The future of European security: Expanded membership and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's search for a role in the post-Cold War period

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THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: EXPANDED MEMBERSHIP AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION'S SEARCH FOR A ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD.

by

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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of the Warsaw Pact ushered in a new era in European security. The stable bipolar confrontation that existed for forty years between the Soviet Union and the United States ended almost overnight. The end result has been the creation of an unstable multipolar Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, debate began regarding the relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Cold War Europe. Initial statements by NATO member nations reaffirmed their desire to maintain the alliance and possibly expand the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe.

Although expansion of the alliance seems a foregone conclusion, and while there may be persuasive support for the expansion, this study argues that there are also important reasons either for not increasing the membership or for at least understanding some of the more important problems associated with an expanded membership. Though a number of issues -- on both sides -- surround the expansion of the alliance, this study examines the most prominent among them. The arguments supporting an expanded NATO include: the possibility of new missions for the alliance, dealing with the new Russia, and the basis for a broader security framework. The problems surrounding an expanded NATO include: antagonizing Russia, the problem of consensus, the possibility of an economic drain on Western resources, and the problem of exclusion.

Following the analysis of the arguments supporting expansion and the problems relating to it, the final chapter discusses where the alliance currently stands in its search for a role, and concludes that an expanded membership does not address the issue of what the alliance's new role is to be in the post Cold-War period. An expanded membership only creates a larger alliance that still lacks long term vision.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Plan of Study

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, a new power began to emerge as the dominant military threat to Western Europe. This new threat came in the form of a war-time ally, the Soviet Union. During the war, the victorious armies of the Soviet Union had marched across Eastern and Central Europe. The presence of these armies and the establishment of "popular" governments compelled the countries of Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and Czechoslovakia to fall within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

Faced with the possibility of continued Soviet expansion, the nations of Western Europe turned to the United States in an attempt to secure their freedom and security. In response, President Harry Truman put before Congress a policy of United States' support to nations attempting to resist Communist expansion. This policy became known as the Truman Doctrine. In addition to the Truman Doctrine, the United States also initiated the Marshall Plan, an economic program aimed at rebuilding the nations of Europe. Despite these efforts by the United States, the nations of Western Europe still felt threatened by the Soviet Union.

On March 4, 1948, representatives from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg met in Brussels to consider a treaty of
mutual assistance. Their efforts resulted in the Brussels Treaty. This treaty was essentially a pledge by the signatories to come to the aid of one another in the event of armed aggression. In addition, the signatories also pledged to "build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties." At the onset of the Berlin Blockade -- June 1948 -- it became clear that the United States would have to play a greater role in European security. Thus the United States would be brought out of "an isolated Fortress America," and once again become entangled in European affairs.

Preliminary talks about safeguarding Western Europe from Soviet expansion opened on July 6, 1948, in Washington D.C. The negotiations centered on the inclusion of Canada and the United States into some form of collective European security agreement. The basis for the creation of a security arrangement of this type was Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the right of individual or collective self-defense. The conference culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The treaty established an alliance for the collective defense of Western Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In time the treaty would incorporate a total of sixteen nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

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2 Ibid., 20.

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

During its over forty-year history, NATO has stood against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact -- Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's counterpart to NATO. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO is now confronting the Post-Cold War world. This study examines the thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has fulfilled its original mission, that of a defensive alliance, based on Inis Claude's idea of selective security, with the intent of curbing possible Soviet expansion and is now searching for a new role. Whatever role emerges will likely involve a re-definition of the identity of the alliance as it confronts an expanded membership from the former Warsaw Pact states. While the pending expansion of NATO membership seems a foregone conclusion and while there may be persuasive support for the expansion, this study argues that there are also important reasons either for not increasing the membership or for at least understanding some of the more important problems associated with an expanded membership.

Since there no longer appears to be a direct threat to the security of Western Europe, NATO's expanded membership seems to be an important step in addressing its new role. The purpose of this study is to examine the current

literature and discussions concerning the entry of Eastern European states and former Soviet republics into the alliance and attempt to delineate the major arguments both for and against an expanded NATO. To accomplish this task, this study examines the perceived benefits and a number of possible problems relating to the expansion the alliance.

A potential benefit of extending NATO membership to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics is that this action could help to bring security and stability to the whole of Europe. According to Henry A. Kissinger, the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union -- though not covered in detail here -- and NATO would provide greater security and stability to these emerging nations and the whole of Europe. Dr. Kissinger writes:

Both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are indispensable building blocks of a new and stable world order. NATO is the best protection against military blackmail from any quarter; the European Union is an essential mechanism for stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Both institutions are needed to relate the former satellites and successor states of the Soviet Union to a peaceful international order.

By integrating the former satellite and successor states of the Soviet Union into the alliance, NATO could provide security to the whole of Europe and could be better prepared to deal with future threats to European security (e.g., from a resurgent, nationalistic Russia). Additionally, the integration of these countries into NATO would create "an entirely new all-European security system," that

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could end the division of Europe "in a way that would preserve those aspects of current collective security arrangements that remain useful."^6

Despite the perceived benefits from expanding the North Atlantic Alliance, a number of problems also appear. Most prominent among the potential problems would be a continuing inability of NATO to clarify its role. In spite of the optimistic view of Henry Kissinger, membership expansion does not automatically resolve important questions concerning the security role of the alliance. A further problem concerns NATO's organizational framework, in particular, its political mechanisms and military structure. According to Jane Perlez, a reporter for the New York Times International, the Western and Eastern models of military leadership are fundamentally different: "In the old Warsaw Pact everything was fed from the top down. In the West, a company commander can make a decision; it's decision-making as low as you can."^7 Other problems relating to an expanded membership include the following: a possible economic drain on Western resources by bringing Eastern Europe into the fold; more members increases the difficulty in reaching a consensus; and a larger NATO could conflict with other pan-European organizations lending assistance to Eastern Europe.


The problems facing NATO following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are somewhat symptomatic of the organization's theoretical foundations. The Atlantic Alliance was created to prevent the expansion of a single foe, the Soviet Union. With the disappearance of that enemy, the organization now faces a serious identity crisis. In order to understand the problems facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there must first be an understanding of the theoretical basis of the alliance, an understanding of both the ideal security arrangement, collective security, and the most practical arrangement to date, selective security.

Theoretical Basis

Collective Security

The First World War is often associated with the failure of the balance of power system of international politics. The balance of power is a key concept among realists, referring to a condition of equilibrium that can exist among nation-states. Generally, under the balance of power system, nations or groups of nations join together in an effort to off-set the power of another nation or group of nations. In essence, their actions seek to maintain the status quo. Balance of power theorists often differ on whether the system is created by the nations' political leaders or whether the system is an inherent characteristic of

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international politics. Whatever the case, the balance of power system is often associated with the outbreak of the First World War.

Following the First World War, the victors attempted to establish a new world order for the maintenance of international peace, a system designed to replace the balance of power. The new system that was envisioned was called collective security. Following the First World War, the League of Nations provided the institutional framework for collective security. This system was designed to prevent aggression through the threat of combined action on the part of the community of nations. According to Inis Claude, a prominent scholar in the field of international organizations, the designers envisioned a system which:

...involved the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce the peace.  

The idea of collective security was put forth as a new method of maintaining the peace among the nations of the world. The designers argued that collective security was better at preserving the peace than the balance of power, and the competing alliances that were a product of it. Despite the optimism of the original architects of collective security, the system itself did not function as planned, and over time has lost some of its meaning. According to Inis Claude, if a system of collective security is to be effective it must satisfy a number of

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9 Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, 247.
subjective requirements, "related to the general acceptability of the responsibilities," and objective requirements, "related to the suitability of the global situation to the operation of collective security."\(^{10}\)

For a collective security system to work there must be commitment by the members to uphold international peace. The system requires that "the premise of the 'indivisibility of peace' should be deeply established in the thinking of governments and peoples."\(^{11}\) Essentially, the system requires that all of the nations have an interest in maintaining world peace. Another requirement is that the interests of the world community and the maintenance of world peace must out-weigh national level interests. Related to this requirement is the notion that the right of self-defense must be restrained and that national foreign policy and defense policy can be over-ridden.

In addition to the subjective requirements, collective security also depends on a number of objective requirements. For a collective security system to function properly a legal organizational framework, or structure must be established. Essentially, the global power system must be considerably diffused. The nation-states themselves must be roughly equal in strength, and the world must be considerably disarmed. The collective security organization also needs to have a universality of membership and large-scale economic interdependence. To summarize,

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 250.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
...collective security assumes the existence of a world in which every state is so limited by the distribution of power, the reduction of military power levels by a disarmament program, and the lack of economic self-sufficiency, that any state which may develop aggressive inclinations can be held in check by methods which probably need not include the large-scale use of force.

When considered as a whole, these requirements add up to the "fundamental subjective requirement that all states be willing to entrust their destinies to collective security. Confidence is the quintessential condition of the success of the system; states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and impartiality." The reliance on nation-states to accept these preconditions leads to a serious dilemma, the problem of circularity.

Collective security will only work if nations follow certain guidelines, but nations will only participate if collective security works. Collective security calls for the "moral transformation of political man." The number and wide range of requirements for the successful implementation of a collective security system have forced nations to consider other options for maintaining the peace.

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War resulted in the creation of the United Nations. The basis of the UN's security arrangement is collective security. However, despite the new organizational structure, the UN's security apparatus is still plagued by the same

\[12\] Ibid., 260

\[13\] Ibid., 255.

\[14\] Ibid., 256.
theoretical problems as that of its predecessor. As a result, nations have largely become dependent upon regional security arrangements. Arrangements that utilize a system of selective security instead of a system of collective security.

**Selective Security**

The United Nation's management of its peacekeeping operations and its handling of various regional conflicts have prompted nations to look for other methods with which to safeguard their interests. These nations have subsequently created regional security arrangements based on Articles 51 through 54 of the United Nations Charter -- the right of nations to create regional organizations for collective self-defense and the regional resolution of disputes. When the Western powers decided to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it was these articles, primarily Article 51, that justified that decision.

The decision to form a regional security organization, was because of a perceived structural problem with the whole idea of collective security. A prominent scholar in the area of conflict prevention outlines the problem as follows:

...as long as the primary political units of world society are nation-states, determined to protect their independence above all other values except physical survival and run by leadership groups accountable to domestic interests ahead of world interests, no member nation of an international collective security association will participate in actions likely to put its independence and
domestic interests at risk unless such participation is clearly required to protect these interests.\textsuperscript{15}

Based on this perceived problem with the collective security system, NATO was created. Inis Claude argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not "purport to be an arrangement whereby a community proposes to put down any aggressor that might arise within its ranks; rather it is a design for joint resistance to possible aggression stemming from a particular power bloc external to the community."\textsuperscript{16} The smaller, more directed nature of the organization forms the basis for a system of selective security.

A system of selective security is one in which the enemy has been clearly defined, and the members are simply waiting for that enemy to act. Instead of waiting for any nation to attack any other, with the entire community then taking action, selective security is primarily concerned with the defense of its members in relation to the defined enemy. According to Claude, selective security is a policy of "some for some, whereas collective security is dedicated to the concept of all for all."\textsuperscript{17} With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the clearly defined enemy has disappeared, leaving the Atlantic Alliance in a unique situation. The disappearance of NATO's enemy has left many questioning the relevance of the alliance. Some would argue that there are other European


\textsuperscript{16} Claude, \textit{Swords into Plowshares}, 266.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
security arrangements, such as the Western European Union and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, that are better suited to dealing with the post Cold-War world than NATO.

Other European Security Arrangements

**Western European Union**

The Western European Union (WEU) was set up by the treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense which was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. The agreement that was signed in Paris was a modification of the original Brussels Treaty and allowed Italy and West Germany to join the new organization. The text of the agreement is similar to that of the Brussels Treaty in that it calls for its members to cooperate closely in economic, social, and cultural fields. Additionally, the Paris agreement calls on members to create a firm basis for European economic recovery, offer assistance to each other in the event of armed aggression, preserve the principles of democracy, and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. Subsequent provisions established the levels of men and materials to be present among the signatories. The machinery of the WEU is straightforward, consisting of five different branches: a council, a secretariat, the Standing Armaments Committee, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, and a consultative assembly.

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From its creation in 1955 to 1984, the WEU was not a major player in European politics, accomplishing only two major political achievements. First, the WEU helped to facilitate the integration of West Germany into NATO, and second, the organization served as a link between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom, until the latter became a member of the EU. Until 1984, the WEU was largely inactive in the European Union's foreign policy making processes until the French government sought to reactivate and revitalize the organization.

Unhappy with United States' strategic defense and nuclear policies, France began a campaign to reactivate the dormant organization in October, 1984. As a result of this displeasure, a series of meetings were held in Rome by the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU's member countries, whereupon they agreed to reactivate and strengthen the organization. The meetings culminated in the signing of the Rome Declaration. The Rome Declaration reaffirmed previous intentions and outlined new goals for the organization, which included:

...the WEU's commitment to strengthen peace and security, to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe, to cooperate more closely both among member states and with other European organizations, to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the members in the field of security and to encourage consensus, and to improve the common defense of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance since the two institutions were both designed to provide security to the West.

19 Ibid., 225.
20 Ibid.
In the three years following the Rome Declaration, a number of important developments took place which allowed the organization to be additionally strengthened.

The first of these events was the call by the Single European Act to increase collaboration in political and security matters, and the WEU served as the logical forum where discussion could take place. The second reason for the WEU's increase in strength was the addition of Portugal and Spain to the organization. The final reason for the WEU's increase in power was the Hague Platform, adopted in October of 1987. The Hague Platform emphasized the role of the WEU in consolidating the European side of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and members called for closer military and diplomatic cooperation in the resolution of out-of-area crisis. During the late 1980s another round of debates began concerning the WEU's future.

The debates centered on two different proposals from member nations. The first proposal was put forward by the German and French governments. Their proposal called for the creation of joint armed forces to serve as the nucleus of an independent defense force. The second proposal was put forward by the governments of Britain and Italy. This proposal called for the members to form a Rapid Reaction Force, which would be used to defend interests outside of NATO's sphere of influence. The debates resulted in a common view put forward in the Maastrict Treaty that outlined the role of WEU in relation to other European organizations and addressed issues surrounding the expansion of the WEU. With regards to interactions with other European organizations, the
Maastricht Treaty encouraged WEU members to cooperate closely and form a European defense policy. These measures were intended to enhance the European side of NATO, providing a more cohesive unit rather than a separate one. Regarding the admittance of new members, the Maastricht Treaty encouraged other EU members to join and European member states of NATO to become associate members of the WEU.

In light of the end of the Cold War, the WEU is forced once again to re-evaluate its position and its mission. Despite efforts to create a common European defense policy, the WEU has been unsuccessful. The lack of success on the part of the WEU to create defense policy is best illustrated by the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The war in the former Yugoslavia shows that the organization was ill-prepared for action, and serves to highlight the problems among the member nations in coordinating their national foreign policies. Additionally, disagreements over policy toward the region strained the relations between WEU members and other regional security organizations. As the war progressed, it became clear that the WEU lacked the necessary military structure to intervene in the region, forcing the United Nations to turn to NATO to carry on with the peacekeeping operation. According to Jeffrey Simon, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the WEU is simply "not credible for

\[\text{Ibid., 229.}\]
many European security challenges, not only does the WEU lack political will, it
needs US military assets to be effective.22

Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe convened in 1972. The
conference itself was an attempt by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to
create an all-European security organization. Despite the appeal of an all-
European security organization, the Western powers correctly perceived the
initiative as an attempt to isolate the United States from Western Europe. That
the Soviet Union was "committed to excluding the United States is evidence of
the primary Eastern objective of isolating Western Europe from the United States
in security discussions," in the view of two scholars specializing in European
defense policies, Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox.23 When the
conference began, both East and West took the opportunity to move ahead with
their own agendas.

Eastern Europe's agenda was very ambitious and contained a number of
different goals. First, the East wanted to gain recognition for the borders that
had evolved since the end of World War Two, especially "the western borders of
Poland and the borders of the German Democratic Republic."24 In addition to

22 Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO" Orbis 37 (Winter

23 Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox, Evolving European Defense

24 Ibid.
recognizing the borders, the East wanted to gain the formal recognition by the West of the German Democratic Republic. Eastern Europe was also interested in trying to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the view of Kelleher and Mattox, by "establishing a permanent process for discussions of European security issues that would transcend both Western and Eastern alliance pacts." The Western approach to the conference was very different than that of their Eastern neighbors. The West used the conference to lay the groundwork for reducing the amount of conventional forces in Europe through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks.

The conference culminated in an announcement by the participants that agreements had been reached and a summit-level meeting was scheduled in Helsinki. From the Helsinki summit, three important provisions were agreed upon (Baskets I, II, and III) the third being the most important. Baskets I and II focused on political and economic issues, respectively. Basket III focused on the issue of human rights, obliging all signatories to "practice and foster certain enumerated basic human rights." According to Henry Kissinger, Basket III played an important role in the disintegration of the Soviet satellite orbit, serving as a "rallying point in their [Eastern European reformers] fights to free their countries from Soviet domination." During the revolutions in Eastern Europe,

25 Ibid.
26 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 759.
27 Ibid.
the leaders used the provisions in Basket III to help topple Soviet control of their countries. Following the end of Cold War, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been transformed into the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is "a multi-leveled process of consultation, supervision, and 'consensual action' taken in response to violations of its principles and norms," according to Michael R. Lucas, a Senior Research Fellow of the World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research in New York.\footnote{Michael R. Lucas, “The OSCE Code of Conduct and Its Relevance in Contemporary Europe” \textit{Aussenpolitik} 47 (3rd Quarter 1996): 227.} Additionally, Lucas writes, the organization requires its members to “manage their armed forces and defense policies according to OSCE principles pertaining to the human dimension, international law, security, and confidence building.”\footnote{Ibid., 223.} The basic purpose of the organization is to provide a forum for conflict prevention, early warning regarding the outbreak of possible conflicts, and early action in dealing with those conflicts. Currently the OSCE provides a political forum for discussions regarding European security; however, without a standing military structure of some kind, the organization can do little in Europe physically to prevent the outbreak of a conflict, or contain a conflict once started.
Summary

The failure of the Western European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to prevent or control the fighting in the former Yugoslavia illustrates the need for an organization that can do more than simply arrange meetings and talk. Neither the OSCE nor the WEU have a standing military; instead, Lucas asserts, each serves as a "structure of 'soft security,'" and "cannot replace organizations of 'hard security' such as NATO." Both of these organizations have the potential to play a major role in shaping European defense policy in the future; however, both organizations currently suffer from serious flaws. The lack of a defined command structure and military assets in both the WEU and the OSCE are the main reasons that neither one represents a suitable replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Therefore, to maintain peace and security in Europe, NATO is again left to shoulder the burden. NATO becomes the focus of peace and security for two reasons -- first because of its record as the most successful European security arrangement, and second because of its clearly defined military apparatus. The question then becomes, without a specific enemy, how will NATO deal with the post Cold War world? One answer to this question is found in the expansion of NATO's membership to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those states of the former Soviet Union. Although expansion of the alliance is already underway, and has the potential to be extremely beneficial to

\[30\] Ibid.
European security, as chapter three will explain, a number of issues regarding the expansion must still be considered. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the history of the Atlantic Alliance, and the possible benefits and problems associated with an expanded membership.

Chapter two of the thesis contains three sections which examine the history and background of the Atlantic Alliance. The first section details the creation of the alliance. The second section focuses on the organizational structure, and the last section looks at the history of the alliance. The third chapter also contains three sections, focusing on the arguments supporting an expanded membership. The first section examines some of the possible new missions that the alliance would encounter should it expand. The second section examines the role that an expanded NATO could play in relation to the new Russia. The final section discusses the possibility that membership expansion could form the basis of a broader security framework.

The fourth chapter contains four parts, detailing some of the problems surrounding the expansion of NATO membership. The first section examines the possible fall-out that could take place between the West and Russia. The next section investigates the economic drain that could befall the West if membership is extended to these newly independent countries. The third section looks at the problems that greater membership would have on the alliance's ability to reach a consensus. The final section examines the relationship between NATO and the countries that do not gain admittance to the
organization. The final chapter reviews the material discussed and also attempts to identify where the alliance currently stands in its search for a new role.
CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY NATO

Creation

Europe After World War II

Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant continental military power. During the war the Soviet army had marched victoriously across the countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and into Eastern Germany. The presence of these armies and the establishment of pro-Soviet governments effectively compelled the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to fall within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and prompted new fears of possible Soviet aggression directed at the war-weary nations of Western Europe. It was during this time of uncertainty about Soviet motives that Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, declaring that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." ¹

The countries of Greece and Turkey became the first areas of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States. In February 1947, Great

Britain notified the United States that their government could no longer afford to protect Greece and Turkey. The United States was left to shoulder the burden of protecting the balance of power in Europe and the Mediterranean. In his book, *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern Foreign Policy*, John Stoessinger asserts that allowing the Soviet Union access into Greece and Turkey would prove detrimental to Western security. Stoessinger writes, "Communist penetration of Greece and Turkey would give the Soviet Union a strong base in the eastern Mediterranean that would further threaten American interests." The problems in Greece centered around a civil war. The pro-Western, Athenian government was under attack by leftist rebels, the ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) and its political arm, the EAM (National Liberation Front). In Turkey, the point of contention was the Dardanelles — the straits separating Asia Minor from Europe. These straits connect the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. The Soviet Union had threatened to take action against the Turks if they refused the Soviet offer of joint control of the straits. In American eyes the Russians were trying to topple the Greek government and subjugate Turkey, bringing these countries into their own sphere of influence.

In response to the events in Greece and Turkey, President Harry S. Truman called a special joint session of Congress. During the session Truman spoke of the threat that the Soviet Union posed to world peace. In this speech to

Congress he proclaimed his "doctrine" as "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." To ensure this policy's success, Truman asked Congress for $400 million to counter the Soviet threat to Turkey and combat leftist rebels in Greece. According to J. A. S. Grenville, the aid to Greece was placed in the context of "combating the designs of a communist assault on the free world." The long term effects of the Truman Doctrine were to ensure that Greece and Turkey were kept out of Soviet hands and subsequently brought into the American sphere of influence.

During the late 1940s, under the standard of containing Soviet expansion, the US goals for Western Europe had taken form. Thomas Patterson contends that the goals of the United States included:

...economic reconstruction and hunger relief, linkage of Germany's western zones with Western European economic system, reinvigorated trade with the United States, prevention of leftist political gains, ouster of communists from governments (especially in Italy and France), settlement of colonial disputes (as in Indochina and Indonesia) that were draining funds, blockage of neutralist tendencies, and building military allies.

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5 Patterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 292.
By 1947, the United States had already spent over $9 billion in Western Europe in an attempt to rebuild the damage from the war. However, the reconstruction of Europe proceeded slowly.

In 1945, the prediction in the United States had been that rebuilding Europe would be strictly short-term; as the expenditures of 1947 proved, the predictions were incorrect. The Truman administration recognized that the speedy recovery of Western Europe required further American aid. The exports from Europe were unable to pay for the imports from America that were needed by Europeans in order to rebuild their countries' infrastructures. In an effort to solve this problem, Secretary of State George Marshall introduced a plan aimed at helping the countries of Europe rebuild. The plan became known as the Marshall Plan. It was designed to reinvigorate the domestic economies of Western Europe and to prevent the spread of communism. The aim of the Marshall Plan, Stoessinger claims, was "the ultimate restoration of the economies of Europe through American aid." Participation in the US aid program was open to any nation, including the Soviet Union and those countries within its sphere of influence. Despite interest in the plan by Eastern European nations, the Soviet Union refused to allow them to participate.

In September 1947, sixteen European nations met to discuss the details of the Marshall Plan. At the conference, the delegates agreed on the outline of a

6 Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists, 61.
four-year European recovery program leading to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). This organization had the responsibility of creating the individual recovery programs for each country. From the American perspective the Marshall Plan was a success; it served to reinvigorate the economies of Western Europe, strengthened the ties between Europe and the United States, and provided a much needed boost in the American economy.

The next year tensions between East-West had become increasingly strained. In February 1948, the coalition government of Czechoslovakia had been ousted by a Communist coup. The impact on Western governments was severe, prompting new fears of Soviet aggression or Communist coups supported by their military. In March of the same year -- in response to the Prague coup -- representatives from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to consider a treaty of mutual assistance. Their efforts resulted in the signing of the Brussels Treaty. This treaty was essentially a pledge by the signatories to come to the aid of one another in the event of armed aggression. In addition, the signatories also pledged to "build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties."
Despite the pledge of these countries to come to the aid of one another, they were simply not well equipped to deal with the Soviet Union should it decide to attack west. Every analysis of the relative power positions, according to Henry Kissinger, "indicated that Western Europe simply did not have sufficient strength to repel a Soviet attack." Following the signing of this treaty, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Allied Control Council and began to interfere with the Western Allies' attempts to communicate with the Western half of Berlin. In time the Soviet Union became increasingly belligerent, culminating in a general blockade of Berlin in June, 1948. It was the Soviet Union's hope that the blockade of Berlin would force the allies to give up their policies regarding Germany. Instead of forcing the allies to rethink their policies, the Berlin Blockade hastened the process of creating an Atlantic defense pact.

In April, 1948, the idea of creating a single mutual defense system covering Western Europe and North America, designed to supersede the Brussels Treaty, was put forward in the Canadian House of Commons. One week later, Senator Vandenburg, a Republican from Michigan, introduced the Vandenburg Resolution in the US Congress, which recommended that the United States should participate in the creation of a defense pact with Western Europe, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51, which provided the basis of the alliance, states:

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10 NATO Facts and Figures, 237.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Preliminary talks between Canada, the United States and the signatories of the Brussels Treaty opened in Washington D.C. on July 6, 1948, and ended on September 9, with a report to the respective governments. In October the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty was able to announce "the complete identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area." In March of the following year the text of the North Atlantic Treaty was made public; additionally, the countries of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal were invited to accede to the Treaty. Despite Soviet objections, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington D.C., creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the alliance, three years after that the Federal Republic of Germany officially became a member, and in 1982 Spain acceded to the treaty.

Organization

The framework of NATO provides an excellent example of what the organizational structure of a security alliance should resemble. As NATO is likely

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11 Ibid., 21.
to continue to exist, it is important to have an understanding of the machinery -- military structure, the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General, and the various committees -- of the alliance.

North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a framework for wide co-operation among the signatories, providing joint action in the military, political, economic, and social fields. The signatory countries undertake, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well-being in their respective areas. In addition, the signatories also endeavor to eliminate incompatibilities in their economic policies and to encourage economic co-operation among themselves. In essence, the treaty has a dual nature. On the one hand it reaffirms a security policy based on the inherent right to collective self-defense -- as stated in the Charter of the United Nations -- while on other hand it proclaims the importance of economic and social progress within the alliance and neighboring countries. The Treaty itself consists of a preamble and fourteen articles. The preamble outlines the main features of the Treaty, stating that the alliance has been created for the defense of a way of life not only by military means, but also through co-operation in political, economic, social, and cultural fields.

The first two articles of the Treaty describe the aims and principles that member nations should follow in their conduct of foreign relations. Article one defines the basic principles to be followed by member countries in the conduct of
their international relations in order to avoid endangering world peace and
security. Article two defines the aims to be followed by the member countries in
their international relations and indicates broadly how these aims should be
fulfilled: through the preservation of peace, development of friendly relations
among nations, achievement of international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic and social character.

Articles three and four outline the obligations of the signatories, providing
clear authority for all co-operation of a non-military nature within the Alliance.
These articles also serve to underline the fact that the alliance was brought into
being to defend a way of life. Article three deals with the ways and means of
maintaining and increasing the individual and collective capacity of members to
resist armed attack. The signatories are encouraged to conduct joint actions and
enact policies of mutual assistance. Article four lays down the obligations
incumbent on member countries in the event of a threat to one of them. The
only explicitly expressed requirement upon the signatories is an obligation to
consult one another in the event that the territorial integrity or political
independence of any member is endangered.

Articles five through eight refer to the North Atlantic Treaty's idea of collective
defense. Article five serves to define the obligations of member countries in the
event of an armed attack against one of them. Each country is free to decide
what action it judges is necessary. In spite of an armed attack, the Treaty does
not call for automatic declaration of war on the part of its members. Thomas
Patterson suggests that the Alliance acts as a "trip wire" to possible
aggressors. The Treaty provides for a collective reaction, but the members use their own judgment as to what kind of response is required.

Article six defines the geographic area within which the provisions of Article five are applicable. However, the definition of a geographical area in no way precludes discussion by the North Atlantic Council of events which occur outside that area. Article seven outlines the Treaty's compatibility with the United Nations Charter, thus its justification under Article 51. In Article eight the signatories confirm the compatibility of the Treaty with their other international commitments, and undertake not to enter into any commitments in the future which may conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty.

Articles nine through thirteen focus on the creation of the North Atlantic Council and the additional committees to assist in the implementation of Alliance policy, the accession of new members, and revisions of the Treaty. Article nine calls for the creation of the North Atlantic Council and provides for the setting up of whatever additional bodies may be needed to implement the preceding Articles. This article provides the legal basis for the existence of the specialized committees and groups set up by the North Atlantic Council, the International Secretariat which serves them, the major and subordinate military commands, and the various military and civilian agencies. Article 10 stipulates that the Parties may, by unanimous decision, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty to accede to it. Article 11 deals

Patterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 296.
with arrangements for ratification of the Treaty by member home governments and its entry into force. Articles 12 and 13 provide for the possibility of revisions to the Treaty or withdrawals from it. The final article simply deals with the arrangements for depositing and storing the Treaty document.

It was during the early years of the Alliance's existence that the basic foundations of the organization were established. These foundations included the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, Secretary General, the Military Committee, the Integrated Military structure, and the various other committees and planning groups.

**North Atlantic Council**

The highest authority within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the North Atlantic Council. It has powers of decision and effective political authority within the Organization. The Council is composed of representatives from each of the member countries who meet once a week in regular session. In addition to the control of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council also plays an important role in public affairs. The Council has an important "public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining its policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of the Alliance." According to Article Nine of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North Atlantic Council is the only body within NATO that derives its power expressly

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from the Treaty. This article also provides the Council with the power to create subsidiary bodies -- committees and planning groups -- to help carry out the work of the Council.

The Council is composed of Permanent Representatives from all sixteen of the member countries, each representative holding the rank of Ambassador (see figure 1). The decisions of the Council are the expressed concerns of member governments. All of the members have an equal stake in the policies that are formed. As each of these members are sovereign nation-states, decisions of the Council are formed based on common consent rather than formal voting. Topics of discussion at these meetings frequently include reports that have been prepared by the subordinate committees and planning groups regarding all manner of activities.

**Secretary General**

The chairman of the North Atlantic Council is the Secretary General. In addition to the duties as chairman of this Council, the Secretary General is also the chairman of the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, and the other senior committees within the Organization. The Secretary General has the power to propose items for discussion and decision during any of the meetings as well as the utilization of his good offices to mediate disputes among the member countries. The Secretary General also acts as the spokesperson to the media and the member governments for the organization. The Secretary General acts as “principal spokesman of the Organization, both in its external
relations and in communications and contacts between member governments."\(^{14}\) Directly under the Secretary General's control is the International Staff. Their responsibility includes managing the day-to-day affairs of the Alliance and assisting the Secretary General.

**Defense Planning Committee**

The Defense Planning Committee is responsible for matters relating to the implementation of collective defense planning. This committee is composed of Defense Ministers from the various member countries. The committee provides recommendations and policy guidelines to the Military Committee. With the exception of France, all of the members are seated on this committee.

**Nuclear Planning Group**

This group is the main arena for discussions relating to the role of nuclear forces within NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group is the principal forum for "consultations on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's security and defense policies."\(^{15}\) Similar to the Defense Planning Committee, this group meets at the level of Defense Ministers twice a year. All member countries participate in the discussions, except France and Iceland who participate as observers.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 96.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
Military Committee

This committee provides recommendations to NATO's political authorities regarding common defense and guidance to the commanders within NATO. The committee helps to provide advice to the Secretary General, the Nuclear Planning Group, the Defense Planning Committee, and the North Atlantic Council. The Military Committee is composed of Chiefs of Staff from the member countries. France provides a military mission, and since Iceland has no military, it provides a civilian observer.

![Diagram of Civil and Military Structure of NATO](Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.)
Integrated Military Structure

The Integrated Military Structure provides the organizational framework for defending the member countries. Included in this structure is a network of major commands covering the North Atlantic area. Following a series of streamlining measures in 1994, the number of commands in NATO was reduced. These measures left NATO with two major commands, Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. Thus, the strategic area covered by the North Atlantic consists of the two commands (Europe and the Atlantic) and a regional United States - Canada Planning Group (see figure 2).

At the top of the command pyramid is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This individual is responsible for maintaining the peace and security of the Alliance and controlling Allied Command Europe. The NATO Handbook describes the primary task of SACEUR which,

...is to contribute to preserving the peace, security, and territorial integrity of Alliance member states. SACEUR is responsible for identifying and requesting the forces required to promote stability, contribute to crisis management and provide effective defense in accordance with his mandate.\(^{16}\)

In the event of armed aggression against the Alliance, SACEUR is responsible for maintaining the territorial integrity of the member states. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe is also the principal spokesman for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition to these duties the

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 169.
commander is also responsible for providing the North Atlantic Council with information about the progress, in military terms, of NATO's other projects.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe's single command is Allied Command Europe (ACE). The task of this command is the defense of Western Europe, an area extending from Norway to Southern Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea, and from the Atlantic Coastline to the border of Turkey. The total area of defense "equates to nearly two million square kilometers of land, more than three million square kilometers of sea, and a population of about 320 million people."\(^{17}\) Included within ACE are three major commands: Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). In each of these three commands there are three subordinate commands, one sub-command for ground forces, another for air units, and another for naval assets.

The headquarters of Allied Forces North West Europe is located in High Wycombe, United Kingdom. This command is responsible for the defense of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the adjacent sea zones. The commander of Allied Forces North West Europe is a four star British general. The headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe is located in Brunssum, The Netherlands. This command is responsible for defending the area south of AFNORTHWEST to the southern German border. The commander of Allied Forces Central Europe is a German four star general. The headquarters for Allied Forces Southern Europe

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 170.

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is located in Naples, Italy. This command is responsible for the defense of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Allied Forces Southern Europe's commander is an American four star admiral.

Fig. 2. NATO Military Structure.
Additional Committees

In addition to the above mentioned committees a number of smaller committees and planning groups have been created. The responsibilities of these planning groups and committees include the standardization of armaments among NATO members, scientific concerns, economic issues, budget committees, and communication and information systems. In addition to these committees, a number of new entities have been created to deal with issues that have only recently developed following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In particular a number of committees has been established to monitor the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Other committees have been created to monitor the progress of new NATO projects, such as the Partnership for Peace and the concept of Combined Joint Taskforces.

History

From 1949 to Today

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty two issues were left unresolved. The first of these issues involved the level of United States' support to the new Organization. One observer, Stanley Sloan, noted that the treaty "neither suggested the institutional framework for US involvement nor specified whether the US military contribution would consist primarily of strategic bombing and naval capabilities or whether it would also include substantial US ground
forces in Europe." The second unresolved issue focused on the role that Germany would be playing in this new European security framework. The treaty did not stipulate whether or not Germany would be allowed to rearm, and if so, to what level. In 1949, the priorities of the leading powers within NATO (Britain, the United States, and France) were all different. All three agreed that the purpose of the organization was to counter-balance Soviet power in Europe and to successfully integrate West Germany, but the disagreement stemmed from the manner in which these goals would be accomplished.

In Paris, policy was designed to limit the future military capability of the new German army. In Washington, the government was more concerned with balancing the power of the Soviet Union in Central Europe. From the American perspective, Sloan further notes that "German industrial capabilities and manpower were assets which could not be overlooked, particularly given Germany's geographic position in the center of Europe." In London, the government was unwilling to maintain a large presence of troops in Central Europe to off-set potential German power. The end result was a conflict of interests between France and the United States, with Britain watching from the sidelines. The American government preferred that France, Britain, Germany, and the other continental powers provide the bulk of the ground forces, while the


19 Ibid., 8.
United States would provide strategic bombing and the Alliance's nuclear weapons. Allowing Germany to join NATO would serve to legitimize German rearmament. The French on the other hand were totally against the rearming of Germany, preferring instead to see American ground forces stationed on the Eastern borders. The solution to this problem came in a somewhat unusual fashion.

On June 25, 1950, without a declaration of war, the armies of the North Korean People's Republic crossed the 38th parallel to attack the Republic of Korea. The ensuing conflict, half-way around the world served as the catalyst for moving Franco-American political concerns beyond the question of Germany and resolving the differing points of view. The resolution was as follows:

The United States would deploy substantial ground forces to Western Europe and place them within an integrated NATO command structure. This integrated command structure would serve the practical role of coordinating Western defense efforts in Europe as well as providing the crucial Atlantic framework for bringing German military forces into the Western defense against the Soviet Union.

The agreement marked a drastic change in American foreign policy; American troops would be stationed in Europe indefinitely. In addition to the commitment of US troops, the Truman administration was gambling on the acceptance by Europeans of the rearmament of Germany.

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20 NATO Facts and Figures, 30.

21 Sloan, NATO's Future, 10.
Later that year, the NATO members decided to create an integrated European defense force with a single allied commander. During the course of this meeting, the Council resolved to place an American officer in charge of the Supreme Allied Headquarters. The Council's choice for this new position was General Dwight D Eisenhower, and on December 19, the appointment was made public. Prior to this decision the Council had been given a report that outlined methods of strengthening the Alliance through the expansion of membership. During the course of the next year, the Council met in Lisbon to discuss the manpower goals that the Alliance should set. The meetings culminated with a decision to create a total of 50 divisions of infantry, tanks, and artillery, over 4,000 aircraft, and strong naval forces. In addition to setting the manpower goals, the Lisbon meeting formally welcomed the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In 1954, at meetings held in Paris, a series of agreements was reached regarding the status of West Germany. The Paris Agreements accomplished a number of different tasks. First, the agreements normalized relations between the NATO allies and the Federal Republic of Germany. Second the agreements terminated the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany. Next the agreements recognized West Germany as a sovereign nation-state, and finally, invited West Germany to join NATO. In May 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. In response, the Soviet Union concluded the Warsaw Treaty with its European satellites, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (granted the prerogatives of a state in late
December, 1955, by the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The formation of the Warsaw Pact ushered in a relatively calm period for Europe, a return to the balance of power.

In 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle formally withdrew his country from NATO's integrated military command structure and asked that NATO remove its forces, headquarters, and facilities from French soil. De Gaulle ordered the removal of "American nuclear weapons from French soil," and, "withdrew the French fleet from the integrated NATO command." The basis for this decision was the difference of opinion that existed between France and the United States. From the beginning, according to Sloan, "France had substantially different objectives for and interests in the Atlantic alliance than did the United States." In the eyes of the French government, the structure of the Alliance subordinated France to a position no greater than that of West Germany. France would still participate in the Alliance and maintain its treaty obligations, but would remove its forces from the integrated military command. At the time, the action taken by France was seen to have little effect on the Organization; however, this was not the case.

Despite the general opinion of the time, the move by France did have some consequences. In a military sense, the French decision to withdraw weakened the lines of communication and supply. The infrastructure for the movement of

22 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 612
23 Sloan, NATO's Future, 35.
supplies to the front line was now moved closer to the front, making them more vulnerable to an attack. The political consequences of the French action included an increased European dependence upon the United States for leadership, coming at a time when the economic might of Europe was strengthening the European position in the Alliance. Another consequence of France's action was to increase the role of West Germany in the Alliance.

One year after the departure of France from the integrated military command structure, NATO implemented a new policy with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. The Alliance's original strategy had been based on the notion of "massive retaliation." This doctrine had been put forth by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger notes that it was based on the idea "that rather than resist aggression where it occurred, the United States would retaliate against the source of the trouble at a time and with weapons of its own choosing." In response to this dated nuclear defense policy, NATO adopted the doctrine of flexible response. The flexible response strategy called for the gradual increase in the amount of force used in any given conflict. According to the new strategy, in Stanley Sloan's assessment, "NATO would be prepared to meet any level of aggression with equivalent force, conventional or nuclear, and would increase the level of force, if necessary, to end the conflict." This new policy did not completely mitigate the differences of opinion within the alliance.

24 Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 574.

25 Sloan, *NATO's Future*, 42.
about its nuclear strategy, but it did provide a formula that helped to reconcile some of the differences.

On the eve of NATO's twentieth birthday, questions were being raised as to the Alliance's viability in the atmosphere of East-West détente -- a period of relaxed tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In response to the growing concern about NATO's future, the North Atlantic Council commissioned a year-long study to examine the future tasks of the alliance. This study became known as the Harmel Report. This report outlined two main functions of the Alliance. The first function was to "maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur." The second and newly assigned function was "to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved." The North Atlantic Council adopted the views of the Harmel Report in December, 1967.

The report helped to bridge the growing gap between the defense of the West and continued détente. At a meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, the Harmel Report was translated into alliance policy that called for force reductions in both the East and West. This meeting marked the beginning of NATO's role in arms-control negotiations. By adopting the ideas of the report, the alliance was able to

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26 Ibid., 45.

27 Ibid.
revitalize its foundations. The Harmel Report "reiterated NATO's commitment to maintain a strong defense, but it broadened substantially the goals of the alliance." In essence, this report provided the Alliance with a lease on life and a renewed sense of purpose.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, concern was being raised about the role of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet Union had begun deployment of a new class of missile, the SS-20. James Nathan and James Oliver provide the following assessment of the SS-20:

It could be MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]; it was mobile; and it had an all-terrain tractor carrier that could move the missile caisson, thereby immensely complicating Western attempts to locate the weapons. It had substantial accuracy, and each of its three warheads had very high yields of over two hundred kilotons.

In response to this new threat, NATO decided to bring new ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles to Europe. However, the deployment of these missiles was not welcome news to the citizens of Western Europe. Throughout the early 1980s public demonstrations were taking place in West Germany, France, Holland, and Britain to protest NATO's deployment of these weapon systems.

As the deployment deadline approached, negotiations were held between the Soviet Union and the United States in an effort to reduce the intermediate-range

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28 Ibid., 46.

nuclear forces in Europe. The result of the negotiations was a treaty signed in Reykjavik, Iceland, which eliminated intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe. In signing this treaty, the United States forced NATO to become more dependent on conventional forces and their own "delegitimized" nuclear weapons. Some members of the Alliance have expressed concern about being displaced from the US nuclear umbrella, having to rely increasingly on conventional forces. With the shrinkage of US forces in the European theater, NATO's future has begun to rest increasingly upon the Europeans.

Shortly after the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Agreement, the Eastern Bloc began to collapse. One by one the Soviet Union's former satellite countries began to break away, until finally the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, forming a loose confederation of states. In 1989 the symbol of a divided Europe, the Berlin Wall, was brought down, and Germany was reunited in 1990. A new era of peace has been ushered into Europe, leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization searching for a new role.

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Ibid., 412.
CHAPTER 3

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AN EXPANDED NATO

New Missions for NATO

Consequences of the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War marked the collapse of a relatively stable, bipolar system of Soviet-American confrontation. Gerhard Wettig, Director of International Relations and International Security Research at the Federal Institute of East European and International Studies in Cologne, describes the bipolar system as one based on mutual deterrence. He writes the following assessment:

During the Cold War period Western countries protected themselves against the military threat emanating from the Soviet bloc by establishing a military counterpoise within the framework of NATO, making any reversion to military force by the other side seem too hazardous. A relationship of mutual deterrence evolved, which functioned on account of the fact that both sides pooled and thus controlled respective forces and tendencies. Under these conditions, the sole aim was to guarantee mutual deterrence.¹

The breakdown of this system of mutual deterrence resulted in the creation of a multi-polar, highly unstable Europe. As a result of the fragmentation of state power, a new period of instability has been ushered into Europe. The lack of clearly defined sides has created a number of problems in Europe. Two

scholars in the field of international relations, John Spanier and Steven W. Hook, contend that the uncertain balance of power has brought instability to Europe in four different ways.

First, the revival of ethnic tensions and nationalist movements within Eastern and Central Europe marks the first consequence of the end of the Cold War. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe has revived nationalistic, religious, and ethnic tensions in the area. According to Spanier and Hook, these tensions are similar to "those that accompanied the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires after World War I and that had kept Eastern Europe in turmoil throughout the interwar period."\(^2\) Soviet control and domination of Eastern and Central Europe after World War II prevented conflicts of this nature from erupting by suppressing national aspirations and claims with the Soviet army. The consequences of the revival of these tensions have ranged from the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia.

A second result of the end of the Cold War has been the breakup of the Soviet Union into separate republics. In the aftermath of the breakup, tensions and violence appeared among the successor states of the Soviet Union. The majority of the violence focused on Russian minorities in these new republics and the new republics' ethnic tensions with each other. According to Spanier

and Hook, these tensions served to renew fears of "Russian imperialism within the old Soviet frontiers as Russian leaders used the alleged dangers to Russian minorities in these states as a pretext for military action." The uncertain future of Russia itself has remained a critical concern for Europe, and will be examined in more detail later.

The third consequence of the end of the superpower rivalry was the clear field left for aspirants to pursue their own designs for regional hegemony. The scholars claim that it was no longer the case that "each superpower, dominant in its own sphere, could restrain its respective clients and prevent local conflicts." The rise in frequency of regional conflicts around the world serves to illustrate the problem. The attempts by Serbia to exert control over large portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the seriousness of this problem. The problem of regional hegemony has also been particularly prevalent in the Middle East and South East Asia where various governments have become more assertive in their regional and international policies.

The final consequence of the end of the Cold War has been its effect on the alliances created to counter the Soviet Union's power abroad. Lacking a clearly defined enemy, the various alliances -- NATO in particular -- have been faced with increasingly blurred missions. Spanier and Hook argue that not only had NATO's "raison d'etre vanished, but the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
the Soviet Union had given priority to economic objectives. These new economic objectives have been characterized by the competition between the European, the North American, and the Asian trading blocs.

The problems that have arisen since the collapse of the Soviet Union seriously threaten the stability of Europe. By expanding NATO to include the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, stability could be brought to an otherwise tumultuous region. According to Jeffrey Simon, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and others, an expanded NATO could provide a number of other security related missions beyond the role of simply deterring and defending an attack against Western Europe. In an article published in Orbis, Simon claims that an expanded NATO could continue to perform the vital roles of anchoring the northern and southern flanks of Europe, maintaining regional stability, and embedding Germany in a multi-lateral, transatlantic security structure. Additionally, an expanded alliance could also prevent the re-nationalization of European defense policy and may provide the potential for participation in out-of-area actions.

Agent of regional stability

The collapse of the bipolar order in Europe has led to a rise in the trend of regionalism. Two scholars in the field, Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne,

5 Ibid., 300.

describe regionalism as a "state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines." As stated earlier, one of the consequences of the end of the superpower rivalry was the clear field left for aspirants to pursue their own designs for regional hegemony. Howard E. Frost, a Washington-based international security affairs analyst, describes the situation as a security vacuum.

The concept of a security vacuum is intended to refer to "the region's lack of international structure, uncertain democracies, weak economies, ethnic strife, and potentially troublesome neighbors." In an effort to deal with the "security vacuum" Central and East European countries have signed numerous agreements dealing with cooperation, friendship, and trade. Should the alliance decide to refrain from expanding to include all of Eastern Europe, the fall-out could be particularly disastrous. On this subject, Jeffrey Simon writes:

...if the new eastern democracies are not soon given a hope of eventual security within a broader NATO, they may come to feel rejected, to look elsewhere, or to succumb to internal reactionary forces. Efforts to create liberal democracies in the Central and East European area will then diminish, and much of the West's investment in the cold war will be squandered.

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At present, many Eastern and Central European countries have begun to find other avenues with which to ensure their security. Rather than waiting for the European Community and NATO to accept them, these countries have signed separate bilateral and multilateral accords. The agreement signed in February 1991, between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on regional cooperation and mutual support represents one example.  

This trend could act to increase regional tensions.

In an effort to curtail the de-stabilizing effects of numerous regional arrangements, NATO could act as an agent of regional stability. By expanding the alliance eastward, Central and East European countries would have no reason to look beyond NATO for security guarantees. Simon contends that the future of European security will be directly affected by "the relationships now forming among states that arose from the old USSR, and it is particularly affected by the degree to which those relationships are cooperative or competitive." Even more than many Western European states, Central and Eastern European states see NATO as the fundamental European security institution capable of providing stability in the region.

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11 Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 23.
Another mission for the alliance would likely involve the continued de-nationalization of defense policies. Simon claims that de-nationalization has been one of NATO's greatest achievements, and has contributed to building confidence and stability among the European nations. De-nationalization is the process whereby a country's defense policy is openly shown to its allies, thereby preventing insecurities from arising among neighbors. Simon is of the opinion that if NATO were to "atrophy and wither away, re-nationalization of defense planning might occur and old suspicions might resurface." The problem would be particularly serious in light of German reunification and Germany's neighbors' suspicions. Re-nationalization could also have negative repercussions between such allies as Greece and Turkey.

A key factor related to the de-nationalization of defense policies is defense burden sharing among members within the alliance. The former secretary general of NATO, Manfred Wörner, contends that as NATO's forces are restructured and scaled down, the burden of European defense needs to be shouldered equally by all members, both current and new ones. Wörner emphasizes that as force reductions take place, there needs to be "an equitable shouldering of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of our common defense," which will require "the continued presence of Canadian and US forces in

\[12\] Ibid., 24.
Europe." Through burden sharing, the alliance could better maintain a sense of equality among members.

**Force for unity in Europe**

A further mission of an expanded NATO might involve helping to unite Europe. Because Iceland, Turkey, and Norway are not members of the European Community, NATO plays an important role as the one institution that anchors those states both to Europe and to a credible security arrangement. Additionally, as Eastern Europe is brought into the fold, some countries that are invited to become members of NATO may elect to remain outside of the European Community. In the unlikely event that this were to take place, NATO could play an important role in keeping non-EC member states attached to a pan-European organization.

If NATO is allowed to disintegrate slowly, the repercussions could have very serious consequences. Simon claims that should NATO wither away, "insecurity and identity crisis would likely be the result, first on Europe's flanks and then throughout all of Europe." In short, to maintain a strong European security organization -- and thus a strong and peaceful European community -- the connection between non-European EC members, Canada, and the United States must be continued.

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Involvement in Out of Area Actions

Out-of-area actions represent another arena in which an expanded NATO could have a role. Former President Richard Nixon sees European defense as NATO's "core mission," but views participation in out-of-area actions as its "cutting edge." According to Nixon, NATO's creators had not intended to limit the alliance to strict boundaries. Rather, the creators had limited the business of NATO to North American and European security concerns. The subsequent globalization of interests has made it necessary to consider Western security concerns in the context of the entire planet. Nixon writes:

...its [NATO's] creators did not envision that by specifying that the NATO commitment applied to Europe and North America, the alliance would operate only within a strict boundary. Instead, they simply sought to exclude Europe's colonies from security guarantees requiring an automatic response from other members. Today, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, challenges to Western interests can arise half a world away.  

The process of globalization has forced nations to think of their security in terms of their neighbors, their international trading partners, and the sources of their strategic raw materials.

Typically, NATO's "area" has been associated with Europe, however, the allies of the southern tier (Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, and Greece) see the region to their south as the new security concern. Simon couples the concern

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16 Ibid.
with the region to the new threat of "North African/Middle Eastern radical fundamentalism linked with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation and advanced delivery systems."\textsuperscript{17} The spread of these systems to the region potentially allows these countries to strike targets in Southern Europe with little or no warning.

Further potential for participation in out-of-area action includes assistance with peacekeeping operations and maintaining forward-deployed material for other operations. The NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR (Implementation Force), is an example of an out-of-area, peacekeeping operation. During the deployment of forces and equipment to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, about one half of NATO's pre-positioned assets were sent to the region. Without these pre-positioned assets, the coalition's buildup of forces would have taken significantly longer. Though the alliance itself may not participate directly in out-of-area actions, Simon contends that "the alliance will likely provide the necessary background conditions for implementing such actions."\textsuperscript{18} Along the same lines, former President Nixon argues that for NATO to participate successfully in out-of-area actions improvement would need to take place in three areas.


\textsuperscript{18} Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 25.
The first area of improvement focuses on the development of rapid reaction forces. Nixon is of the opinion that the European members of NATO should develop a "joint rapid deployment force that would function, depending on circumstances, independently or under an integrated command with similar US forces." Though not under NATO control, the formation of the Euro-brigade (a joint military effort between Germany and France) is a step in the direction toward the formation of a rapid reaction force.

The second area of improvement relates to the relationship between the United States, Europe, and the underdeveloped countries of the world. Nixon states that the United States should "welcome European activism in parts of the underdeveloped world where their historical experience exceeds our own." Closely related is Nixon's idea that the United States should open its overseas bases outside Europe and allow NATO allies access to them. According to Nixon, opening the bases would "facilitate greater European activism in critical parts of the underdeveloped world." Finally, the alliance should develop "better mechanisms for more coordinated crisis management," particularly in light of Europe's handling of the events leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Combined, the members of

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19 David Bender and Bruno Leone, Europe: Current Controversies, 248.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
NATO wield tremendous economic, political, and military might and could use this power to influence the decisions of other countries. Through cooperation, the allies could present a course of action in the United Nations, or on their own, that a potential aggressor would have no choice but to take notice of.

The expansion of membership to Eastern and Central Europe could provide a number of important new missions for the alliance. According to Simon, it could continue to perform the vital roles of maintaining regional stability and embedding Germany in a multi-lateral, transatlantic security apparatus. An expanded alliance could also prevent the re-nationalization of European defense policy, anchor the northern and southern flanks of Europe, and provide a credible capability for potential participation in out-of-area actions.

The New Russia

Instability and Democratization

Despite Russia's moves toward a democratic society, many countries -- particularly those countries in Eastern Europe -- feel that Russia is still a threat to European security. In a study conducted by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, they found that the process of democratization is a dangerous one and often leads to conflict. Their study compared the process of democratization in various countries to the probability of conflict occurring during the democratization process.

The study first classified a variety of national regimes as either democracies, autocracies, or mixed regimes -- a state with features of both. The scholars then
defined a democratizing state as one which is moving from either a mixed or autocratic regime to a democratic one. At this point, the researchers analyzed the likelihood of these democratizing states going to war during their political transition. The results of their analysis showed that "democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in regime" type. This result applies to both the autocratic and mixed regimes, as well as democratic ones. According to Mansfield and Snyder the relationship is "weakest one year into democratization and strongest at ten years." During that ten-year period, the likelihood of a given state going to war was one chance in six. In light of Russia's formidable military power, the study is somewhat disconcerting, especially to Russia's neighbors. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the Russian government still commands an army of more than 1 million troops, the largest of any European nation, and thus remains a threat to European stability.

The Threat of a Resurgent Russia

According to Robert E. Hunter, the director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Soviet Union will "remain the premier security concern in Europe -- the leading threat...to stability and predictability on

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24 Ibid.
the Continent." This fact is especially disconcerting in light of Russia's possession of a large nuclear arsenal. The internal stability of Russia is of particular concern to Western leaders, especially since little can be done by them to influence the situation. On the subject of the West's inability to influence Russia's internal stability, Robert E. Hunter writes:

That fact [the West's inability to influence Russia's internal stability] makes the possibility of turmoil a matter of great danger, both because there can be no assurances that internal strife could be contained within today's Soviet frontiers and because classic policies of deterrence might prove ineffective under circumstances of revolution in a state armed with so many nuclear weapons.

Related to the subject of internal stability are the questions surrounding the ethnic Russians living outside of Russia's borders.

The Russian government's unflinching support for its minorities abroad has also raised questions about a resurgent Russia. The support for these individuals has also prompted new fears of Russian imperialism. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "the imperial impulse remains strong and even appears to be strengthening." The Russian deployment of troops to the republic of Chechnya in 1994 served to flame these fears of an imperialist Russia.

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26 Ibid., 61.

belief was that if Russia were successful in its operation in Chechnya, the
government might see an opportunity to expand to other areas.

The relationship between Eastern Europe and Russia is similar to that of
Russia and its former republics. The countries of Eastern Europe are fearful of a
resurgent Russia intent on reviving its former superpower status at the expense
of its neighbors. Expansion of NATO to include the countries of Eastern Europe
would calm these fears. By integrating these countries into a larger NATO
stability in the region could be assured. Additionally, by encouraging the Eastern
European countries to adopt Western norms and behaviors, these countries
could become more productive and responsible, thus contributing to a secure
and stable Europe.

Basis for a Broader Security Framework

**European Security Organization**

The future of European security will depend greatly on the ability of Western
Europe to integrate the emerging nations of Central and Eastern Europe. A
prominent scholar in the field of international security, Malcolm Chalmers, has
put forward his own idea for dealing with post-Cold War European security
concerns. In an article published in the *World Policy Journal*, Chalmers
advocates the creation of a broader European security framework, the European
Security Organization (ESO). The organization would incorporate all of the
current members of NATO as well as the former members of the Warsaw Pact.
Chalmers contends that the establishment of the ESO would "symbolize and seal the unity of the continent" in a number of different ways. To begin with, it would provide a framework within which the West could embrace the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe without diluting the ultimate objective of the European Union: political unification. In joining the ESO, Eastern and Western Europe would have accepted the need to develop common security policies. Eventually, the process of communication between East and West could be broadened to include additional, non-security issues, such as economic, social, and political concerns.

Additionally, the ESO would continue to embed Germany in multi-lateral security arrangements, thus curbing fears of conflict between Germany and its neighbors. Just as NATO and the Warsaw Pact have done in the past, the ESO would limit Germany's room for maneuver in security policy issues. The framework of the ESO would not seek to place limits on German sovereignty that other member nations were not expected to accept for themselves. Though fears of a resurgent Germany could still exist, over time, successful German membership in the ESO would help to alleviate those fears.

Finally, the ESO would bring the security structure of Europe into line with the new concepts of "common security." Common security is the idea that instability anywhere in Europe threatens the stability of Europe as a whole. As all of the

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members of NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact would be
members in the new security organization, the chances of conflict between East
and West would be greatly reduced. "By creating an all-European security
organization, it will be possible to extend the principle of collective security, as it
has been practiced within NATO, to all of Europe," Chalmers contends.29

Control of the ESO would be maintained primarily by Europeans. Instead of
having an American or Russian commander -- as was the case in NATO and the
Warsaw Pact -- the post of supreme military commander would rotate among the
European members of ESO. Chalmers asserts that although Europeans would
"take the leading role" in administration of the new organization, participation by
the United States would be important, as "its [United States] security is closely
bound up with what happens in Europe."30 In this light, the total disengagement
of the US from Europe would not be in the best interests of either Americans or
Europeans. The debate would then center on what the United States’
commitment should be and how much they should contribute to the new
organization. Chalmers contends that "for the foreseeable future, a modest US
presence is an important safeguard against uncertainty."31

Once created, the ESO would take over a number of functions that are
currently performed by NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. In addition to these

29 Ibid., 229.
30 Ibid., 232.
31 Ibid., 233.
functions, one of the ESO's first tasks would be to provide its members with a military guarantee that their borders could not be changed through the use of force. Despite the political weight that ethnic and national affiliations carry, the ESO would make clear that under no circumstances are borders to be changed using this method. However, the ESO would have to establish clear guidelines for what constitutes national self-determination versus conquering territory by force. In essence, the ESO would act as a mechanism for maintaining the territorial status quo, or at least ensuring that changes take place only under mutually agreed conditions. The admittance of Russia brings an interesting question to the table. Russia is both a European and an Asian power, therefore, how far do the borders of "Europe" and subsequently ESO extend?

At some point in the future, Russia may seek support from its European allies regarding disputes in Asia. Chalmers addresses this point by stating that there are several reasons why it would be unwise for the ESO to take on the task of guaranteeing Russia's Asian borders. First, Russia is currently involved in disputes with both China and Japan over its eastern borders. Subsequently, Europeans would be unwilling to become involved in an ongoing dispute with the two most powerful nations in Asia. Second, by broadening the theory of the ESO to include Asia, the shadow of European hegemony would be cast in a region in which it should not be cast. According to Chalmers, a wider concept for the ESO

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32 Ibid., 237.

33 Ibid., 245.
would "undoubtedly fuel suspicions among the Asian powers that the new European alliance would become an instrument for global hegemony by the 'Northern' or 'white' nations." The final reason that Chalmers outlines focuses on the likelihood that nations of the Middle East would ultimately react in much the same way as Asian nations. The end result is that, if the ESO will have a role in guaranteeing Russia's European borders, it will have to make other arrangements for territorial guarantees to the south and east.

A second function for the new organization could involve the verification and implementation of arms control agreements. Entrusting arms control implementation monitoring to the ESO would represent a practical way of involving the defense ministries and armed forces of Russia, the United States, and all European nations in a common task. Related to the task of arms control monitoring is the task of adapting the military structures of member nations. To accomplish the adaptation of military structures, Chalmers advocates the creation of a system of "defensive defense." He describes this system as one that envisions a force structure that is "sufficient for deterring invasion but cannot itself be used for aggression." Adoption of "defensive defense" postures would help to reassure all the nations of Europe, members and non-members alike, that the remaining armed forces had the sole role of maintaining the territorial

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 240.
36 Ibid.
status quo. In addition to modifying the military structures, the ESO would also expand confidence building measures, such as military information and personnel exchanges.

Chalmers contends that the creation of an all-European security organization is not only a realistic goal, but also the best way to ensure a "secure and prosperous future for Europe as the bipolar division of the continent comes to an end."37 According to Chalmers the potential benefits to Europe for the creation of an organization of this kind are numerous and great. He writes that,

...the ESO would institutionalize common security, and thus help prevent a new division of Europe into two or three opposing blocs. It would safeguard the new democracies of Eastern Europe against Soviet intervention, and thus formalize the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. And it would address the concern...that German unity could lead, in time, to military expansionism. The creation of ESO would also remove one of the major obstacles to the full political and economic integration of Eastern Europe...into the European Community.38

In short, the ESO would help to accelerate the process of European integration which is at least as crucial to a lasting peace as the security structures themselves.

37 Ibid., 247.

38 Ibid., 248.
CHAPTER 4

PROBLEMS SURROUNDING AN EXPANDED NATO

Antagonizing Russia

Relations with Russia

In an article analyzing the American stake in Russia, Alvin Z. Rubinstein provides an assessment of US policy regarding NATO's expansion and Russia's objections to that expansion. The author begins his analysis of NATO's proposed expansion with a look at the Partnership For Peace (PFP), an initiative put forward by NATO following the end of the Cold War. This US backed policy of military cooperation now comprises more than two dozen countries, including former Soviet republics which have joined. The author's contention is that important parallels can be drawn between the PFP and an expanded NATO. Rubinstein argues that the PFP was created and implemented as the best way to spread democracy and provide the alliance with greater opportunities in a variety of fields. He writes:

The PFP was also touted...as the best way to keep the United States bound to Europe, to give NATO responsibility to engage in out-of-area operations, to spread democracy to the former Soviet satellites, to block 'neo-isolationist' efforts to reduce US expenditures on NATO, and to contain Russia.

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2 Ibid., 35.
Although the PFP was not primarily or deliberately aimed at Russia, Rubinstein contends that it gave the Russians that impression. Instead of ushering in peace to Europe, the PFP has “repolarized Europe and had chilling effects on Russian-American relations.” The chilling of relations is due primarily to the misconceptions surrounding the purpose of the PFP. To date the purpose of the PFP is still a mystery; Eastern and Central European countries viewed the PFP as a waiting room for NATO membership. It is Rubinstein’s belief that an expansion of NATO would have the same or greater effect on US-Russian relations as the PFP had.

Rubinstein further contends that any eastward expansion of the alliance can only be viewed by the Russian military and political leaders as a threat. In a recent book, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State*, Rubinstein and co-author Nicolai N. Petro, argue that from a Russian perspective, NATO enlargement represents the main threat to regional equilibrium. The Russian government views Central and Eastern Europe as a demilitarized, buffer zone separating Europe and Russia. The Russian government views any effort by NATO to expand into this area as an attempt to re-militarize the region, and direct these countries’ armed forces toward Russia. That is, the Russian

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3 Ibid.

government views the re-militarization as an attempt to move NATO's eastern border closer to Russia.

Despite pressures within his own government to do otherwise, by mid 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognized -- with reservations -- the inevitability of NATO's expansion. Yeltsin's first reservation was that NATO's expansion should be gradual and in consultation with Russia. Accordingly, there have been high level meetings between the US, NATO officials, and Russia regarding the possibility of expanding the alliance.

The second reservation was that there should be strict rules governing the admission process. Through this reservation, the Russian government was trying to limit the flight of potential allies to the West and maintain its buffer zone with Western Europe. Should expansion go ahead without their involvement, the Russians were afraid of losing their safety net of Eastern Europe. The final reservation was that, eventually, Russia be allowed to join the alliance. However, the admission of Russia would create an interesting dilemma. By admitting Russia, NATO's area of operation could possibly extend all the way into Asia and the Pacific. It is unlikely that the European allies in NATO would be willing to become involved in Russia's problems in Asia.

In addition to the three reservations put forward by Yeltsin, Petro and Rubinstein contend that the Russian government opposes NATO expansion for a number of other reasons. According to them, NATO expansion would first, "delay Russia's integration into Europe and create security subsystems which
exclude Russia." The Russian government is interested in trying to establish a
new pan-European security arrangement in which they can be founding
members. From the Russian's perspective, the NATO alliance is a relic of the
Cold-War, and should only be kept around until a suitable replacement is found.
Second, expansion of the alliance would erode Russian trust in the West, further
isolating Russia and strengthening anti-Western political circles with Russia. For
the maintenance of a lasting peace in Europe, Russia needs to play a substantial
role, and therefore can not be alienated from Europe.

Third, expansion will "increase the tendency within Russia to develop an
alternative security system, accentuating the division of Europe." The
consequences of such an alternative system could be another Cold War, as both
Russia and the United States begin to gather up their allies. Resulting in a
situation where each side is moving forward with its own plans for European
security. Fourth, expanding NATO before a new security mechanism is in place
would limit Russia's ability to participate in the international arena. The Russian
government believes that if they are unable to participate as founding members
in a pan-European security arrangement then their participation in the
international arena as a whole will be limited. As NATO expansion is unlikely to
include them initially, the Russians are fearful that they will not be able to
influence events in Europe. Finally, expanding NATO would make the Baltic

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5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 153.
States and Ukraine permanent sources of discord with the West. The problem here is that where the Baltic States and Ukraine finally end up -- either in Russia's sphere or NATO's sphere -- will be a permanent source of contention between Russia and the West.

According to Rubinstein, the concerns expressed by the Russian government should be enough to prompt the Clinton administration to rethink the logic of the PFP, and therefore the logic of an expanded NATO. On the subject of the PFP's relevance to western security, Rubinstein writes:

[The PFP is] devoid of any strategic logic, military necessity, or ideological merit. Strategically, the PFP answers no threat. There is no power vacuum in Europe that NATO has to fill. NATO is unchallenged on the continent. Russia is weak, disorganized, and intent on finding a way out of its internal time of troubles.

In response to the argument that the expansion of NATO will bring stability to Eastern and Central Europe, Rubinstein contends that the remedy for their anxieties is "work, not welfare." The author is of the opinion that these countries should establish free-trade zones, joint enterprises, and mini-customs unions to encourage cooperation among neighbors. Additionally, these countries should work together to attract foreign investment in order to tackle their shared problems (energy, industrial, economic, and ecological). The logic behind the cooperation approach is that if the nations of Central and Eastern Europe learn

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7 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "America's Stake in Russia Today," 35.
8 Ibid.
to live with each other, then there would be no need to expand the alliance into that area.

In his article, "America's Stake in Russia Today," Rubinstein also addresses the concern among Western leaders that Russia is still capable of launching an invasion of Europe. Rubinstein contends that the threat of a conventional attack, should not even be a concern among Western leaders. According to the author, the Russian army is "underfunded, poorly led, riddled with corruption, and desperately in need of the kind of extensive restructuring and professionalization undertaken by the US Army in the decade after the pullout from Vietnam." The author's belief is that conventionally, the Russian military is incapable of attacking westward. The failure of the Russian military in Chechnya illustrates the lack of preparedness on the part of military. The military's inability to mount even a small-scale invasion makes it highly unlikely that an attack could be launched on a larger scale against Western Europe.

Despite the lack of ability on the part of Russia's conventional forces to intimidate the West, the Russian government is still in charge of a vast strategic arsenal. The best way to deal with the threat of Russia's nuclear weapons is through continued arms control negotiations. The recent negotiations in Helsinki in 1997 have produced the START II treaty and laid the groundwork for a START III treaty. The START II treaty is designed to reduce the nuclear arsenals on both sides to about 3,500 warheads and missiles, the minimum to which both

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{36.}\]
sides are willing to drop. Should there arise a desire to reduce nuclear
weapons further, the negotiations would have to involve the other nuclear
powers. One observer of these problems, Michael Mandelbaum from the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in an article published in
Newsweek, believes that the ill will between Russia and the United States is
"blocking ratification by the Russian Parliament of START II." 10

Pushing ahead with expansion plans could prove detrimental to US-Russian
relations in the future. Additionally, moving ahead with expansion of NATO could
also lead to the alienation of Russia. Mandelbaum writes:

Most dangerously, bitterness over NATO expansion could turn
Russia, over the long term, against the entire post-cold-war
settlement. That settlement, including the liberation of Eastern
Europe, the end of the Soviet Union and the dramatic reductions in
military force, is extraordinarily favorable to the West. 11

The thought of alienating Russia through expansion of NATO is particularly
disconcerting, especially if it could perhaps lead to another Cold War.
Mandelbaum views expansion of NATO as the first step in changing "the security
arrangements of Europe taken against Russia's wishes." 12 As one of the largest
owners of nuclear weapons, relations with Russia need to be given special
attention. Perhaps, based on these arguments, expansion of the alliance is too

10 Michael Mandelbaum, "Don't Expand NATO," Newsweek (December 23,

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
risky to go ahead with. Whatever the decision, the various authors discussed above contend that Russia needs to be made a full partner in the negotiations.

Economic drain on the West

**Unstable Economies**

The process of converting the eastern command economies into western style market economies has proved difficult, and will play an important role in deciding who will be admitted into an expanded NATO. According to a scholar in the field of Eastern European studies, Michael Roskin, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe began programs of privatization and marketization in an effort to “Westernize” their economies. Marketization, according to Roskin, is the process by which a country frees prices, allowing them to “find their own level with few or no fixed prices or government subsidies.”

Roskin defines privatization as “turning previously socially or state-owned industries over to private owners.” The attempts by Central and East European governments to “Westernize” their economies have had serious consequences.

Early in the 1990s these economies began a downward plunge, marked by rising inflation and the closure of numerous industries. During these tough economic times, most governments experienced a rise in the number of votes

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14 Ibid.
cast for Communist parties. The increase in support for the Communist parties prompted new fears of economic collapse leading to a return to the old Soviet style system. The votes cast for the communist parties were a symbol of the people's displeasure with the governments' failure to reform and "Westernize" the economies. Some economies, such as those in the Balkans, continued to slide; others, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary managed to turn around. However, in spite of the turn-around experienced by some of these countries, their economies are still not healthy.

Despite the turn-around experienced by some of these countries, all of their standards of living pale in comparison to the West. Roskin asserts that the standards of living are roughly twenty-five percent of that of their western counterparts.\(^{15}\) For stability to be maintained in these countries, and thus allow them to provide a meaningful contribution to NATO, the economic systems must be stabilized. Until that transformation takes place, these countries would be providing a sub-standard contribution to the alliance. That is not to say that the new members would be shrinking from their duties; rather, the new members may not have the economic support base necessary to provide a quality contribution to the alliance.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 165.
Lack of High Technology

In addition to the problems associated with Central and Eastern European economies, problems are also present in the field of technology. According to Howard Frost, a Washington-based international security affairs analyst, a number of technical problems surround NATO's proposed expansion, including problems of "standardization of force structure, weapons, and communication equipment."¹⁶ The cost to modernize the militaries of Eastern and Central Europe, thus bringing them up to the level of the West, could be phenomenal. The modernization cost alone should be enough to make the West reconsider the proposed expansion eastward. Instead of admitting these countries immediately, western leaders should consider waiting until the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been able to modernize both their economies and their militaries.

Problem of consensus

Is Bigger Better?

Scholars in the field of European security often draw parallels between an enlarged NATO and the EU and the UN. They cite both the UN and the EU as examples of organizations that are too-large to reach decisions effectively. The

greater the number of members, the more difficult it becomes to reach a decision.

In the case of Eastern and Central Europe, the countries of the region have significantly different views on social, political, and economic issues. Two observers in the enlargement debate maintain that, through enlargement, the alliance would face the so-called “numbers problem.” The “numbers problem” states that: “irrespective of the merits of the candidacies of individual countries, NATO could end up enlarging to the point where it became another overlarge, toothless Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.”

Increasing the membership of the alliance without regard for this problem could lead the alliance into a situation in which its strength, and subsequently its effectiveness, are severely diluted.

Howard Frost contends that the decision making capability of the alliance could become significantly hampered by increased membership. He writes that NATO could “find its decision making encumbered with the addition of a group of members having significantly different political, military, and force-planning traditions.”

Currently, no acceptable solution has been offered to remedy the “numbers problem” or the problems associated with eastern force-planning issues, which continue to plague expansion planning. Therefore, how NATO

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addresses the problem of consensus will significantly influence the effectiveness of the alliance in the future.

Problem of exclusion

Dealing with the countries that do not make the cut

To date, the question about NATO's expansion has focused almost exclusively on the countries that should be offered membership. Equally important however is the question of how NATO deals with the countries that are left out of the first round of expansion. The West's handling of the "have-nots" will have important consequences for the future of European security.

Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, two senior analysts at the RAND institute, argue that how NATO handles the "have-nots" will directly affect the stability of Europe. According to the authors, if these countries feel "shut out, a destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces within these countries."\(^{19}\) The authors contend that if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goals of security and stability in Europe, then the alliance must create a clear policy toward the have-nots. The creation of a policy toward the have-nots will help to ensure that a destabilizing backlash in Central and Eastern Europe does not occur.

It is the authors' view that the alliance is split three ways regarding how far expansion should go and how to get there. According to Asmus and Larrabee, the first group wants "an open door policy based on self-differentiation: countries' aspirations and their ability to meet the standards the alliance sets for new members would determine enlargement's extent and pace." Essentially the open door policy implies that the alliance must not impose its preferences in enlargement. Additionally the alliance should endeavor to refrain from including some, while excluding others. In theory then, NATO membership is open to all members of the PFP; it is up to would-be members to establish the parameters for their ascension to the alliance. The authors view the open door policy as the official policy of the Clinton administration, which does not want "the benefits of security integration and cooperation limited to a handful of countries."

The authors term the second approach to the enlargement dilemma as "parallel expansion." The parallel expansion approach holds that the list of NATO candidates should "be the same as the list of current and potential members of the European Union." The logic behind the parallel approach is that if the list of possible NATO members is the same as a list for the EU, Russia would have greater difficulty in opposing the expansion. Membership in NATO would be seen as a logical extension of membership in the EU.

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 14.

22 Ibid.
approach is only designed to integrate the nations of “Europe,” thus excluding Ukraine and Russia. The parallel approach runs the risk of alienating both Ukraine and Russia, who feel that their security is intertwined with that of Europe.

The final view holds that NATO’s enlargement should be limited to a few countries, based on strategic criteria and then cap the process. Proponents of the capping approach argue that this is the best way to appease the Russians and keep the alliance from overburdening itself with new commitments. The problem here is that by capping the membership process, even more countries would become alienated from the West. These countries could likely form alliances of their own, returning Europe to an alliance system similar to that of the Cold War.

The countries of Eastern Europe have a number of fears regarding the expansion process. Many of the countries that are unlikely to make the first round of NATO expansion are also unlikely to make the first round of EU expansion, a serious blow to the county’s morale. Additionally, these countries are afraid that the PFP initiative will be weakened as the more active members are given membership in NATO. According to Asmus and Larrabee, the risk is that “if NATO does not extend its security umbrella to all of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, the destructive nationalism and geopolitical maneuvering that made the region so unstable in the past could be rekindled.”

Regardless of

23 Ibid., 17.
who is admitted in the first round, the alliance needs to take careful steps to ensure that the process of marketization and democratization continues in the countries that are not admitted in the first round.

In an effort to remedy the problem, the authors propose that a compromise be struck between the proponents of self-differentiation (the first approach) and those who support parallelism (the second approach). According to the authors, the two elements could,

...create a narrow band of common ground on which a consensus on enlargement could be built: an 'open door' proclamation affirming that the first new NATO members will not be the last, without naming next-round candidates; and a recognition of the self-differentiation that has already taken place among NATO aspirants not included in the first round.  

They further assert that a compromise between the first and second approaches leaves the alliance with a number of options. By adopting the compromise approach the alliance could then recognize countries that have stated their intentions to seek membership, and have achieved progress in meeting the initial criteria and goals through participation in the PFP. These countries would then be placed in a special category, essentially a holding pattern, awaiting the eventual offer of membership. In addition to the aforementioned compromise, the authors advocate that NATO reorganize the PFP in an effort to expand cooperation and defense integration among those countries that are not admitted in the first round. The move to reorganize the PFP could alleviate fears by the 

\[24\] Ibid., 16.

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Central and East Europeans that the PFP will weaken once the most active members are admitted into NATO.

The proposal that Asmus and Larrabee suggest is that NATO create "strategic homes" around the borders of alliance members. Essentially, these "homes" would consist of sub-alliances, with specifically tailored political and military establishments -- all of which would be under the auspices of NATO command. The envisioned system calls for the creation of three sub-commands, one each in the northeast, southeast, and east-central Europe. These new commands would be responsible for "security in the region as a whole, not only at NATO's borders."\(^{25}\)

These regional commands would allow potential NATO members to cement their ties with allies at the regional level, while allowing them to play a key role in security in their region. The compromise strategy would help to manage Russian concerns about the alliance's expansion, as well as leave the door open for Ukrainian and Russian admittance to the alliance. The use of these sub-commands could also play a role in alleviating the problems associated with numbers. The sub-commands could act as representatives at NATO meetings for the countries in its command, a representative system.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 19.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Review

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact have left NATO confronting the post-Cold War world, and subsequently searching for a new role. The original role of the alliance was to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union into Western Europe. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union has made the role of “defender of the West” obsolete. Whatever role emerges will likely involve a redefinition of the identity of the alliance as it confronts an expanded membership from former Warsaw Pact countries. However, expansion of the alliance does not necessarily address the issue of the alliance’s new role. Through expansion, the alliance would simply be growing larger, without addressing the problem of what its exact security mission should be -- a reformulated “selective security” organization or an agent of the UN’s “collective security.”

The previous two chapters have sought to explain the major arguments surrounding the expansion of NATO. These chapters have provided an analysis of the primary arguments -- both for and against -- that various scholars and world leaders have made regarding the expansion of the alliance. While expansion of the alliance may be a foregone conclusion, one must also understand the potential problems that expansion could present to the alliance.
Arguments Supporting Expansion

Chapter three examined some of the benefits that an expanded NATO could provide to Europe. These benefits include the following possibilities: creating four new missions for NATO, helping to ease tensions between Russia and Eastern Europe, and providing the basis for a broader security framework. The new missions for the alliance include 1) acting as an agent of regional stability, 2) improving burden sharing and continuing the process of de-nationalization of defense policies, 3) providing a force for unity in Europe, and 4) possibly becoming involved in out-of-area actions.

Acting as an agent of regional stability the alliance could alleviate the fear of a security vacuum in Eastern Europe. As Howard Frost noted, the concept of a security vacuum is intended to refer to "the region's lack of international structure, uncertain democracies, weak economies, ethnic strife, and potentially troublesome neighbors."\(^1\) In response to the perceived security vacuum, many Eastern and Central European countries have begun to find other avenues with which to ensure their security rather than wait for the West to accept them. This trend could act to increase regional tensions. However, by expanding the alliance eastward, Central and East European countries would have no reason to look beyond NATO for security guarantees. Jeffrey Simon contends that the future of European security will be directly affected by "the relationships now

forming among states that arose from the old USSR, and it is particularly
affected by the degree to which those relationships are cooperative or
competitive."² Even more than many Western European states, Central and
Eastern European states see NATO as the fundamental European security
institution capable of providing stability in the region.

The second mission of an expanded NATO involves burden sharing and the
continued de-nationalization of defense policies. According to Simon, de­
nationalization of defense policies has been one of NATO’s greatest
achievements and has contributed to building confidence and stability among
European nations. Simon argues that if NATO were to "atrophy and wither
away, re-nationalization of defense planning might occur and old suspicions
might resurface."³ A key factor related to the de-nationalization of defense
policies is defense burden sharing among members within the alliance. The
former secretary general of NATO, Manfred Wörner, contends that as NATO’s
forces are restructured and scaled down, the burden of European defense needs
to be shouldered equally by all members, both current and new ones. Wörner
emphasizes that as force reductions take place, there needs to be “an equitable
shouldering of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of our common defense,”
which will require “the continued presence of Canadian and US forces in

² Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO." Orbis 37 (Winter
³ Ibid., 24.
Europe.  Through burden sharing, the alliance could better maintain a sense of equality among members.

Through expansion, the alliance could also become a useful force for unity in Europe. Because some countries are not members of the European Community, the alliance plays an important role as an institution that anchors those states both to Europe and to a credible security arrangement. If NATO is allowed to disintegrate slowly, the repercussions could be very serious. Simon claims that should NATO wither away, "insecurity and identity crisis would likely be the result, first on Europe's flanks and then throughout all of Europe." Additionally, as Eastern Europe is brought into the fold, some countries that are invited to become members of NATO may elect to remain outside of the European Community. In the unlikely event this were to take place, NATO could play an important role in keeping non-EC member states attached to a pan-European organization. In short, to maintain a strong European security organization -- and thus a strong and peaceful European community -- the connection between non-European EC members, Canada, and the United States must be continued.

Involvement in out-of-area actions represents the final mission in which an expanded NATO could have a role. Typically, NATO's "area" has been

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associated with Europe. However, former President Richard Nixon, sees European defense as NATO's "core mission," but views participation in out-of-area actions as its "cutting edge." The globalization of national interests has made it necessary to consider Western security concerns in the context of the entire planet, and to think of security concerns in terms of neighbors, trading partners, and sources of strategic raw materials. Thus, maintaining interests abroad calls for an organization that is capable of out-of-area operations. Further participation includes assistance with peacekeeping missions (IFOR) and the maintenance of forward-deployed material for other operations. Though the alliance itself may not participate directly in out-of-area actions, Simon contends that "the alliance will likely provide the necessary back-ground conditions for implementing such actions."  

According to Robert E. Hunter, the Soviet Union will "remain the premier security concern in Europe -- the leading threat...to stability and predictability on the Continent." Therefore, NATO could provide an important safety net for Eastern and Central Europe with respect to Russia. The Russian government's support for ethnic Russians living outside of Russia has prompted new fears of Russian imperialism, especially in light of the deployment of troops to the

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7 Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 25.

republic of Chechnya in 1994. The relationship between Eastern Europe and Russia is similar to that of Russia and its former republics. The countries of Eastern Europe are fearful of a resurgent Russia intent on reviving its former superpower status at the expense of its neighbors. Expansion of NATO to include these countries would calm fears and stabilize relations. Additionally, by encouraging the Eastern European countries to adopt Western norms and behaviors, these countries could become more productive and responsible, thus contributing to a more secure and stable Europe.

Through the expansion of the alliance the possibility exists that a broader European security organization could be created. Malcolm Chalmers advocates that Europe should attempt to create the European Security Organization (ESO). The organization would incorporate all of the current members of NATO as well as the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Chalmers contends that the establishment of the ESO would "symbolize and seal the unity of the continent" in a number of different ways, and ensure a "secure and prosperous future for Europe as the bipolar division of the continent comes to an end." According to Chalmers the potential benefits to Europe for the creation of such an organization are numerous and great. Chalmers contends that the ESO would institutionalize common security, and thus help prevent a new division of Europe into two or three opposing blocs. In short, the ESO would help to accelerate


\[10\] Ibid., 248.
the process of European integration which is at least as crucial to a lasting peace as the security structures that are created.

Arguments Against Expansion

Chapter four examined the major problems associated with an expanded NATO. These problems included the possibility of antagonizing Russia, the possibility of expansion creating an economic drain on the West, the problem of establishing and maintaining a consensus within the alliance, and the problems associated with the have-nots.

In examining the possibility of antagonizing Russia, Alvin Z. Rubinstein draws important parallels between the PFP and an expanded NATO. He argues that the PFP was created and implemented as the best way to spread democracy and provide the alliance with greater opportunities in a variety of fields. However, instead of ushering in peace to Europe, the PFP has “repolarized Europe and had chilling effects on Russian-American relations.”\(^\text{11}\) It is Rubinstein’s belief that an expansion of NATO would have the same or an even greater effect on US-Russian relations, being viewed by the Russian military and political leaders as a threat to their security. Essentially, the Russian government views the expansion of NATO as an attempt to move NATO’s eastern border closer to Russia.

\(^{11}\) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “America’s Stake in Russia Today,” *Orbis* 41 (Winter 1997): 35.
In addition to the aforementioned problem, Petro and Rubinstein contend that the Russian government opposes NATO expansion for the following reasons. According to them, NATO expansion would first, "delay Russia's integration into Europe and create security subsystems which exclude Russia."  

Second, expansion of the alliance would erode Russian trust in the West, further isolating Russia and strengthening anti-Western political circles within Russia. Additionally, expansion would "increase the tendency within Russia to develop an alternative security system, accentuating the division of Europe."  

Fourth, expanding NATO before a new security mechanism is in place would limit Russia's ability to participate in the international arena. Finally, expanding NATO would make the Baltic States and the Ukraine permanent sources of discord with the West.

According to Rubinstein, the concerns expressed by the Russian government should be enough to prompt the Clinton administration to rethink the logic of the PFP, and therefore the logic of an expanded NATO. Rubinstein also contends that the remedy for Central and Eastern European anxieties is work, not welfare. The author is of the opinion that these countries should cooperate together in order to tackle their shared problems. The logic behind the cooperation approach is that if the nations of Central and Eastern Europe learn to live and

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13 Ibid., 153.
cooperate with each other, then there would be no need to expand the alliance into the area.

Additionally, Rubinstein refutes the claim by Western leaders and scholars that Russia is still capable of launching an invasion of Europe, claiming that the threat of a conventional attack should not even be a concern. The author's belief is that, conventionally, the Russian military is incapable of attacking westward. The failure of the Russian military in Chechnya illustrates the lack of preparedness on the part of military. The military's inability to mount even a small-scale invasion makes it highly unlikely that an attack could be launched on a larger scale against Western Europe.

Another observer, Michael Mandelbaum argues that pushing ahead with expansion plans could prove detrimental to US-Russian relations in the future, possibly leading to the alienation of Russia. Mandelbaum contends that bitterness over NATO expansion could turn Russia against the entire post-cold-war settlement, which is extraordinarily favorable to the West. The thought of alienating Russia through expansion of NATO is particularly disconcerting, leading perhaps to another Cold War. Mandelbaum views expansion of NATO as the first step in changing “the security arrangements of Europe taken against Russia's wishes.” Perhaps, based on these arguments, expansion of the

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15 Ibid.
alliance is too risky to go ahead with. Whatever the decision, the various authors contend, Russia needs to be made a full partner in the negotiations.

The instability of Eastern and Central European economies is another area of considerable concern in the expansion debate. According to Michael Roskin, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe began programs of privatization and marketization in an effort to "Westernize" their economies, however, these programs have had serious consequences. Early in the 1990s these economies began a downward plunge, marked by rising inflation and the closure of numerous industries. During these tough economic times, most governments experienced a rise in the number of votes cast for Communist parties -- a symbol of the people's displeasure with the reforms -- prompting fears of economic collapse leading to a return to the old Soviet style system. Some economies, such as those in the Balkans continued to slide; others, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary managed to turn around. Despite the turn-around, all of their standards of living pale in comparison to the West. Roskin asserts that the standards of living are roughly twenty-five percent of that of their western counterparts.¹⁶ For stability to be maintained in these countries, so that they could provide a meaningful contribution to NATO, the economic systems must be stabilized.

In addition to the problems associated with the Central and Eastern European economies, problems are also present in the field of technology. According to Howard Frost a number of technical problems surround NATO’s proposed expansion, including problems of “standardization of force structure, weapons, and communication equipment.”\textsuperscript{17} The cost to modernize the militaries of Eastern and Central Europe could be phenomenal. The modernization cost alone should be enough to make the West reconsider the proposed expansion eastward. Instead of admitting these countries immediately, western leaders should consider waiting until the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been able to modernize both their economies and their militaries.

Another problem related to an expanded NATO is that of reaching a consensus within a larger organization. Scholars in the field of European security often draw parallels between an enlarged NATO and the EU and the UN. They cite both as examples of organizations that are too-large to reach decisions effectively. Two observers in the enlargement debate maintain that through enlargement, the alliance would face the so-called “numbers problem,” which states that: “...irrespective of the merits of the candidacies of individual countries, NATO could end up enlarging to the point where it became another

\textsuperscript{17} Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," 39.
Another commentator, Howard Frost contends that the decision making capability of the alliance could become significantly hampered by increased membership. Frost writes that NATO could "find its decision making encumbered with the addition of a group of members having significantly different political, military, and force-planning traditions." Currently, no acceptable solution has been offered to remedy the "numbers problem" or the problems associated with eastern force-planning issues, which continue to plague expansion planning. Increasing the membership of the alliance without regard for these problems could lead the alliance into a situation in which its strength, and subsequently its effectiveness, are severely diluted. Therefore, how NATO addresses the problem of consensus will significantly influence the effectiveness of the alliance in the future.

The final problem relating to the expansion of the alliance relates to the countries that are left out of the first round of expansion. According to Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, the West's handling of the "have-nots" will have important consequences for the future of European security. According to the authors, if the have-nots feel "shut out, a destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces

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within these countries. The authors contend that if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goals of security and stability in Europe, then the alliance must create a clear policy toward the have-nots. The creation of a policy toward the have-nots will help to ensure that a destabilizing backlash in Central and Eastern Europe does not occur.

In an effort to remedy the problem of the have-nots, the authors propose that a compromise be struck between the proponents of self-differentiation (the first approach to expansion) and those who support parallelism (the second approach to expansion). The authors assert that a compromise between the first and second approaches leaves the alliance with a number of options. By adopting the compromise approach the alliance could then recognize countries that have stated their intentions to seek membership, and have achieved progress in meeting the initial criteria and goals through participation in the PFP. These countries would then be placed in a special category, essentially a holding pattern, awaiting the eventual offer of membership.

In addition to the aforementioned compromise, the authors advocate that NATO reorganize the PFP in an effort to expand cooperation and defense integration among those countries that are not admitted in the first round. The move to reorganize the PFP could also alleviate fears by the Central and East Europeans that the PFP will weaken once the most active members are admitted.

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into NATO. The proposal that the authors advocate is the creation of "strategic homes" around the borders of alliance members.

Essentially, these "homes" would consist of sub-alliances, with specifically tailored political and military establishments, which would be under the auspices of NATO command. The envisioned system calls for the creation of three sub-commands, one each in the northeast, southeast, and east-central Europe. According to the authors, these new commands would be responsible for "security in the region as a whole, not only at NATO's borders." These regional commands would allow potential NATO members to cement their ties with allies at the regional level, while allowing them to play a key role in security in their region. The compromise strategy would help to manage Russian concerns about the alliance's expansion, as well as leave the door open for Ukrainian and Russian admittance to the alliance. The use of these sub-commands could also play a role in alleviating the problems associated with numbers. The sub-commands could act as representatives at NATO meetings for the countries in its command and serve as a "representative system."

Where the Alliance Currently Stands

Following a summit meeting in January 1996, in Brussels, the NATO alliance expressed an interest in expanding to other democratic states within Europe. Reports from the summit indicated that expansion would take into account the

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21 Ibid., 19.
political and security developments in the whole of Europe. After the summit was concluded, an internal study was begun by the alliance's foreign ministers to analyze how the alliance should expand. According to Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, the study addresses a number of key issues relating to the enlargement process. Moltke writes:

It [the study] addresses, on a basis of consensus, a number of key aspects of enlargement: the cooperative and undivided Europe which NATO Allies want to see come about; the contribution of an enlarged Alliance and of other international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the Western European Union, to such a Europe; and the place and role of Russia in a cooperative European security architecture.  

The study also outlined the need for careful handling of the expansion process and the guidelines that new members are expected to adhere to prior to being admitted. The first tentative steps toward expansion were taken later that same year.

In December 1996, the alliance announced that it was formally considering the admittance of new members. According to an article published in the New York Times, no reference was made concerning which countries would be invited to join, only that the alliance expects the new members to "join the alliance by

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The front-runners for expansion are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but other possibilities include Romania and Slovenia.

A final decision regarding which countries will be allowed to join the alliance is expected to be reached at the July 1997, NATO summit in Madrid. In a statement issued by the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, "invitations will be issued at that summit [Madrid, 1997] to a number of countries -- at this stage no decision has been reached as to exactly whom -- to begin the enlargement of NATO." Until the announcement is made at the July summit little more than speculation can be made surrounding the expansion of the alliance.

The arguments that focused on the advantages of expanding the alliance into Eastern and Central Europe are persuasive. However, one must also consider the consequences that expansion will bring. Whatever the outcome may be, it is important that NATO's foreign ministers have weighed all of the consequences of expanding the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. One can only wait until an announcement is made, and the reaction of Russia and the have-nots is

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gauged, before passing ultimate judgment on the alliance's decision to expand
its membership.
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