training and distribute funding in the village for risky income generating activities and people would not trust them (Aza). The overall result of limited empowerment was the committee did not function as a village decision making and planning body.

Low Capacity of Traditional Authorities:

The third key element of the design was assigning regulative authority of the initiative goals to village chiefs, which have low authoritative capacity (Figure 18). Chiefs were incorporated by the committees as authority figures, but did not participate actively. This section presents data supporting the suggestion that chiefs had low capacity to enforce project regulations because of their lack of desire and the loss of traditional authority in the project villages.

Traditional authorities were co-opted by the village committees because they are the traditional institution in charge of calling villagers to participate in village activities such as meetings and communal labor, and regulating the events (Paulin). However, in the two primary study villages, Konda and Adame, chiefs and elders were not actual members of the committees; they acted autonomously as a resource, but were not actively involved in organization and execution of the committee activities. In Adame the chiefs referred me to the village committee to answer project related questions because they did not know specific project details (Adame Chiefs).

One reason for this was that chiefs did not want additional village leadership responsibilities. Landowners in Konda accused their Chief as being unwilling to work on the project, “When asked to work he says he is tired or sick” (Prosper). In general, the stance of the Chief of Adame on village governance is reactive. He and the elders are

primarily responsible for settling disputes on judgment days. They were quick to describe village problems and development needs, but had no plans in progress or in development to achieve them other than asking for money (Adame Chiefs). Therefore, chiefs showed little desire to handle management planning and decision making for the project.

Chiefs did not often plan development activities or want additional responsibility in part because the chiefs felt that traditional authority through chiefs was not respected by their village populations. This was the case in activities I pursued with chiefs as a volunteer in other villages. Chiefs were reluctant to initiate activities that they did not feel they could successfully garner support for and control with their limited village authority (observations of Dunyo Chief). A guide in Konda said that the authority of village chiefs decreased because of Togo's initiation of democracy in 1992, which resulted in political and economic turmoil nationally and uncontrolled exploitation within Missahoe locally (Dieu Donne). He said villagers became more defiant and less respectful of traditional norms:

Before you could not talk directly to the Chief. It had to be through a Tsame (interpreter). But now people, even kids, walk by the chief and don't even greet, or informally (disrespectfully) greet...47% of the people won't listen to the chief. (Dieu Donne)

In the design of the Missahoe project, the responsibility of enforcement was defaulted to chiefs on the basis that it is their sociocultural role. However, even if there was adequate monitoring of Missahoe to detect violations of project goals (which the section above suggests would not be the case) this aspect of the design would not be successful. Village chiefs neither had the desire to play the enforcement role, nor the capacity to fulfill this role.

Ministry Technicians Not Empowered:

The fourth key element of the central Ministry control of this initiative was non empowerment of the regional ministry technicians. The Ministry of Forests was represented in the Missahoe initiative by a team of technicians who implemented project activities. The Ministry technical management team was self-represented but not empowered (Figure Y). The hierarchically organized team consisted of the project director, project coordinator, four technical specialists, secretary, and chauffeur. The technicians divided the objectives of the project: protection and surveillance, plantation reforestation within Missahoe, reforestation in surrounding areas, and agroforestry management. These positions reflect the three zones and prescriptions of reforestation from the Ministry plan. The Ministry's protection and surveillance technician commented that each of the technicians had specific duties assigned to them, that they did not have the freedom to deviate from the plan's local committee structure and activities. He refused to comment on the initiative's benefits or future activities because he said those were not his duties in the project (Efako). Thus the strict hierarchy of the Ministry discouraged the technicians to consider the holistic implications of their individual actions.

Technicians were not empowered to make decisions based on their experiential knowledge of the initiative and local population. During the initiative the technicians developed on the ground understandings of the threats to effectively managing the forest. The Director described specific problems including tenant farmers in the surrounding villages that were not addressed in the project plan. He told me these were his personal opinions, making an obvious distinction between them and his Ministry position (Efako). Therefore, the technicians could not directly address what they saw as the true threats and

obstacles to reforestation and protection goals because their role was to implement how the plan was written and executed from above them, not based on their experience in the local context. Consequently, the Director's explanation of project success was that he had correctly implemented his duties and satisfied his superiors, rather than having facilitated effective governance by the local committees.

Technicians were not empowered to make decisions regarding funding or the timeline of the initiative. The OIBT consultant and Ministry technicians held a final project evaluation workshop at the conclusion of the second year of funding in 2002. Unlike the initial workshops, local committee members were better represented in numbers during these sessions. The workshop participants summarized the initiative's results as having only partially achieved its goals. Both technicians and committee members stated in the workshop that the project was working, yet still had problems associated with revenue generation and enforcement of Missahoe boundaries and asked for more time and funding to continue the project (Ministry evaluation report). However, without OIBT funding the central Ministry was not able or willing to continue to support the initiative. The technicians and committee members had a voice during the scheduled time for their participation in evaluation, but they did not have the power to influence subsequent decision making. Immediately after OIBT funding ended in 2002 the Surveillance Technician was promoted to regional Ministry Director position and the remaining technicians were relocated to different worksites around the country. In reference to the post-project role of the regional Ministry, which he now directs, the Surveillance Technician recounted, "The project is over. It ended in 2002. The Director is one person. That person is gone" (Efako). His quote demonstrates two important

elements of Ministry control. First, the Regional Ministry Director was the only person who made decisions locally. Secondly, it symbolizes how the power vested in individuals by the Ministry increased the central office control. By reassigning the Director in 2002 the Ministry effectively ended the project. Since then the new Director (surveillance technician) has not been given duties to continue the project. This reemphasizes the top-down structure of the initiative and non empowering position of the technicians. Since the technicians had no control over critical decisions of the project their personal investment in the success of the initiative was low.

Since the technicians were not empowered, the project did little to capitalize on their pre-existing capacity or build their capacity. Furthermore, the technicians' lack of experience and training with participatory techniques displayed their low capacity to work with and develop the local committees. The technicians' roles in organizing the village committees required them to engage villagers in the initiative through various incentives and benefits of participating. This role was a departure from the technicians' past roles in exclusionary, technocratic management that was limited to enforcement and sylviculture. The OIBT workshops described in the previous chapter were designed to prepare them for this task. However, the following comments from the Surveillance Technician display that the technicians did not play a supportive role in building local committee capacity and representation. He spoke negatively about the local committees, saying their deficiencies were the reasons for project failure, that the committees were disinterested in management, afraid to turn in other villagers, and hooked on funding:

The State cannot continue the project forever. The villagers were supposed to take control and develop the project. They have not continued. We have the reports of our (technician) work done during and after (the project). We can't look for a new project, new donor agencies, when the past project hasn't worked.

The villagers haven't organized, haven't done their part, just waiting for the State to organize (them). We need to see volunteering first. We tried mushrooms, but what do they have today? They wouldn't organize to do the work. We can't do everything. They need to show the effort. They got used to the money and then just sat back. (Efako)

These comments show how he felt the committees had duties, separate from the technicians that they did not fulfill, rather than a sense of connection and vested interest in developing the committees. He viewed the results of the project as something the Ministry could not control because of unreliable committees and local participation.

Although the Ministry technicians were self-represented and had new management responsibilities and training for the implementation of the project, they were not empowered within the Ministry's hierarchy. The hierarchy limited their ability to adapt the initiative to local conditions and continue funding. The pre-existing capacity of the technicians was low due to their lack of experience and training in participatory management, which was further eroded by their limited power and negative feelings toward working with villagers. Together these factors decreased the effectiveness of the technicians' leadership role in the initiative.

Summary: The four issues that led to ineffective monitoring and enforcement in this case were the results of decisions made by the central Ministry. These included decisions about whose interests were represented and the role of different actors in management committees, which collectively describe their representation. Since the Ministry did not devolve decision making power to any interest groups or Ministry technicians, there was no empowerment. The lack of empowerment limited the ability of the technicians and management committees to adapt to problems created by the project design. This case emphasizes the need for on the ground adaptation to keep top-down initiatives in check

and avoid generic formulas that are not useful because of local diversity. With the ability to adapt at the local level technicians could have addressed the problems of village based differences in land tenure and spatial differences in forest owners and users. To do this the Ministry would have to change its hierarchical duty based management structure with its technicians, and village management committees would need to have decision making power, thus empowering both these groups that were self represented.

However, non-self representation among certain interest groups was another main limitation of this initiative because it limited the participation of youth and tenants. Addressing the differences in land tenure types would address the tenant situation. To ameliorate the lack of youth participation the project would need to represent their interests either by including them in decision making or at least incorporating their tourism livelihood interests into the project goals. In other words, the factors that impede success in this case imply that greater self representation and empowerment would help. However, it does not mean that local committees should control all decision making and project design. For this reason the Missahoe project appears that it would benefit by incorporating more characteristics of a co-management framework. Specifically, joint decision making and a form of local representation that incorporates multiple interests would appear helpful.

Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary

This case presents examples of representation, empowerment, and capacity that address the elements of success from the co-management section of the participatory conservation continuum (Figure 4, Literature Review). Co-management is defined as:

when a number of parties engage in negotiation around a management plan as part of a broader agreement, including complementary initiatives, by-laws, incentives and compensations (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). In other words, management activities related to conservation and local livelihoods. Success from the co-management perspective depends on local management bodies building upon pre-existing local institutions and management knowledge that is accessible by all management parties, which ultimately contribute to shared management power and roles between government and local bodies. This case demonstrates the inherent complexities of achieving these factors and bonding management bodies from different scales of government.

Overview: There are three conflicts in this case reflecting both individual and mutual representation and capacity problems with the three co-management levels: national level agency, district level government, and local traditional authority that resulted in ineffective sharing of management roles and power:

1. Ghana's national decentralization policy vested management design authority in the District Assembly, which resulted in the co-management system.
2. Although the most local level of Ghanaian government, the District did not represent local interests in decision making to define co-management roles, or in fulfilling its roles in the system.
3. The Tourism Management Team represented the personal interests of chiefs and elders, rather than the interests of other villagers, which created resistance to their leadership.
4. Weak investment in the sanctuary by the central Ghana Wildlife Division and the lack of promotional opportunities for the wildlife officers, coupled with local conflicts with the Tourism Management Team, decreased the Wildlife Officer's capacity.

First, the TMT instigated change in the Wildlife Sanctuary management to acquire local control of all management aspects from the national Wildlife Division.

However, Ghana's national decentralization policy requires the District Assembly to represent local populations in decentralized national government matters (Sasu 2002). Thus the District was empowered to oversee the changes in Sanctuary management. This resulted in three conflicts at the local level: (1) The District decided against total local control plan brought forth by the TMT and designed the co-management strategy with shared revenues and management roles between the three bodies. (2) Since the co-management arrangement requires the TMT to share power and management roles with the Wildlife Division, which is exactly what the TMT wanted to end by instigating change, the District's authority is also responsible for perpetuating and escalating the dysfunctional relations between these bodies. Therefore, the District authority created mutual problems between the three bodies rooted in each of the body's internal representation and capacity issues, which are summarized in the remaining points.


Second, The District has not participated actively in the project, particularly by not fulfilling its dual roles of enforcement and investment. The TMT and villager dissatisfaction with the control of power at the District level and the lack of action by the District have been continual sources of conflict between the two bodies. The TMT and villagers see the District as simply a different level of government taking money away from the local level without reinvesting. The District's interests on the other hand are by definition not at the single village level. Therefore, the percent revenue they share presumably is used in other district wide development efforts. However, conflict between the District and TMT chiefs has partially been defused by their complementary non-compliance with their co-management roles: the chiefs not complying with their role in the TMT bylaws to represent the village population, and the District not complying

with their co-management role to enforce the TMT compliance with their bylaws. Thus the District is in greatest conflict with villagers who are also in conflict with the TMT.

Third, although the TMT formed as a body to represent all village interests, chiefs and elders represented their sole interests in decision making and were unaccountable to other village interests, particularly those of village youth (Figure 19). This resulted in suspicion of corruption among villagers, low participation by youth in communal labor, and resistance to the TMT in the forms of hunting, farming, and charcoal making. The TMT provides an example of an initiative building on the high capacity of a pre-existing institution. Empowerment of the TMT that was captured by the chiefs, however, resulted in greater control over revenue and decision making power limited to their interests, which decreased local representation and cooperation with the Wildlife Division officers.

Fourth, the Ghana Wildlife Division Officers did not have the capacity (Figure 19) to fulfill their management roles of excluding local sanctuary use because of the low investment in the project by the central Wildlife Division, specifically the small number of officers assigned to the sanctuary. Rather than shifting their investment in the Sanctuary from their national employees to local employees, the Wildlife Division simply decreased investment entirely. The officers were also unmotivated by the lack of training, promotion opportunities, and affirmation the government afforded them by their agency. Conflicts with the TMT over division of management roles and information sharing created other difficulties for the wildlife officers. The result of these factors was decreased capacity and effectiveness, which fostered village hostility towards the officers who were seen as lazy figures of the central government.

Figure 19. Agumatsa Web of Representation, Empowerment and Capacity.



Rather than creating shared management and decision making roles, the inclusion of the Tourism Management Team and District Assembly in sanctuary management with the Ghana Wildlife Division simply brought together multiple levels of hierarchies in competition for resources and decision making power. Each of these hierarchical bodies presented their own internal representation and capacity issues. The emphases from these results are distrust and dissatisfaction among the three management bodies and village populations, which prevented effective sharing of management roles and power. This case demonstrates that although all three co-management bodies meet the requirements of self representation (Figure 16), this did not result in cooperation. By distributing management roles and power across the three bodies the effectiveness of all three management bodies were individually and collectively are limited.

Analysis:

District Assembly Empowerment and Lack of Participation:

Co-management with authority vested in the District Assembly was not the desire of the TMT when its members demanded total control of the sanctuary to be handed over to them from the Ghana Wildlife Division. This section describes animosity at the village level by both TMT leaders and other villagers because they feel the District Assembly does not represent them and that the District is not fulfilling its proper role.

The District self designed its dual enforcement role in the co-management arrangement as: (1) to enforce the rules of the sanctuary, and (2) to enforce the rules of co-management, i.e. prevent one body from taking control. Villagers object directly to the District assuming these roles. The TMT Chairman described the District's role in enforcement of the sanctuary rules, stating that the District says it will bring "the hardened ones" who continually break the sanctuary rules, such as hunters, to justice (Steven). However, he contradicts the District's role:

It is better to punish them through the chiefs because we can work with the person, their family, and educate them, rather than hardening them by learning to fear the laws (fines or jail time). It ruins the message of conservation if they don't learn. (Steven)

He thinks it is more effective to deal with violators through the traditional authority system to create a sense of ownership and self-regulation among the village.

However, the villagers disagree with the District's definition of their own co-management roles. In their minds the appropriate role for the District is neither of the two District defined roles, but rather than directly object to them, the villagers I interviewed simply believe the District roles are different. Instead of the dual roles defined by the District, villagers think their role should be to invest in village and project

infrastructure to develop the value of the project (William, Alfred). This presumption is based on the general role of the District in development projects not related to the Sanctuary, such as schools, roads, and health centers, where the District channels funding from the central government or donors to the village level (William). Therefore, with this role in mind, villagers feel the District is not fulfilling its duties. The TMT Chairman said he thinks the District should remain part of co-management to procure financing for building the tourism center and permanent bridges leading to the waterfall (Steven). One of the guides commented, “They (District) tried to have the road to Hohoe redone, but it has sat for several years still unfinished. They have not given us anything for the tourism facility or guides. They only take money out” (Alfred). These villagers do not feel that the District is effectively playing an appropriate role to justify the twenty percent of the Sanctuary revenue they take. The percentage of revenue sharing is particularly sensitive since it was the main motivation for the TMT instigation of control.

Even the District Assembly Representative for the village said:

The District is getting fat from the project (by) not reinvesting their percentage in infrastructure and facilities... (During the Togo boundary dispute) the District was also there, but only as window dressing. Their leader, the District Executive, did not act strong enough... The District is poisoning (discouraging) the community. (William)

In this quote he also assumes the unofficial investment role of the District in addition to criticizing their lack of enforcement of Sanctuary boundaries, one of the District’s official goals. By ‘poisoning the community’ he meant the District is setting a bad example for the TMT and wildlife officers by taking their percentage of revenues and not reinvesting them or fulfilling its other duties. He feels the District’s lack of compliance with its own co-management roles has discouraged the TMT and wildlife officers to comply as well

(William). To illustrate this, the Assemblyman described that the TMT wrote their bylaws at the time of their initiation and ultimatum, with the intent of gaining total management control. As previously described (Initiation Chapter) the bylaws included goals and measures for representing all village interests and using revenues for village development. These were accepted by the District whose role it was to enforce these as the bylaws governing the actions of the TMT. Since then the chiefs and elders have violated the TMT bylaws (to be discussed). The Assemblyman stated that the District compensates for not fulfilling its investment role in the project by also not fulfilling its enforcement of the co-management arrangement role, i.e. letting the chiefs break the bylaws and misrepresent the village population (William). The District Assemblyman described this as a corrupt alliance between the chiefs and the District that fuel the animosity of villagers and wildlife officers.

Limited Village Representation by Tourism Management Team:

Although the District Assembly was the most empowered management body, required by the government to lead the power sharing co-management roles of the sanctuary, the TMT was still significantly empowered. The TMT percentage of revenue from the sanctuary increased through the co-management arrangement from twenty five to fifty seven percent. The TMT was a self-represented body for village interests in this initiative. The TMT constitution required one of the three TMT members from each village to be a Chief to build upon the traditional form of village representation and authority, i.e. decision making, calling youth to communal labor, and enforcement (William). However, the minority of chiefs have overwhelming power over the TMT as

a whole. Operationally, the TMT was controlled by traditional authorities who co-opted village landowners, guides, and the Accra Youth Association.

TMT Meetings: The chief's presence at TMT meetings dictated that they were conducted according to traditional ceremonial protocols that maintain chiefs in the dominant role. The meetings I observed began with formalities, such as introductions and prayers, between the chiefs and others present. The chiefs always sat on one side of the meeting place, spread out with no distinction between chiefs in or out of the TMT because in these meetings chief status was obviously more important than the TMT. The Accra Youth Association was commonly present at meetings, but sat on cramped benches rather than chairs, in three rows rather than spread out. The TMT chairman or secretary typically sat in front of both groups and mediated between them. Chiefs typically dress in traditional *kente* cloth for the TMT meetings, another status symbol that separated them from the other participants in the meetings. Topics were brought up by either a TMT or Youth member; seldom did chiefs initiate discussion. Usually it was the 'outsiders' like the Youth from Accra, or Chiefs that reside outside the village and came back for a special occasion that were the most vocal at meetings (Observations of TMT). Thus, the chiefs participated in meetings as if they had been called to judge project ideas, rather than planning and proposing topics for the meetings. The role of chiefs on the TMT built upon their traditional role in village authority, that of having ultimate veto and decision making power.

TMT Decision Making: One of the guides described that the TMT technically does make all management decisions, but they are provisional until they are approved by the chiefs and elders, "The TMT makes a decision, but then their decision

goes to the elders for a decision, and then it comes back to the TMT” (Emanuel). During one meeting about future planning, which concerned only how to spend revenue, there was heated debate between the Accra Youth, Chiefs, and TMT members over spending on income generating investments. The Accra Youth had proposed buying plastic chairs to rent for village festivals and beverages to sell to tourists. Most chiefs agreed with this idea, but some argued to save revenues for village development needs, like school repairs. The chiefs ended the debate by leaving the meeting place briefly to make a decision in private and decided to invest in the chairs (Observations of TMT). Thus, neither the discussions, nor final decisions were made in a village forum where public comments could be made. Ultimately income generating investments prevailed in private decision making over investments directly in public facilities.

Non-self Representation of the Accra Youth Assembly: There are two groups of youth concerning the initiative, the village youth (all males approximately under the age of fifty-five) and the Accra Youth Association. The Accra Youth Association’s interests were in developing the sanctuary income generating potential to increase the benefit to all village youth (Youth Meeting). This section describes how the chiefs used their power on the TMT to non-self represent the Youth Association by including their income generating interests. However, the chiefs included them to capture greater benefits themselves rather than sharing greater revenue with the village.

The Accra Youth includes about twelve young men, mid to late twenties, living in Accra, but originally from Wli. The Accra Youth formed when the first term of the TMT ended in 2002 with the intention of replacing them (Emanuel). Guides and the guesthouse owner said the Accra Youth have proposed many income generating, tourism

related village activities for the project that the TMT has refused. One guide, Emanuel said, “(Accra Youth) want to replace the TMT and overturn the chiefs. If the chiefs say ‘Okay you replace the TMT’ it’s like overturning the chiefs (village government) because (the TMT) is their system” (Emanuel). By this he meant that in order for the village wide proposals by the Accra Youth to be accepted by the TMT, they would have to be accepted by the chiefs. This was not the interests of the chiefs, and would have to share power with the youth, something that goes against the norm of traditional authority. Therefore, from his viewpoint, it would be impossible to incorporate other interests into the TMT without ‘overturning’ its power structure.

Instead of a radical change in power, the TMT co-opted the Accra Youth and began allowing them to participate in meetings by generating ideas. In reference to youth participation, the TMT Chairman said they had volunteered the village “bright ones”, the Accra Youth, and “organized the others”, village youth, for labor (Steven). If the youth had effective leadership they would have both the creativity and energy necessary to develop the project, presumably in the interest of the village since youth and their families make up the majority of the population. However, this comment demonstrates that the TMT manipulated both groups to benefit their own interests.

Although misrepresented by the TMT, the Accra Youth obviously sided with full village control of management. Two ideas created and managed by the Accra Youth were printing t-shirts and calendars for sale on Easter Monday. The t-shirts and calendars were popular among the Wli villages. They had a picture of the waterfall printed on them with the title “Agumatsa Falls” without the recognition of the wildlife or sanctuary, like the signs that frustrated the officers. The shirts also said “Community Solidarity, United

We Stand” written below a Venn diagram with the names of the three villages converging together, rather than the three co-management bodies (Observations of Accra Youth). These are examples of other small ways the TMT and villagers resisted the co-management strategy.

Non Representation of Village Youth: Non representation of village youth was another consequence of chief dominance of the TMT. A small number of village youth were non-self represented as tourism guides, while other entrepreneurs, hunters and charcoal makers were not represented by the initiative. Traditionally, Village Youth are represented by a Youth Chief who holds meetings to hear their views and reports them to the Village Chief. When I approached the Youth Chief he discouraged me from calling a youth meeting because they have a poor history of coming to meetings in recent times and would not gather if the meeting was about the AWS initiative (Youth Chief). He reluctantly agreed to hold a meeting in two days, but when the morning arrived he told me he had forgotten to send the crier to call them. With the help of the District Assemblyman we convinced the chief to summon a meeting the next morning. I suspect this was simply an excuse because he was eager and excited to meet with me. I think the Youth Chief did not call the meeting with the Village Youth because the TMT chiefs did not want me to consult with them. At this meeting, the Village Youth did not feel free to discuss the AWS project. They responded to my questions about project goals and revenue as follows: “Those questions are for the TMT...we are under the decisions the TMT makes” (Village Youth). Thus, their Youth Chief Representative is unwilling to call them for meetings and they are not able to voice their interests directly in the project because they were excluded from TMT meetings and intimidated by the chiefs.

However, they discussed their interests that are not represented by the TMT and chiefs. The youth said the lack of economic opportunities is their main problem in Wli. When villagers are trained in skilled labor they have to leave for cities to find work because the only sources of income in the village are surplus food crops. They would like the TMT to invest in their labor to construct small business project facilities, “Employ the village masons and carpenters to build projects...as well as laborers to maintain animals” (Village Youth). They suggested an intensified communal pig husbandry where they could be hired and paid wages like the guides, landowners, and TMT members. (Village Youth) However, chiefs only demonstrated interest in narrow investment opportunities, like the plastic funeral chairs and selling drinks at the tourism center, which they could easily control.

Besides the content of this meeting, its attendance was also telling of the exclusion of village youth from the TMT. There was a complete absence of all but one guide and all non-chief TMT members. Although they are also village youth by definition, they did not answer the call of the Youth Chief for the meeting. Despite not coming to the meeting, one guide in his early 20’s stated his disappointed that “They” (the youth) did not show better numbers in the meeting. He separated himself from “The Youth” because he is one of the five village youth paid to work as permanent guides. He described that the village youth are the trouble makers, the resistance to the TMT. He did not recognize their grievances as a result of non representation, thus perpetuating their reputation as a valid reason to exclude their interests from the TMT.

Resistance and Lack of Support for the TMT: There is a consensus among non-TMT members, including guides, wildlife officers, District Assemblyman,

guesthouse owner, elders, youth, and hunters, that the TMT is focused on remaining in power and having control over revenues, not in developing the sanctuary or the village. This list of non-TMT actors is an unusual alliance of village interests that jumped back and forth during interviews between supporting the TMT to gain total control of management and revenues from the District and Wildlife Division, and supporting the District and Wildlife Division in an attempt to make the TMT represent them. According to how the TMT bylaws were written they would have had both, but in reality they have neither. The following sections are examples of division between the interests of youth and TMT, and types of resistance to the TMT from multiple perspectives.

Guide and Youth Resistance to the TMT: Guides and business owners also said the TMT is not forthcoming with project information, particularly the use of revenue. A guide said chiefs are reluctant to spend or invest revenue in the village or the project, “(Chiefs) speak badly about getting money and immediately spending it” (Alfred). He described this as a norm of traditional authority, wise decision making by not acting hastily. However, he also said money is used regularly for buying drinks for meetings and chiefs’ transportation to the regional capital for reasons unrelated to the project. His description of chiefs drinking conformed with my observations in which TMT meetings always involved heavy alcohol consumption, presumably for ceremonial and spiritual reasons. However, drinking in these meetings commonly went beyond the ceremonial prayer and offering to the ancestors I observed in other village ceremonies. Based on the low participation in discussion and high participation in drinking by most chiefs, it seemed like drinking was their motivation or reward for attending the meetings. TMT funds usually paid for three or four bottles of gin, or locally made distilled palm

wine, *sodabi/apitache*, as well as a crate of soft drinks for each meeting (observations of TMT meetings). Guides, the District Assemblyman, and the guesthouse owner talked about similar misuse of TMT revenues by chiefs.

The guesthouse owner said this was a division between the youth and elders, with the youth having many ideas for project development that the elders would not accept (Guesthouse). One of the guides said he hears recommendations from tourists about improvements for the sanctuary, like labeling and interpretation of plants, reforestation, and litter, but when he offers these to the TMT, “They don’t want to hear that story” (Emanuel). He blamed this partially on the TMT lack of training. He said the Volunteer who organized the TMT ended her service just as the TMT was getting started. She was followed by two other volunteers who were supposed to continue her capacity building work, but they both had to leave for personal before training the TMT. He felt the Volunteer guidance was crucial to keep the TMT true to their village development and representation goals and encourage them to invest in new village youth ideas (Emanuel). He said the chiefs have refused to develop a village home stay system because they are not used to these kinds of projects (Emanuel).

One of the effects of non representation of village youth is low participation in village meetings and labor unrelated to the Sanctuary. Because it is the village chiefs who are not representing them, they resist village wide activities, which further decreases the TMT and chiefs’ desire to include them. A non-TMT village elder discussed the exclusion of the Village Youth as one of his major concerns for the project:

In the case of jobs and benefits offered to youth, there are only a few guide positions. When tourists come (the TMT and Wildlife) didn’t want them to be disturbed by youth wanting to guide them to the falls. So they ban that. But the youth argue that if they cannot have that source of income they will not do

communal labor. And, in fact, they will choose to hunt to get a source of revenue from the project area instead. (Cleophas)

These youth activities, caused by their lack of representation, directly impact the Sanctuary. However, they actually create more trouble for the wildlife officers to exclude their use, which in a way helps the TMT. But they also decrease the capacity of chiefs to manage the village effectively; without communal labor little can be accomplished.

Although not directly related to the Sanctuary, a village guesthouse owner also mentioned several conflicts she has had with hiring village youth to cook, clean, and maintain her rooms. She said the Youth take advantage of her because she has a successful business by raising the prices of their fruit and produce for her and demanding high labor fees for construction. She has also experienced problems with jealousy between villagers she employs, theft, and employees using the guesthouse for prostitution. She sees these as acts of desperation due to the lack of economic opportunities in the village that are antagonized by the non representation of youth by the TMT. She hopes that her business provides an example for more villagers to develop their own projects separate from the TMT. (Guesthouse)

Non-TMT Elder Resistance to the TMT: Two of the most vocal and active villagers in opposition to the TMT were a non-TMT elder of Wli who works as a private consultant on development projects both nationally and internationally, and the District Assembly Representative for Wli. The consultant said that the TMT has too much unchecked power, particularly over the use of money:

They (TMT) formed themselves and then wrote their own laws. It should not be like that. They should be appointed to do a task and given guidelines. Now they can say 'we are going to hire 4 more guides and pay them 400,000cedis'. Who is

going to approve that, to assure it's not just making a job for someone?
(Cleophas)

To address this problem he recommends that the TMT needs to have an advisory board, like the village elders, that hold them accountable, "The board will not have an overbearing control over the TMT, but they will have to be approved annually according to their activities." By saying this he meant that the TMT needs to be able to make decisions more effectively and timely, but that they also need to be accountable to the village population. Because of this he thinks the TMT should simply be the management implementation body, rather than represent village interests and actively manage. As a private consultant he is just as individually motivated to make money as the chiefs and TMT members. He said he is not a TMT member only because his job requires him to travel frequently. Therefore, it is not the chief's narrow interests per se that he sees as a problem, but that they can implement or restrict TMT action without needing anyone's approval (Cleophas).

Besides being the District Assemblyman for Wli and the surrounding area, William is one of the founding, non-chief TMT members. He has engaged himself in reforming the TMT towards what he sees as its original intentions, representing and benefiting the entire village population. He stated that this problem lies within the co-management structure and members of the TMT as well, that "there are many hiding behind the chiefs" (District Assemblyman, Wildlife Officer). By this he meant that it is not only the chiefs, but more of the TMT members that are involved in embezzling, non representation, and undermining the co-management arrangement; that this number has gradually grown in number as the TMT has become less representative. He has approached the TMT problem using his District Assemblyman authority to appoint a non-

TMT committee to review and reform the TMT constitution and by-laws. This was not an assignment for him from the District; rather he took it upon himself in lieu of District action (William). He selected individuals from across the villages to meet and make new decisions about elections, goals, planning requirements, and budgeting for revenue use. He wrote a proposed draft of a new constitution and bylaws with some flexibility for the committee to choose from (William). His leadership experience gives him the confidence to attempt to reform the TMT vis-à-vis chief anger. He admits that even if he succeeds in gathering the committee to reform the TMT bylaws, it will require strong action by the District to legally recognize and enforce them, something they have been unable to do. The examples of Cleophas and William demonstrate that there is broad-based resistance to the chief dominance of the TMT from youth as well as non-chief elders.

Bat Hunters and Charcoal Makers: Bat hunters and charcoal makers are not represented by the project. These activities are banned within the sanctuary, but occur relatively uncontrolled. Bat hunters are village youth that primarily farm, but hunt opportunistically for personal consumption and sales from their homes (Moses). Decisions regarding when to hunt are made within their larger agro-economy, when they are not too busy with their fields and have extra money to buy ammunition. They also plan their hunts around the presence of the TMT. However, hunters are not secretive since their methods include using shotguns, hunting at all times of the day, and accessing the cliffs adjacent to the waterfall where the bats roost through the main tourism trail. When describing the good market for bats in the village, a hunter said that TMT members are frequently among those that buy from him (Moses).

Hunting is downplayed as a serious issue in group contexts, such as TMT meetings, conversations between guides and wildlife officers, and the Village Youth meeting. The TMT Chairman and Youth both described hunters as a limited number of “hardened youth” or those “without conscience” (Steven, Youth). However, in personal interviews it was identified as a threat, but primarily in the context of the TMT or wildlife officers blaming each other for failing to control hunting, rather than how to effectively control it. Therefore, the act of hunting per se is seen as a minor issue, but it is a major symbol of power in the co-management conflict.

The guides and TMT regard hunting as a serious conflict with tourism, largely for safety and aesthetic reasons:

(Hunters) throw rocks down (to make the bats fly within shooting range) like last week when there are guides and tourists here. They threw big rocks and hit one guide and broke a section of the bridge. We called the police and they came, but did not catch them...It will be a very bad thing if a tourist comes and is killed by a rock. The word of this will come to the village, in Ghana and Togo, and it will be severe. (Alfred)

On the other hand the wildlife officers head officer sees it as illegal because of the sanctuary laws (Anthony). A guide said:

They (Officers) say we cannot control our own people to stop poaching. They give us examples...stories about their old projects in their home towns...how they would stop hunters and bring them to justice. They should be patrolling. (Emanuel)

Others blamed the District Assembly for not playing a large enough role in enforcement (Alfred, William). Thus it is unclear which management body is responsible for monitoring and enforcing hunting.

Guides stated that strict enforcement was the only way to stop hunting, “It would be better to take all the guns away...with tough examples, when people are arrested and

taken to court they will be fined or put in prison. After two or three cases there will be an example.” (Alfred) Strict enforcement, as guides described it, implied that it should not be the duty of village authority, but that hunting is a problem for the wildlife officers and District level courts. When I suggested the possibility of more flexible village-based hunting regulations like license fees or seasons to another guide, he said these would be ineffective, “Hunters here are not like you in Europe. If you say go do this, pay (for a license), and stop at some point, they will never respect it” (Alfonse). But a hunter said he thought the possibility of having hunting hours in the early morning when tourists are generally not around to reduce conflict would interest him (Moses). Despite their distain for hunting, guides did not confront or report hunters when they were encountered at the falls or on the trail. A guide said this was because the hunters have guns and are dangerous (Alfonse), while the hunter said they let them go because they are friends (Moses).

These contradictions in problem definition, solutions, and actions taken by the different management bodies exemplify that the hunting debate is not about if the village could control hunters. TMT members who buy bats and guides that do not turn in hunters do not seem genuinely concerned about its negative ecological or economic effects on tourism. Rather hunting it is made an issue by these groups as evidence that the Wildlife Division is ineffective and should not be part of co-management of the sanctuary.

Charcoal Making: Few of the actors thought charcoal making was problematic for the sanctuary. Guides, TMT members, and Wildlife officers commonly replied that as long as it was not happening in the sanctuary; it was not an issue. However, charcoal

making and regular burning of the surrounding fields have contributed to making the sanctuary an island of forest habitat, physically and ecologically separated from other forested tracts (observations of Wli). Charcoal makers in Wli described it as a permanent source of supplemental income from their farms that surround the sanctuary (John, Street Vendor).

In one such instance a landowner adjacent to the sanctuary, whose land was bisected by the main tourist trail, felled a large *odum* tree for making charcoal. Guides and TMT member defended this activity by saying things like, “It was not actually in the sanctuary boundary” (Mary). However, it represents a form of resistance by villagers to the Sanctuary management since chain sawing a large diameter hardwood tree making up a large portion of the canopy, and burning it for coal within a few feet of the main trail used by tourists is obviously not a benefit to those visiting to experience a wildlife sanctuary. Two groups of British and German tourists commented to me at the tourist center about their disappointment with this particular charcoal event. The farmer used one of the permanent bridges constructed for access to the sanctuary to transport the coal to the main road, which meant passing by the tourism office and wildlife officers.

Continued charcoal making by landowners adjacent to the sanctuary also demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the TMT revenue distribution system. Of the TMT fifty-seven percent of total revenue, sixty percent goes directly to landowners to compensate for the lost production potential of their lands (Steven). Going back to the previous charcoal making example, the landowner’s actions were part of a precisely calculated land use decision. He hired a sawyer to cut the tree and taxi driver to transport the coal to the regional market in Hohoe. Considering both of these costs he calculated

the approximate profit margin, which would be used to establish a cocoa farm on different lands (John). Had the landowner percentage system been effective, this landowner could have used his portion of revenues to establish his cocoa farm without making charcoal on the sanctuary border. However, his choice to do so reflects his disregard or dissatisfaction for the sanctuary, since he could have harvested trees elsewhere, and that his revenue percentage fulfills some other element of his farming economy not intended by the project.

This section described that there is village wide opposition to the TMT power and revenue control. The youth resistance occurs through hunting and a general lack of participation in communal labor, while the non-TMT elders are concerned with reforming the TMT structure to increase accountability. It is unclear if these actions will have an effect on the TMT since it is not in their narrow interest to represent these groups. However, with such a large opposition to the TMT it is difficult to imagine reconciling their differences through negotiating new bylaws.

Low Capacity of Wildlife Officers:

The wildlife officers play an ineffective role in the co-management strategy because of their low capacity to engage in monitoring and enforcement. This low capacity was further degraded by conflicts with the TMT and village animosity. The following data demonstrate (1) the low National wildlife officers investment in the Sanctuary, and (2) the pressures put on the wildlife officers by TMT and village hostility.

Lack of National Wildlife Division Investment: The lack of support and investment in the Sanctuary by the central wildlife officers has frustrated the officers and decreased their motivation to work as well. The most obvious example of this is the

number of officers. Initially the Wildlife Division employed twelve officers, while today there are only three. This quadruples the responsibilities per officer. However, the increase in duties has not been effective, partially because officer employment benefits have remained low. One officer complained that he has worked as an officer in two protected areas over the last ten years and has not been trained or promoted:

Some people work ten years without being promoted. For very little (pay). Someone can work their whole career in the same position. It's not satisfying, (local) people don't like you in this job. We have to stop them from doing what they like to do. So they (wildlife officers) have to make us happy too. But only those in Accra get appointed. (Felix)

He would like to be paid more and have more authority. He feels unwilling to risk his safety and decrease his quality of life by creating conflicts with villagers over enforcement because of the low incentives offered by his job. Thus the lack of Wildlife Division investment decreases his capacity by not encouraging him to act.

I observed this example of Felix's frustration and unwillingness to act during an interview at the tourism center. It was the day after Easter Monday, the sanctuary's highest use day of the year with approximately 2000 visitors, primarily Ghanaians from Accra came to picnic at the waterfall. Due to the high number of visitors on this day everyone pays a flat rate holiday price, rather than the usual differential fee system for students, Ghana residents, and those with cameras. To avoid conflict with the high use, local villagers are not allowed to visit the waterfall that day, but the village plans a festival for residents the following day, Easter Tuesday. The TMT also controls all ticket sales on Easter Monday by employing the guides and additional members of the Accra Youth Association as ticket collectors. The problem encountered by Felix was on Tuesday, the village festival day. Local residents are never required to pay to visit the

sanctuary, but for non-residents, Tuesday is a normal fee day. During our interview many non-residents approached Felix at the fee collection desk and begged him to let them go free because it was a village free day and they could not make it for the reduced price non-resident day. Felix refused initially, but then quickly gave in and allowed them to pass or they simply ignored him when he said they would have to pay. Each time this occurred Felix became more depressed, sighing and shaking his head. During this interview he described how he found it difficult to enforce the sanctuary regulations because of the lack of training and wages offered by the Wildlife Division (Felix).

The lack of officers and low morale has compromised the wildlife officers' ability to control sanctuary access logistically, which in turn has angered the villagers and exacerbated the difficulty of the officers performing their duties. A private guesthouse owner said, "They sit back and watch the hunters go by, say 'hello, how are you?', but then they (wildlife officers) say they can't stop them because they (hunters) will make it too hard for them to live here" (Guesthouse). Similarly, the District Assemblyman said, "villagers hired as public servants would appreciate their salary and do the work...the wildlife (officers) just sit there" (William). Guides complained that the officers numbers have become too few to be effective, "If you're going to take most away, why don't you take them all? We don't like to see them working like that, behind a desk. It's not their job, that's not why they're here. They should be patrolling" (Emanuel). The District Assemblyman also remarked that wildlife officers' leadership does not defend the Sanctuary, "It is always like a butterfly in the back. A butterfly looks big but has no strength, but always like to suck the sweetness" (William). He was referring to a border dispute with a village in Togo over access to the waterfall from the upper, Togolese side.

He felt the chiefs and elders (TMT) fought to exclude use more than the wildlife officers, i.e. another reason the officers are not benefiting the Sanctuary.

Another type of investment not made by the central Wildlife Division that lowers their morale is affirmation of the officer's work. The Head Officer lamented the loss of prestige he felt from the recognition from his superiors for managing the Sanctuary. He expressed this by saying that this year they were not in the Ghana Forestry Commission calendar, "I do not know if it will be a protected area (anymore). Usually it (the waterfall) is one of the pictures...one of the prominent tourist attractions" (Anthony). That he bases his feelings of affirmation on the annual calendar rather than direct feedback demonstrates the lack of communication within the Wildlife Division. The Head Officer stated he feels frustrated and says he wants to leave the village but his Wildlife Division superiors will not give tell him what their plan is for AWS:

Now this decision comes through (village chiefs confiscated the revenue books to force the wildlife officers out of the tourism office) and we don't know (what to do). I get my orders from my superior, but haven't heard what they will do with us...I am working in this community for these people. If they don't want me they should give me some signals. I just don't want to be here. I'd just as soon not come to service. (Anthony)

This quote describes the officer's difficulty with not having clear orders from his superiors concerning his current co-management duties and his future employment. He does not want to collaborate with the TMT because of their undermining tactics. Rather than having clear orders on how to collaborate, he would prefer being reassigned to a different protected area. He made reference to his traditional top-down monitoring and enforcement duties at his previous assignment in another protected forest. Therefore, like Felix, he is also discouraged to act but for different reasons.

relations between the TMT and wildlife officers were more effective. The head officer recalled that when he arrived there were no official guides; anyone in the village could invite tourists to follow them through the forest to visit the waterfall. This created competition among village youth to the point of tourists being mobbed as they arrived in Wli. He proposed that the project hire and train official guides to decrease this harassment. The TMT organized and selected five youth from different clans who were trained by the Officers and incorporated into the management system (Anthony). But over time the relationship between the two bodies has changed because of the chiefs take over of the TMT and undermining tactics of the other bodies. The Head Officer discussed changes in TMT activity over time from trying to proactively manage the sanctuary and represent to simply controlling power and revenues:

We had been going along for the past years handing over (management duties), preparing the TMT to eventually take over. Now it's about taking control of the money...not using the books...not going through the District...then getting all our shares (of the revenue). (Anthony)

This quote and other comments made by the Head Officer describe that the TMT was, at some point, more willing to collaborate, but are no longer accountable to either of the other two management bodies.

Increased animosity between villagers and wildlife officers escalated to a break in at the Head Officer's house and theft of his Wildlife Division issued motorbike. Because of this he moved his family to the regional capitol, Ho, for their protection. Today the Head Officer is bitter about the whole situation. Quickly after telling me the success story about creating the tourism guides in the co-management beginning, he said, "They are not special guides. They're just guys that lead people there" (Anthony). The TMT

tactics of forcing the wildlife officers out of the project continues to increase tension between them and the officers.

The officers are ignored and excluded from discussions and information sharing by TMT members, which annoys and detaches them from their work. One day I brought a letter describing my research goals to the tourism office for the wildlife officers and TMT to read. The TMT member sitting at the desk read it and immediately said they would keep it with their records. Only after I asked him to share the letter with the officer, who was sitting at the desk next to him, did he reluctantly hand it to him (observation of TMT). The officer later told me if I was not there to say anything they would never have shown it to them (Felix). Since the TMT does not agree with the co-management agreement, they actively try to exclude the Officers from information and decisions, thus making them less effective, and support the TMT argument that the Wildlife Division should not be a part of the Sanctuary management.

Other discrete excluding acts done by the TMT frustrated the officers. One of the officers pointed out the new signs the TMT painted to post on the trails:

Look, they have all the rules: no weapons, no cutting, no litter, bats are a part of the ecosystem... These are all Wildlife (Division) laws. But on the sign they just wrote 'Agumatsa Sanctuary' rather than Wildlife Sanctuary. (Felix)

What upset him about the signs was that the TMT is copying the Wildlife Division rules, but then claiming them as their own, essentially using the officer's rules as a way to exclude them, i.e. show that they are no longer necessary, rather than help the officers enforce the rules since they already existed. He saw the act of painting the signs as another undermining power move by the TMT. These comments illustrate that, besides the lack of motivation to act because of the low Wildlife Division investment, the TMT

greatly limited the officer's opportunities to participate. Therefore, the wildlife officers are self-represented only in theory by the co-management arrangement and are truly ineffective in practice.

In contrast to Felix's apathy, the Head Officer reacts to the pressure from the TMT by becoming more rigid. In reaction to the TMT excluding the officers as management partners, the Head Officer separates himself from the TMT by exaggerating his authority. Whenever in public he wears a military style officers' uniform with knee high black boots and a wide brimmed jungle hat. The other officers and TMT members all dress like average villagers, wear flip flops and t-shirts. He is more diligent and professional with his duties than the other officers, guides, and TMT as well. His obsessive work ethic, in contrast to Felix's apathy, detaches him from the TMT co-management intentionally as resistance to their undermining tactics. He commonly listens to politics on the radio by himself at the desk and constantly works on keeping records while the others socialize outside the office. He is always serious when he 'reports to service', which contrasts his casual demeanor that I observed during our meetings at his garden and other private situations. These examples illustrate that the TMT has been successful in undermining the wildlife officers and cultivating hostility towards them in the village, which have decreased their already limited capacity.

Summary: This case demonstrates a co-management protected area that satisfies the key to successful participation in theory. However, in practice deficiencies within all three bodies limited their effectiveness. Specifically each of the bodies was deficient in the following ways: non-representation of village-wide interests by the chiefs and TMT;

lack of investment in wildlife officers by the Wildlife Division; and lack of investment and enforcement by the District Assembly. Because of these three large individual problems, it is difficult to analyze what elements of co-management are particularly relevant. Therefore, I have several recommendations.

This case could benefit from a protected area outreach structure if the Wildlife Division was to invest more in its officers or invest higher in the TMT equivalent of government officers. The latter could go a long way in improving the value of the Wildlife Division with TMT and villagers. On the other hand, this case could benefit from a community conservation framework if the TMT was more transparent. For this to happen it appears that the chiefs would have to be separated from the TMT. Ultimately, however, the responsibility of the co-management arrangement lies with the District Assembly because of Ghana's national decentralization policy. In this case the District was not the appropriate level to represent either the village or national interests and became part of a corrupt alliance with chiefs to serve its own income generating interests. This case demonstrates that for co-management to be successful the initial negotiations are critical and the decentralization policy does not allow enough flexibility for the three bodies to engage in meaningful negotiation of their roles based on their individual and shared interests and capacities. Because of this the three body system was not able to effectively share power and management roles.

Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area

This case demonstrates representation, empowerment, and capacity elements from the community conservation pole of the participatory conservation continuum. This

framework defines criteria of success including: project goals reflecting community needs and economic security of livelihoods; management based on local ownership and local knowledge; cohesion between social and geographic boundaries; and locally legitimate decision making and authorities (Figure 4, Literature Review). The broad-based Project Management Committee in this case attempts to incorporate each of these elements, thus this section analyzes these elements in the context of this set of local interest groups and actors.

Overview: There are four key points in this case that arose through the broad-based representation strategy, but never-the-less resulted in low village-wide ownership and responsibility for the project, and high expectations and authority of only chiefs and non-governmental organization managers (Figure 20):

1. The Ghana Wildlife Society (NGO) required the project form a broad-based, multi-village Project Management Committee that self represented all interest groups in the project area. However, this was a foreign concept to the population.
2. Due to traditional leadership expectations, chiefs and the Ghana Wildlife Society managers were empowered more than other project committee members, as traditional authorities and external experts/aid workers.
3. Decisions concerning small scale enterprise activities narrowly made by chiefs and the managers missed opportunities to create greater local ownership and build villager capacity and were generally unsuccessful.
4. Villagers had greater success organizing themselves to participate in these activities in ways not determined by chiefs and wildlife managers.


First, Afadjato's project committee approach, designed by the Ghana Wildlife Society, inserted their managers within a group of village representatives. Therefore, theoretically with only one seat on the project management committee, like the other village representatives, the Wildlife Managers and villagers had equal self representation

and decision making power. The other village representatives on the project committee built upon pre-existing local institutions. Thus the committee was broad based and included locally legitimate representatives, but traditionally these roles exist in a hierarchy separated by village boundaries. Therefore, the committees did not function as they were designed.

Second, in practice the committee design resulted in top-down decision making because the traditional roles of village chiefs, as decision making authority figures, and the Ghana Wildlife Society managers, as external experts, limited the representation of other interest groups. Specifically, landowners, youth, and women that technically had “seats” on the project committee were insignificantly self represented, i.e. they did not participate equally with chiefs and managers in project meetings and decision making. This was a socially determined limitation, not a result of chief and manager direct exclusion of other representatives. Never-the-less, the wildlife managers and chiefs were empowered within the project committee with greater authority and management responsibility over the project than other representatives.

Third, decisions narrowly made, but with good intentions, by the wildlife managers and chiefs resulted in missed opportunities to increase local capacity and unsuccessful enterprise development activities. In several instances the project managers made decisions that they thought would avoid problems, which further concentrated or reaffirmed their power and took responsibilities away from other interest groups. Because of this, the capacities of pre-existing institutions, such as private entrepreneurs, and the social norms that influence them were not built upon.

Fourth, despite the limited success of decisions made by the project committee leaders, villagers involved in the project such as guides and enterprise group members developed other successful forms of participation and organization. These included holding the chiefs and managers downwardly accountable through the public forum of project committee meetings; alternatively organizing enterprise groups; monitoring enterprise groups and leadership roles held by project guides rather than village authority figures; developing enterprise activities based on but autonomous to the project; and incorporating an alternative model of management committee.



Analysis:

Broad-Based Project Management Committee:

The majority of the actors in the Agumatsa initiative fall within the project management committee as self represented interest groups, including: representatives of chiefs, elders, landowners, youth, women, entrepreneurs in project activities, health

center employees, and schools. The representatives for these interests were identified and appointed from preexisting village roles, like the Queen Mother that represents women's interests, Youth Chief for village youth, Paramount Chief, etc... To avoid limited representation there is no limit to the number of project committee interests or members (Edem). In the scheme of project decision making, the Project Manager stated that all final decisions are made by the project committee in an effort to include all representatives (Edem). For these reasons, the project committee, by design, is in a different class from the previous cases' village management committees that relied on small numbers of villagers with similar interests to represent their village populations. However, this design did not coincide well with the project area's preexisting social boundaries.

The Ghana Wildlife Society used the term 'community' as the target population of this initiative to cultivate broad-based support. Project advertisements such as billboards, brochures, and website read, "A partnership between the Gbledi Community and Ghana Wildlife Society". However, when wildlife managers and chiefs described the actors involved in the project, they stated the individual Gbledi villages, Gbogame and Chebi, plus Ahor, one villages from the neighboring Fodome Traditional Area (Edem, Togbega, Mancredo). Guides identified themselves by the village they lived in and the small-scale enterprise groups were especially grounded in individual villages (Isaac). For instance rather than having a "community" bee keeping group, there were groups specific to the individual villages (Mancredo). Therefore, it was not easy for the project to represent all community stakeholders because of the historical separation of villages, and it took considerable effort and designing of the project to organize the project committee.

Creating the project committee with chiefs and across village interests that spanned multiple social boundaries together on one body was one of the first external strategies implanted by the wildlife managers (Edem). This sense of multi-village and traditional area community did not exist previously. Each of the Gbledi villages had their own village chiefs and elders that could cooperate under their Paramount Chief, but bringing together the Fodome village also brought a second Paramount Chief of that traditional area into the picture (Togbega, Mancredo). It was apparent that the term community had been adopted because of its frequent use by chief, wildlife managers, and other representatives; a term not commonly used in the study area villages (observations of study areas). For these reason the community definition of the project population by the Wildlife Society became a critical element to creating and maintaining a cohesive social population.

The reason for creating a project committee that crossed so many social boundaries was to expand the size of the project's forest reserve to make it more attractive for funding from the Dutch Embassy. The Project Manager said the original proposal including only the two Gbledi villages was too small (under 10 hectares) (Edem). However, to increase the protected area size landowners and other village populations had to be incorporated into the project. Thus, the chiefs from Gbledi and wildlife managers stretched the project boundaries by creating a new definition of the "Gbledi Community". The Project Manager said he and the other wildlife managers made several mistakes initially by overselling the project, including filming publicity for the project on neighboring lands not within the boundaries of the project, and advertising nearby attractions, such as the Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary in Wli as being part of the

Afadjato initiative (Edem). He said these resulted in boundary disputes that are continuing problems for the project, particularly competing ecotourism projects in neighboring Liati and Wli Traditional Areas (Edem). These implementation shortcomings based on the external interests of the wildlife managers are indicative of the narrow representation problems throughout this initiative.

Empowerment of Chiefs and Wildlife Managers Over Project Committee:

Although the project committee was formed to broadly self represent all village interest groups this created many inconsistencies between the committee and the traditional village hierarchy. The result of this, when it came to implementing the project committee for decision making and planning, was village representatives were either physically less involved or non vocally engaged while chiefs and wildlife managers played the dominant roles. This happened because chiefs and external experts are traditionally the active participants in development and conservation projects. Furthermore, the meetings where committee members were supposed to participate took place in the form of normal, chief led village meetings. Therefore, the other village representatives expected chiefs and experts to take the lead. The following sections provide examples of how project meetings were dominated by chiefs and wildlife managers; multiple dominant roles played by chiefs; and the technical and financial roles played by the wildlife managers.

Project Committee Meetings: Typically meetings were held in the public open space in Gbledi-Gbogame where the project office and trailhead are located and the residence of the Paramount Chief. On one particular occasion the wildlife managers and liaison presented the chiefs with tourism revenues to divide among landowners and the general village. From a physical participation standpoint, only the Chiefs, village-project

liaison, and wildlife managers were seated in the meeting space. The rest of the project committee members were mixed in with the rest of the village. Thus, the project committee members like youth and women's representatives were not physically on the same level as the chiefs and wildlife managers. The chiefs were dressed in traditional *kente* cloth, sitting in the formal hierarchical seating arrangement, under a bamboo and palm canopy created for such public events. The ceremonial protocols of the meeting were no different from any village meetings I had observed in the study area. Thus, there was nothing more 'participatory' or 'community-based' about this one.

The wildlife project manager led most of the meeting; speaking first to the chiefs who sat across from the three wildlife members in the center of the public space, and then turning to address the village that surrounded them. This demonstrated that the villagers were being informed of project activities during this meeting, while the chiefs were formally sharing responsibility and authority. This was more apparent when the Project Manager gave the Paramount Chief the project tourism revenue and the Paramount Chief had to sign their documents while the Enterprise Coordinator took photographs of the two shaking hands. This symbolized that the wildlife managers required the approval and authorization of the chiefs on behalf of the village. However, this meeting was primarily a ceremony. Since the tourism revenue and distribution percentages had already been calculated, the chiefs and wildlife managers engaged each other in no discussion.

(Observations of project committee)

Dominant Roles of Chiefs: The Project Manager adamantly supported the chief leadership of the project committee. Before I could conduct interviews with wildlife managers and project committee members the Project Manager required the approval of

the Chiefs as well as his Wildlife Society superiors (Edem). To fulfill this approval I had to meet with the chiefs to discuss the goals and methods of my research project and written copies of them, along with authorization letters from the University of Montana and Peace Corps, to the Ghana Wildlife Society office. However, I did not have to meet with any other project committee representatives. In this meeting with the chiefs, they agreed to my research project without any hesitation or need to contact the other project committee representatives. Thus the chiefs, in particular the Paramount Chief, spoke on behalf of all village representatives.

In the Project Manager's opinion, the other village representatives on the project committee do not participate adequately. He said "The women on the committee are simply not vocal" and the Youth Representative can not fulfill his role because of problems he has with the Paramount Chief:

(The youth representative) participates well in meetings but doesn't get the word spread... There are internal problems, something between him and Togbega (Paramount Chief). He (youth rep) needs to beat the gong-gong and call them (youth) but because of the problem he can't (Edem).

He viewed these representation problems as problems inherent to the Youth and Women's Representatives, rather than results of chief control that is enhanced by the wildlife managers. For this reason, he sees an increase in the number of village-project liaisons, a position held by a village chief, as a key to increase representation (Edem). Thus, the Project Manager believes there should be more formal representation responsibility vested in chiefs than other village representatives to make up for their lack of participation. This pragmatic approach contradicts his definition and the project plan's requirements of the project committee and is exemplary of how the wildlife managers approached adaptation to problems encountered throughout the project.

Project-Village Liaison: One of the most active members of the chiefs was the project-village liaison. The Project Manager stated that it was the role of the liaison to facilitate information sharing between interest groups and the implementation of project activities (Edem). This role was created by the wildlife managers specifically for one village chief because he was the main initiator of the project (Mancredo). The Liaison has a history of instigating village development through external connections, such as American, Japanese, and British volunteers. However, because of his chief authority and empowered project role, the Liaison limited the participation of other interest groups. During small group meetings with guides and enterprise groups, and especially the final conference between the three projects, he was dominant and outspoken. He abruptly reprimanded a landowner for voicing a different opinion about the overuse of funds for small-scale enterprise projects and kicked another landowner out of the conference because he said the man was not serious and had been drinking (Mancredo). The Liaison's authoritative conduct occurred in his monitoring of the small scale enterprise groups as well. To visit these groups the liaison would generally ride around the village in the Wildlife Society truck and call people over to him from their compounds and speaking to them out the window (observations of Mancredo). This type of monitoring severely limited the time and encouragement given to enterprise group members during these "home visits".

The Liaison also expressed his role between the village and wildlife managers over the chiefs at times. When the Project Manager required that I get the chief's approval before beginning research, the Liaison took me to the meeting to introduce us.

Since I had already discussed my research ideas with him and the Project Manager, on the way to see the chiefs he said:

We are not going there to ask for permission. We are going to introduce you and inform him of your activities. The only permission needed has already been granted by the office (Ghana Wildlife Society). If you ask them for permission they will go into a meeting and put you through all that again. We will just go to inform. (Mancredo)

Therefore, despite the intentions of the liaison to facilitate greater information sharing between village representatives, the actions of the individual playing this role had the opposite effect.

In a general sense, by creating the liaison position the wildlife managers made direct project committee meetings less necessary, which resulted in more one-way information sharing from the wildlife managers to the village representatives and the likelihood that information designed by the managers to increase participation would be corrupted before it could be realized. Therefore, increasing the number of liaisons, via chiefs, could make information sharing more efficient, but would also increase the amount of wildlife manager influence on the project.

Dominant Ghana Wildlife Society Role: The Wildlife Society's role in the Afadjato initiative differs from its description as a single member of the project committee. The wildlife managers and liaison described a more controlling decision making and total management role of the managers in the two main project areas: reserve management and small scale enterprise development.

The initial wildlife manager activities in reserve management established their leadership role in the project. These activities included the demarcation of the forest reserve area, baseline wildlife inventories, and community education (Edem). During

these activities the wildlife managers employed village guides extensively for field work, and also led the education sessions themselves concerning detrimental land use practices, regulations of the reserve, and values of conservation (Edem). In other words, these roles of the wildlife managers coincide with the keys to protected area outreach success of convincing the local population of the virtues of scientific, protectionist conservation. A project guide confirmed this by saying that the Wildlife Society filled the same role in their project as the governmental Wildlife Division in the Wli Agumatsa Sanctuary, as far as enforcement of rules and forest protection (William).

In reserve management the wildlife managers vested a large amount of knowledge and duties in a limited number of youth by hiring and training the guides to work closely connected to them on biological surveys, tourism, labor around the office grounds, and small scale enterprise projects. Several of the guides were members of the enterprise groups and because of their connection with Wildlife Society they played monitoring and technical advising roles (observations of guides). Their close interactions between the wildlife managers and guides made the guides more knowledgeable than most villagers about project organization and activities. While other villagers, like landowners and small enterprise group members, had diverse perceptions about the objectives of the Wildlife Society, values of the reserve, and management of the enterprise activities, the guides' comments echoed those of the wildlife managers and liaison. Guides knew about the histories of most of the project activities. They even described the failed butterfly farming project in great detail (Isaac, William).

However, because of their close interaction with the wildlife managers, the guides represent the tourism and conservation objectives of the Wildlife Society, rather than the

village or their own. Their duties include guiding tourists on hikes through the forest and protecting the forest. The Project Manager jokingly interchanged these roles and titles, “They are the guides who are also the guards!” (Edem). The guides’ conservation duties, such as trap sweeping, surveys, and monitoring, are activities that also represent the Wildlife Society. This Wildlife Society defined roles of the guides differs from their specific knowledge and interests of the forest. On a hike to the peak of the Mt. Afadjato Reserve I asked a guide about the ecology of the area, and the specific connections between wildlife and the forest habitat. His responses were general, naming the generic tourism draws listed in the project brochure, like monkeys and the golden cat, but no specific interpretive knowledge. Rather than describing wildlife in detail, he changed the subject to the history of the area, contested traditional area boundaries, ancestral land use changes, and current pressures:

Once at the top he showed me a trail that cuts NE and meets the trail to Kuma-Davota (by Eugene’s farm). He showed me Kuma-Bala, which you could see on the horizon straight East. Then he pointed out the valleys, where the Gbledi traditional area meets Liat and Kuma. He described a chateau they have on the next hill North of Afadjato where they go camping. He pointed out a Kabiye farm and homestead near it and the large areas of forest they cut and replanted with bananas and other fruit trees. (Notes from William)

This local history and knowledge of land use was more important to him than the biology of the animals highlighted in the Wildlife Society brochures. To build upon the capacity of guides, and local expressions of conservation, the project would have had to incorporate this knowledge into their ecotourism design. In other words, tourism did not coincide with the knowledge and interests of the villagers. The guides and village could have supported tourism more if this local history and knowledge was promoted rather than external, scientific knowledge of wildlife. Instead, project tourism focused only on

the internationally funded conservation value of preserving wildlife, like the endangered golden cat. This demonstrates that although the wildlife managers employed village youth as guides to provide tourism services that would benefit the entire village, the way the managers engaged these guides and the village did not reflect the characteristics of the village. This is a reoccurring theme among the managers influence on small-scale enterprise activities as well, which will be discussed below regarding missed capacity building opportunities.

Factors Contributing to Wildlife Manager Dominance: The Wildlife Society's controlling role was created at least partially by a desire from the community for Wildlife Society to take certain responsibilities as the external conservation and development experts. One landowner said with pride that the Wildlife Society protects the forest from illegal activities like hunting and cutting, "Now you will be caught at once if you went to the forest!" (Honoue) The guide that described the role of the wildlife managers being like that of the government officers in Wli also said the reason the village did not want the government Wildlife Division involved in their project was that the government only takes money out, while besides their controlling management activities, the Wildlife Society also provides money to the community (William).

Despite the Wildlife Society intentions of integrating into the project committee the Wildlife Society managers' employment status and work schedule divided them and the community. The Wildlife Society project field manager said he, the other officer, and chauffeur were financially independent from the project as contract employees of Wildlife Society rather than the community. He said they will only continue working on the project only as long as there is external funding for the project (Edem). In contrast to

this, being paid by the project committee based on project success, like how landowners were compensated through the distribution of tourism revenue, could have increased downward accountability for their actions and make them true members of the project committee. The wildlife managers also divided their work time each week between the project site and their main office in Accra. They commuted from Accra every Tuesday evening to work in the village Wednesday through Friday. This separated them from the rhythm of village life (Edem, Mancredo).

Another factor contributing to heavy Wildlife Society decision making was corruption among villagers that initiated the project and skepticism of corruption from other villagers. An advisor to the project committee, who described himself as the Side-Support Representative, said that many villagers are confused by the project because they have been misled about the Wildlife Society (Marseilles). He said the well-off villagers that initiated the project expected a bribe or percentage of the project to be paid directly to them as a reward for getting the village to participate in the project. According to the Side Support Representative, the village initiators (mostly residing in Accra) thought they deserved something in exchange for allowing the Wildlife Society to use the village to get project funding; i.e. the village well-offs understood that the goal of the NGO in the project was not only to help the community, but to pay their salaries and acquire funding to develop their national capacity. However, he said that when the initiators were not paid they spread rumors in an attempt to discredit the Wildlife Society plan (Marseilles). Comments from the project committee's Youth Representative confirmed that there was something going on between the wildlife managers and project initiators. He said the chiefs and Wildlife Society are more responsive to their comments, "They only listen to

the ‘big cars’ that come from Accra. I might have a better idea, but because they come dressed fine they get listened to” (Sasa). The Wildlife Society designed the project to promote broad representation and group benefits to prevent corruption. However, these comments illustrate that they had reason to retain control over the project in case the project objectives or local actors were corrupted. Because of the secretive nature of this corruption it was difficult to collect data on this topic, but the following examples illustrate the desire of the wildlife managers to control the project to prevent corruption.

Results of Chief and Wildlife Manager Dominance on Small-Scale Enterprise Activities:

The wildlife managers and chiefs created organizational and financial boundaries for the small-scale enterprise activities. Specifically, the wildlife managers predetermined that the enterprise activities would be organized as groups with elected leadership, and controlled technical and financial expertise of the groups. Once groups had been formed the chiefs made the decision as to which of the group proposed activities the project would fund. The wildlife managers and chiefs made these rules with the intentions of facilitating enterprise growth the quickest by reducing the possibility for conflicts and increasing efficiency. However, these boundaries restricted the amount of participant buy in and ownership that are important for overcoming obstacles to these development activities. Thus, the villagers that participated in the small-scale enterprise activities as members were primarily following the rules the wildlife managers defined for them. The following sections describe the obstacles faced by the enterprise groups because of these boundaries created by narrow decision making.

Group Organizational Problems: One of the main obstacles of the enterprise activities, working effectively as groups of independent, power sharing individuals, was

created directly by wildlife managers. The liaison said, “They (Wildlife Society) said they wanted small enterprise groups of at least ten but less than thirty” (Mancredo). The Enterprise Coordinator (one of the wildlife managers) said the group concept was part of the Wildlife Society’s plan from the beginning. It was how they envisioned the economic development half of the project (Rubin). He defended the original concept, “Group projects work in Northern Ghana and other places” (Rubin). Similar to Togo, the Northern regions of Ghana are inhabited by other ethnic groups, predominantly Muslim rather than Christian, and with different social norms for farming and commerce. In Togo, the Kabye tenant farmers from the North have a system of working in extended family groups on individual member lands during peak seasons, which is not common in the South (observations of farming practices). For this reason, forming groups did not build upon preexisting local institutions with legitimacy and capacity to work effectively.

Once formed, Wildlife Society required the groups to elect a President, Secretary, and Treasurer as group leaders (Edem). However, this form of elected leadership is not consistent with traditional local business organization. For example, the beekeeping groups formed as small, family-based groups (Mancredo), which is more consistent with pre-existing, non-project small businesses. Common local small business groups, like palm oil and gari production, fish smoking and animal husbandry, are organized by individuals, usually with the help of others, but not as employees or group members with equal power and revenue sharing partners. For example, local non-project oil production and fish smoking were organized as family hierarchies with mother and daughter groups with three or four members (observations of private entrepreneurs). Therefore, the family membership structure that were decided upon by locals as the way to organize themselves

was consistent with local culture, but the group structure with divided power between a president, secretary, treasurer and advisors determined by the wildlife managers did not reflect how local groups are organized. This created groups with democratic organization only in theory, while in practice they were still governed by hierarchical family bonds, which provide unequal benefits to leaders at the top and workers at the bottom.

As a result of the previous problems, working as groups was the most widespread difficulty encountered by the enterprise activities. Many actors involved in the enterprise activities described that traditionally labor and business practice among Ewe is individual. The President of the women's palm oil group said, "It is always difficult to work in groups...some people try hard, others are lazy" (oil group President). Many others, including the liaison, landowners, guides, and project committee members reiterated this, often using the word "lazy" to describe the problems of group efforts. Two private businesswomen, producing oil and smoked fish, said they did not think the group projects sounded like good ideas. The fish smoker said, "The groups are not working hard...I used my own money for this" (Private Entrepreneur). Having made her own investments in her fish smoking materials, she would not have to share her profits with anyone, which increased her capacity to work for herself.

Soon after the Wildlife Society asked for groups to form there were twenty proposed groups (Rubin). The groups decided what activities they wanted to pursue, like farming, gari, soap, and oil transformations. From the twenty groups, the Wildlife Society and project committee analyzed the groups and decided that twelve of these looked like good activities to fund, while eight seemed less likely to succeed based on each group's relevant experience, organizational history, and economic feasibility

(Rubin). In the name of the project committee, chiefs rather than the wildlife managers, made the final decision about which enterprise activities to fund. However, they decided to fund all twenty groups to avoid conflicts and jealousy over project benefits (Rubin). Thus, the chiefs and wildlife managers imposed general boundaries on the groups, such as the group concept and leadership that were foreign to the project area, i.e. based on transplanted practical evidence. However, when it came to critical analytical decisions where expert opinions would seem more beneficial, especially with the confusion and conflict one would expect from implanting a new strategy, the chiefs and managers left the decisions up to group members. This represents the greatest shortcoming of the dominant chief and wildlife leadership.

Technical Skill Capacity Building Problems: Group activities were based on different skill sets, primarily differing in the type of product, either traditional or new, and the way they were produced, using traditional or new techniques. Some groups were traditionally organized by family, while others displayed new forms of group organization. Similarly, some groups intensified traditional products with local or external markets, while others created new products with external markets. Finally, some groups used traditional technologies and knowledge, while others used new techniques. These differences created different keys to success across the enterprise activities. The key to success for traditional product activities was sustaining their group organization to provide an advantage of pooled labor over individual producers. On the other hand, the key for new product activities was sustaining production of unfamiliar techniques and finding markets. The results of the wildlife managers control is discussed through the issues of organization and product below. The following sections provide examples for

how decisions made and actions taken by the wildlife managers, and to a lesser extent chiefs, hindered the capacity building for both traditional and new skills.

The enterprise coordinator described palm oil, gari production, and farming activities as examples of intensifying traditional products, “Most of the activities were not new, people have been doing them since infancy” (Rubin). These products built upon local production knowledge and local markets. For these activities the Wildlife Society simply gave loans to increase investment and production with the same methods. Therefore, the project funding gave these groups an advantage over individuals producing the same products by providing more capital and organized labor. However, the Coordinator described that farming groups in particular showed the worst results of all the groups:

The problem is working with groups; people don’t work together and apply themselves the same. The (production from the) amount of lands used as group (farming) lands didn’t increase proportionally. Previously, one person was cultivating half an acre. We could have helped to increase each person to one acre, but instead twenty three people grouped together to farm five acres. The possibility of increasing production is not being met. Plus the five acres was not even maintained to produce. The reason they failed was lack of labor and commitment. (Rubin)

Thus, the project built upon local knowledge and preexisting markets in these types of activities, but the requirement of group organization negated these because other group dynamics limited production.

Wild honey gathering and palm oil soap making are also traditional activities that the project built upon. However, in these cases the project introduced new methods of production to make higher quality farmed honey and import quality soap. In this way the concepts were not new, but new, quality enhancing techniques were taught by external experts (Rubin). A guide said there were originally six beekeeping groups, three in both

the two main Gbledi villages, each composed of fifteen members with three hives per member provided by the project (Isaac). Although the beekeeping market for honey is good both locally and nationally, the groups encountered problems organizing and sustaining production in this activity. One of the group leaders said members became discouraged by the slow hive colonization rate because of the poor advice the trainer had given them about how to capture bees, which resulted in low immediate benefits and many people abandoned their hives (Mancredo). Another member said that “People were falling back. Instead of getting eighteen people at a meeting, you get six” (Marseilles). After poor initial results the Enterprise Coordinator decided to find a new beekeeping expert to train the groups. The new trainer recommended a slightly different design and location of hives. Therefore, the Coordinator recalled the hives to change their roof design. However, when he did he also made decisions about who was still serious about the project and only redistributed hives to these group members (Mancredo). Thus, in response to problems created by the external control of this activity, the Coordinator increased his control in an attempt to ‘fix’ things.

Financial Capacity Building Problems: Finding markets for enterprise products, like soap and gari, was a limiting factor for these activities. When the groups were formed profitability was estimated by the wildlife managers using optimistic transportation and market prices, “When they (Wildlife Society) did the feasibility studies for the small scale projects they said we would find the greatest markets to sell things, but now the prices of the products are all down” (Marseilles). The role of researching these markets was held by the Wildlife Society rather than group members, thus maintaining the villager’s role of production much like that of producing export cash crops where they

have no power over the price of their product because of limited access to market knowledge and restricted communication with buyers because of middlemen.

Another financial role of the wildlife managers in enterprise development was financial, specifically in buying machines for the village to process raw agriculture products. Like the chiefs decision to fund all enterprise groups, the Liaison and Enterprise Coordinator said that to save money and avoid problems Wildlife Society bought most large equipment and transported it directly themselves rather than devolving these tasks to the groups themselves (Rubin, Mancredo). This certainly reduced costs of transport by shipping equipment in the Wildlife Society vehicle. However, it reinforced the wildlife manager's role in large-scale purchases and cost negotiation. The group leaders could have set up purchases that included the use of the project vehicle. Again this limited the access of villagers to market knowledge, and trivialized the fiscal management training the wildlife managers previously required as part of the training of all groups, i.e. they were trained to manage financial resources but not given the responsibility to implement that training into practice.

There was also a general belief that machines, tools, and in general, money, were the missing ingredients to village enterprise success. One chief and landowner said, "Everything is hard to start, but we are hoping for the future. If only donors and funders can help. We have plenty of land and workforce, but no capital to purchase machines" (Morrtty). A guide described the Wildlife Society role by saying they had, "Brought many machines to the village" (Isaac). Wildlife Society made large investments in equipment and supplies depending on the group activities, like bee hives, mills for grinding cassava and palm nuts, butterfly screening, and field tools for farming groups.

However, since these machines were purchased for use by groups, they relied on the false assumption that the machines would easily intensify individual level production. The farming activities showed that this was not the case since working in groups created other group dynamic issues that decreased production. Never-the-less, machines were perceived as essential ingredients for successful development and thus the wildlife managers that provided the machines as well.

The machines were paid for by the project as rotational loans that the groups were expected to repay. When they repaid the project, the funds would be available for new groups to apply for (Rubin). However, because of the loan system, villagers treated the machines as property of the Wildlife Society, rather than village owned and village run. Besides protecting the forest, villagers expected the Wildlife Society to protect “their” (Wildlife Society) machines. The Wildlife Society was synonymous in the village with “the wildlife project”, “their project”, and “their machines”. Unforeseen costs were also experienced by the gari group when their cassava mill broke down. Because of the role of Wildlife Society in purchasing equipment the group assumed that Wildlife Society would pay to repair the mill and refused to contribute amongst them (Gari Group Member). When the mill broke down that was purchased for the cassava processing group, one of the members said, “The group is waiting for (Wildlife Society) to fix their machine” (Gari member). The president of the women’s oil making group said she felt they had to repay the cost of the palm nut mill before they could begin profiting because, “We were being chased to pay it back by the project” (Oil group President). Therefore, because the project expected repayment for the mills the groups felt pressured and as renters not willing to invest.

The previous examples demonstrate the negative effects of decisions made by the wildlife managers and chiefs. Overall, these decisions did not build on preexisting local knowledge and did not increase the capacity of groups to address organizational and production problems. The impact of this was group members had less incentive to dedicate themselves to their activities when the projects encountered difficulties.

Adaptive Management of Enterprise Activities Controlled By Wildlife Managers:

The project has shown adaptations to initial group enterprise problems regarding group organization, sustaining production of new products, and securing external markets. However, the wildlife managers continue to play a dominant role in making changes without realizing that their dominant role contributed greatly to these shortcomings.

Changes in management of enterprise activities, such as the beehive example, show adaptive management on the part of the Coordinator. With respect to group organization problems, the Coordinator shared the lessons they have learned, “We have tried two aspects. The group work didn’t succeed, but neither did the individuals in the groups when they separated. We are now trying to dissolve the groups to find those that are serious” (Rubin). They have also reformed and re-trained the soap making group to use molds to make bars in the preferred market shape versus traditionally made soap balls (to make them look machine made), and researched a higher quality gari (cassava flour) export market that requires this group to make a dryer and lighter colored product (Rubin).

Again these comments are indicative that the Wildlife Society is the only body involved in enterprise evaluation, in an effort to ‘fix’ or ‘save’ the activities. Rather than

attributing the activity failures to heavy top-down influence, the coordinator described the group problems as partially the wildlife managers' fault for inadequate monitoring. Therefore, one exemplary adaptive solution he is trying is more strict, phase type loans for farmers that depend on their step by step accomplishments. He said, "Phase one to clear (the land) and purchase inputs... (phase) two, to plant. Like that we are seeing results" (Rubin). The managers and Liaison are also threatening group members, like those in the snail husbandry group, to make them work harder. The Coordinator said, "We have told them we can take them (snails) back if they are not doing a good job. We have with one lady" (Rubin). Increasing the strictness and monitoring done by the Wildlife Society further increases their role in management, rather than building the capacity of the groups to self regulate, or to be accountable to the project committee. Converse to this, both the Enterprise Coordinator and Project Manager said these elements were lacking in all the enterprise groups. Yet they are implementing more controlling measures without realizing their undermining effects.

Successful Project Elements Built Through Greater Villager Participation:

The previous sections provided examples and discussion highlighting the dominant roles played by chiefs and especially by wildlife managers, which painted a grim picture of this initiative. However, there were several successful elements of this initiative not present in the other two, most significantly downward accountability of chiefs and managers, and different forms of adaptive management. The following sections illustrate that the keys to success in these areas was broader village participation that built upon local capacity. Ironically those were among the core objectives of this project.

Downward Accountability Through Village Meetings: Despite the limited representation and scripted nature of the majority of the ceremonial project meetings between the wildlife managers and chiefs, there was also a high level of participation at the end between the chiefs, managers, and villagers at large. This dialogue between villagers and chiefs on the project committee represents a form of downward accountability where the chiefs were held responsible to the village population by spontaneously responding to questions about project decisions and activities.

The following are examples of this from a project committee meeting. At the end of one meeting a man shouted out a question about the amount of money each family would receive and the duration of payments. He argued that he could be making more by farming his land than tourism was generating. Another man complained that the village youth were not participating enough in communal labor. The chiefs replied to both of these comments. First, one Chief said that he had also donated lands that could be harvested and farmed for more than this payment, but that he accepts this immediate loss for the good of the project. Another Chief replied that the youth missing communal labor would be fined. (Observations of project committee) Although the youth that asked these questions were not empowered, their participation in village meetings forced the chiefs and wildlife managers to present and defend their decisions publicly. It also allowed them to ask questions directly, rather than going through their project committee representative. Therefore, village meetings held the village and project representatives accountable to their sociocultural and professional roles of representing broader village interests.

Women also participated in the project meeting open discussion period. Two women spoke up to illustrate the benefits of the project and propose changes in village hunting behavior. The first woman said that men need to stop hunting because it is not honest to be paid by the project to develop business alternatives to hunting, but continue to hunt. She said it would take more family pressure from hunter's wives for them to stop, "We know when they leave, where they are going" (village woman 1). She also mentioned how the palm oil processing mill has decreased the labor required to make oil by saying, "You do not hear people pounding to make oil anymore. We are benefiting!" (village woman 1) A second woman said she has been preparing food for tourists to make money. She said, motioning towards me, "some even speak Ewe (local language)" (village woman 2), which generated a cheer and laughter among the village. Besides holding leaders accountable, the village meeting dialogue allowed non-decision makers to voice their concerns about other interest groups besides chiefs and wildlife managers. This provided another form of intercommunity regulation.

Building Internal Capacity for Enterprise Success: The palm oil group showed the most promise in both collective sales by increasing production of a traditional product and regulation of productivity as a new, non-family based group. Unlike the soap, gari, and honey groups, this group succeeded because it achieved self regulation and internal decision making. The others relied more heavily on the wildlife managers. This is the only group that has not lost any of its original members, all women. However, gender was not the reason for this, as other women's groups like soap and gari making failed alongside men's groups. The oil group uses a mix of strategies: bulk group sales to increase profitability and decrease transport costs along with traditional, individual labor.

The amounts of oil produced per group, by each individual, are internally regulated because of how the large group is structured according to traditional norms. The forty member group is divided into four, ten woman teams. These teams buy palm nuts at the regional market together where prices are low. Each individual woman within the small groups is responsible for producing oil for her portion of the nuts. If a woman produces less oil with the same quantity of nuts than her group members, or one group produces less than the other groups, they have to make up the difference by purchasing and transforming more personally. They succeed in internal decision making also because of the small group organization. The group President said the organization allows her to consult with the other small group leaders to make decisions based on input from all four groups without having to hold unproductive large group meetings (Oil President).

Bottom-up Guide Monitoring of Enterprise Activities: The guides also led small-scale enterprise activities. As leaders of the groups they play an important education and monitoring role as local citizen participants rather than the Wildlife Society enterprise manager or the village-project liaison. Because of their close contact and daily exposure training with Wildlife Society managers the guides knew great detail on all the enterprise activities. They frequently monitored bee hives, gari production, oil making, and snail raising group members. In contrast to the way the Project Liaison visited enterprise group members, the guides monitored them as non-chief villagers integrated with other enterprise group members, by walking from house to house and spending time demonstrating techniques for the group members (observations of guides). By taking time to answer their questions, the guides encouraged group members to

participate more than top-down monitoring from the liaison or Wildlife Society managers that utilized control and fear to motivate.

Non-Project Enterprise Activities by Villagers: In contrast to the Wildlife Society heavy handed adaptations to group enterprise activities previously described, some villagers are creating individual projects based on the activities of the groups. A leader of one honey group said that since he harvested honey from his first three hives other people not in the bee group have become interested in beekeeping, “Some have even built their own hives apart from the project groups” (Mancredo). Like the comments made about groups ‘not working’, this shows that villagers do want alternative enterprise activities, but are unwilling to work under the project’s conditions. These could ultimately be seen as positive developments resulting from the project, i.e. villagers taking matters into their own hands. However, fear of Wildlife Society control certainly was not the intended method of the enterprise plan to develop enterprises separate from the project.

Reform Project Management Committee: The Project Manager said he would like to model the project committee and enterprise groups after the steering committee from Ahor, the one non-Gbledi village in the Afadjato project. The Ahor Steering Committee was formed and supplied by the Ghana Fire Service as a local bushfire fighting team. Similar committees were formed in villages across Ghana to allow villagers to control bushfires during the dry season, like the historical fire of 1983 that devastated the cash crops of the Gbledi landowners that the village chiefs discussed. The Project Manager said the past successes of the members of the Ahor Committee working together makes volunteerism, planning, and activity follow through high (Edem).

Therefore, this committee had high pre-existing capacity that he would like the project committee and enterprise groups to emulate it.

Summary: This case shows examples of community conservation designed by a national level NGO. This design strategy achieved certain planning and decision goals through the broad-based committee to represent village interests. However, the social norms of traditional authority decision making and village expectations of external aid reasserted project control with the chiefs and wildlife managers. The dominance of these two decision making groups resulted in several shortcomings related to limited local ownership and capacity building. However, the examples of adaptive management that have started to emerge demonstrate that the opposite of this may be more beneficial to creating village self regulation, representation, and ownership of project activities. Success, therefore, relies on chiefs and wildlife managers using their power to require themselves and other village and activity representatives to fully discuss and negotiate project details.

Chapter 7 Competing Forest Values and Benefits of Participation

The previous results chapter looked at the results of representation, empowerment, and capacity, which focused on the effects of how participatory conservation was approached, through what processes, and by what actors. This chapter looks at how, through different activities, each project afforded local actors benefits to achieve its conservation values. These activities included and benefited segments of the local populations differentially, which created conflicts. As a result of these conflicts, benefits from most activities did not enhance the conservation values as they were intended. Therefore, this chapter describes the conflicts created by each initiative's activities between actors concerning the inequitable distribution of their benefits. The following two paragraphs provide an overview of the values, activities, and benefits (Figure 21) explored in this section. This overview is followed by sections analyzing each initiative in greater detail.

The villagers and managers sampled in these three cases recognized six values regarding the use of forests: agroforestry use values, tourism use values, preservation values for ecological and spiritual forest qualities, conversion of forest to non-forest farming values, safety net resource use values, and opportunistic resource use values (Figure 21). These values were promoted differently through each projects' schemes of activities. The first two values, agroforestry use and ecotourism use, were directly promoted in each of the three initiatives' primary activities: reforestation via agroforestry (Missahoe), waterfall-based ecotourism (Agumatsa), and small-scale enterprise development with hiking-based ecotourism (Afadjato). The projects designed these activities to provide benefits in conjunction with different types of conservation. This

chapter demonstrates that the benefits derived through these activities differentially benefited actors in each project. In all three projects, older villagers, particularly landowners and chiefs, received large amounts of direct benefits, while youth received smaller amounts that also required greater costs, such as labor and time investments or the loss of other activities.

Figure 21. Overview of Values, Activities, and Benefits.

<u>Values:</u> Agroforestry	<u>Activities:</u> Reforestation, cash crop production, fuel wood collection	<u>Benefits:</u> Harvests for land users and landowners
Spiritual	Ceremonies, sacred areas, shrines	Cultural, historical preservation
Tourism	Guiding, trail maintenance, gift sales, food and lodging	Fee Collection and distribution
Preservation	Exclusion, border patrol, monitoring use	Compensation to landowners
Opportunistic Use	Hunting and other NTFP* collection	Meat, social capital
Safety Net Use	Charcoal making	Immediate income
Alternative Income Projects	Animal husbandry, value added processing	Long-term income

* NTFP = non timber forest products, like mushrooms, medicines, wild honey, peper, etc...

The preservation value in all three initiatives was promoted through exclusion of use that converted forest into farmland and savanna, i.e. cutting and burning forests for their timber, charcoal, or non-tree food crops. The projects justified limiting these activities and decreasing their benefits based on the new benefits provided through their primary agroforestry, ecotourism, and enterprise development activities. However, this chapter demonstrates that the promotion of other forest values through the projects'

primary activities and restrictions did not decrease forest conversion activities. These conversion activities, which were antithetical to the projects' forest values and conservation goals, continued because they were done by youth that did not receive benefits from the primary activities, and those that did receive direct benefits did not restrict the youth conversion activities. Safety net and opportunistic forest values were also restricted in the three initiatives in conjunction with the conversion of forests, even though activities of these types, like hunting and fuelwood collection, could feasibly occur in harmony with agroforestry and tourism forest use. However, like conversion of forests these activities were continued by those not receiving benefits and not restricted by those receiving benefits.

Foret Classee de Missahoe

The Ministry controlled organization of this initiative clearly favored agroforestry use values and preservation of natural forest values through reforestation, enforcement and monitoring activities. Groups benefited differentially from these activities. Landowners benefited directly from reforestation payments for growing, transplanting and caring for trees on their lands, and stood to profit in the long-term from the value of the mature trees. Additionally, landowners benefited from the legitimization of their tenant farming relations in Missahoe and protection of their lands through monitoring activities. Finally, landowners did not incur any costs from other project activities.

In contrast to landowners, youth and tenant farmers benefited less from project activities. Youth benefited directly only from growing and transplanting project trees. Project activities also created direct and indirect costs for youth, like their unpaid time

and efforts in monitoring activities and lost tourism value due to increased cultivation respectively. Tenant farmers benefited only indirectly from the project by legitimately growing food crops in Missahoe. In addition, this initiative organized mushroom farming and tree raising income generating activities as alternatives to forest use among youth and landowners. However, these income activities excluded tenants and were not desirable to most villagers because of their difficulty and low profitability.

Figure 22. Differential Benefits to Landowners, Youth, and Tenants in Missahoe.

<u>Landowners:</u>	<u>Youth:</u>	<u>Tenants:</u>
Reforestation Payments	Reforestation Payments	(direct cost)*
Mature Tree Value	(no cost)	(no cost)
Agroforestry Income	(indirect cost)	(direct cost)
Monitoring	(direct cost)	(direct cost)
(no cost)	(indirect cost)	Food Crops
Alternative Income	(indirect cost)	(indirect cost)

* Direct costs are those that are incurred because of the efforts spent providing benefits for others. Indirect costs are the cost of decreased value or lost opportunity. No cost indicates an independent benefit for another group.

Therefore, landowners cumulatively benefited more than youth and tenants, and often benefited at the cost of youth and tenants (Figure 22). Additionally, youth and tenants were aware that landowners incurred no costs from the project. These issues created conflicts that decreased youth and tenant incentives to participate. These ideas and evidence supporting these interpretations are developed in greater detail in the sections below that flow in the order of Figure 22, from landowner benefits to youth and tenant benefits and costs.

Benefits of Agroforestry: This initiative focused on agroforestry as a means of preparing previously cut lands for reforestation and indirectly addressing illegal activities. This method planted and maintained seedlings within coffee or food crops

until the trees established themselves. One of the Guides from Konda showed me an area planted with a mixture of timber species:

We came to a farm along the trail in Missahoe. I asked if farming was allowed. He said it was one of the reforestation areas and pointed out several dozen small Frake, Acajou, Erico, and other common timber reforestation trees. It was also being farmed with a scattering of coffee and manioc. He said “while the trees are small they farm, until they reach a certain height, then farming is not allowed. While there is farming, it is clean and the trees grow rapidly.” (Notes from Awube)

Therefore, in this case the landowner was benefiting directly from the trees that had been planted on their land in two ways. The trees were a cash crop in the long term, while in the short term, until the trees reached a certain height, the coffee and food crops that were simultaneously being grown.

Landowners and youth directly benefited from agroforestry through wage labor. The Committee President in Konda said that his group included nine committee members and thirteen village youth, all Ewe residents of Konda (Paulin). For each tree the group produced in their nursery 40CFA (African Francs) were deposited into their group account and, “Divided by the total number of man hours. All members present were paid for their time including laborers and leaders” (Paulin). The Committee leaders in Adame echoed this saying they established, “A group account, which is divided among the laborers” (Adame Committee). Additional sums of 50CFA per tree were paid to youth for transplanting and 70CFA per tree to landowners for caring for the trees (Paulin). These benefits sufficiently motivated youth and landowners to participate in reforestation activities.

These results of these benefits were the successful growth and transplanting of trees in many areas of Missahoe. The Ministry Chief and Konda Committee President

described this method of reforestation on Konda farms as major accomplishments (Efako, Paulin). The farms I visited in these areas held trees planted during the initiative that displayed high survival and growth rates (Observations). These were the farms where Konda farmers have pseudo-landowner status and thus control land use decisions, harvests, and benefited directly from project funds. Therefore, the agroforestry activities and benefits were successful when land use was stable, i.e. controlled by one party or all parties involved benefited directly. However, these conditions were unique to Konda Missahoe lands, while results were less successful on Tokpli lands where tenant farmers that did not benefit directly were more heavily relied upon.

Costs of Youth Employment Benefits: The previous section described that the direct benefits for non-landowners were youth employment in agroforestry activities. However, benefits to youth through employment did not generate the social capital benefits normally received through communal labor. Additionally, youth employment did not coincide with the design of the project for their activities to be regulated by traditional authority. Since they were being paid to participate, it was not considered to be communal labor and could not be controlled by the chief.

First, communal labor activities are valued by the general local population. Providing services like road maintenance and school construction provides village youth with social capital benefits. Unlike communally valued activities, youth reforestation efforts on individual landowner parcels in Missahoe were not activities with wide public value and support. Other forms of employment, such as store keepers, market sales, butchers, and taxi drivers provide social capital as well, in that villagers depend on them for their services and pay for them based on quality. The reforestation employment did

not provide these benefits either. This decreased the efforts youth were willing to put into the reforestation activities. For example, in an interview a tenant farmer described all the work he had done to prepare one of the reforestation sites by establishing a coffee farm for his landowner. Adjacent to this field were others that were overgrown with weeds that had not been reforested. He said the committees did not plant trees in these fields where he had not planted coffee because they were “too lazy” to weed themselves. (Koffi 2) Therefore, youth did not receive the social capital from employment in agroforestry activities that communal labor provides, which decreased the extent of their activities.

Second, employment is not controlled by traditional authority in the way communal labor is. Chiefs have the social power to call youth to work on communal labor days, define tasks, and punish those that do not participate (observations of chiefs). Typical communal labor activities include maintaining roads, public open spaces, soccer fields and schools. However, this is not the case when materials are being produced for sale or used for personal, rather than communal benefit, as was the case with the trees that were produced for sale to the project and were planted on individual landowners’ properties. In such personal cases, the land or business owner has to hire laborers and is responsible for their regulation. Since youth were employed by the project, rather than working for the village, they had no social duties to the Village Chief. This decreased the already weak capacity of chiefs to play an authority role to support the village committees, which carried over into chiefs having no power to assign mandatory youth labor on boundary maintenance and monitoring activities.

Agroforestry Costs for Tourism Preservation:

Guides supported the preservation aspects of the initiative, but not the agroforestry activities because they felt contributed to continued use values. On hikes with the guides they pointed out the examples of food crops being grown without reforestation trees (Awube, Dieu Donne). A guide explained that they wanted to have Missahoe to take tourists to see the unique natural forest. He said that there were plenty of farms with coffee, cocoa and other crops outside Missahoe where tourists could see agroforestry, but there should also be a protected place without use (Dieu Donne). Because of this he is against coffee and cocoa being grown in Missahoe and manages a portion of his family lands as strictly natural forest to take tourists (Dieu Donne). This was primarily for his economic interests to have a more diverse and attractive tourism venue. However, these feelings were also tied to the values that made them want to be tourism guides in the first place. The guides grieved the loss of the Missahoe forest they grew up with, “I can remember back to my childhood memories, around 1984, there was darkness here. Some places you couldn’t see” (Awube). The guides could have been an asset to the project for monitoring forest access, but their disenchantment with the use activities promoted by the project decreased their perception of employment benefits and prevented their participation in monitoring.

Tenant Farmer Agro vs. Forestry Benefits: In contrast to the Konda farms that showed successful reforestation results, reforestation on tenant farms succeeded in varying degrees depending on how individual tenants managed their fields. As previously discussed, land use agreements between landowners and tenants within Missahoe encompassed only coffee production. Besides growing coffee to satisfy this agreement, land use on tenant farms did not comply with the reforestation goals of the project.

When I visited tenant farms, they showed me fields with results similar to landowners with a variety of project trees planted among young coffee. However, in other fields coffee grew in the sparse shade of avocado monocultures with no reforestation trees planted among them. Fields with food crops produced by tenants for their own profit were well maintained and contained no project trees, although theoretically these areas were all designated by the project plan for reforestation. The surface area cultivated in food crops was greater than agroforestry coffee in all of the tenant farms. Therefore, on the most compliant tenant farms, only one third to half of their lands were managed for reforestation (Observations of tenant farms).

Tenant farmers gave personal reasons for the inconsistencies in reforestation between their agroforestry coffee fields and food crops grown in full sunlight. One tenant said he did not see Missahoe as his permanent home. He was trying to make enough money, by selling food crops like corn and yams, to build a house in Adame, the nearby village, or Kpalime, the subregional capital (Koffi 2). His long-term aspiration is to be an elementary school teacher. He studied to get his BAC (diploma) to become eligible for teaching and was given an offer in a nearby village. However, the salary he was offered was not enough to support his family. He decided instead to farm in Missahoe until he saves enough to build a permanent house in the village and then become a teacher. Therefore, he is exploiting the short-term production potential of the lands not in coffee production and is not concerned with the long-term agroforestry and reforestation goals of his landowner and the project.

Similarly, another tenant had a small amount of reforested fields planted with coffee, while the majority of his land area was planted in corn and yams. He said this

was because when the project started he had just arrived in Missahoe from living in the neighboring village, Adame. He had not yet established his compound and reserved the areas planted with corn for his house and food crops when the committees came to transplant trees (Emanuel Jr.). His decision of where to have space to grow food crops was favored over reforestation. On a different tenant's lands, reforestation trees were only present along the trails to and from his fields because his fields had been cut and burned to plant yams and manioc (Emanuel). Therefore, the personal household values of this individual tenant superseded the project goals. Although the landowner's values coincided with the project, the tenant's values did not.

Tenant Perceptions of Landowner "De" and "Re" Forestation Benefits: During interviews both tenants and guides pointed out that landowners were benefiting the most from the project. In a discussion over why one tenant had established a coffee farm in its particular location, he said it was an area cut during the early 1990s political crisis (Koffi 2). Therefore, he did not have to invest the time and labor in clearing the forest. This also meant that either the landowner had cut that section of the forest, or not defended it against cutting during the crisis. This sparked a question from my research assistant (Bassan) about that initial forest clearing benefit to the landowners that was now being built upon by the project. The tenant agreed that it was the landowners whose lands that were deforested, i.e. lands that were not defended by their landowner during the political crisis that the project was now focused on. Guides stated that it was landowners themselves cutting the forest at that time or, more likely, ordering others to cut the forest as laborers (Aswube). The project was now encouraging landowners to employ tenants on these lands and benefiting them landowners again through the reforestation payments

and tenant agreements (Koffi 2). Therefore, since there were no costs to deforestation during the crisis, that benefit plus the benefits from the project cumulatively represent three levels of landowner benefits. None of these benefits required the landowners to do anything to proactively manage the forest.

Continuing in the discussion with the tenant, Bassan half joking said, “Perhaps I could become part of the project also (if I cut a section of forest).” The tenant jokingly replied, “Yes, but would you made it home before being caught (by the committee)” (Koffi 2). He was obviously not serious about being caught by the committee since landowners and youth regularly observed illegal activities in the forest. This half serious discussion represents how tenants are not willing to defend the landowners’ lands for them as part of the project since they would not benefit from doing so. On the other hand, cutting more forest and putting it into cultivation would provide them with additional benefits, because their landowners were not monitoring them. Therefore, despite the multiple benefits from their Missahoe lands, landowners are neither defending them against uncontrolled tenant food production, nor illegal use access.

Ministry Non-Negotiation of Illegal Forest Use Activities: The viewpoint of the Ministry Chief, the technician in charge of surveillance and control during the initiative, was that his team had a project plan to follow that paid for certain activities and banned others, and banned activities would simply not be discussed (Efako). Hunting and charcoal making commonly occurred in all portions of Missahoe investigated during the study; charcoal was always for sale in Konda and along the Missahoe Road (Observations of Missahoe). Whether or not banned activities were actually occurring was not as important to him as the principle that they were illegal. “The plans are there

for that”, the Ministry Chief said with frustration when I asked him about ongoing hunting (Efako). By this he meant that the laws governing hunting existed for the project area. Because of that he believed the project had no reason to further consider hunting as an issue. In particular, he did not think that villagers should have to benefit from the project to abstain from such illegal activities. He said that the reforestation payments hindered the project because it established this type of relationship, which discouraged voluntary compliance (Efako). This bureaucratic mentality from the Ministry compromised the ability to negotiate competing land use values, values that could have been complimentary income generation possibilities, like tourism, hunting, and fuel wood cutting permits. The following subsections illustrate the values behind hunting and charcoal making activities that were not considered because of Ministry control.

Opportunistic Hunting: Historically, hunting has been a preferred livelihood in the study areas. The settlement stories of the Kuma villages all involve hunter exploring new forest areas and gradually establishing ownership through use (Adame Chiefs). However, hunters said that over-hunting and deforestation in the 1990’s political turmoil made hunting an unfeasible primary livelihood (Fiabenu, Bassan). Today hunting is an opportunistic activity done in and adjacent to Missahoe when farmers have free time from farming activities. Hunting is enjoyed because it is a bonus activity. Wildlife is a free resource; the only cost associated with hunting is the time and low expense inputs like hand made gunpowder and shot (Fiabenu, Bassan). Hunters, particularly Kabye hunters who tenant farm, also enjoy the freedom of this time versus farming, “What I catch from the bush is for me alone, no division” (Bassan). Therefore, since hunting occurs at low levels, and relies on forest habitat rather than forest

conversion, hunting could be considered an official youth benefit that is compatible with agroforestry goals. The Ministry could also use these values of hunting to determine what kind of project benefits could deter hunting activities. However, since the Ministry is non-negotiable, hunting continues as an illegal activity in resistance to the project.

Safety Net Charcoal Production: Charcoal makers, who are primarily women, see charcoal as a free income resource because access to trees in the forest is not limited. All farmers have coup-coups and hoes, the essential tools for making charcoal; therefore it has no direct start up costs other than the investment of time. Unlike hunting, charcoal making is not a preferred livelihood. It is done when a quick source of income is needed or to invest in preferred income generating activities like buying fields of manioc to transform and resell (Charcoal makers). While bushmeat is secretively sold in houses, charcoal is openly sold in the market in small quantities for local use as well as large bags which taxi drivers purchase to transport and sell in urban markets. The market price for charcoal fluctuates more than most products (no competitive price fixing) because women are eager to sell. Women were occasionally charged a fee per bag of charcoal being sold in the market by the village market revenue collector, a village tax paid to the Chief by all women with market stands, unrelated to the Missahoe initiative (Observations). The market tax could have been a regulatory mechanism on forest conversion, although it would have been difficult to differentiate charcoal made from Missahoe wood and the surrounding woodlands. However, since charcoal making was non-negotiably illegal, there was no discussion about actual regulatory mechanisms. Thus, hunting and charcoal making were ignored because the Ministry declared them as 'illegal' activities.

Project Initiated Small Business Activities: The Ministry initiated a small business tree nursery project in Konda to produce traditional tooth brushing sticks (cure-dent), *Garcinia* trees. These are planted by farmers in agroforestry systems and typically purchased by market women who cut and transport the wood to their homes to process and sell in the regional market (Observations of *Garcinia* use). This project was funded by the Ministry but was carried out solely by the Konda Committee President. He was given supplies to develop a private nursery and purchase the seed collection rights from a landowner of a mature *Garcinia* tree. He sells seedlings in small quantities locally and in large quantities to landowners who come from the Maritime Region to buy for plantation use (Paulin). His sales have allowed him to expand to producing over 5,000 seedlings annually, which he sells for 150-200CFA each. This project has become his primary personal livelihood. He said, “They (Ministry) asked for volunteers, but I was the only one” (Paulin). Besides this questionable, individual implementation, the tree nursery business, intended to increase agroforestry, was not desired by youth or tenants in their preferred income strategies. Therefore, this activity was targeted at changing local values, not at preexisting values of the local population.

The Ministry also organized mushroom cultivation with village committees. The Konda President said they initially had about 50 members who were trained as a group in the steps of making compost, treating with mycelium, aging in a dark room, harvesting, and drying mushrooms for commercial sale (Paulin). He said they had difficulties with the external restaurant market in the capital city, Lome, and the reoccurring cost of mycelium. However, the greatest problem he said was group members disliking the delicate and precise nature of the work (Paulin). For these reasons only two youth

continue to grow mushrooms. The Adame Vice President said that it is a good idea to have income coming to the villages, but it needs to be something other than generic projects like mushrooms and beekeeping because, “They have tried these and they are not profitable” (Aza). Activities such as these are not likely to replace opportunistic and safety net resource use, or provide alternative livelihood supplements for tenants because of their large time requirements and greater degree of uncertainty. These are risky alternatives that rely heavily on non-local markets. Besides time and profitability, these activities are not as desirable to local youth as their other ideas.

Alternative Youth and Tenant Income Ideas and Internal Problems: Both tenants and guides desired alternative income activity development through the projects. Guides said they would like funds for small animal husbandry, like turkeys, goats and sheep, “To complement the preservation of the forest” (Dieu Donne). Tenants also wanted husbandry funds, but to raise animals at their farms in the forest. One tenant described the forest as an ideal place for husbandry because it was far from the village to avoid common in village problems of thieves, disease, and that the forest canopy would prevent hawks from killing young offspring (Adzo).

I questioned why guides and tenants did not start group husbandry activities autonomously from the Ministry since they both seem to be making steady income through guiding and crop sales. Tenants replied that internal conflicts between the tenants prevented them from working as a group despite their small number and isolated location. The six tenant households on adjacent Tsame and Tokpli lands within Missahoe are strongly bonded by family. The oldest tenant, Emanuel, had many sons and daughters sharing the management of his lands. One of his sons, Emanuel Jr., had his

own farm adjacent to Emanuel. One daughter married another Kabye who established a tenant farm and invited his brother to live next to them. These four households, as well as the remaining two, relied on Emanuel for leadership. When I organized meetings for all tenants to discuss the project together, several individuals replied, “What did the old one (Emanuel) say?” or “Will Emanuel be there?” (Koffi 1, Koffi 2).

This displayed their loyalty and cohesiveness. Rather than a possible group project foundation, tenants described Emanuel’s leadership as a hindrance to developing group business projects (Koffi 2, Emanuel Jr.). Emanuel has a tendency to be dishonest and corrupt in group projects, to take unfair proportions of the produce or default on borrowed group funds (Koffi 2, Koffi 1). A guide said that members of the Guide Association also took loans from the group and never repaid them, and that there were other internal problems that made it difficult for them to continue group projects as well (Dieu Donne). Therefore, strong internal leadership that is not compromised by close relationships is required for animal husbandry and other small business projects to succeed. Despite their capacity to work together in other ways, such as tenants with field labor and guides with partitioning the tourism market, these missing elements make income generating activities difficult for them.

Summary: The top-down Ministry design in this case developed activities with direct benefits for certain agroforestry values. It also restricted activities that provided other forest benefits and non-agroforestry values, like opportunistic use and safety net resource use. To mitigate the loss of these activities and benefits the Ministry designed alternative income activities. However, these did not provide sufficient benefits to replace non-agroforestry values. Furthermore, the direct benefits associated with agroforestry did not

require actors like landowners and tenants to restrict other non-agroforestry land uses, including forest conversion by tenants. The main problem in this case was the lack of equitable distribution of benefits. Besides landowners all other actors had insufficient and undesirable benefits. This demonstrates a case where benefits of participation were not negotiated, which perpetuated open access to forest use.

Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary

Actors in the Agumatsa case discussed forest values as those associated with use through included agroforestry, fuel wood collection, bat hunting, and charcoal making activities. Non-use values were expressed as wildlife sanctuary preservation, waterfall tourism, and education (a combination of wildlife and tourism) activities. The initiation of local participation through the co-management system of this initiative created a shift in values from forest use, ecological, and spiritual values to economic values, instigated by the focus of the Tourism Management Team on controlling revenue (Figure 23). This was most prevalent in conflicts within the village and between management bodies over the distribution and use of tourism revenue. TMT supported economic values overshadowed landowner agroforestry use values, village supported spiritual values, and Ghana Wildlife Division preservation values, because the TMT controlled local decision making in favor of waterfall based tourism. Since villagers, particularly youth, did not feel represented by the TMT they did support the emphasis on economic development that they would not benefit from.

Figure 23. Shift to Economic Values in Agumatsa.

Non-Economic and

Non-TMT Values:

Agroforestry

Spiritual

Wildlife

Education

TMT Economic Values:

Tourism income generation.

Control of decision making
and revenue use.

Fear of revenue sharing with
other interests.

Resulting Conflicts:

Guide employment versus
youth communal labor.

Over reliance on tourism
revenue.

Agroforestry Use Values: The Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary was historically managed as a strictly protected area. No harvesting of any resources within the sanctuary are allowed, except for tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, oil palms, and fruit that were planted before the establishment of the sanctuary in 1975. Most landowners have abandoned their farms within the sanctuary, leaving unmanaged coffee and cocoa mixed with regenerated forest in many areas. Other land users continue to burn and farm lands bordering the sanctuary. In some places these are encroaching on sanctuary boundaries, or creating abrupt edges between forest and fields. The Head GWD Officer said that farmers continue to farm illegally inside the sanctuary boundaries because they have no other lands (Anthony). This pressure has changed his protection approach from guarding all sanctuary boundaries from use to focus on the village sanctuary interface where use is most likely to cross the border. This represents the ongoing conflicts between preservation and use of the lands designated for the sanctuary.

Besides the use, non-use conflicts, there are also disputes among landowners and the TMT over the amount of compensation for their lost lands. In the co-management system landowners receive sixty percent of the TMT fifty seven percent of tourism revenues. However, some landowners continue to burn, farm, and cut along and within the sanctuary boundary. The District Assemblyman suggested that disputes over land

ownership, land use, and compensation could be resolved by surveying the land area and defining a fixed value per season to pay the landowners based on estimated crop values, “We know the amount of corn an acre can produce...how much cassava can be made”, rather than paying them a percentage of TMT revenue independent of actual land use value (William). However, the landowner making charcoal on the sanctuary border, discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates that land use in one location is linked to other land use decisions, and as in the other cases labor for farming activities is often done by village youth that would not be compensated through such a landowner payoff system. Therefore, a simple calculation based on the area and value of one parcel would not necessarily represent the value of discontinuing its use.

Spiritual Forest Values: One of the TMT guides told me how the area that is now the sanctuary has strong spiritual significance about when the village was settled, “At that time the area was very wild. You could not just go in and hunt. People who did were very strong spiritually” (Alfonse). Another guide said the falls has always been a symbol of magic and dangerous animals (Emanuel). He said during the Ashanti War, wars that halted the western migration of Ewe people, their ancestors took shelter in the falls and Ashanti were not brave enough to go after them. Their village locations, surrounding the waterfall, symbolize their strength. In the past the villages used the falls for ceremonies, but these have been replaced by tourism, such as the Easter Monday holiday (Alfonse). More recently the management value of the sanctuary has changed, “It’s not about protection or sacredness anymore; it’s about the role of the government, money, and the (Wildlife) Officers duties” (Emanuel). Therefore, the ecotourism values promoted for development by the TMT have decreased the spiritual connection to the waterfall.

Wildlife vs. Tourism Values: The District Assemblyman promoted more developed tourism use rather than wildlife management. He said, “We are actually too close to the village to preserve wild animals. It won’t be possible this close to people living” (William). A comment from one of the tourism guides supported this when he described the non-environmental ways that Ghanaians recreate at the waterfall as:

Lots of drinking. People get drunk, swim, then whatever they have prepared they share to eat with friends. And they bring their music boxes. It is also very common to see lots of fast food...people complain about the distance too, that there should be a lorry road or motos (motor bikes) allowed in. (Emanuel)

One of the wildlife officers complemented this, “Ghanaian’s idea of tourism is not compatible with a wildlife sanctuary”, but saw this as a trade-off with the economic value of tourism revenues, by saying, “but realize that (Easter Monday use levels) is very rare. It only happens one or two days a year” (Felix). A guide said that in the past there was more wildlife, like baboons, in the sanctuary, “Now they live further away on the range, by Afadjato. With all this sound they won’t come back here” (Emanuel). A different guide said the goal of the sanctuary should be nature education, not noisy tourism or traditional use, “Why should we be hassling animals? Nobody is chasing us. Let’s leave the wildlife” (Alfred). These comments all show the conflicting values of the sanctuary between wildlife preservation and tourism.

TMT Fear of Sharing Benefits: The TMT demonstrated aversion to sharing and negotiating with neighboring village-based activities as well as within the Wli villages. When discussing his consulting document on the possible merging of the Agumatsa and Afadjato projects, the consultant said, “The environment the project operates in is difficult because of how secretive it is. The TMT was absolutely against the Gbledi

expansion. They feared sharing revenue” (Cleophas). However, it was the TMT that originally contacted Ghana Wildlife Society to see if they could assist them in a similar way to the Afadjato project (Emanuel). When the Ghana Wildlife Society drafted a plan with the two traditional areas grouped into one project (during the initial phase when they were trying to increase the size of the forest reserve area), the Chiefs of Wli immediately refused to participate (Chiefs). Historical village and Traditional Area boundary disputes also play a role in this divisive attitude (William). This attitude, embodied by the TMT existed in all study villages, particularly in small business projects.

The TMT Secretary was skeptical of my research goal to share information between the three initiatives in a workshop. During a TMT meeting to discuss this idea he raised many questions about my jurisdiction and the purpose of the workshop. He asked, “Are you sure with all this time we are spending with you, the community will definitely have a benefit?” (Robert) I replied that in my opinion the other projects have more experience with reforestation and small business development activities that Agumatsa has attempted with difficulty to establish. I added that if they could benefit would depend on how willing they were to communicate with the other projects. This type of skepticism presented itself within the project management as well, illustrated by the lack of communication between TMT and GWD officers, private decisions made by chiefs and elders, meeting protocols, and apathy among youth (see previous chapter for more details). The skeptical and secretive, non-power and information sharing behavior of the TMT and chiefs discouraged villagers from supporting their push for economic values of the sanctuary. Villagers, particularly youth, had no reason to believe the TMT planned to share the benefits with them.

TMT Guide Employment vs. Youth Participation: Guides work at the tourism office six days a week and are paid 200,000 cedis per month (Emanuel). They contested this wage as being too low because it does not reflect the guide fee, of 5,000 cedis per tourist. One guide said, “Revenues from the guide fees alone go into the millions per month, but this does not go to the guides” (Alfonse). Another guide said that their wages are too low because they are not enough to support a family, and guiding consumes too much of their time to allow them enough time to farm (Alfred). The guides’ discontent with their salary makes them unwilling to participate in additional activities like reforestation and monitoring of sanctuary boundaries (William).

Unlike the low capacity of chiefs in the Missahoe committees, the overwhelming power of chiefs on the TMT also does not apply communal labor to manage the sanctuary because of the personal income guides and TMT members receive. At the youth meeting one of the villagers said, “We do not do communal labor for the sanctuary project because there are enough people employed who earn their daily bread from it. If we go there is no direct benefit” (Youth Meeting). To remedy this situation, both the District Assemblyman and TMT Chairman said that there should be more village employees (William, Steven). However, with the current distribution of revenue percentages, guides that are employed feel under compensated. Increasing the number of employees would require a change in revenue distribution, which the TMT seems unwilling to consider.

Over-reliance on Sanctuary Funds: All guides would like to be paid more for their efforts, but some think the co-management system is better than others for the village as a whole. One said, “It is much better now. Before, whenever anything was to be done we

had to contribute (money)” (Alfonse), while another guide’s comments contradicts this, “The village is too used to the money. Before, if there was something (to be done) we would beat the gong-gong and everyone would contribute. Now everyone points to the waterfall for financing” (Emanuel). The TMT Chairman described that the fifty-seven percent of total project revenues gathered by the TMT are divided as follows: forty percent is shared among landowners, ten percent is given to each of the three villages, and the final thirty percent is allocated for development projects that directly involve all three villages (Steven). He said that little can be done with the ten percent of revenues going to each village because they are too small to make investments (Steven). The District Assemblyman thinks this dispute over use of revenue and distribution of percentages needs to be addressed by reinvesting in the sanctuary to increase its income making potential. In order to do this the village has to be convinced that the profits will eventually be used in the broader village good. However, the conflicts between the TMT and village make this seem unlikely.

Summary: This case demonstrated tension between the use and non-use wildlife preservation, forest use, and spiritual values of the sanctuary supported by the Wildlife Division and non-TMT members, and the economic tourism values supported by the TMT. The TMT focus on tourism development overshadows wildlife and spiritual values, and decreases the concern for resolving use conflicts because the focus of tourism is on the waterfall rather than the forest. The TMT emphasis on economic development in theory will increase the amount of village benefits through income. However, the non-transparent history of the TMT makes villagers reluctant to trust their intentions.

Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area

This case reveals less conflict over forest values and more discussion of how benefits from the initiative were distributed to the local population. This project directly compensated landowners through revenue sharing and the continuation of agroforestry activities in the buffer zone area surrounding the forest reserve (Figure 24). Like the Missahoe case, the payments to landowners did not compensate for the direct and indirect costs to youth for their lost opportunities on landowner parcels. The project also directly benefited a small number of guides through employment. However, the majority of local actors, village youth, benefited from the project through alternative income (small-scale enterprise) activities (Figure 24). The directness of these benefits depended on the successfulness of the different small-scale enterprise activities, which all required large investments of time for uncertain results. In addition, small-scale enterprise activities were set up by revolving loans, rather than compensation. Therefore, youth were expected to repay the project for their benefits. These issues created conflicts that decreased youth motivation to participate.

Figure 24. Differential Benefits For Landowners and Youth in Afadjato.

<u>Landowners:</u>	<u>Youth:</u>	<u>Others:</u>
Direct compensation for preservation of forest lands	(indirect cost)	(indirect cost)
Buffer zone agroforestry (no cost)	(direct cost)	(no cost)
	Small-scale enterprise activities	(indirect cost)
		Infrastructure*

* Infrastructure benefits were desired but not supported by the project.

Landowners in particular considered this benefit strategy to be sufficient, while others wanted community wide benefits, such as infrastructure, health care, or

opportunities rather than income (Figure 24). Despite initiating a community based approach, the Wildlife Society primarily saw non-conservation activities and benefits as a means to achieving their conservation goals of establishing the forest reserve. Therefore, the managers were not critical of the equity of benefit distribution.

Payments for Preservation vs. Preservation Per Se: The creation of the Mt. Afadjato Reserve was the primary concern of the Ghana Wildlife Society project manager to fulfill the projects conservation mandate (Edem). The reserve was a condition of the Wildlife Society project plan for the village to receive the technical and financial assistance of the project. Therefore, the debate over values from a villager's standpoint was between the value of forest use (i.e. no project) and the value of funding and possibilities of development from the initiative for creating the reserve. Thus not use values versus direct values of preservation, like ecosystem services. The Ghana Wildlife Society coordinator of small-scale enterprise activities said, "The community has worked on the conservation part very well, but they don't want to see just rainforest. They also want to see village development" (Rubin). He described the village perceptions of the first round of funding for the small-scale enterprise activities as a payoff for cooperating in conservation activities, "We (Ghana Wildlife Society) see that people view the first loans as a gift to the community for their initiating the project and donating their lands, like a payment" (Rubin). Therefore, the benefits of conservation through the project were the incentive for the village to participate, not conservation itself.

Similarly, the reserve area was supported by landowners for its payoff value, "We don't want to climb to the top (to farm). Even digging there to plant trees is difficult. We would rather market it to have people come and see what Gbledi people have done"

(Morrtty). From their perspective any income from the steep forested hillside would be better than use since use is too difficult. Another landowners said he would be happy to cultivate more cash crops in different places outside the reserve, but would need the project to fund him to do this (Aprepsu). Hunting was also banned in the reserve area. Most landowners discussed the loss of bushmeat as a protein source, but again said this was okay as long as the project provided them enough revenue to buy meat and fish at the cold store (Morrtty, Aprepsu, Agima IV).

All types of forest use within the core of the Mt. Afadjato Nature Reserve were restricted; only tourism and other low impact traditional use, like the collection of wild fruits, were allowed. The Ghana Wildlife Society manager said that fruit harvesting is promoted as an educational opportunity to link forest conservation and economic activity because many of the fruits grow only in non-burned forests (Edem). Landowners said that they could collect one head load of dead wood from the reserve, but only for home use (Agima IV, Aprepsu).

Landowner Buffer Zone Use Benefits: Outside of the core area, this initiative established a buffer zone between the village lowlands and the forested mountainside. This sloping land is cultivated with agroforestry systems including coffee, cocoa, kola, oil palm, banana, citrus, mango, avocado, pineapple, and other locally named fruits (Morrtty). Ghana Wildlife Society has organized tree planting in this zone with fast growing leguminous species and economically valuable trees (Edem). This buffer land use is partially consistent with traditional forest land use; however, it focuses on the late stage of the agroforestry cycle and does not allow the cutting and burning cycle used to achieve this. Therefore, in the long run this buffer will become more like the reserve.

This may be acceptable for the landowners who are continually paid a percent of tourism revenues, but this would not account for the lost opportunities for youth food production in the traditional agroforestry system.

Typical agroforestry use occurred just outside the buffer zone. In one of these areas the landowner granted use rights to a section of forest to his nephew. The nephew cut and burned the forest. The wood from the trees was used to make charcoal or saved for household use based on its quality for coal making. After burning, the land was immediately cultivated with corn. Following the corn harvest, the land was used to produce cassava while simultaneously being planted with oil palms, plantains, and other valuable fruit trees. In this arrangement, the nephew profited from the majority of the initial produce, the charcoal, corn, and cassava, and the landowner established a farm of long-term cash crops. Following this the farm would exist as a tree farm for approximately ten years, providing annual palm nut harvests, until the trees were mature and cut down to make palm wine (Honoue). Other landowners described this three year cash crop development, agroforestry cycle as well (Morrtty, Mancredo).

The initiative allowed continued use of farms previously established in the buffer zone, but no new cutting and burning for food crops that was part of the establishment of the fields. Therefore, this only recognizes the landowner end of the lost value of use. One landowner said, "The young men not advanced in education need the land. The land is not growing; the population is" (Agima IV). Landowners are also large beneficiaries in the tourism revenue sharing percentage scheme: 50% landowners, 20% Project Management Committee, 15% community, 10% traditional authorities, and 5% District Assembly (Edem). The youth, on the other hand, were expected to benefit from the

initiative through participation in small-scale enterprise activities. Their desire to continue farming livelihoods led to the small-scale enterprise farming groups that failed largely because they were forced to organize into groups. One of the snail group members said he is more interested in expanding his plantain production because there is always a good local market for them. However, he is a member of the snail group because that is what is available through the project's small-scale enterprise activities (Marseilles). The small-scale enterprise Coordinator said, "We are less interested in farming projects. We know all over Ghana that farmers don't pay loans" (Rubin). In other words the project is benefiting landowners, but not appropriately compensating youth.

Youth Small-Scale Enterprise Benefits: Enterprise activities were valued by their members differently according to the perceived successfulness and actual amounts of benefit from the activities. There were several keys to successful small-scale enterprise activities in providing local benefits. One of these characteristics was efficiency. Members of the beekeeping group described the efficiency of the hives and extraction design for producing large amounts of high quality honey (Isaac, Mancredo). However, there are many designs of bee hives and extractors to choose from in the apiculture field. Unlike more intricate hive models and centrifuge extractors used by beekeepers across the border in Togo, the hives and press style extractor used by the Afadjato bee groups were less tedious to construct and use, yet still much more efficient than traditional wild honey harvesting. (Observations of beekeeping) The President of the oil group also said efficiency of labor was a benefit to their activity, "(The mill) takes only two minutes per

headpan (of palm nuts), instead of pounding them” (Oil President). Therefore, activities that were efficient were higher valued more by group members.

Another similar key was the extent that the small-scale enterprise activities could integrate into other livelihood activities, particularly farming of food crops. A member of one of the beekeeping groups said their activities will be lucrative, not as a livelihood in itself, but as part of fruit harvesting, tourism revenue, and other alternative income activities like fruit collection and animal husbandry (Mancredo). Palm oil processing also integrated well with the farming calendar. The President of the group described that the peak fruiting season for oil palms to make red palm oil is between the planting and harvest seasons for corn and yams. Additionally, the inner kernels used to make clear oil can be saved and transformed during the dry season when there are few farming opportunities (Oil President).

By not conflicting with existing activities, successful small-scale enterprise projects were additional income rather than substitution income. However, increasing the efficiency and popularity of clear oil production through group sales could substitute for other traditional safety net resource uses like charcoal making, since it requires little initial investment and can be done at any time with a secure market. An example of this was the oil making group, which capitalized on selling oil as a group to reduce transportation costs and sell at a higher price in the regional market. Private oil makers said they sold their oil locally for 500 cedis less per liter than the regional price because they would each spend more than that amount in travel and food (Private business women). An increase in profitability such as this could be enough for charcoal makers to

switch to palm oil production, especially considering its increased efficiency, as a safety net income activity.

Costs of Small-Scale Enterprise Benefits: One of the oil group members said she did not like the way profits from oil making were not reinvested in making more oil. She felt forced to use her oil income for everyday living expenses rather than saving it, “When you only make ten or twelve bottles (of oil), that only pays for school fees, fish, sauce, and it is finished. Not enough to buy more palms” (Oil member). She thought if more profits were invested initially or reinvested, they could profit more, “We should be making oil everyday because we have the machines” (Oil member). Since oil making was not profitable enough to cover her household expenses, she did not consider it to be a successful enterprise.

A member of the snail husbandry small-scale enterprise says the villagers have unrealistic expectations of the alternative income activities:

The question of funds being insufficient is something different. People expect to work for a year and get something right away rather than pay back loans and slowly develop something over several seasons. (Marseilles)

Therefore, he thinks the enterprise benefits are not being realized fast enough. He realizes the potential of small-scale enterprise activities to alleviate stress on the household budget, but not to be substitute livelihood activities. However, he was discouraged by what he saw as a large amount of responsibility the youth have to take on to make the small-scale enterprise projects succeed. He said he would rather be a slave than have so much uncertainty:

I would like to have the chance to be like that (a slave)...Have a job to go to everyday...Come home to a house kept up for my family. If we have a health problem they (project owners) will look after us (Marseilles).

People do not want to invest their time in insecure benefits, such as those associated with working in groups, external markets, and new products that require new skills, like many of the small-scale enterprise activities. If they do take such a risk, they would like the benefits to be enough to support them, not just supplement their current workload.

Infrastructure Benefits vs. Income Benefits: Actors discussed other desired benefits besides enterprise development that could have been viewed as more traditional development benefits than the difficult small-scale enterprise approach to building village capacity through group activities with loans to repay and high uncertainty. A landowner said he would prefer “Some construction. There’s not much to see here (from the project). Other projects build school blocks and pay school fees for primary school” (Aprepsu). Another project committee member supported the long-term benefits that infrastructure could provide:

When I was a kid I went to Senior Secondary (School) in Hohoe. Now because of our work our kids can go here at the Senior Sec that we got funding for through the Japanese Embassy and built. But if projects don’t benefit today (like schools) people are going to say they aren’t good. People here want something that benefits today, not the future. (Marseilles)

By this comment he means that people want enterprise developments from the project because long-term infrastructure benefits are not direct enough. The youth representative said he thinks having a youth center built would encourage the youth to organize for all kinds of activities, cultural, music, sports, not just income generating projects (Sasa). He thinks the loss of these cultural aspects of village life, caused by the migration of youth to urban areas in search of employment, have just as much of an impact on the quality of village life as the lack of job opportunities. The Paramount Chief said that some of the

greatest needs for the village are road improvements and erosion control to facilitate transportation, and village latrines to solve sanitation problems (Togbega). Chiefs also said a gravity fed water system was a village wide priority because the village population exceeds the current borehole pumps that continually break down (Chiefs). However, the Wildlife Society project plan determined that enterprise development would be the economic benefits component of the project for the community. These comments demonstrate that the enterprise activities did not satisfy other local values.

Summary: The motivation for villagers to participate in this initiative was primarily for economic benefits. Likewise, the Wildlife Society viewed benefits as means to achieve conservation. However, the project did not adequately consider the disproportionate distribution of benefits. This project divided benefits between directly compensating landowners for restricting their use activities on forested lands and creating benefits for youth through alternative small-scale enterprise activities. Like the previous cases this resulted in landowners receiving greater amounts of benefits for less effort, while youth were required to invest themselves to receive insufficient benefits.

Summary and Discussion

Actors from all three initiatives displayed diverse forest use and non-use values and low capacity to negotiate them. This appears to be a result of competitive organizational structures, i.e. certain groups not wanting to share benefits with others, which was enhanced by each project's focus on one primary benefiting scheme. Even in the Afadjato case, where agroforestry use, tourism, and alternative income sources were promoted, their distributions of benefits were disproportionate. Agroforestry benefited a

small number of older landowners and tourism activities provided jobs for eight guides, while the majority (one Project Management Committee member estimated 80%) of youth were benefited through the small-scale enterprise program. However, the benefits from enterprise activities were low, required large time investments, and their benefits were uncertain. Similarly, the limited benefits of reforestation in Missahoe and tourism in Agumatsa could not represent the spectrums of values in their local populations.

Benefits from the projects depended on the organization and type of the activities. Some activities, like the TMT guides in the Agumatsa case were an example of substitute income sources, while tourism income divided amongst the community in the Afadjato example was additional income that did not change land use behavior. The enterprise income in the Afadjato case showed that to be successful the benefiting activities had to coincide with actor's values, but this does not guarantee more sustainable or beneficial outcomes than the original land uses. Despite social and economic studies in the Missahoe and Afadjato case, the projects did not critically analyze the associations of different types of benefits with positive and negative pre-existing livelihood activities. In the Afadjato case, additional income for landowners replaced their desire for bushmeat, but additional income that requires ongoing time and material investments like the small-scale enterprise activities do not replace safety net resource activities like charcoal making.

The projects did not capitalize on the complementary and contrasting potentials of values and benefits. Benefiting one group, such as Missahoe landowners via reforestation also benefited tenant farmers, but in ways counter to the goals of the project. Benefiting the landowners also created relatively narrow benefits for guides whose

preservation values were compatible with the Ministry technicians. For benefits to have more widespread influence in promoting desired land uses, they will have to be addressed on a larger scale as webs of interconnected benefits. Local management committees did not make project decisions as value and benefit tradeoffs. The projects assumed that satisfying the values of one group could exist without negative impacts from another group, and that those benefiting would internalize the costs of minimizing conflicting benefits from other groups, like hunters.

Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations

Looking back at the continuum of participatory conservation described in the literature review (Figure 2), the three initiatives display characteristics from the three main perspectives of participatory conservation: protected area outreach (Missahoe—Figure 25), co-management (Agumatsa—Figure 26), and community conserved area (Afadjato—Figure 27). The previous results chapters described how elements of participation from these perspectives were demonstrated by the projects through their distinct reasons and methods of initiating participation, webs of representation of local interests; and activities to create benefits that reflect local values, which each resulted in site specific problems. Although each initiative had site specific characteristics and difficulties, the three initiatives displayed similarities relative to participation that impeded and facilitated their success. This chapter briefly summarizes the results of each initiative in three figures (25, 26, 27) and then discusses the projects' similarities. With regards to their similarities, I make recommendations for participatory conservation initiatives.

The results chapters demonstrated that each project failed to accomplish the foundational elements of participation described in the literature review for meeting their approach to participatory conservation. Specifically, the Missahoe protected area outreach case encountered difficulties through initiation, representation, and identification (or distribution or generation?) of benefits, to effectively monitoring and enforcing forest use and regulations (Figure 25), which are the foundation to the protected area outreach approach. Likewise, co-management in Agumatsa failed to create shared decision making and management roles (Figure 26), and the Afadjato

community conservation approach relied too heavily on external management and therefore did not build upon local capacity and create local ownership (Figure 27), which are the foundations of these respective approaches to participatory conservation. Therefore, the three cases all displayed distinct problems that prevented the projects from achieving their goals.

Through their different goals, organizations, and activities, the initiatives ran into distinct problems caused by similarly narrow methods in which participation was initiated, differentially represented levels of interests, and provided insufficient and inequitable benefits based on narrow project values. In other words, the distinct problems exhibited in each case were the results of conflicts caused by each initiative's different narrow approach to participatory conservation. Narrow participation initiation resulted in assumptions and narrow definitions of 'conservation' and 'participation' in all three cases. Although the cases designed different forms of representation aimed at incorporating multiple local interests, each approach resulted in limited decision making and exclusion of other interests. These narrow initiation and limited representation processes transferred into activities and benefits that did not satisfy the diversity of local populations or the values of the projects.

Therefore, I conclude that at the site level, particular elements of each approach to participatory conservation limited these initiatives. At a general level, I conclude that it was the narrowness of the participatory approaches that impeded their successfulness; the limited scope in which local participation was incorporated as a step or ingredient, rather than as a process throughout the stages of initiative development and implementation. Specifically, the projects did not realize or openly identify the conflicts that were created

by the limited inclusion of multiple parties and perspectives at the local level, and did not negotiate through shared decision making processes to resolve these conflicts. Not only did this limited inclusion hinder the successfulness of projects initially, but it has prevented the projects from adapting to improve their participatory processes incrementally. By adaptation I mean the ability to resolve conflicts that arise during the implementation of the initiative due not only to external control, but to differences among actors at the local level. The following subsections describe how the three initiatives displayed this similar problem among the three themes: initiation, representation, and values. Following this, the recommendations section discusses a method of facilitating dialogue to include broader perspectives of participatory conservation and more local actors, specifically non-leadership and non-authority figures, to resolve conflicts among participatory conservation initiatives that may promote better adaptation to local conditions.

Figure 25. Foret Classee de Missahoe Summary

Initiation: The project ran from 2000-2002 under the control of the Ministry of Forests. The project was initiated to restore Missahoe as a wood producing forest after a decade of uncontrolled access for timber harvest, charcoal making, hunting, and farming. The international NGO (OIBT) funded and technically advised the Ministry management team on participatory management techniques. Participation was initiated to correct the ineffectiveness of State management, but ultimately to achieve the same goals of wood production. Thus, the transition to participatory techniques was a top-down means of achieving predetermined conservation goals.

Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity: The initiative created local management and protection committees to organize participation in reforestation activities. Landowners made up the decision making positions on these committees while youth and tenant farmers provided labor for their activities. The interests of youth and tenants, therefore, were not represented by the project, which resulted in low participation in forest monitoring on their part. Additionally, representation of landowners did not coincide with the diverse forms of land tenure and the distribution of forest use, and the designation of chief authority did not recognize their low capacity, resulting in ineffective monitoring and enforcement

Values and Benefits: This initiative clearly benefited only the agroforestry values of landowners through payments for reforestation and protection of their lands. Agroforestry appeared to benefit tenant farmers as well. However, agroforestry coffee production was required of tenants for permission to grow food crops, the basis of their livelihood, which was the only way they benefited. Guides valued forest preservation as a way to enhance their ecotourism livelihood, but only benefited from the project through temporary employment to grow and transplant seedlings. Because of this, guides and tenants engaged in, or did not participate in restricting hunting and charcoal making as the project was designed.

Figure 26. Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary Summary

Initiation: The initiative began in 1998 when village elders formed a Tourism Management Team and demanded control of the sanctuary from the Ghana Wildlife Division. The TMT was motivated to control tourism revenue that had been going to the central government, rather than access to and management of forest resources. However, Ghana's decentralization policy requires devolution of authority from central agencies to the District Assembly, a partially elected sub regional government body, rather than the village level. Therefore, through negotiations led by the District Assembly, the three bodies joined in co-management. This arrangement distributed project revenues and management duties between the bodies.

Representation, Capacity, and Empowerment: Although the three body co-management system was designed to represent the interests of all three management bodies, the TMT in particular did not want to share revenues and thus did not recognize the roles of the other management bodies and undermined their management capacity. These tactics created animosity between management bodies. Additionally, the Tourism Management Team was dominated by chief and elder decision making, which did not represent village interests, particularly village youth. This resulted in resistance towards the TMT from the village as well. The result of these conflicts between management bodies and villagers were ineffective sharing of management decisions and roles.

Values and Benefits: This initiative demonstrated a definite shift from previous ecological, spiritual, and agroforestry use values of the Sanctuary towards ecotourism based economic values. Although management goals remained in place from the preservationist sanctuary goals, all decisions made by the TMT revolved around tourism revenue. However, since the TMT did not represent village interests broadly and denied sharing control over revenue from tourism, there was weak support for tourism and economic values from other villagers. Therefore, village youth resisted the TMT by not participating in management activities and by hunting in the sanctuary.

Figure 27. Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area Summary

Initiation: This project was initiated by a small group of well-off villagers that approached the Ghana Wildlife Society, a national level NGO, to provide technical and financial assistance to their village to conserve their forested mountainside and promote village economic development. The Wildlife Society was familiar with the forest area from prior ecological surveys it had conducted on bird diversity. After conducting socioeconomic surveys of the village, the Wildlife Society wrote a project plan focused on creating a project management committee to oversee the creation of a forest reserve and small-scale enterprise developments, which was funded by the Dutch Embassy.

Representation, Capacity, and Empowerment: The Project Management Committee included broad-based village representation, within which the wildlife managers and village elders were single members. However, due to social norms, these two interest groups dominated decision making and management roles, which resulted in activities that did not build upon local knowledge and capacity. Therefore, villagers were not invested in the project activities and relied heavily on the external support of managers and chief decision making when the project encountered difficulties. In contrast to the shortcomings of the narrow decisions of managers and chiefs, activities designed through the actions of villagers produced greater participation and success.

Values and Benefits: The focus of actors in this initiative was on economic development. Forest conservation and the leadership of the Wildlife Society were seen as the means to acquire funding for the village. However, there were conflicts among the village over the types of economic benefits derived from the project. Landowners benefited directly from tourism revenues for the lost farming opportunities on their lands, which did not compensate youth. Youth participated in enterprise developments that required new skills, large time investments, and uncertain benefits. Additionally, income from these activities was supplementary rather than replacement income, thus they did not change negative forest use. Finally, other villagers desired infrastructure benefits rather than cash from these activities.

Participation Initiation: Despite their differences in origin, organization and implementation, each initiative developed similar concepts of ‘conservation’ and ‘participation’. In each case conservation was carried out through exclusionary techniques such as delimiting boundaries and patrolling to achieve predetermined and externally valued conservation goals, like wildlife conservation and reforestation. To achieve these conservation goals the initiatives relied heavily on external financing, either through project grants or tourism revenue, to motivate participation in project activities. In other words, because the projects’ conservation goals did not reflect local interests, other incentives had to be provided to achieve conservation goals, and receiving benefits, in some form of monetary compensation, were the foundation of local participation. In Missahoe youth were paid directly per tree to participate in reforestation activities (Figure 25). The management roles of both the wildlife officers and TMT in Agumatsa were to preserve the sanctuary in return for their percentage of the ecotourism revenue (Figure 26). Even in the Afadjato case, the most community controlled, the village donated lands for the forest reserve in order to receive funding for economic development activities (Figure 27).

Therefore, in all three cases participation was initiated to receive incentives in exchange for, or as means to achieve external conservation goals. This compensation for participation foundation reified the mentality that participation was not something local actors would want to do, that they would need to receive benefits because the project activities would not normally be doing them anyway. In other words, local interests were not directly incorporated because none of the projects built upon a local desire for forest conservation. Since the projects’ conservation goals were not based on local interests,

the histories of each area, diversity of interest groups, actors, and the capacity of social institutions such as traditional authority were not adequately considered. This was demonstrated in the Missahoe case by the Ministry's ignorance of the discrepancies between land tenure and land use distribution in the historical use of this forest (Figure 25). The Agumatsa and Afadjato cases implanted preservation goals and tourism based on preservation, in areas historically used for agroforestry, thus requiring local users to change their livelihoods rather than changing from within and promoting more effective agroforestry and adding value to it with agroforestry tourism (Figures 26 and 27).

In these projects the initiation of local participation, regardless of its motivation and origin, did not result in locally adapted conservation goals, which created conflicts among different interests in the local population. However, since these conflicts arose through implementation, the real problem is that the projects have not dealt with these conflicts to incorporate local interests more appropriately. In other words, even though all the project were characterized by what was described as shallow participation in the literature review, none identified the need for deeper participation to help negotiate and resolve conflicts.

Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity: In writing, each of the projects established representation and empowerment goals at the village or community level. They each based representation on different types of local management committees to represent multiple interests and incorporate pre-existing social institutions. The Missahoe case showed local committees controlled from above by the Ministry (Figure 25). Conversely, the TMT in the Agumatsa was controlled locally by Village Chiefs (Figure 26). Finally, the Afadjato management committee was divided between NGO

and Village Chief influence. Despite these differences, each of the projects favored certain interests over others. They all demonstrated narrow decision making by upper level traditional authorities or managers. Therefore, these projects did not transfer enough power to all levels of interests and representatives and representatives were not strongly accountable to their constituencies.

The results of narrow representation were different in the three cases because each case had different goals. In all three cases, however, the lack of representation contributed towards not achieving its goals participatory conservation by creating conflicts between interest groups, i.e. those that did not feel represented were not motivated to participate in conservation activities. Thus, in the Missahoe protected area outreach case, conflicts resulted in ineffective monitoring and enforcement (Figure 25) Shared decision making and management roles, were barred by conflicts generated by the lack of representation in the Agumatsa case (Figure 26). Low representation in the Afadjato case created low local ownership and high reliance on external manager and authority figure conflicts (Figure 27).

All these cases demonstrate that the opportunity for self representation in itself is not enough to realize broad self representation in circumstances where there is not a history of self representation, i.e. where it goes against social norms to have multi-party self representation. Therefore, like initiating participation with local legitimacy, broad local self representation is something that must be cultivated. In other words, this conclusion is that neither building on preexisting local representation (Agumatsa), nor creating new types of representation (Missahoe, Afadjato) are adequate in themselves.

Both need to be actively pursued to create broader participation that is adapted to local conditions.

Values and Benefits: For the most part, these projects' activities and benefits varied between employment, revenue sharing, and alternative income projects. Employment provided incentive to participate in certain initiative efforts, particularly reforestation in Missahoe (Figure 25), and guides in Agumatsa and Afadjato (Figures 26 and 27). However, employment and payment for certain activities directly and indirectly limited participation in other activities because of the conflicts it created. Employment directly limited participation in non-paid activities by actors previously paid to participate, in other words, conflicts over what activities were paid for. Employment also created conflicts over who was employed, which indirectly limited participation in other activities by those not paid at all, most commonly youth that were expected to work on the projects as communal labor. Since some youth were paid, others refused to work without the same benefits. The duration of employment was also not guaranteed for the long-term and depended on external revenue in all cases. Employment also benefited only a relatively small number of villagers and was not empowering in these cases because it did not coincide with the livelihood values of the villagers, which meant that those employed did not benefit through social capital usually gained from providing services to other villagers. Therefore, employment stimulated short-term participation in certain conservation activities, but also created many conflicts and did not lead to long-term, sustained participation.

Revenue sharing occurred in the Agumatsa and Afadjato cases based on tourism revenue (Figures 26 and 27). In both cases the distribution of revenue was highly

contested among village interest groups, as well as the specific uses of revenue percentages once they were distributed. In both cases, decisions regarding the percentage distribution and use were made by upper level villagers like chiefs and landowners that dominated the management committees. In Afadjato, revenues were distributed directly to landowners and families for unconditional use. This allowed women to invest in produce to sell or transform for sale in the market. However, because it was targeted at women, this revenue did not change the livelihood activities of men, particularly hunting for bushmeat. In Agumatsa revenue was distributed according to the village management committees made up of village chiefs. The greatest percentage of revenue in this case went to landowners, who continued to degrade the reserved areas. The chiefs made decisions to increase the income potential of the project through ecotourism, but also controlled how that additional income was used. Since they did not invest the revenue from tourism in the village, villagers were skeptical about supporting the project. Villagers in both cases were dissatisfied with their system of revenue distribution and use. Therefore, revenue sharing did not change the livelihood activities of actors that were engaged in forest extraction activities, as they were designed, and since revenue sharing was inequitable it created conflicts that decreased participation in activities like forest monitoring.

Alternative income strategies were initiated in the Missahoe and Afadjato cases. Unlike the traditional forms of village representation that were built upon by the projects, enterprise activities were based on new products, expert training, external markets, and machines, which created conflicts over what activities were created. These cases also required that alternative enterprise activities were developed in groups, which was not a

social norm in the study area. This created conflicts among group members that hindered the development and profitability of most activities. Conflicts over the slow development of projects, types of activities encouraged, and amount of time required for uncertain activities also discouraged villagers to invest themselves fully in these activities. Without local ownership most of the alternative income activities did not produce substantial benefits. Since these activities and benefits were primarily targeted at youth, this meant that they did not change youth's extractive forest use activities.

In all three types of benefits: employment, revenue sharing, and alternative income, the projects failed to provide enough incentive for villagers to achieve the goals of their distinct approaches participatory conservation. In Missahoe, both youth and landowners were paid for their efforts in reforestation, but based on these benefits; neither was willing or capable of monitoring and enforcing the protection goals of the project (Figure 25). In Agumatsa the TMT members complained that the distribution of revenue across the three management bodies and further between the three villages, did not allow them to provide benefits to the villages. The Afadjato project provided benefits to landowners through tourism revenue while other funds were used to create enterprise activities (Figure 27). In this case neither the youth nor landowners felt satisfied by their benefits. Therefore, each of the projects developed problems with creating benefits that satisfied no one. Like the shared shortcomings of the previous themes, the conflicts over project benefits are symptoms of unresolved discrepancies between the projects and diverse interests of the local populations. In other words it was not necessarily the benefits themselves that were problematic, but the results of people feeling they were not party to the negotiation of benefits.

Recommendations: Despite all the criticism of the three initiatives that I have discussed in this thesis, I consider each project to be successful in many ways by raising the awareness and interest in the conservation of forests at the local level. Although local participation was limited in each case, I witnessed changes in the actors involved in each of the projects due to the forms of participation they experienced, even though those forms would be labeled shallow from the perspective of the framework identified in the literature review. Before these projects, technical aspects like silviculture prescriptions, boundary delimitation, regulations, monitoring, and revenue were the primary forest management concerns, which rested solely with project managers. Throughout the projects factors emerged at the local level such as historical use, organization, representation, distribution of benefits, and many others that reflect a shift from a wholly technocratic approach to a participatory approach. The projects certainly broadened the scope of possibility for forest conservation among the actors at each of the study sites.

Never-the-less, the projects have obviously stumbled out of the gates at achieving successful participatory conservation, regardless of their different perspectives. However, all of the projects are in their initial stages; therefore it is possible that what appear to be failures presently could turn into greater success over time. I concluded that the problems specific to each of the three projects are all rooted conflicts caused by their shared, but different narrow focuses on their initiation of participation and predetermined conservation goals; methods of representing diverse local interests through management organization; and the benefits that are provided through project activities focused on particular forest values. In other words, it is not any particular element from those discussed in the review of participatory conservation (Chapter 2) that impedes or

facilitates success, but the process of fitting those elements to ever-changing local conditions and conflicts, i.e. adapting. Therefore, my main recommendation is that the projects need to resolve conflicts by broadening their scope of possible participatory conservation approaches and negotiating the choice of techniques that are more adapted to their circumstances. As a specific example, I recommended at the end of the Missahoe section of the Chapter 6 that this initiative would benefit from a co-management framework with more empowerment at the local level and shared power with the Ministry of Forests. However, because of the limited definitions of participation and conservation in the design of the initiative by higher authorities in the Ministry, the local forestry technicians and local committee members were not aware of alternative types of participation. Although this was undoubtedly the result of an underlying desire to retain control by the central Togolese government, it was also due to the limitations of the protected area management perspective driving the process. Therefore, I think approaching participatory conservation projects such as Missahoe at the local level with the continuum of alternative strategies would provide the opportunity for greater decision making, negotiation, and adaptation processes. Unfortunately the government is a definite limiting factor in this case, but that should not prevent resolving conflicts and increasing capacity, even if it is something separate from the initiative, at the local level.

To expand on this recommendation I will discuss what I and previous authors see as the necessary ingredients for incorporating the type of adaptability called for in the preceding paragraph. The populations in this case, as well as tropical farmers in general, historically base their livelihoods on adaptation to changing environmental and economic conditions. Farmers in the study area depend on harvesting diverse cash crops to

compensate for their volatile global markets, and cultivate diverse food crops to guard against disease, drought, and soil fertility loss. More specific to these cases, youth in all three initiatives adapted their forest use activities, like hunting, to avoid detection by, but continue in resistance to the conservation activities. So how can the ability to adapt such as these be incorporated into participatory management initiatives? This is not a question I have a specific answer for, however the following discussion describes my attempt at creating a foundation for adaptation through dialogue among local actors in the final conference I facilitated between members of each of the three projects.

The Afadjato case demonstrated the clearest example of adaptation in its small scale enterprise projects (Figure 27). These activities were initiated with revolving loans from the project to village groups. The consensus among managers and group members was that the group work method was a primary cause for these projects failing; members simply did not work effectively together. With this experience the project managers changed the small scale strategy from groups to individuals, as well as implementing other technical changes based on initial results of the activities. As previously discussed, this adaptation was completely controlled by the Ghana Wildlife Society managers, but never-the-less represents the type of trial and error, incremental development that the projects need to apply to all phases of management, not merely alternative income strategies, that will gradually adapt the projects to local conditions. For this to happen more broadly the projects must have access to what Skutsch (2000) considers the keys to adaptation: identify that there is a conflict, have knowledge of alternatives that are available, and the pro's and con's of alternatives between different interests. In addition to this, the actors must have the will and ability to act on decisions that are negotiated.

The will and ability to participate depends on what Chambers (1994c) describes as changes in attitudes and personal behaviors, which he has documented through the use of participatory rural appraisal techniques that empower poorer and weaker local actors to engage in conservation and development activities.

Creating the conditions for these elements was the impetus for the conference that I organized between diverse representatives from the three projects at the end of data collection period of this research project. This conference represents the type of action that I would recommend for project managers, students, or volunteers to foster adaptive processes among preexisting participatory conservation projects. During this conference small groups of participants from different interest groups in each project (managers, landowners, tenants, hunters, tourism guides, women, etc.) worked together to present the details of their project to the conference participants from the other two groups. My primary goal was for the participants from each project to realize that there are many ways to organize participatory project management and implement different participatory activities besides those at work in their project to achieve their goals. Since, according to my organization of participatory conservation literature, each of these projects represents a different perspective, I created a forum where practical examples from each approach could be shared through a dialogue of local project actors. This conference helped each project build what Salafsky and Margolois (2002) describe as a “Learning Portfolio”. Therefore, this fulfilled the first half of the requirements for adaptation: the need to identify conflicts, have knowledge of alternatives, and the pro’s and con’s of them between different interest.

In addition to this objective, the conference also provided the opportunity for the practical knowledge of participatory conservation to be generated and shared by the local actors themselves. My decision to invite such a diverse group of participants to the conference from each group was made based on the other crucial piece of evidence of adaptation in the Afadjato case, that non-managers and non-leaders, or common village participants, were better at adapting (Figure 27). This is consistent with similar adaptive strategies being applied in West African cases, such as the *Gestion de Terroir* approaches in Francophone countries (Painter et al. 1994, Pimbert 2004). Therefore, rather than presenting information to project managers, which would have been much easier, the conference also targeted villager participants such as youth, tenants, and small enterprise group members, to empower them through inclusive methodologies to speak on behalf of their conflicts with the project. This coincides with the recommendations of Chambers (1994c) and helped to satisfy the second half of adaptation: the local will and ability to act.

This brings up a significant point about this recommendation. Conflict resolution and adaptation has the potential to create more effective management because it can create projects better fit to local circumstances and facilitate greater participation. At a deeper level conflict resolution aims at doing this by creating projects that are more “fair” or have goals and activities that are acceptable to more interests (Skutsch 2000). Therefore, conflict resolution is a way to create justice in conservation projects. This is not merely an idealistic recommendation. It means, for example, that maybe landowners in these initiatives should get greater benefits than youth from initiative activities because, to follow one possible moral argument, the forests that exist in the project areas

are there because they did not cut them down. This is obviously too simplistic because I have argued previously that it is actually the youth that do or do not cut the forest down. However, what this conflict resolution recommendation says is that there needs to be a dialogue among local actors about the moral arguments between interests, like landowners and youth, a process that is lacking in all three initiatives. Therefore, the type of dialogue I am recommending are deliberate discussions of inclusion of multiple actors and interests. In other words, a discussion by local actors concerning the type of participatory conservation that is desirable. I do not think that the depth of participation is something that should necessarily be shifted completely to the deep end with all power and responsibility resting at the local level. In many cases local actors may not be ready or willing to take on the responsibilities of participatory processes and management activities. However, these should be conscious decisions made on the basis of local resources and assets, knowledge of alternatives, and discussion including local project managers, authorities, and non-authority figures.

In summary, the conclusions of this study lead me to recommend that these initiatives need to be better fit to the characteristics of their local populations to reduce conflict. I believe that for this to happen, the projects need to adapt their current strategies. The way I recommend for this to happen is through processes, such as the previous conference example, to foster dialogue and agreement among diverse interest groups to engage in experimentation with alternative participatory strategies. Experimentation among diverse interests requires the situated knowledge of management choices among local actors to determine what the best strategies of participatory conservation are in their case. Therefore, through this study I recommend the initiation

of participatory action research among preexisting projects at the site level that focus in particular on situating knowledge among non-manager project actors to facilitate broader negotiated project activities. Actions such as the conference described could also initiate the formation of alliances of participatory conservation projects in regional and national settings in countries rich in small-scale conservation efforts that could increase the breadth of their collective knowledge, which have also been called for to scale up participatory conservation forums (Colchester et al. 2003, Chambers 1994c).

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Appendix A: Interview Guides and Questionnaires

Project Director Worksheet

(general guide used in all initial manager and some management committee interviews)

Project Title:

Project Headquarters:

What are the boundaries and target populations of the project? Include landmarks, surface area, and population characteristics. Draw a map if possible.

Describe the history of the project. Date started, problems, goals and objectives, project initiators, start up funding sources, etc...

What is the leadership and organization of the project? Role of local, regional, and national governments, role of associations or collaborating organizations, international support, etc...

What are the project facilities? What activities do they accommodate? How and when were they built?

Who are the stakeholders in the project? Numbers organizations/associations, # of employees, # of project beneficiaries, landowners, etc... Include the # of men, women, boys and girls if possible.

What are the project's economic benefits? Include those for the project, village groups, and individuals for these three questions.

What are the projects social benefits?

What are the projects environmental benefits?

Estimate the visitation of the project. Include local, national and international if possible and the purpose of their visits.

What is the future vision for project management? When and how will this occur? What changes have taken place already?

Use reverse side to describe project problems and needs.

Village Leader Worksheet

(general guide used in all village leader and some management committee interviews)

Village:

Population:

Describe the history of the village (founders, settlement, demographic patterns):

What are the village boundaries? Political, traditional, changes in them over time etc... Draw a village map if possible.

What are the village ethnic, lingual, or other socially defining groups? Approximately what percentages of the population does each make up?

Describe the village government system. Village, traditional area, district, regional, national, etc...

What is the village economic situation? Numbers of stores, bars, hotels/guesthouses, market, electricity, road condition, housing conditions, etc...

What is the village education situation? Numbers, types, and qualities of schools, teachers, and students.

What are the local village resources? Foods, cash crops, forest products, building materials etc... Draw a seasonal calendar if possible.

What are the traditional holidays and celebrations of the village?

Describe a normal day's activities for men, women, and children in the village.

Use the reverse side to describe village problems and needs.

Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Worksheet

(More specific guide created for actors in Afadjato case)

Describe how the project was imagined, researched, planned, written, etc...(Explain the general ideas as well as who specifically participated in each step of project creation)

How is the role of Ghana Wildlife Society (NGO) different from government conservation agencies like Ghana Wildlife Division and Ghana Tourism Commission that work in neighboring villages?

Describe how the Project Management Committee was planned, selected, formally written and put into action. What are the member's regular duties?

Does the Project Management Committee represent all stakeholders in the immediate and Accra communities? For example the local youth vs. Accra youth. How does each representative (Chiefs, Youth, Women, etc.) inform their interest group of project objectives and activities?

What are the project's conservation objective and activities? Who initiated these, trained the staff, and what staff does the work? How are workers hired, managed, and paid? How does project work relate to communal labour?

Describe how the small-scale enterprise activities began. Why were interested people required to form groups? How and what activities were chosen? Who made the

decisions to fund different activities, budget amounts, and the terms of financing between groups and the project?

What is the state of the small-scale enterprises today? What has been accomplished and what have been the largest obstacles? Describe the problems of working in groups, lack of dedication to new activities, and finding markets for various products.

Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary Worksheet

(More specific guide created for actors in Agumatsa case)

Describe how the sanctuary began with the Wildlife Division. (Planning, objectives, organization, activities, revenue generation, etc.)

Describe how the Tourism Management Team was imagined, researched, planned, formally written and put into action. (Explain the TMT general ideas as well as who participated in creating the new management strategy. Explain the role the District Assembly plays.)

What are the stakeholder revenue sharing percentages and how were they determined? What activities have % been used for by all groups: Wildlife, TMT, landowners, chiefs/elders, etc...

Does the TMT represent all stakeholders in the community?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of working with three levels of co-management? Wildlife, TMT, and District Assembly. (Sharing of labour, training village guards, road/school improvements, difficulty communicating and sharing authority, etc.)

How has tourism been developed in the sanctuary? (Guide organization and trainings, trails, bridges, advertising and publicity, etc.)

Describe the problems of hunting, wood collecting, illegal farming and bushfires in the sanctuary. Who participates in these activities? What has been done to stop them?

What other activities have been proposed for village development and how have they been incorporated into the sanctuary management plan? (Animal husbandry, guesthouses, restaurants, reforestation, etc.)

Foret Classee de Missahoe Worksheet

(More specific guide created for actors in Missahoe case)

Describe how the project was imagined, researched, planned, written, etc. (Explain the project's general ideas as well as who specifically participated in each step.)

Why were two separate plans created: Reforestation in the Foret Classee and Reforestation in the surrounding rural areas?

What is the reforestation plan? Plantations, natural forest, or agroforestry? Who will benefit and how when the trees are mature?

How has payment of participants in the reforestation activities been organized? Work in nurseries, transportation of saplings, transplanting, weeding, etc...

How have project stakeholders worked in collaboration? (Roles of chiefs, landowners, tenant farmers, village committees, women and youth.)

What other activities have been proposed for forest conservation and village development and how have they been integrated into the village management strategy? (Tourism organization, village work groups, mushroom culture, beekeeping, improved cook stoves, prevention of bushfires and forest cutting.)

What is the state of reforestation today? What other activities have been achieved?

Landowner Questionnaire

(Guide created for landowners in Afadjato project)

What of your land was given to the project?

How was the ownership or management in you family for lands?

What do you use your remaining % for now?

Has that changed since donating land to the project?

Do you personally farm?

Who else in the family farms?

What type of wood or charcoal is used to cook in your household?

Where does it come from?

Did your family collect wood in your forest before donating to the project?

How often does your family consume meat?

Where does it come from?

Did your family hunt in your forest before donation?

How have you been compensated for lands your family donated?

Has the project made a difference in your daily life?

Appendix B: Biographical Sketches and Data Excerpts of Interviewees

Missahoe

Efakao, Ministry of Forests Regional Director.

Kossi Efakao is situated in the forestry hierarchy, which simultaneously frustrates and comforts him by restricting his workspace in projects. This limited workspace, in turn, affects his definition of problems, methods of engaging them, motivation, and perception of success. In his ministry chief opinion, the project was successful because all the hierarchical steps of project creation, implementation, and reporting were done by the office. His perception of success is not the field results because they depended on village committees, which the ministry could not control. He says the failures in the field were due to the lack of participation, volunteering in particular, and sustaining the initiative after donor funds ended. He said it was the 'taste of money' they got during the project that spoiled them. He also says they were scared to implement and enforce the rules. From his personal opinion, he understands that the initiative did not adequately address certain issues like land scarcity and tenants, but he saw these as obstacles to overcome through the plan the way it was written rather than changing it.

- About 50 years old, Ewe, works from the Kpalime Ministry of Forests and Waters office. Also known as the DECP.
- His job is to manage the office, with 3-4 foresters under him (who mostly hang around outside the building talking) and two secretaries. He often rides around the prefecture to different forestry lands on his off-road motorcycle. He also collaborates with another office just outside of Kpalime and gives tours of managed areas when international reps and Lome Ministry supervisors visit.
- His office is always the same, desk full of papers as if he was working on a book, yet he is never busy doing anything. I met with him a half dozen times, each time unscheduled. He was either there or gone. When he was there I was always shown into his office and he was always doing nothing, as if the papers are there as props.
- He was disorganized and used this as one of many reasons to withhold information from me. He gave me a plan at one point for the Missahoe initiative, but after I asked for it again and other documents he said he couldn't find them and I would have to go to Lome to get copies.
- He was never friendly to me and seemed to use professionalism as a barrier against conversation, somewhat like chiefs with interpreters. He didn't engage in any of the cultural norms of greetings and hospitality when I visited him in the office. Instead he was always skeptical, short with responses, and often refused to respond for various excuses.
- When he did respond to questions he often contradicted himself. His first response would typically be to deny that there was a problem, or that there was a strategy set up to deal with the problem that he could not change. Then after a while he would admit that there is a problem and blame it on someone, usually villagers, and again plead that there was nothing he could do so it wasn't worth thinking about. Specifically he said did this about illegal hunting, cutting of live wood for coal or timber, burning, and enforcement.
- He frequently used the hierarchy of the forestry ministry as an excuse that he couldn't participate in alternative management ideas. He would refuse to answer questions that weren't addressed specifically to his position. Overall, he said he would cooperate with my study but didn't take it seriously because it wasn't one of his orders. He said he couldn't continue working with the Missahoe project forever, and the project had officially ended so he had no means to continue with it.
- He is a good example of how the Missahoe project, being the first participatory attempt at management in Togo, was done with staff from wood revenue and enforcement based era.
- He was one of the 3 technicians from the forestry tech team which included 2 project leaders from Lome, 3 technicians for reforestation inside Missahoe, reforestation in the surrounding rural areas, and surveillance. He was the Surveillance leader who trained through doing members of the local committees. They created, or enhanced the patrol trail by cutting and maintaining a 5 meter fire block around the trail, erected the cement monuments, and visited reforestation sites and tenant farms.
- To give the local committees authority, he organized village meetings with the Prefet (regional governor) and village traditional authorities. He said the committees were scared to enforce the rules and boundaries of Missahoe when not with the foresters.

- He describes the success in technical term, didn't know how to respond to questions of environmental benefits, or who the village beneficiaries are. However, he said that it was the 'taste of money' that the local committees got during the project that prevent them from sustaining the project now that the funds have ended.
- He is aware of the real threats to Missahoe, bushfires, illegal logging, and tenant farming, and general land scarcity. However, because of his place in the hierarchy he had to address these through how the plan was written, ie without acknowledging tenant/landowner relations and naively thinking that farmers would accept reforestation in the surrounding areas as a better idea than moving to more fertile forested lands to cultivate. This is part of what frustrates him about the project and his work.
- His old school idea is that these problems should be resolved, period. That there shouldn't be a plan to address them, that they are simply wrong and must be stopped. Like the idea that the committees got a taste of money and wouldn't work without it after the project ended, he doesn't think people should be paid or benefit not to do illegal activities.

Dieu Donne, *Tourism Guide.* Dieu is very pro-preservation, specifically non-use, no coffee or agroforestry, only natural forest. He sees these others as competing with tourism values, although he also sees traditional village activity as tourism. His perception of how it should be and how it was is different, pro-wilderness. He sees ineffectiveness of Traditional Authorities to regulate resource use as the main problem. He would like to be hired as a spy to relay convicting information to Foresters and gendarmes to stop all use in Missahoe.

- Ewe, about 25 years old, from Konda. One of the core members of the youth guide association (approximately 8-12 full time members involved in various tourism related activities). This group is strongly affiliated with both the NGO ADETOP and the hotel Campement, although there are differing alliances between the guides and their destination, like a partitioning of the tourist market.
- The members of the guide groupement guide hikes, collect insects (butterflies, spiders, scorpions, walking sticks...) for making entomology type display cases, carve furniture and drums, host parties/traditional fetes. Some of them plan longer trips with international tourists and expats living in Lome around West Africa.
- They have a weak groupement structure that supposedly collects % of revenues from all activities for a group savings account. He said these funds mostly get used for throwing parties. But then he said that the funds are also given out to individuals as "loans" or split up amongst guides to pay for their living expenses. He said most guides do not farm so they have to buy all their food.
- Dieu makes his living from a mixture of these activities. He is especially educated in insect and plant identification and traditional use, and interacts with eco-minded tourists regularly.
- He told me the project has failed because of the lack of authority of village chiefs. He said that chiefs are not respected by villagers like they once were. He blamed this on democracy, and ineffectiveness of chiefs to solve development problems in their villages. He said Konda has this problem, but it is a common problem. "Before you couldn't just talk directly to the chief. It had to be a formal ceremony with interpreters. But now people, even kids, walk by the chief and don't even greet, or informally (disrespectfully) greet."
- He also said the village committees were not paid adequately to enforce the laws. He gave Ghana forest rangers as an example of effective control because they are feared by the public and paid well to do their job. He said there need to be spies that are paid well in the villages that report directly to the foresters, who then need to do their jobs by fining people rather than being bribed.
- He also said the money paid to the CLGPM were paid in lump sums to traditional authorities or committees and disappeared.
- He said there is a lack of alternative livelihood education and start-up loans. He is against any kind of agroforestry that compromises natural forest, but says there need to be things like animal husbandry that complement the forest.

Awube, Kossi. *Tourism Guide.* He supports the old ways of the foresters, strict control, and would like to see the Missahoe become a zoological park for tourism only. He doesn't support the new agroforestry plan because he sees that it isn't being applied by all farmers and not stopping bushfires. Kossi was disappointed with my lack of anger about the state of the Missahoe. He was personally hurt by the way the forest has changed since his childhood in the late '80s. He lamented, "I can remember

back to my childhood memories, around 1984, there was darkness here. Some places you couldn't see." The guides were not officially incorporated into the plan, as guides. Some participated in the reforestation labor, but Kossi and others do not know the details of the Missahoe initiative.

- Kossi is the youngest of the Ewe guides, perhaps 20, in the Konda tourism association. He lives in an old but well off family compound with cement walls, aluminum roof in the center of the village.
- Like the other guides they look like tourists themselves in the village because they dress like youth in Lome or Kpalime in western clothes, unlike the rest of the village wearing traditional cloth or farming attire. The guides also speak more French and frenchier French than anyone else in the village.
- He is very active in guiding and working on the side with Lome based expats. Besides guiding for them he harvests bromeliads and other plants for their gardens and takes them to Lome. He carries a cell phone from one expat in Lome, I guess for emergency garden services.
- He also collects butterflies very diligently. He only goes for those that he knows they need for collections, and then inspects them for any defects before deciding to kill them. He isn't as knowledgeable about forest plants as Dieu and others. He follows Prosper, the owner of Auberge Pappion and entomologist, more closely. He is more into the business sides of tourism and doing well with it.
- We met through his entrepreneurial spirit; he distributed coffee for the Café Kuma group in Dunyo. However, he proved to be untrustworthy when he didn't pay the group for their coffee for several months. In addition to this, when Café Kuma decided to sell through the hotels directly, not through guides, he and some guides tried to boycott the coffee or would take bags from the hotels the group sold through without paying them back.
- The guides association operates very unofficially. When a tourist comes to town, most youth will offer services as guides and despite their supposed rates for guiding, the prices fluctuate and are negotiated individually. To retain this autonomy the guides are not affiliated to any of the hotels or guesthouses, rather they all compete with each other. But they also manage to all make enough of a profit to continue in that manner.
- Like other guides he is very upset by the current state of the Missahoe with tenants and uncontrolled illegal use. While we were hiking he made special efforts to point out the tenant farmers fields within the forest, and tell about the illegal cutting during the political crisis that led to the savanna areas. He said the deforestation was a combination of "Everyone came, cutting, shooting animals, and trapping. Our fathers cutting and Kabiyes cutting to make charcoal. Everyone did there part, but it was mostly the Kabiye that came the time of the grave and live here (in Missahoe) now."
- But like guides at Agumatsa in Ghana, he did nothing out of the ordinary on our hikes when we saw men and women illegally cutting down trees for firewood and harvesting pepper, or said anything to the tenants as we passed through their compounds. He didn't report them or say anything warning them, he was just somewhat curt with them. At one point he was talking to me about the tenants cutting, burning, and changing the forest to coffee in front of them as if they weren't there.
- He said the people we saw harvesting were from Tsame. He also said the trail we were on was maintained by the CLGPM from Konda and Tsame as a fire break, and they also monitor the forest. The trail obviously wasn't stopping the fires from crossing in some places. Kossi pointed out how illegal users are aided by the trail that is used for monitoring, pointed out how a trail from Adame used by charcoal makers intersects with the one we were on. He said the northern border is split up between Tsame and Konda, but the southern border is worse because it is split into many more villages committees.
- He described the project as being finished and failing, and so would the Missahoe.
- He was especially bothered by the burned areas and savanna lands within the Missahoe. On our hike we saw many burned areas that had not burned since before the beginning of the participatory project in 2000. These were especially on the northern edge (Tsame lands) and along the lower Missahoe Route.
- The guides also don't seem to know concrete answers about the Missahoe initiative like what their rights are and the rights of other users, and responsibilities of the local committees and foresters. It's unclear why this is since committee leaders and foresters talk about village meetings to educate the populations about the plans. If these meetings were anything like my 'meetings' experiences I can imagine why.

- He did understand the agroforestry method of reforestation in theory, but was quick to point out that it was not closely followed by all farmers in Missahoe, especially Kabye tenants.

Paulin, President of Local Management and Protection Committee, Kuma-Adame. Paulin never spoke of enforcement and regulation problems of Missahoe laws, only the benefits of people changing their livelihoods through reforestation and alternative livelihoods like him and tourism friends. He promotes the project as if people in the village still haven't come aboard, need to be convinced of its benefits to them. He also sees problems between villages hurting the project. He wants to continue the project with the help of the forestry ministry, but doesn't feel secure enough to lead the village alone. Also doesn't have the management funds that he sees necessary to work on project ideas. He wants the village management team to be under the support of the ministry indefinitely.

- About 40 years old, Ewe, built like a lanky truck driver. Usually wears shirts with their sleeves cut off and smokes constantly. Lives in a large, well off, family compound in Kuma-Konda with his wife who is nursing their most recent baby girl.
- He is part of a local alliance with Prosper, a villager who owns Hotel Pappion and the leader of ADETOP a Konda based NGO. They are the older Konda axis that supports alternative development in the village through tourism, aid projects, reforestation and try hard to sell these.
- In that sense they are elitists in the village, since most villagers are average Kuma farmers, hunters, charcoal makers, market women etc... They are also at somewhat of odds with the younger group of tourism guides, butterfly collectors, and sculptors who want the same basic things but don't group together because they all want autonomy.
- He makes his living in many alternative ways to traditional farming, although he farms as well, we never discussed it beyond his forest farms. He manages a large personal tree nursery for producing mostly cure-dent and some other income generating tree species like etcho, kola, citrus, and timber for sale locally and nationally.
- He farms coffee as well with the most outstanding reforestation results I ever saw with timber, nitrogen fixing, and fruit trees flourishing in his coffee like a poster for shade grown coffee certification. He also works with a group of mushroom farmers that produce large exotic white mushrooms to dry and sell to supermarkets and restaurants in the capital city, Lome.
- He has farms in Missahoe but uses them very differently than tenant farmers. He and other Konda farmers use the lands like Dunyo farmers use their forest lands adjacent to Afadjato in Ghana, for fruit production like avocado, banana, plantain, taro, cacao, yovozi and others.
- He is the President of Konda's local management committee (CLGPM) and the Secretary of the management union (UCLGPM). His role was to organize the labor to grow seedlings and plant them in Missahoe.
- He coordinated the transplanting of trees on Konda farms with the help of village youth. He described how they kept track of days worked and everyone was paid in Konda.
- However, he said it was different in Tokpli where they have tenant farmers. The landowners were part of the project and paid by the CLGPM for the trees planted on their land. But unlike Konda, where the "landowners" are also the farmers, the landowners in Tokpli have tenant farmers who were not part of the project benefits.
- Paulin was definitely one of the privileged members of the CLGPM and Union. This is evident by the way he feel so close and wants to be with the foresters, the personal aid he received for starting the cure-dent and mushroom projects, and how he was present at all the workshops. From the reports written by the ministry it is clear that not all committee members were treated equally.
- He describes the benefits from the project as individual, depending on if people participate in tree planting, tourism, and alternative livelihoods. But he admits that not everyone was included (like tenants) and that many people were involved in tourism, beekeeping, and other village activities that the project didn't negotiate with before creating the plan.
- It was as if the project thought it could come in and benefit some of those that were not yet benefiting without upsetting others.

Aza, Kodzo, Vice President of Local Management and Protection Committee, Kuma-Adame. Kodzo sees everything as a gradual process, extremely wise and practical, foresighted for the long-term. He sees reforestation in this way, something for the next generation not his benefit. He sluggishly plays roles

in group activities like the nursery, but if there was something actually more beneficial out there he would be doing it. All the group endeavors he participates in are behind his private affairs. He seems to be involved in them as more of a social obligation to progress that he believes in due to his status as a leader in the village than to personally benefit from participating.

- Kodzo is about 45 years old, Ewe, from the same family as Denis Koffi, but unlike Denis he is part of the village upper class. He has plenty of lands, store, coffee farming, and coffee buying income. He lives in a large compound in Adame and is building a retirement home on his farm outside the village.
- His family owns the lands East of Kuma-Adame as far as the beginning of Kuma-Tsame lands. They reach the northern border of Missahoe.
- I met him on my first day in Kuma because he is a friend of my Peace Corps counterpart in Dunyo. He is also a store owner and coffee buyer in Adame. His family sells mostly sodabi (distilled palm wine) and various supplies like eggs, matches, ground nuts, cigarettes, candy, oil and other things. Its not the most stocked store in town, but frequented for sodabi by most men in that quarter of the village.
- As a coffee buyer, like my counterpart Kodzo EGAN, he has a group of coffee farmers that sell their coffee to him every year based on the Kpalime market price. When the transporters from Kpalime come to the village they stop the truck at Kodzo's store to load up the bags. He makes a commission per kilo on all the coffee he stores. As the local buyer he is seen as the farmer's Patron because he often pays them in advance for their crops, gives them loans throughout the year based on their harvest, and in turn they are loyal to selling to him each year and giving him gifts.
- His land use and livelihood are very dynamic, he engages in coffee farming, fruit and spice trees, nitrogen fixing tree species, gardening, yams, crop rotation with corn, groundnuts, beans, and manioc. His farms are like textbook integrated agriculture fields.
- He has definite long-term goals for his land and family including tree planting, animal husbandry, and moving from the village to the farm.
- He is also active in many village committees and agrobusiness groups, like fish farming, honey production, rents parts of his land. Due to this he is savvy about projects and new activity potentials and complexities. Because of this he focuses on his own farms, tries to be an example, but knows not to get involved with wider forced reform strategies that depend on others.
- He was part of the group that started the Adame village tree nursery. The Vice President of the village management committee (CLGPM). His reasoning for doing this are mixed between livelihood planning and moral reasons to reforest. He has worked before and after the Missahoe initiative that paid them for seedling production and talks about it on the basis of restoring some of what there used to be in Kuma in his youth, like the guides, unlike thinking about production potential.
- He said he didn't think the CLGPM doing the nursery would be interested in having a meeting. He said they meet on Fridays to work, but even he didn't take these too seriously because he was skipping the meeting this day just to go to another village. The committee only 'meets' when there is a problem to discuss, only discusses it among the leaders without the laborers. It is only to discuss problems, rather than planning.
- He emphasized how Adames role is only participating in the work and getting paid through cash or kind to do the work. He said the other villages have "more interesting roles".
- He is personally depressed about the condition of the environment for and doesn't believe the Missahoe participatory project is the solution. He asked at one point if I meant when the forest was classified (i.e. before the looting) or during the project, to differentiate the two management timeframes. He also said that resource collection (hunting, wood, coal) are ongoing and regular.
- When I asked about benefiting the villages more he said it was a good idea, but would have to be done very carefully, unlike the current strategy and not using generic income solutions.

Chiefs and Elders, Kuma-Adame. They gave responses that seemed factual in most cases, but in some cases they responded with Development Fantasy responses like the CLGPM to seem like the village is more homogeneous than it really is and more needy than in reality. On the needy side they said the village needs a health center, running water, electricity, road, and market improvements. However, all of these things are present in the village at some state, which is beyond all other Kuma villages besides Konda and Tsame. They did not have any strategy for development, or any framework for how

development would fit in with village management. Instead they were flexible and fishing for sponsors rather than solutions.

- I met with the Chiefs of Adame and other villages in the study area and my work areas less frequently than people I worked with regularly. They were not a target of my work and were only consulted when there was a formality of some kind or organizational question I had that I thought they could help with.
- I befriended many other elders in the villages that were also helpful with answering these questions. Chiefs never went out of their way to try to work with me as a Volunteer. For a long time I had a bad opinion of chiefs because they seemed to do nothing progressive, rather were a formal hindrance or leach to village development.
- This opinion was largely because the Chief of Dunyo, the village where I lived, was absent for the first year and a half I lived there. He worked for a bank in Lome and was never in the village. I blamed him for the lack of initiative in the village during that time. However, when he returned I did get to know him as one of the least formal, most practical of all chiefs, and the lack of initiative in the village was just that.
- Kuma was settled by the Ewe at Kumato in approximately 1750 during a migration from Notse, a former capital of the Ewe people. This is the same migration route and time period when Wli and Gbledi were settled.
- Frequent traveling and employment outside the village is common for chiefs in the Kuma. Like Dunyo, the chief of Adame is rarely in because of trips to Kpalime and Lome. They are from the upper village crust and most educated/fortunate. For this reason I had trouble meeting with him to discuss the village history and role in the Missahoe initiative.
- Chief's main duties in the village are settling disputes and judgments on Thursday mornings.
- Meeting with the Chiefs of Adame was always a formal affair with the chiefs aligned across from me in formation with the Chief in the center and his 3 main subchiefs surrounding him: security, royalty, and protocols. Below these four are village rep chiefs like the youth chief, queen mother, and clan heads. Only after a few minutes the chief would speak to me directly and openly. We always had drinks and prayed before and after.
- Adame is one of the original villages to branch off of Kumato, with Tokpli. Lands were acquired by hunters exploring different areas on multi-day trips. Over time they started farms in their hunting lands and they became the owners.
- Today the chief said there are few lands not owned. The vast original lands have been divided among generations of siblings and spouses of extended clan families. Landowners give out lands to relatives or tenants based on gentleman's agreements, which are intentionally vague to allow users and owners freedom when times change. Chief said they are obliged to give out lands that are not in use, but they then deserve repayment for their generosity.
- For example they said the population is 99.82% Ewe and disregarded any of the Kabye population living on and using Adame lands. They said all the Kabye living in Davota are living under Adame control and lands. They only listed Kotakoli (a different northern ethnicity) as the other 0.18%.

Comite Locale de Gestion et de Protection de Missahoe (CLGPM), Kuma Adame. This group was loosely affiliated with the reforestation in surrounding rural areas goal of the Missahoe project. They are also supplied, again for the predetermined goals of reforestation, by another local NGO. Both relationships are paternalistic and non-empowering. The way the committees and tree production are set up decrease their empowering and revenue generating possibilities, and decrease the use of the trees. The group mostly is seeking payment for doing 'others' ideas of development and because of this try to say what they think they should.

- Trying to get funding, say what the funders want/require as a committee. "We are composed of 15 members, including 4 women." (this number 15 is the 'key' to development projects with many NGO's and aid groups that have worked in the project area. When I would visit farmers to discuss their agrobusiness strategies and bring up possible group forming, they would automatically have a picture of this type of structure in their minds. A 'groupement' needed 15 members and female reps, but rarely paid attention to ethnic or class diversity)—this number contradicts the 8 member management committee and 8 member work committee described by Kodzo AZA.

- They want to be hired/supported to stop the menacing activities of villagers and bushfires rather than getting resources to support a community based management or sustainable use strategy.
- Everything they said was polished to make it seem like they were a successful, accountable group when in reality they were not able to have a meeting with me after several requests and they do not commit to their own work schedule. They are aware of this inconsistency, but they avoid it by perpetuating their view of the development fantasy. They thought I wanted them to provide fantasy information as conditions for more aid.
- Unclear who actually benefits from the trees produced in their nursery, how they are distributed. In Adame and Dunyo I had trouble getting farmers not in the nursery work groups to ask for trees from the nursery. The CLGPM says their goal is to provide seedlings, education, and support to the whole village, but there is a social pressure not to benefit from something the others did not put time and effort into. The "Its their project" idea of not working collectively. As if the social capital gained by the group doing the work would be compromised if they shared the trees freely with everyone.
- The Adame group was primarily part of the Missahoe initiatives reforestation in surrounding rural areas objective. The group says it need ongoing financial aid for tools and seedbags, things it could organize itself, and ongoing education through rural extension. It seems like their involvement with the Ministry and APAF (an agroforestry NGO that has since supplied tools and resources like the Missahoe initiative) has created a paternalistic dependence within the committee.

Koffi 1 and Adzo, Tenant Farmers in Missahoe. They have it good enough with food production, gari, charcoal, fruit, trapping, and firewood to not object to the tree planting project. They also seem to have a strategy of doing coffee to comply with Missahoe foresters and landowners, but not seriously for themselves. Even though they came to Missahoe before the others and are on Tsame lands, they are sandwiched the Emanuel family group and their participation in new projects and activities depends on him.

- Adzo and Koffi 1 are in their early 30s with 3 kids around the house and a few more going to middle school in Adame. They were the first farm in the Missahoe when they began in '91. They are on the western border of Tsame lands, where they meet Tokpli lands used by Emanuel's family.
- Their home is two houses with old aluminum sheets, a large patio for coffee drying, a long kitchen with grass roof, two gari cookstoves, and a large three burner improved cookstove. Behind the two room main house is a small pigpen in construction with two rooms. They have three sickly dogs and a small number of sickly chickens.
- They farm mostly coffee with a mixture of palms and avocados. There is other land around the house in fallow and mostly forest between them and the border otherwise. They farm other lands further away, outside Missahoe for yams, manioc, and corn.
- Koffi 1 spends most of the days roaming to the other farms to work. Adzo is always around the house, except on market days, usually making gari or charcoal and taking care of the young ones.
- They want to do other husbandry activities, expand chickens and pigs because of the forest being a good location (far from thieves, keep snakes away from the house, trees protect the chicks from hawks). But they don't have the resources to do this very fast and also do not want to work with Emanuel or others to share start-up costs.
- Koffi 1 immediately asked me if Emanuel was interested in a project meeting, before asking what the meeting was about. He acted like he was interested if Emanuel wasn't, but when I said he was Koffi 1 said he would participate, but it was not what he wanted.
- They are more closely related to the 6th farm that branches off the trail past theirs, which is the farm closest to the forest edge. Like Koffi 2, this farm has extensive corn and manioc, but no coffee.
- They are on Tsame lands that border Tokpli lands, but they are surrounded by Emanuel's family by Koffi 2 and his brother, a strong family affair since Koffi 2 is married to Emanuel's daughter. So the difference in landowners is not significant in activities, labor sharing, decision making...
- They comply with the Missahoe project and planted coffee around the stream "to please the foresters" as well as their landowners. They said the project only worked on their fields one year, transplanting and now they don't burn those fields. Instead they weed everything by hand.
- Adzo is very confident, and like most Kabye they have boundless energy to do work as long as they feel they are benefiting. They seem to feel this way because of their need for lands and good deal with their food crops, hunting, forest products...

Koffi 2, Tenant Farmer in Missahoe.

Koffi 2 is knowledgeable in more advanced husbandry and agriculture techniques, but cannot apply them because of his lack of funds and power. He supports the Missahoe plan and believes it will succeed in reforestation soon. He is also making the most of his opportunity to cultivate without division, although it is unclear if he is investing his profits anywhere.

- Kabye tenant, in late 20s, originally from Blifu area. Grew up in a typical sounding large Kabye family learning coffee farming on his father's farms.
- Educated through his BAC from Kpalime, wanted to be a teacher but declined a position available at the Blifu elementary school because it paid too little to support his family.
- Sought lands on a recommendation in Tsame and began planting his coffee farm in '98, in areas cut during the early '90s. During the project the bulk of his lands were reforested with primarily Khaya and Terminalia, timber trees. He maintains the coffee fields well and survival of the project trees is high.
- He also cultivates yams and manioc in other areas with project trees. Besides these he has two large corn fields that have no trees or the trees have been burned and died. Therefore, his participation in the project varies from excellent to failure.
- His tenant-landowner negotiations are different from those outside the boundaries. Outside all crops and land use activities are divided between the two parties (usually 2/3 tenant, 1/3 landowner). These vary somewhat depending on the value of the crop and the friendliness of the relations. Some landowners are more generous because tenants gift them meat and produce that they don't require.
- Tenants inside, however, only divide their coffee harvests. The remaining cereal crops and tubers are for their complete profit. Reasons given for this is the distances of the farms from the village are too far for older landowners to visit and farm themselves. So the coffee profits are seen by landowners as better than nothing rather than less than possible exploitation. This explanation seems to contradict the idea that land is very scarce in Kuma today and that preference would seem to go to members of the landowner clan before tenants.
- Another reason for this is that the food cultivation is technically illegal. From the tenant perspective, growing coffee to share is a means to have non-divided profits in other crops. In Koffi's case the other crops are where the project is failing, while in the coffee they are excellent.
- He is heavily under Emanuel's influence because he is married to Emanuel's daughter who is linked through women's activities strongly to her family at Emanuel's compound. Emanuel's presence restricts Koffi 2 getting involved or starting any other group work, because he doesn't want to work with him and, like Emanuel's son, he would have to.
- The success of the project trees in his coffee, and Koffi 2's obvious interest in coffee farming and reforestation show that he is also loyal to his Tsame landowner and wants to see the reforestation succeed, or his landowner was more dedicated to the project. This is unlike the other tenant farms that have very few visible reforestation trees.

Emanuel. Oldest Tenant Farmer in Missahoe. Emanuel is an old school land exploiter, shady dealer in general. He has made his fortune by employing his family army and continues the methods of deforestation, burning, and cultivation despite having the finances to invest in other activities. He has influence over all other tenants in Missahoe despite their different landowners. He has not complied or participated in the reforestation project.

- 65 year old Kabye migrant from Kara area. Originally settled in Davota but created a compound in Missahoe on Tokpli lands in early '90s.
- He is a cross between a tenant and a patron (landowner) because of his wealth and power.
- He travels quite often between his lands in Kara, Davota, Missahoe, and even Ghana. He has 3-4 wives and countless children spread around. He owns at least 2 vehicles, which his son's drive, that run the Blifu/Kpalime route.
- His compound in Missahoe is by far the biggest, 4 large buildings with 2-3 rooms each, all with aluminum roofs, indoor kitchen, elevated racks for drying coffee and storing yam heads, water barrels, chicken coop with guinea fowl.
- His wife and several daughters dominate the Adame tchouk market. His family in general is his farming workhorse for growing coffee, yams, corn, and manioc. His coffee is mostly quite old and has no project trees planted in its understory, mostly palms and avocados. His other lands are in fallow or

being cultivated for manioc, corn, and yams without project trees. The few project trees are located along the trail leading to his compound, sort of like token trees.

- Seen by his family/public as difficult to work with because of his dishonesty and greed.
- Emanuel was only interested in finding out what I had to offer, he wasn't serious about increasing his participation or effort in anything. When it came down to our meeting, he had better things to do and left his farm in charge of his familial army. However good at controlling and communicating he is with the tenants, he had not told any of them about the meeting I asked him to help me organize. I think he didn't want the meeting to take place without him there.

Emanuel's Son. Tenant Farmer in Missahoe.

Views the land he cultivates in Missahoe as belonging to his father and is planning to use them for the long-term. Prefers Missahoe lands to tenant agreements in Adame. He would like to pursue alternative income projects, especially chicken raising that he was trained to do, but even more than the others, he is under his father's influence. Any project or profit he makes will have to go through Emanuel. He grows coffee and few project trees.

- Mid 30s Kabye tenant working on his house and fields in Emanuel's lands from Tokpli. He is probably the most educated son of Emanuel and more independent than his other sons that drive his taxis.
- He is married and has been living near Adame on another landowner's property, but has decided to come back to the Missahoe lands to finish his house and move there to live with his family because of problems with the Adame landowner. He described similar problems as Koffi Bassan like his landowner demanding more than a fair amount, stolen animals and crops, threats, etc...
- His home in Missahoe is two buildings, one is an older, small, two room house while the other is a large two room house still in construction, both with grass roofs. There is no kitchen, perhaps because of its proximity to Emanuel's compound, but there is an abandoned gari making shelter.
- He has a large corn field around the house with no project trees. He said this was not considered part of the project because he had not decided yet how he was going to construct his compound when they staked out the planting areas. So he had quite a bit of influence.
- His other main field is the steep slope leading to the stream at the edge of Tokpli lands. He has about half the slope from the bottom planted in coffee. The closest to the river is the oldest, and producing well, while the trees get younger further up the slope. There are very few if more than a handful of project trees in the whole field.

Bassan, Koffi. Hunter and Interview Aid, Kuma-Adame.

- 31 year old Kabye tenant farmer living outside Missahoe border on Adame lands. Originally from Davota, from a large Kabye family.
- His father migrated from Kara but still has lands to tend and makes seasonal trips back and forth. He has 2-3 wives in Kara and Davota. Koffi is closest to his siblings with the same mother. The extended family works together, approximately 12 men, on farming and house building projects when needed. They call each other to work on individual farms for individual profit, but use group labor. The beneficiary who calls the family group together provides food for the group as payment.
- Koffi is a jack of all trades. Mostly a tenant/laborer. He typically works for a landowner other than the landowner where he lives in exchange for a portion of their lands to use for himself. He works until the farmer's lands are cleared/planted/harvested and his own portion. When he isn't doing this he does a combination of hunting, metal work, and animal husbandry.
- He also farms for himself and his landowner around his house, but differently than when he is seriously working for someone. His house area is mainly used for his own food, like manioc, sweet potatoes, small amounts of yams, and a garden along the river. This upsets his landowner who wants him to extract as much as possible to divide with him. Koffi has tried other crops like beans as a cash crop. He says the land is not fertile to produce much, and the landowner's sons regularly come and steal his harvests.
- He is very resourceful and collects most of his food and supplies from the forest near his house. He collects firewood and spices for cooking; bamboo, vines, and thatch for building materials; palm nuts, wine, kola, cacao, and honey for income; and hunts or collects crabs, snakes, crocodiles, porcupines, field rats, agoutis, partridge, antelope, lizards, squirrels, bats, owls, snails, beetles, fish, frogs, and anything he can catch for food and sale.

- He does not sell meat from hunting. He eats the majority himself and gifts portions to friends, family, and his landowner. He also invites friends and family to work with him and repays them with a meal of meat.
- He has traveled extensively in the Kara Region, Ghana, and Benin during his youth and while he was doing technical training in Kpalime for blacksmithing.
- Koffi has a reputation in the village as being untrustworthy because he is single, Kabye, and lives by himself outside the village. He is known to be a hunter and assumed to be a thief as well, assumed because hunters go through other peoples' lands and fields at night.
- He doesn't have the resources to support a family, but neither do many family men. He is looked down upon by some for being self centered because of this. This is partially true; he is able to work only as hard as he needs to get by, whereas if he had a family to support he would probably be bound more strictly to landowner labor.
- His single status also upsets his landlord, who has told him if he was married and had a family to provide for he would not demand as much, but since it is Koffi by himself he doesn't want him to profit.
- Koffi's dream is to live in a man-made forest. During his first cultivation of his homestead he planted several varieties of trees, kola, mandarin oranges, etcho, for long-term income. However, his landowner didn't agree with his plan for these products because they would not be as profitable to him and implied long-term land use rights.

Fiabenu, Hunter and Farmer in Kuma-Dunyo.

He has seen hunting decline along with forest habitats to the point where people like him no longer have choices over livelihood activities, they must farm. They also have fewer choices over what to farm because of the economy for tree crops. He laments this and still tries to get by doing his mixed bag because he doesn't like farming or its results. He says there is no longer any value in hunting because animals are too rare, so he just catches and eats or gifts what he gets when he can. He blames the loss of his livelihood to over hunting and cutting during the '90s political crisis.

- A Dunyo youth, early 30's, Ewe farmer on family/clan lands, but he personally engages in more transitory activities like palm wine tapping, fruit collecting, hunting, and has inherited large mandarin orange and other fruit farms near Bala from his father.
- He is loyal to the village Chief, regularly organizing and working in the Chief's projects. In the Chief's absence, he is one of the men in charge of Dunyo.
- Also loyal to RPT, organized the village ally during the elections despite the vast majority of Dunyo and Kuma region being opposition grounds.

Denis, Koffi, Hunter and Farmer in Kuma-Adame.

- Ewe farmer and hunter in late 40s. Generally speaking, he is from an upper class family of Adame, but every family/clan has wealthy members and less well off. Koffi is from the same family as Kodzo Aza as an example of the two levels within one land rich family. Their family owns the lands that are adjacent to Missahoe and extend north to Kpime. Koffi's farm is near this border in the NE corner of the Kuma Traditional Area.
- His position, which he describes as being an 'Outsider' is because he left the village as a youth to find work in Kpalime. He became the head of the Kpalime/Lome taxi station and married a woman from Aflao (the border city on Ghana side of Lome). They had several children and he bought a taxi that took eight years to pay off. His life changed dramatically in the early '90s when his taxi was burned by the military police who accused him (from the Kpalime-opposition city-station as being against the president).
- When this happened he fled to Adame, and his wife returned to Aflao.
- He was given lands by his family and began re-learning farming and hunting techniques of his youth.
- Koffi was an avid hunter during the '90s, using a shotgun and jaw traps, but has now reduced the amount of time spent hunting mainly using snares. He used to spend most nights out with his headlamp and shotgun, frequently killing antelope, agoutis, and once a large forest bongo.
- He used his connections with the taxi drivers to export his bushmeat to Kpalime.

- His hunting declined because of the laws becoming reinforced in the later '90s. Like many others he said the gendarmes were heavily involved in the bushmeat trade in the beginning, but then started enforcing the laws again. He also said the price of ammunition and repairing his gun and equipment became unprofitable. He got rid of his gun, being repaired, but still has the bigger traps.
- Like others, his livelihood has changed to primarily farming of subsistence crops, which he dislikes. He has a system now of farming his manioc, yams, and corn inside an enclosure lined with snares. His crops are used as bait for rats, snakes, antelope, and agouti. He checks them less frequently, about every three days. Success depends on the season and if he is lucky to find his prey before another hunter passes by.
- Despite, or perhaps because of, his lack of interest in farming, he is very knowledgeable about different species of yams that grow above ground. Normally a vine grows above ground while the main tuber of yams grows below. Koffi plants below ground yams in concert with other species of yam that produce small 'air potatoes' in the same area of ground. He uses these in small amounts to improve fufu.
- He also has planted many fruit trees around his farmhouse, mangos, citrus, etcho, paw-paw and others.
- He tried other projects besides farming as well, like raising dogs and chickens. He said these failed because of thieves stealing his chickens that he kept at the farm while he and the dogs were back in the village.
- He is also a village omelet man, sells egg sandwiches, tea, and coffee especially during funerals and other celebrations when people spend money. He is a cleaver businessman, always doing little things to make a little cash, unlike most that rely on their farms.

Charcoal Makers

- This represents a group of Kabye women living along and within the Missahoe border, adjacent to Adame lands. Most are married, many are sisters or daughters of the same father who are based on his farm, like Emanuel the tenant farmer with extended family.
- They all grew up in Davota and live in the Adame/Davota market cycle: Adame markets on Tuesday and Saturday mornings, Davota market Saturday afternoons. They typically sell charcoal or other farm produce at the Saturday morning Adame market before going to Davota to trade other goods.
- They are all involved in a wide variety of farm and transformation income sources such as charcoal making, firewood gathering, yam, corn, and manioc farming, gardening, gari (manioc) processing, amo (manioc processing), and small scale animal husbandry (chickens, guinea pigs, ducks).
- Typically it is the woman who provides the sauce ingredients (vegetables, spices, meat...) to prepare with the tubers or grains provided by the man of the household. This is breaking down somewhat because women now do all male farming activities as well (Kabye more than Ewe), but the women's fields are usually done for sale to buy sauce ingredients or essential goods, where the man's is consumed first and then sold.
- These women are involved in group activities together, especially processing manioc. To do this they contribute group funds and labor to cultivate or buy manioc fields and process as a group for sale. This is another use of their income as an investment.
- The tradeoff between different income generating activities depends on the season, market abundance/price, activity knowledge or preference, available labor and tools, group consensus, and start-up funds among other things.

Agumatsa

Steven. TMT President. An upper class businessman (teacher/lawyer), wants the project to succeed in the long-term. Only a vocal leader when playing the go-between role for the Chiefs and Elders and TMT.

- In the beginning, each village gave 3 people, including 1 chief, to form the TMT. Steven was elected Chairman from this group of appointees. There is also a usual executive bureau with a Secretary, Treasurer and Advisors as well. They meet regularly and whenever something comes up as a TMT issue (thus reactive). (Steven)

- He said eventually the DA should pull out as well, after the building is paid off, but that they are a large stakeholder because of that initial investment. He said it is good to have the DA as a relevant stakeholder because they will bring justice to their “hardened ones” who will be arrested for continuing use violations. He said they have been given authority to apprehend people and punish them for hunting and cutting. This is usually done through the chief system, but at the DA level if necessary. (Steven)
- He said the villages would volunteer their young bright ones to be trained in forest preservation, and they would organize the others (laborers). This speaks to who participates, in what ways, and how do they benefit. This could create conflict like that seen between the “bright ones” who are the guides and get a TMT salary, vs. the other youth who are asked to do communal labor. (Steven)
- He broke down the 57% TMT portion of the revenues. It is split up 10, 10, 10% to each of the three villages, then 40% landowners, and 30% for development projects that directly involve all three villages. That leaves only 10% for individual villages to fund projects, however most projects like schools, tourism, latrines etc would benefit all three since they share many common resources. He said both the 10% for each village and 30% development funds are very heavily chief influenced. (Steven)
- TMT has thought about doing economic workshops like the Gbledi small-scale enterprise. He said they are leaving that up to the village members to use their portion of the \$. But then he said the profits per village are so thin that they can’t give out money to everyone. (This seems untrue since the project makes probably around 15,000,000 cedis monthly. That would make about 885,000 per village at 10%, plus the 30% group development) (Steven)
- Steven is also the Secretary of the PMT—project management team—a joint body between the DA, GWD, and TMT. When project wide activities take place, building bridges was the only example I heard of, the three bodies have to decide how to contribute from their revenues to share the cost. Since none of them think their % is enough, its very difficult to agree on cost sharing. It also seems problematic to define what a shared activity is. (Steven)
- Steven is the main go-between for the Chiefs and the TMT. When the Chiefs/Elders decided to stop using the Wildlife Division books to keep track of visitors, and to exclude the DA, it was Steven who delivered these messages to the guides for them to begin doing the Officer’s jobs. I overheard this meeting and was surprised by how vocal Steven was since he usually played an insignificant leadership role in TMT/Elders wide meetings. (Steven)

TMT Chiefs and Elders

- Many of the high ranking Elders and TMT members travel frequently or live outside the village. The paramount chief and secretary both share time between Lome and Accra the capitals of Togo and Ghana. William and Steven both work in Hohoe and commute on a daily basis.
- The TMT, Chiefs and Elders usually met with the elders under the gazebo behind the tourism center. There was never any distinction made between who was who, like chiefs in the TMT and elders. They all sat together, dressed the same, talked the same contributed or just sat there. They always sat on plastic chairs with armrests and backs. The Youth Association always sat on benches, one behind another, rather than spread out.
- Attendance at the TMT meetings varied, the smallest meeting 8 up to 40. The number of chiefs and TMT members changed between each meeting, as well as which TMT members were there and who facilitated the meetings. The Easter Monday meeting was the biggest and run by the chiefs, with the youth association participating. Others were very short with William speaking to the chiefs with little response. Usually it was the ‘outsiders’ like the Youth from Accra, or Paramount Chief or Robert that came to the village for special occasions that were the most vocal at meetings.
- Its worth noting that every elders/TMT meeting I have seen has been dominated by the formalities of introductions, translations, and posturing which quickly fades into massive alcohol consumption. By the lack of participation by most chiefs at these meetings, it seems clear that that is their motivation for attending the meetings. Once the chiefs begin drinking at the early morning meetings they are usually nodding off. This is quite different from the Ghana Wildlife Society meetings in Gbledi. When in the small group doing the village leaders worksheet, the Gbledi chiefs also drank but lightly with respect to me. I never saw the Gbledi chiefs hanging out together getting trashed like the “meetings” in Wli. At some meetings it was a struggle for the chiefs to finish all the sodabi among them, often having bottles go around 3 or 4 rounds. (observations of meetings)

- Robert, the TMT Secretary represents the village women on the TMT. This is because the Queen Mother, whose duty it is to organize and represent them traditionally, is too old.
- Robert was also the most skeptical member of the TMT or Elders about my research. On several occasions during meetings he asked me repeated questions about the jurisdiction, purpose, use, and benefits of my research. He suggested that I was working for the government, and tried to create suspicion with the others about my motives by saying I was unclear.
- The system in Wli, with the TMT apparently being accountable to the chiefs for all decisions, seems to be hindering TMT progress. It keeps them caught in a traditional system that is not expanding, or does not do anything rapidly. Rather than being strong leaders with authority over their villages, the chiefs seem more like they are hanging on to a system of the past and trying to get as much out of it as possible. (observations of chiefs)
- Originating from the early Ewe settlement in Notse around 1720. The Wli area was settled by hunters exploring the forests of present day Kuma near Wli-Todzi. A Dovo Fetish and shrine was erected at the top of the upper falls as a spiritual protector. The boundaries of the village is made up by rivers and certain species of boundary marking trees planted by their founding ancestors. The entire village is Ewe. There are Kabiye farm laborer, but they are not seen as village members, and definitely not stakeholders in the project.
- They replied to my questions that it was too late to answer that question and that I should do more next time. They were worried that I was understanding what they said in Ewe when they discussed their responses before formalizing their response in English. They could tell I understood some things by the expressions on my face. They said they had other matters to discuss so they would “discharge me”. In other words, the group that was there that night, refused to discuss their role in village development or relation to the TMT, and were suspicious of my questions.
- The elders and TMT are all very paranoid about being part of a project that requires partnership with anyone that would share their revenues. But they are always half interested because they think there is a chance I will have some kind of aid package to offer them.
- Steven was still remarkably unspoken. I wonder why he is the Chairman. How does he fulfill that role by hardly doing anything. Steven kept looking at me and sighing, occasionally yelling “Its 350,000 cedis, its nothing!”
- Once this was decided, there was a huge debate over what to do with the left over 350,000 cedis. This caused the most problems, everyone having an idea and constantly being cut off by someone else. Eventually the elders went into the center’s back room and shut the windows to make a final private decision on the money matter. Unlike the decision to invest in chairs as a TMT business, where there was a large group discussion, the extra cash decision was made in private.
- After the counting and drinking had finished the meeting turned to “the future of the project”. This consisted of discussing how to spend the profits. The group decided to buy a number of plastic chairs like the chiefs were sitting in. These are the customary ‘respectable’ chairs for important people to sit in during events like funerals. They would use these as in income generating project by renting the chairs to locals when they had festivals, rather than having to rent them in Hohoe. It would be less expensive than paying the transport fee, and they would be investing in the project. This was an idea of the Youth group, as well as the ideas of printing t-shirts and calendars that sold well during the Easter holiday.
- The talk bounced back and forth from group to group. The chiefs would make a prayer or statement, everyone would give thanks, then either the Secretary, Chairman, or a Youth spokesman would reply. The Youth would usually cause a stir, and one of the other groups would interrupt. Once again it was as if the Youth were making their statements to the Chiefs, or defending themselves, rather than being part of a discussion. Every 5 minutes the whole crowd would devolve into chatter, yelling and the Tchame would have to stand up and “Ago!” everyone to be quiet again. The whole meeting was very aggressive and intimidating, not good grounds to negotiate or compromise on anything.

William. *District Assemblyman.* Strong willed politician, representing the village and trying to do the best for the long term of the project. His objectives are to reform the TMT so it represents the village and avoids the spending and lack of development issues it currently has. He has many problems with the

current co-management system, such as non-efficiency, lack of spending, lack of support, delinquent in fulfilling management duties, and overall goals. He wants things to happen his way

- William, an Ewe from Wli-Todzi, about 50 years old. A founding member of the TMT, also the District Assemblyman, he fills many roles and holds substantial power in the village. His power is the distinct from the TMT and elders power because of being a politician. (William)
- In a similar way to Kodzo Aza in Kuma-Adame, William is involved in many groups of village development, but more as a representative than a stakeholder. That is he fights for more equitable benefits because he doesn't need to benefit himself or isn't benefiting himself like others in the TMT. He criticizes other educated members of the village for not doing enough, like he is to make changes.
- He criticizes most all three management bodies: TMT, DA, and Wildlife Division as not helping the project develop. He makes many suggestions for the TMT to revise, the DA to fund development projects, and Wildlife to leave. Ultimately he thinks the village should have control of 100% of the project, but to do this they will need to follow "his" reform steps. (William)
- During meetings and when interacting with other managers, like the officers, William is controlling. He often dominates all the speaking and in meetings, and did not share information with others openly, like my interview guides and research goals.
- He has appointed a committee to review and reform the TMT by-laws. He did this with his DA power because the DA is the policing body of the 3 that makes sure revenue is distributed and actors remain consistent with their constitutions and by-laws. The committee is made up of non-TMT members of the community as a way to increase participation and representation. But it seems like throwing the baby out with the bathwater by asking non-members to change the TMT without the TMT member's input. (William)
- He wants there to be new elections and clear goals, % money use and budgeting, term of office, role of TMT members etc...(William)
- He wants to revise the landowner % by doing a precise calculation of land use value. (William)
- He has clear objectives about using project money for development and upkeep of the project facilities to increase their value before trying to directly benefit the village. He sees the project as a long-term income source, but fears it is crumbling because of the internal disputes over the short-term. He is trying to do the right thing for the village, but is focused on doing it himself through the reform of the TMT. (William)
- He critiques the chief's positions on the TMT because of their misuse and blockage of using project revenues. But also says "there is the problem of people hiding behind the chiefs and elders". He praises the chiefs for fighting with the Yikpa community during a boundary dispute over use of the falls. The DA and Wildlife Division were not willing to risk getting involved like the chiefs did. (William)
- He says the Wildlife Division "is always like a butterfly in the back. A butterfly looks big but has no strength, but always likes to suck the sweetness" (William)
- He also said that if local villagers were hired as public servants rather than the Wildlife Officers that they would "appreciate their salary and do the work...the wildlife officer just sit there". This conflicts with his opinion that there are many in the village hiding behind the chiefs and elders. (William)
- He sees the project as a tourism opportunity, not Wildlife Sanctuary. He says one reason the Wildlife Division should draw out of the project is "because we are actually too close to the village to preserve wild animals. It wont be possible this close to people living." (William)
- Besides being a member of the DA and using the power of his position to influence the project heavily, he has harsh criticism of their lack of funding to develop the project and garner support in the community. He says "The DA is getting fat from the project...poisoning the community... ", by not reinvesting their percentage in infrastructure and facilities. "The district was also there (during the Yikpa conflict), but only as window dressing. Their leader, the district executive did not act strong enough." (William)
- He says that if the TMT was the sole body, rather than 3, things would be done faster because they currently require the three to agree to share revenues. Since none of the three think they are currently getting a fair share of the revenues it is difficult for them to share for anything. (William)

Cleophas. Private Consultant and Wli Elder. Educated and experienced in international development, but not interested in the village strife over the waterfall project. He would rather engage in the project as a business owner by putting up a bar/club for tourists to spend money on. A strong asset to the community with ideas of reform and management, but hesitant to get involved with something he has seen in his work as difficult to accomplish.

- Guy is one of the most educated residents in Wli. He has worked for NGO's nationally and across Africa for the past 20 years. He is in his 50's. He is one of the clan heads in the village.
- Despite his intimate knowledge of development work, budgeting, projects of all kinds, he is not part of the TMT because of his absence to work elsewhere. He was commissioned by the Ghana Wildlife Society, as part of their Gbledi project assessment, to write a document about possibly incorporating the Wli community and waterfall with them. This document provided valuable background information on the community as well as his critiques of both the waterfall and Ghana Wildlife Society project ideas.
- Unlike William and Kodzo Aza, Cleophas doesn't feel the pressure to act on his critiques of the project. He is candid to talk about them but doesn't feel it is in his interest or responsibility to change them. He was appointed by William as a member of the TMT review committee.
- He says the environment the project operate in is difficult because of how secretive and non-transparent it is. The TMT was absolutely against the Gbledi/Ghana Wildlife Society expansion project. They feared \$ sharing, and didn't want anything to share with Gbledi. Ghana Wildlife Society also didn't show them the overall budget which made them as well as Gbledi landowners very skeptical of Ghana Wildlife Society motives.
- He thinks the TMT has too much unchecked power and says they do not represent the community well. "They formed themselves and then wrote their own laws. It should be like that. The must be appointed to do a task and given guidelines. Now they can say 'we are going to hire 4 more guides and pay them 400,000'. Who is going to approve that, to assure its not just making a job for someone?"
- He recommends having a board of elders above the TMT, not to take part in regular management, but as something for the TMT to be accountable to. "The board will not have an overbearing control over the TMT, but they will have to be approved annually according to their activities." He thinks an advisory board would be more representative of the village than the TMT, however he said he realizes that there are no neutral parties in Wli since the project has become so contested.
- He is concerned about the exclusion of youth in the TMT and project. "In the case of jobs and benefits offered to youth, there are only a few guide positions. When tourists come they (TMT/Wildlife) didn't want them to be disturbed by youth wanting to guide them to the falls and harass them. So they ban that. But the youth argue that if they cannot have that source of income they will not do communal labor. And, in fact, they will choose to hunt to get a source of revenue from the project area instead. However, they have been taught that when tourists are not coming because of the gunshots or cut and burned areas it hurts everyone in the community."
- He thinks the project needs to be more forthcoming with budget details, but also more focused on sub-budgets for individual activities. He approaches things from his background of project plans, budgets, and reports. He says a lot of the problems arise when the elders see the total budget, or billions of cedis and think "billions of cedis and you pay us this (%)"

Lodge Owner. Built their lodge based on the waterfall tourism. Feel the TMT is corrupt but the Wildlife Officers are also ineffective managers. The village is unwilling to change to address the TMT problems or wider problems in the village in general for development. She thinks a lot of it is due to money and bribes, and village rivalries and jealousy. She hopes their lodge can be an example to villagers to do something for themselves.

- German couple owning the Wli Waterfall Logde that is only a few years old. They came and bought land to construct their 3 room guesthouse. When expats come from Accra they often stay there.
- She sees the problems as conflicts within the village due to differences in power, like youth vs. chiefs, TMT vs. Wildlife, or as simply corruption.
- She says there were elections after the four year probationary period, but the old TMT refused to step down arguing that they would not change their status until the Wildlife Division withdrew. The

wildlife said it would be there to train and help the TMT transition into management. The DA was supposed to uphold this co-management.

- She feels the revenues are not being shared, that they are embezzled by a few of the top leaders, the same ones that refuse to change the TMT.
- She blames the village elders and chiefs for not being progressive with village development. She describes them as being unwilling to change and incorporate ideas from the village youth. She described them as corrupt as well, using an experience with being hired to prepare food for a village festival only to have the chiefs back out of the plan because she wasn't willing to bribe them for their business.
- She has had several conflicts with villagers over working for her, selling her fruit, helping with construction etc...She now goes to Hohoe to buy fruit just to avoid local disputes and jealousy.
- She agrees with trying to force out the Wildlife Officers. She says they are ineffective at controlling poaching. She says the village denies responsibility for these as well, always blaming fires, hunting, and boundary disputes on the Togolese.
- She also disagrees with the prices and restrictions put on tourists who come to the falls. She would like it to be less expensive and let tourists go by themselves to the falls and hike in other places. They tried to put up markers for a hiking trail around their lodge, but she said guides from the TMT pulled them up.
- She is not interested in helping the situation change because she sees it as a hopelessly corrupt group, but she wishes their guesthouse would be an example to villagers that they can start private businesses also and profit from the waterfall.

Anthony. Head Wildlife Officer. He is more happily part of the Wildlife Division hierarchy, frustrated by the post he currently fills, and wants to be reassigned to somewhere he can manage according to the books. He is frustrated with the TMT/Elders, especially what he sees as personal threats to him. His reaction to this is also negative and uncooperative. He has taken many proactive management steps in the past (guides, bridges, borders), and sees the TMT as not being capable of managing, rather they just want the money.

- Anthony is the only member of any bodies of management that is not Ewe. He is from the Coastal Region near Cape Coast. He is about 45 years old and almost always speaks in English even though he speaks Ewe fine.
- He seems to be overcompensating for the lack of respect he gets from the TMT and village by the way he acts. He also usually wears the official military style officer uniform. The other officers never wore these, and besides the chiefs dressing in kente cloth for the meetings, everyone (elders, TMT, guides, officers) always dressed like average villagers. Besides his dress, he diligently does all of his office duties (never acting informal like everyone else), writing receipts and keeping log book records. He also listens to the radio rather than socializing and seems pretty sharp on political news. He takes his position more seriously than the 2 others, possibly anyone period.
- He said that when "gazetted" in the 70's it wasn't quite real because they "didn't have the judicial powers" (they didn't buy the land for the sanctuary). He says I'll have to go through his supervisor in Ho to get any of the Wildlife management plans.
- He came to Wli just before the 2000 management changes began. He started working in Wli in 1999. He was new but part of a 3 man team. Back in the beginning there were as many as 12 officers at Agumatsa WS. In 2000 the newly formed TMT "gave them an ultimatum" that the TMT would take over everything by May 2000. This prompted a DA meeting between TMT and Wildlife Division superiors where the percentages were worked out.
- In the 2000 meeting with TMT, DA and Wildlife, they decided that locals would get 57% and start training to take over positions, draft a wildlife plan (to manage the lands inheld, like what crops and trees to plant) for in and outside of the sanctuary.
- He said since then "we had been going along for the past 2 years handing over, preparing the TMT to take over. Now this decision comes through and we don't know. I got my orders from my superior, but haven't heard what they will do with us. It's about taking control of the \$ now. Not using the books, not going through the DA, then getting our shares."
- The elders informed him that they made the decision not to use the books to collect revenues, and not to partition them. Thus taking away one of the 2 jobs of the officers, but also hiding any data on \$

and no longer sharing. So now he hasn't even been going to the office anymore to work, "only to check up. Its like I should be here, but I can't."

- At that time anyone who brought tourists to the village could be a guide. Anthony Their only compensation was from tips. He decided to change that to stop begging problems, or guides refusing small tips. He decided to start training village guides and giving them a fixed fee as an attempt to improve the tourism experience, decrease competition over tourists. After that youth from the village were discouraged from approaching tourists if they were not one of the guides. Anthony said "they are not special guides. They are just guys that lead people there." He said this in front of Emanuel the guide. Tony was very bitter by this point in his work in Wli and was commonly mean to everyone but the other officers.

- He told me, "I haven't been myself (to the falls) for some time, some days or even weeks. I had my official moto stolen, from my house. They broke the window and opened the door. They (thieves) did not come from Accra to steal it. They are from here, to go sell it. Now I am working with the Chiefs (on the TMT) to find the ones. I am working in this community for these people. If they don't want me they should give me some signals." "I just don't want to be here...if Felix is here I'd just as soon not come to service."

- To do repairs they all have to agree and discuss before getting any funds and doing the work. From the wildlife % he said they used to be sending most to a central government account, but now they don't. Once the revenues are divided, the remaining percentage pays for officer salaries only.

- Also said he doesn't know if it will continue to be a protected area since there is no picture of the falls in this years Forestry Commission Calendar. He lamented that it usually is because it is one of Ghana's best attractions. This seemed like another blow to his ego, no longer working at one of the top wildlife sanctuaries.

- He says the farmers continue to farm inside the boundaries because they have no other land, but that doesn't make a forest possible. So he has been trying to maintain just the front border because people don't farm on the uphill side.

Felix. Assistant Wildlife Officer. Felix is working in his second assigned post as a Wildlife Officer. He is frustrated by most aspects of his work including: not being trained and promoted by the Wildlife Division, the negative tactics of the TMT to push the officers out, the lack of respect and authority by villagers for the rules, and having to be in the office.

- Felix and I began talking about his history as a Wildlife Officer. He started in 1994 in his hometown where the Kalakpa Resource Reserve. He worked there for 4 years without being promoted or trained, and was transferred to Agumatsa Sanctuary here in Wli. Officers have no formal training and he doesn't know of any documents other than the map of Ghana's protected areas that is on the wall.

- He was and is still frustrated with his work. He says, "some people work 10 years without being promoted. For very little. Someone can work their whole career in the same position. Its not satisfying, (local) people don't like you in this job. We have to stop them from doing what they like to do (cutting and hunting). So they (Wildlife Division) have to make us happy too (promote us). But only those in Accra get appointed."

- Wildlife Department began the project in 1975 with no revenue sharing. It was started because of the waterfall and bats. "Gradually the people started coming, money started coming, and the community saw we were making money from under them." Now the revenue sharing is 57% TMT, 23% Wildlife, 20% DA and they want to push Wildlife out.

- He is also frustrated with the position the TMT puts the officers in. "Today, like that letter you brought in. If not for you telling him I should read it, he, the DA said 'I'll file it'. But there it will never be available for anyone who comes here to see." He says the community is "taking everything into their own hands" and "pushing the wildlife out of everything."

- He even noted the new signs the TMT painted to put along the trail. "Look, they all have rules: no weapons, no cutting, no litter, bats are part of the ecosystem... These are all Wildlife (division) laws. But on the sign they even just wrote 'Agumatsa Sanctuary' rather than 'Wildlife Sanctuary'."

- As for field work, the Officers keep the boundary cut and patrol to stop trapping, cutting, and hunters. He said, "we normally work all week. Only when the revenue collector is not here, we have

to be here.” (In all my visits I only recall seeing the officers go into the field once. The boundary was always well maintained, but nine times out of ten Felix was at home when I passed by his house.)

- No locals are allowed to go to the falls on Easter Monday itself because it is such a popular tourist destination for Ghanaians from other parts of the country. Easter Monday works differently than usual. Tickets are pre-printed and sold all over the village by guides and members of the Accra Youth Association, who are home for the holidays and assist/take precedence over the usual guides. This group also runs the half way checkpoint gates. They sell tickets there as well. The prices are uniform (5000 adult, 2000 child) to make things smoother. They estimated 2000 visitors yesterday (10,000,000cedis)! The Youth also sold Tshirts and calendars. These profits go only to the TMT, not shared like other general revenues.

- He says Ghanaian's idea of tourism is not compatible with the goals of a wildlife sanctuary, “but realize that is very rare. It only happens one or two days a year.”

- Today, is the local's day, but non-locals can go by buying a ticket as usual. While sitting at the office for an hour with Felix at least 150 people passed without paying, many had to be strangers. The obvious strangers that arrived by taxi's came to the office and begged with excuses like they couldn't come yesterday. Felix eventually let all of them go free, but you could see him getting more and more depressed each time.

Alfonse. Agumatsa Guide. One of the original guides, sees the TMT as an improvement in management and benefits for the Sanctuary. He doesn't discuss things as problems, or think too critically about developing the project. He is generally easy going and does what he has to, farming, charcoal, gardening, guiding to get by but doesn't worry about others. He thinks hunting should stop, but doesn't take personal responsibility to stop it because they are his friends. He would like the guides to be paid more but knows he has a good job as well. Alfonse was an excellent research aid with helping me integrate and introducing me to the right informants.

- About 30, Ewe, younger son of one of the village chiefs. Unmarried and opportunist. Besides guiding, he farms and makes charcoal. We discussed other income generating ideas and with my help he started a gardening project for lettuce, cabbage, and green peppers.

- One of the original guides trained by the project. Like TMT members, guides were also appointed through the clan system. Each clan nominated someone, from each of the three villages, and the TMT chose them based primarily on their English speaking abilities. Three guides were originally trained, followed by two newer guides.

- The guides work 6 days a week. Alfonse said they make only 80,000cedis per month unlike Emanuel's 200,000 and Lawrence's 50,000. He said the revenues from guide fees (5,000cedis per visitor) alone go into the millions most months, but this doesn't go only to guides. They are on a probationary period, even though it's been many years since they started. They are petitioning the TMT to get a salary increase to 300,000cedis per month.

- He doesn't know why the receipts are divided up into entrance, guide, and bridge fees when they are all lumped back together as revenue.

- The Wildlife Division has labeled some of the largest trees along the trail to the falls. Alfonse pointed these out to me to tell me something about their value or history in village use. Some of them were native and others planted by the NCRC tree nursery project.

- Alfonse said the falls play a large role in village history. They were discovered by Kuma hunters and considered a spiritual place. He said “because at that time the area was very wild, you couldn't just go in and hunt. People who did were very strong spiritually.” Later people from Wli settled at the second falls and used the falls for ceremonies. He said they have only one ceremony annually now, the rest have been replaced by tourism.

- He said that before the TMT was created the Wildlife Division started giving the villages 25% of revenues, but they demanded more, and now get 57%. He said “It is much better now. Before, whenever anything was to be one we had to contribute. Now we have the 57% to use.” He wants the project to continue to separate more or completely from the Wildlife Division.

- He said originally they just guided people on walks along the trail, through the stream. Then the TMT built bridges but the washed out during the rains. Then there was funding through the Wildlife Commission, or DA from the World Bank to build the current bridges.

- We happened to pass two hunters coming back from the falls with bats. He said that guides don't tell or confront the hunters because of fear, since the hunters have guns. People who are caught sneaking in are made to pay double, and firewood is not normally cut, although there are accidental fires from Togo and cigarettes. But poaching is blatant, no control.
- Bats have an excellent market in Wli, 3000 cedis, "You can take 100 (bats) and finish selling in 30 minutes." I asked if they couldn't have a regular hunting time and permit system. He said, "Hunters here are not like you in Europe, if you say go do this, pay, and stop at some point, they will never respect it." He said the hunters should not get compensated because there are plenty of hunting areas outside of AWS and the sanctuary should be respected.

Emanuel. Agumatsa Guide.

Supports the TMT concept, but thinks there is a lack of education, openness, and planning. He thinks the chiefs have too much control and are not receptive to village needs and taking action. He also thinks the village demands too much from the sanctuary. He thinks the Wildlife officer's role has changed and they should leave because they are no longer effective or respected locally. He wants the villagers to do everything, but wants help to organize and train.

- Ewe, about 45, extremely optimistic. Thinks everything is achievable through education and planning.
- The village counterpart of three Peace Corps Volunteers in Wli during 1996-99. Worked with volunteers on reforestation NCRS that was the original instigation for entering the waterfall project. NCRS/Japanese embassy funded the building of a tree nursery and research area at the base of the sanctuary.
- His younger sister recently died of AIDS and he wanted to know if I could do any formations in the village on aids, or somehow get a volunteer or someone assigned to the village for health education.
- Now he works as a guide for the TMT. He is paid 200,000 per month. First the revenues go to Hohoe where the DA, Wildlife, and TMT divide them. Then he and the wildlife officers go to Hohoe to get paid. He says the money system is unusual. Usually the DA asks for the revenue total and then demands a % tax. But in the AWS they take the money and then pay the TMT and Wildlife their shares. For this role in controlling money sharing they take 20%. He and others think this is too much without other benefits from DA.
- Feels the lack of Wildlife Officers assigned to AWS limits their effectiveness and their respect by the village. Originally there were 12 officers when the area was created in 1973, but that has gradually decreased. He says "if you're going to take most away (so they aren't effective), why don't you take them all?"
- He says the village attitude towards the sanctuary has changed over time. Its not about conservation anymore, its about the role of the government, money, and how the Wildlife Officers have changed their duties over time. Ironically, it is the bookwork that keeps the wildlife officers the most busy. Whenever the revenue collector isn't there, which is often, the officers man the desk. Emanuel said "People, we don't like to see them working like that, behind a desk. Its not there job, that's not why they're here. They should be patrolling. But then they say we cannot control our own people to stop poaching. They give us examples, stories about their old projects in their home towns, how they would stop hunters and bring them to justice."
- He said that the volunteer who organized the TMT to take on project management ended her service just as the TMT was getting started. Then her replacements both ended up leaving after just 9 months. So he feels the TMT didn't have enough training and guidance, which has led to problems.
- He sees the need for other small business projects like a restaurant, guesthouse, and others, but sees a lack of education to accomplish these. He said they need training to manage these activities and need a volunteer to organize them because they are not used to that kind of work.
- The problem is who will be on the TMT. He said the current group was appointed by the elders, each clan gave 2 representatives. Now their time has expired according to their constitution, but their replacement is contested.
- Village and Accra youth formed a separate Youth Development Group to replace the current TMT, but the chiefs and elders (current TMT) will not grant them power. He said "they want to replace the TMT and overturn the chiefs. If the chiefs say 'ok you replace the TMT' it's like overturning the chiefs also because it's their system. The TMT is heavily influenced by the elders for

decision making, especially spending money. He said the TMT makes a decision, but then their decision goes to the elders for a decision, and then it comes back to the TMT. The chiefs demand money from the TMT to do something.

- He feels the TMT members are distant and non-actionary. He hears ideas from the tourists he guides, but when he offers them to the TMT nothing happens. They are also non-receptive when he says there is too much trash and over-use. After Easter Monday he told them about trash and how trees they planted got broken off, but “they (TMT) don’t want to hear that story”. He says the TMT is about power and money, rather than developing the project.
- He said the village is “too used to the money. Before, if there was something, we would beat the gongolier and everyone would contribute. Now everyone points to the waterfall for financing.”
- Also said there is a lack of information exchange and planning. For the village to be more effective than the wildlife officers they need to plan and use the money for something. He wants all the work to be done by trained villagers. He said “if the wildlife isn’t going to do anything, the small effort the village government makes should get their 23%. It depends on if they spend the money on new guards. We need to have a plan.”
- He said the holiday tourism was bad for the sanctuary wildlife. Said there used to be baboons in the sanctuary that now live further away on the range, towards Afadjato. He said “With all this sound they won’t come back here.”
- The way Ghanaians celebrate is at odds with conservation. They drink heavily, play music at the falls, transport food and cook at the falls, leave garbage everywhere, and want quicker transport by moto or car to the falls.

Alfred. *Agumatsa Guide.* One of the original guides. Complains that the guide salary is not enough to support a family, but keeps them away from their farms too long. He sees hunting, revenue sharing, and lack of spending by the TMT as other big issues. He thinks hunting should stop, and blames most of it on Togolese. He wants strict enforcement and more severe penalties for violators. He doesn’t think the DA benefits the project, and thinks the TMT don’t spend money wisely or enough on project development.

- He said the guide’s wages (200,000 cedis/month) was too low. He cannot work 6 days a week without going to his farm on that salary, plus their uniform expenses are theirs.
- Alfred doesn’t think there should be any hunting, “why should we be hassling animals, nobody is chasing us. Lets leave the wildlife.”
- Blames hunting and throwing rocks on the Togolese from Yikpa. He said, “They mostly Togolese come from the other side and roll rocks down to scare the bats. Then the bats fly around and land in trees near them and they shoot them. But sometimes they throw rocks down like last week when there are guides and tourists here. They threw big rocks and hit one guide and broke a section of the bridge. We called the police and they came, but did not catch them.” Alfonse and other echoed this, and said it is the Togolese who do the burning as well.
- He had said that some villages in Togo get small cuts of revenue—the chief’s anyway—to try to stop their encroachment on the sanctuary. He said it would be better to take all the guns away in Togo, like they are doing in Ghana.
- He said gradually, with tough examples. When people are arrested and taken to court they will be fined or put in prison. After 2 or 3 cases there will be an example. He said the chiefs need to collect people’s guns also and give harder punishment to hunters. He said it was because of the chiefs that people are not sent to court.
- He complains that the TMT doesn’t spend their \$ either, because the elders will speak badly about getting money and immediately spending it. He sees lots of things that need to be done including facilities, food/drinks, guide uniforms, safety communication to the falls, lodging etc...but the \$ is not being spent. I asked what the 10% village \$ was used for. He said schools at first, but then said a lot of the coffers are used for unrelated things by the chiefs, like their transportation to Hohoe and ceremonies.
- He wants the DA to back out as well as GWD because they are not contributing. “They (DA) tried to have the road to Hohoe redone, but it has sat for several years still unfinished. They have not given anything for the facility or guides. They only take \$ out.”

- He thinks everyone should pull out and leave the TMT, but keep it as a sanctuary for education, but that the TMT has to decide to spend better.

Moses, *Agumatsa bat hunter.*

- He usually hunts in small groups. Hunts both in the sanctuary for bats, and outside for grasscutters, monkeys, and bushfowl.
- He hunts once a week usually, sometime he doesn't at all if it is during a heavy crop season or he doesn't have the money to buy cartridges which cost 3,500 cedis in Hohoe. But today he shot 5 bats with one cartridge, and said he often gets 8 depending really on how many they can recover once they fall in the forest. Their strategy is to scare the bats off the cliff by throwing rocks. When the bats scatter and land in trees they get up close shots.
- He sells some and prepares others when they have no meat in the house. He says people come to his house regularly to buy, but it is all secretive. Even the TMT members buy from him.
- How he benefits from the waterfall. He said "No, only the landowners and Chiefs." I brought up the idea of time and day hunting restrictions like hunting hours from 5-8am. He said it could work. I also brought up the idea of having license fees and bag limits, but he was not interested in this.
- He learned to hunt 5 years ago from his father. People go whenever they can and always come back with something. But they don't always go to the Sanctuary. They know when the TMT is there and what days it is gone, they go those days.
- When they see their friends, like Alfonse, he won't turn them in because they know each other. But he said "If the TMT catches you with bats you will be in trouble."
- How he thought the project could help him. He said there should be a better road to bring more tourists. Then he said he would like to grow cabbages so "when the whites come to see the falls, they'll see the cabbage and buy them."
- He said a bat sells for 3,000 cedis, in comparison to 50,000 for a grasscutter. He said this is because "a bat is not a meat, not like an animal, like a bird." "But you can have them at the house and eat them 1 by 1 to make sauce, light sauce for fufu."

Wli Charcoal Makers.

- Young man, 25-30, sells charcoal in Wli in small quantities daily for household use. He charges 2,000 for a tomato can worth, and gets 20,000 for the larger bags he sells in Hohoe.
- He makes the coal from mostly mango trees on his distant farm. He cuts only part of the tree at a time, enough to make one batch, but not kill the tree. He makes the coal at the farm, then transports the coal. He uses the same method as is common in Togo.
- I asked why he makes charcoal when he and most people use dry wood in the village. He said, "because charcoal is cash." He also said many women in the village make it for the same reason.
- John, Charcoal Maker in Cocoa forest on the trail to Agumatsa Falls. John has cut down a 1 meter diameter Odum tree into charcoal making chunks. He paid the sawyer a fee of 50,000cedis and intends to use the entire tree to make about 30 bags of charcoal.
- He is doing this to maximize profit, so he will sell all the bags in Hohoe where the market price is higher, 15-18,000 per bag. So he should make roughly 500,000 cedis before the sawyer and transportation fees are deducted. He is from the family that owns all the land up to the 2nd bridge.
- He said his plan is to plant bananas and taro in the gap created by cutting down the tree, and use the profits to buy cocoa seedlings to start a new farm on other land.
- Mary, guide of Agumatsa on charcoal making on the trail. "Well they aren't actually doing charcoal in the sanctuary, just at the beginning of the trail. They have farms up to the 4th bridge. The border is far from the falls isn't it?"
- This goes along with the general concern of managing for tourism rather than for the environment. When I asked about charcoal, she immediately thought that I meant it would detract from the visitors experience of the falls, and if it was far enough from that it and farming were okay.

Village Youth, Wli.

- A group of about 20-25 young men filtered in throughout the meeting. I began by saying I have been meeting all the interest groups in the village to get their views on the project. They replied, "what

project?” When I said the Sanctuary they grumbled and said, “Those questions are for the TMT. We are under them (we can’t speak about them as a group). We only see what plans they draw.”

- What activities do village youth do? communal labor, building projects, school and church projects, cleaning projects. Emanuel, the guide and PCV counterpart, was helping with Ewe interpretation. He said, “for these things they are all coming quickly.” But he said, “We do not do communal labor for the sanctuary project because there are enough people employed who earn their daily bread from it. If we go there is no direct benefit (like there is for those people).”
- How are Youth represented by TMT? “We are not”... “The meetings with youth are for the security council, to protect the forest or for some problem. Normally the TMT does not meet like that.”
- How are Youth in Wli connected to the Youth Assoc. in Accra? “We are the same. Our brothers there are interested in seeing our project go as well as it can.”
- How do youth raise ideas to the TMT if there are problems? “We talk to the youth chief. We used to have meetings. He presents the ideas to the elders, who present to the TMT. Anything must go through the chiefs to preserve harmony.”
- So how did the Accra Youth consult with you? “They actually went directly to the elders without touching us. That was not how it should be, but they felt so strongly they went directly.”
- What are village income generating activities other than small farming surplus? “Nothing right in the village. When people learn trades they go to work in Hohoe.”
- How would they like to benefit from the project, “Pork husbandry, chickens, tree plantations. We would like these projects to employ the village; pay our carpenters and masons to get jobs and then afterwards the projects will create income as well, by themselves.”

Afadjato

Rubin, Ghana Wildlife Society project manager of Small Scale Enterprise development.

- The small-scale enterprise part of the project began in 2001 with 20 groups: 5 farming, oil, gari, misc soap making and carving, animal husbandry.
- The concept of small-scale enterprise component of the project was developed prior to doing any village studies of project possibilities, as well as the concept that small-scale enterprise’s had to be done in groups. He said, “the reason to group was to share resources. Things like sprayers and push carts couldn’t be bought for individuals. And there are successes of group work in Northern Ghana, especially women.”
- 20 groups formed and submitted budgets and a analysis worksheet/questionnaire to assess their experience, group history, and bank account. From the original 20, 12 were selected as good. 8 were decided to not be funded yet, but the Project Management Committee didn’t want there to be conflicts between groups so they were all funded. “They split the funds between the groups, but not equally. It depended on the activity.”
- All groups were given a check to cash and some materials. Cutlasses and hoes to farming groups, and machines to other groups. The materials were all purchased directly by the project and a few community reps, rather than the groups using their checks to purchase them.
- The groups were given training on bookkeeping and some on technical aspects, “But most of the activities were not new, people have been doing them since infancy.”
- None of the farming groups have succeeded. “The amount of lands used as group lands didn’t increase proportionally. Previously 1 person was cultivating ½ an acre. We could have helped to increase each person to 1 acre, but instead 23 people grouped together to farm 5 acres. The possibility of increasing production isn’t being met. Plus the 5 acres want not even maintained to produce.”
- Rice and yams all failed supposedly due to a lack of rain. “But the reason they failed was lack of labor and commitment. When they got the \$ they decided to divide it up as individuals and work alone. One man said his whole field of cassava went rotten. The problem is working with groups, people don’t work together and apply themselves the same.”
- “We failed on our part also. We were not set up to monitor at that point (June 2001). Since then we have given group funds to farmers in Fodome-Ahor and done the payment in phases. Phase one to clear (the land) and purchase inputs, 2 to plant. Like that, we are seeing results. But still it is always

few doing the work for all, even the time of harvest.” “We are less interested in farming projects. We know all over Ghana that farmers don’t pay loans.”

- The soap, oil, and gari groups are all having trouble with markets for their finished products. Oil making has not worked as groups either. “They are more concerned over sharing the running of the machine and paying back the group than developing or increasing their production. The families not in the groups have increased their production more, so we are looking to make the machine community owned (rather than group owned).”
- Ghana Wildlife Society tried to find an export market for gari, but the buyers wanted the yellow gari, versus the white that the village makes, and they demanded a dryer product. The soap making group learned how to make long bar soap, comparable to that sold in the markets, but because of the large soap companies keeping prices down “the women are less serious.”
- Ghana Wildlife Society has been trying to seek out which members of most groups are really serious and then make those people individuals with their own loan to pay back and own materials. Such as the beekeeping projects that are now 5 hives per person, rather than group hives.
- “We see that people view the 1st loans as a gift to the community for their initiating the project and donating their lands, like a payment.” “The community has worked on the conservation part very well, but they don’t want to see just rainforest. They also want to see village development.”
- “The project is waiting for approval of its 2nd stage of funding. Has been operating with very low budget.
- Rubin sees the snail raising as a great example of individual responsibility and commitment. The way they have constructed the tanks and do all the day to day without any financing, just the starter seed snails. “We have told them we can take them back if they are not doing a good job, we have with one lady. And we are trying to buy the adults when they are grown.”
- “We have tried two aspects, the group work didn’t succeed but neither did the individuals in the groups when they separated. We are now trying to dissolve the groups to find those that are serious.”

Edem, Ghana Wildlife Society Project Director.

- The project oversees 12km² of reserve area surrounded by a buffer zone. The three villages involved are Gbledi-Gbogame, Gbledi-Chebi, and Ahor (also in order of amounts of land donated to make up the 12km). He drew me a map sketch of the land in protection stretching from Afadjato (the border between Gbledi and Liati traditional areas) North to the border between Ahor and Wli-Todzi. The buffer extends East from the core boundary into No Mans land and Togo.
- He described the long standing boundary dispute on the south end of the reserve between Liati and Gbledi, both claiming ownership to parts of Afadjato mountain and both having ecotourism projects. Gbledi separated itself into a separate traditional area in the 1980’s. Since 1999 the villages have had a gentlemen’s agreement not to disturb tourists that come from either side, ie if they come from Liati and hike down the Ghana Wildlife Society trail. You can easily see the fire scars on the hillside where the boundary is. He says this is because of persistent burning on the Liati side that developed more fire resistant species.
- He regretted the “big mistake” Ghana Wildlife Society made early on in the project by bringing in a TV crew to shoot publicity video for Afadjato without consulting Liati. The video was partially shot on Liati lands, but promoted the attraction as being solely Gbledi and Ghana Wildlife Society.
- The project breaks down tourism revenues as such: 50% landowners, 5% district assembly, 20% project management committee, 10% traditional authorities, and 15% community. All landowners share a similar amount of revenue, not dependant on the acres donated, but Gbledi gets a larger proportion because their village donated the most. Community percentages are broken down further into villages and then families.
- The Project Management Committee (Project Management Committee) is made up of representatives from the following: Ghana Wildlife Society, liaison, project manager, 3 chiefs of the three villages, youth rep, women’s rep, district assembly rep, Accra youth rep, Ahor steering committee rep, and health and sanitation rep. This committee makes all project decisions together.
- I asked Edem about how Youth and Women are represented in the Project Management Committee. He said “There are women’s reps on the Project Management Committee, but they are not vocal. The youth (rep) participates well in meetings, but doesn’t get the word spread...There are

internal problems, something between him (youth rep) and Togbega and other things. He needs to beat the gong-gong and call them, but because of (internal problems) he can't."

- The elders of Gbledi approached Ghana Wildlife Society in 1996. They wrote the plan that was accepted in 1998 by the Dutch Embassy. He says landowners bought into the project mostly for the tourism and small business development aspects, and to a lesser extent conservation benefits. At first the project acceptance was dependant on the area of the reserve. When Gbledi and Chebi alone wasn't big enough they went to Ahor and Wli. Ahor was interested, but Wli was interested one day and not the next. Eventually Ghana Wildlife Society decided not to waste their time. Edem did lots of the original interviews with landowners because the project manager, Isaac, didn't speak fluent Ewe. He said, "they (landowners) would say 'yes' to the conservation benefits, but they say, 'but what am I going to eat today?'"
- The project progressed to include 8 guides from Gbledi and Chebi. These began working with the project during the initial surveys. They were nominated by village clan heads/ sub chiefs and interviewed by the project managers. The three officers are contract employees of Ghana Wildlife Society, rather than the community, so they will only be there as long as there is funding for the project from external sources. There is also a secretary from Gbledi and the liaison.
- The guides do all of the field monitoring and trap sweeping. Surveys are done for birds, mammals, insects, plants, and to collect traps. The project managers assist with the technical aspects of the surveys. He joked about the guides interchanging the word guide with guards often, "the guides who are also the guards!"
- He described several benefits of the project including: harvesting of fruits from the forest that can only grown in places that don't burn (therefore protecting from bushfires as well), social benefits of changing hunters into guides, creating a forum to discuss conservation and increase consciousness (they did many brainstorming activities in the beginning to discuss resources), experiences in group projects and \$ managing. He also mentioned increased rainfall and animal populations.
- He still sees problems with bushfires, hunting and trapping, and disputes between traditional areas. He thinks the small scale enterprise activities developed too fast, without having enough emphasis on \$ managing skills. The groups dissolved and have not repayed loans, and machines have broken.
- The future of the project is somewhat secure for the short term. The Dutch embassy has agreed to fund a second phase of the project for 2 additional years. He sees a few things as key to this succeeding: increasing the number of liaisons to 3, one for each village, to increase representation, and replication of the Ahor steering committee. This committee is unique to Ahor and is formed from the village committees they had from working with the Ghana Fire Service.
- He said he doesn't think the village is ready to take over yet, someone from the outside needs to stay at least one more year. Specifically someone to help with \$ management for some time after Ghana Wildlife Society pulls out. He doesn't think the Project Management Committee is functional yet. He also says there will need to be more external funding. Tourism revenue was 12,000,000 since 1998, but that was nowhere near their expenses. He was dejected at times about the loans from the small scale enterprise groups.
- He emphasized over and over that to him it was a conservation project, not economic or tourism even though he said the reason landowners agreed to join and came to Ghana Wildlife Society was for \$. He mentioned other soft benefits, like "the experience" and increased environmental awareness and communication about conservation.

Mancredo, Afadjato Village Project Liaison.

- Togbe introduced himself to me as Chief. That is what Togbe means, but most sub-chiefs generally do not use that title in conversation. His wife and children are from Kuma-Konda and now work and live in Lome (at Ecobank and another \$ firm).
- Ghana Wildlife Society managers only work at the Gbledi site Wed-Friday, usually arriving from Accra late in the night Tuesday. This requires them to have a Ghana Wildlife Society vehicle and put on lots of miles between the office and project site each week.
- The District Assembly is in charge of distributing \$ and development projects to the most worthy villages. They had financing from EU microprojects to build a Junior Sec school. Other villages applied but DA chose Gbledi. I brought up that DA is one of the 3 partners in the WLI project. He said they collect a share of the revenue because they chose to invest in a visitor center there. Also a

guest house in Wote, but not in Gbledi, so the Afadjato project doesn't share any authority with the DA. They still collect a tax from the project however.

- As for the Chiefs and elders of the village. Each village has a paramount chief (in principle). The PC has a right wing, left wing, and back chiefs. Each chief has 2 'fathers'-a stool father and father father, neither of which are parental. After the paramount chief, each clan has a chief, several subclan chiefs. A subclan is created anytime a group of a clan disputes being properly represented by the clan chief. Subclans can also go extinct when the families continue to many outside the clan.
- Today Gbledi has 4 clans. Within Togbe's clan there are 3 subclans (2 active and 1 extinct). As for action, the chiefs represent their groups and report to the government higher up. "The government promises many things and lies." He described the subclans and chief system as problematic. Like when the DA has to decide where \$ or projects go, they have so many competing chiefs. If they were less in number but more organized and prioritized they could be more successful.
- I described my walk around the village, seeing the JSS, SST, Health Center with nurses from all over the country coming to work. I said things in the village were looking pretty good (especially in comparison to Togo) He agreed and said their priorities now are a library, and gravity fed water system (like Chebi) that can give water pressure in the homes. And maybe a vehicle for the village. He said in April they have a village development council.
- He mentioned all the equipment from the project. How important the project management was to protect it. He said they have had trouble working with groups, so they are going to manage them in the community interest with a community fund.
- In the 80's he came back to Gbledi and was already decided upon to be chief by his family when his grandfather died. He arranged for 3 PCV's in the village, as well as 6 Japanese volunteers and some British crews to come for month long work vacations.
- He described the whole project as his brain child. He was the one who the guide William described as the village 'well-off' from Accra telling the village what a good thing it had to conserve.
- Originally the IBA birders had been coming and he said, "Shouldn't there be a project here to protect this and help the community?" So the Ghana Wildlife Society asked whose land it was and he lied saying it was his. That was in the beginning. Now he seems to be getting it straight with all the stakeholders, represented.
- He also said the chiefs and elders normally have no legal judicial power, but sometimes when it is a 1st offense, or the person knows they are guilty, they are lenient and give them a local penance, usually drinks.
- When talking about he and I meeting with the Chiefs to discuss my research Togbe said, "We are not going there to ask for permission. We are going to introduce you and inform him of your activities. The only permission needed has already been granted by the office (Ghana Wildlife Society). If you ask them for permission they will go into a meeting and put you through all that again. We will just go to inform." Like in Wli, the Chiefs played a veto role in Gbledi and were 'informed' of Ghana Wildlife Society plans and decisions.

Togbega (Paramount Chief) and Gbledi Village Elders

- The chiefs sat in formation in front of me and Togbe. I gave them a copy of the worksheet and they read the questions, deliberated and discussed, and usually Togbega responded. If he didn't the chiefs looked to him for permission and then he would sort of nod with approval after they responded.
- Approximate village populations in Afadjato project area: Gbogame 800, Chebi 565, Gbodti 75, Toglo/Agomatsa 400.
- They started the project to "get something from the mountain range", to improve rainfall and climate, and stop bushfires.
- The boundaries of the project are Fodome, Liati, Kuma, and Wli. They played down the boundary dispute between Gbogame and Wote by saying the Wote People came from Kuma very late in the settlement of the area and do not have the right to use the top of Afadjato. They have, however, over time tried to increase their use rights by burning successively higher on the hillside for cultivation and thus pseudo use/access rights.
- The history of the Gbledi people was described not differently from all the villages in the study area: originally the Ewe people came from Katu (present day Nigeria) migrating to Notse (Togo) then on to Kpele-Tutu then to Akabadji (present Akata) to Wormukpene to Afedome, and finally Gbledi

around 1800. They described a different legend about the Chief in Notse being a wicked drunk, which forced the people to escape his high walled prison like village. They splashed water on the mud wall repeatedly over a period of time until it was weak enough to break through and sneak away. They said the escapees walked away from the village backward so they could always see if they were being chased, and to confuse the wicked Chief.

- The village was settled at the base of the mountains because of its rich farmland. They separated legally from the Liat Traditional Area in 1952. They said the original clumping of the 2 together was because of the colonial capital, at that time under the German Togoland, the capitol was in Kpalime for their region.
- Ethnicities present in the project area include Ewe, Kabiye, and migrant farmers from southern parts of the Volta Region. All the non-Ewe live in the settlements on top of the mountains (Toglo/Agomatsa) rather than in the village.
- The village government hierarchy is as such: Paramount Chief, Divisional Chiefs, Subchiefs, Opinion leaders, and community. There is also the Queen Mother who exists separate from the hierarchy, whose job it is to translate all of the decisions made by the Paramount Chief to the women.
- The chiefs consider their village to be average for rural poverty all over Ghana. Their entire population is made up of peasant farmers. The village consists of 7 stores, 4 bars, 1 guesthouse, 6 homestay houses, electricity, motorable road, small market on Fridays, and average housing. The village also has a health unit that serves the project area plus Wote for vaccinations, visits, and maternity.
- They consider the education level in the village to be high, with many highly educated managers, doctors, and engineers. Togbega teaches at the Senior Secondary (high school) technical school. The village has a primary school, new junior secondary school, and SST, however they desire a library and more space in the JSS and Primary schools.
- Wed is communal labor day and Friday market day when merchants come from Hohoe to sell. There are no village taboo's controlling activities. They see their roll in the Community conservation project as "tasking the village youth to participate in conservation activities."
- Village problems include poverty, mainly due to a great bushfire in 1983 that burned all their cocoa and coffee cash crops. They have no collateral to get credit to restart these farms and prices for goods in the national economy continue to rise. They also named road erosion, lack of transport as a problem. As well as sanitation problems due to a lack of latrines in the village.
- The village has a bore-hole pump water system, which the current population exceeds causing breakdowns. They have a project written by a village engineer to tap a stream on the mountain and have a gravity fed pressurized water system. They are waiting for an aid agency to "buy the project" so they can begin its construction.

Project Management Committee Meeting

- This morning it seemed most of the village came to hear the Ghana Wildlife Society present the Chiefs and elders with project revenues/payments. Edem, Rubin, and Togbe were set up in a line of plastic chairs on one side of the side street, while the Chiefs were aligned in formation on the other side; Togbega center with the sub-chiefs (minus Togbe) all around. The rest of the Project Management Committee members were not part of this exchange, but were just part of the general village population spread around.
- Edem did most of the speaking on the Ghana Wildlife Society behalf, in Ewe. He described the amount of money and percentages to be shared by "community", "village leaders", "women" etc... This sum was not part of the economic projects, but something to help individuals with household living costs and family businesses like farming and women's commerce. The amounts per family sounded substantial, like 400,000 cedis for a woman to buy and sell products.
- Several people from the village spoke out. They were all gathered around in the streets behind the Chiefs and Ghana Wildlife Society forming a mass with only the space of the street open. There were probably 150 people there. While Edem addressed the elders he walked from the side of the street he was seated on into the middle of the circle and spoke to both the chiefs and community, favoring the community by turning about to speak in all directions as the village was gathered everywhere and there were of course no microphones.

- The chiefs sat in the chairs to speak, although they were often very animated. Especially Togbega, who obviously was the final word on things, often waving his arms and pointing, or waving off topics as undisputable for discussion. Other chiefs occasionally stood and stepped forward to quell certain questions from the villagers.
- About 6 people total spoke from the village. One man yelled out from a bar very actively. I think he was questioning the amount of money per family or the duration of payment because it sparked one of the chiefs to respond that he had given up his lands and could be making more than 400,000 by farming them, but he accepted the loss for the good of the project.
- Next a man stormed into the center of the street shouting at the chiefs about communal labor, and the delinquents that skip out. He was very upset, perhaps drunk already, but the chiefs quickly said they would call the skippers out and assess them fines. It was obvious that labor wasn't a large issue of the meeting because of how it was quickly passed over. Communal labor is every Wed in Gbledi, Tue in Chebi.
- A lady spoke up to restate the problem of certain people still poaching. She made it sound like it is still a very significant number of people. She said it isn't good/honest that the women are given money to help the family pay for food/meat and their husbands still go poach. She said it would take more personal demands from wives to ask their husbands not to go hunt. She said, "We know when they leave, where they are going." She stated that they are benefiting from the project. "You don't hear people pounding palm nuts anymore, we are benefiting." From the woman's comments about husbands hunting in the village that it seems the project activities are working to benefit and make oil making more efficient, but people are still doing the hunting and charcoal making because they are "cash" activities, or extra activities that they can do in addition to the project, partially due to division of labor, ie just because the project is helping women doesn't mean the men will change. It seems to also be a matter of the project not making enough of an impact/benefit. The benefits are not enough to make them change their activities from say hunting to husbandry.
- A second lady spoke up to mention that I had arrived in the night before and paid her to cook me amokple, and that I spoke Ewe. This got a real rouse out of the village. She used it as another example of benefit.
- Then Edem and Togbe presented the cash to the chief next to Togbega, who immediately began counting it. They also gave Togbega several papers to sign and Rubin took their picture together.

Marseilles, Side Support Representative for Afadjato project.

- Approximately 40 years old, more well off farmer in the village.
- "At least 80% of youths are in one of the (Afadjato project) groups." The problem is when they (Ghana Wildlife Society) did the feasibility studies for the small scale enterprise projects, they said we would find the greatest markets to sell things automatically, ie they overestimated possible profit margins, but now the prices of the products are all down. (gari, soap, oil)
- The problem is the groups can't meet together on project ideas or show up on time. Interests don't align. "You (aid agencies/NGO's) should come and say 'look Sasa what do *you* want to do? (rather than demanding groups be formed)"
- "the question of funds being insufficient is something different." People expect to work for a year and get something right away rather than pay back loans and slowly develop something, so now they are falling back instead of the original 18 at a meeting you get 6.
- The problem is a lack of values, you whites and us Africans. People here want to do something that benefits today, not the future. When I was a kid I went to Senior Secondary after Hohoe. Now because of our work our kids can go here. But if projects don't benefit today people are going to say they aren't good.
- He says that many people are very confused by the project, but says it is greatly because of old rich people from Gbledi misleading them about Ghana Wildlife Society, saying Ghana Wildlife Society has mismanaged the project, to bet back at Ghana Wildlife Society for not giving them a cut off the top of the project. (ie they know how the development system can be corrupted, and want a cut for getting the Ghana Wildlife Society into the village in the first place and thus getting their NGO salaries and admin fees written into the project)
- When I asked him what he would like from the project he went on a tangent about slavery. He said he would like to be a slave, "I would like to have the chance to be like that (a slave), have a job to

go to everyday, come home to a house kept up for my family, if we have a health problem they (project owners) will look after us..." He would like it without the bad treatment. Said it was bad for colonies to leave without Ghanaians being free of mind. "Black people are more wicked to other blacks today." He gave the example of ministers and "big men" that don't give anything back to the rural communities.

Sasa, *Project Management Committee Youth Representative.*

- He said the more significant impact on their lives had been the fire of 1983 that burned their cocoa fields. "Before then the economy was balanced (between cash and subsistence crops)...didn't cultivate to sell."
- He defined youth as usually anyone under 50, but that there are actually no age restrictions. He sees his role in the village as encouraging the youth to revitalize cultural activities as benefits of organization, not to necessarily come together just to make money right away. He spoke of creating a youth center as a place to educate youth groups to start more dynamic projects, by working as groups.
- He described briefly four group project ideas he has been trying to encourage, based with his family group and branching outward including modern music traveling around as a band in his bus, making clothes with several sewing machines they have acquired, farming, and animal husbandry.
- He said he was appointed as the village youth representative because he was a real outgoing young man; sporting, musical etc...He was on the district board back in the 80's when there was a PCV in the village. He said it was his brother, a past District Assemblyman, and his idea to originally open the village to tourism.
- He says the village youth supply all the labor for the project like patrolling, fire control, building, road maintenance, communal labor etc...but unlike landowners and elders they don't get any % of the profits. He says "the Project Management Committee is too bureaucratic. They only listen to the 'big cars' that come from Accra (the business men from Gbledi that initiated the chiefs). I might have a better idea, but because they come dressed fine they get listened to."
- He doesn't really have any solid ideas. He kept changing what he would call his "really serious idea" from fish ponds, community center, or anything that could attract my attention enough to work with him.

Agima IV (Asafo), *Gbledi landowner.*

- His clan includes 3 families. He is the head of the family Zwe, the representative of all lands. But he said from the outside the chief is responsible.
- He is not interested in farming the mountain, but says strangers and some members of the clan are. His coffee and cocoa were destroyed in the '83 fire and now the Kabiye dominate the cash crops. He concentrates on lower food crop farming and cash making trees, like palms, mangos, and cashews. He is not interested in the top also due to fire pressures from Togo. (Agima IV)
- "The young men not advanced in education need the land. The land is not growing; population is. The land is there." He complains about only being able to farm with tenant farmers now because "all the youth have left." (Agima IV)
- They also use wood and coal depending on the women. He says they are "sometimes late or need fast heat." They make and fetch both, or buy coal.
- They eat fish daily, meat from time to time. With his pension his wife buys when people in the village slaughter. He says 10-15 years ago he and his brother consumed a lot of game from the bush, but that has reduced now that his brother left and the conservation project arrived. "Times ago wood was more plenty. Now some small in forest." (Agima IV)

Honoue, *Gbledi landowner*

- Mr. Honoue is an elder from his family. Spent most of his life out of the village working abroad or for the Ghana Police Department. He is widowed by his wife and he now lives alone and cooks for himself. His family gave a portion of their forested lands on the uphill side of the road to the project reserve.
- He gave a large area of forested land to his nephew to manage. The area was cleared and burned, the suitable trees were used to make charcoal, while many others lay around the fields drying and are being farmed around. Their negotiation is for his nephew to use the lands for corn and cassava while

planting oil palms. When the palms grow Mr. Honoue will take over the farm again and live off the palm nuts and palm wine as he gets old.

- He said all his firewood comes from the farm where his nephew works. He said “you will be caught at once if you went to the forest”.
- I observed that most landowners who donated their lands and are the recipients of the compensation % are too old to actively farm. Traditionally they would do what Honoue is doing with his nephew as a way to continue to provide for their family. This also benefits the youth who works their land. However, if now the elders are being compensated, aren't the youth opportunities decreasing?

Aprepsu, Gbledi Landowner

- His clan donated about 1/6th of their land. Their sub-clans are divided by their father's lands. There is no clan head in this case to make decisions, so they were made at the sub-clan/family level.
- His family uses both charcoal and wood. The wood is still harvested in their forest areas, but only by the headpan, not for sale.
- He does the usual corn, cassava, and plantains on the lower lands, and palms on the upper side. Some of this is sharecropping and some paid labor. His sharecropping is 50/50 for cassava, and 75/25 for corn. He described the importance of plantains as being a quick source of cash in the economy. He would like to do more, and other cash crops on the downside, but says then he would have no food. To compensate for this he says ‘they’ (Ghana Wildlife Society) needs to give them a %.
- They eat fish everyday, meat only once a month. Previously his brother hunted, but has stopped. He sets some traps, but only on the lowland side, and is trying to start husbandry as a substitute. “Thankfully there is a cold store to provide meat.”
- To continue the project he says, “the key is obeying their (Ghana Wildlife Society) bylaws or they will pack up and leave us, and we won't get anything.” He sees an obvious connection between benefit and Ghana Wildlife Society being there.
- He would like to see the Ghana Wildlife Society build a community center. “Some construction, (there's) not much to see. Other projects build school blocks, pay school fees for primary school.” Obviously doesn't have confidence in the sustainability of the small enterprise projects.

Mortty, Gbledi Landowner.

- Mortty elders said they don't know what portions of the approximately 11.9km² is donated by each landowner or clan, because they all share the profits of the reserve equally. They donated 25% of their family lands. Decisions of land use/farm decisions are made by family heads, who then ask clan heads for permission to grant lands to users.
- On their lands above the road they produce coffee, kola, peya, and cocoa, but also do these on the lowlands. In the lowlands they concentrate on cereals, like rice, yams, corn, and wood. The clan head uses his farm himself, but pays laborers to do certain jobs like weeding. He does not share crop or tenant farm. They use charcoal and wood in their house for cooking. The wood is collected in the lowlands because it is easier to get than climbing the hills, but he said they still allow wood collecting on the slopes donated. They buy meat and fish from the cold store to replace the “meat shortage from the bush”.
- Group work problems: “Everything is hard to start but we are hoping for the future. If only donors and funders can help. We don't work well together, must be individuals like with an irrigation system. Cannot profit, even in groups, doing manpower farming. We have plenty of land and workforce, but no capital to purchase machines to do the irrigation.”
- He said he wants to conserve for intrinsic future desires like stopping extinction, education, and ecosystem services. Doesn't want to use lands in the forest as “working forest” because they do not want to farm the difficult areas. “Even digging there to plant trees is difficult. We don't want to climb to the top. We would rather market it to have people coming to see what Gbledi people have done.”
- He said he has a feeling of laziness, “Your (white peoples) groups work fine. People are lazy and they still chop. Here we say ‘no work, no chop’. You have to work very hard to get anything.” He said he has a feeling of laziness, “Your (white peoples) groups work fine. People are lazy and they still chop. Here we say ‘no work, no chop’. You have to work very hard to get anything.”

- Sharecropping occurs in many was here, like in Togo. When land is given to plant palms, cocoa, or coffee usually the cultivator benefits for 3 years growing corn, cassava, and harvesting the wood they clear. They give small, token amounts to the landowner, but then the landowner gets the benefit of the cash crops solely when they are mature. On the other hand, if the use is only for the corn and cassava, the owners get a significant cut or donation in kind. Besides these, deals are often cut for doing only specific parts of the toughest labor, like weeding or making charcoal.

William, Afadjato Guide

- We discussed the differences between the Ghana Wildlife Society and GWC. He restated that there are ongoing control issues between the community project team and Wildlife Department in Wli, but ended saying that there are 2 guards assigned to the sanctuary government Wildlife Commission to stop hunting and sawing. He said, "At times if they were not there you would hear shooting all the time. People would sometimes enter and fell trees and be sawing." When I brought up the possibility of the Wli project being separate from the government like Afadjato he said the government has to take a % because of the 2 employees they have there.
- He described the roll of the District Assembly in both projects. The DA controls all business activities in the region, everyone pays a tax. He said it was the DA that paid for the bridges at the waterfall.
- We passed by the grasscutter house made of cement, expensive screen, double doors, funky 2 tier metal roof, etc...project park/recreation area that he described had been leveled off with bulldozers and then partially reforested with cassia siamea. He showed me the butterfly houses and screened in area used to enclose captured butterflies until they laid eggs that turned into crycalis, which would then be exported. But that part of the project had not been working for a while due to a lack of market. As we passed some snail raising pits he briefly named off all the different small enterprise projects developed by the project, 9 total: beekeeping, snails, gari, soap, grasscutter, palm oil, yam, rice, etc...
- Why do guides talk about 9 small-scale enterprise groups, Ruben talk about 20, others talk about 10...?
- I asked about what types of animals lived in the forest, but he didn't give any specific animals, just said wildlife. Once at the top he showed me a trail that cuts NE and meets the trail to Kuma-Davota. He showed me Kuma-Bala, which you could see on the horizon straight East. Then he pointed out the valleys where the Gbledi traditional area meets Liati and Kuma. From the Davota trail highpoint you look West to see Liati-Wote. He pointed out a Kabiye farm and homestead near it where we could see obvious bananas planted all around that valley. It was obvious that the history of the area, traditional use rights, geography were more significant to him than wildlife. He pointed out the taditional boundaries, not the forest reserve boundary.
- He said it was well off villagers that now live in Accra who originated the idea, proposed it to the village elders to preserve the highest mountain and make \$ for the village via aid. The village elders then went to Ghana Wildlife Society to suggest they protect Mt. Afadjato. He said they approached Ghana Wildlife Society because they knew the government had no \$ to give to communities without connections. The Ghana Wildlife Society wrote the plan and sought the Netherlands Embassy's aid. The project began once the plan was accepted, the equipment for projects was bought, park was bulldozed, and guides were trained.
- He said there are 8 guides, 9 small-scale enterprise groups, and 3 project managers. Whenever he described the project, it was always "they" either referring to Ghana Wildlife Society or to the village elites who initiated it, "they knew this", "they decided this", "we ask them", "we do this"...He said the project helps directly through income generation, less of a demand on farming, and indirectly by attracting tourists that buy goods and services.

Isaac, Gbledi Guide

- Each of the guides has their special interests in the project. Patrick is the grasscutter and snail husbandry leader, often checking up on members in the village. William was very knowledgeable about the butterfly project. Isaac knew more about the beekeeping groups and methods. They are all open with information and know much more than other villagers I talked to. They are usually outside the office waiting for tourists or orders to do manual labor.

- It seems like they could be doing more in the way of education, bridging the gap between the project managers and villagers than the one liaison.
- He showed me the hives they use that are different from those used commonly in Togo. They don't use frames or centrifuge extractors either, which cuts down on the costs of harvesting. Their hives are about 4 feet long and one foot tall, only one level unlike the double hives in Togo. The hive has about 20 top-bars. Once full of honey, they harvest all but the middle three bars and cut the wax and honey off the others to press out. They press them in a wooden frame with holes drilled in the sides.
- Their honey sells for 15,000 per bottle. They also sell the wax and use it to bait other hives. We compared the prices of constructing the different hives and found it to be similar for wood, but the intricate work in Togo made the carpentry price higher. The wood prices per hive in Ghana was about 180,000 at the high end. For 300 hives that would cost the project 52,000,000.
- He said there are 3 groups in Gbledi and 3 in Chebi. Each group has about 15 members and each member has 3-4 hives. This totals approximately 270-300 hives. Each group has a president, VP, secretary type structure. All the hives and bee suits, press, etc... were paid for by the project. With the harvest \$ the groups will start to repay the money given to build the hives for the revolving fund system.
- The bee groups are having problems with "lazy" members not working, or giving up on their hives. These hives are then taken back and given to other members.
- He also described the oil groups: 1 in Gbledi, 1 in Chebi, both with 18 members. They go all over to buy palm nuts at different markets and bring them back to their village to process. The project bought "many machines" to make both types of palm nut and palm kernel oils.
- The groups then stock the prepared oil and wait for the season to pass when the price of the oils increases before selling.
- During our conversation about how they became guides I left an extra long pause and Isaac asked if I had any difficulties in my Peace Corps projects. I said that the hunting and cutting was not viewed as a problem by villagers because everyone does it and it's never been managed.
- He immediately fired back, "don't you have by-laws?" I explained that the projects I worked on were mostly development work, not under any whole 'Conservation and Development' theme like Afadjato. I said that including conservation activities indirectly in the projects doesn't seem relevant. Also I said that the people in the projects probably wouldn't write in conservation or anti-hunting by-laws since they would only be sanctioning themselves, and they want to keep using those resources.
- This triggered Patrick to say the by-laws of Afadjato were not implanted by Ghana Wildlife Society. They were the desires of the community, or individuals within the community. These by-laws were formed based on their ideas, supported and enforced by the village traditional system.
- They are also on a probationary period (like Wli guides) for payment as guides. Ghana Wildlife Society gives them an allowance, but when the project is finally handed over, it will be up to the community to decide on their wages. The community will also hire and train other guides then to replace tired guides from the original group. Patrick, for instance, is very busy with the grasscutter and snail raising and I don't think he wants to continue guiding. They see it as very difficult work to wait around for tourists under the cashew tree and then hike up to the top with them.

Palm Oil Goup Chairwoman

- She said the group consists of 38 women and 2 men. The reason for having the men is for someone to run the mills! They formed in 2003, by having the village gong-gong announce that anyone interested in joining the group to come to a meeting. This was different than other smaller groups, which formed mostly by family groups. The Ghana Wildlife Society made it mandatory for them to form as a group, and made some kind of selection process to cap the group number at 40.
- Like other small business groups, the palm oil group members had to elect a chair or president, secretary, and treasurer. They were all trained by Ghana Wildlife Society in bookkeeping techniques and they opened a group bank account.
- She said they do not hold large group meetings, but all decisions are made by the group as a whole. I observed that the women often work on their individual portions of nuts in a common area, share the rakes used to mix the flesh with water, and socialize at that time.

- For their actual work the 40 members is split up into 4, 10 person small groups. She said these groups delegate someone to go buy ripe palm nuts in Hohoe which the members divide amongst themselves to process separately using the mill but doing the rest of the work at their individual homes. Then they stock the oil together again as a large group and wait to sell it until the palm season ends and the price for oil increases.
- She said they buy the ripe nuts in Hohoe because it is a group business. The nuts they collect from their own farms in the village are used for making personal oil for family use and sale for family profit.
- So far the group profits have mostly gone towards paying the electricity bill for running the mills, and a small amount used to start repaying their loan to Ghana Wildlife Society. She says the group will be able to pay back most of the loan this year and all of it within two seasons. Until then the members are not profiting personally. She said the group decided to pay back the loans first, rather than profiting some and paying back some gradually because “we were being chased to pay it back by Ghana Wildlife Society.”
- She said the mills are open to use for anyone in the village, not just group members, but they have to pay a fee just like the village flour mill. Even members of the group have to pay the fee when they are not doing group work. She said in this way the whole village is benefiting from the mills, but the members are benefiting more because when the loan is paid off they will be making profits from their group oil production and profits from running the mill. When they use the mill for personal oil making they are investing it in themselves.
- Unlike the other projects, there have been no quitting the oil group so far. She said “its always difficult to work in groups, all over Ghana. Some people try hard, others are lazy.”
- She said there is an unwritten rule on production within the group. If a woman shows poor production on their portion of the palm nuts, i.e. each woman from the group of 10 should produce approximately the same amount, then she has to make up the difference with their personal oil production. She also said if it happens regularly they will not be asked to contribute in the future.
- She says the oil making business is good because it doesn’t conflict with other farming activities. The peak nut fruiting season is in between the planting and harvest for most crops. The red oil is made at this time and the kernels can be saved to make the clear oil during the dry season when there are fewer activities.
- She said the mills make the work much easier. “It takes only 2 minutes per headpan, instead of pounding.” She said this is even more important for the kernels, which is traditionally done by cracking them open one at a time between stones by hand. This oil is less commonly made because of this and is where the real profit lies. Not all members of the group are willing to make the kernel oil, so it is voluntary for personal profit.

Gari Processing Group

- They said the Ghana Wildlife Society bought the machines, 1 new motor and 1 new cassava grinding mill. The mill was under a new building, put up with newer timbers, walls, and sheeting roof.
- The group worked under a long grass roofed paillote with six clay stoves and roasting pans on each side. The women had their children with them, laying around the stoves! Normally gari making is done at the home and there is some younger sister or neighbor who can look after a woman’s kids.
- But because the mill has broken a few welds they now grind at the regular village mill. One of the members said, “because the mill broke, the group also broke. Now we just do it for ourselves (use the group stoves and materials to make individual family gari supplies).”
- So now the hardly broken mill and brand new motor with aluminum roof etc... just sit idle. The group is waiting for Ghana Wildlife Society to fix ‘their’ machine, while Ghana Wildlife Society is waiting for the group to contribute money to have ‘their’ machine repaired.

Mancredo, Beekeeping group members

- We were talking about the status of loan repayment for small enterprise groups, he said, “I don’t know what the plan will be. That all depends on the office. Ask Rubin, he’s the director of small enterprise.”
- Togbe first got into beekeeping in the late 70s through a Gbledi PCV. When Ghana Wildlife Society asked for small business ideas, Togbe and Accra youth offered the idea of beekeeping.

“Ghana Wildlife Society said they wanted small enterprise groups, at least 10 but less than 30. The idea was to give us them revolving loans.”

- Togbe’s group was 9 women, 11 men. He said the bee groups were loosely formed on family groups. They chose their own leaders, treasurers, and secretaries, opened bank accounts and were trained in bookkeeping. The project hired a technical trainer from Accra to come and guide the groups.
- The money for the groups was deposited in the bank in Hohoe. Their group was given 7,000,000 cedis to build 40 hives, buy boots, cutlasses, and other materials. “We bought things to be used individually, cutlasses 20,000, Boots 50,000, and other things through the bee group. No matter what (the outcome), people have benefited.”
- The groups had poor success capturing bees in their hives. They switched to a local technical trainer who suggested changing their hive locations and constructing new hive roofs and top-bars.
- Ruben (Ghana Wildlife Society) recalled the hives to make repairs, but at the same time decided to give out fewer hives per group (15) and only to group members that were still serious with the project. In Togbe’s group only 5 remained out of the initial 20, who each now have 3 hives. Some members resisted returning their hives, because they had bees in them, and the old hive design turned out better at keeping out water and pests.
- Togbe said group members lost interest due to laziness and not being serious. They were discouraged by the slow start and low capture rate. Now that they harvested Togbe’s 3 hives this year, yielding 6 gallons of honey, he says people are getting interested again. Some have even built their own hives apart from the project groups.
- Togbe has high hopes for the beekeeping project. He described it as lucrative, but not as a livelihood in it self, as part of a larger plan of fruit harvesting, tourism, and other alternatives to farming.

Private Businesses in Gbledi.

- The people I observed in small business activities throughout the village, separate from the project, were all family groups of small numbers with one person obviously leading them. For example, an two old couples engaged in farming and husbandry, an older woman and 3 daughters making palm oil, a woman and 2 young daughters smoking fish, and a young family engaged in palm growing, gardening, and fruit sales. (observations of businesses)
- Three of these groups said that they were not present when Ghana Wildlife Society started the small scale enterprise projects, but they wanted to join. Some said they can’t join now until the next round of project funding.
- One man was originally part of a farming group given a loan by the project for growing yams and cassava. He said the purpose was to use the project loans to pay laborers to work more land for them, and consolidate their yam harvests to sell them in a better market. All he could say was the projects didn’t work out and the group no longer exists. He cannot work anymore himself as well.
- Three families said they were not interested in the small-scale enterprise projects because they did not sound like ideas they would like to do. They said the projects would not work because “groups don’t work, they are not working hard.” Another said that she was proud of her fish smoking business because “I used my own money for this.”
- One woman said the small-scale enterprise work was too hard and they would not be paid to do it, saying that if you are called to work for someone you should be paid not given a loan. They also expected that the landowners would be paid for their lands, not just a percentage of the profits.
- The private group of women making oil say they are forced to sell it in the Gbledi village market for 3,500cedis, rather than 4,000 per bottle in Hohoe, because the cost of each of them traveling to Hohoe for a day would not be profitable. This supports the small-scale enterprise oil group plan of selling in bulk as a group.
- An older woman in the oil making and snail husbandry small-scale enterprise groups says they are not working enough. This is because they don’t have enough money to invest in buying palm nuts to process. She made oil 10 times this season, but says “we should be making everyday because we have the machine.” However, this seems to be a lack of their investment strategy as well. She said, “When you make 10-12 bottles (of oil), that only pays for school fees, fish, sauce, and it is finished. Not enough to buy more palms.”