Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders

Authors

Robert G. Natelson, University of Montana School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2006

First Page

239

Volume

11

Source Publication Abbreviation

Tax. Rev. L. & Pol.

Abstract

This article explores the fiduciary law of the founding fathers to determine whether it was part of the constitutional design for the Judiciary to review special interest appropriations, and, if so, how the courts might proceed. The author’s findings suggest that, at least from the standpoint of the original understanding of the Constitution, prior judicial deference to the Legislature has been excessive and that there are solid constitutional grounds in arguing for a more searching standard of review.

Recommended Citation

Natelson, Robert G., "Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders" (2006). Faculty Law Review Articles. 52.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_lawreviews/52