Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Category
Social Sciences/Humanities
Abstract/Artist Statement
There have been numerous occasions when a great power has become involved in another country’s civil war. Whether induced by the invading great power or caused internally, the balance of power in civil wars can be shaped by the presence of a great power. However, the purpose of my question is to redirect the attention away from the great power leaving and focus on the domestic and regional impacts of such events. To answer this question, I examine two case studies of when the United States withdrew itself from a civil war, namely Iraq in 2011 and Vietnam in 1973. The purpose of doing so is to reflect on the residual effects of the following years after the U.S. left. In order to shed any light on the effects of a great power leaving civil war is for the civil war country itself and the surrounding area, one has to look at historical examples. The purpose is to determine which state(s) used military force in these two countries after the U.S. withdrew its troops, and why did they do so. This last question is critical to understanding which states are likeliest to involve itself militarily after a great power leaves a civil war in the future.
Furthermore, these historical examinations will be done through the lens of two theories in international relations (IR). A part of this exercise is to apply and hopefully strengthen IR theories to build upon the field itself. I examine this question using a structural realist and an economic interdependence approach. These theories are important because they emphasize different, yet mutually important aspects in IR, namely power and trade. Structural realism focuses on state power and capabilities in analyzing international relations, while economic interdependence theory stresses trade and economic gain as consequential to any international relations event/analysis.
In applying structural realism, I use the Correlates of War National Capabilities database to ascertain which countries around Iraq and Vietnam are the strongest, i.e. most capable countries. I then use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to see if any states around these two countries used military force in Iraqi or Vietnamese territory after the U.S. withdrew its forces. For economic interdependence theory, I use the same conflict data, but rather than looking at national capabilities, I use Barbieri trade data that is apart of the Correlates of War dataset to compare trade levels between the surrounding countries and the target countries themselves. The hypothesis is that the more interdependent any two countries are economically (and in this case, measured by the amount of interstate trade flows), the less likely they are to use military force due to the fear of losing future trade revenue.
The contribution that my research gives to the field is twofold. First, I hope this research aids in strengthening theory in IR. Second, I hope to shed light on the power dynamics and economic conditions that might make military force likely after a great power leaves a civil war. Additionally, this can be useful to U.S. foreign policymakers in deciding what are the potential consequences for the states and local communities are “left behind.”
Mentor Name
Karen Adams
Examining the Residual Effects of a Great Power Leaving a Civil War
There have been numerous occasions when a great power has become involved in another country’s civil war. Whether induced by the invading great power or caused internally, the balance of power in civil wars can be shaped by the presence of a great power. However, the purpose of my question is to redirect the attention away from the great power leaving and focus on the domestic and regional impacts of such events. To answer this question, I examine two case studies of when the United States withdrew itself from a civil war, namely Iraq in 2011 and Vietnam in 1973. The purpose of doing so is to reflect on the residual effects of the following years after the U.S. left. In order to shed any light on the effects of a great power leaving civil war is for the civil war country itself and the surrounding area, one has to look at historical examples. The purpose is to determine which state(s) used military force in these two countries after the U.S. withdrew its troops, and why did they do so. This last question is critical to understanding which states are likeliest to involve itself militarily after a great power leaves a civil war in the future.
Furthermore, these historical examinations will be done through the lens of two theories in international relations (IR). A part of this exercise is to apply and hopefully strengthen IR theories to build upon the field itself. I examine this question using a structural realist and an economic interdependence approach. These theories are important because they emphasize different, yet mutually important aspects in IR, namely power and trade. Structural realism focuses on state power and capabilities in analyzing international relations, while economic interdependence theory stresses trade and economic gain as consequential to any international relations event/analysis.
In applying structural realism, I use the Correlates of War National Capabilities database to ascertain which countries around Iraq and Vietnam are the strongest, i.e. most capable countries. I then use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to see if any states around these two countries used military force in Iraqi or Vietnamese territory after the U.S. withdrew its forces. For economic interdependence theory, I use the same conflict data, but rather than looking at national capabilities, I use Barbieri trade data that is apart of the Correlates of War dataset to compare trade levels between the surrounding countries and the target countries themselves. The hypothesis is that the more interdependent any two countries are economically (and in this case, measured by the amount of interstate trade flows), the less likely they are to use military force due to the fear of losing future trade revenue.
The contribution that my research gives to the field is twofold. First, I hope this research aids in strengthening theory in IR. Second, I hope to shed light on the power dynamics and economic conditions that might make military force likely after a great power leaves a civil war. Additionally, this can be useful to U.S. foreign policymakers in deciding what are the potential consequences for the states and local communities are “left behind.”