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Abstract

Defining the scope of a defendant’s duty of care has sparked heated debate for decades, and rightfully so. The obligations we have to one another dictate our societal structure at its core, for “in the absence of a duty, there can be no negligence.” Tort law, serving as a “deterrence of antisocial conduct,” purposefully molds our behaviors by making us financially accountable for our choices. That which we choose to do—and refrain from doing—is directly impacted by both our duty and the cost of breaching it. As a result, positive behaviors may be indirectly deterred by demanding compensation when they fall short of perfection. Policy makers should be cautious not to lose sight of the greater good in a quest to compensate every harm.

The Public Duty Doctrine prevents tort law from deterring publicly beneficial services for the sake of a single citizen. By recognizing that that governmental agents performing public roles owe their duty to the public, not individuals, it prevents citizens from jeopardizing public services by demanding perfection from them. Without the doctrine, municipalities may have to terminate services as a whole in order to compensate a single mistake.

In Kent v. City of Columbia Falls, the Court has inexplicably torn apart the Public Duty Doctrine. It has stretched the boundaries of public duties to include countless individual citizens like Kent, opening the door to an unprecedented wave of lawsuits against municipalities. This note discusses the legal errors of the Court’s holding that Kent can proceed against the City of Columbia Falls on the theory of a voluntarily assumed duty of ordinary care and argues that public policy supports the preservation of the Public Duty Doctrine.

debate for decades,1 and rightfully so. The obligations we have to one another dictate our societal structure at its core, for “in the absence of a duty, there can be no negligence.”2 Tort law, serving as a “deterrence of antisocial conduct,” purposefully molds our behaviors by making us financially accountable for our choices.3 That which we choose to do—and refrain from doing—is directly impacted by both our duty and the cost of breaching it. As a result, positive behaviors may be indirectly deterred by demanding compensation when they fall short of perfection. Policy makers should be cautious not to lose sight of the greater good in a quest to compensate every harm. The Public Duty Doctrine prevents tort law from deterring publicly beneficial services for the sake of a single citizen. By recognizing that that governmental agents performing public roles owe their duty to the public, not individuals,4 it prevents citizens from jeopardizing public services by demanding perfection from them. Without the doctrine, municipalities may have to terminate services as a whole in order to compensate a single mistake. In Kent v. City of Columbia Falls,5 the Court has inexplicably torn apart the Public Duty Doctrine. It has stretched the boundaries of public duties to include countless individual citizens like Kent,6 opening the door to an unprecedented wave of lawsuits against municipalities. This note discusses the legal errors of the Court’s holding that Kent can proceed against the City of Columbia Falls on the theory of a voluntarily assumed duty of ordinary care and argues that public policy supports the preservation of the Public Duty Doctrine.

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