Year of Award

2018

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Type

Master of Arts (MA)

Degree Name

Philosophy

Committee Chair

Soazig Le Bihan

Commitee Members

Albert Borgmann, Daniel Spencer

Keywords

value influence in science, roles approach, aims approach, non-epistemic value influence

Publisher

University of Montana

Subject Categories

Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Criticism of the value-free ideal has motivated attempts to formulate a criterion for the legitimacy of non-epistemic value influence in science. I argue that this search aims to protect two main components of legitimacy, scientific integrity and justice. While integrity is primary, justice remains important, especially in setting scientific goals. One of the main proposals for setting legitimate goals is to rely on democratic endorsement (Intemann 2015). I critically assess four interpretations of this criterion, finding that all are problematic. I then propose and evaluate three alternative models that seek to better balance respect for the public with scientific expertise.

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© Copyright 2018 Rebecca Korf