Conflicts between resource development and preservation at Glacier National Park

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CONFLICTS BETWEEN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESERVATION AT GLACIER NATIONAL PARK

By

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This study examines the history of selected conflicts between resource development and preservation at Glacier National Park. Early exploration, settlement, and resource development activities in the region severely conflicted with the desire of preservationists to establish it as a national park. When Congress set the park aside in 1910 several concessions were made in Glacier's Organic Act that allowed continued resource development within park boundaries. The most serious and long lasting of these concessions involved a provision granting the Reclamation Service permission to utilize "any area" of the park for maintenance or development of government reclamation projects. The Congressional bequest of such liberal access to the water resources of a national park constituted a major departure from previous national park acts. The consequences for Glacier National Park were serious and persistent. The Sherburne Valley, on the park's east side, became a storage reservoir for the Milk River Irrigation Project even though Sherburne Dam was not planned at the time Glacier Park was established. Furthermore, the inclusion of utilitarian water development concessions in the Organic Act encouraged other attempts to construct dams in the park. In the late 1940s the Army Corps of Engineers proposed to build a dam in the North Fork Valley that would have flooded about 20,000 acres of Glacier National Park. The Corps' proposal set the stage for a major confrontation between resource developers and preservationists. The last two chapters of the thesis examine the North Fork conflict in detail.
DEDICATION

Je veux dédier cette thèse à la fouine qui franchement didn't give a dam[n] et la félicite pour la sienne dont je me suis éperdument fichu!
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Preservation of the natural environment never has been an easy task in the United States. The emergent tradition of Progress and material accomplishment fixed American attention on the labor of conquering a virgin continent; there was no time to waste. Natural resources, remolded by man's ingenuity, offered millions an opportunity to carve comfortable homes from wilderness. In an 1830 address to Congress, President Andrew Jackson expressed the predominant American desire to develop the continent's potentials. Jackson generalized for his countrymen:

What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute?

Development represented the powerful systolic pressure of the American heart; preservation of nature was a feeble diastolic movement.

In 1910 appreciation for the natural environment clearly remained a secondary concern for most Americans. Passage of the Glacier Park Act in May 1910 was possible only because the park seemed not to stand in the way of future resource
development, for, firmly embedded in the Glacier Organic Act were a number of concessions to the utilitarian demand that development schemes not be impaired. Furthermore, the act included a provision for natural resource development which constituted a major innovation in national park legislation. The Reclamation Service received authority to use any area within Glacier for development or maintenance of government reclamation projects. No previous national park act authorized such free accessibility to water resources. Glacier's reclamation provision quickly became a model for other parks.

Two factors explain the concessions to resource development schemes written into the Glacier National Park Act. First, Congress considered the bill during a turbulent period of national debate on natural resource policies. Conservationists were split among themselves on natural resource issues. Utilitarian conservationists advocated multiple-use development of all natural resources while aesthetic conservationists called for preservation of the most primitive and spectacular elements of the landscape. By 1910, the two wings of the conservation movement represented substantially differing goals and the cohesion which had characterized earlier periods disintegrated in the heat of the Progressive conservation crusade.

Secondly, resource use concessions within the Glacier Park bill stemmed from the ambiguous nature of the preserv-
tionist movement itself. Much of the preservation rhetoric obfuscated the fact that preservationists themselves advocated both resource management and use. Naturalist John Muir, for example, delighted in seeing Americans wandering in the wilds; he wanted wildlands set aside for people who desired to escape from "car and dust and early death." It is true that Muir's "use" differed substantially from that advocated by utilitarian conservationists, but it was use nonetheless. Therefore, the fundamental difference between utilitarian and aesthetic conservationists was not whether to use or not to use resources, but how and to what degree. The ambivalence and ambiguity inherent in the preservationist outlook accommodated some utilitarian developments in primitive areas. The Glacier Park bill stretched the accommodation to the limit and thereby imperiled the preservation principle.

This study is an examination of conflicts between resource development and preservation at Glacier National Park. It concentrates on debate whether or not to set Glacier aside and the consequences of ambiguous attitudes toward preservation. To understand the significance of the conflict it is necessary first to examine the period prior to the park's establishment. For more than one hundred years attempts to develop the area's natural resources dominated the minds of local and national leaders. This period es-
established solid patterns of settlement and natural resource utilization that significantly conflicted with the preservationist idea.
CHAPTER II

THE INITIAL SETTING

Everything about the Americans, from their social condition to their laws, is extraordinary; but the most extraordinary thing of all is the land that supports them.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

Lewis and Clark were the first Americans to break the isolation that encompassed the Northern Rockies. Although their expedition did not enter the area of present-day Glacier National Park it laid preliminary foundations upon which others would build.

The Lewis and Clark Expedition focused attention on the West as have few other events of American history. The focus was holistic, never narrow. Jefferson's three pages of instructions to the Expedition's leaders envisioned an extensive investigation of geographical information, commercial possibilities, the nature of the soil, mineral deposits, and weather. In addition, the Indian inhabitants were to receive close scrutiny. Aboriginal numbers, social patterns, tribal alliances, housing, food, clothing, diseases,
laws and customs were to be recorded carefully.\(^1\) Jefferson's sweeping, comprehensive instructions set the tone of the Expedition, which in turn "keynoted what was to be a . . . flexible and economically mobile American approach to the West."\(^2\) In short, though interested in commerce, the Great Captains were charged with investigating "almost every phenomenon that might prove useful to settlers from the United States."\(^3\)

The Expedition's legacy to those who later settled present-day Montana was especially rich. Jefferson instructed the leaders to examine the headwaters of the Missouri and Columbia watersheds and to locate, if possible, the "most direct and practicable water communications across this continent for the purpose of commerce."\(^4\) But, the existential reality of Montana geography proved a bitter disappointment to the centuries-old dream of a possible water route to Cathay across the North American Continent. The headwaters of both the Missouri and Columbia drainages proved much too shallow to accommodate navigation and the cordillera of the


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 6.

\(^3\)Ibid.

Rockies constituted a formidable barrier, too high and wide to be bridged. Although negative discoveries of the Expedition, they meant that future development must be directed toward settlement of, not passage through, the region.

On the eastward return journey two events further outlined possibilities and limitations of the areas adjacent to present-day Glacier National Park. The first left a sketchy map of the northeastern portion of the Columbia River watershed. Unable to cash letters of credit provided by President Jefferson, the Expedition was obliged to spend five weeks with the Nez Perce Indians trading for provisions. During extensive talks with the Indians, Clark was able to draw a rough map of the Missoula, Jocko, Mission, and Flathead Valleys. The first outlines of the three forks of the Flathead River (called 'Parkee' by the Indians) and the elusive Marias Pass were thus set down on paper. Although three-fourths of a century passed before the low defile of this pass would be officially 'discovered,' it was clearly marked on Clark's chart.5

The second major event on the return trip set a pattern for Indian-white relationships which endured for a full

quarter-century after the Expedition passed. Lewis and Clark decided to divide the Expedition at Traveller's Rest in the Bitter Root Valley; Clark would reconnoiter the Yellowstone region while Lewis reascended the Marias River to "ascertain whether any branch of that river lies as far north as LAT. d 50. . . ."6 Lewis' detour to the Marias was part of a geo-political strategy aimed at strengthening future U.S. negotiations for the disputed northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. Lewis' effort failed. A few miles east of the present town of Browning, Montana, Lewis noted in his journal, "I now have lost all hope of the waters of this river [Marias] ever extending to N Latitude 50°."7 Obviously, the Marias River offered no advantages for future boundary negotiations.

Disappointed, Lewis and his three-man contingent turned south to rejoin their waiting comrades on the Missouri. However, a greater disappointment awaited. Lewis knew the Marias region was well within Blackfeet Indian territory. Earlier he had noted in his journal that he wished "to avoid an interview"8 with the Blackfeet, whom he characterized as "a vicious lawless and reather [sic] an abandoned set of

6 Thwaites, Original Journals, vol. 5, p. 175.
7 Ibid., p. 214.
8 Ibid., p. 206.
wretches..." Despite Lewis' wishes, the party sighted eight Blackfeet shortly after turning south for the Missouri; the dreaded "interview" was at hand. Both groups camped peacefully the night of June 26, 1806 but the next morning the Blackfeet attempted to steal weapons and horses from Lewis and his men. A struggle followed. Two Indians were killed and the rest fled. Fearing retaliation, Lewis led his men on a 120-mile forced march back to the Missouri. In their wake, the Expedition left a smoldering distrust between Blackfeet and whites which endured for many decades. The incident served to keep American traders out of the area east of the present-day park and retarded settlement.

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9Ibid.
10Ibid., pp. 223-227.
The incident on the Marias did not shake Lewis' faith in the region's potential. Before the Expedition's twenty-eight month odyssey ended, Lewis shared some of his knowledge of the West with two American fur hunters. "I gave them a short description of the Missouri," Lewis reported in his journal, "a list of distances to the most conspicuous streams . . . and pointed out to them the places where the beaver most abounded." Lewis wished both men luck.

The British, not the Americans, however, were the first to exploit the region's resources. Under the leadership of David Thompson, the indomitable explorer and fur trader, the North West Company extended operations from the Saskatchewan area in Canada to the Columbia's upper reaches. Although untutored, illiterate traders probably moved west of the Rockies as early as 1800, Thompson's journals were the first historic records for the district. In 1807 Thompson erected Kootenay House on Lake Windemere near the Columbia's source. By late 1808, he extended the North West Company's territory again--this time to the south. Thompson sent his assistant, Finan McDonald, south to the Kootenai River in

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12 Thwaites, Original Journals, vol. 5, p. 175.


present-day Montana to construct a log cabin and establish commercial ties with the Indians.¹⁵ The Kootenay Indian tribe was the only band inhabiting the immediate vicinity of the new post but the outpost was located strategically to capture Kootenay, Flathead, Kalispel and Spokane Indian trade.¹⁶

Competition for the rich fur trade soon materialized. Joseph Howse, representing Hudson's Bay Company, moved into the Upper Flathead Country during the winter of 1810-1811 to gather information on Thompson's North West Company operations. Howse abandoned the area, however, in 1811 effectively ending Hudson's Bay Company activity there for a decade.¹⁷

American fur hunters entered the field in 1812. Francis Benjamin Pillet, acting for John Jacob Astor's Pacific Fur Company, moved into present-day northwestern Montana and a short-lived but lively rivalry quickly developed.¹⁸ In 1813 Pillet and a North West Company principal fought a duel¹⁹ over trade disagreements but the real battle for the interi-


¹⁸Isch, "Upper Flathead," p. 36.

or's wealth was settled without a shot when Astor's Pacific Fur Company became a casualty of the War of 1812. Rumors that a British man-of-war would soon arrive at Astoria caused Astor's Pacific adventure to disintegrate.  

Astor's withdrawal left the British in uncontested control of the upper-Columbia until Americans re-entered the field in the 1830s. Even then, competition was light. The highly profitable fur business faded during the 1840s as the new use of an old product, silk, made inroads on fur. The commerce in plews was moribund in the northwest by the 1850s.  

The importance of the fur trade era in Montana should not be underestimated. Until the 1850s this wilderness enterprise accounted for almost all exploration and discovery in the region after Lewis and Clark. Yet, the commerce in beaver did not mean permanent settlement. Many valleys remained unexplored during even the peak of fur trade activity. No serious effort was made to penetrate the North Fork Valley, for instance, since Indians with whom traders dealt lived in valleys farther south or west.

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20 Hamilton, Wilderness, p. 64.
Furthermore, continued Blackfeet hostility both to trappers and other Indians, made valleys like the North Fork too dangerous for even the most daring adventurer.\(^{24}\)

The decade of the 1850s was an important transitional period; Montana passed from the fur trade era and prepared for settlement.\(^{25}\) However, in the Upper Flathead Country the hiatus between fur trade and settlement lasted through the 1850s and well into the 1860s. Several factors accounted for this. The failure of Governor Isaac I. Steven's Northern Pacific Railroad Survey to locate the mysterious Marias Pass during the 1853 reconnaissance of the Northern Rockies shifted attention southward.\(^{26}\) Steven's establishment of the Blackfeet and Flathead Reservations on the east and west sides of the present park also acted to insulate the region, thus retarding white exploration and settlement.\(^{27}\)

The somnolent Upper Flathead Country roused a bit after 1860. The 1863 Kootenay gold discoveries and an 1867 strike

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on Libby Creek drew substantial interest from miners. A few enterprising individuals attempted to tap the bonanza market by running cattle north of Flathead Lake and selling beef to packers. But when mineral supplies decreased the miners drifted away. Without a close market the cattlemen soon followed. Activity remained light in the Upper Flathead region for the next two decades. However, a few people explored the North Fork Valley in hopes of finding mineral resources. For example, Texan William Veach and four other men reportedly discovered a thirty-ounce gold nugget in the creek flowing into Quartz Lake in 1876. No rush developed, perhaps because the men found nothing else and drifted on to California without telling anyone of their discovery. Several other itinerant prospectors and fur trappers also tried their luck in the North Fork Valley during the 1870s and 1880s but found little and stayed only a short time.

The 1880s marked the beginnings of permanent settlement in the Upper Flathead Country. The major Indian problems of

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29 Robinson, Through the Years, p. 36.
the 1870s were over, Montana Territory was strongly garrisoned, the buffalo were well on the way to extinction, and the aboriginal population moved backstage in the minds of most whites.  

In 1881 the Northern Pacific Railroad steamed into the Territory. By 1883 the line's western segment reached Missoula and late in the year construction crews laid tracks through the Hell Gate and on to Garrison. The Northern Pacific, a substantial landowner in the new Territory by virtue of generous land grants from the federal government, promoted settlement along its lines. The Upper Flathead indirectly benefited by the land promotions. Settlers who could not find suitable land near the railroad, or workers who lost their jobs when initial construction activities ended, drifted into valleys north of the Clark Fork River. Settlement was rapid after 1883. The estimated population of the Upper Flathead Valley by 1890 was 3000.  

The discovery of Marias Pass by John F. Stevens in 1889 and subsequent construction of the Great Northern Railroad through the Upper Flathead and on to the coast set the stage for accelerated development of the area. In frenzied anticipation, several towns grew rapidly. Joseph M. Robinson, Through the Years, p. 32.

Toole, Uncommon Land, p. 132.
Dixon, later an influential Montana Senator, described two of the area's most promising new towns. He characterized Demersville, at the head of navigation on the Flathead River, as

...a typical new western town, hardly a year old [in August 1891], houses mostly planked up and down, six or seven hundred inhabitants, something like twenty 'real estate' offices, some of them canvas tents, and, ... 43 saloons. ... 34

Columbia Falls, twenty-five miles further up the Flathead River was, in Dixon's words, "superlatively newer." Dixon noted that it had been only five months since the first house was constructed

...yet, the town boasted 500 inhabitants, water works, electric lights, a $40,000 hotel - yet to be - ... and many other improvements, most of which I found to be on paper. 35

Clearly, the Upper Flathead Valley had all the trappings of a bustling frontier by the time of Dixon's visit. If that activity was to be sustained, however, valley residents would need to draw increasingly upon the region's natural resources. Not surprisingly, they quickly turned their attention to just that.

Coal, discovered in 1886 by Frank Emmerson near Coal


35Ibid.
Creek in the North Fork Valley, became the focus of early resource development schemes. James Talbott, a Columbia Falls promoter, organized the Northern International Improvement Company to develop the North Fork's coal resources. Talbott's company laid out a town site near the coal banks and made plans to transport coal down the North Fork River to Columbia Falls. He hoped that a ready supply of coal would entice Great Northern Railroad managers to locate their line's division point at Columbia Falls where he and others owned substantial real estate.

Talbott's North Fork coal enterprise got under way in 1892. The Oakes, a seventy-five foot, double engine, single boiler stern-wheeler, left its Columbia Falls moorings in May and began churning up the flood-swollen waters of the main Flathead River. Three miles above Coram, at Red Lick Rapids, the crew encountered their first crisis. With the boiler stoked to the limit the boat splashed wildly through the rapids. Just as the craft edged past the last

36 Charlie S. Shaw, The Flathead Story (Missoula, Mont.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1964), p. 51; and Historical Information concerning the Upper Flathead Country (Kalispell, Mont.: Trippet's Printers, 1971), p. 58. This work states that a cable raft operated on the North Fork bringing out coal as early as 1883. This date is not confirmed by any other accounts and one can only assume the 1883 to be a typographical error which should read "1893".

37 Robinson, Through the Years, p. 44; and Historical Information, p. 42.
of the turbulent waters she lost power; two engines were too much for a single boiler. The Oakes began drifting dangerously down the river's narrow channel. Two crew members rowed ashore desperately in a tender, and wrapped a rope around the nearest tree. The drifting boat halted. After a delay to secure more hauling line, the crew nudged the boat back into the main channel. Another crisis came just below Lower Canyon Creek on the North Fork of the Flathead. The Oakes, caught by the swift current, was driven out of the main channel and spent several desperate minutes whirling round-and-round among drifting logs and debris. Once again, lines were put ashore; the drifting boat stopped. A power winch and line assisted the craft past the swift water. A few miles north of Canyon Creek, however, the Oakes literally came to the end of its rope. Swift current again demanded the use of the power winch and lines attached to large trees on the river's banks. Unfortunately, the boat began to rock under the strain of the tow line and the current beating against her sides. As the craft pitched she took in water. The rocking motion increased. Suddenly the $5,000 sternwheeler capsized, rolled completely over and, within minutes, tore asunder. That was the end of steamboat navigation on the North Fork River.

38 Robinson, Through the Years, pp. 45-47.
Talbott tried to bring coal out of the North Fork one more time the following year. Encouraged by a visit to Columbia Falls from Copper King Marcus Daly, Talbott dispatched six men overland to the coal deposits. The men whip-sawed enough lumber at the mine site to construct a raft capable of floating half a boxcar of coal to Columbia Falls. They completed the trip down the river without major incident. For the first time, a large quantity of coal was delivered at Columbia Falls. However, an effort to duplicate the success ended in failure when a second raft tore apart and the crew quit. Talbott reluctantly gave up the enterprise. Coal exploitation would have to wait a more sane avenue of transportation than the one offered by the North Fork River.

1892 and 1893 thus marked the first efforts, supported by substantial capital, to tap North Fork resources. Talbott's failure was not surprising since the valley was extremely rugged and isolated. Furthermore, the North Fork River was an incorrigible transportation route. Talbott's exertions proved the river too swift to navigate during high

39 Shaw, Flathead Story, p. 53.

40 Robinson, Through the Years, p. 50.

41 During the 1920s the Coal Creek coal mine was leased to Claude Elder, who successfully operated it until the late 1930s when demand for low-grade coal decreased. No one tried to operate the mine after Elder. The 1964 owner of the coal claim was the First National Bank of Butte. See Shaw, Flathead Story, p. 53.
water; during low water the rocky channels promised to rip the bottom out of any but the smallest boat.

The failure to develop coal deposits in the North Fork did not mean a complete withdrawal of interest from the valley. H. B. Ayres, in an 1899 report on the Flathead Forest Reserve, noted minor prospecting, logging, and homesteading activity in the North Fork Valley. "About thirty cabins were seen," Ayres reported, "but only two of these were occupied; one at the coal banks on Coal Creek, and one on Bowman Creek. Two on Camas Creek were kept in repair and seem to be occupied during a part of the year." Ayres also observed that a man named Chilsom cut several thousand board feet of timber on Logging Creek for the Columbia Falls Mill Company in the early 1890s. The timber was left to rot, however. Low prices and transportation difficulties probably accounted for the fact that North Fork timber was not marketed at Columbia Falls.\textsuperscript{42} Notwithstanding the activity Ayres observed, the North Fork remained essentially undisturbed until the twentieth century.

Oil, not coal, was the next magnet to draw attention to the North Fork in 1901. Oil had been observed in the area around Kintla Lake (near the U.S.-Canadian border) as early

as 1892 but the expense of getting heavy equipment into so remote a region probably discouraged early drilling. Yet, in 1901, a group of Butte businessmen pushed a forty-mile road north from Lake McDonald to the foot of Kintla Lake. The road was a crude affair. No grading was done and logs were placed in marshy areas to effect a corduroy path over which heavy equipment could be hauled. The drilling paraphernalia arrived over the road to the base of Kintla Lake late in the year. As soon as the lake froze solidly, crews dragged the material to the head of the lake; drilling began in November. The Butte Oil Company invested $30,000 in the operation by the end of the year.

An oil boom quickly materialized. Speculators moved in and land prices skyrocketed as

Practically every foot of the country along the north fork [sic] of the Flathead River from the international boundary to the Great Northern Railroad [fifty miles to the south] was covered with claims.

Claims valued at $5 before the oil boom sold for $25 to $100 afterward. Observers who followed the new oil field's development made sanguine predictions about the future.

P. W. Francis, writing for the Rocky Mountain Magazine, noted:

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43 Robinson, Through the Years, p. 40.
46 Ibid.
There is no more beautiful region in the whole northwest than this virgin wilderness, which the enterprise of man will soon convert into a populous and busy territory, with all the industries of a great oil field in full blast.\(^{47}\)

P. W. Francis and hundreds of other men of his faith were wrong. Commercial quantities of the 'black gold' were not discovered in the North Fork Valley.

After 1903 the oil boom died in the North Fork Valley. Oil rigs were left to rust, silent reminders of a wilderness adventure.\(^{48}\) But not everyone abandoned the valley. Sparse settlement remained in the hope that known coal deposits or possible oil reserves would yet be developed. Rumors that a railroad might be constructed through the valley added to incentives for staying. Settlement characterized the North Fork Valley by 1907—widely scattered—but permanent nonetheless. Along the river that Indians called for centuries the 'Parkee' white settlement was ensconced.

East of the Continental Divide, development and settlement patterns were generally later and less permanent than west of the Divide. Rumors of rich copper deposits in the Swiftcurrent Valley began as early as 1889. Prospectors could not legally enter the area, however, since it was part of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation and therefore closed to mineral entry. Montana businessmen and the state legislature pressured the federal government to purchase the mountainous

\(^{47}\)Ibid., p. 20.

\(^{48}\)Robinson, Through the Years, p. 40.
strip along the reservation's west side. In 1895, a three-man commission, including naturalist George Bird Grinnell, successfully negotiated a $1,500,000 purchase from the Blackfeet Indian Tribe. On April 15, 1898 the "Ceded Strip" opened to prospecting and settlement. The Swiftcurrent Valley quickly became the center of mining activity. The town of Altyn, consisting of "a dozen or so buildings, . . . a post office, a store, several saloons and dance halls, a two story hotel, and a few tent-houses and cabins" at the head of Upper Sherburne Lake, experienced a rapid cycle of boom and then bust between 1899 and 1900. Despite frenzied activity, prospectors found no rich ore deposits.

An oil boom in the Swiftcurrent Valley quickly followed declining interest in copper. Sam Somes, a hotel operator in Altyn, discovered small pools of oil in a mining tunnel at the mouth of Lower Sherburne Lake in 1901. By 1903 several oil companies formed to develop the oil resources, but their promotions were no more successful than earlier attempts in the North Fork. The oil boom in the Swiftcurrent Valley ended by 1907.


50 Ibid., Through the Years, pp. 37-40.

51 Ibid., pp. 40-43.
Concurrent with mining and oil exploration was an interest in developing the water resources of the St. Mary River and tributaries. As early as 1891, the Chief Engineer for the Department of the Interior investigated the feasibility of diverting St. Mary River waters to the Milk River for agricultural use near Havre, Montana. The engineer reported favorably on the project. The newly created U. S. Reclamation Service authorized both the Milk River project and the St. Mary storage and diversion scheme. The need for an agreement with Canada on water distribution for both rivers, however, delayed major construction activity in the St. Mary area.

Attempts to develop the natural resources in and around present-day Glacier National Park represented the predominant interest of local, state and national governments. The exploitive emphasis severely conflicted with the idea of preserving the area's natural environment. It did not, however, totally preclude the preservationist idea.

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An appeal to set the area aside as a national park was registered as early as 1883. In a letter printed in the Fort Benton River Press, Lieutenant John T. Van Orsdale wrote:

I sincerely hope that publicity now being given to that portion of Montana will result in drawing attention to the scenery which surpasses anything in Montana or adjacent territories. A great benefit would result to Montana if this section could be set aside as a national park. . . .54

Lieutenant Van Orsdale was familiar with the Glacier area because he and Lieutenant Charles A. Woodruff made a military reconnaissance through the region in 1873.55 The publicity to which Van Orsdale referred was the result of the 1882-83 Northern Transcontinental Survey led by mining expert and geologist Raphael Pumpelly. Pumpelly's survey conducted under the auspices of Henry Villard's Northern Pacific Railroad investigated the mineral and agricultural resources in the territory adjacent to the railroad.56 Van Orsdale had accompanied the Northern Transcontinental Survey. His letter to the River Press represented a general appreciation on the part of Pumpelly's Survey of Glacier's scenic beauty.

Widespread appreciation for Glacier's unique scenic


55 Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 97.

56 Ibid., p. 103.
attractions gained impetus after naturalist George Bird Grinnell visited the present-day park in 1885. Charmed by the beauty of the area, Grinnell returned East and wrote fourteen installments on the area for his magazine *Forest and Stream*. Grinnell's articles brought national attention to the area.57

In September 1891, while exploring the Upper St. Mary Lakes region, Grinnell mused in his field diary:

> How would it do to start a movement to buy the St. Marys country say 30 X 20 miles from the Piegan indians at a fair valuation and turn it into a national reservation or park[?] The Great Northern R.R. would probably back the scheme and T.C. Power would do all he could for it in the Senate. . . . certainly all the Indians would like it. This is worth thinking and writing about.58

Grinnell's 'scheme' received an unexpected boost when President Grover Cleveland established the Lewis and Clark Forest Reserve in 1897. The Reserve included the 'Ceded Strip' and all the western side of present-day Glacier National Park. Preservation of the area seemed assured, the mineral entry provisions notwithstanding.

But 1897 also marked a watershed in forest management. The first Forest Reserve Act of 1891 provided no instructions for utilitarian management of reserves. Preservation—

57 Ibid., p. 108.

58 George Bird Grinnell, "Field Notes, September 17, 1891" (Los Angeles, Calif.: Southwest Museum, Item 320), no pagination.
ists looked upon the 1891 Act as an effective vehicle for leaving the forests "untouched." For preservationists, a national forest reserve was tantamount to national park status. But the Forest Management Act of 1897 provided legal machinery for scientific forestry management. The 1897 Act was an opening wedge for 'wise use' conservationists like Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot. The Act thwarted efforts by irrigation, game and park preservationists to keep the reserves free of lumbering, grazing and mineral entry. In short,

The Act paved the way for federal officials in the future to permit grazing, commercial lumbering, and hydroelectric generation within the forests, and to establish the national forests program clearly as one most concerned with rational development.

George Bird Grinnell and others only slowly realized the changing patterns of forest legislation. As late as 1901 Grinnell enthusiastically predicted a bright future under Forest Reserve protection for the Upper St. Mary Lake region:

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61 Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 36.

62 Ibid., p. 37.
Happily, in 1897, by the official initiative of the United States Forest Commission . . . a large section of this mountain country was made into a forest reserve, including Upper St. Mary's Lake. Under faithful and intelligent supervision . . . in due time Montana will rejoice . . . that so large a source of her water-supply has thus been preserved for her people.63

Grinnell's statement indicates that he was relatively comfortable with the Forest Reserve status the area enjoyed as late as 1901. Contrary to some interpretations, Grinnell did not call for national park status of the Glacier area in 1901.64

Yet, by 1903 the division between scientific management advocates like Pinchot and preservationists was clear. Pinchot, in a May 1903 address to the Society of American Foresters, declared:

The object of our forest policy is not to preserve the forests because they are beautiful . . . or because they are refuges for the wild creatures of the wilderness . . . [our object is] the making of prosperous homes. . . . Every other consideration comes as secondary. 65


64 Several secondary works cite Grinnell's "Crown of the Continent" article as the first serious call for national park status in the northern Rockies. See Robinson, Through the Years, p. 53; and Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 112. See also, Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 190 for a discussion of preservationist ideas vis à vis the Forest Management Act of 1897. Grinnell's article was similar to the efforts by irrigators to have forest areas set aside for watershed protection. See Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 23.

65 Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, pp. 41-42.
Pinchot's statement, coupled with his drive to have the Forest Reserves removed from the stewardship of the Department of the Interior and placed under the Department of Agriculture's jurisdiction, was an unequivocal move to establish a policy of development within the Forest Reserves. On February 1, 1905 the Reserves were transferred to Agriculture. Pinchot and the utilitarians were now fully in charge of the Forest Reserves.  

The time to push for national park status of Glacier was clearly at hand. When the copper and oil excitement died, Grinnell approached Montana Senator Thomas H. Carter with the idea of setting aside Glacier as a national park. A confrontation followed between those who wanted to continue the region's development and those who desired to preserve it for the enjoyment of posterity.

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66 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

CHAPTER III

GLACIER NATIONAL PARK: PRECEDENTS AND PRESERVATION

The president [Taft] said the subject of conservation was rather abstruse. 'But,' he said, amid laughter, 'there are a great many people in favor of conservation no matter what it means.'

Great Falls Tribune
May 1, 1910

In his book Glacier National Park Historic Resources Study, James W. Sheire characterizes the legislative process culminating in the establishment of Glacier National Park as "quiet and uneventful."¹ Sheire contends that the effort to set aside Glacier does not stand as a classic battle in American conservation or environmental history. With the exception of the small Montana community of Kalispel and [a] few senators and representatives, nobody opposed the park.²

Sheire further states that "the [utilitarian] conservationists did not oppose the bill."³ Although some conservationists held "minor" reservations, their wise-use objections were sufficiently minor that they did not conflict with the

¹Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 184.
²Ibid., pp. 184-85.
³Ibid., p. 185.
basic preservation objective. Sheire is not alone in his assessment of the legislative process which culminated in the establishment of Glacier National Park. Most standard interpretations of Glacier's history pass over the period from 1907 to May 1910 as quickly as possible.

Yet, the two and a half year period when park supporters and opponents hammered out the organic act is enormously significant for understanding much of Glacier's subsequent history. A careful study of that period clearly demonstrates that both local and national interest groups strongly opposed establishment of Glacier National Park until major concessions for resource exploitation were written into the park bill. The passage of the Glacier bill through Congress was 'quiet and uneventful' only because preservationists did not put up 'a classic battle' against 'wise use' conservationists. Preservationist failure to engage in the battle at Glacier constituted a major breakdown in their efforts to defend and articulate the principle of National Park inviolability.

Montana Republican Senator Thomas H. Carter introduced a bill to establish Glacier on December 11, 1907. Carter modeled the bill after the Yellowstone Act of 1872, except that the new park was to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture--not under Interior.

\[\text{4 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{5 Robinson, Through the Years, pp. 53-55.}\]
Local reaction to Carter's Glacier bill developed even before the Senator introduced legislation. Opponents objected to provisions restricting settlement in the North Fork. They called attention to the fact that 150 applications for settlement in the valley were pending approval in the General Land Office. Furthermore, the boundaries of the proposed park included the Kintla oil fields. Many local people still hoped the oil wells would produce commercial quantities of crude oil. The anti-park people cited drilling reports which indicated that, although great production could probably not be hoped for, the quality of the oil already found was high and therefore would not require great amounts to be highly profitable. Local opponents also stressed their concern that a park would seriously interfere with the year-round forest product industries in the Kalispell area. With timber locked up in the park, they argued, development would be seriously restricted. Senator Carter attempted to allay local fears. He insisted that the park would be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture with the "sympathetic touch of forest rangers." Local opponents remained unconvinced.

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6Kalispell (Montana) Inter Lake, November 15, 1907, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Inter Lake.


8Inter Lake, January 3, 1908, p. 1.
As indicated above the most serious local resistance came from west of the Continental Divide. People in Kalispell, Columbia Falls and settlers in the North Fork vigorously objected to the inclusion of agricultural lands within the boundaries of the park. Hunting restrictions also were felt to be inimical to local rights. Petitions and letters emphasizing such views were sent to many Montana representatives. Stanley Logan, a prominent Kalispell lawyer, pictured opposition to the park in broad terms. He strongly implied political retaliation if Carter did not make adjustments to the park bill. "The Montanan," Logan reminded Republican Carter, "loves the wild free life . . . and it makes him careworn, pessimistic and inclined to vote the Democratic ticket when he feels he is being pestered by such regulations."^^

Carter responded to Logan in a letter printed in the Daily Inter-Lake. He insisted that the Glacier Park legislation would have beneficial effect on the immediate area around the park. According to the Senator, a park would mean more jobs and increased business for the adjacent region. Carter estimated $1,000,000 would be added to the local economy on the park's west side.^^

^^Inter Lake, December 20, 1907, p..4.
^^Inter Lake, December 27, 1907, p. 1.
^^Inter Lake, January 3, 1908, p. 1.
George Bird Grinnell supported local lobbying efforts to convince Kalispell area residents that their interests would be best served by the proposed park. Grinnell later commented that without local support "it was clear that there was little prospect of securing [the Glacier] legislation..." Grinnell believed it was necessary

... to convince the local people that it was to their material advantage to have the region protected, and it was not hard work to make them understand that a considerable invasion of travelers into their section would help it.\(^\text{12}\)

Local people may easily have been convinced that tourism would benefit local economies but they were not at all sure that it should exclude natural resource development.

The letters, petitions and Inter Lake editorials were not wasted on Senator Carter. In February 1908, Carter introduced Senate Bill 5648 to supersede his first Glacier Park bill. The second bill took local objections into account. It allowed right of entrance and exit to all surveyed lands and validated mining claims existing within park boundaries prior to January 1, 1908. Also, in the new bill the Secretary of Agriculture received the right to approve private summer cottages. Carter's modified bill incorporated some of the utilitarian objectives of the local people and to

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\(^{13}\)Ibid.
that measure lessened their opposition to the park.\textsuperscript{14}

For the next two years opposition shifted from a strictly local level to one more national. From 1908 to 1910 the Glacier National Park bill took shape against the background of a national discussion on conservation. By 1908 conservationists and preservationists engaged in acrimonious debate on several issues; San Francisco's request to utilize the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park for city water supplies dominated the debate. The controversy drove conservationists into opposing camps. By the time the Hetch Hetchy dispute was settled (in favor of utilitarians), the leaders of the two camps no longer communicated with each other.\textsuperscript{15} The consequences of that polarization for Glacier National Park legislation was two-fold. First, the Hetch Hetchy battle absorbed the lion's share of preservationist interest and resources.\textsuperscript{16} In com-
parison, Glacier seemed only a small issue. Secondly, the Hetch Hetchy rivalry hardened Gifford Pinchot in his determination to oppose new parks unless they incorporated his utilitarian views of resource management. The Glacier Park legislation suffered from the buffeting of intra-conservationist battles.

Carter's second Glacier bill was not satisfactory to the Pinchot forces since it restricted timber harvests to local settlers. The Forest Service proposed a counter measure to insure that mature, as well as dead and down timber, could be removed by any citizen of the United States. Also included in the Pinchot measure were provisions allowing water power development and railroad construction within park boundaries. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and the other water conduits, and for domestic, public, or other beneficial uses," slipped past preservationists because they had not the financial resources to maintain vigilant surveillance of all national resource legislation. Quoted in John Ise, *Our National Park Policy: A Critical History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 86. The cost of paying experts to present the preservationist viewpoint at various hearings also strained their resources. See Jones, *John Muir*, pp. 90, 132.

Preservationist organizations sometimes lost cohesiveness during the Hetch Hetchy struggle. The Sierra Club was forced to set up a front organization called the Society for the Preservation of National Parks in 1909 to take the heat off the Sierra Club for its strong opposition to the Hetch Hetchy reservoir. Also, when the Appalachian Mountain Club wavered in its opposition to the Hetch Hetchy project the Society for the Preservation of National Parks invaded the Eastern club's territory and established a rival branch. See Jones, *John Muir*, pp. 97-117, 119-20.


18Ibid.
Secretary of the Interior supported the amendments. They suggested the bill not pass unless the change became part of the park act.\textsuperscript{19} Significantly, Secretary of the Interior James Rudolph Garfield agreed with the Forest Service that the provision in the bill leaving this particular park to supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture is proper, because he has a supervisor, rangers, and other necessary officials all ready to care for the area. For that reason the park would be fully protected without extra expense to the Government.\textsuperscript{20}

Secretary Garfield's recommendation was in no way inconsistent with his basic beliefs that resources should be used; a month later he approved the city of San Francisco's application to dam Hetch Hetchy.\textsuperscript{21} For the remainder of the second session of the Sixtieth Congress the Glacier Park bill met increasing opposition and finally died for lack of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{22}

In the Sixty-first Congress Carter introduced Senate Bill 2777 to establish Glacier Park. The bill went to the

\textsuperscript{19}Letters, James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, and James Rudolph Garfield, Secretary of the Department of Interior, dated 16 April and 15 April 1908; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Lands, Glacier National Park in Montana, S. Rept. 106, 61 Cong., 2d sess., January 20, 1910, Senate Miscellaneous Reports 1:2-4, hereafter cited as Senate Report 106.

\textsuperscript{20}Letter, James R. Garfield, 15 April 1908.

\textsuperscript{21}Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{22}Anderson, "Local Opposition," pp. 16-18.
Committee on Public Lands where Montana Senator Joseph M. Dixon gave it sympathetic treatment. On January 20, 1910 the bill was sent back to the Senate chamber for consideration. The new legislation included several important changes. Now under the Secretary of the Interior, the bill allowed cutting of mature as well as dead or down timber. The Secretary also gained authority to grant railroad right-of-ways along the "Flathead or any of its tributaries within the boundaries of said Glacier National Park."\(^{23}\) At the suggestion of the Department of the Interior, Dixon added an amendment to the bill on February 9, 1910, which read:

\[\ldots\text{the United States Reclamation Service may enter upon and utilize for flowage or other purposes any area within said park which may be necessary for the development and maintenance of a government reclamation project.}\]

The reclamation amendment was to facilitate irrigation projects for the Blackfeet Indians at Lower Two Medicine Lake and for settlers along the line of the Great Northern Railway. In late January 1910, Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger wrote to Knute Nelson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Public Land, expressing concern about the Glacier Park bill. As then constituted, Ballinger complained, the

\(^{23}\) Senate Report 106, pp. 2-4.

bill did not "confer upon the Interior Department the authority to construct a reservoir at the St. Mary Lakes, and the works in connection with said reservoir, in accordance with the plans adopted by the Department for the St. Mary Irrigation project." The Secretary said that $300,000 already had been expended on the project. Ballinger requested an amendment to protect Interior's investment. Dixon's reclamation amendment superbly met Ballinger's solicitation. No Senator rose to challenge the reclamation provision; attention turned to discussion of the railroad amendment.

The amendment to grant rights-of-way to railroads within park boundaries interested several groups. First, Kalispell and North Fork residents believed the North Fork route would be an important north-south commercial connection with Canada. No other feasible route existed save for the North Fork Valley. An editorial in the Inter Lake noted tersely:

If the creation of the Park is to mean the erection of a barrier to railroad building, then we had better be without the park.

Some local people were skeptical, also, about the Great Northern


26 Editorial, Inter Lake, February 9, 1910, p. 4.
support for Glacier Park. They thought it possible that Great Northern's strategy was to lock up any possible passes within the park thus preventing competition from other railroads.27

Two railroads were interested in the North Fork Valley: the Great Northern and the Milwaukee. In 1909, with park legislation stalled in the Congress, both railroads employed crews to survey a route through the valley hoping that the first company to file survey plats would thereby gain a franchise for future North Fork railroad construction. If this could be done prior to Congressional passage of a Glacier Park bill the successful company would present Congress with a fait accompli.

The stakes were high and it did not matter that the surveys were helter-skelter affairs. Accurate surveys took second place to finishing first. Whenever one crew lagged behind its competitor, it simply dropped over onto the adversary's survey until the gap was closed.28

As with the reclamation amendment, no Senator publicly opposed granting railroads right-of-ways through the North


Fork even though it meant a railroad might cross to the park side many times. Senator Heyburn, of Idaho, expressed a consensus when he remarked:

We are making the west park line the middle of the [North Fork] river. I think we should recognize the rights of railroad companies. . . to construct . . . lines into those great coal fields [in British Columbia] . . . and we should have no element of uncertainty in this legislation. . . Should any question arise between the executive departments and the railroad companies as to whether it was intended that only under circumstances of extreme necessity should they invade the park, then we would have this record of the [Congressional] proceedings . . . to justify the contention that we intend to recognize the existing rights of the railroad companies.29

Both local and Congressional opinion converged in the desire to protect potential railroad development.30

In April 1910 the House of Representatives received for consideration the Senate version of the Glacier bill. Without debate, House amendments struck out the utilitarian provisions for timber, railroad and water development.31


30The railroads filed their plats in May and June of 1909, but a new decision by the Secretary of the Interior held that no rights could be attached to the filings—before final approval by the Secretary. The matter was in the courts in 1910. U.S., Congress, Senate, Discussion of railroad right-of-ways within Glacier National Park, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 9 February 1910, Congressional Record 45:1640.

conference committee of both Houses then considered the bill and quickly resolved the impasse in favor of utilitarian timber, railroad and water-storage provisions. New York Representative John Joseph Fitzgerald asked Representative Frank W. Mondell of Wyoming to explain the House's hesitancy to insist upon its version of the bill. Mondell responded that the House managers had not been completely informed, but after securing full information in regard to the matter, the committee deemed it proper to recede. . .

The railroad right-of-way and reclamation provisions remained in the bill. With both Houses in agreement, the Glacier bill went to President Taft, who signed it into law on May 11, 1910.

Several factors coincided in 1910 to make possible the establishment of Glacier National Park. First, settlement was established firmly west of the Continental Divide. Citizens adjacent to the proposed park had the wherewithal

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33 U.S., Congress, House, Representative Fitzgerald asking for information on amendments to the Glacier Park bill, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 29 April 1910, Congressional Record 45:5570. There is no indication in the Great Northern Archives, located at the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota, that the Great Northern Railroad lobby attempted to convince members of the Senate-House Conference Committee of the importance they attached to granting railroad rights-of-way. See letter, Duane P. Swanson, Director, Great Northern Project Archives, dated 30 October 1975 to author.
to demand concessions in the park bill. Residents in Kalispell and the North Fork Valley were especially successful in seeking their more utilitarian desires. Throughout the legislative process letters and petitions flooded Senator Carter's Washington, D.C. office demanding changes in his bills. The result was concessions to settlement, timber, mining, railroad and water use in the park.

The same was true of the Department of Agriculture. As noted earlier, Pinchot was determined that there should be no more national parks set aside which did not recognize the policy of natural resource development. The Chief Forester could not afford to undermine his political support in the West by an alliance with preservationists; hence Pinchot avoided embracing anything that smacked of 'locking up' forest resources. The Glacier National Park bill signed by President Taft in May 1910 must have pleased Pinchot very much.\(^{34}\)

The Great Northern Railroad also was interested in the new park but it had little interest in pure 'wilderness'. James J. Hill, manager of Great Northern, entertained a view

\(^{34}\) Sheire, *Historic Resources Study*, p. 191; see also, letter from George Bird Grinnell to Madison Grant, February 28, 1908, Southwest Museum, Los Angeles, California, General Correspondence, 1908. Grinnell noted in the letter that "Pinchot, who is very familiar with the [Glacier] region, is enthusiastic for the [Park] bill;" and James B. Trefethen, *Crusade for Wildlife* (New York: Boone and Crockett Club, 1961), pp. 50-61.
of conservation similar to Pinchot. Conservation, Hill intoned,

does not mean forbidding access to resources that could be made available for present use. It means . . . the . . . largest development . . . consistent with the public interest and without waste.\footnote{Inter Lake, September 8, 1910, p. 1.}

For Hill the 'public interest' usually coincided with the interests of his railroad. The new national park would be a valuable asset for the Great Northern line but first it would have to be developed with a system of roads, trails, and comfortable hotels. Only then would Glacier's scenic grandeur attract large numbers of vacationers and boost Great Northern's passenger revenue.\footnote{Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 177. There is a paucity of information on the Great Northern's role in setting aside Glacier National Park. The Great Northern Archives are currently closed to researchers. Professor Ralph W. Hidy, Isidor Straus Professor of Business History in the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University, is currently working on a two-volume history of the Great Northern Railroad.}

Great Northern interest in Montana was not limited to Glacier National Park, however. East of Glacier Great Northern's line spanned over four hundred miles of Montana's high plains. James Hill's railroad enthusiastically promoted settlement and farming in the region. By 1910 a trickle of homesteaders into Montana was turning into a flood. For example, between January 1 and April 15, 1910 Great Northern
hauled 1,100 carloads of equipment to eastern Montana for optimistic Honyackers. 37 Emigrants snapped up thousands of acres of land each month all along the Great Northern line east of the proposed park. 38

The key to success for sustained agriculture in that semi-arid region lay in reclamation projects to bring water to the parched soil. For decades Great Northern promotional material extolled the value of the Rocky Mountain's "never failing water supply for irrigation purposes." 39 A national park in the northern Rockies, which protected reclamation projects, promised to buttress diversified 'public interest' and the railroad's future.

Preservationists had little difficulty in joining the railroad--farmer--irrigation coalition in support of national parks. In fact, the irrigation/preservation coalition had enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship in protecting both the nation's watersheds and its scenery. 40 Preservationists easily added the watershed argument to their intellectual repertoire for park preservation. George Bird Grinnell's

38 Ibid., p. 59.
39 Pamphlet, Great Northern Railroad Company, "Irrigation Projects in Montana Along the Great Northern Railway" (St. Paul: n.p., n.d.), p. 1.
40 Hays, Gosepl of Efficiency, pp. 21-22.
article, "The Crown of the Continent," was fundamentally a call to preserve the watershed of the St. Mary Lakes region. The Eastern naturalist concluded:

The . . . region has a real value to this country, and this consists in its being a reservoir for the storage of the great amount of moisture precipitated there. For eight or nine months of the year this moisture takes the form of snow, and supplies the annual waste caused by the melting of the glaciers. Without these glaciers and the far-reaching fields of snow which lie on the many mountains, the lakes and the rivers would soon go dry. At present all the watercourses are full at all seasons of the year, and the winter's snoes, protected by dense pine forests, are still slowly melting in June and July.41

Grinnell's preservation rationale merged intimately with the need to protect natural resources for man's use. Grinnell was not opposed to tampering with nature for human benefits:

A plan is already on foot to divert the St. Mary's [River] from its present course and turn it into Milk River. If this should be done it would render irrigable many hundreds of square miles in northern Montana which are now quite without value for lack of water. But if the forests of the . . . region should be swept away by fire or the ax, its value as a reservoir would be gone.42

Though Grinnell opposed destructive forestry practices he was enthusiastic about plans which contemplated utilizing the


area's watersheds for agricultural purposes. He did not protest, therefore, when Senator Dixon offered an amendment to protect the reclamation scheme.

In one sense, the passage of the Glacier bill with the water development schemes intact, represented the ambiguous nature of preservationist attitudes. In the past, preservation, irrigation, and travel interests agreed on leaving the watersheds untouched by man-made reservoirs. By 1910, however, major elements of the older coalition were unwilling to forego reservoir developments within the boundaries of proposed parks. Preservationists were slow to react to the changing situation, possibly because reclamation schemes seemed to be some of the most promising programs of the Progressive era.

Glacier National Park became the first national park to accommodate man-made water storage projects. Thus, four years before Hetch Hetchy received a green light from the Secretary of the Interior, Glacier National Park legislation established a precedent that would cause future misunderstanding and further obscure preservationist principles in all national parks.

Two fundamental facts explain Congressional passage of the Glacier National Park bill. First, preservationists failed to see what future problems might arise if utilitarian principles were allowed free reign in the organic act. Sur-
prisingly, they did not even attempt to restrict Secretary Ballinger's specific reclamation requests. Hence, the reclamation amendment offered by Senator Dixon not only protected tentative projects but expanded Reclamation's authority to the entire park.

Secondly, the Congressional debate on the Glacier Park bill provides an interesting view of contemporary attitudes toward national parks in general. Parks were seen as areas of marginal worth. Senator Dixon described Glacier as

... an area of about 1,400 square miles of mountains piled on top of each other. There is no agricultural land whatever, except a little down in one valley on the west slope. ... Nothing is taken from anyone.43

Dixon might have added that every major actor who demanded a concession be written into the park bill received something. The premise that 'nothing be taken from anyone' represented the First Commandment in the Congressional discussion on Glacier. Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania succinctly summed up the Congressional attitude toward Glacier:

It is one of the grandest scenic sections in the United States, absolutely unfit for cultivation or habitation, and as far as I know not possessing any mineral resources.44

Penrose thus pronounced:

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The section is admirably adapted for a [national] park. 45

Finally, when frugal Texas Senator Joseph W. Bailey asked Joseph Dixon if the new park would require the government to expend large sums of money in acquiring lands, Dixon replied that it would not. "All of it is now in a forest reserve." Dixon triumphantly added, "there will not be a great deal of difference in its future status [than] from its present." 46 Dixon was right. As constituted by the organic act, the new national park was little more than a "hybrid forest." 47 Pinchot's multiple-use concept of resource development was grafted successfully to a national park.

45 Ibid.


47 Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 175.
CHAPTER IV

'THE RAPE OF THE SHERBURN'E'

There is no better way to destroy a park intended for beauty and use, such as Glacier . . . no way so absolutely successful and so absolutely sure to be successful as the granting of a right to . . . do business within it. This precedent will come home to roost.

New Jersey Congressman Richard W. Parker speaking against amendments to the Mesa Verde National Park Bill - 1910.

Glacier's Organic Act was not a carte blanche for unrestricted resource development within the park. But neither did the Act set aside an area where nature was to remain forever free from man's tamperings. In each instance where Congress perceived the possibility of utilizing natural resources, it took pains to protect posterity's right to develop them. The ambiguous and contradictory Glacier Park Act, with its emphasis on protecting both past and future development, led to inevitable conflicts between the desire to develop natural resources and the principle of preservation.1

1Obviously, it could be argued that even had Congress closed all utilitarian loopholes and firmly established the primacy of preservation within the Park, conflicts still would have arisen. The history of Yellowstone National Park, which has one of the least impaired organic acts, provides solid proof of such a contention. However, it is clear that where conflicts are inevitable, an act which clearly states the preservationist policy is preferable to one which recognizes general exceptions to the preservation policy. In the absence of a clear policy, administrators, private interests, and the public are left without a scale on which to balance
Conflicts appeared within a year of the park's establishment. East of the Continental Divide, the reclamation and timber provisions allowed the first large-scale utilization of Glacier's natural resources. The reclamation clause protected two specific Reclamation Service projects: the Blackfeet Project and the St. Mary Storage Unit of the Milk River Project. The Blackfeet Project was surveyed, recommended, and authorized prior to the establishment of Glacier National Park. It was a cooperative Bureau of Indian Affairs and Reclamation Service irrigation scheme to provide water storage and canal facilities for Blackfeet Reservation farmers. One section of this four-unit project directly affected Glacier National Park. The Lower Two Medicine Lakes Dam, built in 1912 on the Blackfeet Reservation, impounded approximately 13,800 acre feet of water; the dam was rebuilt later 300 feet downstream and provided 40,000 acre feet of storage. About one-third of the Lower Two Medicine Lake Reservoir lay on national park land. The Glacier Park Act protected the Blackfeet Project.

preservation or development of resources within a national park.

Utilitarian attempts and preservationist opposition to development of the Park's natural resources west of the Continental Divide will be the subject of chapter 5.


The Piegan, Badger-Fisher, and Birch Creek units do not impound water within Glacier National Park.

Two Medicine Dam was washed away in 1964. The Bureau of Reclamation rebuilt the dam. See, letter, George C. Shelhame to author, April 6, 1976.
The St. Mary Storage Unit of the Milk River Project differed in several significant respects from the Lower Two Medicine Unit. First, the St. Mary Storage Unit was a headwater storage and diversion project to supplement the low summer flow of the Milk River. The headwater storage, diverted through a twenty-nine mile canal to the North Fork of Milk River, served to irrigate semi-arid Montana lands two to three hundred miles east of Glacier Park. The diversion project required an international agreement with Great Britain to adjudicate water distribution for both the St. Mary and Milk Rivers. President Taft proclaimed the Boundary Waters Treaty two days after he signed the act creating Glacier National Park. Between 1902 and 1910 survey and exploration work on the St. Mary Storage Unit was done to protect the United States claim to water appropriations on the St. Mary River while international negotiations continued. The St. Mary Storage Unit differed, therefore, from the Blackfeet Project in size, international scope, and in its being a diversion unit for farmers hundreds of miles removed from the Rockies. Also, the Unit differed in two other important aspects from the Blackfeet Project. First,

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6Project Histories: Milk River Project, Montana; Project History, 1902 to 1911, vol. 1 (Reel 76), p. viii.
7Ibid., no pagination. Boundary water negotiations were carried on for many years prior to May 13, 1910. The Treaty was signed January 11, 1909.
8Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 18 (Reel 82); St. Mary Storage Unit History to January 1912, vol. 1, pp. 77-78.
the specific headwater storage plans changed significantly after May 1910. Secondly, the impact of the St. Mary project on Glacier National Park was greater--both potentially and actually--than the developments initiated for the Blackfeet Indians.

Originally, Reclamation contemplated using Upper and Lower St. Mary Lakes for storage. The entire flow of Swiftcurrent Creek was to be diverted into Lower St. Mary Lake to increase available water volume. To safeguard the plan, the Secretary of the Interior withdrew a belt of land extending one-half mile back from the margin of both lakes on February 28, 1903.\(^9\) The 1910 reclamation provision in the Glacier Park Act both protected and reaffirmed the 1903 withdrawal.

When early investigations found bedrock too deep for a feasible dam site on the upper lake, attention shifted to Lower St. Mary Lake.\(^10\) Reclamation engineers investigated the possibility of constructing a forty-six foot dam on the lower lake that would pool both lakes together. Their plan included a dredging operation between the lakes so that Upper St. Mary Lake's storage capacity could be drawn down to the level of Lower St. Mary Lake. This proposal provided 218,000 acre feet of storage in both lakes. It was

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 30.

\(^10\)Ibid., p. 15.
the Reclamation's water storage scheme at the time Congress passed the Glacier Park bill. Obviously, the 1910 plans for the St. Mary Storage Unit were preliminary and subject to considerable change. This fact best explains the general language employed in the reclamation amendment to the Glacier Park bill. The Reclamation Service did not want to be held to a strictly defined construction plan for the St. Mary Unit since their surveys and explorations were all tentative.

Reclamation Service activities after 1910 directly affected Glacier National Park in several ways. The Supervising Engineer for the St. Mary Project, H. N. Savage, explained to Reclamation Service Director Frederick H. Newell that electrical power needed to run construction equipment for the St. Mary Canal could be obtained at "an unusually good . . . damsite at the outlet" of Lake McDermott (Swiftcurrent Lake). Savage recommended developing the site and selling it to either the Great Northern Railroad or Glacier Park when no longer needed by the Reclamation Service.

Glacier Superintendent William R. Logan heartily endorsed the Reclamation Service plan. In a letter to Clement S. 

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11 Ibid., p. 75.


13 Ibid.
Ucker, Interior's Chief Clerk in charge of the national parks, Logan explained that he hoped to have the hydroelectric plant made sufficiently large not only for [Reclamation's] needs but [also] our needs, giving us the opportunity to sell considerable power to hotels, etc., within a radius of twenty-five or thirty miles of McDermott Falls.14

Logan added that a transmission line built across the Continental Divide would allow electricity to be supplied also to the Park's west side. In short, Logan hoped to capitalize on the reclamation project, thus adding a money-making facility to augment park income.

Although the power transmission lines were not built, Reclamation did construct the hydroelectric plant at McDermott Falls. The willingness of park officials to accommodate development of McDermott Fall's water potential illustrated their ambivalent attitude toward the principle of preservation and the failure of preservationist groups to keep a close surveillance on Glacier Park.

Superintendent Logan vacillated wildly in his attitudes toward preservation or development of Glacier's natural resources. In the same letter to Ucker in which Logan lauded the hydroelectric potentials of McDermott Falls, he pleaded with the Chief Clerk not to support a Great Northern plan

14 Letter, William R. Logan to C. S. Ucker, January 24, 1912, U.S. Reclamation Service, File 660-05.4, GNPA.
to dam McDermott Lake. Great Northern operated boat launches on both Lake McDermott and Josephine Lakes. A dam at the outlet of Lake McDermott could raise the lake's level and facilitate a boat passage between both lakes. The vacationers would no longer have to walk a quarter of a mile between the lakes! Logan challenged the plan, insisting

This is not right and should not be permitted, as it would have a tendency through the hand of man of spoiling the scenic beauty as created by the hand of God, and I would never recommend that the Great Northern, or any of the concessionaires be allowed to tamper in any way, shape or form, with the natural beauties of the park.15

Logan evidently saw no inconsistency in advocating on one hand the hydroelectric plan at McDermott Falls and on the other hand demurring to the Great Northern dam at the outlet of McDermott Lake. Perhaps the key to understanding Logan's attitude lies in the fact that the latter plan involved large changes in the natural landscape and would be highly visible to park visitors.16

The Reclamation Service had its own plans for McDermott Lake. In May 1912 the Board of Engineers recommended delay-

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15 Ibid.

16 Steven T. Mather, appointed Director of the National Park Service in 1916, did not share Superintendent Logan's scruples. Mather gave the Great Northern project enthusiastic support in the belief hotel patrons would be benefitted. But, because of a lack of funds and higher priorities elsewhere, the project never advanced beyond the planning stage. See, Curtis Buchholtz, "The Historical Dichotomy of Use and Preservation in Glacier National Park" (Master's thesis, University of Montana, 1969), p. 41.
ing the pooling of the St. Mary Lakes "for several years until the growing needs of irrigation [on the Milk River Project] require their [dams] construction." The Engineers suggested a low dam at Lower St. Mary Lake to control water diversion into the St. Mary Canal and a thirty-foot dam on Lake McDermott for storage and flood control. A reservoir on Lake McDermott would require the removal of recently constructed Great Northern buildings on the lake. The Board of Engineers noted that "these buildings in any event must be removed to permit development of Lake McDermott as a reservoir for irrigation, but this need not be insisted on at the present season. . . ." Reclamation clearly felt it had priority.

In 1914, the Reclamation Service changed their plans for the St. Mary Storage Unit again. Engineers believed that more economical storage and flood control could be gained by construction of a dam at the outlet of Lower Sherburne Lake on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. The entire reservoir behind the proposed Sherburne dam was to be on Glacier National Park lands in the Sherburne Valley.

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18 Ibid., pp. 142-43.
19 Ibid., p. 144.
20 Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 27 (Reel
The engineers pointed out that if future demand required additional storage, a dam could be constructed at Red Eagle Lake. The Lower St. Mary dam might also be raised. In accordance with the Board of Engineers recommendation, the Director of the Reclamation Service approved the Sherburne Dam in June 1914; construction began in July.

It took the Reclamation Service four years after the passage of the Glacier Park Act to decide on a definite plan for water storage in the St. Mary area. By 1914 Reclamation envisioned a major reservoir in Glacier Park's Sherburne Valley, a small dam to divert Swiftcurrent Creek water into Lower St. Mary Lake and a low dam on St. Mary

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86): St. Mary Storage Unit: Sherburne Lake Reservoir Dam Feature History, 1914, vol. 10, p. 4, citing letter, Board of Engineers to Chief Engineer, May 29, 1914; and Sherburne Lakes Reservoir Dam Feature History, 1914, vol. 10, pp. 65-67. The Reclamation Service conducted the first rough topographical surveys and investigations of the Sherburne Lakes between 1912 and 1913. See, Sherburne Lakes Reservoir Dam Feature History, 1914, vol. 10, p. 4. There were alternative water storage sites on the Milk River which some engineers felt should have been developed in lieu of the Sherburne Reservoir. Finally built in 1939, the Fresno Dam [Chain of Lakes Reservoir] was one such alternative. As late as 1928 an engineer expressed the opinion that "if he had had his way, the Sherburne Lakes storage would never have been built and the Chain of Lakes storage originally constructed in its stead." See Florence Kerr Facey, "Actual Construction of Fresno Dam Has Finally Started After 37 Years," Progress Edition, The Havre Daily News, March 26, 1937, pp. 18, 20, 25. Preservationists failed to exploit these differences.


River to control diversion of 850 cubic feet per second of water into the St. Mary Diversion Canal. When future need justified additional storage, plans called for utilization of park lands to satisfy the demands. Obviously, the Reclamation Service took the water utilization clause in the Glacier National Park Act seriously. "Any area" of the park was available for Reclamation's appropriation.

National park officials did not object. Superintendent Logan, as we have seen, encouraged Reclamation to expand its plans where he thought the park might benefit financially. Later, Acting Superintendent of Glacier, R. H. Chapman, provisionally granted the Reclamation Service permission to cut timber in the Red Eagle Valley for camp construction and reclamation facilities.\(^{23}\) Clement S. Ucker quickly confirmed the permit stipulating that the logging done in the park should follow standard U. S. Forest Service practices; payment to Glacier Park for cut timber was to be paid at prevailing Forest Service rates.\(^{24}\) Reclamation crews cut 900,570 board feet of timber in the Red Eagle Valley. The cutting lasted from May 1912 until January 8, 1913 when heavy snows halted logging operations.

Reclamation's logging venture was a fiasco. Cut timber had to be rafted four to five miles down Upper St. Mary Lake,


through the one and three-quarters mile of creek between
the upper and lower lakes, and then on to the sawmill at
the edge of Lower St. Mary Lake. Frequent rough, high
waves on the upper lake and the narrow creek between lakes
made the rafting operation difficult, dangerous and inef­
cient. Only 151,560 board feet of the 900,570 cut from
the Red Eagle Valley reached the sawmill in 1912.\textsuperscript{25} Raft­
ing attempts on the upper lake left thousands of board
feet of timber scattered along the lake's shore.\textsuperscript{26} In
steep terrain, "where it was impracticable to get . . .
[timber cut in 1912] out at a cost commensurate with the
cost of s[t]umpage plus cutting," logging crews left the
down timber to rot.\textsuperscript{27}

Glacier Park and National Park Service officials also
cooperated with the Reclamation Service project in the
Sherburne Valley. Reclamation constructed a large gravel
plant three and one-quarter miles above the Sherburne dam
site within park boundaries in the summer of 1915. Crews
processed and cleaned gravel at the plant and a tugboat
pushed barges of the gravel down Sherburne Lake to the dam
construction site.\textsuperscript{28} Timber from Glacier National Park's

\textsuperscript{25} Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 24 (Reel
85): St. Mary Storage Unit Feature History, 1914, vol. 7,
pp. 198-201.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 198.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 205.

\textsuperscript{28} Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 28 (Reel
Sherburne Valley provided cheap fuel and construction material for dam operations. In April 1918, National Park Service Director Steven Mather authorized the Reclamation Service to utilize fish from the Sherburne Lakes for camp food supplies.

The first eight years of Glacier's existence thus witnessed some attention to the principle of preservation, but in general, superintendents and park planners assumed preservation would take care of itself. Park officials materially aided many reclamation schemes but concentrated on their own projects. Hence, the period can be characterized as one of general development. Road construction within...

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29 Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 27 (Reel 86): St. Mary Storage Unit: Sherburne Lake Reservoir Dam Feature History, 1915, vol. 11, p. 34.


31 In 1911 William R. Logan, Superintendent of Glacier National Park placed an order for a sawmill and shingle machine to saw dead, down and insect infested timber into lumber and shingles. In his report to the Secretary of the Interior, Logan commented that "In many places the cutting of fully matured timber will not in the least mar the beauty of the park, but will benefit the growing timber. . . . Numerous inquiries for lumber have been received, and in a short time it is believed lumber will rank first among the sources of income [for the Park]." See, Report of the Superintendent of Glacier National Park printed in Report of the Department of the Interior For the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1911, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912), p. 674.
the park was planned and executed according to comprehensive, not limited, objectives. Large hotels and chalets sprang up in numerous locations throughout the park during this early period. Mather's attitude toward development was typical of national park thinking at the time. Mather hoped to make park travel easier by promoting wholesale improvement in hotels, camps and other concessions and in roads and other transportation facilities both inside the national parks and outside.

Director Mather was continually buffeted between those who wanted to develop luxurious resorts and those who maintained the parks should be kept as primitive, and as close to their natural conditions, as possible. Mather's attempts to tread between the two sides was a personal nightmare. According to Mather's biographer, Robert Shankland, the Director "had no formula to fall back on, no scales for weighing out use against preservation." In fact, Mather leaned toward natural resource development either when it directly served park guests or when resource use could not be observed directly by the public. The Glacier Park Act, with

34 Shankland, Steve Mather, p. 101.
35 Buchholtz, "Historical Dichotomy," p. 44.
built-in utilitarian provisions allowing timber and water development, accentuated the dilemma. The Glacier Park Organic Act offered neither superintendents nor directors clear guidelines for developing park policies.

Mather's strategy was to establish solid public support for the national parks by increasing their popularity. In turn, he hoped public support would be reflected in expanding Congressional appropriations. Yet, despite general enthusiasm for development, 1918 became a reminder to many park officials that resource developments endangered the preservation principle. In that year, Reclamation prepared to close the gates of Sherburne Dam.

Belatedly, Mather became concerned with the effect of the reservoir on one of "Glaciers most celebrated valleys...". In his 1918 report to the Secretary of the Interior Mather drew attention to what he called "Serious Irrigation Problems" that would "impair the scenic beauty" of the Sherburne Valley. Mather did not contemplate a battle to stop the flooding of the valley, but rather concentrated his efforts on having the flowage area cleaned of brush and timber prior to the flooding so that unsightly debris would not greet visitors as they traveled through the valley.


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.
In 1919 the gates of the Sherburne dam were actually closed. Water stored behind the structure totaled 28,828 acre feet by June.\(^3^9\) A sliding action in the dam's north abutment disrupted an overflow weir-type spillway thus preventing Reclamation from filling the reservoir to capacity. Yet, the small amount of water stored was enough to create, in Mather's words, "a scene of havoc" in the Sherburne Valley.\(^4^0\) Mather's reaction to the inundation was characteristic of his general attitude toward park preservation. He was not upset with the dam per se. What dismayed the Director, was the fact that timber and brush in the reservoir had not been removed and therefore left an "unsightly" spectacle for park visitors.\(^4^1\)

The issue of Sherburne dam drifted lazily for another seven years. The Bureau of Reclamation continued to have difficulty with the Sherburne spillway. So long as it was inoperative the reservoir level remained low. During this period park officials tried to get brush and timber in the flowage area removed but could come to no agreement with Reclamation as to which government agency should pay for

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\(^{39}\) *Project Histories: Milk River Project, 1919*, vol. 16 (Reel 81), p. 34.


\(^{41}\) Ibid.
the cleanup. In 1926 the Sherburne issue received serious attention for the reservoir was to be filled to capacity in 1927.

Charles J. Kraebel, Superintendent of Glacier National Park since 1924, informed Director Mather of Reclamation's schedule; Park Saddle Company's corrals would have to be removed from the flowage area. Kraebel, a government employee since 1911 and Assistant Superintendent of Forestry in the Territory of Hawaii prior to accepting the superintendency at Glacier, held strong views about the impending Sherburne dam inundation. The issue of moving the Park Saddle Company corrals was of minor importance to Kraebel. The consequences of flooding the Sherburne Valley engaged his mind.

In September 1924, he prepared an eight-page article, complete with photographs of the valley before and after the limited inundations, entitled "The Rape of the Sherburne." Kraebel juxtaposed pictures taken in 1905 of the Sherburne Valley against photographs he took in 1924. He hoped the photographs would vividly demonstrate that even limited inundations destroyed the valley's beauty.

Kraebel did not publish "The Rape of the Sherburne" material for two reasons, however. First the 1905 photographs of the valley were of poor quality. He realized

\[42\text{Ibid.}\]
that the contrast he hoped to demonstrate would not be effective. Secondly, Kraebel thought it "[un]seemly for a member of one government Bureau [the Park Service] to attack the procedure of another Bureau [Reclamation]. . . ." \textsuperscript{43}

Nevertheless, Kraebel confided his frustration in a memorandum to Director Mather:

> There is probably no question of the great need of additional water for the Milk River Irrigation Project and no question, therefore, of the high money value of the additional acre feet of water which will be obtained by filling Sherburne reservoir to its maximum capacity in the spring of 1927. At the same time however, in the effort to reclaim the sagebrush prairies in the vicinity of Malta [Montana] should the government lose sight of the fact that it is destroying the beauty of one of the principal valleys of Glacier National Park? \textsuperscript{44}

Kraebel continued, striking a note not theretofore emphasized in the Sherburne dam discussions:

> Is it not rather shortsighted for the government to build with one hand and destroy with the other, particularly when the thing destroyed is something which nature has taken centuries to produce and which no government, however powerful, can ever replace?

Kraebel's statement touched the cornerstones of preser-

\textsuperscript{43} Letter, Charles J. Kraebel, Superintendent, Glacier National Park, to Steven T. Mather, Director, National Park Service, February 7, 1927, Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA. Probably is penned in on the typewritten copy.

\textsuperscript{44} Letter, Charles J. Kraebel to Stephen Mather, February 9, 1927, Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.
vationist principles. Something must remain 'untouched,' inviolate. "The preferable thing [to do] would be to pro-
hibit this flooding altogether," Kraebel told his superior,
"but . . . that may appear too visionary and might, there-
fore, raise a storm of protest from the would-be farmers of
the Milk River Project. . . ."45 Nevertheless, Kraebel
felt it his responsibility to point out the "wanton destruc-
tion"46 of the reclamation project and to insist that the
Park Service vigorously renew its efforts to convince Recl-
amation to pay more attention to aesthetics at the Sher-
burne site.

Director Steven Tyn Mather was not a visionary. Ignor-
ing Kraebel's suggestion that the Park Service move to pro-
hibit the flooding altogether, Mather tried to keep a lid
on the affair.47 Mather preferred to lobby behind the
scenes. In a letter to Reclamation Commissioner Elwood
Mead, Mather requested

that before flooding any tree-covered land
[in the Sherburne Valley], all tree growth
and brush should be cut and burned. Such

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Memorandum between Mather and park officials at
Glacier National Park dealing with the Sherburne matter
was sometimes marked Confidential or included instructions
such as not for publication. See, e.g., letter, Mather to
Acting Superintendent R. R. Vincent, March 10, 1927, Sher-
burne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.
clearing should be complete and clean and should be carried to an elevation of a few feet above the ultimate high water contour. 48 Mather hoped Mead would hold off filling the reservoir until 1928 so the cleanup could be accomplished. 49 Mather's efforts were unsuccessful. The Bureau of Reclamation closed the gates on Sherburne Dam in 1927; the reservoir filled to a full-pool capacity. The skeletons of bleached, white trees greeted Park visitors until removed by Civilian Conservation Corps workers in the late 1930s. 50

Reclamation developments on the Park's east side were important for several reasons. First, reservoir construction was due, in part, to preservationist failure to confront a Congress debating the Glacier Park bill with the incompatibility of reclamation projects and the principle of preservation. It is clear from the Congressional debates that had preservationists insisted on excluding utilitarian schemes from the bill, its passage would have been impossible. In this sense, preservationist unwillingness to fight 'a classic battle' to exclude the east-side reclamation projects can be understood as prudent strategy; a fight to exorcise water development schemes would have resulted in

48 Letter, Steven Mather to Elwood Mead, 9 March 1927, Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.

49 Ibid.

50 John Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 182.
no national park. If such was the preservationist strategy it did not succeed. For the reclamation clause in the Glacier Park bill did not simply protect projects planned prior to the park's creation. The Act extended the Bureau of Reclamation's authority to "any area" within the park "necessary for the development and maintenance of a government reclamation project. . . ." Secretary Ballinger's specific request grew, therefore, to an all inclusive amendment without protest from preservationists.51 This was a serious blunder since it opened the entire park to water development projects.

Secondly, park officials encouraged Reclamation to expand their utilization of the park's water resources in the period prior to establishment of the National Park Service. Logan's support of Reclamation activities at the McDermott

51Secretary of Interior Ballinger's attitude toward national parks was usually superior to many of his contemporaries. Ballinger opposed the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir, supported a national parks bureau in 1910, and wrote in favor of exempting the national parks from the provisions of the Right-of-Way Act of 1901. The broadening of the reclamation amendment to include "any area" within Glacier National Park went far beyond both the spirit and intent of Ballinger's specific request to Senator Nelson. See Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 198 for a comparison between Ballinger's and Gifford Pinchot's attitude toward national parks; George Bird Grinnell's magazine, Forest and Stream, called for the passage of the Glacier Park bill in several editorials. Even after the reclamation amendment was appended to the bill, an editorial noted that "There can be no objection to the bill on any grounds, save possibly that of some supposed expense in connection with the maintenance of the park. . . ." See editorial, Forest and Stream, March 5, 1910, p. 367. Ironically, on the same editorial page, Forest and Stream reiterated its opposition to a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley.
Falls hydroelectric plant smoothed the way for additional development. Park officials clearly placed resource development and additional park revenue above the principle of preservation.

Director Mather's inability or unwillingness to protest the use of water resources within Glacier stemmed partly from his ambivalent attitude toward the use/preservation dichotomy. More importantly, however, Mather was concerned primarily with the task of protecting the political base of the National Park System itself. Horace Albright, who became National Park Service Director when Mather retired in 1929, once remarked that "Mather had a shrewd political sense. He wouldn't get in trouble with Congress because he knew he needed their money and support." Political reality, then, imposed strict limits upon Mather's ability to defend strict preservationist policies within Glacier National Park. Had Mather strongly opposed the Sherburne project between 1916 and 1927, the 'storm of protest' from Milk River farmers would surely have undermined Glacier's political support. In addition, Mather must have realized that the Glacier Park Organic Act dealt 'would-be farmers' most of the important trump cards. Under such conditions, Mather was unwilling to call anyone's bluff.

52 Shankland, Steve Mather, p. 294.
CHAPTER V

A VICTORY AT GLACIER VIEW

I am apprehensive that this [Glacier View Dam] issue is going to involve 'the battle of the century' so far as we are concerned. We shall need all the help we can get.

Newton B. Drury, Director
National Park Service

Conflicts over possible uses of the resources within Glacier National Park were not confined to the Sherburne Valley. West of the Continental Divide local interest groups who originally opposed a strictly preservationist Glacier Act continued efforts to restrict what remained of the preservationist writ.

In 1911, private land holdings within Glacier National Park totaled 16,580 acres; North Fork Valley homesteaders held the bulk of these private holdings.\(^1\) Residents of the North Fork area, aided by the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce, circulated petitions in 1911 and 1912 that demanded recession of valuable North Fork lands from national park to private ownership. The petitions asserted that ten to twelve thousand acres of patented agricultural land and

\(^1\)Buchholtz, "Historical Dichotomy," p. 33.
thousands of acres of valuable timber were unjustly included within park boundaries. Petitioners believed the lands thus included within the park had "no particular scenic value" and therefore should be opened immediately to further settlement.  

Superintendent William R. Logan's response to North Fork petitions was quick and forceful. In a letter to Frederick K. Vreeland, a member of the Camp Fire Club of America, Logan called attention to the efforts by "settlers and land promoters" to separate from the park "all the open land from [North Fork] river to the timber. . . ." on the west slope of the Livingston Range. Logan explained to Vreeland that the area petitioners wanted withdrawn contained "the best portion of our grass country and game section." He urged Vreeland to use his influence with Congress and the Camp Fire Club membership to maintain North Fork lands within Glacier. Logan concluded his letter with a challenge to those who wanted to redraw the park's western boundary. "Instead of giving up any land there," Logan wrote to his friend, "I think we should take steps to obtain more land; in fact get rid of every settler on the north fork of Flathead River. . . ." Logan's attitude represented standard na-

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2"Efforts to Exclude the North Fork," Chronology File, 1911, GNPA.

3Letter, William R. Logan to Frederick K. Vreeland, January 24, 1912. Re-opening Lands to Settlement, 1912, File 562, GNPA.
tional park reaction to attempts by outside interests to exploit park resources. As the park custodian, Logan consistently fought efforts to redraw Glacier's boundaries for private gain. Officials in the Interior Department supported Logan's position. 4

North Fork settlers repeated their petition campaign in 1915. The new petitions concentrated on the isolation and depravation caused by exploitable North Fork resources being locked away inside Glacier. "It is practically impossible," the petitioners declared, "to transport farm products out of the valley . . . [and] this situation must continue until development is brought about by more settlers or other assistance." The North Fork Valley was capable, in the opinion of settlers, "of supporting a dense population. . . . and we submit that it is more important to furnish homes to a land-hungry people than to lock the land up as a rich man's playground which no one will use or ever use." The settlers also reasserted their previous contention that the valley contained no glaciers or scenic attraction to justify park status. 5

None of the early efforts to adjust Glacier's western

4 Letter, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Interior to Assistant Superintendent, Glacier National Park, H. W. Hutchings, February 23, 1912. Re-opening Lands to Settlement, 1912, File 562, GNPA.

5 Chronology File, 1915, Card #9, GNPA.
boundary succeeded. While park officials wavered on other issues they did not contemplate acceding to pressures for boundary revisions. The inability of the valley to support agriculture, the continued failure to develop oil and coal potentials, and frequent destructive fires in the North Fork Valley accounted for most people drifting out of the area after 1919. Decreasing population contributed to lack of interest from railroads for building a line into the North Fork Valley.

Two other events further discouraged settlement and relieved pressures to exclude portions of the North Fork from the park. A special Congressional committee visited Glacier in 1925 to investigate the practice of private land holdings within the park. The committee reported unfavorably toward agricultural holdings within Glacier. In 1929, Congress authorized gradual acquisition of private lands within the park and in 1931 repealed the railroad right-of-way provision originally granted in the Glacier Park Act.⁷


⁷Act of January 26, 1931 (46 U.S. Statutes at Large 1043). Surprisingly, there was neither Congressional nor local opposition to repealing the railroad right-of-way provision in the Glacier Organic Act. The Depression and a generally negative attitude toward railroads during the 1930s probably accounts for the lack of interest to extend lines into the North Fork. For the Congressional debates see, U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate on an act to provide for uniform administration of the national parks by the U.S. Department of the Interior, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 21 January 1931, Congressional Record 74:2793-2796. Local reaction to the January 26, 1931
Henceforth, any railroad building through the North Fork Valley would have to construct its line totally west of the park. The period from 1910 to 1931, therefore, marked the end of liberal right-of-way grants and the beginning of a park policy ultimately aimed at acquiring all private land within the boundaries of Glacier National Park. One major resource utilization problem remained, however. The provision within the Park Act that allowed water resource developments.

As early as 1899 H. B. Ayres noted an abundance of potential water power development sites in the North Fork Valley. Ayres reported specifically that the tributary creeks to the North Fork River offered good water power potential. "Most of these [tributary creeks] flow through lakes which would afford excellent reservoirs...", and a steady supply of water. 8

Several areas affecting the west half of Glacier National Park were reserved for dam sites in the first two decades after Glacier's establishment. In 1915, Steven T. Mather, then Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, transmitted to Glacier Superintendent S. F. Ralston without

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comment, a copy of an executive order withdrawing approximately forty acres of land in Glacier for potential water power development. The reserved area was on the North Fork River one mile above its junction with the Middle Fork of the Flathead River. Two more power site withdrawals were made on the North Fork River in the early 1920s. The first involved a small area near Canyon Creek; the second reserved 3,685 acres—extending from five miles below Big Creek to two miles south of Polebridge and one-half mile back from the river. No map of the reserved area could be found but it probably involved only Flathead National Forest land on the west side of the North Fork River. The withdrawal is interesting, nevertheless, for several reasons. An amendment to the Water Power Act of 1920, effective March 3, 1921, prohibited the Federal Power Commission from granting power licenses within the boundaries of any national park as then constituted. The February 13, 1922 North Fork withdrawal antedated that amendment by nearly a

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full year. Since it would not be possible to use the February 1922 withdrawal without inundating portions of Glacier National Park the withdrawal would logically seem to have violated at least the spirit of the 1921 Water Power Act amendment. The power site withdrawal aimed ultimately at protecting water site development on the North Fork River if Glacier River boundaries could be adjusted at a future time.

In 1927 P. N. Bernard, Secretary of the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce, suggested just such a scheme to accommodate a water storage proposal by the Rocky Mountain Power Company. Writing to National Park Director Mather, Bernard stated:

> It has been my understanding that the Park Service has been of the opinion that the west side of the park bordering on the North Fork and in the immediate vicinity of the North Fork was not a valuable asset to the Park, on account of the fact that it does not possess scenic beauty, and that there are a large number of settlers on the west side in an agricultural region that is not a Park Asset [sic]. . . .

Bernard admitted to some apprehension that his proposal might be considered a dangerous precedent by the National Park Service, but that he

also apprehended that the demand today for storage is so great, and so necessary in this particular instance, that it would be

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12 "Efforts to Withdraw North Fork Land, 1927," History Chronology File, 1927, GNPA.
reasonable upon the part of the Park Service to grant, or favor, the passage of a bill providing for such storage and the elimination of the North Fork canyon from the park area.\textsuperscript{13}

Mather's reply was unequivocal. He strongly opposed withdrawing any park land for commercial purposes.\textsuperscript{14} Glacier's North Fork Valley benefitted from National Park Service efforts to protect Yellowstone National Park from dam developments in the early 1920s. Speaking against dams there, Mather asked:

\begin{quote}
Is there not some place in this great nation of ours where lakes can be preserved in their natural state; where we and all generations to follow us can enjoy the beauty and charm of mountain waters in the midst of primeval forests?\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Mather's evolving distaste for artificial reservoirs in national parks strengthened his opposition to dams on Glacier Park's west side.

No further efforts were made during the 1920s to develop the North Fork's water resources. Events occurred during the 1930s, however, that attested to continued interest in water development on the park's west flank. E. W. Kraemer, working for the United States Forest Service, listed potential water power sites on the North Fork in a

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Quoted in Ise, \textit{Our National Park Policy}, p. 309.
The United States Geological Survey conducted a similar survey in 1935. The U.S.G.S. Director, in a reply to an inquiry from the National Park Service, stated that the only sites being seriously considered for future development were on Flathead Lake and on the South Fork of the Flathead River. He further stated that there was "no reason for alarm as to any reservoir construction that could affect Glacier National Park in any way." A Northwest Pacific Planning Commission report listed a potential reservoir site on the North Fork River at the base of Glacier View Mountain in 1939, despite U.S.G.S. assurances. Recognition of the Glacier View site in the late 1930s set the stage for concerted efforts to develop it in the 1940s.

The governmental agency most likely to have been interested in developing the Glacier View Dam site prior to World War II was the Bureau of Reclamation. But the exigencies of global war altered the situation. Three weeks

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17 "Chronological Summary," Glacier View Dam I, GNPA. The Glacier View Dam files consist of four parts. Parts 1 and 2 are in chronological order, 1943-1949. Parts 3 and 4 are mixed up. All memorandum in the files consist of copies.

18 Ibid.
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States faced a critical electrical power shortage.  

The situation in the Pacific Northwest was particularly crucial. The plutonium plant at Hanford, Washington, and Pacific Northwest aluminum plants—which provided material for aircraft construction—required enormous amounts of electrical energy to supply material for the war. In June 1943, Brigadier General Warren T. Hannum and Colonel Richard Park of the United States Army, Corps of Engineers, held public hearings at Kalispell to present plans for augmenting by three million acre feet the supply of water available upstream from Grand Coulee and Bonneville dams. Wartime shortages of construction material precluded anything more than enlarging an existing structure. Therefore, the Corps proposed to add seventeen feet to the height of Kerr Dam to secure extra storage. According to Brigadier General Hannum, the proposal to raise Kerr dam was "the only solution to the problem of supplying power needed by the end of


20Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L. C. Merriam, June 12, 1943. Glacier View Dam I, GNPA.

1944 for war production in the Pacific Northwest.\textsuperscript{22} The Corps' plan called for an additional seventeen feet at a later time, to increase the reservoir capacity behind Kerr Dam by another three million acre feet.

The Corps of Engineers' plans would have flooded the town of Kalispell (population 9,700) and several small communities in the Flathead Lake area. Residents objected vigorously. Shops in Kalispell closed for the Army hearings and hotels filled to capacity with Flathead area people who wanted to express personally their dissatisfaction with the Corps' proposal.\textsuperscript{23} Citizens packed the Kalispell auditorium, where the hearings were held, beyond its three thousand person capacity; loudspeakers carried the proceedings to throngs of people outside.\textsuperscript{24} Less than a week later, the Corps announced that the plan to raise Flathead Lake was officially "dead".\textsuperscript{25}

Glacier National Park officials watched apprehensively the political skirmish between Flathead residents and the Corps. Their initial interest stemmed from the fact that the Corps' plan to raise Flathead Lake to 2927 feet above mean sea level would flood parts of the Glacier National Park

\textsuperscript{22}Quoted in Missoulian, June 3, 1943, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}Missoulian, June 9, 1943, p. 1.
Fish Hatchery at Creston. But more importantly, Flathead area residents insisted that less destructive alternative power storage sites existed in the Flathead's upper tributaries. Specifically, they pointed to three potential sites: Hungry Horse, Bad Rock Canyon and Glacier View.²⁶ The Flathead Citizens Committee, hastily organized in 1943 to thwart changes in Flathead Lake's level, quickly produced a report which expanded the rationale for developing water resources above Flathead Lake. According to the Committee report, upstream development would enhance irrigation and provide cheap electrical power for expanding the region's lumber industry. The Committee positively supported water resource development, but not on Flathead Lake. The Committee's report concluded that the Hungry Horse and Glacier View Dams "should be developed . . . at the earliest possible date."²⁷

The Flathead Citizens Committee was not alone in its assessment regarding Flathead Lake and the upper tributaries. The Montana County Commissioners, meeting for their Annual Convention at Great Falls in July 1943, endorsed a resolution

²⁶ Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L. C. Merriam, June 12, 1943. Glacier View Dam I, GNPA.

²⁷ Report and Justification for Development of Water Resources Above Flathead Lake and the Relation to Irrigation, Flood Control, Power, and Navigation, prepared for Flathead County Citizens Committee, by the Flathead Valley Planning Committee, August 26, 1943, p. 18.
that listed the detrimental effects of raising Flathead Lake. The resolution concluded that the Corps project "would seriously damage the entire Flathead Valley."\(^28\)
The assembled Commissioners asked authorities to investigate the upper tributaries of the Flathead River where lands were uninhabited and already under government ownership. Dams could be built there, "without serious damage to anyone. . . .\(^29\)"

The response of the Park Service to these early suggestions was cautious. Park officials appreciated the difficult problems faced by Flathead area people in protecting their communities. Glacier Superintendent Donald S. Libbey outlined the predicament for his regional director. Libbey believed that the shortage of critical materials during the war would make construction of a dam at Glacier View or elsewhere unlikely, if not impossible. He warned that in the long run the site at Glacier View would be given serious attention by water development agencies. He recommended careful study of all aspects of the problem. In a curious conclusion to his memorandum Libbey noted: "Actually, there are some advantages as well as disadvantages to Glacier National Park which should be weighed in the balance. . . ." when considering the Glacier View dam proposal.\(^30\)

\(^{28}\) *Great Falls Tribune*, July 6, 1943, p. 1.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L. C. Merriam, June 30, 1943. *Glacier View Dam I*, GNPA.
position of the Park Service to dams on Glacier's west side obviously had not yet gelled by 1943.

The war caused Park Service ambivalence. Two thousand-four hundred wartime permits allowing military use of areas or facilities within the National Park Service system were issued during World War Two. Forts Pulaski and Cabrilllon, both national monuments, closed during the war to allow utilization of the land for study of military tactics, maneuvers, and bivouacking of troops. Death Valley National Monument was opened to the mining of salts and Yosemite National Park was exploited for a small amount of tungsten. Numerous suggestions were made during the war that cannons, markers, and monuments in the national military parks be melted down and contributed to scrap metal drives. The N.P.S. successfully resisted most of these suggestions, although Swiss bells placed on several of Glacier National Park's highest passes did go to the junkman.31

Two events in 1942 at the park underscored the feeble position of the National Park Service during the war. Superintendent Libbey reported in March 1942 that the U. S. Army was contemplating interning Japanese enemy aliens at abandoned CCC camps at McDonald Creek and Apgar Flats near Lake

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McDonald.\(^{32}\) Acting Region Four Director Herbert Maier noted the difficulty of the Army's plans:

... this [Japanese] alien matter is a very serious one at this time from the standpoint of the federal authorities, since it pertains directly to the war effort. The Service is not in a particularly strong position to interpose objections, especially since tourist travel to the Park is likely to be very low this summer, and since both McDonald and Apgar Flats are not centers of tourist concentration.\(^{33}\)

The National Park Service could not openly discuss this topic with anyone. Secrecy prevented raising questions or obtaining much information.

Luckily, the Park Service heard nothing more of the scheme after March 1942. But one further incident emphasized the 'weak position' of the Service in dealing with military use of the park. A group of Army officers visited Glacier in August 1942 on a preliminary reconnaissance to establish the feasibility of constructing a seventeen thousand man cantonment for snow survival training, mountain climbing techniques, skiing, and mountain maneuvers. The

\(^{32}\)Confidential Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to Owen A. Tomlinson, March 4, 1942. Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services, File 601-04 (L1419); see also Secret Memorandum, quoted in Confidential Memorandum, T. K. Wolfe, Liaison Officer, CCC, to O. A. Tomlinson, March 3, 1942, Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services, File 601-04 (L1419).

\(^{33}\)Confidential Memorandum, Herbert Maier, to D. S. Libbey, March 5, 1942. Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services. Emphasis mine.
survey party investigated Apgar Flats which lies between park headquarters and Lake McDonald. The Army offered to adjust any damages done to the park landscape by acquiring all the private land holdings on the lower end of Lake McDonald—turning all of it over to the National Park Service after the war. Reporting these facts to National Park Service Director Newton B. Drury, Libbey suggested that the destruction to park features could be kept to a minimum by restricting the training area to the Apgar Mountains west and southwest of Lake McDonald. Confined to that area, possible damages "would not destroy a scenic portion of the Park which is now, or in the future would be, of primary importance from a scenic viewpoint." Director Drury told Libbey to direct the officers to areas outside the park.

The military's war-related requests to utilize parts of Glacier National Park can be characterized generally as probes and investigations. In each instance, the National Park Service essentially remained in the dark, uneasy about what the military might suggest next, and trying desperately to formulate positive alternatives to military requests. Compounding the problem was the fact that National Park Service offices had been moved out of Washington, D.C., and

34 Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to Newton B. Drury, August 7, 1942. Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services, File 601-04 (L1419).
relocated in Chicago for the duration of the war to make room for 'essential' war-related bureaus. This further weakened the Park Service ability to communicate with Washington officials sympathetic with their responsibilities.\textsuperscript{35} The secrecy surrounding Army proceedings on these early matters was typical of what came later when the Corps of Engineers sent field representatives to Glacier to investigate potential dam sites.

While the war continued, the Park Service had little choice other than to cooperate with the Army. When Secretary of War Henry Stimson requested permission from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to conduct field surveys and exploratory borings at the Glacier View and Fool Hen reservoir sites on the North Fork River, Ickes granted the Corps authority. The Park Service exacted a commitment from the District Corps of Engineers officer in Seattle not to do any irreparable damage to the park landscape and to clean up the test areas to the satisfaction of Glacier's superintendent.\textsuperscript{36}

Secretary Ickes, with enthusiastic support from the National Park Service, attempted to terminate Corps explorations


\textsuperscript{36}Letter, Abe Fortas to Secretary of War, August 16, 1944. Reservoir Sites, File 601-05, part 1, GNPA.
in Glacier as soon as the war ended. Newly appointed Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's August 22, 1945, request for additional Corps explorations at a new site on the North Fork gave Secretary Ickes and the National Park Service an opportunity to test their strength. Ickes sent Under Secretary Abe Fortas a special memorandum:

I think that we ought to go pretty slow about giving the Army Engineers the right to bore in any of our national parks . . . . I will have to be convinced of the necessity and the reasonableness of making these borings.37

Encouraged by Secretary Ickes' concern and cautious position, Newton B. Drury, Director of the National Park Service since 1940, seized the opportunity to present Ickes with a comprehensive overview of water development-related threats to the National Park system. "I have been gravely concerned for some time," Drury confided to the Secretary, "about the expanding dam construction programs of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation as I feel that they constitute a serious threat to the preservation of the National Park System. . . ." Drury admitted that the National Park Service gained some benefits through cooperation with these agencies but emphasized that it was "becoming more difficult to withstand pressure for the construction of water projects in areas of the National Park System."38

37Special Memorandum, Harold Ickes to Abe Fortas, September 10, 1945. Reservoir Sites.

38Memorandum, Newton Drury to Harold Ickes, September 26,
Director Drury had a particular reason for accentuating the Bureau of Reclamation in his memorandum to Secretary Ickes. The Bureau of Reclamation's River Basin Reports, soon to be released, tentatively listed proposed projects that would encroach upon two national parks and several national monuments. These published reports, in Drury's opinion, increased pressure on the Park Service to compromise the boundaries of the national parks. Furthermore, Drury argued that the inclusion of tentative projects by the Bureau of Reclamation in their reports placed the Service in the uncomfortable position of seeming to oppose "worthwhile water conservation projects," even though many of the projects might "never be needed or could be constructed elsewhere." Drury felt that a judicious amount of heat applied to the Bureau of Reclamation by the Secretary would protect the Park Service's position within the Interior Department.

The National Park Service Director's immediate problem, however, was not the Bureau of Reclamation, but the Corps of Army Engineers. Their request for additional authorization for test bores near Canyon Creek was still pending in Secretary Ickes' office. The National Park Service staff drafted a reply to the request for Ickes' signature. Ickes wanted


39Ibid.
to deny permission for further drilling in Glacier National Park, stating that the "Corps of Army Engineers is just as regardful of scenery and recreation as a swarm of locust is for vegetation." The draft denying permission explained the rationale:

The exigencies of war and certain emergency legislation to facilitate its successful prosecution justified limited relaxation of . . . the . . . long-time policies for the conservation of our national parks and monuments. That situation, however, no longer exists. In the circumstances, I [Ickes] must refuse to permit further encroachment upon the national parks, except in those instances specifically authorized by the Congress.

The Archilles Heel of both Secretary Ickes' and Director Drury's desire to protect Glacier National Park from encroachment was contained in the last clause of the draft: 'except in those instances specifically authorized by the Congress.' Interior Department Solicitor, Warner W. Gardner, asked to comment upon the legal basis for denying permission, professed substantial misgivings. Gardner advised the Secretary and Director Drury that he believed the Corps possessed adequate legal authority to carry out surveys at Glacier under provisions of a Congressional act of June 28,

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41 Draft letter (never signed), Harold Ickes to Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, September 26, 1945. Reservoir Sites.
1938 directing the Secretary of War to survey the Flathead River and tributaries for flood control purposes. The Upper Canyon Creek area came within the orbit of this congressional directive. It was "probable," Gardner advised, "that the Corps of Engineers, if it were sufficiently bold, could make these surveys whether or not it had permission of the Department [of the Interior]." 42 The Solicitor suggested granting permission in order to maintain administrative control and supervision over the Army surveys at Glacier. Park Service officials continued to feel that permission should be denied despite Gardner's legal reasoning. However, Ickes acquiesced to Gardner's logic but insisted Gardner make the letter granting permission to the Corps "a stiff one." 43

Unable to halt Corps surveys, Drury again tried to have references to reservoir sites affecting Glacier National Park deleted from the Bureau of Reclamation's Columbia Basin Reports. In a letter to Secretary Ickes, the National Park Service Director noted that "we will not be in a good position to withstand pressure from Corps of Engineers' projects in the parks if we include similar reservoir proposals in the Departmental reports. To include tentative

42 Memorandum, Warner W. Gardner to Harold Ickes, December 5, 1945. Glacier View Dam I.

43 Ibid.; pennote from Ickes to Gardner on Gardner's letter.
projects, such as the one for Glacier View, would only aggravate the situation."\textsuperscript{44} The Bureau steadfastly objected to deleting potential reservoir sites on the North Fork River. Their February 1947 report included the following reference to the Glacier View site:

\textit{\ldots a reservoir site at the Glacier View site would probably have less effect upon Glacier National Park than alternative storage possibilities on the upper Flathead River, where storage may be required ultimately for full use of water resources of the [Columbia] basin. \ldots}

"The value of such storage," the report admitted, "must be carefully weighed from an economic standpoint against the park values lost to determine the feasibility of this project."\textsuperscript{45}

Two things, then, were clear to National Park Service officials by early 1947. First, the contradictory nature of several Congressional acts negated the possibility of protecting Glacier from encroachment by the U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers. While the National Park Service wanted desperately to carry out its responsibility to preserve the park's

\textsuperscript{44} Memorandum, Newton Drury to Harold Ickes (Through the Water Resources Council), February 7, 1946. \textit{Glacier View Dam I.}

natural environment, the Corps of Engineers was equally responsible to the Congress for compiling comprehensive reports on the Columbia River Basin. Secondly, the contradictory nature of the Department of the Interior, of which the National Park Service was but a small part, augured against a solid Interior Department consensus for preservation. In fact, the Bureau of Reclamation, which remained in Washington during the war, continued to expand its programs and congressional support for water development schemes. Furthermore, by the time National Park Service national headquarters were re-established in Washington in 1946, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, generally a strong National Park Service supporter, had resigned. The Park Service's position within the Interior Department was weakened by these developments and the general post-war desire for unrestricted resource development.

Hemmed in by conflicting departmental interests within Interior, Drury decided that it was time to tap the major source of Park Service political support outside the government. Drury sent a short mimeographed circular on proposed dams in Glacier to over forty conservationist organizations in May 1947. The organizations on Drury's list were primarily preservationist in emphasis—as opposed to a 'wise use' conservationist orientation. The circular

46 Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics, p. 59.
briefly explained the effect of possible dams on Glacier National Park. Attached to the circular was an address for individuals wanting to write to the Corps of Engineers. The N.P.S. Region Two office provided detailed information on proposed dams to the organizations later in the same month. The memorandum noted that the proposed dam at the Glacier View site would be four hundred feet high and impound about three million acre feet of water in a twenty-eight mile long reservoir. Twenty-one thousand, five hundred acres of Glacier National Park would be inundated by the development and the fall and winter drawdown of the reservoir would average between 125 to 140 feet. The Region Two statement summarized the detrimental effects of Glacier View dam on the park:

Construction of the Glacier View Dam would seriously impair the primitive character of the North Fork section of the park by creation of a fluctuating artificial body of water. This area contains forests of exceptional beauty; its wilderness character is one of the most highly prized features of the park. Also, it would be extremely detrimental in its effect on wildlife, particularly the larger animals. The area that would be submerged would encompass practically all of the winter range of moose and white-tailed deer in the northwestern part of the park as well as materially reduce the range for many other species. In 1945 it was estimated that 70% of the winter range for 450 white-tailed deer, 20% of the winter range for 550 mule deer and elk, 80 to

47 Statement, Drury to conservationist organizations, May 14, 1947. Glacier View Dam I.
90% of the winter range of 100 moose, and 70% of the beaver colony population of 130 would be eliminated as a result of constructing the dam.48

The reservoir would flood, in addition, two ranger stations, the North Fork roads on both sides of the river, and raise the level of Logging Lake by fifty feet. The Park Service's assessment of Glacier View's effects on the park and park wildlife provided preservationists essential background information necessary to organize stiff opposition to the dam should the Army Corps of Engineers decide seriously to promote the project.

It had become clear, by January 1948, that the Corps' forthcoming review reports of proposed dam and reservoir sites in the Columbia Basin would emphasize and recommend for approval the Glacier View site.49 The National Park Service asked the Secretary of Interior, Julius Krug, to intervene directly in the Glacier View matter with the Secretary of War when Seattle District Engineer, Colonel L. H. Hewitt, informed the Service that the schedule for completion of the Columbia River Review Report had been accelerated to meet a completion date of Spring 1948.50 The Service


49 Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to O. A. Tomlinson, January 20, 1948, Glacier View Dam I; Memorandum, Herbert Maier to Newton Drury, January 26, 1948, Glacier View Dam I; Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to Herbert Maier, January 28, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

50 Memorandum, Herbert Maier to Newton Drury, January 26,
prepared a letter for Secretary Krug's signature which emphasized the primitive nature of the North Fork region and the Park Service's obligation to maintain it in a "natural state for the use and enjoyment of . . . this and future generations." The letter to Army Secretary Kenneth C. Royall asked for deletion of the Glacier View site from the Corps' reports. However, several agencies within Interior objected to the draft letter. Walton Seymour, Director of the Office of Power, recommended that National Park Service objections be first "presented at the regional level . . . and that any communications from the [Interior] Secretary be deferred until the [Interior] Department has been called upon officially to present its comments on a definite report of the Corps of Engineers." In short, Seymour insisted the National Park Service stay within established procedural channels and not short-circuit the process by directly appealing to the Secretary. Drury's response to Seymour's comments was curt. At the bottom of Seymour's letter Drury penned:

1948, Glacier View Dam I; Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to Herbert Maier, January 28, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

51 Draft letter, Secretary of the Interior Krug to Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, March 17, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

52 Memorandum, Walton Seymour to Newton Drury, March 30, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
Mr. Seymour:

Sorry, but I do not believe the letter should be further delayed.

N.B.D.
3-30-48

The proposed letter, drafted by the National Park Service, never reached Secretary Krug's office despite Drury's repeated insistence. Drury's staff redrafted the letter several times to meet objections but it was held in the office of an interested agency for over a week without having been signed. The delay was sufficiently long to convince Drury that he would have to delay urging Secretary Krug's intervention until after he saw the kind of treatment Army reports would accord the National Park Service position on Glacier View dam. National Park Service officials, stopped again by forces within Interior, decided to concentrate on preparing for Corps of Engineers hearings on the Glacier View proposal scheduled for Kalispell in May. The Service also began enlisting support from major national conservation organizations.

The notice of public hearings sent by the Corps to interested parties stressed both the legal authority for conducting the Kalispell hearings and the multi-purpose

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53 Memorandum, Newton Drury to L. C. Merriam and O. A. Tomlinson, April 23, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

54 Memorandum, Drury to conservationist organizations, May 4, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
aspects of the Glacier View dam proposals. According to the notice, the Glacier View proposal contemplated "headwater storage regulation for flood control, navigation, and hydroelectric production." Glacier View dam, in conjunction with other projects, would control completely the floods that cause damage in the vicinity of Kalispell and at other points along the Flathead River, and assist in the control of damaging floods throughout the Columbia system downstream. The project would [also] provide abundant and economical power throughout the year locally, and assist in relieving a critical power shortage which now is hampering the economic development of the entire region.

Recreation and soil conservation measures were also listed as valuable components of the plan.

The issue of dams on Glacier's western boundary became an open public debate in May 1948. The Army hearings, and later hearings in Spokane by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, provided an extended opportunity to clarify conflicting attitudes toward the future status of Glacier's North Fork area.

Preservationists focused attention on several issues during the period of open debate. At the outset, they attempted to lay to rest the clause in the Glacier Park Act

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55 Notice of Public Hearing, Issued by Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Seattle District Engineer, April 27, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

56 Ibid.
allowing Reclamation the right to use park areas for flowage purposes. Horace Albright, director of the National Park Service from 1929 to 1933, wrote Colonel Hewitt expressing his belief that the reclamation amendment applied only to existing projects on the park's east side. According to Albright, the reclamation clause did not justify the Glacier View dam proposal which he described as "a precedent of monstrous size and fearful portent. . . ." The American Planning and Civic Association buttressed Albright's interpretation by insisting that the Glacier View project was not, in any case, a reclamation scheme. The engineers' own report, they argued,

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reveals that of $8,488,000 estimated benefits [from the Glacier View project], $7,773,000 or 91.5 percent, will be realized from power, 7.15 percent from flood control, 0.8 percent from recreation, and 0.2 percent from navigational improvements.  
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The Association concluded that reclamation was not a part of the project. Therefore, the Glacier Park Act clearly lent no legislative authority to the project. Anticipating arguments of those who might wish to cite the reclamation clause to justify other schemes, the Association was quick to affirm that the reclamation amendment was not meant to negate the principal preservationist features of the Glacier Park Act.

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57Letter, Horace Albright to Colonel L. H. Hewitt, May 21, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
National Parks Director Drury echoed much the same rationale in opposing Glacier View dam. He noted that the reclamation clause in the May 11, 1910 Glacier Park Act was "permissive" but stated that there was "no evidence to indicate that this provision was ever intended to authorize the use of park lands for a huge hydroelectric project such as the Glacier View Dam proposal."60 Drury admitted that the Sherburne reservoir inundated park lands east of the Continental Divide. "Regrettable as these losses of rare national park lands were," Drury cautioned, "their importance is relatively minor when compared with the damage to the park that would result from the construction of the Glacier View power project. . . ."61

Dam opponents reinforced their anti-dam, anti-reclamation clause arguments by insisting that proper soil conservation and forestry management techniques should be used to enhance the ability of the land to regulate water flowage. "Maintaining a healthy forest cover on our watersheds . . .," the Master of the Montana State Grange argued, would be more efficacious than building gigantic dams.62 "Throwing dams across our streams," he said, "is

60 Statement, "Effect of Glacier View Dam Project upon Glacier National Park," May 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
61 Ibid.
62 Testimony, Winton Weydemeyer, Master of the Montana State Grange, May 25, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
in too many cases only an emergency measure, instituted to overcome in part the results of abuse of our watersheds."\(^6^3\)

Watershed management and protection, according to the Grange, obviated the necessity of building dams.\(^6^4\)

Preservationist arguments received a serious setback in late May of 1948. The entire Columbia River and its tributaries throbbed under the weight of spring floods while the Army hearings received testimony. A combination of heavy rains and unseasonably warm May weather turned the Northern Rockies' heavy snow pack into fast running water and accounted for an unusually high runoff throughout the Columbia drainage. "Old Man River has a hump in his back like a mad buffalo," reported Oregonian staff writer Leverett Richards, "and he's stampeding all over the place."\(^6^5\) National Parks Region Two Director L. C. Merriam suspected conspiracy between the Corps and mother nature. "The [Kalispell] hearing was apparently timed pretty well," he observed, "to coincide with the spring run-off in the Columbia River Basin. . . ."\(^6^6\) But not even the Corps could have guessed that the 1948 flood would be the

\(^6^3\)Ibid.


\(^6^5\)Portland Oregonian, May 29, 1948, p. 3.

\(^6^6\)Memorandum, L. C. Merriam to Newton Drury, June 2, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
biggest and most destructive since the freshets of 1894.

Disaster struck on Memorial Day 1948. The dikes protecting the community of Vanport, Oregon (population 18,000) sagged under the pressure of the flood-swollen Columbia River. Within an hour Vanport was gone. In the words of Oregon journalist Richard L. Neuberger, "Vanport City was reduced to a maelstrom of floating kindling" by the sudden influx of water. Miraculously, there were few deaths.

President Truman visited the moribund community early in June. He remarked: "I hope we can pass a program under which these disasterous floods will never happen again." Obviously, with public and Presidential attention engaged by the flooding Columbia, water resource agencies were under increased pressure to formulate proposals to guarantee adequately that the Vanport disaster would not happen again.

Preservationists recognized that the destruction of Vanport would heighten pressure for building a dam on the North Fork. Park Service Regional Director Merriam believed that decisions might be taken quickly by the Corps and Congress without taking all considerations into account. Acting Assistant National Parks Director Conrad L. Wirth

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68 Quoted in Oregonian, June 12, 1948, p. 1.
69 Memorandum, L. C. Merriam to Newton Drury, June 2, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
warned preservationists that "the Corps of Engineers will fight us to the limit on this [Glacier View dam] and . . . [they are] armed with a certain amount of superficial ammunition as a result of the recent floods in the Northwest."\textsuperscript{70}

Preservationist fears were accurate. At the Columbia Basin Inter Agency Committee\textsuperscript{71} meeting at Jackson, Wyoming, in late June, Army Corps of Engineer Colonel Thorton Weaver stated that the Glacier View dam, in co-ordination with two other structures, would have reduced the flood crest on the Columbia River at Portland by four feet.\textsuperscript{72} The implications of Colonel Weaver's remarks were clear; flood control dams on the Columbia's upper tributaries, and especially a dam at the Glacier View site, were needed desperately to prevent future Vanports.

The Park Service immediately placed A. van V. Dunn, Chief of the National Park Service Water Research Branch, in charge of investigating the flood control value of Glacier View dam. Dunn was to pare down the importance of a flood control structure on the North Fork. Dunn's preliminary report suited National Park Service objectives admirably. It characterized flood control storage at the Glacier View site as "a relatively gigantic plan for remote

\textsuperscript{70}Circular, Conrad Wirth to conservationists, July 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

\textsuperscript{71}The Columbia Basin Inter Agency Committee was a coordinating agency for water-related interests of the Department of the Interior.

\textsuperscript{72}Memorandum, Conrad Wirth to O. A. Tomlinson, July 7, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
contingencies on a minor tributary of the Columbia River." Dunn's main conclusion indicated that the North Fork flood-crest reached the area of Vanport ten to twelve days after the main Columbia crest passed the same point and subsided. He reasoned, therefore, that a dam at Glacier View would account only for three or four inches of the four feet reduction Colonel Weaver desired. Dunn's analysis strongly supported the National Park Service contention that the dam at Glacier View site was primarily a hydroelectric project with only incidental flood control values.  

National Park Service attempts to demonstrate scientifically the limited value of flood control on the North Fork did not lessen pressure from the Corps or from water control agencies within the Department of the Interior. Officials within Interior insisted that the Park Service reappraise "factually rather than emotionally" their position on Glacier View. Arthur Piper, Chairman of the Pacific Northwest Coordinating Committee, called for a Park Service reappraisal because he believed Glacier View dam to be an essential element in the Army's comprehensive plan. Piper saw other advantages in the Glacier View site for a major reservoir.

73 A. van V. Dunn, "Comments Concerning Hydrological and Hydraulic Features of Proposed Glacier View Dam," August 27, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

74 Memorandum, Arthur Piper to Walton Seymour, August 9, 1948, Glacier View Dam III.
Glacier View would not require expensive relocation of communities or major transportation networks. Piper also felt that the recreational benefits from the Glacier View reservoir would open the North Fork to more tourists. The Corps of Engineers agreed with Piper's reasoning. Colonel Arthur Wipple complained that "reservoirs either interfered with humans and developed lands or wildlife and wilderness. As time passes," he warned, "these problems will be greater since it is certain that development in the Columbia Basin will continue to expand." For Colonel Wipple, the problem compounded itself with the passage of time and additional development. Undeveloped wildlands looked increasingly attractive to the Corps as settlement elsewhere precluded the possibility of flooding large areas.

The position of preservationists looked bleak in the fall of 1948. Regional Director O. A. Tomlinson reviewed a preliminary draft of the Report Review on the Columbia River and Tributaries, Corps of Engineers in the Washington office of the Chief of Engineers. Tomlinson reported to Drury:

You will find . . . that the Report, as to the Glacier View target, is a shotgun blast hitting in a very good pattern as closely as diplomacy will permit to the position of the Secretary and the Service. If the report is not confidential we believe that every effort now should be made through

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75 Quoted in memorandum, George Olcutt to O. A. Tomlinson, August 6, 1948, Glacier View Dam II.
appropriate means to point out to the public the strong desire of the Corps to invade Glacier National Park, and that it is the time for park conservationists to redouble their opposition to the proposal.76

Reading further into the report Tomlinson found the basic Corps position in support for Glacier View dam:

Intangibles, such as national security, loss of life, improved standards of living, and stabilization of business employment over a long period will be impressive by-products of this development. . . . These factors constitute potent arguments for the development of the valuable water resources now largely wasted, and far outweigh the few minor disturbances of local economy or conflicts with resources of lesser significance that cannot be avoided. 77

Drury decided to reinform conservationist organizations. He moved, at the same time, to re-institute a direct appeal from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Army to have the Glacier View proposal deleted from the Corps' reports. Secretary Krug agreed to Drury's request; a letter went to Army Secretary Royall on December 3, 1948. W. S. Moore, Colonel, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, replied to Krug's letter four days later:

The Board [of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors] appreciates knowing of your interest in the proposed improvement and I can assure you that in future study of the engineering

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76 Memorandum, O. A. Tomlinson to Newton B. Drury, November 18, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

77 Ibid., quoted from Report Review on the Columbia River and Tributaries, Corps of Engineers, chapter 3, p. III-40, section 70, Glacier View Dam I.
and economic features of the Glacier View Reservoir the Board will give careful consideration to the views and comments contained in your communication prior to formulating its recommendations to the Chief of Engineers.\textsuperscript{78}

This must have sounded very much like a form letter to Secretary Krug. It was obvious that the Secretary of War was not ready to intercede with the Chief Engineer. Arthur Maass, in \textit{Muddy Waters}, notes that the Secretary of War generally, "exercises little, if any, real supervision or review over the conduct of Engineer civil functions." This, perhaps, accounts for the polite but negative reply to Krug's letter by Colonel Moore.\textsuperscript{79} Again, the National Park Service regrouped and prepared to argue its case before the Board of Engineers meeting at Spokane in January and February 1949.

Proponents of Glacier View dam at the Spokane hearings outnumbered opponents by two to one. The pro-dam spokesman represented chambers of commerce, bankers, labor unions, farm groups and local electrical cooperatives. Don Trealoar, chairman of the 700-member Flathead Valley Citizens Committee, presented the proponents' strongest arguments in favor of Glacier View dam. Reflecting on the "distressing and damaging floods of 1948," Trealoar said, "the time has come for

\textsuperscript{78}Letter, W. S. Moore to Secretary Krug, December 7, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.

the Northwest to protect and preserve human life and property ahead of any other considerations, especially when that protection can be secured by such beneficial means as the building of Glacier View Dam. Much of Trealoar's support for the Glacier View dam was linked to opposition to a proposed dam at Paradise, Montana, which would create a reservoir one-third the size of Fort Peck Reservoir and flood the towns of Paradise, Dixon, Moise, parts of Ravalli and St. Regis, and some Flathead Indian Reservations lands. Glacier View, by comparison, would disrupt little according to Trealoar; he estimated tax revenue losses to Flathead County would amount to only $500 annually if Glacier View dam was constructed. Trealoar professed "unqualified support for the Glacier View Dam..." He discounted detrimental effects of the Glacier View Reservoir on North Fork wildlife; he did not believe the Park Service estimates on the effect of the reservoir on moose populations in particu-


81Great Falls Tribune, January 9, 1948, p. 1, Glacier View Dam; Senator James E. Murray Papers, University of Montana Archives.


83Ibid., p. 36.
lar. I "feel sure that...some moose in the area...would probably have more to eat if they sought forage at slightly higher elevations," he said, "either on the benchlands above the flowage areas or in the high range which is still intact further up the river."\(^{84}\)

Labor representatives agreed with Trealoar's assessment. "We understand the Park Service looks with disfavor on displacing the deer and elk. This local [International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Labor Union of America, Local 1192, A.F.L., Kalispell, Montana] looks with equal disfavor on the displacing of several thousand workers and their families."\(^{85}\) The consensus among labor representatives at the hearings was solid:

\begin{quote}
Civilization must go forward...the great watersheds of the Pacific northwest [sic] in the United States have already been idle too long in rendering the services they should to mankind....The plea that the habitat of certain wild animals will be destroyed is of small consequence, considering the human factors in the matter and considering the modern techniques available for creating game preserves and propogating them with the desired species of wild life.\(^{86}\)
\end{quote}

In the scheme of things for the labor representatives, deer, elk, and moose were reminiscent of cartoonist Jay Norwood Darling's quip that wildlife was like the "bow-legged girl

\(^{84}\)Ibid., p. 38.
\(^{85}\)Ibid., p. 51.
\(^{86}\)Ibid., p. 41.
of the village . . . Everybody sympathizes with her but never asks her to the picnic."87 "Civilization's" values clearly had prior claim in the mind of Glacier View proponents at the Spokane hearings.

The National Parks Association contested the flood control value of Glacier View Dam. The Association's representative stated that the 1948 flood would have been less destructive had "mountain slopes . . . not been logged so severely. . . ."88 The Association cited, as supportive evidence, a Forest Service report which noted "that considerable water would have been held back until after the flood peaks passed, if millions of upland acres in the [Columbia] basin had not been previously deprived of their forest cover."89

To the surprise of some observers the Whitefish Chamber of Commerce presented a strong statement in opposition to Glacier View Dam. Spokesman Brad Seeley, argued that the North Fork area served the highest possible value to the region and the nation as part of Glacier National Park.90

Another source of unexpected opposition to the Glacier View Dam came from a Montana Power Company spokesman who

89Ibid., p. 58.
90Ibid., p. 296.
presented a detailed statement for his company. S. P. Hogan, Secretary of Montana Power Company, said his company had 349,500 kilowatts of installed generating capacity and 56,000 additional kilowatts of supplemental power which would be available from Kerr Dam within a few months. In addition, Hogan noted that another 66,000 kilowatts of power-producing equipment were on order by Montana Power Company. Hogan's message was that his company could satisfy all the current and future electrical needs of Montanans; federal power dams were neither needed nor wanted.91

H. Frank Evans, a long-time summer resident of the North Fork, spoke for the Sierra Club, National Parks Association and the Wilderness Society in opposition to Glacier View dam. Evans presented an articulate summary of National Park Service principles to the Army Board. He was intimately familiar with the North Fork region of the park, having conducted 'Wilderness Trips' through Glacier's back-country for several years. "Wilderness is . . . great music . . ." to visitors who come "from the highly mechanized cities of the East" Evans told his listeners.92 "The National park ideal [which protects Glacier's wilderness] stands as a beacon of hope in an age that is well blighted by power, war and moral degradation. . . . A violation to Glacier National Park . . . ,"

91Ibid., pp. 275-77.
92Ibid., p. 258.
Evans warned, "would be a severe and heartfelt blow to an ideal which is dear to the hearts of millions of our people." Evans asked his auditors to consider the affects of Glacier View dam on the park:

This park would be impaired far beyond the stinking, lifeless shores of a fluctuating artificial lake. Inundation of the valley would destroy a major portion of the park wildlife. . . . Wilderness, as an entity, as a biological whole, would vanish forever, for the wildlife is an integral part of the wilderness as is the terrifyingly beautiful scenery that sweeps the horizons of the valley. Already pitifully scarce are those areas where wolves, wolverine and the slinking lions and other predators are on a par with the horned and antlered clans.

The quintessential point of the Glacier View dam issue, Evans reminded his audience, was that "Wilderness once removed is lost forever." Evans pushed his justification for Glacier's wilderness much further than most defenders of the North Fork. He cautioned people not to think that the area could withstand large numbers of people. "Wilderness . . . is a fragile thing which cannot stand the trampling of many feet," he said. The Park Service usually shied away from such statements, preferring to accentuate the increasing use and future potential of the valley to the park visitors.

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93 Ibid., pp. 258-59.
94 Ibid., p. 259.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 260.
97 Letter, John W. Emmert to Jean Sullivan, April 30, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
Evans also tried to educate the Spokane hearing participants to the psychological values of preserving the North Fork Valley in its pristine condition. "It is immensely satisfying to know of the existence of something that you may never feel," he said. "I shall perhaps never visit England, but I would be spiritually shocked if I knew it had been destroyed." Evans ended his statements to the Board of Rivers and Harbors hearing with an adamant defense of the North Fork Valley:

We will not compromise short of the complete abandonment of the Glacier View Project. . . . Sorry, the North Fork is already taken; you'll have to find something else.

The Spokane hearings conducted by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors ended formal public review of the Glacier View Project. Established procedure dictated that the Board and the Chief of Engineers transmit their recommendations to the Congress--through the office of the Bureau of the Budget in the White House. Both sides in the controversy tried to elicit support for their position from high level governmental officials between February and April 1949. Associated Press reporter Ernest B. Vaccaro asked President Truman if he opposed construction of the Glacier View dam at a February 17 press conference. Truman replied

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99Ibid., p. 261.
to Vaccaro's enquiry with an evasive answer. "I can't re-
member enough about the case, Tony. That's the first I had
heard of that controversy. Is that on the - that the
Hungry Horse Dam?"

"I think it's Flat Head Dam" or something like that,
replied Vaccaro. "First I heard of it was ten minutes ago.
[Laughter]."

"Then I happen to know a little bit more about it than
you do, Tony," Truman retorted. More laughter followed
Truman's humorous reply but it was clear that the President
hoped to maintain an aloof posture on the Glacier View issue
to avoid provoking additional controversy. Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug continued to
press the Secretary of War and the Board of Engineers for
Rivers and Harbors to drop the Glacier View proposal from
their list of recommended projects. Explaining his position
in a letter to Congressman Michael Mansfield, Krug said,

\[100\] U.S., President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1945-1953),
Harry S. Truman, Press Conference Statement, February 17,

\[101\] Truman followed essentially the same tactic in the
spring 1947 controversy over Olympic National Park boundaries.
See, Richardson, *Dams, Parks and Politics,* p. 43; also, in
January 1953, after enlarging Olympic National Park, Truman
was asked to comment on his decision. The President feigned
ignorance--asking if the reporter did not mean Mount Rainier.
Truman said he had never heard of Olympic National Park!;
see, HST, *Public Papers,* p. 1069.
"I do not deny the need for water control on the Clark Fork, but we must find some way to do it without sacrificing Glacier National Park."\(^\text{102}\)

Five days later, Krug successfully concluded an agreement with the Chief of Engineers to drop the Glacier View dam proposal from the list of recommended projects submitted by the Corps to Congress. The agreement ended years of effort by preservationists to halt dam construction on the North Fork. The agreement came as a welcome victory for the National Park Service as it girded itself for a confrontation with the Bureau of Reclamation over plans to construct a dam in Dinosaur National Monument.\(^\text{103}\)

Several factors lay behind the ability of preservationists to stop the Army Corps of Engineers' recommendation of the Glacier View project. National Park Director Newton B.

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\(^{102}\) Letter, Julius Krug to Congressman Mansfield, April 6, 1949, Glacier View Dam II.

\(^{103}\) The exact reasons for the Corps' willingness to forego immediately recommending the Glacier View dam for construction are obscure. The Corps' general correspondence files on the project apparently have been misplaced or lost. Without these papers, it is difficult to assess precisely the Corps' thinking in April 1949. See letter, Steven Foster to author, March 18, 1976, appendix; several other sources were not available to the writer for research. The Montana Power Company failed to answer requests for research material. Likewise, Senator Michael Mansfield's files were not available. See letter, Mike Mansfield to Professor H. Duane Hampton, October 30, 1975, appendix. Mansfield sent no xerox material to the author on the Glacier View Project. See also Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, passim, pp. 129-186; also, Philip Sorotkin and Owen Stratton, The Echo Park Dam Controversy and Upper Colorado River Development, Inter-University Case Program, Draft copy loaned by Newton B. Drury to author, p. 69.
Drury and his staff formed a solid cadre around which preservationists could rally. Drury's unwillingness to compromise lost his department some support within Interior but strengthened the Park Service's support from conservationist organizations.

The Corps of Engineers, itself, was under heavy attack in early 1949. The Hoover Commission and its Task Force, on Natural Resources recommended to the President that the Corps' civil water functions be transferred to the Department of Interior. In addition, President Truman asked the Congress to create a Columbia Valley Administration to end piecemeal treatment of Columbia River development. These factors perhaps weakened the Corps' resolve. The Corps had enough trouble by April 1949; to further embroil itself in the Glacier View dam controversy might weaken defenses elsewhere.

Preservationists received support from several groups not directly interested in park preservation. As noted earlier, the Montana Power Company opposed federal dams at Glacier View, Hungry Horse, Paradise, Libby or elsewhere. Although the Park Service was hesitant about such arguments, it probably was happy to have Montana Power Company's aid nevertheless. Montana Senator James E. Murray typified

104 Maass, Muddy Waters, p. 113.
105 Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 19-38.
106 The Park Service supported the construction of the
one facet of on-again, off-again support for Glacier View
dam which must have made officers in the Corps rue the day
they first suggested the Glacier View Project. Murray
wanted, above all else, a coordinated plan for Columbia
Basin development. An early sponsor and enthusiast for
the Missouri Valley Authority, Murray withheld support for
the Glacier View dam until he was satisfied that the Corps
and the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to a coordinated com-
prehensive plan. Murray's opposition aimed at protect-
ing Montana's interests--not in stopping the Glacier View
dam per se. In this effort, many Montanans supported
Murray's concern that Montana not be turned into a huge
reservoir for use by Oregon and Washington.

Preservationists were elated by the victory at Glacier
View regardless of the complex nature of events and inter-
est which effectively stopped the project. However, they
realized that the success was a costly one. The editor of
the National Parks Magazine assessed the price paid:

... it must not be overlooked that this
struggle has been costly in money and time

Hungry Horse Dam. With one element of the Flathead River
controlled they hoped pressure for dams on the North Fork
would be lessened.

Statement, Senator James E. Murray, "Paradise and
Glacier View," May 10, 1948, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers;
see also, Montana Reclamation Association statement, "Pro-
posal of the Corps of Engineers to Construct Glacier View Dam
and Paradise Dam on the Columbia River Watershed of Western
Montana," April/May 1948, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers;
letter, James E. Murray to J. S. McFarland, June 19, 1948,
Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers.
not only to the many groups and individuals that fought it, but also to the taxpayers in financing the exploration of the dam site and the drafting plans. Many headaches and waste of great sums of money could be avoided if, once and for all, the officials of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers would realize that the national parks and monuments have been set aside by law to be preserved as nature made them.108

The editorial appeal fell on many deaf ears. The April 11, 1949 agreement not to recommend the Glacier View reservoir site was a matter of convenience on the part of one water development agency, not a recognition of preservationist principles.

CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

It takes time to persuade men to do even what is for their own good.

Thomas Jefferson

The Glacier View dam controversy did not terminate in April 1949. The Corps summarized its position on the dam in a statement on Principles and Responsibilities for development of the Columbia River Basin in this manner:

The Glacier View project, which is one of the most economically favorable projects considered for the [comprehensive Columbia River Basin] plans, and which is approved by the State of Montana and local interests generally, is strongly opposed by many because it would encroach upon Glacier National Park.

The statement concluded that, in view of the strong opposition, the project should not be authorized "at this time. . . ."\(^1\)

Although the Corps generally respected the April agreement to look elsewhere in the Columbia Basin for water storage sites, there were numerous attempts to have Glacier View

dam constructed by other interests. Demands for the dam were most often local. Western Montana Congressman Mike Mansfield introduced House Resolution 6153 in August, 1949, seeking immediate authorization and construction of Glacier View dam. Mansfield reiterated earlier arguments that the dam would be of immediate benefit to the regional economy with minimal effects on Glacier National Park. He believed that the North Fork was not a crucial segment of Glacier since it was

separated from the rest of the park by a divide with very poor roads leading into it, and [because] ... very few of the park's visitors go into this area.

In Mansfield's opinion, the Glacier View dam

would not affect the beauty of the park in any way but would make it more beautiful by creating a large lake over ground that ... has no scenic attraction. ... As to wild game now occupying this area, there are vast areas just as good nearby that the game could move into.²

National Park Service officials were surprised by Mansfield's attempt to short-circuit the April agreement. However, they speculated that H.R. 6153 probably represented "a gesture ... for local consumption ... while the House [of Representatives] is in recess."³

²Letter, Mike Mansfield to Julius Krug, February 25, 1949, Glacier View Dam IV. Mansfield entered the letter to Krug in the Congressional Record in support of his position on the Glacier View project.

³Letter, Charles A. Rickey, Acting Chief, Land and Rec-
Mansfield's bill never came out of the Committee on Public Lands. Congress apparently preferred to abide by established procedures and consider the Glacier View dam only as part of the Corps' survey reports.\(^4\) Mansfield pushed again for construction of the Glacier View dam during the Korean War. He maintained that the dam was essential for successful prosecution of the conflict.\(^5\) President Truman had decided, however, not to authorize any new water development projects while the war continued. The President's decision undermined Mansfield's efforts.\(^6\)

Local business groups, farmers, and labor unions supported Mansfield's pro-Glacier View dam position. The completion of Hungry Horse Dam in the early 1950s, for example, reawakened local interest in large federal projects at other potential sites near Kalispell. Daily Inter Lake editor William B. Sweetland explained the new interest:

> It is felt that there must be some effort made to provide other projects of the type

\(^4\)Memorandum, Conrad Wirth to Region Two Director, January 31, 1950, Glacier View Dam IV.

\(^5\)Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 59; and letter, Mansfield to Walter Nye, December 9, 1950, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers.

\(^6\)Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 73.
of Hungry Horse dam . . . which will help assure a sustained, aggressive economy in this region.  

Sweetland and other community leaders applied pressure for federal dams--and Glacier View dam in particular--whenever political or economic conditions seemed to favor such a move.

Not all interest in the Glacier View dam was local. Paul Raver, chief of the Bonneville Power Administration, actively pushed for the project in the early 1950s; Michael Straus, Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner, strongly supported Glacier View dam construction. Straus was unhappy with the Corps' decision not to recommend immediately the Glacier View site. He commented, "I think the Department [of Interior] is wrong, and I am going to see that it [Glacier View] is built - preferably by Reclamation." Secretaries of Interior were reluctant to become embroiled in the controversy. Horace Albright warned Douglas McKay

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7Letter, William B. Sweetland to James E. Murray, January 27, 1955, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers; see also, "Labor Petition for Glacier View Dam," quoted in Daily Inter Lake, October 9, 1955, p. 1; Letter, Charles Byers, Business Manager, Local Union 768, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Kalispell, Montana to Stanley E. Thompson, December 13, 1954, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers; and letter, James E. Murray to Stanley E. Thompson, January 27, 1955, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers in which Murray gives the following advice: "I think it would be highly desirable if labor and other groups in that area [Kalispell] would organize an association for the purpose of promoting interest in the construction of this dam [Glacier View]."

8Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 59-60.
that the Glacier View issue was potential "political TNT" for both Interior and the Eisenhower administration. McKay reiterated departmental opposition to the site and Reclamation quickly adjusted its statements to reflect the Secretary's position. 9

The initial Park Service response to continued solicitation for the Glacier View structure was cautious. Director Drury and Region Two Director Lawrence Merriam decided that the Park Service "should not make any concerted effort to oppose the Glacier View Dam at the present but that it was quite alright [sic] to talk to individuals along the line of opposing the dam. . . ." 10 Several University of Montana professors, many of them friends of Mike Mansfield, were shown through Glacier. The Park Service hoped this indirect method would convince Mansfield to modify his position on the North Fork dam.

Glacier Park officials also began a survey of Glacier's value to the Montana economy during the summer of 1949. N.P.S. Director Drury had suggested, as early as February 1949, that such a survey was necessary to "bring this [Glacier View Dam issue] down to earth." 11 The tourist survey

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9 Ibid., p. 109.
10 Memorandum, John Emmert to Region Two Director, National Park Service, September 19, 1949, Glacier View Dam IV.
11 Memorandum, Drury to Region Two Director, National Park Service, February 16, 1949, Glacier View Dam I. National
contacted 3495 out-of-state visitors who camped at least one night in the park. The survey results suggested that 75 percent of the people interviewed attributed their visit to Montana directly to a desire to see Glacier National Park. The survey also listed the cities in Montana that benefited most from tourist travel to Glacier Park: Missoula, Great Falls, Havre, Helena, and Kalispell.12

In 1954 tourist surveys placed the direct economic value of Glacier National Park to the regional economy at fifteen million dollars. The 1954 survey was quick to point out that travel to the park grew substantially each year. The implication was that local communities could count on the park's value to increase annually. Park officials' arguments were surprisingly simple. They contended that the people of the area could not have both dam construction and increasing tourist travel. "If Glacier National Park is despoiled by encroachments incompatible with its wilderness character," park officials warned, "it will no longer attract these visitors - particularly after the wilderness

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Park Service Director Steven Mather had tried to convince state and local leaders of the potential "tourist gold" and economic importance of national parks for regional economies as early as 1916. See, Donald C. Swain, "The Passage of the National Park Service Act of 1916," Wisconsin Magazine of History (Autumn 1966):8.
becomes even more precious to Americans." Dam projects, they concluded, "could easily compare to the 'killing of the goose that laid the golden eggs'."\textsuperscript{13}

The National Park Service was not content, however, with the generally defensive nature of lobbying and economic surveys. In 1951 the Service took the offensive. Arthur E. Demaray, National Park Service Director succeeding Drury, approved a plan to construct a highway from Apgar to the U.S. Forest Service road west of the North Fork River. The proposed highway would continue up the North Fork Valley on the Forest Service side, pass over Akamina Pass, and connect with an existing highway near Waterton Lakes Townsite in Canada. The highway would complete the western segment of a figure-eight loop transportation system encircling the park.\textsuperscript{14}

Demaray's approval of the project was an about-face from previous park policy. Earlier, Regional Director Lawrence Merriam warned against promoting North Fork travel.

\textsuperscript{13}National Park Service, "The Glacier View Dam," Item one, Glacier National Park Conservation Problems, June 20, 1955, p. 5, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers.

Merriam told Glacier Superintendent Emmert that additional travel there would bring "considerable pressure for road improvement. . . ." Primary "highways are not contemplated," Merriam said, "since they would ruin the wilderness aspect of that section of the park."

The change in policy for the North Fork reflected National Park Service uneasiness with continued pressure for Glacier View dam. In 1953, Emmert called the loop road to Waterton "the best defense we can make against the Glacier View Dam. . . ." Acting Region Two Director Howard Baker explained the National Park Service support of the North Fork highway. "We do not see," he said, "how the tremendous wilderness values of the west slope can otherwise be enjoyed by the public."

Anticipating increased travel into the North Fork, the Park Service built two new campgrounds at Quartz and Logging.

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15 Memorandum, Emmert to Region Two Director, April 13, 1949, and memorandum, Region Two Director, to Emmert, April 19, 1949, Glacier View Dam II. During Drury's Directorship of the National Park Service opposition to access roads reached its height. Drury revealed his attitude toward roads in a statement to wilderness buff Robert Marshall, "I am against roads," he told Marshall, "I am death on roads." Quoted in Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 8.

16 The North Fork highway also would lessen pressure on the Going-to-the-Sun Road. Personal interview with John Emmert, December 20, 1975.

17 Memorandum, John Emmert to Region Two Director, April 13, 1949, and memorandum, Region Two Director to John Emmert, April 19, 1949, Glacier View Dam II.
Lakes in 1953, "to avert pressure for the Glacier View dam."\(^{18}\)
The loop highway and campground developments were National Park Service attempts to justify, by increased usage, the continued park status of the North Fork Valley. By occupying the reservoir area and increasing visitor 'enjoyment' there, the Service hoped to undercut dam proponent arguments.\(^{19}\) However, the Park Service efforts severely conflicted with earlier defenses of the valley as a wilderness retreat. The highway and campground promotions clearly illustrated how far the National Park Service could be pushed to 'protect' the North Fork from reservoir inundations. The last line of defense in the Park Service strategy was to develop the wilderness in order to 'save' it.\(^{20}\)

The pressure for construction of the Glacier View dam

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\(^{19}\) The road building tactic was nothing new to preservationists. For example, the Sierra Club attempted to put a road into the Hetch Hetchy Valley in 1909 to stem the tide for reservoir construction. See, Holway R. Jones, *John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Publication, 1965), p. 122. Approximately 500,000 motorists were expected to use the loop highway each year. See, Bolle, "The Basis of Multiple Use Management," p. 211.

\(^{20}\) The highway from Apgar to the Forest Service North Fork road was completed in 1967. Local preference for the status quo and decreasing pressure for Glacier View dam after the mid-1950s contributed to the Park Service dropping plans for completing the loop highway system. See, U.S., Department of Agriculture, *Flathead River, Wild and Scenic River Report* (Kalispell: July 1973), p. 64.
abated somewhat after the mid-1950s. The inability of resource development agencies to establish dams elsewhere within the National Park system cooled enthusiasm for such projects. Specifically, the unsuccessful Bureau of Reclamation attempt to place a major water storage facility at Echo Park in Dinosaur National Monument increased preservationist resolve to keep the park system free of water control structures. The Echo Park defeat was a clear lesson to water development proponents in the Columbia River Basin. Montana Congressman Lee Metcalf carefully analyzed the status of the Glacier View project in light of the Echo Park decision. Metcalf bluntly stated to Inter Lake editor William B. Sweetland that

introduction of . . . [Glacier View Dam] legislation would, in my opinion, be detrimental to the development of water resources of the entire northwest, because it would get us into a controversy like the one which developed around the Upper Colorado Project. . . . I don't want any more opposition to our Montana water resource development than we already have. I don't want to have the whole development of the Upper Columbia identified with an attempted invasion of Glacier National Park as the Upper Colorado is identified with the attempted invasion of the Dinosaur.

The lesson of Echo Park was clear to Metcalf. Many other

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21 Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 129-152 deals with the Echo Park controversy.

leaders came to the same realization. By 1957, even Mont­
tana Senator Mike Mansfield told constituents that chances
for constructing Glacier View dam were "nil." Mansfield
suggested efforts be concentrated on more probable proj­
ects.23

Current discussion of dams on the North Fork River re­
volves around debate of the Wild and Scenic River status
for the rivers of the Upper Flathead Basin. The National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 directed the U.S. Forest
Service to study 219 miles of the Upper Flathead River for
possible inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic River
System.24 If the North Fork is included in the system,
future dam construction would be prohibited.25 The Corps of
Engineers and the Federal Power Commission oppose Wild and
Scenic River status for the North Fork. Both agencies feel
the possibility of dam construction should remain open for
future hydroelectric and storage needs.26 However, the
Forest Service recommends inclusion of the entire North Fork

23Quoted in (Columbia Falls) Hungry Horse News, Octo­


25Ibid., p. 50.

26Ibid., p. 16, citing letters from the Corps of Engi­
eers and the Federal Power Commission to the Regional
Forester, Flathead National Forest, dated March 8, 1973
and March 20, 1973, respectively.
River within the Wild and Scenic River System. Congress must now decide the relative merits between resource development and preservation.

Sixty-five years have passed since the establishment of Glacier Park. The difficulty of protecting the natural environment from encroachment by those who would develop and utilize the park is amply illustrated during those years. The Sixty-first Congress, debating the Glacier Park bill, was unwilling to establish solid guidelines for the park's preservation. In fact, the weight of the Organic Act was clearly on the side of protecting both past and future development. Park officials were burdened, therefore, with an ambiguous and contradictory Organic Act. They rode the back of a fitful tiger whenever they tried to justify preservation of park landscape.

It is probable that park officials could not have prevented reclamation developments east of the Continental Divide even had they desired to do so. The Sherburne Reservoir, or its equivalent, was a foregone conclusion when President Taft signed the May 1910 Organic Act. It did not matter that the Sherburne Dam was not part of the original reclamation scheme. The act allowed "any area" to be developed for reclamation purposes. The surprising thing was that more areas were not developed.

Ibid., p. 104.
West of the Continental Divide the situation was similar. Fortunately, the demand for water control structures came after the National Park Service developed an abhorrence for such projects. But, again, Glacier's Organic Act provided no solid framework on which preservationists could fall back. And worse, the act provided no strong statement to the general public as to the park's purpose. In part, the misunderstandings among the local communities can be traced to the failure to define the preservationist principle. Not surprisingly, therefore, local interests pointed to the Organic Act as justification for development. For example, a 1955 labor union petition for the Glacier View dam noted:

> it is apparent that as early as 1910 intelligent and far-sighted people recognized that portions of the park would be needed for . . . [reclamation] purposes by an enlightened and expanding people. The time foreseen even at that early date has arrived and we feel that this portion of the park should now be used for the purpose for which it was intended and for which reservation has been made in the very act of creation.\(^2^8\)

The Park Service response to such statements was feeble and historically inaccurate. Officials argued that the reclamation provision pertained to a project on the east side of the Park entailing two low earthfilled dams -

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Sherburne and Lower Two Medicine - along the eastern boundary of the Park for irrigation needs on and adjacent to the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. These projects were underway when the Park was established and were recognized to be but minor impoundments.29

Park Service officials were on safer grounds when they maintained that the Glacier View project was not a reclamation project but a flood control and hydroelectric scheme. Yet even that argument could cut both ways; after the 1964 flood in and around Glacier Park, the Bureau of Reclamation assumed responsibility for future development projects on the North Fork River.30

In the final analysis the Glacier Park Organic Act offered little support to the Park Service position for preserving the natural environment of the park. The Service tended, therefore, to cite later legislation that contained stronger preservationist statements.31 Finally, the Park Service appealed to people to recognize the fact that the 1910 legislation no longer suited the post-World War II need for undisturbed wilderness. Drury told people

Civilization is encroaching on these great wilderness areas all over our land; what remains of them becomes increasingly pre-

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29 National Park Service, "The Glacier View Dam Project," pp. 2-3, Glacier View Dam II.


Drury's appeal recognized that the resource decisions made during the heated Progressive conservation movement debates did not provide adequate protection for America's shrinking wilderness areas. Yet Drury's appeal and the general debate on the Glacier View issue underscored an even more significant fact; preservationists at mid-century were no more willing than their Progressive Era cousins to confront head-on the preservationist issue at Glacier. No one suggested that the Park Service ask Congress to repeal the reclamation clause in the original Glacier Park Act. They evidently felt that such a move would be fraught with too many pitfalls. As a result, the amendment remains to this day in the act—a potential nightmare threatening the preservationist principle.

32 Statement, Newton Drury for inclusion in the Army Corps of Engineers Columbia River Basin Report, Glacier View Dam II.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

LETTERS
October 30, 1975

Professor H. D. Hampton  
Department of History  
University of Montana  
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Hampton:

This will acknowledge your letter of the 16th and the enclosed letter from Mr. Oppedahl.

I wish it were possible for me to comply with the request made by Mr. Oppedahl, but, unfortunately, while some of my files for those years have been sent to the University, in checking, I find that the file on the Glacier View Dam project was not sent out because this is a project on which there might be further discussion in the future, and on files of this kind, I feel that they should be kept here for future reference.

I will, however, be glad to go through the file on this project to see if I can duplicate some of the information in the file and send it to Mr. Oppedahl. It is my hope that this material will be helpful to him in the research he is doing.

With best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

cc—R. James Oppedahl  
510 North Orange St.  
Missoula, Montana 59801
Mr. R. James Oppedahl  
Department of History  
University of Montana  
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Mr. Oppedahl:

This responds to your several questions regarding Glacier View and Smokey Range damsites (Upper Flathead River Basin).

The Bureau of Reclamation completed an information report on the Spruce Park development on the Middle Fork of the Flathead River in 1961. These studies were discontinued because of strong public sentiment against the effects the project would have on the fish and wildlife resources of the area. Studies of sites on the North Fork at Glacier View were reported in 1948, and at Smokey Range in 1962 by the Corps of Engineers. These studies were also deferred because of strong objection to these developments and the effects they would have on Glacier National Park.

The need for local flood control measures were overwhelmingly demonstrated by the devastating flood that occurred during June 1964. That flood caused an estimated $24 million in flood damages and required evacuation of about 6,000 people due to flooding caused by the uncontrolled flows of the North and Middle Forks of the Flathead River. On the South Fork of the Flathead River, Hungry Horse Reservoir stored and held back virtually all of the flood runoff produced. This flood was different than previously recorded floods in that it was caused primarily by rain. Floods similar to that of June 1964 may be repeated and even be exceeded in the future.

As a result of the 1964 flood, the Montana State Legislative Assembly requested the Bureau of Reclamation to reactivate its studies of storage sites on the Flathead River. The Corps of Engineers, under separate authority, was also directed to review previous reports and studies related to the Flathead and Clark Fork Basins.

In May 1965, the Montana Power Company and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation filed joint license applications with the Federal Power Commission for projects Buffalo Rapids
This proposal led to a directive from the Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of Reclamation requesting the Bureau to broaden the scope of its studies to include both the upper and lower Flathead River Basins. Subsequently (about mid 1965), the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers initiated a joint investigation for development of known storage and run of river sites in the entire Flathead-Clark Fork Basin for flood control and hydropower. The findings of that joint study were published in September 1967, "Memorandum Report on Clark Fork Basin, Montana, for the Federal Power Commission."

It was determined in the above mentioned study (September 1967) that a minimum of about 1,500,000 acre-feet of flood control storage on the North Fork and at least 500,000 acre-feet of flood control storage on the Middle Fork of the Flathead River would be necessary to effectively control floods. It was also decided that the Bureau of Reclamation would take the lead and utilize all available information from previous reports together with developing new information to report on the storage sites in the upper and lower Flathead River Basin.

Glacier View Project as reported on by the Corps of Engineers in 1948, included a dam and reservoir with 3,160,000 acre-feet of active storage capacity. A public hearing was held May 29, 1948, at Kalispell, Montana. Several local committees, chambers of commerce, and labor councils favored the project, but the predominance of local sentiment favored the views of the National Park Service in opposition to the project. The desirability of minimal encroachment of the reservoir on Glacier National Park lands, together with the requirement of at least 1,500,000 acre-feet of storage to control the North Fork led to the resizing of the project by the Bureau of Reclamation for the joint studies (September 1967-Bureau and Corps); resulting in a full pool elevation of 3,600 feet with 132 feet of drawdown, thereby providing 1,510,000 acre-feet of active storage and about 275 feet of head on the powerplant (resized project).

Smokey Range Project was reported on by the Corps in 1962 (HD 403) and included a dam and reservoir with 1,510,000 acre-feet of usable storage capacity. The reservoir at full pool would provide a total capacity of 1,650,000 acre-feet. The storage capacity of this project was not changed in the joint studies, September 1967. A full pool elevation of 3,550 feet with 170 feet of drawdown would provide 1,510,000 acre-feet of active storage and about 354 feet of head on the powerplant.

Development at either Glacier View or Smokey Range sites are mutually exclusive in that the construction of one would preclude development of the other. Comparing the project from the 1967 report, Smokey Range site is located about 10 miles farther downstream, the reservoir would encroach to a lesser extent on Glacier National Park lands than Glacier View Reservoir (resized for 1,510,000 acre-feet of active storage). Also, a
potential of about 80 more feet of head can be developed at the Smokey Range site compared with Glacier View; thereby, providing more hydro-energy and capacity from the same river flows. Smokey Range was selected as the more favorable development on the North Fork.

Question 1 — Why was Glacier View Project shifted from the Army Corps of Engineers to the Bureau of Reclamation in 1964?


Question 2 — Have any public hearings been held on the Glacier View Project since the Bureau of Reclamation assumed responsibility?

No.

Question 3 — Can you indicate the current status, as of 1976, of the Bureau of Reclamation plans for Glacier View site?

The Bureau does not have detailed studies underway at either site at the present time. However, these two sites are being considered in a broad overview of hydropower potentials in the west as a part of Reclamation's Western Energy Expansion Appraisal Study.

Question 4 — Does the Regional Office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Boise retain the complete project file along with memorandum to and from national headquarters? Are these archives available to responsible researchers?

The Regional Office has a file on our Flathead Studies. This file is available for researchers. However, with the exception of a short review of potential irrigable lands in the Flathead, our studies came to a stop in 1967. The joint report (Bureau and Corps) for the Federal Power Commission was completed in that year. The Federal Power Commission continues to update that report. Also, the Corps of Engineers has updated some cost data and reevaluated project contributions of some Clark Fork projects recently as requested by the Montana State Study Team and Bonneville Power Administration.
The Federal Power Commission, Bonneville Power Administration, and Division Office of the Corps in Portland may be the best sources for continuing research for both the North Fork Sites and others in the basin.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Acting Regional Director
Mr. R. James Oppedahl  
510 North Orange Street  
Missoula, Montana  59801

Dear Mr. Oppedahl:

This is in response to your letter of 20 February 1976 requesting that we further search our files for material on planning of a dam on Glacier View damsite on the North Fork of the Flathead River. We have again searched our records and find no trace of correspondence or other planning material on the Glacier View project which you have not already seen. In July 1954, 56 cartons of files covering records from 1943 to 1948 were shipped to our Kansas City archives. Three of the cartons shipped failed to reach their destination and our records show one of these cartons contained material on the Columbia River 308 report. We now suspect that the missing Glacier View files may be among those that were lost.

Since 1954, the Seattle District files stored in Kansas City have been returned to Seattle and are currently stored in the Federal Archive Center. Upon receiving your 20 February 1976 letter, we contacted Mr. Philip Lothyan, Chief, Archives Branch, Federal Archives Center, 6125 Sandpoint Way, Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98115. He has checked his records of stored files and can find no trace of files concerning the Glacier View dam project.

We contacted our Division office in Portland, Oregon, in an attempt to obtain for you at least part of the correspondence concerning the Glacier View project. Mr. Lynn Jackson, Records management Officer, has located files in storage which contain correspondence concerning the Columbia River 308 report on many planning studies, including Glacier View damsite studies. Unfortunately, these files contain very little of the coordination correspondence between various agencies and public officials. Most correspondence is related to management matters; i.e., time scheduling, funding, and progress reporting. Correspondence on Glacier View damsite studies is scattered throughout three file cardboard cartons. Retrieval of Glacier View correspondence would require about 16 hours of file search at a cost of $6.50 per hour, with a minimum
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Mr. R. James Oppedahl

charge of $3.50. Reproduction of any correspondence would be charged at the rate of $2.00 for the first six pages and 5 cents per sheet for each additional page. If you are interested in proceeding with this search, please contact me by phone: (206) 764-3622, or by letter, to make the necessary arrangements.

I am sorry for any inconvenience I have caused you and hope that the files which I finally located will assist you in your research project.

Sincerely yours,

STEVEN FOSTER, P.E.
Study Manager
May 27, 1976

R. James Oppedahl
510 North Orange Street
Missoula, MT 59801

Dear Sir:

In response to your letter of March 5, concerning the Glacier View Dam, I was unable to find anything in our files pertaining to that project.

I just learned from our chief engineer that The Montana Power Company took no position in the Corps of Engineer proposal. He was aware of the two proposed sites along the North Fork. Smokey Range, being just upstream from the Glacier View site, knew of no involvement of The Montana Power Company in either proposal.

I apologize for the delay in responding to your inquiry.

Yours very truly,

Carl R. Anderson, Manager
Environmental Protection Department

CRA/nb/4:4
APPENDIX B

DRAWING
Artist's conception of Glacier View Dam. Glacier National Park Archives.
APPENDIX C

MAPS
Glacier View Dam reservoir at elevation 3725. May 20, 1948.
Glacier National Park Archives.
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