Oral Presentations and Performances: Session III
Project Type
Presentation
Faculty Mentor’s Full Name
Soazig Le Bihan
Faculty Mentor’s Department
Philosophy
Abstract / Artist's Statement
Peter Singer’s preference utilitarian defense of selective infant replacement in cases of severe disability remains one of the most controversial arguments in contemporary bioethics. The core of Singer’s position relies on the claim that replacing a severely disabled infant with a non-disabled infant increases overall preference satisfaction and is therefore morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that Singer’s argument fails to justify this conclusion. Singer’s replacement premise requires a utilitarian calculus that depends on reliable predictions about future preference satisfaction. While some critics maintain that Singer underestimates the quality of life of disabled individuals, I contend that, once this concern is integrated with the welfare impacts on caregivers and the broader social effects of disability-inclusive communities, the aggregate preference satisfaction required by his argument becomes difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty. The combined uncertainty surrounding individual well-being, caregiver adaptation, and socially distributed effects undermines the claim that replacement reliably maximizes preference satisfaction. By challenging the methodological assumptions underlying the utilitarian calculus, this paper exposes a critical weakness in the structure of Singer’s justification for replacement.
Category
Humanities
Utility Under Uncertainty: A Critique of Singer's Disability Replacement Argument
UC 330
Peter Singer’s preference utilitarian defense of selective infant replacement in cases of severe disability remains one of the most controversial arguments in contemporary bioethics. The core of Singer’s position relies on the claim that replacing a severely disabled infant with a non-disabled infant increases overall preference satisfaction and is therefore morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that Singer’s argument fails to justify this conclusion. Singer’s replacement premise requires a utilitarian calculus that depends on reliable predictions about future preference satisfaction. While some critics maintain that Singer underestimates the quality of life of disabled individuals, I contend that, once this concern is integrated with the welfare impacts on caregivers and the broader social effects of disability-inclusive communities, the aggregate preference satisfaction required by his argument becomes difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty. The combined uncertainty surrounding individual well-being, caregiver adaptation, and socially distributed effects undermines the claim that replacement reliably maximizes preference satisfaction. By challenging the methodological assumptions underlying the utilitarian calculus, this paper exposes a critical weakness in the structure of Singer’s justification for replacement.